J-A20019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

YUNEY RIJO-HENRIQUEZ; SURETY: 

FINANCIAL CASUALTY AND SURETY, 

INC. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1256 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at CP-06-CR-0001931-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc. (Appellant), which provided a bail 

bond for Yuney Rijo-Henriquez (Defendant), appeals from the order denying 

its petition to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety. After careful review, 

we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows:

Defendant was arrested on March 13, 2020, on charges 

related to an alleged conspiracy and potential delivery of a large 

quantity of fentanyl. ... Bail was set ... in the amount of $200,000,

secured. On March 17, 2020, bail was posted by [Appellant]. ... 

On October 10, 2020, a new and separate complaint for charges 

of fleeing and eluding police ... was filed against the Defendant and 

the bail set at $250,000 secured in that matter. The Defendant 

was taken into custody when he was not able to post bail on the 

second set of charges and committed to Berks County Jail System

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“BCJS”). On Tuesday, October 22, 2020, [Appellant] brought a 

bail piece[1]in [the original case] before the sitting emergency 

motions judge ... for signature.[2] ... [Appellant] indicated on its 

request for bail piece that the sole reason was the Defendant’s 

failure to remain arrest free. On Friday, October 23, 2020, [the 

judge] issued an order scheduling a bail piece hearing on Monday, 

October 26, 2020 ....

On October 26, 2020, the Defendant was brought before the 

court for two different proceedings. First, a bail reduction petition

in [the second case] was heard. The bail in that case was reduced 

to $25,000 secured, and the Defendant remained in the custody 

of the [BCJS] on that matter. Second, in the above-captioned 

docket, the bail piece hearing was held. At that time, the bail 

piece of [Appellant] was dissolved.[3] Ethan Klein was present at 

the hearing on behalf of [Appellant]. He requested [Appellant] be 

____________________________________________

1 “A bail piece is a warrant from the court that gives authority to a surety, or 

other authorized person, to apprehend the Defendant and bring him before 

the Court for an alleged violation of the bail.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, 

at 4.

2 Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(B) provides “a surety or bail agency may apply to the court 

for a bail piece,” and “[i]f the court is satisfied that a bail piece is required, it 

may issue a bail piece authorizing the surety or bail agency to apprehend and 

detain the defendant, and to bring the defendant before the bail authority 

without unnecessary delay.” Here, the trial court signed the bail piece 

authorizing Appellant

to apprehend and detain the defendant ... wherever the defendant 

may be found[] and bring the defendant without unnecessary

delay before a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas at the Berks 

County Courthouse, Reading, Pennsylvania, to be further dealt 

with according to law, and for such purposes this shall be your 

sufficient warrant. The Surety shall inform the District Attorney’s 

Office of the need to place the Defendant on the Jail List for the 

next available court business day so that a hearing can be held.

Bail Piece, 10/22/20.

3 “The bail piece was dissolved by [the] court because the [D]efendant was 

already in custody, albeit on other charges, and had been brought before the 

court.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 5.
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removed from the bail. The motion was specifically denied. ... 

The [dissolution] order indicated that there was no motion 

before the court for any change of bail, and that any implied 

motion was a nullity and therefore denied. The dissolution 

order specifically indicated the court would entertain 

motions for changes to the bail or for release as surety 

should they be filed through counsel. The Defendant posted 

bail on the newly filed charges and he remained free in the 

community pending disposition of his charges. No motion was 

filed by [Appellant], or through counsel as directed, to be 

removed as surety on the Defendant’s bail in this docket. The 

District Attorney’s office also did not seek any bail modification or 

revocation.

After a series of continuances and back up trial dates, on 

November 9, 2021, the Defendant’s case was set for a primary 

trial to occur on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, at the request

of counsel for the Defendant, a date was requested prior to the 

trial date for a guilty plea and sentence. The date for a guilty plea 

and sentencing was set for December 7, 2021. When the 

Defendant failed to appear, a bench warrant was requested, 

authorized, and ultimately issued on December 8, 2021. On 

December 17, 2021, a notice of intention to forfeit the bail was 

generated and served on [Appellant]. On March 4, 2022, counsel 

for [Appellant] filed the petition to vacate bail forfeiture and 

exonerate surety. Hearings on the petition of [Appellant] were 

held on June 2, 2022 and August 3, 2022. The motion was denied 

on August 12, 2022.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 2-4 (footnotes and emphasis added; original 

footnotes and some capitalization omitted).4 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered concise 

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant presents the following 

question for review:

____________________________________________

4 Berks County indicated that Defendant had not been apprehended at the 

time it filed its brief. Appellee’s Brief at 11.
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Did the trial court err in granting full forfeiture of the $200,000.00 

bail after [Appellant] obtained a bail piece and requested to be 

relieved of its bail obligation while the [D]efendant in the 

underlying case was still in custody on charges in a new case?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

Appellant argues it “is inconsequential that [D]efendant was 

incarcerated” on the second set of charges when Appellant obtained the bail 

piece. Id. at 12. Appellant emphasizes its prompt attainment of the bail piece 

to prevent Defendant’s release. Id. at 14, 17. Appellant claims that by 

obtaining the bail piece, it “insured the [D]efendant’s [c]ourt appearance 

regardless of what could have transpired in the second case.” Id. at 12-13. 

Appellant acknowledges Defendant willfully breached the bail conditions. Id.

at 16. However, Appellant maintains the trial court did not properly consider 

its efforts to keep the Defendant incarcerated after his arrest in the second 

case. Id. at 17. Appellant concludes the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant relief while Defendant was in custody. Id. at 18.

We adhere to the following standard of review:

The decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies with 

the sound discretion of the trial court. Trial courts unquestionably 

have the authority to order the forfeiture of bail upon the breach 

or violation of any condition of the bail bond. In bond forfeiture 

cases, an abuse of that discretion or authority will only be found 

if the aggrieved party demonstrates that the trial court misapplied 

the law, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable 

manner, or acted on the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will. To the 

extent the aggrieved party alleges an error of law, this Court will 

correct that error and our scope of review in doing so is plenary.
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In re Hann, 111 A.3d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, quotation marks, 

and brackets omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 536(A) provides for forfeiture 

as a sanction for violation of bail:

(2) Forfeiture

(a) When a monetary condition of release has been imposed 

and the defendant has violated a condition of the bail bond, 

the bail authority may order the cash or other security 

forfeited and shall state in writing or on the record the 

reasons for so doing. When the surety is a third party, the 

cash or other security may be ordered forfeited only when 

the condition of the bail bond violated is that the defendant 

has failed to appear for a scheduled court proceeding.

(b) Written notice of the forfeiture shall be given to the 

defendant and any surety, either personally or by both first 

class and certified mail at the defendant’s and the surety’s 

last known addresses.

(c) The forfeiture shall not be executed until 90 days after 

notice of the forfeiture order.

(d) The bail authority may direct that a forfeiture be 

set aside or remitted as provided by law or if justice 

does not require the full enforcement of the forfeiture 

order.

(e) When a magisterial district judge orders bail forfeited 

pursuant to this rule, the magisterial district judge shall 

generate a check in the amount of the bail monies he or she 

has on deposit in the case, and shall send the check and a 

copy of the docket transcript to the clerk of courts for 

processing and disbursement as provided by law.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2) (emphasis added).

Rule 536 further provides:
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(C) Exoneration

(1) A bail authority, as provided by law or as justice requires, 

shall exonerate a surety who deposits cash in the amount of 

any forfeiture ordered or who surrenders the defendant in a 

timely manner.

(2) When the conditions of the bail bond have been satisfied, 

or the forfeiture has been set aside or remitted, the bail 

authority shall exonerate the obligors and release any bail.

Pa.R.C.P. 536(C).5

Under Rule 536(A)(2)(a), the Commonwealth may petition for forfeiture 

when the defendant breaches a condition of release. See Commonwealth 

v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 71 (Pa. 2013). The court has discretion to order 

forfeiture and provide written notice to the defendant and his surety. Id. The 

forfeiture may not be executed before 20 days have passed. Id. After 

receiving notice, the defendant or his surety may oppose forfeiture, and 

“[o]nly then may the court direct that a forfeiture be set aside or remitted if 

justice does not require the full enforcement of the order.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, in a case where the Commonwealth has sought 

forfeiture, and the defendant or his surety opposes it, a hearing 

should be held. At the hearing, the Commonwealth has the 

burden of proving the conditions to bail forfeiture as aforesaid, 

upon which the burden will shift to the defendant or his surety to 

justify full or partial remission of bail forfeiture.

____________________________________________

5 Rule 536 also permits revocation as a sanction for violating bail. As the trial 

court observed, the District Attorney did not seek revocation in this case. Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 3.
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Id. at 71-72. Again, the Commonwealth did not pursue forfeiture in this case.

Rule 536(A)(2)(d) provides that a court may set aside or remit bail 

forfeiture “if justice does not require the full enforcement of the forfeiture 

order.” Historically, Pennsylvania courts relied on considerations expounded 

by the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania:

When the defendant breaches a bail bond, without a justifiable 

excuse, and the government is prejudiced in any manner, the 

forfeiture should be enforced unless justice requires otherwise. 

When considering whether or not justice requires the enforcement 

of a forfeiture, a court must look at several factors, including: 1) 

the willfulness of the defendant’s breach of the bond, 2) the cost, 

inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government, and 3) 

any explanation or mitigating factors.

Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 

United States v. Ciotti, 579 F. Supp. 276, 278 (W.D.Pa. 1984)).

In 2013, our Supreme Court rejected a strict application of the Mayfield

factors. Hann, 81 A.3d at 66. The Court reviewed practices in other 

jurisdictions and concluded the language of Rule 536(A)(2)(d) “implicates a 

case-by-case analysis of when forfeiture is or is not proper, and whether that 

forfeiture should be for the full sum of the bail or some reduced amount.” Id.

at 67. The Court referenced the “non-exclusive list” of factors identified by 

the New Jersey Supreme Court:

(1) whether the applicant is a commercial bondsman; (2) the 

extent of the bondsman’s supervision of the defendant; (3) 

whether the defendant’s breach of the recognizance of bail 

conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors 

presented by the defendant; (5) the deterrence value of 

forfeiture; (6) the seriousness of the condition violated; (7) 

whether forfeiture will vindicate the injury to public interest 
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suffered as a result of the breach; (8) the appropriateness of the 

amount of the recognizance of bail; and (9) the cost, 

inconvenience, prejudicial or potential prejudice suffered by the 

[s]tate as a result of the breach. That list is not exhaustive, and 

trial courts may consider other factors as interests of justice 

require.

Id. at 67-68 (citing State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934-35 (N.J. 2001)).

The Supreme Court instructed “that courts should look to these as well as 

other factors as justice dictates on a case-by-case basis, understanding that 

the parameters of each will be applied differently to each individual forfeiture 

proceeding.” Id. at 68.

Instantly, the trial court addressed the Mayfield factors and stated it 

had also considered the factors set forth in Hann. See Trial Court Opinion, 

10/21/22, at 7-14. The trial court addressed the willfulness of Defendant’s 

breach, stating:

The purpose of bail is to assure the Defendant’s appearance 

in court, while being an amount that is potentially able to be 

posted for the Defendant to allow the Defendant to remain in the 

community in keeping with the presumption of innocence, while 

still acknowledging the seriousness of the charge before the court 

and community protection. As the main purpose of bail is to 

assure court appearances, the failure to appear in court as 

required is a serious violation of bail. The Defendant, through 

[Appellant], posted bond on March 17, 2020. While this docket 

was pending, the [D]efendant was arrested on additional (and 

unrelated) charges. After posting bail in the second case, after 

the modification on October 26, 2020, the Defendant continued to 

appear as required in this docket. The Defendant set his case for 

a primary trial set to occur on December 9, 2021. Within a week 

of the scheduled trial date, the Defendant met with his attorney 

in his office, on November 30, 2021, and determined the best 

course of action was to enter a guilty plea. The paperwork was 

prepared, and the case was set for a plea on December 7, 2021. 

The Defendant failed to appear for the plea at which time a bench 
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warrant was issued. The Defendant has not yet been 

apprehended. Even giving the Defendant the benefit of the doubt 

that perhaps he was unaware of the December 7, 2021 date, as 

no scheduling order was issued, he still ultimately failed to appear 

at the December 9, 2021 date that had been set for trial; a date 

for which he had been provided a scheduling order. The 

Defendant has not yet been apprehended on the bench warrant 

that was issued for his failure to appear. Absent any justifiable 

excuse, the [D]efendant’s failure to appear was willful.

Id. at 8-9.

The trial court next considered the cost, inconvenience, and prejudice 

suffered by the government, recognizing that Appellant

alleges a deficiency as to testimony as to this prong. The assigned 

district attorney and [D]efendant’s trial counsel gave testimony at 

the hearing about the circumstances of the Defendant’s case 

leading up to the issuance of the bench warrant. As the 

[D]efendant was a fugitive, no trial was able to occur as scheduled 

on December 9, 2021. The government has no obligation to 

furnish a bill of costs, nor can the cost and inconvenience factor 

be dismissed, against the government, simply because they may 

not be substantial. A financial detriment is not required under the 

rule, as courts have applied the second prong of the forfeiture 

framework ... as factors the trial court must consider, not 

conjunctive elements the Commonwealth must prove. The 

Mayfield and Hann framework are factors to be considered but 

are not a required checklist.

The Defendant failed to appear at his guilty plea[,] which 

was set two days prior to trial at the request of his attorney. Had 

the guilty plea not occurred for reasons beyond the failure to 

appear, the trial of the Defendant would have occurred as 

scheduled. ... The Commonwealth prepared its case for trial on 

December 9, 2021, which would include issuing subpoenas for 

witnesses, although the witnesses were released upon the 

authorization for the bench warrant.

The allegations against the Defendant are of the most 

serious nature. Specifically, he was alleged to have committed a 

conspiracy to deliver and then the delivery of approximately 100 

grams of fentanyl, and other related charges under the Drug, 
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Device and Cosmetic Act, along with receiving stolen property (a 

gun). The high dollar amount of the bail is proportional to the 

seriousness of his charges and in [an] amount that should have 

assured his appearance, as even posting a portion should be a 

significant expense for an average defendant. There is an 

intangible element of injury to the public interest in almost any 

case where a defendant deliberately breaches a condition of his 

bail bond. The Commonwealth was prejudiced by [Defendant’s] 

disappearance, which has delayed the disposition of his underlying 

charges as he remains at large.

Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).

In discussing any relevant explanation or mitigating factors, the trial 

court opined:

It should be noted that [Appellant] is a commercial 

bondsman. Courts have uniformly held that a surety’s status as 

a bondsman tends to lead in favor of forfeiture. Hann, [81 A.3d 

at 69; see also id. (“In making the business decision of whether 

to take a bail bond, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a 

bondsman should have been fully cognizant of his responsibilities 

and the consequences of a defendant’s breach of the conditions of 

the bond.” (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted)]. The 

driving force behind a surety’s provision of a bond is the profit 

motive. This is the basis for the burden being placed on the 

aggrieved party, the bondsman, to show that the court misapplied 

the law, exercise manifestly unreasonable judgment, or acted on 

the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will to that party’s detriment on 

appellate review.

[Appellant] asserts that its actions within the first ninety 

(90) days to ascertain the whereabouts of [Defendant] were done 

promptly and in good faith as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5747.1,

and therefore the forfeiture and remittal should be set aside. In 

support of their position, [Appellant] presented testimony that 

they attempted to be removed from the Defendant’s bail by the 

filing of the bail piece on October 22, 2020, before the emergency 

motions judge, after the Defendant was arrested on fleeing and 

eluding charges. As previously discussed, the bail piece was 

dissolved six days later, on October 26, 2020, with the issue of 

removal of the surety addressed. The request to be removed from 

the bail was denied on the record and again addressed specifically 
J-A20019-23

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in the Dissolution Order. The [c]ourt communicated to 

[Appellant] that it needed to file a motion through counsel 

asking to be removed as surety. No further action was 

taken by [Appellant] to be removed from the bail. There 

was no further attempt to remove [Appellant] as surety, 

only the request for a bail piece.

At the first hearing on [Appellant’s] motion, on June 2, 

2022, Ms. Sheila Smith indicated the belief of [Appellant] that the 

Defendant immediately absconded on October 27, 2020, following 

the posting of the bail in the second matter and shortly after the 

dissolution of the bail piece by the court. This was an unsuccessful 

attempt to shift the responsibility for the Defendant’s appearance 

(or lack thereof) on the [c]ourt or the District Attorney’s Office. 

Additionally, contrary to Ms. Smith’s testimony, court records 

indicate the Defendant had approximately a full year of proper 

court attendance before his failure to appear and the issuance of 

the warrant. There was testimony from the Defendant’s attorney, 

Mr. Nigrini, that there was no contact from [Appellant], that he 

recalls, from the time he filed the bail motion in the second case 

until after the bench warrant was issued. This was not 

contradicted by [Appellant]. This establishes the lack of the 

extent of the bondman’s supervision of the Defendant considering 

the large amount of the surety posted.

Further, the court file includes the preliminary arraignment 

form of the Magisterial District Judge.... This form indicates the 

Defendant was twenty-seven (27) years old, was not a U.S. citizen 

(although he was a permanent resident)[] and had only part-time 

employment (outside of Berks County) to support his family that 

included six children. Further, the Clerk of Courts file reveals a 

“pretrial defendant assessment,” dated March 13, 2020 (four days 

prior to bail being posted by [Appellant]), ... which indicated the 

Defendant was from the Dominican Republic and had resided 

there for twenty-four (24) years. This establishes significant ties 

to his home country, and fairly recent immigration, which is 

information [Appellant] should have been aware of when making 

its determination of risk in posting the high amount of bail. 

Further, [Appellant] did not present any testimony that they 

attempted to secure [Defendant’s] passport as a condition of their 

agency in posting the bail. There is no support for claims that the 

Commonwealth’s failure to file modification or revocation of the 

bail of the [D]efendant, or the court’s failure to impose a higher 

bail (or in this case, the decision to reduce bail in a second 
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docket), mitigates a surety’s duty to fully investigate a 

defendant’s background before issuing a bail bond.

This is not to say that [Appellant] made no effort to find 

their client following his failure to appear. [Appellant] presented 

testimony from Mr. Mikhaeil, a bounty recovery agent, that he had 

been given the case file for the Defendant on December 7, 2021, 

which was the date of the [D]efendant’s failure to appear. This 

was prompt action by [Appellant]. The bounty recovery agent met 

with the Defendant’s “wife” who indicated that the last time she 

heard from him was on November 30, 2021, or perhaps early 

December, and that she believed he went to the Dominican 

Republic. Although he could not give the name of the person to 

whom he spoke, the bounty recovery agent indicated that he 

placed a call to the warrants division of the Sheriff’s department 

indicating that he had information that the Defendant was in the 

Dominican Republic. He also further indicated that in midDecember of 2021, he came to see the “DEA” detective from this 

case and the arresting officer in the Defendant’s second case to 

give them this information as well. The Defendant’s attorney in 

this case, Mr. Nigrini, also indicated that after the bench warrant 

was issued for the Defendant, Ms. Smith[, on behalf of Appellant,]

contacted him with the information provided by Defendant’s wife 

that he had absconded to the Dominican Republic.

Id. at 10-13 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the trial court concluded:

Absent any justifiable excuse, the [D]efendant’s failure to 

appear was willful. The question here is not whether [Appellant]

made any effort to recover [Defendant], but whether their efforts 

had a substantial impact on his return. The efforts of [Appellant,]

while done promptly in response to the failure to appear[,] have 

not had any impact on the [D]efendant’s apprehension or return, 

as he remains at large. The Commonwealth was prejudiced by 

[Defendant’s] disappearance, which delayed the disposition of his 

underlying charges. It is no defense to the forfeiture of bail 

given for an absconding defendant that the surety applied 

for a bail piece. The Defendant was in custody on another 

matter. [Appellant] made no further effort to file a motion 

to be removed from the Defendant’s bail despite specific 

direction from the court. As previously noted, this court 

specifically prompted [Appellant] to file a proper motion upon the 
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dissolution of the bail piece if they wished to be removed from the 

[D]efendant’s bail. Accordingly, there is a deterrence value to the 

forfeiture[, for Appellant] to be aware of court orders issued 

prompting a process[,] even when they view such as a “nonpreferred” method. [Appellant], a commercial surety, took a 

calculated business risk when it agreed to post bail for a defendant 

with ties out of the country. Having applied the factors delineated 

in Mayfield and in consideration of the additional factors of Hann, 

justice requires full enforcement of the forfeiture order in this 

matter.

Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added; paragraph break omitted).

We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. The record reflects

the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in reaching its 

conclusion that justice required full forfeiture. See Hann, 81 A.3d at 67. 

To the extent Appellant argues its efforts in seeking the bail piece should 

be considered part of the “explanation and mitigating factors” prong of 

Mayfield, this argument is unavailing. Following remand from the Supreme 

Court in Hann, this Court observed “that ‘mitigating factors’ refer to any 

explanation for the defendant’s conduct in violating the terms of his 

bail bond, i.e., the defendant failed to appear for a court date because he 

was caring for his sick child.” In re Hann, 111 A.3d at 762-63 (emphasis 

added). Appellant cannot shift blame to the trial court for reducing the amount 

of bail in the Defendant’s second case.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s petition to 

vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/19/2023