1 14-396-cv Sloan v. United Technologies Corp. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA TABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 th day of March, tw o thousand fifteen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- MICHAEL SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 14-396-cv UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., DBA United Technologies Res earch Center, Defendant-Appellee.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- FOR APPELLANT: Michael Sloan, pro se, West Hartford, Connecticut.

FOR APPELLEE: Glenn William Dowd, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, Connecticut; Howard Fetner, Day Pitney LLP, New Haven, Connecticut.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alfred V. Covello, Judge ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entere d on January 13, 2014, is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff Michael Sloan, proceeding pr o se, appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendan t United Technologies Corp. on Sloan’s claims of racially discriminatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We assume the partie s’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our

decision to affirm. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light

most favorable to the non-m oving party and draw[ing] all r easonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Ce nt. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

1 Sloan points to no error in the district c ourt’s dismissal of his parallel claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practice Act, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-58 et seq. Accordingly, we deem any such argument abandoned and do not address the state-law claim. See Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2012). In any event, the district court did not err in concluding that sections 46a-58 and 46a- 60 of that law afford him no private cause of action independent of section 46a-100, which requires exhaustion before the Connecticut Commission on Hu man Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”). See Sullivan v. Bd. of Poli ce Comm’rs, 196 Conn. 208, 21 5–16 (1985) (stating that plaintiff who fails to follow prescribed administrative route for claim of discrimination lacks statutory authority to pursue that claim).3 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole coul d not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 4 75 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (inter nal quotation marks omitted);

accord Chabad Lubavitch of Litc hfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchf ield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2014). Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court correctly granted summary judgm ent for defendant on Sloan’s federal claim. For essentially the reasons stat ed by the district court, we conclude that Sloan failed to

adduce evidence sufficient to admit a finding that his discharge occurred “in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination,” as required to carry his prima facie burden under Title VII. Kirkla nd v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing Title VII claims unde r burden-shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (19 73)). The stray remarks cited by plaintiff were either facially race neutral or too rem oved from plaintiff’s disc harge to support an inference of discriminatory causation. S ee generally Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing factors to consid er in determining probative value of stray remarks); Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that remarks by someone other than decision maker “may have little tendency to

show that the decision-maker was motived by the discrimina tory sentiment expressed in the remark”), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.4 167, 177–78 (2009). On this re cord, no rational finder of fact could find that plaintiff was discharged as a result of racial discrimination. 2 We have considered plain tiff’s remaining arguments, a nd we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judg ment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O = HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court

2 We decline to consider the new evidence plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal. Our review is generally limited to “the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)(1); see Lori a v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1280 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, material not included in the reco rd on appeal will not be considered.”). Plaintiff contends that his at torney failed to include this evidence in the record below, but such failu re is not an “extraordinary circumstance[]” that would warrant an exception to our general rule. IB M Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1975); see Jackson v. Fe d. Express, 766 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (a party is “bound by the concessions of [his] freely retained counsel ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).