IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2018-KA-01006-COA ANTONIO LARON BRIDGES APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/29/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DEE BATES NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/31/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ. BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In the early m o rning hours of May 29, 2016, Roy B oss and Cedric Martin sustained

m ultiple gunshot wounds while sitting in Boss’s car at an apartm ent com p lex in McCom

b, Mississippi. Antonio Laron “Ron” Bridges (Bridges) was later identif ied as the s hooter, and he was indicted f

or two counts of attem

pted m urder, one count of p ossession of a f irearm by

a f e lon, and one count of

shooting into a m otor vehicle. A Pike County Circuit C ourt jury convicted Bridges of all f our counts. Adjudging him to be a habitual o f f ender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2015), the c ircu i t c o urt sentenced Bridges to serve f

our concurrent sentences of lif e im prisonm e nt in the custody o f theMississippi Departm e nt of C o r r e c t i o n s (MDOC). 1 Af ter the court denied his m otion f or judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), B r i d g e s appealed. Finding no error, we af f irm

. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. T h e s hooting of Boss and Martin resulted f rom a dom estic squabb l e e a r l i e r t h a t evening b e t w e en Bridges’s nephew, Ty reace Bridges, and Ty

reace’s girlf

riend, Latoy a Nunnery

. Latoy a’s brother, Bran d o n Stewart, and Bridges’s sister, Shawn McCray , both lived at the apartm ent com plex where the shooting later occurred. Af ter the argum ent with Latoy a, Ty

reace went to M cCray ’ s apartm ent. Either Ty reace or McCray called Bridges and Ty reace’s brother and f

ather to com e to McCray ’s apartm ent. Bridges showed up with his girlf riend, Ty neisha Carter. Bridges and Ty reac e then returned to Latoy a’s h ouse, where they f ought with Stewart and o ther m em bers of his f

am i ly

. M artin observed the f ight but did not participate. Ty

reace and Bridges lef

t Latoy a’s house when police arrived. ¶3. Boss, who was at a nearby bar, heard of the f i ght a nd drove t o L a toy a ’s h ouse. Boss and M artin then drove to Stewart’s apartm ent, where Boss backed h is Crown Victoria into

a p arking space. Bridges, Ty reace, and T y

reace’s brother, Clarence, arrived at the apartm ent

com plex at approxim at e ly the sam e tim e i n Clarence’s vehicle. A ccording to Boss and Martin, Bridges w alked over to Boss’s car and began shooting at them

. Ducking down, Martin pulled out a revolver and shot twice a t B r i d ges, who suf f ered a gunshot wound. Clarence and Ty

reace took Bridges to a nearby h ospital. Bo s s a n d Martin were taken by

1 B rid g es h ad b een p rev io u sly co n v icted o f m an slau g h ter an d f elo n y d ru g p o ssessio n . 2am

bulance to the hospital with gunshot wounds. ¶4. O n J a n u a r y 3 1 , 2017, a grand jury indicted B ridges f o r two counts of

attem pte d

m urder, one count of possession of a f i r e a r m b y a f

elon, and one count of shooting into a

m otor vehicle. The i ndictm ent was later am ended to ref lect Bridges’s h a bitual-of f ender
status under section 99-19-83, noting his prior convictions of m anslaughter and p ossession of m arijuana with intent to distribute. Prior to trial, def ense counsel m oved to sever Count III (possession of a f

irearm by a f elon) f r om the other counts, arguing that the “eliciting of testim o ny in support of the S tate’s c a s e i n t h e prosecution of C ount III would violate and prejudice [ Bridges], a s to Counts I, II, and IV of the indictm ent as the Jury could not be expected to disregard this evidence i n determ in ing the guilt or innocence of [ Bridges] in those Counts.” The court denied the m otion. ¶5. A trial was h e ld in the Pike County Ci r c u i t C o u r t o n M a r c h 2 7-29, 2018. John Glapion, a deputy with the Pike County Sherif f ’ s Departm e n t, testif

ied that he arrived at the

scene of the shooting m inutes af ter the 9 1 1 c a l l

. W h en h e arrived, there were f our people standing around Boss’s Crown Victoria. Boss and Martin were inside the car, and Deputy Glapion stated that the two m e n were “hy s te r i cal” a n d “going into shock.” One of the victim s t old him that Bridges h a d “com e running towards the driver’s side of the door and shot them .” ¶6. Dr. Shu

n t e J o n e s , a f

o r m e r e m e r g e n c y - r o o m p h y s i c i an at Southwest R egional Hospital in McCom

b, treated Boss, M artin, and Bridges on the night of the shooting. She testif ied that both Boss and Martin suf f ered lif e-threatening injuries. W ith regard to Bridges, she noted

3that he had a broken nose, a superf icial head i njury , as well as “an obvious gunshot wound to his right chest.” ¶7. The investigator, Robby Roberts, testif ied that the r e w ere several s pent .45-caliber shell casings both inside and outside the Crown V i c t o r ia. A t the hospital, Investigator Rober t s i nterviewed Clarence, who had transported B r idges in his Suburban. No gun was f o u n d i n that vehicle. Investigator Roberts interviewed Boss and Martin a f ew day s later (due to the severity of their injuries). Although Martin could not identif y the shooter at that tim e, Investigator Roberts said that Boss, when shown a picture, indicated that Bridges was
t h e s h ooter. Investigator Roberts was unable to secure the clothing Bridges wore t h a t evening because “[ i]t had been destroy ed.” ¶8. Stewart t e s t i f

i e d t hat Ty

r eace, Bridges, a nd other m em bers of S tewart’s f

am ily had engaged in a “brawl” that evening, but the f i ght broke up af

ter som eo n e c a l l ed the police. Stewart said he c alled Boss, who cam e o ver to L atoy a ’s house; B oss and Martin then lef t to
go to the apartm ent com

p lex. Boss called Stewart, say ing that n o one was there and that he

was com ing back to Latoy a ’s house. However, Boss called back seconds later, telling Stewart that he h ad been shot; so Stewart went to the apartm ent com plex. Stewart testif

ied that h e was standing by the Crown Victoria, talking to Boss, and that Boss “gave m e his phone, and he a sked f

or a picture because he didn’t see his f ace.” Stewart sent B oss a picture of Bridges about an hour later. ¶9. Boss testif

ied that he had j ust arr i v e d in town that day

. Stewart, whom B oss called

“ L i t t le B,” had been taking care of his car f or a f ew m onths while he was away f or work

.

4Boss went to a l ocal bar that night, but wh e n h e l e a r n e d of the f ight, he went to Latoy a’s house. From there, Boss drove him self and Martin to Stewart’s a partm ent. Boss noticed a truck f ollowing his car; s o he backed into the parking s pace at the apartm ents. His head was down, and he was “play ing with [ h i s] radio” when he heard som e one say , “Little B, I’m f ixin’ t o kill y ou.” Boss testif ied, “So by that tim e, Mr. Ron [ was] right there. H e was at the driver’s side. He was s hooting of f i n my c ar.” Boss also testif i ed that M cCray , Bridges’s sister, ran over cry ing and s aid, “Eww. Ron s h ot them boy s.” Boss acknowledged he did not know Bridges and “[ t]hat was his f irst tim e seeing [ Bridges and McCray ],” but Boss said that he looked the shooter “dead in his ey es.” ¶10. Martin testif

ied that he h ad observed th e fight between the B ridgeses and the Stewarts, and he rode with Boss back to Stewart’s apartm e nt af terward. They

backed into a parking
space, and Martin said h e saw a truck and a car pull in a f t er them and “the def

endant walking

across the par k i n g lot toward the car.” Martin did not notice a gun “until [ Bridges] was bringing it up, and he shot at [ Boss] f irst.” Martin t estif

ied that Bridges c ontinued to shoot, sticking the gun into a n open window on the driver’s side. Martin was shot f i ve tim es, and he returned f

ire with a .22-caliber revolver. He later threw his gun out of the car, which law enf orcem ent recovered. ¶11. Clarence testif

ied that he, Ty

reace, a nd Bridges returned t o the apartm ent. W hen he parked his Suburban, Clarence noticed a Crown Victoria on the other side of the parking lot with i ts headlights on. Clarence said that he, Ty reace, and Bridges got out o f the Suburban and that he walked toward McCray ’s apartm ent; he did not look back to see where Ty reace

5and B ridges were. W hen he h eard gunshots, Clarence ducked b ehind a nearby car. Af ter the gunshots st o p p e d , C l arence testif ied that Bridges w as next to him (within arm ’s reach) holding his side, say i ng that he had been shot; Ty reace was a f

ew steps beh i n d B r i dges. Clarenc e stated that he n ever saw Bridges walk in the direction of the Crown Victoria. Clarence and Ty

reace p ut Bridges in the S u b u r ban and took him to the h ospital. Clarence did not see a gun. ¶12. McCray testif

ied that she awoke and hea r d g u n s h o t s , w e nt on the f ront porch, and heard Boss scream ing that he h ad be e n shot; so she walked over to Boss’s car. McCray denied telling Boss that Bridges had shot them , and she said that Boss was on the phone with Stewart when she got t o the car. She also testif ied that M artin was “hollering” about a “f at, baldheaded m an with a white beard.” McCray stay ed downstairs around the parking lot until law enf orcem ent arrived. ¶13. The j ury convicted Bridges of all f our counts. The circuit court sentenced him as a habitual of

f ender to serve f

our sentences of lif

e im prisonm ent i n the custody of the MDOC, with the sentences set to r

un concurrently

. B ridges f iled a m otion f

or a JNOV, which the trial
court d enied. On a

ppeal, Bridges argues that he was s ubject to i nef f e c t i v e assistance of counsel due t o def

ense counsel’s f

ailure to raise an objection to t h e adm i ssion of his
statem ent to law enf

orcem e nt. He claim s that the adm ission of a portion o f his statem ent to law enf orcem ent, in which the i nterviewer noted Brid g e s ’ s p rior f elonies, was prejudicial and constitutes plain error. DISCUSSION

6¶14. T h e a s s i g n me n t s o f e r r o r r aised by Bridges b oth pertain to the investig a t o r ’ s

m entioning Bridges’s prior convictions in a videotaped statem e n t, which was adm itted into evidence at trial. During the interview, Investigator Roberts said t o Bridges, “I m ean, y ou understand this is gonna go to court, and it’s gonna go under [ a ] b ig judge. You got som e priors. T hat ain’t [ going to] l ook good

. . . y ou got a m anslaughter a nd y ou g o t a f elony

con t r o l l e d substance. So y o u know what num ber three is? This charge. It’s serious.” Responding to the investigator, Bridges acknowledged that he was a f e lon. A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶15. At trial, the parties agreed to stipulate to Bridges’s prior convictions. J ury Instruction 3 a lso instructed the jury that Bridges was “a convicted f elon,” and this i nstruction was given

a s s t i p u l a ted by the parties. Because of this stipulation, Bridges now asserts that def ens e counsel’s f

ailure to object to the adm ission of his statem ent, to m ove f o r a m i s t rial, or to

m ove t o r e d a c t I n v e s t i g a t o r R o b e rts’s com m ents c o nstitutes inef f ective a ssistance of counsel. Bridges cites Herrington v. State , 1 02 So. 3d 1241, 1 245-46 (¶¶15-17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), in which this Court f

ound that “trial counsel was def icient in f

ailing to object to the introduction of three prior convictions” into evidence a f ter the parties h ad already s tipulated that the def

endant was “a convicted f elon.” Concluding that “this def iciency p rejudiced [ the def endant],” we reversed and rem anded. Id

. at 1246 (¶17). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held that “the strategic goal of such stipulation is to curtail the prejudice that m ight arise if a m ore detailed and expansive record of prior b ad acts is allowed in.” Taylor v. State , 167 So. 3d 1143, 1147 (¶8) (Miss. 2015).

7¶16. Inef

f ective-assistance-of

- counsel c l aim s should ordinarily “be r aised in a m otion f or post-conviction relief

, not o n d irect a

ppeal.” Pinter v. State , 2 21 S o. 3 d 378, 386 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 17). The Court “will address such c laim s on direct a p peal when ‘[ (1)] the record af f irm atively s hows i nef

f ectiveness of constitutional dim ensions, or [ (2)] the parties stipulate that the r ecord i s a dequate[ ,] and the [ appellate court] d eterm ines that the f indings of f act b y a t r i a l j udge able to consider the dem eanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed.’” Ross v
. State , 288 So. 3d 317, 324 ( ¶29) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Bell v. S tate , 2 02 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶12) (Miss. 2 016)). In this case, neither p arty has expressly stipulated that the record is adequate f

or this Court to m ake such a f inding. ¶17. F u r t h e r mo r e, “[ w]ith r espect to the o verall perf orm ance of the attorney , counsel’ s choice of whether or n ot to f i le certain m otions, call witnesses, ask certain questions, or m ake certain objections f

alls within the a m

bit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an inef f ective assistance of counsel claim

. ” Graham v. State , 264 So. 3 d 819, 822 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Carr v. S tate , 873 S o. 2d 991, 1003 (¶27) (Miss. 2 004)). W h en the State requested that Bridges’s s tatem ent be adm itted i nto e vidence, def ense c ounsel consulted with Bridges p rior to deciding wh e t h e r o r n o t to m ake an objection: THE COURT: B e f

o r e w e d o a n y

t h i n g , [ d e f

e n s e c o u nsel ] , i f t h e r e ’ s going to be a m o tion -- if there’s going to b e an objection to this, why was it

. . . not handled pretrial in a m otion to suppress? [ DEFENSE]: I’m not sure there’s g oin g t o b e
. That’s w h y I want to review it with my client.

8THE COURT: Okay

. W ell, I m ean, regardless, whether there’s going to b e or not, it s hould have been a m atter that should hav e been handled in a pretrial hearing. (THE PROCEEDINGS ARE RECESSED FOR A SHORT BREAK.)

. . . . THE COURT: [ Def ense], y ou’re not objecting I presum e. [ DEFENSE]: No, sir, Your Honor. (Em phasis added). Thus, it appears f rom the record that def

ense counsel’s decision not to object t o the adm ission o f Bridges’s statem ent was trial strategy

. D u r ing the videotaped interview, Bridges m aintained that he did n ot have a gun, that he did not shoot any one, and that he had never s een Boss o r Martin bef ore. Bridges told the i nvestigator that he was just walking in the parking lot when “ all hell broke loose” and he “got h it.” Allowing in the
statem ent provided Bridges the opportunity to relate his v ersion o f events to the jury without his testif y ing and being subject to cross-exam ination. Had the statem ent been redacted, the State c ould have decided not to adm it the s t a tem ent at all, d epriving Bridges of that opportunity

. However, because Bridges’s c laim is based o n f a cts n ot f ully apparent f

rom the record, we deny relief without prejudice to Bridges’s right t o seek l eave f rom the Mississippi Suprem e Court to raise his c laim of inef f ective assistance of counsel through post-conviction

r elief proceedings under M i ssissippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7 (Rev. 2 0 1 5 )

. S e e G u n n

v
. S tate , 174 S o. 3d 848, 869 (¶83) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) ( f inding the i ssue of inef

f ec t i v e assistance of counsel n ot “appropriate f or r esolution on direct appeal” becau s e def ense counsel’s decisions appear to be trial strategy a nd c ounsel “has not been af f orded an

9opportunity to explain his actions”). B. Plain Error ¶18. Bridges a rgues that Investigator Roberts’s m entioning of Bridges’s prior convictions in the statem ent violated his f undam ental r i ght to a f

a ir trial. Because Bridges did not raise the issue of the adm issibility of his statem ent to law enf o rcem ent in his post-trial m otion f or

a JNOV, this issue is procedurally barred f rom r eview on appeal. See Carey v. State , 80 So. 3d 131, 135 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (f inding a d ef

endant’s f ailure to assert an issue in

a post-trial m o tion procedurally barred him f rom r a i s i n g t h e issue on appeal). Bridges contends that the circuit c ourt’s adm ission of h is p rior convictions, af ter the parties had agreed to stipulate, v i olated Mississ i p p i R u les of Evidence 403 and 404(b) and, thus,

c o n s t i t u tes plain e rror. The plain-error doctrine allows o ur a ppellate courts to “recogniz e obvious error which w as n ot properly r a ised by the def e ndant on appeal, a nd which af f ects

a def endant’s ‘f

undam ental, substantive right.’” Smith v. State , 986 So. 2 d 2 90, 294 (¶10) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Debrow v. State , 972 So. 2 d 550, 553 (¶10) (Miss. 2007)). “For the plain-error d octrine to apply , there m ust have b e e n a n e rror that r esulted in a m anif est

m iscarriage of justice o r s eriously af f ect[ e d] the f

airness, integr i t y or p ublic reputation of judic i a l p r o c e e d i ngs.” Hall v
. State, 201 So. 3d 424, 428 (¶12) ( Miss. 2 016) (internal quotation m arks om itted )

. “[ I]n order to determ i ne if plain error has occurred, we m ust determ ine if

the trial court has deviated f rom a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcom e of the trial.” Pinter v. State , 221 So. 3d 378, 384 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (em phasis o m itted) ( quoting Green v. State ,

1 0183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016)). In this i nstance, we can f ind n o plain or obvious error

or deviation f

rom a legal rule in the trial court’s admi ssion of the investigator’s statem ent. See Demorst v
. State , 2 28 So. 3d 323, 328 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ( “[ W ]e a re aware of no legal rule requiring a trial court to sua sponte suppress evidence.”). ¶19. AFFIRMED. CAR L T O N A N D J . W I L S O N , P . J J . , G R E E N L E E , W E STBROOKS, TINDELL, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., C O N CURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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