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No. 00-026 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 145

300 Mont. 49

3 P. 3d 614

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBIN BEAVERS, 

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade,

The Honorable Marge Johnson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Carl B. Jensen, Jr., Cascade County Public Defender's Office,

Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

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Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell,

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney; Susan Brooke, Deputy

County Attorney, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 27, 2000 

Decided: June 1, 2000

Filed: 

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 By Information filed in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade 

County, the Defendant, Robin Beavers, was charged with, among other offenses, four 

counts of Felony Theft. Beavers pled guilty to each count of Felony Theft. The District 

Court ordered Beavers to pay restitution. Beavers appeals the District Court's order of 

restitution. We vacate the restitution order and remand. 

¶2 The following issue is presented for review: 

¶3 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it ordered Beavers to pay restitution?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶4 During the course of a drug investigation, Robin Beavers admitted accepting property 

that she knew was stolen in exchange for illegal drugs. On March 9, 1999, the State filed 

an Information charging Beavers with, among other things, possession of stolen property 

in violation of § 45-6-301(c)(3), MCA.

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¶5 Subsequently, Beavers reached a plea agreement with the State. The plea agreement did 

not provide for restitution. Nevertheless, at Beavers' sentencing hearing, on October 1, 

1999, over the objection of both Beavers and the State, the District Court ordered Beavers 

to pay restitution. The District Court said:

Well, this is what I find. [Beavers] admitted to having property that she knew was 

stolen, that she took in exchange for drugs. I have evidence offered in the 

presentence investigation report and the victim impact statements that the people 

who were out of the property filed claims with the insurance companies.

Their insurance companies have paid and they have been out the property, certainly 

for well over a year. The State does not make a great effort to return property that 

they have as evidence in a case. And I don't even know if all of the property will get 

back to these folks. So to the extent I have verification of loss I'm going to impose 

restitution. 

On December 10, 1999, the District Court amended its judgment and sentencing order, 

and provided the following reasoning:

Both Mr. Jensen, [Beavers' attorney], and the attorney for the State argued against 

any restitution requirement, claiming that Ms. Beavers was only charged with 

possession of property which will eventually be returned to the victims. That 

property, however, has not been in the victims' possession for the past year while 

this case has been pending. Their insurance companies have paid on that property 

and they have had to absorb the cost of any deductible. Clearly, the victims of the 

burglarized property and their insurers are victims of Ms. Beavers' ongoing criminal 

behavior of taking stolen property, and thus encouraging the thefts, in exchange for 

drugs. For that reason, it appears critical that I impose an appropriate restitution 

amount. I have no information that the State has proceeded against any of the people 

from whom she obtained the property and who presumably actually burglarized 

their homes. Unless Ms. Beavers is held accountable, it is very possible that the 

victims will never be made whole. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 We review the imposition of a sentence for legality only. State v. Rennick, 1999 MT 

155, ¶ 7, 56 St. Rep. 611, ¶ 7. The standard of review on legality of a sentence is whether 

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the sentencing court abused its discretion. Rennick, ¶ 7. 

ISSUE

¶7 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it ordered Beavers to pay restitution?

¶8 The sentencing judge may impose restitution if the sentencing judge finds that the 

victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss. Section 46-18-201(5), MCA. Section 

46-18-241(1), MCA, provides:

As provided in 46-18-201, a sentencing court shall require an offender to make full 

restitution to any victim of the offense who has sustained pecuniary loss as a result 

of the offense, including a person suffering an economic loss as a result of the crime. 

The duty to pay full restitution under the sentence remains with the offender until 

full restitution is paid. 

(Emphasis added.) Pecuniary loss means:

(a) all special damages, but not general damages, substantiated by evidence in the 

record, that a person could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out 

of the facts or events constituting the offender's criminal activities, including 

without limitation the money equivalent of loss resulting from property taken, 

destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed and out-of-pocket losses, such as medical 

expenses, loss of income, expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and 

necessary services that the victim would have performed if not injured, expenses 

reasonably incurred in attending court proceedings related to the commission of the 

offense, and reasonable expenses related to funeral and burial or crematory services; 

and

(b) reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the victim in filing charges or in 

cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the offense.

Section 46-18-243(1), MCA. In State v. Blanchard (1995), 270 Mont. 11, 16, 889 P.2d 

1180, 1183, we stated:

While this is a question of first impression in Montana, a number of other 

jurisdictions have addressed the issue and have held that an accused is liable for 

restitution for offenses to which the accused (1) has admitted, (2) has been found 

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guilty, or (3) has agreed to pay restitution.

(Citations omitted.)

¶9 Beavers' argument is twofold. First, she contends that she cannot be required to pay 

restitution for property she did not receive simply because restitution is not recoverable 

from those who stole it. With that contention we agree. In addition, Beavers argues, and 

the State concedes, that because Beavers was only in possession of stolen property and did 

not actually steal the property the pecuniary loss sustained by the victims was not a result 

of Beavers' offense. The District Court, however, found otherwise. At her sentencing 

hearing, the District Court reasoned that the victims suffered a pecuniary loss as a result 

Beavers' offense. The District Court said:

Well, this is what I find. [Beavers] admitted to having property that she knew was 

stolen, that she took in exchange for drugs. I have evidence offered in the 

presentence investigation report and the victim impact statements that the people 

who were out of the property filed claims with the insurance companies.

Their insurance companies have paid and they have been out the property, certainly 

for well over a year. The State does not make a great effort to return property that 

they have as evidence in a case. And I don't even know if all of the property will get 

back to these folks. So to the extent I have verification of loss I'm going to impose 

restitution. 

¶10 Beavers is not responsible for restitution for offenses she did not commit. She 

has admitted and pled guilty to receiving stolen property, but she denies she 

received all the property that was stolen.

¶11 Since, however, she has admitted the offense of receipt of stolen property, Beavers 

satisfies our rule established in Blanchard, 270 Mont. at 16, 889 P.2d at 1183. Her 

admission and guilty plea are sufficient to satisfy the causal standard of § 46-18-241(1), 

MCA; that is, the victim suffered loss as a result of Beavers' offense. In Dowdy v. Florida

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), 700 So. 2d 409, that court held: "We find, however, that 

Dowdy's receiving the stolen property and pawning it, is sufficiently 'related' to the 

victim's loss to justify restitution." Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did 

not abuse its discretion when it ordered Beavers to pay restitution. Beavers, however, is 

required to pay restitution for only that property which formed the basis of her offense. 

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She is not responsible for restitution for property that was stolen by others, but not 

received and possessed by her.

¶12 Where stolen property is recovered, as in this case, the amount of restitution owed is 

the difference between the value of the property taken and the salvage value of the 

property returned. Bowman v. Florida (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), 698 So. 2d 615, 616. The 

State has the burden of establishing those values. "A defendant may not be ordered to pay 

restitution in excess of the damages caused by his criminal conduct." Bowman, 698 So. 2d 

at 616. Accordingly, we remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 

calculate the amount of restitution owed, if any, consistent with the guidelines set forth in 

this opinion.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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