(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MCLANE CO., INC. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 15–1248. Argued February 21, 2017—Decided April 3, 2017 

Damiana Ochoa worked for eight years in a physically demanding job

for petitioner McLane Co., a supply-chain services company. McLane 

requires employees in those positions—both new employees and

those returning from medical leave—to take a physical evaluation.

When Ochoa returned from three months of maternity leave, she 

failed the evaluation three times and was fired. She then filed a sex 

discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) began an investigation,

but McLane declined its request for so-called “pedigree information”:

names, Social Security numbers, addresses, and telephone numbers

of employees asked to take the evaluation. After the EEOC expanded

the investigation’s scope both geographically (to cover McLane’s national operations) and substantively (to investigate possible age discrimination), it issued subpoenas, as authorized by 42 U. S. C.

§2000e–9, requesting pedigree information relating to its new investigation. When McLane refused to provide the information, the

EEOC filed two actions in Federal District Court—one arising out of

Ochoa’s charge and one arising out of the EEOC’s own agediscrimination charge—seeking enforcement of its subpoenas. The 

District Judge declined to enforce the subpoenas, finding that the 

pedigree information was not relevant to the charges, but the Ninth 

Circuit reversed. Reviewing the District Court’s decision to quash 

the subpoena de novo, the court concluded that the lower court erred 

in finding the pedigree information irrelevant. 

Held: A district court’s decision whether to enforce or quash an EEOC 

subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. 

Pp. 6–12. 
 

 

2 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Syllabus 

(a) Both factors that this Court examines when considering whether such decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate review point toward abuse-of-discretion review. First, the 

longstanding practice of the courts of appeals is to review a district

court’s decision to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena for

abuse of discretion. Title VII confers on the EEOC the same authority to issue subpoenas that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)

confers on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During the

three decades between the NLRA’s enactment and the incorporation

of its subpoena-enforcement provisions into Title VII, every Circuit to

consider the question had held that a district court’s decision on enforcement of an NLRB subpoena is subject to abuse-of-discretion review. Congress amended Title VII to authorize EEOC subpoenas 

against this uniform backdrop of deferential appellate review, and 

today, nearly every Court of Appeals reviews a district court’s decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena for abuse of discretion. 

This “long history of appellate practice,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 

U. S. 552, 558, carries significant persuasive weight. 

Second, basic principles of institutional capacity counsel in favor of 

deferential review. In most cases, the district court’s enforcement decision will turn either on whether the evidence sought is relevant to

the specific charge or whether the subpoena is unduly burdensome in

light of the circumstances. Both of these tasks are well suited to a 

district judge’s expertise. The first requires the district court to evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought and 

the particular matter under investigation—an analysis “variable in

relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry.” Oklahoma 

Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 209. And whether a 

subpoena is overly burdensome turns on the nature of the materials

sought and the difficulty the employer will face in producing them—

“ ‘fact-intensive, close calls’ ” better suited to resolution by the district

court than the court of appeals. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 

496 U. S. 384, 404. 

Other functional considerations also show the appropriateness of

abuse-of-discretion review. For one, the district courts’ considerable 

experience in making similar decisions in other contexts, see Buford 

v. United States, 532 U. S. 59, 66, gives them the “institutional advantag[e],” id., at 64, that comes with greater experience. Deferential review also “streamline[s] the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering 

facts already weighed and considered by the district court,” Cooter & 

Gell, 496 U. S., at 404, something particularly important in a proceeding designed only to facilitate the EEOC’s investigation. Pp. 6–9.

(b) Court-appointed amicus’ arguments in support of de novo re-
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

view are not persuasive. Amicus claims that the district court’s primary task is to test a subpoena’s legal sufficiency and thus requires

no exercise of discretion. But that characterization is not inconsistent 

with abuse-of-discretion review, which may be employed to insulate

the trial judge’s decision from appellate review for the same kind of 

functional concerns that underpin the Court’s conclusion that abuse

of discretion is the appropriate standard. 

It is also unlikely that affording deferential review to a district

court’s subpoena decision would clash with Court of Appeals decisions that instructed district courts to defer to the EEOC’s determination about the relevance of evidence to the charge at issue. Such 

decisions are better read as resting on the established rule that the 

term “relevant” be understood “generously” to permit the EEOC “access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations

against the employer.” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 68–69. 

Nor do the constitutional underpinnings of the Shell Oil standard require a different result. While this Court has described a subpoena

as a “ ‘constructive’ search,” Oklahoma Press, 327 U. S., at 202, and 

implied that the Fourth Amendment is the source of the requirement 

that a subpoena not be “too indefinite,” United States v. Morton Salt 

Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652, not every decision touching on the Fourth

Amendment is subject to searching review. See, e.g., United States v. 

Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 702. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 236; 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, distinguished. Pp. 9–11.

(c) The case is remanded so that the Court of Appeals can review 

the District Court’s decision under the appropriate standard in the 

first instance. In doing so, the Court of Appeals may consider, as and

to the extent it deems appropriate, any of McLane’s arguments regarding the burdens imposed by the subpoena. Pp. 11–12. 

804 F. 3d 1051, vacated and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 

GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–1248 

MCLANE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER v. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 3, 2017]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to 

issue a subpoena to obtain evidence from an employer that 

is relevant to a pending investigation. The statute authorizes a district court to issue an order enforcing such a 

subpoena. The question presented here is whether a court 

of appeals should review a district court’s decision to

enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena de novo or for abuse 

of discretion. This decision should be reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. 

I 

A 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” §703(a), 78 Stat. 255, 42 

U. S. C. §2000e–2(a). The statute entrusts the enforcement of that prohibition to the EEOC. See §2000e–5(a); 

EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 61–62 (1984). The 

EEOC’s responsibilities “are triggered by the filing of a 

specific sworn charge of discrimination,” University of Pa. 
 

 

2 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 190 (1990), which can be filed 

either by the person alleging discrimination or by the

EEOC itself, see §2000e–5(b). When it receives a charge,

the EEOC must first notify the employer, ibid., and must 

then investigate “to determine whether there is reasonable

cause to believe that the charge is true,” University of Pa., 

493 U. S., at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This case is about one of the tools the EEOC has at its 

disposal in conducting its investigation: a subpoena. In 

order “[t]o enable the [EEOC] to make informed decisions 

at each stage of the enforcement process,” Title VII “confers a broad right of access to relevant evidence.” Id., at 

191. It provides that the EEOC “shall . . . have access to, 

for the purposes of examination, . . . any evidence of any 

person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by” Title 

VII and “is relevant to the charge under investigation.” 42 

U. S. C. §2000e–8(a). And the statute enables the EEOC 

to obtain that evidence by “authoriz[ing] [it] to issue a

subpoena and to seek an order enforcing [the subpoena].” 

University of Pa., 493 U. S., at 191; see §2000e–9.1 Under 

that authority, the EEOC may issue “subp[o]enas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the

production of any evidence.” 29 U. S. C. §161(1). An 

employer may petition the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, 

see ibid., but if the EEOC rejects the petition and the

employer still “refuse[s] to obey [the] subp[o]ena,” the 

EEOC may ask a district court to issue an order enforcing 

it, see §161(2). 

A district court’s role in an EEOC subpoena enforcement

proceeding, we have twice explained, is a straightforward 

—————— 

1The statute does so by conferring on the EEOC the same authority

given to the National Labor Relations Board to conduct investigations.

See 42 U. S. C. §2000e–9 (“For the purpose of all . . . investigations

conducted by the Commission . . . section 161 of title 29 shall apply”). 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

one. See University of Pa., 493 U. S., at 191; Shell Oil, 466 

U. S., at 72, n. 26. A district court is not to use an enforcement proceeding as an opportunity to test the 

strength of the underlying complaint. Ibid. Rather, a 

district court should “‘satisfy itself that the charge is valid 

and that the material requested is “relevant” to the

charge.’” University of Pa., 493 U. S., at 191. It should do 

so cognizant of the “generou[s]” construction that courts 

have given the term “relevant.” Shell Oil, 466 U. S., at 

68–69 (“virtually any material that might cast light on the

allegations against the employer”). If the charge is proper

and the material requested is relevant, the district court

should enforce the subpoena unless the employer establishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burdensome. Id., at 72, n. 26. See United States v. Morton Salt 

Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652–653 (1950) (“The gist of the protection is in the requirement . . . that the disclosure sought

shall not be unreasonable” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

B 

This case arises out of a Title VII suit filed by a woman 

named Damiana Ochoa. Ochoa worked for eight years as 

a “cigarette selector” for petitioner McLane Co., a supplychain services company. According to McLane, the job is a

demanding one: Cigarette selectors work in distribution

centers, where they are required to lift, pack, and move 

large bins containing products. McLane requires employees taking physically demanding jobs—both new employees and employees returning from medical leave—to take

a physical evaluation. According to McLane, the evaluation “tests . . . range of motion, resistance, and speed” 

and “is designed, administered, and validated by a third 

party.” Brief for Petitioner 6. In 2007, Ochoa took three 

months of maternity leave. When she attempted to return 
 

 

4 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

to work, McLane asked her to take the evaluation. Ochoa 

attempted to pass the evaluation three times, but failed.

McLane fired her. 

Ochoa filed a charge of discrimination, alleging (among

other things) that she had been fired on the basis of her 

gender. The EEOC began an investigation, and—at its

request—McLane provided it with basic information about 

the evaluation, as well as a list of anonymous employees

that McLane had asked to take the evaluation. McLane’s 

list included each employee’s gender, role at the company,

and evaluation score, as well as the reason each employee

had been asked to take the evaluation. But the company

refused to provide what the parties call “pedigree information”: the names, Social Security numbers, last known 

addresses, and telephone numbers of the employees who

had been asked to take the evaluation. Upon learning

that McLane used the evaluation nationwide, the EEOC 

expanded the scope of its investigation, both geographically (to focus on McLane’s nationwide operations) and substantively (to investigate whether McLane had discriminated against its employees on the basis of age). It issued 

subpoenas requesting pedigree information as it related to 

its new investigation. But McLane refused to provide

the pedigree information, and so the EEOC filed two 

actions in Federal District Court—one arising out of

Ochoa’s charge and one arising out of a separate agediscrimination charge the EEOC itself had filed—seeking 

enforcement of its subpoenas.

The enforcement actions were assigned to the same 

District Judge, who, after a hearing, declined to enforce 

the subpoenas to the extent that they sought the pedigree

information. See EEOC v. McLane Co., 2012 WL 1132758, 

*5 (D Ariz., Apr. 4, 2012) (age discrimination charge); Civ.

No. 12–2469 (D Ariz., Nov. 19, 2012), App. to Pet. for Cert. 
 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

28–30 (Title VII charge).2 In the District Court’s view, the 

pedigree information was not “relevant” to the charges 

because “‘an individual’s name, or even an interview he or 

she could provide if contacted, simply could not shed light

on whether the [evaluation] represents a tool of . . . discrimination.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29 (quoting 2012 WL

1132758, at *5; some internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit reversed. See 804 F. 3d 1051 (2015).

Consistent with Circuit precedent, the panel reviewed the

District Court’s decision to quash the subpoena de novo, 

and concluded that the District Court had erred in finding

the pedigree information irrelevant. Id., at 1057. But the 

panel questioned in a footnote why de novo review applied,

observing that its sister Circuits “appear[ed] to review 

issues related to enforcement of administrative subpoenas 

for abuse of discretion.” Id., at 1056, n. 3; see infra, at 7 

(reviewing Court of Appeals authority).

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement between the Courts of Appeals over the appropriate

standard of review for the decision whether to enforce an 

EEOC subpoena. 579 U. S. ___ (2016). Because the United 

States agrees with McLane that such a decision should

be reviewed for abuse of discretion, Stephen B. Kinnard

was appointed as amicus curiae to defend the judgment

below. 580 U. S. ___ (2016). He has ably discharged his 

duties. 

—————— 

2The District Court also refused to enforce the subpoena to the extent

that it sought a second category of evidence: information about when 

and why those employees who had been fired after taking the test had

been fired. The District Court provided no explanation for not enforcing the subpoena to the extent it sought this information, and the Court 

of Appeals reversed on that ground. 804 F. 3d 1051, 1059 (CA9 2015). 

McLane does not challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. 

See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. 
 

6 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

II
 

A 

When considering whether a district court’s decision 

should be subject to searching or deferential appellate 

review—at least absent “explicit statutory command”—we

traditionally look to two factors. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 

U. S. 552, 558 (1988). First, we ask whether the “history

of appellate practice” yields an answer. Ibid. Second, at 

least where “neither a clear statutory prescription nor a

historical tradition exists,” we ask whether, “‘as a matter 

of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is 

better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.’” Id., at 558, 559–560 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 

U. S. 104, 114 (1985)). Both factors point toward abuse-ofdiscretion review here. 

First, the longstanding practice of the courts of appeals 

in reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or quash

an administrative subpoena is to review that decision for 

abuse of discretion. That practice predates even Title VII 

itself. As noted, Title VII confers on the EEOC the same 

authority to issue subpoenas that the National Labor 

Relations Act (NLRA) confers on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See n. 1, supra. During the three

decades between the enactment of the NLRA and the 

incorporation of the NLRA’s subpoena-enforcement provisions into Title VII, every Circuit to consider the question 

had held that a district court’s decision whether to enforce 

an NLRB subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See NLRB v. Consolidated Vacuum Corp., 395 F. 2d 

416, 419–420 (CA2 1968); NLRB v. Friedman, 352 F. 2d 

545, 547 (CA3 1965); NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 148 

F. 2d 24, 29 (CA7 1945); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 

NLRB, 122 F. 2d 450, 453–454 (CA6 1941). By the time

Congress amended Title VII to authorize EEOC subpoenas

in 1972, it did so against this uniform backdrop of deferential appellate review. 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Today, nearly as uniformly, the Courts of Appeals apply

the same deferential review to a district court’s decision as 

to whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena. Almost every

Court of Appeals reviews such a decision for abuse of

discretion. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 620 F. 3d 287, 

295–296 (CA3 2010); EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F. 3d 433, 

442 (CA4 2012); EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., 261 

F. 3d 634, 638 (CA6 2001); EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 

287 F. 3d 643, 649 (CA7 2002); EEOC v. Technocrest Systems, Inc., 448 F. 3d 1035, 1038 (CA8 2006); EEOC v. 

Dillon Companies, Inc., 310 F. 3d 1271, 1274 (CA10 2002); 

EEOC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F. 3d 757, 

760 (CA11 2014) (per curiam). As Judge Watford—writing 

for the panel below—recognized, the Ninth Circuit alone 

applies a more searching form of review. See 804 F. 3d, at 

1056, n. 3 (“Why we review questions of relevance and 

undue burden de novo is unclear”); see also EPA v. Alyeska 

Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F. 2d 443, 445–446 (CA9 1988) 

(holding that de novo review applies). To be sure, the 

inquiry into the appropriate standard of review cannot be

resolved by a head-counting exercise. But the “long history of appellate practice” here, Pierce, 487 U. S., at 558, 

carries significant persuasive weight.

Second, basic principles of institutional capacity counsel

in favor of deferential review. The decision whether to 

enforce an EEOC subpoena is a case-specific one that 

turns not on “a neat set of legal rules,” Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983), but instead on the application of 

broad standards to “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow

facts that utterly resist generalization,” Pierce, 487 U. S., 

at 561–562 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 

mine run of cases, the district court’s decision whether to 

enforce a subpoena will turn either on whether the evidence sought is relevant to the specific charge before it or

whether the subpoena is unduly burdensome in light of 

the circumstances. Both tasks are well suited to a district 
 

8 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

judge’s expertise. The decision whether evidence sought is

relevant requires the district court to evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought and the 

particular matter under investigation—an analysis “variable in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the 

inquiry.” Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 

U. S. 186, 209 (1946). Similarly, the decision whether a

subpoena is overly burdensome turns on the nature of the

materials sought and the difficulty the employer will face 

in producing them. These inquiries are “generally not 

amenable to broad per se rules,” Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U. S. 379, 387 (2008); rather, 

they are the kind of “fact-intensive, close calls” better

suited to resolution by the district court than the court of 

appeals, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 

404 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 

Other functional considerations also show that abuse-ofdiscretion review is appropriate here. For one, district 

courts have considerable experience in other contexts

making decisions similar—though not identical—to those

they must make in this one. See Buford v. United States, 

532 U. S. 59, 66 (2001) (“[T]he comparatively greater 

expertise” of the district court may counsel in favor of 

deferential review). District courts decide, for instance, 

whether evidence is relevant at trial, Fed. Rule Evid. 401; 

whether pretrial criminal subpoenas are unreasonable in 

—————— 

3To be sure, there are pure questions of law embedded in a district

court’s decision to enforce or quash a subpoena. Whether a charge is 

“valid,” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 72, n. 26 (1984)—that is, 

legally sufficient—is a pure question of law. And the question whether

a district court employed the correct standard of relevance, see id., at 

68–69—as opposed to how it applied that standard to the facts of a

given case—is a question of law. But “applying a unitary abuse-ofdiscretion standard” does not shelter a district court that makes an 

error of law, because “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its 

discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter 

& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 403, 405 (1990). 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

scope, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(c)(2); and more. These 

decisions are not the same as the decisions a district court 

must make in enforcing an administrative subpoena. But 

they are similar enough to give the district court the “institutional advantag[e],” Buford, 532 U. S., at 64, that 

comes with greater experience. For another, as we noted 

in Cooter & Gell, deferential review “streamline[s] the 

litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty

of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already

weighed and considered by the district court,” 496 U. S., at 

404—a particularly important consideration in a “satellite” proceeding like this one, ibid., designed only to facilitate the EEOC’s investigation. 

B 

Amicus’ arguments to the contrary have aided our consideration of this case. But they do not persuade us that 

de novo review is appropriate. 

Amicus’ central argument is that the decision whether a

subpoena should be enforced does not require the exercise

of discretion on the part of the district court, and so it 

should not be reviewed for abuse of discretion. On amicus’ 

view, the district court’s primary role is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the subpoena, not to weigh whether it should 

be enforced as a substantive matter. Cf. Shell Oil, 466 

U. S., at 72, n. 26 (rejecting the argument that the district 

court should assess the validity of the underlying claim in 

a proceeding to enforce a subpoena). Even accepting 

amicus’ view of the district court’s task, however, this 

understanding of abuse-of-discretion review is too narrow. 

As commentators have observed, abuse-of-discretion review is employed not only where a decisionmaker has “a 

wide range of choice as to what he decides, free from the 

constraints which characteristically attach whenever legal

rules enter the decision[making] process”; it is also employed where the trial judge’s decision is given “an unu- 
 

 

10 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

sual amount of insulation from appellate revision” for functional reasons. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial 

Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 637

(1971); see also 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §5166.1 (2d ed. 2012). And as we have 

explained, it is in large part due to functional concerns

that we conclude the district court’s decision should be 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Even if the district 

court’s decision can be characterized in the way that amicus suggests, that characterization would not be inconsistent with abuse-of-discretion review. 

Nor are we persuaded by amicus’ remaining arguments. 

Amicus argues that affording deferential review to a district court’s decision would clash with Court of Appeals 

decisions instructing district courts to defer themselves to

the EEOC’s determination that evidence is relevant to the 

charge at issue. See Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 

v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F. 3d 1304, 1307 (CADC 

1997) (district courts should defer to agency appraisals of 

relevance unless they are “obviously wrong”); EEOC v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., Aero & Naval Systems, 116 F. 3d 

110, 113 (CA4 1997) (same). In amicus’ view, it is “analytically impossible” for the court of appeals to defer to the 

district court if the district court must itself defer to the 

agency. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. We think the better reading 

of those cases is that they rest on the established rule that 

the term “relevant” be understood “generously” to permit

the EEOC “access to virtually any material that might

cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Shell 

Oil, 466 U. S., at 68–69. A district court deciding whether 

evidence is “relevant” under Title VII need not defer to the 

EEOC’s decision on that score; it must simply answer the 

question cognizant of the agency’s broad authority to seek 

and obtain evidence. Because the statute does not set up 

any scheme of double deference, amicus’ arguments as to

the infirmities of such a scheme are misplaced. 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

Nor do we agree that, as amicus suggests, the constitutional underpinnings of the Shell Oil standard require a 

different result. To be sure, we have described a subpoena

as a “‘constructive’ search,” Oklahoma Press, 327 U. S., at 

202, and implied that the Fourth Amendment is the

source of the requirement that a subpoena not be “too

indefinite,” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 652. But not every

decision that touches on the Fourth Amendment is subject

to searching review. Subpoenas in a wide variety of other 

contexts also implicate the privacy interests protected by

the Fourth Amendment, but courts routinely review the 

enforcement of such subpoenas for abuse of discretion.

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974) 

(pretrial subpoenas duces tecum); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F. 3d 428, 432 (CA5 2012) (grand jury subpoenas); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F. 3d 1186, 1201 

(CA10 2010) (same). And this Court has emphasized that

courts should pay “great deference” to a magistrate judge’s

determination of probable cause, Gates, 462 U. S., at 236 

(internal quotation marks omitted)—a decision more akin 

to a district court’s preenforcement review of a subpoena 

than the warrantless searches and seizures we considered 

in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 (1996), on which 

amicus places great weight. The constitutional pedigree of 

Shell Oil does not change our view of the correct standard 

of review. 

III 

For these reasons, a district court’s decision to enforce 

an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. 

The United States also argues that the judgment below 

can be affirmed because it is clear that the District Court 

abused its discretion. But “we are a court of review, not of 

first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 

(2005), and the Court of Appeals has not had the chance to 
 

12 MCLANE CO. v. EEOC 

Opinion of the Court 

review the District Court’s decision under the appropriate 

standard. That task is for the Court of Appeals in the first 

instance. As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals may 

also consider, as and to the extent it deems appropriate,

any arguments made by McLane regarding the burdens

imposed by the subpoena.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby vacated,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–1248 

MCLANE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER v. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 3, 2017]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. 

While I agree with the Court that “abuse of discretion” 

is generally the proper review standard for district court

decisions reviewing agency subpoenas, I would nevertheless affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in this case. As 

the Court of Appeals explained, the District Court’s refusal to enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission’s (EEOC) subpoena for pedigree information 

rested on a legal error. Lower court resolution of a question of law is ordinarily reviewable de novo on appeal. 

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, 

Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___, and n. 2 (2014) (slip op., at 4, and 

n. 2). According to the District Court, it was not yet “necessary [for the EEOC] to seek such information.” 2012 WL 

5868959, *6 (D Ariz., Nov. 19, 2012). As the Ninth Circuit 

correctly conveyed, however: “The EEOC does not have to

show a ‘particularized necessity of access, beyond a showing of mere relevance,’ to obtain evidence.” 804 F. 3d 

1051, 1057 (2015) (quoting University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 

U. S. 182, 188 (1990)). Because the District Court erred as 

a matter of law in demanding that the EEOC show more

than relevance in order to gain enforcement of its subpoena, I would not disturb the Court of Appeals’ judgment.