SECURITY FORCE 

ASSISTANCE

More Detailed 

Planning and 

Improved Access to 

Information Needed to 

Guide Efforts of 

Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2013

GAO-13-381

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-381, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2013

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to

Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor 

Teams in Afghanistan

Why GAO Did This Study

ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan has 

shifted from a combat role to focus 

more on preparing ANSF units to 

assume lead security responsibility by 

the end of 2014. A key element in 

advising and assisting the ANSF is 

SFA advisor teams, provided by the

U.S. Army and Marine Corps. A House 

Armed Services Committee report 

accompanying its version of the Fiscal 

Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act directed GAO to 

review DOD’s establishment and use 

of SFA advisor teams. Specifically, 

GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) 

DOD, in conjunction with ISAF, has 

defined SFA advisor team missions, 

goals, and objectives; (2) the Army and 

Marine Corps have been able to 

provide teams; and (3) the Army and 

Marine Corps have developed 

programs to train teams for their 

specific missions. GAO reviewed 

doctrine and guidance, analyzed 

advisor requirements, reviewed 

training curricula, and interviewed 

Army, Marine Corps, theater 

command, and SFA advisor team 

officials in the U.S. and Afghanistan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that theater

commanders take steps to work with

brigade commanders and advisor

teams to identify end states, 

objectives, and milestones for the 

development of their ANSF counterpart 

units in support of the regional 

commands’ broad goals, and that the 

Army and Marine Corps improve 

availability of mission-specific 

information prior to advisor teams’

deployment. DOD partially concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations and 

identified actions to further prepare 

SFA advisor teams for their missions.

What GAO Found 

DOD and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have defined the 

mission and broad goals for Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams; 

however, teams varied in the extent to which their approaches for developing 

their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) units identified activities based on 

specific objectives or end states that were clearly linked with established goals. 

SFA guidance states that to be successful, advisors must have an end or goal in 

mind, and establish objectives that support higher-command plans. Theater 

commanders have outlined goals aimed at strengthening specific capabilities 

such as logistics, and it is largely left to the teams to then develop their approach 

for working with their counterparts. GAO found some advisor teams had 

developed structured advising approaches drawing from these goals, such as 

identifying monthly objectives and milestones for their team. Other teams GAO 

met with used less structured approaches, such as relying on interactions with 

ANSF counterparts to identify priorities and using this input to develop activities 

on an ad hoc basis, rather than as part of a longer-term, more structured 

approach to achieve broad goals. Officials from several teams stated that the

guidance they received lacked specificity regarding desired end states for the 

development of their ANSF counterpart units. Without a more structured 

approach with clear linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that 

are in support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders cannot be 

assured that the advisor team activities are making progress toward these goals.

The Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill requests for SFA advisor 

teams, using various approaches such as tasking non-deployed brigades to form 

advisor teams or creating teams using personnel already deployed in 

Afghanistan. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, the ability to 

substitute an individual at one rank above or below the request has helped the 

services meet rank and skill requirements. The Army’s reliance on brigades to

provide a portion of their personnel to form advisor teams has enabled them to 

meet requirements but resulted in leaving large numbers of personnel at the

brigades’ home stations. To manage these large rear detachments, brigades 

undertook significant planning to ensure that enough stay-behind leadership 

existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and provide certain training. 

The Army and Marine Corps have developed training programs for SFA advisor 

teams, but teams varied in the extent to which they had specific information to 

help prepare them for their mission prior to deployment. SFA guidance states 

that an in-depth understanding of the operational environment and of foreign 

security force capabilities is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA. 

Advisor teams may access such information from a variety of sources such as 

conducting video teleconferences with the teams they will replace, using secure 

networks to gather information, or sending personnel on predeployment site 

surveys, although teams varied in the extent to which they were actually able to 

gain access to these sources. For example, GAO found that while teams had 

access to a certain secure network at training sites, only some had access at 

home station, enabling them to shape their training and mission analysis earlier 

in predeployment training or after training but prior to deploying. Having limited 

access to this information prior to arriving in Afghanistan may result in advisor 

teams needing more time after deploying to maximize their impact as advisors.

View GAO-13-381. For more information, 

contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 

pickups@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Letter 1 

Background 3

SFA Advisor Team Mission and Goals Are Broadly Defined; 

Advisor Teams Varied in the Extent to Which Their Approaches 

Identified Specific Objectives and Activities Linked to Goals 5

The Army and Marine Corps Have Provided the Required Number 

of SFA Advisor Teams While Managing Ongoing Challenges 8

The Army and Marine Corps Have Developed Programs to Train 

Advisor Teams, but Teams Differed in the Extent to Which They 

Had Mission-Specific Information Prior to Deployment 12

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 25

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28

Related GAO Products 29

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Abbreviations

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

CENTRIXS-I Combined Enterprise Regional Information 

Exchange System-ISAF 

COMISAF Commander, International Security Assistance 

Force 

DOD Department of Defense

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SFA Security Force Assistance

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Page 1 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 30, 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In November 2010, the Afghan government and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) agreed upon a plan for transferring lead security 

responsibilities from the NATO-led International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end 

of 2014 while drawing down international forces. As part of this transition, 

the focus of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role 

to a security force assistance (SFA) role more focused on advising and 

assisting the ANSF. For the U.S. contribution, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) has used a variety of approaches to provide U.S. forces to carry 

out the advise-and-assist mission. For example, in early 2012, the U.S. 

Army and Marine Corps began to deploy small teams of advisors with 

specialized capabilities—referred to as SFA advisor teams—that are 

located throughout Afghanistan to work with Afghan army and police 

units. Our past work has identified challenges DOD has faced in 

supporting the advising mission, such as providing and training advisor 

personnel, balancing advising activities with other missions, and defining 

command relationships.1

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its version 

of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act directed us to 

 

1 GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, (Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2011).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

report on DOD’s establishment of SFA advisor teams and the use of 

these teams to further develop the capabilities of the ANSF.2

To address these objectives, we reviewed doctrine, guidance, and key 

planning documents from NATO, the Army, Marine Corps, and ISAF and 

U.S. theater commanders pertaining to SFA advisor team missions, goals 

and objectives, as well as staffing and training of the teams. This 

documentation included the Army’s Field Manual for Security Force 

Assistance,

To address 

this requirement, this report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD, in 

conjunction with ISAF, has defined SFA advisor team missions, goals, 

and objectives, (2) the Army and Marine Corps have been able to provide 

SFA advisor teams, and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have developed 

programs to train SFA advisor teams for their specific missions in 

Afghanistan.

3

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains additional 

information about our scope and methodology.

the ISAF SFA Concept and Implementation Guidance, 

requests for forces, ISAF minimum training requirements, and lessons 

learned from SFA advisor teams. Additionally, we met with officials from 

relevant organizations in the United States, such as the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters Marine

Corps, U.S. Central Command, Army Forces Command, and Army and 

Marine Corps training organizations, as well as officials from 

organizations in Afghanistan, including U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, ISAF, 

division and brigade headquarters, and 23 SFA advisor teams. Although 

many ISAF coalition countries deploy SFA advisor teams, the scope of 

this review included only U.S. SFA advisor teams.

 

2 H.R. Rep. No-112-479, at 263-264 (2012) accompanying H.R. 4310. H.R. 4310 became 

Public Law No. 112-239. 

3 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May 1, 

2009).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Since 2001, the United States and its NATO partners have been 

responsible for securing Afghanistan and leading the effort to secure, 

stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan. In 2010, the United States, NATO, and 

other coalition partners agreed to transition lead security responsibility for 

Afghanistan from NATO to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

Specifically, the Afghan government and ISAF—including the United 

States—agreed to a transition process that emphasizes a shift in ISAF’s 

role from leading combat missions to advising and assisting the ANSF, 

resulting in ISAF shifting to a security force assistance mission.4

ISAF is a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan established by the United 

Nations Security Council in December 2001. The ISAF coalition currently 

consists of 28 NATO nations, including the United States, and 22 

partnering nations with forces deployed across Afghanistan. ISAF is 

divided into six regional commands across Afghanistan, each with a 

specific geographic area of responsibility—North, East, South, Southwest, 

West, and the Kabul area (known as Regional Command–Capital). The 

United States leads three of these commands—East, South, and 

Southwest.

Lead 

security responsibility in Afghanistan is defined as responsibility and 

accountability for planning and conducting operations within a designated 

area, with ISAF support as required. At the same time, overall U.S. force 

levels are planned to draw down over the next year to about 34,000 with 

additional decisions on drawdown of remaining U.S. forces yet to be 

determined.

In addition to conducting security operations, ISAF forces have long been 

training and advising the ANSF both in training centers and at unit 

locations after they have been formed and fielded. For the U.S. 

contribution, DOD has used a variety of approaches to provide U.S. 

forces to carry out the advise-and-assist mission. For example, prior to 

2010, the advising mission in Afghanistan was primarily conducted with 

transition teams. These teams did not exist as units in any of the services’ 

force structures and were instead comprised of company- and field-grade 

officers and senior non-commissioned officers who were centrally 

 

4 Army doctrine defines SFA as the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, 

host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. According to 

NATO, in Afghanistan SFA encompasses all ISAF actions to develop ANSF operational 

effectiveness and includes partnering and advising, as well as provision of support to 

ANSF units. 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

identified and individually selected based on rank and specialty.5 As we 

have previously reported, the demand for these leaders created 

challenges for the services because, among other things, the leaders 

were generally pulled from other units or commands, which then were left 

to perform their missions while understaffed.6 In part as a means of 

alleviating these challenges, the Army developed the concept of 

augmenting brigade combat teams with specialized personnel to execute 

the advising mission, and began deploying these augmented brigades in 

2010. In early 2012, based on requests from ISAF as part of its shift to a 

security force assistance mission, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps began 

to deploy small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to 

as SFA advisor teams, which are located throughout Afghanistan, to work 

with Afghan army and police units from the headquarters to the battalion 

level, and advise them in areas such as command and control, 

intelligence, and logistics.7

U.S. advisor teams are under the command and control of U.S. 

commanders within ISAF’s regional commands.

More recently, the Army began tailoring the 

composition and mission of its brigade combat teams to further focus on 

advising efforts.

8

 

5 Company-grade officers are those in the pay grades of O-1 to O-3 (e.g., lieutenants and 

captains) and field-grade officers are those in pay grades O-4 to O-6 (e.g., majors, 

lieutenant colonels, colonels). Senior non-commissioned officers are those in the pay 

grades of E7 to E9 (e.g., sergeants first class, first sergeants, sergeants major). 

The regional commands 

have overall responsibility for operations in their geographic area, 

including setting goals for the advising mission. ISAF establishes the 

requirements for advisor teams, including force needs, and training 

requirements. To meet the U.S. share of these requirements, the Army 

and Marine Corps are responsible for providing advisor personnel, 

establishing service-specific training requirements, and conducting 

training prior to deployment.

6 GAO-11-760 and GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 

Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, 

GAO-09-380T (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009).

7

 The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have provided the majority of U.S. advisor personnel 

to Afghanistan, and the Navy and Air Force also have contributed personnel to advise the 

ANSF. 

8 There are some limited instances where U.S. advisor teams may be operating in 

regional commands that are not led by the United States, though these teams remain 

under U.S. command.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

DOD and ISAF have defined the mission and broad goals for advisor 

teams based on the type of ANSF (e.g., army, police) and the type of unit, 

from the headquarters to the battalion level. Advisor teams varied in the 

extent to which their approaches for developing their ANSF counterparts 

identified activities based on specific end states, objectives, and 

milestones that are in support of the regional command’s broad goals.

The mission for advisor teams for various types of ANSF units are defined 

in multiple ISAF and DOD plans, directives, and orders. According to 

DOD documentation, SFA advisor teams provide training, advising, 

assisting, and development functions to prepare ANSF units to assume 

full security responsibility by December 31, 2014. Missions also have 

been defined for SFA advisor teams based on the type of ANSF unit they 

advise, specifically:

• Afghan National Army advisor teams are expected to advise and 

assist those units, act as liaisons to ISAF units, and support the 

operational planning and employment of the Afghan unit as part of 

helping to develop a self-sufficient, competent, and professional unit 

capable of autonomous operations. 

• Afghan National Police advisor teams are expected to advise those 

units, act as liaisons to ISAF units, and support the operational 

planning and employment of the Afghan unit as part of helping to 

develop a self-sufficient, competent and professional unit capable of 

maintaining public order, security, and rule of law. 

• Operational Coordination Center advisor teams are expected to 

advise those units, act as liaisons to ISAF units and support the 

development of a coherent security coordination structure.9

 

9 Operational Coordination Centers are ANSF command-and-control organizations that 

coordinate security operations and civil response to developing situations in their 

respective areas of responsibility.

 

SFA Advisor Team 

Mission and Goals Are 

Broadly Defined; 

Advisor Teams Varied 

in the Extent to 

Which Their 

Approaches Identified 

Specific Objectives 

and Activities Linked 

to Goals

DOD and ISAF Have 

Defined the Mission and 

Broad Goals for Advisor 

Teams for Various Types of 

ANSF Units
 

Page 6 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

The regional commands have amplified this guidance for advisor teams 

by providing key advising goals based on the developmental needs of the 

ANSF in their region. For example, Regional Command-South identified 

their top-five advising goals, aimed at strengthening ANSF capabilities 

such as logistics, countering improvised explosive devices, and medical 

evacuation. Regional Command-East had a similar set of top-five 

advising goals.

While ISAF and the regional commands have defined the mission and 

broad goals for the advisor teams, it is largely left to the teams, in 

coordination with the regional command and brigade commander for their 

area of operations, to develop their approach for working with their ANSF 

counterpart units. According to multi-service guidance on advising, in 

order to successfully exert influence, advisors have an end or goal in 

mind.10 Similarly, the Army’s Field Manual for Security Force Assistance 

states that, in order to be successful, advisors have an end or goal in 

mind and should establish objectives and milestones that support highercommand plans and can be achieved during their deployment.11

Some teams we spoke with had taken the initiative to develop structured 

approaches that identified objectives or end states and milestones, 

drawing from the regional command’s broader goals to guide their 

advising efforts. For example, one team stated they worked directly from 

the regional commander’s top-five goals, developing a planning process 

In 

addition, advisor teams must balance the priorities of their commands 

with those of their counterpart units. Specifically, DOD officials 

emphasized that advisor teams need some flexibility to tailor their 

approaches to the respective needs of their ANSF counterpart units while 

still working towards regional command goals. Advisor teams we spoke 

with were generally familiar with the broad goals established by ISAF and 

regional commands, but used various approaches to develop their ANSF 

counterpart units, which varied in the extent to which they resulted in the 

identification of activities based on specific objectives or end states that 

were clearly linked with established goals.

 

10 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 3-07.10, Advising: Multi-service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces (September 2009). This 

guidance applies to the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. 

11 Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May 2009).

Advisor Teams Varied in 

the Extent to Which Their 

Approaches Identified 

Activities Based on 

Specific Objectives Linked 

to ANSF Development 

Goals
 

Page 7 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

to identify monthly objectives and milestones for each advising area (e.g., 

personnel, intelligence, logistics) that support these goals, and then 

regularly assessing where they are in terms of progress towards the 

commander’s goals and in what areas they should continue to focus. 

Using this process, the advisor team identified a training need for an 

ANSF brigade related to the regional commander’s broad goal of 

developing the ANSF’s counter improvised explosive device capabilities 

and arranged for a U.S. Explosive Ordinance Disposal unit to provide this 

training. In another instance, a logistics advisor team identified a need for 

its ANSF counterpart to be capable of repairing items such as cranes and 

fuel distribution equipment to help achieve the regional command’s broad 

goal of developing general level maintenance capability. To achieve this

objective, the team created a training program to develop this capability. 

Another team leader we spoke with stated he developed advising plans 

based on the regional command’s high level goals and informed by an 

assessment of their ANSF counterpart unit, to identify tasks and timelines 

to train their counterparts on basic skills such as map reading in order to 

improve their ability to plan and conduct operations.

Other advisor teams we met with were familiar with the broad goals for 

ANSF development and had identified activities to develop their ANSF 

counterpart units, but used less structured approaches to guide their 

advising efforts. For example, advisor teams in multiple regional 

commands stated their approach was to rely on interactions with their 

ANSF counterparts to identify priorities, using this input to develop 

activities on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, according to a brigade 

commander serving as an advisor team leader, his team and other 

advisor teams from his brigade generally identified development activities 

in reaction to situations as they arose rather than as part of a longer-term, 

more structured approach to achieve broad goals. According to several 

advisor teams, while they received input from various higher 

headquarters, that input lacked specificity regarding end states they 

should be trying to achieve for their ANSF units, leading them to use less 

structured approaches to guide their efforts. For example, the deputy 

team leader of an advisor team for a high-level Afghan National Army unit 

with visibility over the efforts of several advisor teams for subordinate 

ANSF units stated that while his team was able to develop activities 

intended to enable his counterpart unit to operate independently, he 

believed that guidance from the regional command did not clearly define 

the overall desired end state for the ANSF, which made it difficult to 

determine where to focus their particular advising efforts. Similarly, 

officials responsible for collecting best practices and lessons learned from 

SFA advisor teams in one regional command said that, in talking with 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

teams, they found a lack of direction for advisor teams from higher 

headquarters resulted in what they characterized as a collection of good 

activities conducted by individual teams over time without a synchronized 

approach driving towards a tangible end state. Without a more structured 

approach with clear linkages between objectives or end states linked to 

development goals for ANSF units, regional commanders cannot be 

assured that the activities of individual advisor teams are in fact making 

progress toward established goals. Moreover, having such an approach 

would help with continuity of effort from one advisor team to the next, 

since advisor teams typically deploy for 9 months.

The Army and Marine Corps have provided the required number of SFA 

advisor teams to Afghanistan based on theater commanders’ requests. 

Recognizing that high ranks and skill specialties were required for advisor 

teams, theater commander guidance allowed for some substitutions when 

specific ranks or skills were unavailable, which enabled the Army and 

Marine Corps to provide the appropriate personnel. The Army’s use of 

brigades to form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements 

but has resulted in leaving large numbers of brigade personnel at their 

home station locations. To manage these large rear detachments, 

brigade leadership undertook significant planning to ensure enough staybehind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and 

provide certain training and exercises.

In late 2011, ISAF and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan established 

requirements for coalition and U.S. SFA advisor teams, including 

specifying the number of teams required, team composition and 

capabilities, and assignment to ANSF units. Although the numbers of 

teams have changed over time, according to ISAF, the Army and Marine 

Corps have provided the required number of SFA advisor teams based 

on these requests and, as of December 2012, approximately 250 U.S. 

advisor teams were operating in Afghanistan. SFA advisor teams are 

generally comprised of 9 to 18 advisor personnel—made up of a mix of 

company- and field-grade officers, and senior non-commissioned 

officers—with specific specialties such as military intelligence, military 

police, and signal officers. The composition of advisor teams is tailored to 

match the needs of their ANSF counterpart. For example, teams at higher 

echelons of the ANSF (e.g., corps or provincial headquarters) have a 

higher rank requirement for the advisor team leader and police advisor 

teams include requirements for military police personnel. According to 

ISAF, Army, and Marine Corps officials, advisor teams are generally 

The Army and Marine 

Corps Have Provided 

the Required Number 

of SFA Advisor Teams 

While Managing 

Ongoing Challenges

The Army and Marine 

Corps Have Provided the 

Required Number of SFA 

Advisor Teams Based on 

Theater Commanders’ 

Requests
 

Page 9 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

expected to remain with the same ANSF unit for the duration of their 

approximately 9-month deployments. According to DOD and ISAF 

officials, the requirement for advisor teams has fluctuated as additional 

ANSF units have been fielded, and the overall requirement for advisor 

teams is expected to change as the development of ANSF units 

progresses. For example, according to ISAF officials, SFA advisor teams 

currently advise down to the battalion level, but as U.S. forces draw down 

in Afghanistan and the capability of the ANSF increases, the U.S. 

advising effort could shift to a brigade-and-higher focus, which could 

affect the overall number and size of the teams.

U.S. SFA advisor teams began deploying to Afghanistan in early 2012, 

and the Army and Marine Corps have used a variety of approaches to 

provide these teams.

• To meet its requirements for the first set of advisor team deployments, 

the Army tasked three non-deployed brigades to form the bulk of the 

advisor teams using personnel from their units, with additional nondeployed units tasked to form the remaining teams. These advisor 

teams then deployed to Afghanistan and were attached to combat 

brigades already in theater. More recently, the Army shifted its 

sourcing approach by tailoring the composition and mission of 

brigades deploying to Afghanistan to further focus on the SFA 

mission, and began deploying these SFA brigades (SFABs) in 

November 2012. According to ISAF officials, SFABs include advisor 

teams that are primarily created using personnel from within the 

brigade. According to Army officials, as of January 2013, three SFABs 

have deployed in place of combat brigades, and at least four more 

U.S. brigades in Afghanistan have been identified to be replaced by 

SFABs. According to Army officials, the Army will continue to provide 

some advisor teams using personnel from non-deployed active and 

reserve units that will join the remaining combat brigades in 

Afghanistan. Additionally, planning for the remaining brigades and 

overall force levels in Afghanistan is ongoing and by late 2013 all 

deploying U.S. brigades may be SFABs.

• To meet the initial deployment of SFA advisor teams beginning in 

early 2012, the Marine Corps created some teams out of personnel 

already deployed in Afghanistan and created additional teams using 

non-deployed personnel generally from the I and II Marine 

Expeditionary Forces, according to Marine Corps officials. For 

subsequent deployments of teams, the Marine Corps has created 

teams using non-deployed personnel from across the Marine 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Expeditionary Forces that then deploy to Afghanistan as formed 

teams.

The Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill SFA advisor teams, but 

they continue to face challenges meeting specific rank and skill 

requirements. In 2011, we reported on challenges the Army was 

experiencing providing high-ranking personnel with specialized skills for 

the advising mission in Afghanistan.12

• While 40 majors were required to fill the specified number of teams, 

the brigade had only 25 majors on hand. Recognizing this, the Army’s 

plan called for substituting captains for majors in order to meet the 

requirement.

According to Army and Marine 

Corps officials, meeting the rank and skills required for SFA advisor 

teams, including those as part of SFABs, continues to present a 

challenge given the limited availability of such personnel across the 

services. To help address these challenges, theater commanders, in 

coordination with the Army and Marine Corps, have outlined a set of 

substitution guidelines, to allow flexibility in the rank and skill 

requirements. For instance, specific rank requirements can generally be 

substituted with an individual one rank above or below the requirement. 

Similarly, there are guidelines for different skills and specialties that may 

be substituted for one another. For example, a team may have a 

requirement for a specific type of intelligence officer, but the substitution 

guidance identified other types of intelligence personnel that could be 

used to meet this requirement such as a counterintelligence or signals 

intelligence analyst. Army Forces Command officials told us that because 

the required number of ranks and specialties for SFA advisor teams 

exceeds the total number of such personnel that exist in a typical brigade, 

the ability to substitute certain ranks and skills with other available 

personnel was critical to meeting the requirement for most advisor teams 

and for all three of the first deploying SFABs. Army officials recognized 

that substitutions would need to occur both within and among brigades. 

According to sourcing officials and officials from one of the brigades 

tasked to provide the first set of advisor teams, The following are 

examples:

• The requirement for certain intelligence officers exceeded that which 

existed in the brigade. Therefore, brigade leadership used lower 

 

12 GAO-11-760. 

The Army and Marine 

Corps Used Substitution 

Allowances and Individual 

Augmentees to Address 

Challenges in Meeting 

Rank and Skill 

Requirements
 

Page 11 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

ranking military intelligence officers or other officers with sufficient 

related experience.

According to Army officials, the rank and skill requirements, as well as the 

reliance on substitutions, are expected to continue with the use of SFABs. 

As the Army and Marine Corps began to form the teams, they also 

worked with their force providers in order to utilize individual augmentees 

from active and reserve non-deployed units to help meet the rank and 

skill requirements for SFA advisor teams. For example, an official from a 

Marine Expeditionary Force responsible for providing many of the first 

advisor teams stated that the unit used reservists to fill over 130 advisor 

slots, and the Marine Corps expects to continue to use them to fill 

subsequent teams.

The Army’s sourcing approaches enabled it to meet theater requirements 

for SFA advisor teams, but resulted in brigades leaving large numbers of 

personnel at home station locations. For the first set of Army 

deployments, the three brigades identified to source the bulk of the teams 

left the majority of their personnel at home station. For example, 

according to brigade officials, one brigade deployed approximately 370 

people to create advisor teams, leaving approximately 3,100 personnel 

(approximately 90 percent) behind at home station. According to Army 

officials, SFABs reduce the size of the rear detachments because a larger 

percentage of the brigade’s personnel are to be deployed, although they 

recognized SFABs would continue to result in large rear detachments. 

For example, two of the first SFABs to deploy each left roughly 2,000 

personnel at home station. Because the advisor team requirement calls 

for high numbers of company- and field-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers, as well as specific skill specialties, staffing the 

teams required the brigades to deploy a significant portion of their 

leadership and expertise, including the brigade commanders and many 

battalion, company, and platoon commanders, for the advisor mission. As 

a result, according to Army Forces Command officials and officials from 

two brigades, brigade leadership had to undertake significant planning to 

ensure that enough stay-behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient 

command structure and the unit leadership needed to conduct certain 

training, such as artillery and other live-fire exercises. In order to help 

brigades in this planning, Army Forces Command has issued guidance 

for the training and employment of rear detachments during advisor team 

deployments, including missions the force may be assigned to, training 

expectations, and equipment maintenance responsibilities. For example, 

one brigade that deployed many of the first set of advisor teams 

The Army Is Taking Steps 

to Manage Large Rear 

Detachments That Result 

from SFA Advisor Team 

Sourcing Approaches
 

Page 12 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

consolidated its rear detachment into smaller numbers of more fully 

manned platoons to ensure appropriate leadership existed for each 

platoon. In addition, the brigade leadership developed a training plan for 

the rear detachment to maintain proficiency in critical tasks while awaiting 

reintegration of deployed personnel.

The Army and Marine Corps have developed standardized 

predeployment training programs for SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan, 

but teams varied in the extent to which they had access to missionspecific information prior to deploying that they believed would help them 

prepare for their specific advising missions.

SFA advisor teams take part in a broad set of training activities both at 

home station and at training centers in the months leading up to their 

deployment. ISAF has established minimum training requirements for 

SFA advisor teams from all coalition countries, including the United 

States. These training requirements include both individual advisor 

knowledge and skills, such as understanding how to work through an 

interpreter, and collective team knowledge and skills, such as how the 

advisor team will assess ANSF unit capabilities and provide force 

protection and sustainment. ISAF envisions that this training will be 

conducted using a combination of individual and team-based training. In 

accordance with these requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have 

each developed a program of instruction for predeployment training, 

which generally occurs in three stages. 

• Home-Station Training. Home-station training includes individual 

and team-level combat skills training provided to all deploying forces 

to Afghanistan. Typically, SFA advisor teams are formed prior to the 

beginning of this training. Topics include combat lifesaver training, 

various weapons and driving qualifications, and countering improvised 

The Army and Marine 

Corps Have 

Developed Programs 

to Train Advisor 

Teams, but Teams 

Differed in the Extent 

to Which They Had 

Mission-Specific 

Information Prior to 

Deployment 

The Army and Marine 

Corps Have Developed 

Predeployment Training 

Programs for SFA Advisor 

Teams
 

Page 13 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

explosive devices. During this period, teams also begin to gather 

information regarding their specific advising assignment in order to 

conduct mission analysis, shape the next two stages of their training, 

and establish their initial plan for their advising missions.13

• Advisor-Specific Training. Advisor-specific training is focused on 

language, culture, counterinsurgency, and advisor skills. Army advisor 

teams generally receive advisor-specific training during an 8-day 

course provided by the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade.

For 

example, officials at the Joint Readiness Training Center Operations 

Group, which conducts culminating training exercises for Army 

advisor teams and SFABs, told us that it is during this time that they 

begin to work with commanders to design their culminating training 

exercise. 

14 Marine 

Corps teams receive training at the Advisor Training Cells at their 

respective Marine Expeditionary Force home stations, as well as the 

Advisor Training Group at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 

Center. 15

• Culminating Training Exercise. This training includes situational 

training exercises and a culminating training exercise that integrates 

ANSF role players into a simulated deployed environment in order to 

exercise the advisor teams’ ability to advise their ANSF counterpart 

units. For Army advisor teams, this exercise is incorporated into the 

culminating training exercise of the brigade under which they will 

operate in Afghanistan, when possible, and is conducted at the Joint 

Both the Army and Marine Corps training includes courses 

such as overviews of Afghan security force institutions, how to use an 

interpreter, and techniques for building rapport. The training also 

utilizes role players in practical exercises to simulate engagements 

with key Afghan civilian and military leaders in different situations.

 

13 Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks 

necessary to accomplish the mission. According to Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation

Planning, mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and 

the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand.

14 Army officials told us that some advisor personnel receive an 8-week course from the 

162nd Infantry Training Brigade, which includes both combat skills training and advisorspecific training and is based on a variety of factors including the training capabilities of 

home units.

15 Advisor training cells are training sites located at each Marine Expeditionary Force 

home station, which provide training capabilities for advisor teams that work with foreign 

security forces, including SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan. The Advisor Training Group 

is located at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, 

California, and its purpose is to train Marine Corps teams that advise, mentor, and train 

foreign military, police, and border units in operational techniques and procedures.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, or other combat 

training centers. These exercises include training based on the level 

(e.g., brigade, battalion) and type (e.g., army, police) of the ANSF unit 

that teams will be advising and their specific areas of responsibility in 

Afghanistan, individual and team proficiency assessments, and livefire drills, such as combat patrols. Marine Corps advisor teams 

receive similar training at the Advisor Training Group, though this 

training does not include the combat unit with which they will be 

operating in Afghanistan.

The Army, Marine Corps, and ISAF have established mechanisms to 

gather feedback on predeployment training from advisor teams in 

Afghanistan in order to update and refine training for the advisor mission. 

Both the Army and Marine Corps centers for lessons learned have 

ongoing efforts in Afghanistan to collect observations and best practices 

for SFA advisor teams. Additionally, the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade 

employs liaison officers at ISAF and the regional commands, among 

other places, to collect lessons learned and after-action reports from 

advisor teams in Afghanistan, which are then incorporated into advisor 

training. Officials from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade said that, 

based in part on this feedback, the advisor training has changed 

significantly since the first SFA advisor teams began going through the 

training in January 2012, and that the program of instruction will continue 

to evolve. For example, officials from two of the first SFA advisor teams 

told us that the advisor training was too focused on classroom instruction. 

Officials from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade said that they had 

heard similar concerns, and later iterations of SFA advisor team training 

was updated to provide greater balance between classroom training and 

practical exercises that use cultural role players. Further, between August 

2012 and October 2012, ISAF conducted a survey of U.S. and coalition 

nation SFA advisor team personnel on predeployment training in order to 

provide advisor insights to U.S. and NATO training centers and made 

several recommendations to improve predeployment training. For 

example, ISAF recommended that advisor teams contact the unit they will 

be replacing to fine tune their training in order to meet the challenges they 

will face upon deployment. 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

ISAF’s minimum training requirements direct advisor teams to conduct 

mission analysis prior to deployment in order to develop plans for 

advising their ANSF counterpart unit. Further, the Army’s Field Manual for 

Security Force Assistance, states that an in-depth understanding of the 

operational environment—including a clear understanding of the theater, 

population, and the foreign security forces and capabilities with which 

they are working—is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA.16

Advisor teams varied in the extent to which they had access to 

information to help prepare for their specific advising missions prior to 

deployment. Advisor teams may gain access to this information through a 

variety of ways. For example, officials from the 162nd Infantry Training 

Brigade said that they coordinate video teleconferences between advisor 

teams going through advisor training and deployed advisor teams with the 

goal that advisor teams are able to talk to the SFA advisor team that they 

will replace to help the deploying team better understand its specific 

mission and the unit that it will be advising. Advisor teams can also utilize 

secure networks to gather mission-specific information. For example, 

much of the information on advising and general operations in 

Afghanistan (e.g., daily and weekly update briefs, details of the advisor 

teams’ interactions with ANSF units, and regional command campaign 

plans) is stored and shared on the Combined Enterprise Regional 

Information Exchange System-ISAF (CENTRIXS-I) network—a network 

According to some advisor team officials and ISAF officials tasked with 

gathering lessons learned from advisor teams and identifying potential 

challenges, the personalities and capabilities of each ANSF unit and 

district are unique, and advisor teams need specific information on their 

ANSF counterpart unit as well as the efforts of the advisor teams currently 

working with the unit prior to deployment in order to be successful. In 

addition, some advisors stated that having specific information about the 

operational environment where teams will be deployed would be 

beneficial in determining where to place emphasis during training. For 

example, some advisor teams we spoke with are able to walk to their 

counterpart unit’s headquarters, while other teams had to travel longer 

distances to accompany their counterpart units. Having this type of 

specific information about their operating environment could be helpful for 

advisor teams in tailoring some of their more general combat training at 

home station.

 

16 Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May 2009).

Advisor Teams Varied in 

the Extent to Which They 

Had Access to Information 

to Help Prepare for Their 

Specific Advising Missions 

Prior to Deployment
 

Page 16 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

that is widely used by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, but with 

limited access in the United States. Additionally, advisor teams may take 

part in predeployment site surveys in which commanders take staff 

members to theater and meet with the units they will be replacing to learn 

more about the mission they will support. According to the Army Field 

Manual for Security Force Assistance, the predeployment site survey 

should, among other things, provide information on the organization, 

leadership, and capabilities of the foreign unit that will be advised, as well 

as an overview of the operational area.17

We found differences in the extent to which advisor teams were actually 

able to gain access to mission-specific information throughout their 

predeployment training. For example,

ISAF minimum training 

requirements also require that advisor teams conduct predeployment site 

surveys as part of their SFA mission analysis and planning. 

• While some SFA advisor teams told us that mission-specific 

information shared on CENTRIXS-I is beneficial in shaping their 

predeployment training and mission analysis, we found that advisor 

teams varied in the extent to which they were able access this system 

and thus the information contained therein throughout their 

predeployment training. Some advisor teams had access to 

CENTRIXS-I at home station. For example, officials from one brigade 

that provided SFA advisor teams said that they recognized the value 

of CENTRIXS-I in gathering specific information from units on the 

ground in order for teams to conduct their mission analysis and early 

planning, and proactively took steps to gain access to the network at 

home station early on in predeployment training, and were able to 

obtain access for its SFA advisor teams 5 months prior to deploying.

However, other advisor teams said that they had limited or no access 

to this network at their home stations, thus limiting the information 

available to the teams to shape training, conduct mission research, 

and develop situational awareness before arriving in Afghanistan. 

Advisor teams are able to access CENTRIXS-I once they arrive at the 

162nd Infantry Training Brigade and the Advisor Training Group 

training sites. However, teams are at these locations for a short time 

(i.e., less than 30 days) in the mid-to-late stages of training. Advisor 

teams with limited or no access to CENTRIXS-I at home station may 

be unable to fully leverage mission-specific information to (1) either 

 

17 Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May 2009).
 

Page 17 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

shape their training prior to going to these locations or (2) continue to 

fully maximize the up-to-date information contained therein to prepare 

for their missions after they leave the training sites.

• Advisor teams varied in their ability to send representatives on 

predeployment site surveys to Afghanistan. Unit commanders and 

theater commands determine the numbers of personnel that take part 

in the survey, taking into consideration limitations on the ability of 

certain locations to provide transportation, housing, and other support.

According to an ISAF official, units tasked with the advising mission 

are encouraged to take some representatives from their advisor 

teams on these surveys. According to a U.S. Forces–Afghanistan 

official, there has been at least one recent case where a 

predeployment site survey team sent to Afghanistan was augmented 

with additional personnel in order to accommodate the need to visit 

multiple locations. In contrast, some advisor teams we spoke with said 

that they did not send representatives from their individual teams on 

these site surveys, which limited their ability to shape their training 

and their understanding of the environment in which they would be 

operating. For example, one advisor team said that it did not know the 

specifics of the operating environment when conducting home station 

training, such as details about security and movement, and that the 

opportunity to conduct a predeployment site survey would have been 

helpful for the team’s mission preparation. Another unit that was 

organized into three advisor teams reported that they did not take part 

in a predeployment site survey and thus faced significant challenges 

during their first 45 days of deployment because they were unaware 

that logistic support arrangements for the teams in Afghanistan had 

not been established.

DOD officials acknowledged that increased information prior to 

deployment would benefit advisor teams, but added that resource 

constraints are a consideration in determining how to expand access to 

certain information sources. Nonetheless, without a more complete 

understanding of the capabilities of the ANSF counterpart units to be 

advised and the operating environment in which they will be advising prior 

to deploying, it may take advisor teams more time after deploying to 

maximize their impact as advisors. 

The use of SFA advisor teams to develop and support the ANSF are a 

key element of the U.S. and ISAF strategy to transition lead security 

responsibility to Afghanistan while drawing down combat forces. By 

ensuring that SFA advisor teams have structured approaches with clear 

linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that are in 

Conclusions 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders can enhance 

the ability of advisor teams to develop their ANSF counterparts. In 

addition, this will enable theater commanders to better gauge an ANSF 

unit’s progress towards their broader development goals and facilitate 

continuity of effort from one advisor team to the next. Lastly, by improving 

the availability of mission-specific information prior to deployment, the 

Army and the Marine Corps will ensure that SFA advisor team have the 

information necessary on their specific ANSF counterpart and the 

operational environment to better inform training. Moreover, such 

information would enhance the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and 

undertake their efforts immediately upon deployment.

To ensure that the activities of individual advisor teams are more clearly 

linked to ISAF and regional command goals for overall ANSF 

development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with the commander of U.S. Central Command, direct 

theater commanders in Afghanistan to work with brigade commanders 

and advisor teams to identify specific end states, objectives and 

milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts that are in support of 

the broad theater goals to guide their advising efforts during their 

deployment.

To enhance the ability of SFA advisor teams to prepare for and execute 

their mission, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army and the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps take steps to improve the availability of 

mission-specific information during predeployment training. Such steps 

could include:

• Expanded access to the data and information contained in 

CENTRIXS-I; and,

• Increased opportunities, in coordination with U.S. Central Command, 

for advisor team leaders to participate in predeployment site surveys 

with the teams they are expected to replace.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 

our recommendations. The full text of DOD’s written comments is 

reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated where appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 19 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

In its comments, DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation 

that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the commander of U.S. 

Central Command, direct theater commanders in Afghanistan to work 

with brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify specific end 

states, objectives, and milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts 

that are in support of the broad theater goals to guide their advising 

efforts during their deployment. Also, DOD provided comments regarding 

the command relationships and guidance affecting the advisor teams. 

Specifically, DOD stated that the issue of linking advisor teams with 

regional commanders and the theater commander to identify specific end 

states, objectives, and milestones resides within the operational level and 

not at the strategic level with the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central 

Command. The department further stated that the Commander, 

International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), is the theater 

commander and produces the operation plans for Afghanistan, which 

provide the end states, objectives, and milestones for the campaign, 

including efforts to develop the ANSF and ministerial-level agencies. 

COMISAF also issues guidance for developing the ANSF and ministerial 

agencies to include end states, objectives, and milestones. Further, DOD 

noted that regional commanders receive their guidance and direction in 

part through the OPLANs and other guidance issued by COMISAF. The 

department also stated that brigade commanders, SFABs, and SFA 

advisor teams are operationally and/or tactically controlled by the regional 

commanders. DOD stated that guidance from the regional commanders 

for these subordinate elements should include the guidance provided by 

COMISAF regarding development of the ANSF. Lastly, DOD stated that 

individual ANSF elements advised by SFA advisor teams and SFABs 

have different levels of capabilities and unique circumstances involved in 

developing those capabilities. Therefore, DOD stated that commanders at 

the operational and tactical level should have sole responsibility for 

directing the development of the individual ANSF elements. 

We agree that it is the responsibility of commanders, particularly regional 

commanders, at the operational and tactical level, to direct SFA advisor 

teams to develop individual ANSF elements. As we noted in our report, 

regional commands have overall responsibility for operations in their 

geographic area, including setting goals for the advising mission. We 

further noted that the missions for advisor teams are defined in multiple 

ISAF and DOD plans, directives, and orders and that the regional 

commands amplify this guidance by providing key advising goals based 

on the developmental needs of the ANSF in each region. However, we 

found that it is largely left to advisor teams to develop their approach for 

working with their ANSF counterpart units and that advisor teams varied 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

in the extent to which their approaches identified activities based upon 

specific objectives linked to ANSF development goals. Therefore, we

recommended that theater commanders in Afghanistan should work with 

brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify specific end states, 

objectives and milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts that are 

in support of the broad theater goals to guide their advising efforts during 

their deployment. We agree with the department’s view that directing the 

development of the individual ANSF elements should be the sole 

responsibility of commanders at the operational and tactical level. We 

believe that our recommendation does not conflict with this principle but 

rather calls for the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Commander of U.S. Central Command, to direct the operational 

commander to ensure that these actions are taken. 

Regarding our second recommendation, we recommended that the 

Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps take 

steps to improve the availability of mission-specific information during 

predeployment training, and provided two examples of such steps for 

illustrative purposes. DOD commented separately on these examples. 

Specifically, with respect to the step calling for expanded access to the 

data and information contained in CENTRIXS-I, DOD concurred and 

noted that actions had been taken to install CENTRIXS-I kiosks at U.S 

bases and overseas locations and plans were underway to install 

additional kiosks. Also, DOD noted that while CENTRIXS-I is a specific 

capability, it appears that the intent of our recommendation is to expand 

information flow by any means available, and DOD suggested that we 

rephrase the first step to read: “Expand access to secure networks in 

order to gather data and information.” We agree that the intent of our 

recommendation is to expand information flow and to recognize, as noted 

in our report, that other information sources exist beyond CENTRIXS-I. 

Based on our discussions with command and advisor team personnel, 

CENTRIXS-I was cited as an important information source and therefore 

we cited it as an example in our report. We believe that, as currently 

worded, our recommendation provides flexibility for the department to 

determine a range of options for improving the availability of information 

to advisor teams. 

With respect to the step calling for increased opportunities for advisor 

team leaders to participate in predeployment site surveys, DOD partially 

concurred. The department stated that advisor teams and the leadership 

of brigades must collaborate and use the site survey as well as the 

brigade’s intelligence infrastructure to support the teams in getting 

situational awareness. Further, DOD further noted that space and 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

logistical constraints may limit participation in a brigade’s site survey. 

Given the critical nature of the SFA advisor team mission, DOD noted that 

team leaders should be given priority to participate in a predeployment 

site survey, but that a balance must be met regarding the comprehensive 

nature of the mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, the department stated 

that while the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps can explore timing opportunities for advisor team leaders to 

participate in predeployment site surveys, the Afghanistan theater of 

operations has responsibility for ultimate approval for a site-survey visit 

request. As a result, the department recommended that we rephrase the 

second step to include the wording "in coordination with U.S. Central 

Command.” We agree that various factors can affect the composition of 

the personnel participating in the site surveys and that the theater of 

operations has responsibility to approve visit requests. Our report 

specifically notes that unit commanders and theater commands determine 

the numbers of personnel that take part in the predeployment site survey, 

and take into consideration limitations on the ability of certain locations to 

provide transportation, housing, and other support. Based on DOD’s 

comments, we modified the text of our second step as DOD suggested. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Army; the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commander of U.S. Central 

Command. In addition, the report will also be available on our website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sharon L. Pickup

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD), in 

conjunction with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has 

defined Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor team missions, goals, 

and objectives, we reviewed doctrine and guidance from the Army, 

Marine Corps, and theater commanders, including the Army Field Manual 

3-07.1 Security Force Assistance and the ISAF SFA Concept and 

Implementation Guidance. We also examined key planning documents, 

such as operational plans and orders, theater commanders’ requests for 

forces, and select advisor team mission briefs and after-action reports. 

Additionally, we interviewed officials in the United States from the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, as well as officials in Afghanistan from ISAF, ISAF Joint 

Command, regional commands, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisor 

teams.

To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have been 

able to provide SFA advisor teams, we reviewed documents such as 

theater and combatant commanders’ requests for forces that establish 

personnel requirements for SFA advisor teams and Army and Marine 

Corps sourcing documents, including execution orders and other manning 

guidance. We also examined ISAF, ISAF Joint Command, and Army and 

Marine documents detailing the structure and composition of the SFA 

advisor teams, including the ISAF SFA Concept and Implementation 

Guidance, theater commander operational and fragmentary orders, and 

unit and advisor team briefings. Additionally, in addition to the officials 

mentioned above, we also interviewed officials in the United States from 

Army Forces Command, Marine Corps Central Command, 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force, U.S. Central Command, officials from Army brigades 

that provided SFA advisor teams, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

advisor team personnel in the United States and Afghanistan.

To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have 

developed programs to train SFA advisor teams for their specific missions 

in Afghanistan, we reviewed theater commanders’ and service training 

requirements for SFA advisor teams, such as U.S. Central Command 

theater training requirements, ISAF minimum training requirements for 

SFA advisor teams, and Army and Marine Corps training requirements for 

SFA advisor teams. We also examined documents detailing Army and 

Marine Corps advisor training programs, such as concept briefs and 

curriculum documents from the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, the Joint 

Readiness Training Center, the Marine Corps Advisor Training Group, 

and Marine Corps Advisor Training Cell. We also reviewed after-action 

reports and lessons-learned documents from SFA advisor teams. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Army 162nd Infantry 

Training Brigade, Joint Readiness Training Center, 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force Advisor Training Cell, Marine Corps Advisor Training 

Group, and U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisor personnel conducting 

training in the United States and deployed in Afghanistan, as well as from 

those organizations mentioned earlier.

We visited or contacted officials from the following organizations in the 

United States and Afghanistan during our review:

DOD Organizations in the United States

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia

• U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida

• U.S. Army

• Department of the Army Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia

• U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

• 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Polk, Louisiana

• Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana

• 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

• U.S. Marine Corps

• Headquarters, Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia

• Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Florida

• 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, including its Advisor Training Cell, 

Camp Pendleton, California

• Advisor Training Group, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 

Twentynine Palms, California

DOD and International Entities in Afghanistan

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entities, including the 

following:

• ISAF, ISAF Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team, and 

ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan

• NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan

• Regional Command headquarters and staff:

• Regional Command–East (Commanded by 1st Infantry 

Division, U.S. Army), Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan

• Regional Command–South (Commanded by 3rd Infantry 

Division, U.S. Army), Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

• Regional Command–Southwest (Commanded by 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force (Fwd), U.S. Marine Corps), Camp 

Leatherneck, Afghanistan

• U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

• U.S. Army and Marine Corps Units, Personnel, and Advisor Teams 

deployed in Afghanistan:

• 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Army

• 2nd Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. Army

• 162nd Infantry Training Brigade training liaison officers

• 23 SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan, including the following:

• 7 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–East

• 10 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–South

• 5 Marine Corps advisor teams in Regional Command–

Southwest

• 1 Army advisor team in Regional Command–West

As part of this review, we selected an illustrative, non-generalizable 

sample of deployed U.S. Army and Marine Corps SFA advisor teams in 

Afghanistan. We worked with theater commands in Afghanistan to identify 

and meet with a selection of advisor teams that included both Army and 

Marine Corps advisor teams, advisor teams operating in different regional 

commands, and advisor teams assigned to various types (e.g., army, 

police, operational coordination center, etc.) and levels (e.g., corps, 

brigade, battalion, etc.) of the ANSF. Ultimately, we met with 23 deployed 

U.S. advisor teams in Afghanistan operating in four different regional 

commands’ areas of operations—18 Army teams and 5 Marine Corps 

teams.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 27 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 28 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Sharon Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant 

Director; Virginia Chanley; Carole Coffey; Grace Coleman; Mark Dowling; 

Kasea Hamar; Marcus Oliver; Luis Rodriguez; and Sally Williamson made 

key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Page 29 GAO-13-381 Security Force Assistance

Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage 

Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation. 

GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues.GAO-13-218SP. Washington, 

D.C.: February 11, 2013.

Afghanistan Security: Security Transition. GAO-12-598C. Washington, 

D.C.: September 11, 2012.

Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead 

Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces. 

GAO-12-734C. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2012.

Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and 

Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.

Interim Results on U.S.-NATO Efforts to Transition Lead Security 

Responsibility to Afghan Forces. GAO-12-607C. Washington, D.C.: May 

18, 2012.

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide 

Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556. 

Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army 

Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington, 

D.C.: August 2, 2011.

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