[Cite as State v. Young, 2019-Ohio-4639.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 18AP-845 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CR-2606)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Kali E. Young, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 12, 2019 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Valerie 

Swanson, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert. 

On brief: Yeura Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E. 

Pierce, for appellant. Argued: Timothy E. Pierce.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Kali E. Young, appeals from a judgment entry of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty, pursuant to no contest plea, of 

one count of possession of cocaine and one count of possession of heroin. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} By indictment filed May 13, 2016, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, charged 

Young with one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a second-degree 

felony; and one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fifth-degree 

felony. Young initially entered a plea of not guilty. 

{¶ 3} On August 21, 2018, Young filed two motions to suppress. Specifically, Young 

argued the officers lacked probable cause to obtain the search warrant. 
No. 18AP-845 2 

{¶ 4} At a suppression hearing conducted on September 17, 2018, the state 

introduced a copy of the search warrant. The affidavit in support of the search warrant, 

signed by Detective Jon Earl of the Whitehall Police Department, states in its entirety:

[The informant] contacted Det. Earl on 2/19/16 and stated that 

he/she knows of a drug dealer named "Kali" who is currently 

selling cocaine from 4218/4238/4227 Rickenbacker Ave. The 

informant stated that Young does not live at the apartment 

complex. The informant stated that Young comes to the 

complex and sells cocaine to numerous people. The informant 

knows Young to sell out of what he/she believes is Apt. 40 at 

4218 Rickenbacker Ave. This informant is considered reliable 

and has provided information that has resulted [in] numerous 

arrests and the recovery of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and guns 

in the past. The informant described "Kali" as a male/black 

around 5'07" with a large/heavy build, short hair in his late 30's 

to early 40's in age. The informant provided a telephone 

number of 614-948-9350 for "Kali". The informant stated that 

he/she has recently seen "Kali" in a white Toyota Camry license 

number GMQ4910. 

Upon investigating the information provided by the informant, 

Det. Earl was able to locate Kali Young. Young matched the 

physical description provided by the informant. A BMV 

photograph of Young was shown to the informant who stated 

"That's Kali". 

Young was shown to have a possible address of 1008 Caldwell 

Pl Columbus, OH 43203. Detectives began to conduct 

surveillance on the location. Detectives have observed the 

White 2009 Toyota Camry parked in front of the residence. 

Detectives have also observed Young coming and going from 

the residence using keys each time to enter/exit the residence 

at various hours of the days and nights. Detectives have also 

observed Young driving that vehicle. Young has been observed 

making quick stops and meeting other people at various 

locations in the vehicle. From training and experience these 

stops appear to be narcotics deals where the meeting last less 

than five minutes and hand to hand exchanges take place. 

Within the past 72 hours, Det. Earl #50 met with [the 

informant]. The informant was searched and no contraband 

was located. The informant was provided with recorded city 

funds. The informant contacted a male at 614-948-9350 who 

he/she identified as Kali. A controlled narcotics buy was setup 

for a predetermined amount of crack cocaine at a 
No. 18AP-845 3 

predetermined meeting location. Prior to the call Det. 

Grinstead #71 was conducting surveillance at 1008 Caldwell Pl 

in Columbus, OH. The white 2009 Toyota Camry was parked 

in front of the residence at the time. A short time after the call, 

Young was observed leaving 1008 Caldwell Pl and getting into 

the listed Toyota Camry. Young then drove to the 

predetermined meeting location while being kept under mobile 

surveillance. Young was observed meeting with the informant 

for less than five minutes. Young left the area and was again 

kept under visual surveillance. He was then followed back to 

1008 Caldwell Pl where he was observed using keys to enter the 

apartment. The informant was kept under constant visual 

surveillance after the controlled narcotics buy. He/she met 

with Det. Earl and handed him the predetermined amount of 

crack cocaine. The informant stated that he/she just purchased 

it from the person that he/she identified as Kali Young. The 

informant was again searched and no contraband was located. 

The recovered crack cocaine was field tested and showed a 

positive reaction for cocaine. 

Kali Young CCH has shown arrest for Carrying a Concealed 

Weapon and Resisting Arrest. He also has numerous arrests 

for Felony possession of Drugs and a conviction for Third 

Degree Felony Possession of drugs. Based on the information 

regarding the suspects criminal history and trafficking in 

drugs, it is believed to be likely the suspect(s) would be armed 

as is common with narcotics traffickers and the ability for the 

suspect(s) to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence is likely if 

entry is delayed. 

With the information above Detectives believe that illegal 

narcotics are being kept and sold from 1008 Caldwell Pl 

Columbus, OH 43203 Under these above circumstances it 

would be common to serve a search warrant and recover drugs 

and drug related evidence. This would be routine, common 

practice. This search warrant is requested based on the above 

facts and based on Detective Earl's 13 years of law enforcement 

experience that includes involvement in several hundred drug 

related arrests and investigations. 

 

(Sic passim.) (Affidavit in Support of Warrant to Search.) Based on the information in 

Detective Earl's affidavit, a judge issued a search warrant for 1008 Caldwell Place in 

Columbus limited to: 

Controlled substances included in Schedule I through V, 

papers indicating occupancy and/or ownership, drug 
No. 18AP-845 4 

paraphernalia, drug records, drug monies and/or proceeds, 

weapons, other evidence of illicit drug trafficking unknown at 

this time, fruits and/or instrumentalities of drug trafficking, 

electronic recording and authority to search any person or 

persons at such location, identities known or otherwise. 

(Search Warrant.)

{¶ 5} Detective Earl testified regarding his investigation, and he described meeting 

with a reliable informant in February 2016 who provided him information that Young was 

selling narcotics at an apartment complex in Whitehall. This apartment complex had been 

the subject of numerous drug complaints to police. Detective Earl testified he had used this 

same informant in the past, resulting in search warrants and arrests related to other drug 

dealers. 

{¶ 6} Based on the information from the informant, Detective Earl testified he 

placed Young under surveillance, determining 1008 Caldwell Place to be Young's residence 

after witnessing him coming and going from that address. Once he believed he knew the 

location of Young's residence, Detective Earl said he set up a controlled drug transaction 

while Young was under surveillance. 

{¶ 7} First, Detective Earl met with the informant and searched him to make sure 

the informant did not already have contraband on his or her person. Then, Detective Earl 

testified that Young was at 1008 Caldwell Place, under surveillance, when the informant 

called to initiate the controlled drug transaction, and the informant identified Young's voice 

on the call. While under surveillance, officers observed Young leave the residence, drive 

directly to the location of the controlled drug buy, and complete the drug transaction. The 

informant was provided with prerecorded money to use in the transaction so that police 

could locate the money later. Detective Earl testified that officers continued their 

surveillance after the drug transaction, observing as Young went directly back to 1008 

Caldwell Place following the transaction. Based on his observations, Detective Earl testified 

that the drugs came from 1008 Caldwell Place prior to the transaction, and the prerecorded 

money returned to 1008 Caldwell Place after the transaction. 

{¶ 8} Having witnessed the controlled drug transaction occur, Detective Earl then 

sought and obtained a warrant for 1008 Caldwell Place; the warrant was executed within 

72 hours of the controlled drug transaction. In executing the warrant, Detective Earl 
No. 18AP-845 5 

testified that officers had 1008 Caldwell Place under surveillance and watched Young arrive 

at the residence. At that point, officers placed Young under arrest based on witnessing the 

controlled drug buy, which Detective Earl testified is done primarily for safety prior to 

executing the warrant. Once Young was in police custody, Detective Earl said officers 

executed the search warrant of 1008 Caldwell Place using the keys to the residence that 

Young had on his person at the time of his arrest. Officers executing the search warrant 

seized heroin, cocaine, and $482 in cash from 1008 Caldwell Place. 

{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court overruled 

Young's motion to suppress. Specifically, the trial court concluded the search warrant was 

valid as it contained probable cause to search 1008 Caldwell Place, finding a sufficient 

nexus between the conduct observed and the residence to be searched. 

{¶ 10} The following day, September 18, 2018, Young entered a no contest plea to 

both charges. The trial court accepted Young's plea, found him guilty of both offenses, and 

sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of four years. The trial court stayed Young's 

sentence pending appeal, making house arrest a condition of his appeal bond. The trial 

court journalized Young's convictions and sentence in an October 3, 2018 judgment entry. 

Young timely appeals. 

{¶ 11} Prior to filing his appeal, Young absconded from house arrest, and a capias 

has been issued. In response to Young's absconding while out on appeal bond, the state 

filed a motion to dismiss on June 14, 2019, arguing Young's absconding from house arrest 

disentitled him to an appeal. We address both the merits of Young's appeal and the state's 

motion below. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 12} Young assigns the following error for our review: 

The lower court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to 

suppress. All evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 

search of Appellant's residence violated the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Sections 14 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
No. 18AP-845 6 

III. Young's Assignment of Error – Probable Cause for Search Warrant 

{¶ 13} In his sole assignment of error, Young argues the trial court erred in 

overruling his motion to suppress. More specifically, Young asserts the officers lacked 

probable cause to obtain the search warrant. 

{¶ 14} " 'Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier 

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the 

credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts 

as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.' " 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100, quoting 

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.

{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 

the persons or things to be seized." The Ohio Constitution similarly provides at Article I, 

Section 14 "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 

warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 

describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized." 

{¶ 16} "When determining whether a search warrant affidavit demonstrates 

probable cause, a magistrate must ' "make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 

given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 

'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." ' " State v. Neil, 

10th Dist. No. 14AP-981, 2016-Ohio-4762, ¶ 34, quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 

(1989), paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39. By 

contrast, in reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause contained in a search warrant 
No. 18AP-845 7 

affidavit, an appellate court must not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate, "but 

reviews the warrant 'simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 

concluding that probable cause existed,' according 'great deference to the magistrate's 

determination of probable cause,' and resolving 'doubtful or marginal cases * * * in favor of 

upholding the warrant.' " State v. Eal, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-460, 2012-Ohio-1373, ¶ 9, 

quoting George at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 17} "Probable cause means less evidence than would justify condemnation, so 

that only the 'probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard 

of probable cause.' " (Internal quotations and emphasis omitted.) Eal at ¶ 10, quoting 

George at 329. Generally, the issuing judge or magistrate is confined to the averments 

contained in the supporting affidavit to determine whether probable cause supports a 

search warrant. Id.; Neil at ¶ 34, citing State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio1565, ¶ 106.

{¶ 18} Young argues the search warrant affidavit here failed to establish probable 

cause because it did not demonstrate a nexus between the conduct the officers observed 

and the location ultimately searched. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, a probable 

cause determination for a search warrant requires special considerations, including "how 

stale the information relied upon is, when the facts relied upon occurred, and whether there 

is a nexus between the alleged crime, the objects to be seized, and the place to be searched." 

Castagnola at ¶ 34. Further, "[w]hen considering whether a nexus exists between the 

alleged crime and the place to be searched, ' "the circumstances must indicate why evidence 

of illegal activity will be found in a particular place." ' " State v. Phillips, 10th Dist. No. 

15AP-1038, 2016-Ohio-5944, ¶ 14, quoting United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 

240 (6th Cir.2004), quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.2004). 

" '[A] nexus exists between a known drug dealer's criminal activity and the dealer's 

residence when some reliable evidence exists connecting the criminal activity with the 

residence.' " Phillips at ¶ 14, quoting United States v. Gunter, 266 Fed.Appx. 415, 419 (6th 

Cir.2008). By contrast, "when 'the only evidence of a connection between illegal activity 

and the residence is unreliable, such as uncorroborated statements by a confidential 

informant, then a warrant may not issue allowing the search of the residence.' " Phillips at 

¶ 14, quoting Gunter at 419. 
No. 18AP-845 8 

{¶ 19} Young argues the information provided by the confidential informant did not 

provide probable cause that Young was storing drugs at 1008 Caldwell Place. This court 

recently considered the question of whether a sufficient nexus exists between a suspected 

drug dealer's criminal activity and the suspected drug dealer's residence. In Phillips, we 

held that "[t]he temporal proximity between appellant's arrivals to the residence and the 

controlled drug transactions, combined with Detective Grinstead's experience in narcotics 

investigations, provided the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that a nexus 

existed between the place to be searched and the alleged criminal activity, and, at the least, 

probable cause to believe the proceeds of a drug transaction would be located in the 

residence." Phillips at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 20} Although we are mindful that probable cause determinations are intensely 

fact-specific, we find Phillips to be directly on point to the issue here. In Phillips, a 

confidential informant disclosed to police officers the identity of a drug dealer. Using the 

informant's information, police set up a controlled drug transaction between the defendant 

and the informant, and police surveilled the transaction. The police officers in Phillips then 

kept the defendant under surveillance after he left the controlled drug transaction and went 

back to a house in Blacklick. That house ultimately became the subject of the search 

warrant. Additionally, the same detectives, Detective Earl and Detective Guy Grinstead, 

conducted the investigations and filed the search warrant affidavits both here and in 

Phillips. 

{¶ 21} Though Young acknowledges Phillips, he nonetheless argues Phillips is not 

controlling here, emphasizing that the informant in Young's case never indicated to police 

that he had been inside Young's residence and observed the presence of narcotics, and thus 

the information from the informant was insufficient to establish a nexus to search Young's 

residence. We note, however, that the informant in Phillips similarly did not indicate to 

police that he had been inside the defendant's residence and personally observed narcotics 

there. Moreover, despite Young's attempts to distinguish Phillips, Young ignores the 

critical factual information that police did not rely solely on the informant's information in 

obtaining the search warrant. While using the informant for the controlled drug 

transaction, police additionally surveilled Young, watching as he departed his residence 

immediately after the informant's phone call, drove directly to the location of the controlled 
No. 18AP-845 9 

transaction, engaged in the controlled transaction, and drove directly back to his residence. 

Additionally, Detective Earl stated in the affidavit that his significant experience in 

narcotics investigations led him to believe Young was storing narcotics at the residence, an 

important consideration in determining whether a nexus exists between the criminal 

activity and the location to be searched. Phillips at ¶ 24-26, citing United States v. Brown, 

828 F.3d 375 (6th Cir.2016). 

{¶ 22} In considering all of these facts under the totality of the circumstances, and 

mindful of the deference given to a magistrate's decision regarding the existence of 

probable cause, we find the search warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between 

the alleged criminal activity and the residence to be searched. See Phillips at ¶ 25. 

Accordingly, we conclude the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable 

cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant of Young's residence, and the trial court 

thus did not err in denying Young's motion to suppress. We overrule Young's sole 

assignment of error. 

IV. State's Motion to Dismiss 

{¶ 23} Also in this case, the state filed a motion to dismiss based on the "fugitive 

disentitlement doctrine" as a result of Young absconding from the jurisdiction of the court. 

However, having overruled Young's sole assignment of error, the state's motion to dismiss 

based upon the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine" is moot. State v. Bass, 10th Dist. No. 

03AP-1002, 2004-Ohio-2532, ¶ 11 (where an appellate court overrules the appellant's 

substantive assignments of error, the state's motion to dismiss the appeal based on the 

"fugitive disentitlement doctrine" is moot).

V. Disposition 

{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding 

probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. Having overruled Young's 

sole assignment of error, rendering moot the state's motion to dismiss, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT, P.J., and BEATTY BLUNT, J., concur.