J. S41028/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

WILLIAM STERN :

Appellant :

: No. 3308 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division No(s): CP-46-CR-0001919-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 05, 2016

Appellant, William Stern, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence 

entered August 21, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 

County. After careful review, we conclude that (i) the evidence was 

sufficient to support a finding that Appellant was a sexually violent predator 

(“SVP”); and (ii) the trial court did not abuse its discretion or impose an 

unreasonable sentence where Appellant plead guilty to multiple counts of 

rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse for the repeated, escalating, 

sexual abuse of his minor son over a six-year period. Therefore, we affirm. 

The relevant facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The victim in this case is [Appellant’s] biological son. On 

January 30, 2014, a friend of the victim, a fellow student at 

Norristown Area High School, informed a police officer that his 

friend, the victim, had disclosed to him that his father had been 

sexually assaulting him for many years.

On February 11, 2014, when the victim was 18 years old, he 

reported to the police that his biological father had sexually 

assaulted him since he was 11 years old. The first sexual 

assault was in September, 2007 (the month in which the victim 

turned 12). [Appellant] told him that he “wanted to see how he 

was developing sexually.” He showed the victim a pornographic 

video on his laptop. [Appellant] then manually masturbated the 

victim. [Appellant] asked the victim about his sexual preference 

and “kept telling” him that it was “ok, and that there was 

nothing wrong.” The victim reported that the sexual assaults 

continued “bi-weekly from that time until the present.” The 

assaults progressed over time into mutual oral sex and mutual 

anal intercourse. The victim stated that oral sex occurred 

“probably close to 100 times, if not more.” The victim reported 

that he never ejaculated, but that [Appellant] ejaculated “every 

time,” into the victim’s mouth. Intercourse occurred more than 

seven times. The victim reported that he grew up thinking, 

when he was younger, that it was “between every father and 

son.” The victim was advised by the police to leave the home 

and seek a Protection From Abuse Order. The last sexual assault 

occurred on February 3, 2014. The victim stated, “I thought it 

was my fault that it was happening.” He reported that his father 

was “everything I had” and that he had “no other way to live.” 

“The way I saw it, I was stuck. I didn't have a choice.”

In an intercepted telephone conversation between the victim and 

his father, [Appellant] admitted the sexual assaults but stated 

that the victim “never said no.” He told the victim, “All I ever 

did was ask. And, and, and you said, okay.” [Appellant] told 

the victim in that telephone conversation that “there would be no 

more sex,” if the victim returned home. 

[Appellant] gave a statement to the police after he was arrested 

on February 19, 2014. He admitted that he had engaged in 

sexual activity with his son, including manual masturbation, oral 

sex, and anal intercourse. He admitted showing the victim adult 

pornography, including homosexual pornography. He admitted 

that he knew the sexual encounters were wrong, illegal and no 
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part of the normal father-son relationship. When asked if he had 

anything to add to his statement, [Appellant] stated that the 

victim “never said anything that would indicate any problems or 

issues or that he was being forced. Therefore, it is my belief 

that it was voluntary.”

The victim began living with [Appellant] in March of 2004 when 

the victim would have been eight years old. [Appellant] had 

little contact with the victim prior to 2004. He obtained custody 

of the victim after the victim’s mother was arrested in New 

Mexico for multiple felonies. The victim lived with [Appellant] 

until these crimes came to light.

Trial Court Opinion, dated 1/12/16, at 3-5.

On February 27, 2015, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty before 

the Honorable William T. Nicholas to two counts of Rape by Forcible 

Compulsion, one of which was with a victim under 16 years of age; two 

counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Forcible Compulsion, 

one of which was with a victim under 16 years of age; one count of 

Corruption of a Minor; and one count of Incest of a minor under 13 years of 

age.1

Judge Nicholas deferred sentencing and ordered a presentence 

investigation (“PSI”), a psychosexual evaluation, and a Sexually Violent 

Predator (“SVP”) Assessment. On August 21, 2015, Judge Nicholas held a 

sexually violent predator hearing, at which both sides presented expert 

testimony and argument. Crediting the expert testimony of the 

Commonwealth’s expert over Appellant’s expert, Judge Nicholas concluded 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6301(a)(1)(ii); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(b)(1), respectively.
J.S41028/16

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that, by clear and convincing evidence, Appellant is an SVP pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.24. N.T., 8/21/15, at 215-19. 

After hearing additional testimony and arguments, Judge Nicholas then 

sentenced Appellant as follows: 10 to 20 years of imprisonment for each 

count of Rape, to run concurrent to one another; 10 to 20 years of 

imprisonment for each count of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, to 

run concurrent to one another and consecutive to the Rape sentences; 5 to 

10 years of imprisonment for the count of Incest, to run consecutive to the 

sentences for Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse; and 3 1⁄2 to 7 years of 

imprisonment for Corruption of a Minor, to run concurrent to the sentence 

for Incest. The aggregate sentence is 25 to 50 years of imprisonment.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging his classification as 

an SVP and alleging that his sentence was manifestly unfair and 

unreasonable. Both parties submitted briefs to the trial court on those 

issues. On October 20, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s postsentence motion. 

Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on November 2, 2015. The 

trial court and Appellant both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the two issues he preserved in his postsentence motion, namely:

1. Did the Honorable Trial Court err in finding that the Appellant 

(i) has a mental abnormality or disorder making him likely to 

engage in predatory sexual violent offenses and (ii) meets the 

statutory criteria to be considered a sexually violent predator?
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2. Did the Honorable Trial Court abuse its discretion in imposing 

a sentence that was manifestly unreasonable and, essentially, a 

life sentence given the Appellant's age?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant avers that his SVP determination cannot 

stand because it is predicated on his diagnosis as a pedophile, and the 

Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence that the victim in this case 

was pre-pubescent. This Court will review a claim that the trial court relied 

upon insufficient evidence when designating a defendant as an SVP under 

the following standard:

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law 

requiring a plenary scope of review. The appropriate standard of 

review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the 

evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all 

the elements of the offenses. As a reviewing court, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact-finder. Furthermore, a fact-finder is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence presented. 

At the hearing prior to sentencing the court shall determine 

whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator. 

Accordingly, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding the determination of SVP status, we will reverse the 

trial court only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and 

convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to 

determine that each element required by the statute has been 

satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 484 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations and quotations omitted).
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As our Supreme Court has made clear, this Court is limited to “simply 

assessing the legal sufficiency” of the evidence presented; we may neither 

reweigh the evidence nor require greater proof than is required by the 

statute. Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. 2005). In 

assessing the legal sufficiency, this Court must consider the “expert opinion 

that, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, [Appellant] was a 

pedophile.” Id. at 223. Our role as an appellate court does not permit us to 

pick apart, on appeal, the merits of that diagnosis. Id. The diagnosis itself 

is evidence, and any attack on the underlying merits of the opinion goes to 

“the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the expert’s evidence.” Id. at 224. 

In the instant case, Judge Nicholas has authored a comprehensive, 

thorough, and well-reasoned Opinion, citing to the record and relevant case 

law, and discussing each of the factors considered in an SVP determination. 

After a careful review of Appellant’s argument and the record, we affirm the 

trial court’s determination that Appellant is an SVP on the basis of that 

Opinion. Trial Court Opinion, dated 1/12/16, at 5-11. 

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 

66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, where, as here, the appellant 

has preserved the sentencing challenge for appellate review by raising it at 

sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion, the appellant must (1) 
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“include in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence[,]” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (2) “show that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code.” Id. at 363-64.

In the instant case, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a 

timely post-sentence motion. He also included a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

statement in his appellate brief. Moreover, Appellant’s claim—that the trial 

court imposed an unreasonable sentence while ignoring the sentencing 

guidelines and relevant sentencing criteria—presents a substantial question 

for our review. See Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d 247, 250 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (holding that a claim that the sentencing court failed to 

consider the applicable sentencing guidelines, prior to exceeding them, 

presents a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 

187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that an “[a]ppellant’s contention that 

the sentencing court exceeded the recommended range in the Sentencing 

Guidelines without an adequate basis raises a substantial question for this 

Court to review.”). See also Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (finding a substantial question exists where appellant 

claims “that the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, 

including the protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense 

and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
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9721(b) requires, and instead focused on the injuries suffered by the 

complaining victims.”).

Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of our 

standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Where a trial court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing 

guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) requires the trial court to provide, in open 

court, a “contemporaneous statement of reasons in support of its sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012). To 

satisfy the requirements of Section 9721(b), the trial court must:

demonstrate on the record, as a proper starting point, its 

awareness of the sentencing guidelines. Having done so, the 

sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, 

to fashion a sentence which takes into account the protection of 

the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 

gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact on the 

life of the victim and the community, so long as it also states of 

record the factual basis and specific reasons which compelled it 

to deviate from the guideline range.

Id. (brackets and citation omitted). 
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The on-the-record disclosure requirement does not require the trial 

court to make “a detailed, highly technical statement.” Commonwealth v. 

Hunter, 868 A.2d 498, 514 (Pa. Super. 2005). Where the trial court has 

the benefit of a presentence investigation (“PSI”), our Supreme Court has 

held that “it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so 

informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (discussing 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18-19 (Pa. 1988)). Where the 

trial court has reviewed the PSI, it may properly “satisfy the requirement 

that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating 

that he or she has been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering 

and weighing all relevant factors.” Id.

Finally, where the trial court deviates above the guidelines, this Court 

may only vacate and remand a case for resentencing if we first conclude that 

“the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the 

sentence is unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). Although the 

Sentencing Code does not define the term “unreasonable,” our Supreme 

Court has made clear that “rejection of a sentencing court's imposition of 

sentence on unreasonableness grounds [should] occur infrequently, whether 

the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the 
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unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review.” 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007). 

In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the statutory 

maximum on each of six counts, running one half of those sentences 

consecutive to one another. Although these sentences fell outside of the 

sentencing guidelines, we do not agree with Appellant that the trial court 

abused its discretion or otherwise erred in imposing an aggregate sentence 

of 25 to 50 years of imprisonment. 

We begin our analysis by emphasizing the events which immediately 

proceeded the trial court’s imposition of sentence. Although Appellant 

alleges the trial court merely paid lip service to a myriad of sentencing 

factors, the record of events immediately preceding the court’s imposition of 

sentence belie Appellant’s claim. Not only did the trial court have the benefit 

of a PSI, but the trial court imposed sentence immediately following hours of 

testimony and arguments regarding, inter alia: (i) Appellant’s age and 

background, including his employment history and lack of criminal record; 

(ii) Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and efforts to date; (iii) community 

support for Appellant; (iv) Appellant’s willingness to plead guilty; (v) the 

details and seriousness of the offenses; and (vi) the impact of the offenses 

on the victim and the community.2

 

2 The trial court imposed sentence following almost an entire day’s worth of 

evidence and argument. The SVP proceedings commenced at 9:50 am and 
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Moreover, prior to imposing sentence, the trial court made a lengthy 

statement, on the record, explaining its decision:

All right. The Court has the responsibility of fashioning a 

sentence and explaining the reasons for that sentence. And as 

judges, we have no greater responsibility than considering a 

sentence where the person to be sentenced presents with no 

prior criminal history but the offenses committed are serious, not 

to say horrendous and vile in the extreme. Mr. Stern has 

acknowledged that much.

The Sentencing Code directs the Court to consider a sentence 

where a sentence of confinement is consistent with the need to 

protect the public, consistent with the gravity of the - - of the 

offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on 

the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the Defendant.

We have presentence investigations done. And we have 

sentencing hearings. And we've been at this for the better part 

of the entire day to consider the facts of this case and to 

consider Mr. Stern's involvement and his personal situation. We 

sentence an individual. We sentence the crimes, but we 

sentence the individual as well.

So we take everything into account, everything that is reflected 

in the reports. And, certainly, I take into account the statements 

that [defense counsel] provided with respect to the family and 

friends that are here in support of Mr. Stern.

The Court first must consider the seriousness of the offense. And 

no one who has been in this courtroom could fail to come to the 

conclusion that these offenses were vile and horrendous in the 

extreme.

[The Commonwealth’s Attorney], I think, correctly points out we 

owe our children love and nurture. We don't victimize our 

children as responsible human beings. That is so outside the 

 

sentencing did not conclude until 3:50 pm. N.T., 8/21/15, at 1, 284. In 

that time, the trial court heard from seven witnesses, and the parties 

entered 15 documents into evidence, including four letters submitted in 

support of Appellant.
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realm of normal, appropriate parental behavior that that need 

not be commented upon further. It's vile in the extreme.

And as [the Commonwealth’s Attorney] points out, I think quite 

correct, these events - - these offenses were committed over a 

seven-year period of time.

Mr. Stern, you did deprive your son of his childhood. And I think 

without question that's going to carry long-term consequences 

for him, but we hope and pray that he will find the strength to 

move on and make a life for himself that's constructive, that he 

can somehow put this in his past, but that's going to be very 

difficult, problematical. If he succeeds, wonderful.

But despite that, we have to take into account the seven years 

of horror that he experienced at your hands. He was truly a 

victim in the sense that he had nowhere to turn. The person who 

owed him everything basically deprived him of everything as a 

child. So that has to be taken into account.

Now, in imposing a sentence, the Court doesn't act out of 

vengeance, no, but the Court certainly has to take into account 

the nature of the offense. And we talk in terms of the goals of 

the sentencing. Certainly, we take into account the 

rehabilitative needs of the Defendant, but that's a factor that's 

considered. It's not - - it's not an exclusively considered factor.

In addition to that, we consider the need to send the right 

message to the larger society. Every sentencing in every case in 

these Courts is, we hope, a lesson for the larger community as 

to what conduct will and will not be tolerated.

So while we don't sentence out of vengeance, our sentence has 

to essentially channel society's outrage at the behavior. That's 

what this is about.

So we talk in terms of individual deterrence, incapacitation, if 

you please. You've got to be taken out of society for the period 

of time that we think is appropriate so that others cannot be 

victimized.

But beyond the need for individual deterrence, a sentence also 

has to serve the goal of general deterrence. That's the lesson to 

the larger community. This conduct simply cannot be tolerated 

in civilized society. So the sentence has to reflect that.
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Now, I do take into account that you did plead guilty. That 

certainly did spare [the victim] the necessity of offering his 

testimony in court, but that's basically a consideration that 

doesn't persuade the Court to impose a sentence any less than 

the one that I'm about to impose. I think any sentence other 

than the one I'm about to impose would depreciate the 

seriousness of this offense.

I take into account your age. And I understand that this is going 

to be a sentence that deprives you of a good portion of the rest 

of your life, but it's a sentence that must be imposed, I think, for 

the reasons I've indicated.

And I come back to the point that you made. This was not a 

single, isolated act for which these guidelines are essentially 

designed. The guidelines in this case - - and I certainly take into 

account the sentencing guidelines - - but these sentences will be 

outside the guidelines as they must be because the guidelines 

don't take into account the fact that these offenses were 

repeated over and over and over again literally hundreds of 

times when this youngster was victimized.

And, again, the fact that the victim was your own child is a 

betrayal of trust and an utter betrayal of the proper parental 

role. And I believe what you say is that you now realize that, 

and you are remorseful. I don't doubt that.

But the point that I come back to is that these crimes deserve 

punishment. They deserve severe punishment. Liberty is 

precious. We don't take it away lightly, but in this case, I think

you must be deprived of your liberty for a substantial period of 

time, Mr. Stern.

So if you'll stand, please.

The following sentence is imposed.

N.T., 8/21/15, at 273-78.

Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence in excess of the aggravated 

range of the sentencing guidelines. Although the sentences imposed on 
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each count significantly exceeded the sentencing guidelines, the aggregate 

sentence was not unreasonable.3 Moreover, the trial court, having 

considered all of the pertinent aggravating and mitigating information, did 

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to the statutory maximum. 

See Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1194-95 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (affirming a statutory maximum sentence imposed after the trial court 

considered and balanced all of the relevant mitigating and aggravating 

facts). Thus, Appellant’s argument to the contrary lacks merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/5/2016

 

3 We note that, had the trial court sentenced Appellant to the top of the 

standard range and run all six sentences consecutive to one another, 

Appellant would have received an identical 25 to 50 year sentence.
1 Count I, rape by forcible compulsion, 18 Pa .C.S.A.§312 I (a)(i) (victim under 16 years of age requiring a 

mandatory 10-yeartenn of imprisonment), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §9718(a)(i); Count 5, rape by forcible compulsion, (victim 

over 16yearsofage), 18Pa.C.S.A.§3121(a)(i); 

2 Count 18, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, I 8 Pa. C.S.A. §3 l 23(a)(i).(victim 

underl6 years of age, requiring 10-year mandatory term of imprisonment), 42 Pa .C.S.A. §97 I 8 (a)(i); Count 23, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion (victim over 16 years of age), 18 Pa. C.S.A. 

§3123(a)(i); 

3 Count 197, corruption of minor (felony of the 3'd degree), 18 Pa. C.S.A. §630l(a)(i)(ii); 

4 Count 209, incest(felony ofthe 2"d degree, victim under 13 years of age), 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4302(b)(i). 

On August 21, 2015, upon praecipe filed by the attorney for the 

Commonwealth, all evaluations having been completed, a sexually violent predator 

and sentencing hearing was convened. Both sides presented expert testimony and 

argument. At the conclusion of the sexually violent predator phase of the hearing, 

the court determined to accept the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert over 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On February 27, 2015 the defendant, represented by able, privately retained 

counsel entered an open plea of guilty before the undersigned to two (2) counts of 

rape-; two (2) counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourses: corruption of 

minors: and incests. Sentence was deferred and the court ordered a presentence 

investigation, a psychosexual evaluation, and a Sexually Violent Predator 

Assessment. The defendant remained on bail pending sentencing. 

The defendant, William Stern has appealed to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania from the judgment of sentence, 25 to 50 years imprisonment, imposed 

on August 21, 2015. 

NICHOLAS, S.J. January 12, 2016 

OPINION 

SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET 

WILLIAM STERN NO. 3308 EDA 2015 

vs. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA NO. CP-46-CR-0001919-2014 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

Circulated 07/22/2016 10:23 AM
2 

11. The court imposed a sentence that was manifestly unfair 

and unreasonable and a less severe sentence would accomplish the 

purposes of (i) appropriately punishing the defendant, (ii) protecting 

society, and (iii) deterring others from committing similar offenses. 

1. The court erred in finding that the defendant met the 

DSM-5 definition of psdophilic disorder and that he met the statutory 

criteria to be classified as a sexually violent predator; 

On August 31, 2015, the defendant, by his counsel, filed a post-sentence 

motion raising two issues: 

On Count 1, rape - 10 to 20 years imprisonment; on Count 5, rape, 10 to 20 

years imprisonment to run concurrently with Count 1; on Count 18, involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse, 10 to 20 years imprisonment to run consecutively to 

Count 5; on Count 23, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 10 to 20 years 

imprisonment to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 18; on Count 

209, incest, 5 to 10 years imprisonment to run consecutively with the sentence 

imposed on Count 23; and on Count 197, corruption of a minor, a concurrent 

sentence of 3 '12 to 7 years imprisonment run concurrently with the sentence 

imposed at Count 209. The aggregated sentence was thus not less than 25 years 

nor more than 50 years imprisonment, dating from August 21, 2015, with one day of 

credit for time served. 

The court then proceeded to the sentencing phase of the hearing (N.T., 

8/21/15, at 219-284). After hearing the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of 

the counsel and the defendant's statement in the exercise in his right of allocution 

(N.T., 8/21/15, at 271-273), the court imposed the following sentences: 

that of the defense expert (N.T., 8/21/15, at 215-216). For all the reasons stated on 

the record, the court concluded that the Commonwealth had proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that William Stern is a sexually violent predator (N.T.1 8/21/151 

at 219). 

• l 
3 

The victim in this case is the defendant's biological son. On January 30, 

2014, a friend of the victim, a fellow student at Norristown Area High School, 

informed a police officer that his friend, the victim, had disclosed to him that his 

father had been sexually assaulting him for many years. 

FACTS 

For the reasons that follow, we respectfully believe these contentions are 

without merit and that the judgment of sentence and our finding that appellant is a 

sexually violent predator should be affirmed. 

(2). Did the Honorable Trial Court abuse its discretion in 

imposing a sentence that was manifestly unreasonable and, 

essentially, a life sentence given the appellant's age. 

(1). Did the Honorable Trial Court err in finding that the 

appellant (i) has a mental abnormality or disorder making him likely 

to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses and (ii) meets the 

statutory criteria to be considered a sexually violent predator; 

On November 20, 2015, the appellant's counsel filed a timely concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) raising 

the following issues: 

By Order dated October 20, 2015, this court concluded: (i) that wo correctly 

found that the Commonwealth met its burden to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the defendant was a sexually violent predator; and (ii) that the 

sentence imposed was fair, just and appropriate under all the circumstances and for 

all the reasons explained by this court in imposing sentence. Accordingly, the 

defendant's post-sentence motion was denied. 

As directed by the court, the Commonwealth filed a response in 

opposition to the defendant's post-sentence motion. 
4 

The defendant gave a statement to the police after he was arrested on 

February 19, 2014. He admitted that he had engaged in sexual activity with his 

son, including manual masturbation, oral sex, and anal intercourse. He admitted 

showing the victim adult pornography, including homosexual pornography. He 

admitted that he knew the sexual encounters were wrong, illegal and no part of the 

In an intercepted telephone conversation between the victim and his father, 

the defendant admitted the sexual assaults but stated that the victim "never said 

no." He told the victim, "All I ever did was ask. And, and, and you said, okay." The 

defendant told the victim in that telephone conversation that "there would be no 

more sex," if the victim returned home. 

On February 11, 2014, when the victim was 18 years old, he reported to the 

police that his biological father had sexually assaulted him since he was 11 years 

old. The first sexual assault was in September, 2007 (the month in which the 

victim turned 12). The defendant told him that he "wanted to see how he was 

developing sexually." He showed the victim a pornographic video on his laptop. 

The defendant then manually masturbated the victim. The defendant asked the 

victim about his sexual preference and "kept telling'' him that it was "ok, and that 

there was nothing wrong." The victim reported that the sexual assaults continued 

"bi-weekly from that time until the present." The assaults progressed over time 

into mutual oral sex and mutual anal intercourse. The victim stated that oral sex 

occurred "probably close to 100 times, if not more." The victim reported that he 

never ejaculated, but that the defendant ejaculated "every time," into the victim's 

mouth. Intercourse occurred more than seven times. The victim reported that he 

grew up thinking, when he was younger, that it was "between every father and 

son." The victim was advised by the police to leave the home and seek a Protection 

From Abuse Order. The last sexual assault occurred on February 3, 2014. The 

victim stated, "I thought it was my fault that it was happening." He reported that 

his father was "everything I had" and .that he had "no other way to live." "The way I 

saw it, I was stuck. I didn't have a choice." 
5 

In her report, and in her testimcny, Dr. Hahn considered the 15 statutory 

factors in coming to her conclusion that the defendant is a sexually violent predator; 

42 Pa. C. S. A. § 9799.24(b)(1)(2)(3) and (4): 

Dr. Jennifer R. Hahn, a member of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, 

conducted the evaluation of the defendant for the Board, authored a report (Exhibit 

C-2) and testified at the hearing on August 21, 2015. (N.T., at 6-77). Having 

reviewed all available records, all the factors specified in the Act, and having 

considered current and credible sex offender research, it was Dr. Hahn's opinion 

that the defendant meets the criteria for classification as a Sexually Violent 

Predator under the Act. Dr. Hahn concluded that the defendant, having entered a 

guilty plea to sexually violent offenses, is an individual with a mental abnormality 

or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in predatory sexually 

violent offenses. 

SEXUALLY VIOLENT.PREDATOR DETERMINATION 

(1) 

DISCUSSION 

The victim began living with the defendant in March of 2004 when the victim 

would have been eight years old. The defendant had little contact with the victim 

prior to 2004. He obtained custody of the victim after the victim's mother was 

arrested in New Mexico for multiple felonies. The victim lived with the defendant 

until these crimes came to light. 

normal father-son relationship. When asked if he had anything to add to his 

statement, the defendant stated that the victim "never said anything that would 

indicate any problems or issues or that he was being forced. Therefore, it is my 

belief that it was voluntary." 
6 

• 

Whether the defendant completed any prior sentences. While the 

defendant had no history of prior sentences, he failed to comply 

with bail conditions and the PFA order by contacting the victim. 

This is associated with an increased likelihood of re-offending. 

Whether the defendant participated in available programs for 

sexual offenders. While the defendant sought and obtained 

treatment from Sexual Addiction Treatment Services, LLC for a 

year from the time of his arrest until just prior to his sentencing, 

Dr. Hahn opined that "there is no reason to believe that he has 

learned the skills necessary to manage his sexual offending." It 

• 

The defendant's prior criminal record (sexual and non-sexual) . 

The defendant has no known prior criminal history. 

• 

The mental capacity of the victim. The victim's mental capacity 

was limited by his chronological age. 

• 

Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the 

defendant during the .commission of the crime. There is no 

indication that the defendant displayed unusual cruelty. 

• 

• The relationship of the defendant to the victim. The victim is the 

defendant's biological son. The victim was totally dependent 

upon the defendant for his sustenance, giving the defendant 

complete access and total dominance over the victim. 

• Age of the victim. The age of the victim when the sexual 

offending began is consistent with pedophilic sexual interest 

defined as sexual interest in a pre-pubescent child (generally 13 

years or younger). Deviant sexual interest (such as arousal to 

children) is the strongest predictor of sexual recidivism. 

• The nature of the sexual contact with the victim. The defendant, 

over a seven year period, sexually assaulted the victim. Sexual 

assaults became increasingly intrusive over time. 

• Whether the defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve 

the offense. There is no indication that the defendant exceeded 

the means necessary to achieve the offenses. 

• Whether the offense involved multiple victims. There was one 

victim in the current offense but the repeated victimization over 

a seven year period involved a pattern of behavior with a male 

victim which is associated with an increased likelihood of sexual 

re-offending. 
7 

• Likelihood of re-offending. The defendant demonstrated a 

sexually deviant pathway to offending. 

The defendant presented Dr. J~nnife.r Weeks as an expert. Dr. Weeks 

authored a report dated August 5,. 2015 (D-3) and testified (N.T., 8/21/15, at 77-151) 

that in her opinion the defendant does not meet the criteria for classification as a 

• The "condition" over-rode the defendant's emotional/volitional 

control. Despite knowing that it was wrong, the defendant 

repeatedly sexually assaulted his son. (N.T. at 44) 

• The defendant suffers from a lifetime "condition". Deviant 

sexual interests are stable and lifelong. (N.T. at 44) 

• The defendant has a congenital or acquired "condition" which is 

the impetus to the sexual offending. Dr. Hahn opined that 

sexually deviant interests are congenital or acquired. 

• Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the defendant's 

conduct. The defendant displayed "grooming" behavior by 

showing the victim pornography, normalizing the behavior and 

by engaging in increasingly intrusive sexual behaviors over 

time. (N.T., 8/21/15 at 42-46) 

• Any mental illness, mental disability, or mental abnormality. 

Dr. Hahn opined that the defendant meets the DSM-V 

diagnostic criteria! for Pedophilic Disorder. He repeatedly 

engaged in sexual activity with a pre-pubescent child for at least 

one year. He is at least 16 years old and at least five years older 

than the victim. 

• Uses of illegal drugs by the defendant. There is no history of 

substance abuse. 

• Age of the defendant. The defendant was born in 1963. Over the 

period of the offenses from 2007 to 2014, the defendant would 

have been 44 years old to 51 years old. This is consistent with a 

sexual deviant pathway (N.T., 8/21/15 at 30). 

is also noteworthy that the report of Sexual Addiction 

Treatment Services, LLC authored by Dr. Jennifer Weeks, the 

defense expert (D-2), reflected that early in his treatment, the 

defendant was evasive and vague about his sexual contact with 

his son, displaying a great deal of distorted thinking and denial 

about the abuse. 
8 

Specifically, Dr. Hahn accepted the DSM-5 construct of pre-pubescent as 

generally a child under 13 years of age. In contrast, Dr. Weeks merely offered the 

"possibility" that the victim was not pre-pubescent when the abuse began. Dr. 

Hahn further testified in rebuttal that the ABEL Screen is not heavily relied upon 

by psychologists who diagnose an individual with a paraphilia such as pedophilia 

(N.T., at 188). Dr. Hahn explained that there have been a number of studies that 

have shown that it is not a reliable diagnostic tool. In this respect, Dr. Weeks' 

conclusions were based on the defendant's visual reaction time when viewing 

images of different individuals. It is presumed that the longer the person looks at 

an image, children for example, that indicates an interest in children. Dr. Hahn 

pointed out that a number of studies have shown that a subject can fake a result by 

simply looking away every time a child comes on the screen. Given the defendant's 

minimizing and denying various behaviors, Dr. Hahn concluded the test is in no 

way valid for him. 

In rebuttal, Dr. Hahn addressed the main difference between her opinion and 

Dr. Weeks' opinion - the pedophilic disorder. 

"So that's - - my opinion. It's based partially on the possibility that Mr. 

Stern's son could have been in the puberty process as well as the subjective testing 

measure." (N.T., at 114, and 128). 

Dr. Weeks' opinion rested upon two considerations: "The possibility that Mr. 

_ Stern's son was not pre-pubescent but was starting the - - starting the process of 

puberty at the time of 11, nearly 12, combined with his ABEL Screen results, which 

show that he does not have any object - - from this objective testing, he does not 

have any arousal - - sexual arousal to males of any ages nor any pre-pubescent, 

either males or females. 

a sexually violent predator. The main difference of opinion between Dr. Hahn and 

Dr. Weeks is whether the defendant suffers from pedophilic disorder (N.T., at 187- 

188). 
9 

And with respect to the other reason that Dr. Weeks offered, she relied 

on this ABEL Screen, which is self-reporting, this component of it. And I 

He repeatedly engaged in sexual activity with a prepubescent child for 

at least one year. Prepubescence is defined as a youngster under 13. Clearly, 

these offenses occurred when the youngster was under 13 years of age. And I 

don't think it's incumbent upon the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the victim was somehow prepubescent. I think they 

can rely upon the definition, which I accept as well. I accept the testimony of 

Dr. Hahn in that regard. 

So I find by clear and convincing evidence, accepting her testimony, 

that the Defendant does suffer from pedophilic disorder. 

The testimony on the other side offered by Dr. Weeks basically 

centered on the two things as we've discussed: That there really is no 

evidence that the child was prepubescent, and - - and in that regard, I think, 

as Mrs. Feden [assistant district attoJ;ney) has pointed out, the 

Commonwealth's burden is to prove that the Defendant suffered from a 

mental disorder or a personality disorder· - a mental disability as defined in 

the DSM-V. He suffers from pedophilic disorder in the testimony and in the 

opinion of Dr. Hahn, which I credit. 

And I must say I have heard other experts opine on this in this area. 

And Dr. Hahn's testimony, I think, was among the best testimony I've heard 

in this area. So I commend her for her testimony and her evaluation. 

She identified all of the factors appropriately that are set forth in the 

statute. 

So, basically, I have to weigh one opinion against the other. 

I'm frank to say that I accept Dr. Hahn's testimony over that of the 

testimony of Dr. Weeks in terms of her experience, her credentials, and all of 

the reasons that she stated in her testimony. 

As I said earlier, this determination essentially centers on the court's 

determination of the various opinions that were expressed here today - - all of 

the evidence, obviously in light of the factors set forth in the statute. 

"The court has been through hearings of this sort before. And I think 

I'm familiar with the case law and the statutory law. 

The court concurred with Dr. Hahn's opinion and rejected Dr. Weeks' opinion 

and explained our conclusion as follows: 
10 

. 

if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each 

As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, the evidence and reasonable 

inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. The trial court's determination of SVP status will be reversed only 

(N.T., 8/21/15, at 215-219). 

I find by clear and convincing evidence that William Stern is a sexually 

violent predator." 

So I conclude that that element has been met as well. 

As Dr. Hahn said and I agree, the past is prologue. 

Now, there's been opinion expressed that the risk of re-offending is 

low. That's one aspect of it. It's not an independent factor that the 

Commonwealth must prove by clearand convincing evidence. These·· these 

factors are all to be oonsidered.Eut no one factor is dispositive. The presence 

or absence of any factor - · any particular factor is not dispositive. It's a 

combination of factors which allows the Court to conclude, as I do, that the 

Defendant suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that 

makes him likely to engage in predatory sexual offenses. 

I'm satisfied that the Defendant's conduct was clearly predatory. 

(C.P.) came to him when he was eight years of age. He was the parent. He 

was the sole support. And as Dr. Hahn observed, he said he felt trapped. 

And this conduct was clearly predatory in the sense that it involved leading 

this youngster down a path of first manual stimulation, and then oral sex, 

anal sex, and all the rest of it. 

It involved grooming behavior. 

His behaviors were certainly - - they covered a period of time. 

I stated my opinion based on the testimony, which I accept the 

opinions of Dr. Hahn that he suffers from a pedophilic disorder. 

Clearly, the Defendant was convicted by his guilty plea of a sexually 

violent offense. 

think, again, Dr. Hahn's testimony pointed out the weakness and utility of 

that particular tool in coming to a conclusion. 
11 

The appellant's challenge to the discretionary aspects of the- sentence entitles 

him to no appellate relief. 

THE SENTENCE 

We believe the record fully supports our determination that the appellant 

meets the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator. Given the scope of 

appellate review of this determination, such finding should be affirmed. 

In short, we believe the manifest legislative purpose, to protect the public, is 

met by subjecting individuals like the appellant to the most stringent registration 

and notification requirements of the Act as a Sexually Violent Predator. One may 

well ask, if William Stern is not a Sexually Violent Predator, who is? 

Commonwealth u. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2011), aff'd, 621 Pa. 

401, 78 A3d 1044 (2013)." 

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, 

must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and 

convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP]. As with any 

sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 

We will reverse a trial court's determination of SVP status only if the 

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that 

each element of the. statute has been satisfied. 

"Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the 

trial court's SVP designation. Our standard and scope of review is wellsettled: 

In Commonwealth u. Hollingshead, 111 A.3rd 186 at 189 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

the Superior Court panel explained: 

element of the statute has been satisfied. Commonwealth v. Meals, 590 Pa. 110, 

912 A.2d 213, 218 (2006). 
12 

And as Mrs. Feden points out, I think quite correct, these events · - 

these offenses were committed over a seven-year period of time. 

Mrs. Feden [ADA], I think, correctly points out we owe our children 

love and nurture. We don't victimize our children as responsible human 

beings. That is so outside the realm of normal, appropriate parental behavior 

that that need not be commented upon further. It's vile in the extreme. 

The Court first must consider the seriousness of the offense. And no 

one who has been in this courtroom could fail to come to the conclusion that 

these offenses were vile and horrendous in the extreme. 

So we take everything into account, everything that is reflected in the 

reports. And, certainly, I take into account the statements that Mr. Hilles 

provided with respect to the family and friends that are here in support of 

Mr. Stern. 

We have presentence investigations done. And we have sentencing 

hearings. And we've been at this for the better part of the entire day to 

consider the facts of this case and to consider Mr. Stern's involvement and his 

personal situation. We sentence an individual. We sentence the crimes, but 

we sentence the individual as well. 

The Sentencing Code directs the Court to consider a sentence where a 

sentence of confinement is consistent with the need to protect the public, 

consistent with the gravity of the - - of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the Defendant. 

"All right. The Court has the responsibility of fashioning a sentence 

and explaining the reasons for that sentence. And as judges, we have no 

greater responsibility than considering a sentence where the person to be 

sentenced presentswith no prior criminal history but the offenses committed 

are serious, not to say horrendous and vile in the extreme. Mr. Stern has 

acknowledged that much. 

At the conclusion of the full day SVP/sentencing hearing, and after careful 

consideration of the reports, evaluations, testimony and arguments of counsel, the 

undersigned fashioned the sentence that we believe was fair, just and appropriate 

under all the circumstances and for all the reasons explained by this court on the 

record as follows: 
13 

I take into account your age. And I understand that this is going to be 

a sentence that deprives you of a good portion of the rest of your life, but it's a 

sentence that must be imposed, I think, for the reasons I've indicated. 

Now, I do take into account that you did plead guilty. That certainly 

did spare (C.P .) the necessity of offering his testimony in court, but that's 

basically a consideration that doesn't persuade the Court to impose a 

sentence any less than the one that I'm about to impose. I think any 

sentence other than the one I'm about to impose would depreciate the 

seriousness of this offense. 

So w~ talk in terms of individual deterrence, incapacitation, if you 

please. You've got to be taken out of society for the period of time that we 

think is appropriate so that others cannot be victimized. 

But beyond the need for individual deterrence, a sentence also has to 

serve the goal of general deterrence. That's the lesson to the larger 

community. This conduct simply cannot be tolerated in civilized society. So 

the sentence has to reflect that. 

So while we don't sentence out of vengeance, our sentence has to 

essentially channel society's outrage at the behavior. That's what this is 

about. 

In addition to that, we consider the need to send the right message to 

the larger society. Every sentencing in every case in these Courts is, we 

hope, a lesson for the larger community as to what conduct will and will not 

be tolerated. 

Now, in imposing a sentence, the Court doesn't act out of vengeance, 

no, but the Court certainly has to take into account the nature of the offense. 

And we talk in terms of the goals of the sentencing. Certainly, we take into 

account the rehabilitative needs of the Defendant, but that's a factor that's 

considered. It's not - - it's not an exclusively considered factor. 

But despite that, we have to take into account the seven years of 

horror that he experienced at your hands. He was truly a victim in the sense 

that he had nowhere to turn. The person who owed him everything basically 

deprived him of everything as.a child. So that has to be taken into account. 

Mr. Stern, you did deprive your son of his childhood. And I think 

without question that's going to carry long-term consequences for him, but we 

hope and pray that he will find the strength to move on and make a life for 

himself that's constructive, that he can somehow put this in his past, but 

that's going to be very difficult, problematical. If he succeeds, wonderful. 
. 14 

As the record reflects, this court carefully considered the factors set out in 42 

Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b) in fashioning the sentence . 

"A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." 

"'The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis." Commonwealth u. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 

533 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further: 

post-sentence motion. We believe, however, that the record does not present a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. In Commonwealth u. Swope, 123 A.3d 333 at 338 (Pa. Super 

2015), the Superior Court panel noted: 

The appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal and preserved his issues in a 

... 

N.T., 8/Zl/15 at 273-278. 

The following sentence is imposed." 

So if you'll stand, please. 

But the point that I come back to is that these crimes deserve 

punishment. They deserve severe punishment. Liberty is precious. We don't 

take it away lightly, but in this case, I think you must be deprived of your 

liberty for a substantial period of time, Mr. Stern. 

And, again, the fact that the victim was your own child is a betrayal of 

trust and an utter betrayal of the proper parental role. And I believe what 

you say is that you now realize that, and you are remorseful. I don't doubt 

that. 

And I come back to the point that you made. This was not a single, 

isolated act for which these guidelines are essentially designed. The 

guidelines in this case - - and I certainly take into account the sentencing 

guidelines - - but these sentences will be outside the guidelines as they must 

be because the guidelines don't take into account the fact that these offenses 

were repeated over and over and over again literally hundreds of times when 

this youngster was victimized. 
15 

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.~d 52~ (Pa. Super. 2011) presented facts 

remarkably similar to the instant case. Prisk was convicted of multiple counts of 

rape, IDSI and indecent assault. He systematically sexually abused his stepdaughter over a period of six years, from the time the victim was ten years old. As 

the victim grew older, the abuse escalated, including mutual masturbation, oral sex 

and rape, almost on a daily basis. The aggregated sentence of 633 years to 1500 

years' imprisonment was affirmed by the Superior Court. As here, the defendant 

argued that the sentence was essentially a life sentence and was manifestly 

excessive. The Superior Court disagreed, noting that consecutive sentences were 

not imposed on every count and given the violent, repeated nature of the 

defendant's crimes, the aggregated consecutive sentence was not excessive. See, 

too, Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798 (Pa. Super. 2013). (aggregated sentence 

of 35 to 70 years imposed on 4 7 of 96 counts of possession of child pornography was 

not an abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 867 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. 

I • 

2005), (aggregated sentence of 12 to 24 years on less than all 42 counts being 

We believe this court acted well within its discretion in imposing consecutive 

sentences on three of the six Bills of Information being sentenced. If all six Bills 

had been sentenced consecutively, the aggregated sentence would have been 48-1/2 

to 97 years. Contrary to the appellant's contention, we did not impose a "life 

sentence". The appellant is now 52 years of age and under the sentence imposed, 

could be released in his lifetime. While the sentence was long, it was not 

disproportionate to the horrendous nature of the appellant's crimes and was not 

unduly harsh or excessive. 

The court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or 

consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial question. Rather, the 

imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a 

substantial question in only "the most extreme circumstances, such as where the 

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the 

length of imprisonment." Swope, 123 A.3d 333 at 338. 
16 

Robert Martin Fallen, Esquire, Deputy District Attorney, Chief of Appeals, District Attorney's Office 

Kristen M. Feden, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney 

Henry S. Hilles, III, Esquire, Defense Counsel 

Christine Sanchez, Deputy Court A ministrator, Criminal Division 

Copy of the above opinion to the following on 

January J &-__, 2016: . 

For the above reasons, we believe the judgment of sentence should be 

affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

The standard of review of the sentencing court's imposition of a sentence was 

outlined clearly by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth u. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 

A.2d 957 (2007). Appellate review of the discretionary aspects of the sentence is 

confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d). As Walls 

makes clear, sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge, and the sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. Where, as here, the sentencing court detailed the reasons for the 

sentence in satisfaction of 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9721(b), as directed by the Supreme Court 

in Walls, the appellate court will not reweigh the sentencing factors and impose its 

judgment in place of the sentencing court. 

sentenced on a 74 year old defendant, essentially amounting to a life sentence, was 

not manifestly excessive); Commonwealth u. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763 (en bane, Pa. 

Super, 2015), (aggregate sentence of 31 to 62 years was not excessive).