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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 12-CF-1837

EDDIE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,

v.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia

(CF2-4178-12)

(Hon. Florence Y. Pan, Trial Judge)

(Submitted February 5, 2014 Decided January 15, 2015)

Ian A. Williams was on the brief for appellant.

Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman,

Veronica M. Sanchez, and David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

were on the brief, for appellee.

Before THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior 

Judge.

RUIZ, Senior Judge: On July 5, 2012, appellant Eddie Williams was charged 

by superseding indictment with assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW),

1

 

1 D.C. Code §§ 22-402, -3611 (2012 Repl.).
2

possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV),2threats to injure 

another person (felony threats),

3

and commission of a felony while on release.4

The first three charges were tried by a jury, which convicted appellant of felony 

threats and acquitted him of ADW5and PFCV. The court convicted him of 

committing a felony while on release. Appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling 

admitting evidence that he had previously threatened the complaining witness on 

multiple occasions, once while armed. He also contends that the trial court 

improperly admonished a witness to ―tell the truth‖ in the jury’s presence, and 

impermissibly based appellant’s sentence in part on finding that appellant was 

armed when he threatened the complaining witness, even though the jury acquitted 

him of the weapons offenses. We conclude that appellant did not suffer substantial 

prejudice as a result of the asserted errors, and affirm the convictions.

 

2 D.C. Code § 22-4504 (b) (2012 Repl.).

3 D.C. Code § 22-1810 (2012 Repl.).

4 D.C. Code § 23-1328 (a)(1) (2012 Repl.).

5

The jury hung on the lesser-included offense of simple assault. 
3

I.

All charges arise from a single incident on October 11, 2011, when appellant

approached a neighbor, D.J., and threatened to shoot him. D.J. and a friend who 

witnessed the encounter testified that they saw appellant reach into the waist or 

pocket of his jeans to reveal what looked like the handle of a gun. As the jury 

learned, this was not the first hostile interaction between appellant and D.J. They 

had met about one year before, right after D.J. had moved to the 37th Street, S.E. 

neighborhood, when appellant put a gun to D.J.’s head and told him to ―give me all 

your shit.‖ D.J. said at trial that the weapon appellant put to his head, which he 

saw from the ―corner of [his] eye,‖ looked ―like a toy gun,‖ like a ―gray or black‖

9-mm gun. When D.J. resisted, appellant tried to ―jack‖6him and asked him to go 

to the ―cut,‖ an invitation that D.J. refused because he did not want appellant ―to 

shoot‖ him. D.J. also testified that after that initial encounter appellant would call 

him ―bitch ass‖ and taunt him on ―a weekly or monthly basis‖ about D.J.’s former 

neighborhood, as ―everybody‖ did. 

 

6

 D.J. explained that ―jack‖ means ―like they trying to get me like play with 

me like.‖
4

II.

On appeal, appellant contends that the jury should not have been allowed to 

hear evidence that: (1) he had once assaulted and made many taunting remarks to 

D.J. during the course of the year prior to the October 11, 2011, incident that 

underlay the charges, and (2) he was armed with what looked like a gray or black

9-mm gun a year before the charged offenses. The court admitted evidence of 

appellant’s past taunts and armed assault against D.J. as relevant to the felony 

threats count because it showed the relationship between the parties and explained 

why D.J. would have believed that appellant was reaching for a gun. The trial 

court ruled that evidence that appellant had brandished a weapon at D.J. in the past 

was also relevant to the ADW and PFCV counts, insofar as it provided reason to 

think that appellant owned the weapon used to commit the charged offenses. The 

trial judge considered that ―the probative value is clearly far greater than any 

prejudicial effect.‖ 

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See

(Markus) Johnson v. United States, 960 A.2d 281, 294 (D.C. 2008). We apply a 

five-step analysis in reviewing whether the trial court has properly exercised

discretion. Id. at 295 (citing (James) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363-
5

67 (D.C. 1979)). Part of the abuse of discretion standard includes an inquiry into 

whether substantial prejudice has ensued as a result of the trial court’s 

discretionary action. Id.

It is a longstanding rule in this jurisdiction that in order to safeguard the 

presumption of innocence, evidence of a defendant’s past bad acts is inadmissible

to prove disposition to commit the charged crimes. See, e.g., Harris v. United 

States, 366 A.2d 461, 463 (D.C. 1976) (citing Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 

89 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). Such evidence is admissible only if offered for a substantial, 

legitimate purpose, such as proving motive, intent, common plan, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident, id. at 463 n.5 (quoting Drew, 331 F.2d at 90), and 

only if the issue is genuine, disputed, and material in the case. See Campbell v. 

United States, 450 A.2d 428, 430 (D.C. 1982) (citing Willcher v. United States, 

408 A.2d 67, 75-76 (D.C. 1979)). However, evidence of the defendant’s past bad 

acts does not come within the general rule of exclusion if it is ―(1) direct and 

substantial proof of the charged crime, (2) closely intertwined with the evidence of 

the charged crime, or (3) necessary to place the charged crime in understandable 

context.‖ (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. 1996) 

(en banc). Evidence of past acts that place the charged crime in context are those 

that are ―so closely related to the charged offense in time or place that they are 
6

necessary to complete the story of the crime by . . . placing it in context of nearby 

and nearly contemporaneous happenings.‖ Id. (quoting Holmes v. United States, 

580 A.2d 1259, 1266 (D.C. 1990)); see Wilson v. United States, 690 A.2d 468, 469 

(D.C. 1997) (defendant’s threats to kill the decedent days before decedent was 

killed were admissible because ―relatively contemporaneous‖ with the charged 

offense). As with any other relevant evidence, the trial court must exclude 

otherwise admissible evidence of the defendant’s past bad acts if its probative 

value is ―substantially outweighed‖ by the risk of unfair prejudice. (William) 

Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1100-01.

A. Evidence of appellant’s past threats toward D.J.

The offense of threats requires proof of three elements: (1) the defendant

uttered words to another person, (2) those words were ―of such a nature as to 

convey fear of serious bodily harm or injury‖ to the ordinary hearer, and (3) the 

―defendant intended to utter the words that constituted the threat.‖ Carrell v. 

United States, 80 A.3d 163, 171 (D.C. 2013); United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38, 

41 (D.C. 1983) (recognizing that the elements for misdemeanor threats under D.C. 

Code § 22-407 and felony threats are the same), abrogated on other grounds by 

Carrell, 80 A.3d at 171. In weighing whether the evidence suffices to satisfy the 
7

second element, the jury must posit an ordinary hearer ―aware of all the 

surrounding circumstances,‖ including the relationship between the defendant and 

the person to whom facially threatening language is directed, to determine whether 

the defendant’s words, uttered within the framework of that relationship, would 

convey fear of serious bodily harm. See Gray v. United States, 100 A.3d 129, 134, 

135-36 (D.C. 2014); In re S.W., 45 A.3d 151, 154, 157 (D.C. 2012) (noting that 

evidence is generally sufficient for a threats conviction when threatening 

statements are made in the context of a ―volatile or hostile relationship‖). 

At issue in this appeal is whether the government’s presentation of evidence 

about the past hostile relationship between appellant and D.J. in support of the

charged ADW and felony threats ran afoul of our longstanding prohibition on the 

admission of evidence of a defendant’s past bad acts to prove propensity. Here, 

because one of the past bad acts in evidence was similar to the charged offense—

armed assault and threats—the risk that the jury would draw an improper inference

of propensity was ―at its greatest.‖ Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522, 527

(D.C. 1978).

7

 

7

 Instead, the trial judge thought the reverse, noting that, ―this is a case in 

which he’s alleged to have assaulted somebody with a gun so it’s the same type of 

conduct and so I think the prejudicial effect is not so great as to substantially 

outweigh the probative value.‖ 
8

Evidence about the hostile relationship between appellant and D.J. was

relevant to determining whether the defendant’s words charged as threats would 

have conveyed a fear of serious bodily harm to an ordinary hearer in D.J.’s 

circumstances. Some evidence of the repeated taunting—especially the more 

recent instances—was clearly probative and admissible to show appellant’s

hostility. But the same cannot be said of the prior armed assault. The passage of 

time—about a year—reduced its probative value. The risk of prejudice from 

evidence of the prior armed assault, when viewed in light of its reduced probative 

value and the availability of other less prejudicial evidence (the repeated taunting) 

to show appellant’s hostility, weighed heavily against admission of the year-old 

armed assault. Nor was it admissible as ―intertwined‖ with the charged offenses.

Parker v. United States, 586 A.2d 720, 725 (D.C. 1991) (defendant’s physical 

abuse of complaining witness seven months before the charged offense was too 

temporally removed to be part of the ―surrounding circumstances‖ of the offense). 

The trial court, by misapprehending the risk of prejudice, see note 7 supra, 

erred in its exercise of discretion. See (James) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 (noting 

that failure to consider a relevant factor or reliance on an improper factor is error). 

This initial error in the court’s analysis necessarily infected its subsequent 

weighing of probative value and potential prejudice. We conclude, nonetheless, 
9

that there was no ―abuse‖ of discretion because appellant was not substantially 

prejudiced. Id. at 367. First, the court gave a limiting instruction which told the 

jury it could use evidence of the past attempted armed robbery only to provide 

context for the charged offenses and to show the relationship between appellant 

and the complainant, but not for any other purpose.8 Second, it appears that the 

jury did not give undue consideration to the prior armed assault in light of its

acquittal on the armed offenses (ADW and PFCV). See (Renaldo) Lucas v. United 

States, 102 A.3d 270, 281-82 (D.C. 2014) (emphasizing importance of proper 

limiting instruction in evaluating prejudicial impact of prior crimes evidence).

Thus, we can be confident that the jury’s verdict finding appellant guilty of threats 

was not substantially swayed by any error.

 

8

 Other crimes evidence: 

You have heard evidence that Eddie Williams allegedly 

attempted to rob [D.J.] on a previous occasion. It is up to 

you as a threshold matter to decide whether to accept that 

evidence. This evidence was admitted for the limited 

purpose of providing context for the charged offenses 

and for showing the relationship between Mr. Williams 

and Mr. [J.]. In addition, there is some evidence that a 

gun may have been used during the alleged attempted 

robbery. It is up to you to decide if a gun was used. If 

you find that a gun was used on the prior occasion, you 

may infer but are not required to infer that the same gun 

was used during the charged offenses if those offenses 

occurred. You may not use this evidence for any other 

purpose. 
10

B. Evidence of prior gun possession 

Evidence that the defendant has possessed the weapon used to commit the 

charged offense is relevant evidence of guilt, and is therefore admissible provided 

that the connection between the weapon and the offense is not ―conjectural and

remote.‖ Busey v. United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C. 2000) (quoting 

Burleson v. United States, 306 A.2d 659, 662 (D.C. 1973)). Thus, ballistics 

evidence that the weapon used in the charged offense was also used by defendant 

in another shooting eight days earlier is admissible as direct evidence that 

defendant possessed that weapon. See Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 998-

99 (D.C. 2013). Evidence that the defendant’s weapon met the same general 

description as the one used in the charged offense may also be admissible under 

this well-established rule. See Daniels v. United States, 2 A.3d 250, 254, 262 

(D.C. 2010) (testimony of several witnesses that the defendant had been seen many 

times with a black gun and a silver gun was properly admitted when there was 

testimony that the murder weapon was black and other testimony that it was 

silver). Admissibility turns on consideration of temporal proximity and the 

closeness of the description of the weapon known to be (or have been) in the 

defendant’s possession with the one used in the charged offense. Evidence 

connecting the defendant with the weapon used in the offense that puts the weapon 
11

in the defendant’s possession close in time to the offense is admissible. See, e.g., 

Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130, 1134 (D.C. 2011) (one month after); 

Muschette v. United States, 936 A.2d 791, 797 (D.C. 2007) (several weeks before). 

But courts do not abuse discretion in admitting evidence that the defendant had the 

weapon at a time further removed from the offense if there is strong evidence that 

the weapon was the same type as the one used in the charged offense. See 

McConnaughey v. United States, 804 A.2d 334, 338-39 (D.C. 2002) (eleven 

months between two sightings of defendant with a chrome-colored .32 caliber 

automatic weapon and offense in which .32 caliber bullets were fired from semiautomatic pistol); (Phillip H.) Johnson v. United States, 701 A.2d 1085, 1092 

(D.C. 1997) (picture of defendant taken more than a year before charged offense 

admissible where .38 or .32 caliber revolver shown in picture was of design 

abandoned in 1940s and would have produced bullets with no rifling marks like

.38 caliber bullets recovered from murder victim).

In this case, the connection between the weapon purportedly used in the 

charged October 11, 2011, assault and the weapon that, according to D.J., appellant 

had used one year earlier in an attempt to rob him, was tenuous. D.J. and another

witness to the charged offense saw only what ―looked like‖ the black handle of a 

gun in appellant’s waistband or pocket that they did not describe in any further 
12

detail, whereas a year earlier D.J. saw, out of the corner of his eye, appellant

brandishing a ―black or grey‖ gun that appeared to be a 9-mm handgun. The 

considerable temporal remove between the two events coupled with the tenuous 

similarities between the descriptions of the weapons lessened the probative value 

of the evidence, while the risk of prejudice was significant for the reasons we have 

discussed. These considerations weighed heavily against admission of evidence of 

appellant’s prior armed assault on D.J. with a 9-mm gun.

9

 

We consider whether appellant was substantially prejudiced by admission of 

the evidence and again conclude that he was not. The weaknesses in the evidence

connecting the two weapons were pointed out to the jury in closing argument, and 

the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction. See note 8, supra. In light of the 

jury’s acquittal of the ADW and PFCV charges, we are confident that the jury did 

not consider the evidence of his prior gun possession for an improper purpose and 

thus that appellant did not suffer substantial prejudice. 

 

9

 The trial court recognized that ―the details about this gun are less clear, as 

those in the case law,‖ but concluded that ―there’s a reasonable probability that it’s 

the same gun. There is no indication that it is not the same gun.‖ This statement 

does not support admission of a defendant’s gun possession a year earlier. 
13

III.

Appellant contends the trial court plainly erred in reminding D.J. that he was 

under oath and directing him to answer counsel’s questions truthfully. He argues 

that by doing so in front of the jury, the trial court impliedly discredited D.J.’s 

exculpatory testimony, lent judicial weight to the government’s case, and deprived 

him of an impartial judge, constituting structural error.

We begin by recounting what occurred at trial. D.J. was a reluctant and at 

times uncooperative witness. At one point, the prosecutor asked D.J. what he had 

seen when appellant ―reached into his pants pocket.‖ D.J. responded that he 

thought he saw ―like a handle‖ but could not say of what, and then said it was 

―probably like a belt or something like that. I don’t know. . . . I can’t explain.‖ 

The prosecutor asked D.J. to ―think back‖ to when he told the grand jury that he 

saw a ―handle‖ and asked again, ―what do you mean by handle?‖ The following 

colloquy ensued in the jury’s presence, without objection from the defense:

[Government]: . . . I want you to think back. You 

used the word handle. What do you 

mean by handle?

[Defense]: Objection.
14

[Court]: Overruled. You’re under oath, sir. 

Answer the question.

[Witness]: Am I under oath?

[Court]: You’re under oath. You swore to tell 

the truth.

[Witness]: Okay.

[Court]: You have to tell the truth.

. . .

[Witness]: I think it’s like a – I think it’s like a 

handle, like a handle.

[Government]: Okay. Of what? What did you think 

it was?

[Witness]: I don’t know. It could have been 

anything. But I think it was a handle. 

I don’t know. . . . It was like he was 

holding on a door knob or something 

like that. That’s why I say handle.

The government then impeached D.J. with his statements to the grand jury that the 

handle he saw was the handle of a gun. 

Appellant does not maintain that trial judges are generally precluded from 

admonishing a witness to testify truthfully. What appellant contends is that to do 

so in the jury’s presence while the witness is testifying ―is tantamount to telling the 

witness that the judge does not believe the witness.‖
15

This court has never decided whether it is an abuse of discretion to remind 

witnesses of their oaths or to admonish them to tell the truth during their testimony

in front of a jury.

10 Other courts have found such statements to be within the 

court’s discretion and even part of its obligation. See United States v. Hinson, 585 

F.3d 1328, 1340 (10th Cir. 2009) (―It is entirely proper—and oftentimes it is 

imperative—that a witness be cautioned about the consequences of an oath.‖

(quoting United States v. Vosper, 493 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1974))). However, 

instructing a witness to answer truthfully carries the implication that the judge 

thinks the witness might not be doing so. In a jury trial, the assessment of a 

witness’s credibility is a function reserved exclusively to the jury, and encroaching

on that function implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial. 

 

10 We have addressed a related question about the propriety of jury 

instructions that indicate to the jury that the judge thinks one or more of the 

witnesses are lying. In Kinard v. United States, 416 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. 1980), 

we rejected the ―falsus in uno‖ instruction as inappropriate for use in the District of 

Columbia court system. That instruction told jurors, in part, that they could 

disregard a perjurer’s testimony. We noted that ―one of the serious objections [to 

the instruction] is that the jury readily may get the implication that the trial judge 

considers that one or more of the witnesses have willfully testified falsely.‖ Id. 

(quoting Knihal v. State, 36 N.W.2d 109, 113-14 (Neb. 1949)). The instruction 

furthermore ―constitutes the expression of the judge as to the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.‖ Id. Here, we are 

considering not the appropriateness of an instruction but of an admonishment of a 

particular witness during his testimony. But the concern that the judge may not 

influence the jury’s assessment of the witness is the same. 
16

In conducting plain error review, we must first determine whether it should 

have been obvious to the trial judge that she should not have reminded the witness

of the oath and to ―tell the truth.‖ See Lowery v. United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1173 

(D.C. 2010). Even though it is well established that courts must scrupulously 

avoid conveying to the jury that they believe a witness is lying or telling the truth, 

we have not previously addressed the issue in terms of a facially neutral reminder 

of the juror’s oath. Therefore, the error, if any, would not have been obvious to the 

judge. Cf. Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 412-13 (D.C. 2009) (holding that 

in light of established legal principle that judge may not interfere in defendant’s 

decision whether to testify, the manner in which trial judge addressed defendant 

was obviously erroneous where judge did not simply inform the defendant of his 

rights but ―impos[ed] considerable pressure‖ on defendant). Viewing the court’s 

admonition in context, we think that in this case the court more likely conveyed 

that the witness was being uncooperative and reluctant to answer questions—

something that would already have been apparent to the jury. That impression 

would have been confirmed by a comparison between the witness’s in-court 

testimony and the witness’s more forthright testimony before the grand jury. We,
17

therefore, conclude that appellant has not shown there was plain error warranting 

reversal of his convictions.

11

IV.

Finally, appellant challenges the court’s decision to base his sentence in part 

on the court’s finding that he was armed during the charged offense despite the 

jury’s acquittal on the weapons charges, ADW and PFCV.

12

 We reject this 

challenge. The court enjoys broad discretion in sentencing and can rely on ―all the

evidence presented at trial, including evidence of charges on which appellant was 

acquitted,‖ provided that sentencing is not based on ―misinformation of a 

constitutional magnitude.‖ Greene v. United States, 571 A.2d 218, 220-21 (D.C. 

1990) (quoting United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985)).

There is no claim that the trial judge’s finding that appellant was armed was based 

on misinformation of any kind; rather, the trial court assessed the evidence that 

 

11

 Appellant’s contention that the error was ―structural‖ in nature does not 

alter our application of plain error review. See (Jose) Lucas v. United States, 20 

A.3d 737, 741 (D.C. 2011). 

12 The government argues that this objection was not raised at trial. 

However, we note that appellant’s counsel asked the court at sentencing to impose 

a lesser sentence in part ―. . . given the nature of the conduct, what the jury found, 

[and] that there was no gun involved—.‖ This comment sufficed to preserve the 

issue appellant now raises on appeal. 
18

was presented at trial in a different manner and under a lesser standard than the 

jury.13 The statutes appellant was found guilty of violating carry sentencing ranges 

of up to twenty years (for felony threats) and between one and five years (for 

committing a felony while on release).14 The trial court’s sentences of twenty-four 

months for felony threats and twelve months for committing a felony while on 

release were within those ranges. ―Generally, a sentence within statutory limits is 

not subject to review.‖ Smith v. United States, 837 A.2d 87, 100 (D.C. 2003) 

(citing Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076 (D.C. 1976)). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

So ordered.

 

13

 The trial court was aware of the jury’s acquittal on the PFCV and ADW 

charges and clearly stated that she found by a preponderance of the evidence that 

appellant was armed while he committed the offense despite the jury’s acquittal on 

that charge. 

14 See D.C. Code §§ 22-1810, 23-1328 (a)(1) (2012 Repl.).