### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 16 , 200 5 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . SHANNON A. HOLL ADAY Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Anderson County No. A4CR0044 Jam es B. Scott, Jr ., Judge

No. E2004-02858-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Fe bruary 8, 2006

G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J

. , co n cu rr i n g.
I ag ree with the majority

that t h i s ca s e i s not properly befor e this court for

an appe al as of rig ht pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that it does not qualify as an e xtra or din ary

app e a l un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 10

. I write se pa rate ly be c aus e it i s my vie w that th e dis mis sa l of the state app e a l mi g ht i mpl y that e vid e nc e ob ta ine d f ro m a vehicle' s event data re corde r (the air bag sensor module) is g ener ally inadmissible.
An " e ve nt d a ta

re c or de r" ha s b e e n d e fi ne d b y the Natio na l H ig hw a y

Tr a ff ic Sa fe ty Administration as "a

device installed in a motor vehicle to r ecor d t ec hnical vehic le and oc cupant information for a

brief pe riod of time ( seconds, not minutes) befor e, during and afte r a cra sh." Eve nt Data Re c or de r Ap pli c a tio ns fo r H ig hw a y a ndTr a ff ic Sa fe ty , h ttp :/w ww -n rd .n hts a .d ot. g ov /e dr -s ite (last visited Fe b. 2, 2006). The data re corde d varie s by model but commonly

rec orded information ma y inc lud e " (1 ) p re -c ra sh ve hic le dyna mic s a nd sy ste m status , (2 ) dri ve r i np uts , ( 3) ve hic le c ra sh signature, (4) restraint usag e/deployment status, and (5) post-c rash data such a s the activation of an automatic collision notification (ACN) sy stem." I d

. The fir st such device s were available in the 1970' s but were not installed on most passenge r ca rs until twenty y ear s later. Event Data Re corde r Ap pli c atio ns fo r H ig hw ay

and Tr a ff ic Safe ty , h ttp :/ www -nr d. nh ts a.d ot .gov /ed r-s it e/histo ry .h tml(l a st visited Feb. 2, 2006) . I n Marc h of 2000, the Ve ntronix Corporation made its Crash Data Retrie val Sy stem, which is a devic e used to downloa d informat i o n fr o m event data re corde rs in Gene ral Motors vehicles, a vailable f or sale to the public. I d. Since that time, sever al courts have c onsidered the a dmi ssi bil ity

of the inf orma tio n f

ro m e ve nt d a ta

re c or de rs a nd c on c lud e d tha t it wa s a dmi ssi ble under the test established in Fry e v. United States, 293 F . 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). S ee Matos v. St ate, 899 So. 2d 403, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); B achma n v. Gene ral Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 281 (I ll. App. Ct. 2002). The Fr y e t es t wa s superc eded in this state by the adoption of Te nnessee Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. McDa niel v. CSX Tr ansp., 955 S.W .2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) . Our su pr e me c ou rt

ha s o bs e rv e d, ho we ve r, that th e te st f or a dmi ssi bil ity

un de r R ule s 7 02 a nd70 3 is " le ss restric tive" that the g ener al ac cepta nce te st adopted in Fr y e. I d

. at 262. I n conseque nce, suc h evidenc e should be a dmissibl e in this state.I n M a i n e , for ex a mp l e , t h e eq u i pm e n t s u bj e c t t o i n s pe c t i on i n c l u de s bo dy c om po n e n t s , br a k e s , e x h a u s t s y s t e m, 1 gl azi ng, ho rn , l i ght s and dir ect i o nal s i gnal s, rearvi ew m i rr o rs , ref l ect o rs , runni ng gear, s afet y s eat be l t s, s t eeri ng (c o n tinu e d ...) -2- The is s ue in this case, how ever , is not the admissibi lityof the data under the Rules of Evidence but whether

the data was g ather ed in a manner that violated the def endant' s constitutional rig hts. The threshold inquiry is w hether the defe ndant had a re asonable expectation of privac y in the information re corde d by

the eve nt data re corde r, which w as re fer red to at trial as the air

bag sensor m o d u l e
. In t h e tr i a l c o u r t , t h e s t a t e s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d a n e x p e c t a t i o n o f p r i v a c y
. It ha s c ha ng e d it s p os iti on in thi s app eal. B e c aus e the de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r a re a so na ble expectation of privac y exis ts is a leg al conc lusion, see United States v. Ramapur am, 632 F.2d 1149, 1 1 5 5 (4 t h C i r. 1 9 8 0 ), ce rt

. d en i e d , 4 5 0 U

. S

. 1 0 3 0 (1 9 8 1 ), t h i s co u rt i s n o tb o u n d b y t h e s t at e's conce ssion, see State v. Jackson, 173 S.W .3d 401, 406 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that the standar d of revie w for que stions of law is de novo without a pre sumption of corre ctness). The United States Supre me Court has held that when considering w hether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, a r eviewing court must determine (1) " whether

the individual, by

his c o n duct, has ' exhibi ted an a ctual (subjec tive) expectation of priva c y ' " a nd(2 ) " wh e the r the ind iv id ual 's su bje c tiv e e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y is ' on e that so c ie ty

is prepa red to re cog nize a s rea sonable.' " Smit h v. Mary land, 442 U.S. 735, 740 ( U.S. 1979) (quoting Katz v. Un ite d St a te s, 38 9 U .S. 34 7, 36 1 ( U. S. 1 96 7) ). Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s a pp lie d th e sa me analy sis under article 1, section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution. See State v. Munn, 56 S.W .3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001)

. I n this case, the de fendant's damag ed v eh i cl e was transported at the r equest of la w enfor ceme nt to L owe' s Towing in Cli nton following the acc ident. Trooper Fox, who had spec ialized training and possessed e quipment with the capability of g athering the information containe d in an e ve nt d a ta re c or de r, te sti fi e d tha t he re tr ie ve d the data a s a part of the inv e sti g a tio n in to the a c c ide nt. Whil e conc eding that his searc h was not a part of an inve ntory proce ss, Trooper

Fox described how he cut a two-inch hole in the c arpe t underne ath the passe ng er' s seat of the de fendant's 2002 Chevr olet Cavalier in or der to g ain ac cess to the e vent data r ecor der. H e then loaded t he data from the r ecor der on to h is l apto p c omp ute r u sin g the Ve ntr on ix Cra sh Data Re tr ie va l Sy ste m. The United States Supre me Court has consistently h el d t h at althoug h "the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privac y that exis t w ith r espec t to one' s home, a c ar' s in te ri or a s a wh ole is n on e the le ss s ub je c t to F ou rth A me nd me nt p ro te c tio n f ro m un re a so na

ble intrusions by

the police." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115 (U.S. 1986); see also United States v. Rascon -Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754-755 ( 10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the e x terior of a ca r does not constitute a search" ); United S tates v. Geor g e, 971 F.2d 1113, 1119-1120 (4th Cir. 1992).
I n some states, courts have he ld that when the ve hicle is subject to re g ulation and inspection, the owner does not h av e a re asonable expectation of privac y in the component parts. See, e.g ., 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1 mechan i s m, t i r es , wi nds hi el d wi pers , ca t al y t i c c onver t er , an d f i l l er ne ck r es t r i ct i on. Fur t her , t he i ns pect i on of ve hi cl es r eg i s t er ed i n c er t ai n c ou n t i es i n cl u des t h e f u el t an k c ap an d t h e on
- boar d di ag n os t i c s y s t em. M e. Rev

. St at

. An n
. t i t

. 29, § 1 7 5 1 (20 0 5 ).

-3- Massac husetts v. Mamacos, 568 N.E .2d 1139 (Mass. 1991); State v. McManus, 1995 Me. Super. LEXI S 416, 6-9 (Me. Super. Ct. 1995). Those states, unlike Tenne ssee, ha ve statutes which r equire the annua l inspection of all vehicle s reg istered within the state. Be cause that extent of reg ulation of vehicles doe s not ex ist in t his state, this court cannot c onclude that the def endant did not have a rea sonable e x pectation of privacy in the event data re corde r, at lea st from this perspec tive. Courts of other states, e ven those without signif icant re g ulation of reg istered ve hicles, have c on c lud e d th a t a n o wn e r doe s not ha ve a priva c y int e re st in a veh ic le that has be e n to ta lly or pa rt ia lly d e s tr o ye d

. S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. M e t z g e r , 7 7 8 F

. 2 d 1 1 9 5 , 1 1 9 9

- 1 2 0 0 ( 6 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 5 ) ; S t a t e v
. J a c o b y, 907 So. 2d 676, 680-681 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 2005). I n Michig an v. Clifford, which dealt with the war rantless e ntry

into a home that had be en destroy ed by fire, the Unites States Supreme Court ruled that "[p]rivacy expectations will va ry with the type of pr operty , the amount of . . . da mag e, the prior a ndc on tin ue d u se of the pr e mis e s, a ndin s ome c a se s th e ow ne r' s e ff orts t o s e c ur e it a g a ins t int ru de rs ." 46 4 U .S. 28 7, 29 2 ( 19 84 ). Th e hig h Co urt ob se rv e d th a t "[ s] ome f ir e s may be so d ev as t at i n g t h atn o re as o n ab l e p ri v ac y i n t er es t s re m ai n i n t h e as h an d ru i n s , re gar d l es s o f t h e o wn er 's subjective e x pectations." I d. I n this case, howe ver, there wa s no proof a s to the ext ent of the damag e to the def

endant' s vehicle. Thus, this court cannot conclude that the vehicle was so dama g ed as to remove the expectation of priva cy in the vehicle' s interior.
As indicated ab ove, neither reg ulation by

the state nor damag e fr om the acc ident (none ha vin g be e n e sta

bli sh e d by the state ) dim ini sh e d the de fe nd a nt' s e xpe c ta tio n in the event data re c or de r, wh ic h w a s lo c a te d ina no n- vis ibl e po rt ionof

the ve hic le ' s int e ri or
. Se e Cla ss, 47 5 U .S. at 114-115 (obse rving that a re asonable expectation of privac y exis ts in those portions of the interior of a ve hicle that are not visible to the public). In conseque nce, it is my view that the de fendant had a re asonable expectation in the event data re corde r.
Be cause the def

endant ha d a re asonable expectation of privacy in the event data re corde r, the question is whether the sear ch wa s proper . Both the state and fed er al consti tutions protect individuals from unrea sonable sea rche s and seiz ures; the ge nera l rule is that a wa rra ntless searc h or se izur e is pr e su me d unr e a so na ble a nd a ny e vid e nc e dis c ov e re d sub je c t to su pp re ssi on . U .S. Con st. a me nd . IV; Te nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 7; Coo lid g e v. Ne w H a mps hir e , 4 03 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5 ( 19 71 ); State v. Bridge s, 963 S.W .2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997). The bur den of e stablishing the leg ality of a war rantless sea

rch r ests with the state. State v. Troxell, 78 S.W .3d 866, 868-869 (Te nn. 2002).
I n this case, the pr osecutor i n d i cate d at the hea ring on the motion to suppress that the defe ndant' s vehicle w as seized at the sc ene of the a ccide nt as a pa rt of the investig ation. She stated that th e ve hic le wa s th e n to we d to a n impo un d lo t us e d b y the po lic e
. Th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot c on te st-4-

the seizure of the vehicle and indicated that the only issue befor e the tria l court wa s the taking of the data f rom the eve nt data re corde r.
Th e ve hic le e xce pti on to the wa rr an t r e q u i re me nt, fi rs t r e c og nize d inCarr oll v. Un ite d St a te s, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), is based upon mobile nature of ve hicles and upon the lessened e x pectation of privac y in vehicles a s compare d to residenc es. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1 97 6)

. Whe n the re is p ro ba ble c aus e to b e lie ve that a ve hic le c on ta ins e vid e nc e of a c ri me a nd" if the re are e xig e nt c ir c ums ta nc e s necess itatin g a n im me diate se arc h a ndse izur e ," the wa rr a ntl e ss sear ch o f a v eh i cl e i s permitted. See State v. Shrum, 643 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. 1982). The vehicle e x ception has been applied not only to the passeng er c ompartment, but also to "a locked c ar trunk, a sea led pac kag e in a car trunk, a closed compartment unde r the da shboard, the interior of a vehicle' s upholstery , [and] seale d packa g es in side a c overe d pickup truck." California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386, 392 (U.S. 1985) (c itations omi tte d ). I n Cormey v. Kentucky , the Kentuc ky Court of Ap pe a ls c on c lud e d th a t " [b]e c aus e a ve hic le is sub

je c t to a wa rr a ntl e ss s e arc h o n p ro ba

ble c aus e if the ve hic le c on ta ins e vid e nc e of a c ri me, th e veh ic le sh ou ld l ike wi se be su bje c t to a wa rr a ntl e ss seizure if the ve hicle itself is an instrument of c rime." 943 S.W .2d 629, 632 (Ky . Ct. App. 1996) ); see a lso Capraro v. Bun t , 4 4 F.3d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1995); M.C.J . v. State, 444 So. 2d 1001, 10 03 -1 00 4 (F la

. Di st. Ct. Ap p. 19 84 ). Th e de fe nd a nt' s c ar c on ta ine d e vid e nc e of a po ssi ble c ri me a nd , inmy

vie w, wa s a n i ns tr um ent of anypo ssi ble c ri me . B a se d u po n th e se auth oriti e s, it i s my vie w that th e se izur e of

the de fe nd a nt' s v e hic le imm e diate ly fo llo wi ng the c ra sh did no t vi olate constitutional protections ag ainst unrea sonable sea rch and seizure. Finally , when the police reta in rig htful custody of a vehicle, they may conduct a ny nece ssary testing. See State v. McDona ld, 872 P.2d 627, 642 (Alaska App. 1994) ("[I ]f the initi al seizure wa s upon probable cause that the i tem would be of evidentiary value, it may be tested and examined for the pu rp os e [of

] ma ximizin g its va lue in this re sp e c t." ). I t is my vi ew th at a ny te sti ng wo uld ne c e ssa ri ly inc lud e a n a na ly sis of

the inf orma tio n s tor e d inthe e ve nt d a ta re c or de r. Pol ic e ro uti ne ly a nd pr op e rl y c on du c t te sti ng of ite ms t ake n in to e vid e nc e a nd , u nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, a ve hic le is n o d if fe re nt. Ac c or din g ly , it

is m y vie w that th e se arc h w a s n ot u nc on sti tut ion a l.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE