EMERGENCY 

ALERTING

Capabilities Have 

Improved, but 

Additional Guidance 

and Testing Are 

Needed

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2013

GAO-13-375

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-375, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2013

EMERGENCY ALERTING

Capabilities Have Improved, but Additional 

Guidance and Testing Are Needed

Why GAO Did This Study

An effective system to alert the public 

during emergencies can help reduce 

property damage and save lives. In 

2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS with the 

goal of integrating the nation’s EAS 

and other public-alerting systems into a 

comprehensive alerting system. In 

2009, GAO reported on long-standing 

weaknesses with EAS and FEMA’s 

limited progress in implementing 

IPAWS. Subsequently, FEMA and 

FCC conducted the first-ever 

nationwide EAS test in November 

2011. GAO was asked to review recent 

efforts to implement IPAWS and 

improve EAS. GAO examined: (1) how 

IPAWS capabilities have changed 

since 2009 and what barriers, if any,

affect its implementation and (2)

results of the nationwide EAS test and 

federal efforts to address identified 

weaknesses. GAO reviewed FEMA, 

FCC, and other documentation, and 

interviewed industry stakeholders and 

alerting authorities from six locations 

that were selected because they have 

public-alerting systems in addition to 

EAS and experienced problems during 

the nationwide EAS test. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FEMA work in 

conjunction with FCC to establish 

guidance for states to fully implement 

and test IPAWS components and 

implement a strategy for regular 

nationwide EAS testing. In response, 

the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) concurred with GAO’s

recommendations and provided 

examples of actions aimed at 

addressing the recommendations. 

DHS, FCC, and the Department of 

Commerce also provided technical 

comments, which have been 

incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found

Since 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken 

actions to improve the capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning 

System (IPAWS) and to increase federal, state, and local capabilities to alert the 

public, but barriers remain to fully implementing an integrated system. 

Specifically, IPAWS has the capability to receive and authenticate Internet-based 

alerts from federal, state, and local public authorities and disseminate them to the 

public through multiple systems. For example, since January 2012, publicalerting authorities can disseminate Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages

through IPAWS to television and radio stations. Beginning in April 2012, alerting 

authorities have used IPAWS to transmit alerts via the Commercial Mobile Alert 

System interface to disseminate text-like messages to mobile phones. FEMA 

also adopted alert standards and increased coordination efforts with multiple 

stakeholders. Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an 

integrated system, state and local alerting authorities we contacted cited a need 

for more guidance from FEMA on how to integrate and test IPAWS capabilities

with their existing alerting systems. For example, an official with a state alerting 

authority said that additional guidance from FEMA is needed to determine what 

systems and policies should be put in place before integrating and testing IPAWS 

with other public alerting systems in the state’s 128 counties and cities. In the 

absence of sufficient guidance from FEMA, states we contacted are reluctant to 

fully implement IPAWS. This reluctance decreases the capability for an 

integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting system.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required all EAS participants 

(e.g., broadcast radio and television, cable operators, satellite radio and 

television service providers, and wireline video-service providers) to submit a 

report to FCC by December 27, 2011, on the results of the nationwide EAS test. 

As of January 2013, 61 percent of broadcasters and cable operators had 

submitted the required report. Of those, 82 percent reported receiving the 

nationwide test alert, and 61 percent reported successfully retransmitting the 

alert to other stations, as required. Broadcasters’ and cable operators’ reception 

of the alert varied by state, from 6 percent in Oregon to 100 percent in Delaware. 

Key reasons for reception or retransmission difficulties included poor audio 

quality, outdated broadcaster-monitoring assignments, and equipment failure. 

For example, poor audio quality of the test alert resulted in some broadcasters’ 

receiving a garbled and degraded audio message and others’ receiving a 

duplicate alert that caused equipment to malfunction. According to FEMA 

officials, the poor audio quality is being addressed, in part, with the deployment 

of a dedicated satellite network that will become fully operational by fall 2013. 

However, at the time of our review, FEMA and FCC had taken few steps to 

address other problems identified in the nationwide test. Furthermore, while FCC 

rules call for periodic nationwide EAS testing, it is uncertain when the next test 

will occur. Without a strategy for regular nationwide testing of the relay 

distribution system, including developing milestones and timeframes and 

reporting on after-action plans, there is no assurance that EAS would work as 

intended should the President need to activate it to communicate with the 

American people. 

View GAO-13-375. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov
Page i GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Letter 1 

Background 3

IPAWS Capabilities Have Improved, but Barriers to 

Implementation Exist 9

Most Reporting EAS Participants Received and Retransmitted the 

Test Alert, but Federal Efforts to Address Identified Weaknesses 

Are Limited 21

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments 29

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 31

Appendix II FEMA’s Progress Addressing Responsibilities of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order 

No. 13407 34

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 35

Appendix IV Comments from the Federal Communications Commission 38

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Tables

Table 1: Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

Form a Comprehensive Public-Alerting System under 

Executive Order No. 13407 (2006) 7

Table 2: State and Local Interviews 32

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Figures

Figure 1: Flowchart for National-Level Alerts 5

Figure 2: National-Level EAS and Current IPAWS Architecture 13

Figure 3: Percentage of Broadcasters and Cable Operators by State 

That Received the Nationwide EAS Test Alert 22

Abbreviations

AMBER America’s Missing Broadcast Emergency Response

CAP Common Alerting Protocol

CMAS Commercial Mobile Alert System

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EAS Emergency Alert System

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

HazCollect All Hazards Emergency Message Collection System

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

NEMA National Emergency Management Association

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

PEP primary entry point

WARN Act Warning, Alert, Response, Network Act

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 24, 2013

The Honorable Bill Shuster

Chairman

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lou Barletta

Chairman

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and

 Emergency Management

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Denham

House of Representatives

Effective public emergency alerts via various telecommunications modes 

are critical in major events such as natural disaster, terrorist attack, or 

war. A reliable and comprehensive system to alert Americans during 

emergencies can help save lives and reduce damages and hardship. The 

Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a national public warning system that 

requires broadcasters, cable operators, and other communications 

service providers to provide the President with communications capability 

to address the American people during a national emergency.

Although EAS was originally designed to alert the public via radios and 

televisions, in June 2006, an executive order directed the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to modernize the nation’s public-alerting 

systems to ensure the capability of distributing alerts though a variety of 

telecommunications devices beyond broadcast media. The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS is responsible for 

modernizing EAS and implementing the Integrated Public Alert and 

Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended to integrate EAS and other 

public-alerting systems into a larger network to form a comprehensive 

public-alerting system. In September 2009, we reported that EAS 

exhibited long-standing weaknesses that limit its effectiveness and that 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

FEMA had made little progress in implementing IPAWS.1

To meet these objectives, we examined federal agency data and reports 

since 2009, including FEMA’s inventory and evaluation of public-alerting 

systems; the IPAWS program management plan; nationwide EAS test 

data and preliminary reports; and various agency orders and rules. To 

determine the reliability of the data used in this report, we reviewed 

relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials about their 

processes for reviewing the data and ensuring their accuracy. We found 

the agency data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. 

We met with officials from FCC, FEMA, DHS, and the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to understand the agencies’ 

progress in implementing IPAWS and efforts to address weaknesses 

identified from the nationwide EAS test. For both objectives, we also met 

with representatives from industry trade groups, including radio and 

television broadcasters, cable operators, and wireless service providers, 

and an organization representing individuals with disabilities. In six 

locations—California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the 

District of Columbia—we interviewed state and local alerting authorities, 

state emergency-communication-committee chairs, the state 

broadcasters association, and selected local broadcasters. We selected 

these states and the District of Columbia because, among other things, 

they have additional public-alerting systems other than EAS, and some 

have the ability to provide alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited 

English. The selected states also experienced problems during the 

nationwide EAS test. Results from our review of the selected states and 

localities are not generalizable.

In November 

2011, FEMA, in conjunction with the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC), conducted the first-ever nationwide test of EAS, 

which revealed that some portions of the system did not work as 

intended. Building on our previous work, you asked us to provide 

information on recent efforts to implement IPAWS and improve EAS. We 

examined (1) how the capabilities of IPAWS have changed since 2009 

and what barriers, if any, are affecting its implementation and (2) the 

results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts under way to 

address identified weaknesses.

 

1

GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for 

Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System, GAO-09-834 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion of 

our objectives, scope, and methodology appears in appendix I.

EAS serves as the nation’s primary alerting system. It provides the 

President the capability to issue alerts and communicate to the public in 

response to emergencies. It was built on a structure conceived in the 

1950s when over-the-air broadcasting was the best-available technology 

for widely disseminating emergency alerts. EAS has been upgraded 

numerous times since then, including in 2005 to include digital broadcast 

television as well as satellite radio and television. EAS was further 

expanded to include Internet-protocol-based television in 2007.

FEMA, in partnership with FCC and NOAA, is responsible for operating 

and maintaining EAS at the federal level. NOAA’s National Weather 

Service and state and local alerting authorities, in conjunction with local 

radio and television stations, can also use EAS to disseminate 

emergency messages, including weather warnings, America’s Missing: 

Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts,

2

Presidential EAS alerts, also known as national-level alerts, use a 

hierarchical broadcast-based distribution system to relay emergency 

messages, as shown in figure 1. As the entry point for national-level EAS 

messages, FEMA is responsible for distributing such alerts to National 

Primary stations, often referred to as primary entry point (PEP) stations.

and other public 

emergency communications, targeted to specific regional and local areas

and independent from a presidential alert. 

3

 

2

The AMBER Alert Program is a voluntary collaboration among law-enforcement 

agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the wireless industry to activate an 

urgent bulletin in the most serious child-abduction cases.

Broadcasts of national-level alerts are relayed by the PEP stations across 

3

PEP stations are usually private or commercial radio stations, but FEMA also designated 

some satellite providers as PEP stations, such as SiriusXM Satellite and National Public 

Radio’s Satellite System News Advisory Channel. 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

the country to radio and television stations that rebroadcast the audio and 

visual message to other broadcast stations, cable systems, and other 

EAS participants4

 

4

EAS participants are entities required under FCC rules to comply with EAS rules and 

include radio and television broadcast stations, wired and wireless cable television 

systems, direct broadcast satellite service providers, satellite digital audio radio service 

providers, and wireline video systems. 47 C.F.R. § 11.2 (d). 

until all participants have been alerted. This 

retransmission of alerts from EAS participant to EAS participant is 

commonly referred to as a “daisy chain” distribution system.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Figure 1: Flowchart for National-Level Alerts

While FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national-level, 

FCC adopts, administers, and enforces rules governing EAS and the EAS 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

participants. FCC rules require EAS participants to install FCC-certified 

equipment and transmit all national-level alerts; EAS participants can also 

voluntarily transmit alerts generated by the National Weather Service or 

state and local alerting authorities. EAS participants, through their State 

Emergency Communications Committee,

5 may maintain state EAS plans 

that contain procedures for the distribution of national-level alerts as well 

as other voluntary alerts generated by state and local alerting authorities 

and the National Weather Service.6

On November 9, 2011, FEMA conducted the first-ever nationwide test of 

the national-level EAS in response to our prior reports noting the lack of 

EAS testing. FEMA conducted the test in conjunction with FCC. In 

conducting the test, FEMA initiated a national-level alert to be distributed 

through the EAS daisy chain to EAS participants, which include about 

26,000 broadcasters, cable operators, and other EAS participants. To 

obtain information on the results of the test, FCC directed all EAS 

participants to report either electronically or via paper report by December 

27, 2011, on whether they received and retransmitted the alert. Although 

December 27, 2011, was the deadline, FCC continued to accept paper 

reports from EAS participants past the deadline.

State EAS plans describe the EAS 

relay network of each state, including the monitoring assignments of EAS 

participants for all national-level and other alerts.

In addition to EAS, state and local alerting authorities may own and 

operate other warning systems, such as emergency telephone notification 

systems, sirens, and electronic highway billboards, to provide public 

emergency information. Additionally, NOAA provides alerts through the 

NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards system, which is a network of radio 

stations broadcasting continuous weather information, including warnings, 

watches, and forecasts directly from the nearest National Weather 

Service office.

In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS to integrate EAS and other public-alerting 

systems into a larger, more comprehensive public-alerting system. In 

June 2006, the President issued Executive Order No. 13407, entitled 

 

5

State Emergency Communications Committees are groups in each state that are 

comprised of radio and television broadcasters, cable companies, and state alerting 

authorities. 

6

47 C.F.R. § 11.21.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Public Alert and Warning System, adopting a policy that the United States 

have a comprehensive, integrated alerting system. The order directs the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to “ensure an orderly and effective 

transition” from current capabilities to a more coordinated and integrated 

system and details the responsibilities of the Secretary in meeting the 

President’s directive.7

Table 1: Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security to Form a 

Comprehensive Public-Alerting System under Executive Order No. 13407 (2006)

As shown in table 1, the executive order 

established 10 responsibilities for the Secretary of Homeland Security. It 

is FEMA’s intention that IPAWS be the programmatic mechanism to carry 

out the executive order.

Responsibilities

1. Inventory, evaluate, and assess the capabilities and integration with the public alert 

and warning system of federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local public-alert and warning 

resources.

2. Establish or adopt, as appropriate, common alerting and warning protocols, standards, 

terminology, and operating procedures for the public-alert and warning system to enable 

interoperability and the secure delivery of coordinated messages to the American people 

through as many communication pathways as practicable, taking into account FCC rules, 

as provided by law.

3. Ensure the capability to adapt the distribution and content of communications based 

on geographic location, risks, or personal user preferences, as appropriate.

4. Include in the public-alert and warning system the capability to alert and warn all 

Americans, including those with disabilities and those without an understanding of the 

English language.

5. Through cooperation with the owners and operators of communication facilities, 

maintain, protect, and if necessary, restore communication facilities and capabilities 

necessary for the public-alert and warning system.

6. Ensure the conduct of training, tests, and exercises for the public-alert and warning 

system.

7. Ensure the conduct of public education efforts. 

8. Consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the private sector, including communications 

media organizations, and federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governmental 

authorities, including emergency response providers, as appropriate.

9. Administer the EAS as a critical component of the public-alert and warning system.

10. Ensure that under all conditions the President of the United States can alert and 

warn the American people.

Source: Executive Order No. 13407.

 

7

Exec. Order No. 13407, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,975.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

In addition, in 2006, the Warning, Alert, Response Network Act (WARN 

Act)8 was enacted, which required FCC to adopt relevant technical 

standards, protocols, procedures, and other technical requirements to 

enable commercial mobile service providers (e.g., wireless providers) to 

issue emergency alerts.9 The act required FCC to establish an advisory 

panel called the Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee to 

recommend technical specifications and protocols to govern wireless 

service providers participation in emergency alerting.10 In 2008, following 

public notice and opportunity for public comment as required by the 

Administrative Procedure Act,11 FCC adopted many of the committee’s 

recommendations for wireless providers to transmit alerts and began 

developing the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS),12 in conjunction 

with FEMA.13

We previously reported several factors that limited EAS effectiveness and 

delayed IPAWS implementation.14

 

8

The WARN Act was enacted as title VI of the Security and Accountability for Every Port 

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 602, 120 Stat. 1,884, 1,936 (2006), codified at 47 U.S.C. ch. 

11.

For example, in 2009, we reported that 

a lack of redundancy and testing and gaps in coverage, including 

capabilities to reach individuals with disabilities and non-English 

speakers, significantly limited EAS reliability and efficiency. We also 

reported in 2009 that IPAWS program implementation had stalled, as 

state and local governments were forging ahead with their own alerting 

systems. We made several recommendations to FEMA to improve 

program management and enhance transparency about the progress 

9

47 U.S.C. § 1201.

1047 U.S.C. § 1202.

115 U.S.C. § 553(c). 

12FCC recently released an order amending Part 10 of the FCC rules to change 

references from “Commercial Mobile Alert System” and “CMAS” to “Wireless Emergency 

Alerts” and “WEA.” In the Matter of Commercial Mobile Alert System, PS Docket No. 07-

287, (PSHSB, Feb. 25, 2013). 

13In the Matter of the Commercial Mobile Alert System, 23 FCC Rcd. 6144 (2008), 

reconsidered, clarified and corrected, 23 FCC Rcd. 11,669 (2008), with errata, 23 FCC 

Rcd.12,561 (2008)

14GAO-09-834 and GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System 

Has Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be Challenging, 

GAO-07-411 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
 

Page 9 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

toward achieving an integrated public-alerting system. FEMA 

implemented all our recommendations, including periodically reporting on 

the status of implementing IPAWS to congressional committees and 

subcommittees.15

Since we reported on these issues in 2009, FEMA has taken actions to 

improve IPAWS capabilities. In particular, FEMA implemented a federal 

alert aggregator in 2010, called the IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency 

Networks,

16 which has increased alerting capabilities for authorities at the 

federal, state, and local level.17 The alert aggregator is capable of 

receiving and authenticating alerts from public-alerting authorities and 

routing them to various public-alerting systems. As of January 2013, 93 

public-alerting authorities,18 including those in at least 35 states, have 

gone through the necessary authentication steps with FEMA to use 

IPAWS and an additional 110 alerting authorities have applications in 

process.19

 

15Information on the specific actions FEMA took to implement our recommendations is 

available at http://www.gao.gov/products/

Authorized public-alerting authorities may use IPAWScompatible software to compose and transmit alerts via the Internet to the 

GAO-09-834. 

16Throughout this report, we refer to IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency Networks 

simply as IPAWS. 

17U.S. territories and tribal governments can also use the federal aggregator for public 

alerting.

18According to a survey FEMA conducted from January 2010 through December 2011, 

more than 3,300 public-alerting authorities existed in the United States at that time.

19FEMA requires alerting authorities to take specific steps to become authorized alert 

originators. A federal, state, local, tribal or territorial alerting authority can become an 

authorized alert originator by (1) selecting IPAWS compatible software, (2) applying for a 

memorandum of agreement with FEMA, (3) applying for public-alerting permissions, and 

(4) completing IPAWS web-based training. Use of IPAWS for federal, state, and local 

authorities is voluntary, and there is no cost to send messages through IPAWS, although 

there may be costs associated with acquiring IPAWS-compatible software. 

IPAWS Capabilities 

Have Improved, but 

Barriers to 

Implementation Exist

FEMA has Increased 

Federal, State, and Local 

Alerting Capabilities Since 

2009
 

Page 10 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

alert aggregator using a common standard, called the Common Alerting 

Protocol (CAP).20 According to FEMA, once the alert aggregator verifies 

the credentials of the message, an alert may be distributed to the public 

through multiple alerting systems,21

• EAS. As of January 2012, public-alerting authorities can disseminate 

CAP-formatted EAS alerts through the alert aggregator to television 

and radio stations.

which make up the components of 

IPAWS, as follows:

22 As of June 30, 2012, FCC required EAS 

participants (i.e., radio and television broadcasters, cable operators) 

to have in place CAP-compatible equipment and monitor the IPAWS 

EAS feed so they can retrieve and retransmit Internet-based EAS 

alerts. State and local alerting authorities’ use of IPAWS to send EAS 

alerts is voluntary and as of January 2013, no public-alerting 

authorities had used IPAWS to send an EAS alert. However, 

according to FEMA, state and local alerting authorities had sent 81 

EAS test messages via the alert aggregator between January 2012 

and January 2013.

• All-Hazards Emergency Message Collection System (HazCollect). 

NOAA’s HazCollect system connected to IPAWS in September 2012, 

and enables federal, state, and local alerting authorities to send nonweather emergency messages through IPAWS to the National 

Weather Service’s alerting systems, including NOAA Weather Radio’s 

nationwide network of radio stations.23

 

20CAP is an open, non-proprietary digital message format that is compatible with multiple 

applications and telecommunications methods.

Examples of non-weather 

emergency message events can include wildfires, hazardous 

materials releases, terrorist incidents, AMBER alerts, and public 

21The various alerting systems either receive a pushed message—meaning data is sent 

by the server to the user—or poll for a message from the alert aggregator—meaning data 

is pulled from the server by the user. 

22According to FEMA, the IPAWS EAS Atom Feed came online on September 2011. 

FEMA began processing applications for IPAWS public alerting authorities in June 2011

and FEMA began posting weekly tests to the IPAWS EAS Internet feed in January 2012. 

To access the IPAWS EAS feed, public-alerting authorities need Internet connectivity, 

appropriate equipment (CAP EAS Encoder/Decoder) and software, and must complete 

FEMA’s authentication steps to become an authorized user of IPAWS.

23Other National Weather Service dissemination systems include the NOAA Weather Wire 

Service, Emergency Managers Weather Information Network, National Weather Service 

Websites, Internet feeds, and others. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

health emergencies. According to FEMA, EAS participants generally 

monitor the NOAA Weather Radio directly for emergency alerts. As a 

result, IPAWS with HazCollect provides an alternate means for EAS 

participants to receive non-weather alerts from local alerting 

authorities, increasing the number of alerting channels and enhancing 

the likelihood that the public will receive timely alerts. According to 

FEMA, 22 NOAA Weather Radio messages had been sent via the 

alert aggregator as of January 2013.

• CMAS. Starting in April 2012, public-alerting authorities can use 

IPAWS to transmit alerts via the CMAS interface to disseminate 

mobile alerts, which are geo-targeted, text-like messages to mobile 

phones.24 These alerts are limited to 90 characters and emit a unique 

ring tone and vibration cadence, which is intended to, among other 

things, improve capabilities for notifying individuals with disabilities 

during an emergency. This new capability is designed to relay 

presidential (or national-level), AMBER, and imminent threat alerts to 

mobile phones using cell technology that is not subject to the 

congestion typically experienced on wireless networks during times of 

emergency.25 Most imminent threat alerts are issued by the National 

Weather Service, which began sending severe weather-related alerts 

to all regions of the country in June 2012. According to FEMA, as of 

January 2013, the National Weather Service had sent 2,667 weather 

alerts via CMAS. An additional 3 imminent threat alerts had been sent 

from one state related to Hurricane Sandy and 17 AMBER alerts had 

been sent from the National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children.26 While CMAS became operational in April 2012, 

participation by wireless carriers is optional under the WARN Act.27

 

24CMAS is a partnership between FEMA, FCC, and wireless carriers to enhance public 

safety. The rules for CMAS are published at 47 C.F.R. ch. I, subchapter A, pt.10. In 

December 2009, FEMA formally adopted the CMAS Interface Specification, which defined 

the interface between the federal alert aggregator gateway and the commercial service 

provider gateways. This initiated a 28-month period during which participating commercial 

mobile service providers needed to develop, test, and deploy their portion of CMAS. 

25Cell phone users may opt out of receiving imminent threat and AMBER alerts, but may 

not opt out of receiving presidential alerts. 

26The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is a nonprofit organization 

whose mission is to serve as the nation’s resource on the issues of missing and sexually 

exploited children. 

2747 U.S.C. §1201 (b)(2). 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Nevertheless, according to CTIA—The Wireless Association, all of the 

major wireless carriers have agreed to participate.28 Some carriers 

may still be rolling out CMAS capabilities and not all cell phones are 

yet capable of receiving alerts, according to CTIA. Some state and 

local alerting authorities we contacted raised concerns about the 

degree of granularity for geo-targeting these alerts, which we discuss 

later in this report.

• Internet services. As of September 2012, Internet web services (e.g., 

Google Public Alerts) and software application developers can 

retrieve and redistribute IPAWS alerts to the public through their own 

services, such as websites, mobile phone applications, email, and text 

messaging. To do so, an alert redistribution service must complete a 

memorandum of agreement with FEMA, which then grants them 

access to the IPAWS Public Alerts Feed from the alert aggregator.

• State and local alerting systems. According to FEMA, existing state 

or locally owned and operated public-alerting systems—such as 

sirens and emergency telephone notification systems—may also be 

configured to receive alerts from IPAWS.

FEMA views the new capabilities for public-alerting authorities to 

distribute CAP-formatted messages through the federal alert aggregator 

as an added capability, not a replacement, to the traditional national-level 

alert (i.e., EAS daisy chain relay distribution system). As a result, FEMA 

officials said they anticipate maintaining both systems into the 

foreseeable future as parallel alerting systems, as shown in figure 2. 

FEMA officials also told us that discussions with the White House are 

ongoing to determine use of IPAWS during a presidential alert; however, 

at the time of our report, FEMA officials said a national-level alert would 

not be disseminated through the federal alert aggregator.29

 

28CTIA is an international non-profit organization that represents the wireless 

communications industry. Membership in the association includes wireless carriers and 

their suppliers, as well as providers and manufacturers of wireless data services and 

products.

29In addition, FEMA officials said there are additional challenges to sending a nationallevel alert directly to EAS participant stations through both IPAWS and the traditional 

system. Specifically, uncertainty exists regarding technical malfunctions that could occur 

with equipment if EAS participant stations simultaneously received an alert both through 

the PEP stations via the traditional daisy chain and the alert aggregator. FEMA officials 

said that until these technical issues are resolved, FEMA would not distribute a CAPformatted national-level alert to EAS participant stations through IPAWS.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Figure 2: National-Level EAS and Current IPAWS Architecture

In addition to creating the alert aggregator, FEMA has taken other actions 

to implement the IPAWS program and address directives in Executive 

Order No. 13407. Specific examples include:

• Expanded and modernized PEP stations. To increase direct 

coverage of a presidential alert and address executive order directives 

to augment infrastructure for the public alert and warning system, 

FEMA has expanded the number of PEP stations from 34 in 2009 

(directly covering about 67 percent of the American population) to 65 

in 2012 (directly covering about 85 percent of the American 

population), according to FEMA officials. FEMA plans to further 

expand and modernize this network, with the goal of having a total of 

77 PEP stations operational by fall 2013, providing direct coverage to 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

over 90 percent of the American population.30 FEMA officials said 

they have also added satellite connectivity in 50 PEP stations, with 

the goal of a fully operational, dedicated PEP satellite network to all 

77 stations by fall 2013. According to FEMA officials, once 

operational, this network will be the primary connection between 

FEMA and the PEP stations in the event of a presidential alert; the 

traditional telephone-based distribution network will provide a 

redundant backup connection.

• Adopted CAP standard. To address directives in the executive order 

that DHS develop alert standards and protocols, FEMA formally 

adopted CAP in September 2010. CAP can be used as a single input 

to activate multiple warning systems, and is capable of geographic 

targeting and multilingual messaging. According to a survey FEMA 

conducted of more than 3,300 public-alerting authorities in the United 

States from January 2010 through December 2011, 64 percent of the 

sites responding used CAP and had IPAWS-compatible Products 

in place at the time of the survey.31 Most public-alerting authorities we 

contacted are moving toward adoption of CAP; however, some are 

still in the process of implementing new software to interface with 

IPAWS or are waiting for vendors to provide upgrades to their existing 

systems. In addition, representatives from the broadcast industry told 

us, based on experience, that the vast majority of broadcasters are 

able to receive CAP-formatted alerts, as required by FCC rules.

• Developed IPAWS training and webinars. Executive Order No. 

13407 directs DHS to conduct training for the public alert and warning 

system. To address this directive, FEMA developed an independent 

training course for alerting authorities on IPAWS capabilities, which 

has been available online since December 2011. The goal of the 

course is to provide public-alerting authorities with increased 

awareness of the benefits of using IPAWS for public warnings; skills 

to draft more appropriate, effective, and accessible warning 

messages; and best practices in the effective use of CAP to reach all 

 

30Although roughly 10 percent of the population will not be covered by a PEP station, the 

public may also be reached by other EAS participants (e.g., satellite TV providers). 

Information on the specific areas of the country that have PEP station coverage is 

available at http://www.fema.gov/primary-entry-point-stations. 

31FEMA, IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report, December 2011. See 

appendix I for a description of the survey used to produce the inventory.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

members of their communities. In addition, the IPAWS program office 

conducts monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.

• Conducted outreach to partners. Since 2009, the IPAWS program 

office has made efforts to improve communication and outreach to 

stakeholders at all levels, according to FEMA officials. Executive 

Order No. 13407 directs FEMA to consult, coordinate, and cooperate 

with the private sector, as well as provide public education on IPAWS. 

Some government and private stakeholders told us that FEMA’s 

communication and coordination efforts have improved significantly 

since 2009, although improvements could still be made, especially in 

educating the public, as discussed below. According to FEMA 

officials, the IPAWS program office works to engage federal entities; 

state, local, tribal, and territorial alerting authorities; private sector 

industry; non-profit and advocacy groups; and the American people 

through working groups and roundtables, conferences, 

demonstrations, trainings and webinars, Congressional briefings, and

the IPAWS Web site, among other mechanisms.

For a complete list of actions FEMA has taken to address Executive 

Order No. 13407, see appendix II.

Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated 

alerting system, barriers exist that may impede IPAWS implementation at 

the state and local level. Specifically, public-alerting authorities we 

contacted, as well as representatives from national trade industry groups, 

identified five main barriers at the state and local level. These barriers 

include (1) insufficient guidance on how states should fully implement 

IPAWS; (2) inability of state and local alerting authorities to test all IPAWS 

components; (3) CMAS geo-targeting and character limitations; (4) 

inadequate public outreach on IPAWS capabilities; and (5) limited 

resources at the federal, state, and local level to fully implement IPAWS.

• Insufficient guidance to fully implement IPAWS. While most state 

and local alerting authorities we contacted, including representatives 

from the National Emergency Management Association,32

 

32The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) is a non-partisan, non-profit 

association dedicated to enhancing public safety by improving the nation’s ability to 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from all emergencies, disasters, and threats to our 

nation’s security. NEMA is the professional association of and for emergency 

management directors from all 50 states, 8 U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.

said they 

Barriers Remain to Fully 

Implementing and Using 

IPAWS 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

are moving toward implementing IPAWS, some are reluctant to fully 

implement the system, citing a need for more information and 

additional guidance from FEMA.

33

• Inability of state and local alerting authorities to test all IPAWS 

components. Some officials from state and local alerting authorities 

we contacted were also reluctant to use IPAWS because procedures 

Specifically, while current IPAWS 

training exists to instruct public-alerting authorities on, among other 

things, how to draft an appropriate IPAWS alert, state and local 

alerting authorities we contacted said additional guidance is needed 

on integrating and operating IPAWS with existing state and local 

public-alerting systems in their states. For example, officials in one 

state said that while they are prepared to use IPAWS, they have not 

yet integrated their state and local alerting systems with IPAWS, citing

a need for additional guidance from FEMA and communication within 

the state to determine what systems and policies should be put in 

place to integrate IPAWS with public-alerting systems in the state’s 

128 counties and cities. Although Executive Order No. 13407 directs 

DHS to ensure interoperability and the delivery of coordinated public 

messages through multiple communication pathways, we found that 

none of our selected states had yet integrated their alerting systems 

with IPAWS for state or local level alerting, although according to 

FEMA, the alerting authorities had gone through the necessary steps 

to become authenticated IPAWS originators. Since IPAWS is still in 

the early stages of its deployment, officials said that there are no 

examples of how to effectively implement IPAWS at the state and 

local level. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA officials 

noted that they are involved in efforts to conduct case studies with 

public-alerting authorities in Nebraska and Nevada to provide 

examples of effectively implementing IPAWS at the state level. FEMA 

officials said they are working with state and local alerting authorities 

as well as system developers and vendors, to address some notable 

challenges related to implementing IPAWS, including how states can 

manage IPAWS capabilities within their respective states.

Nevertheless, in the absence of additional FEMA guidance, some 

states are reluctant to fully implement IPAWS, a reluctance that 

decreases the capability for an integrated, interoperable, and 

nationwide alerting system.

 

33According to FEMA, system developers and vendors conduct the technical integration 

of the alerting systems. FEMA is continuing to provide ongoing support to the developer 

community via webinars and published guides.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

for them to test all IPAWS components do not exist. As a result, they 

cannot assess the system’s reliability or effectiveness. For example, 

while there are procedures for public-alerting authorities to test EAS 

alerts via IPAWS, currently, the only way state and local alerting 

authorities could potentially test CMAS is to send a live alert, which is 

not permissible under FCC rules. Although FCC’s CMAS rules allow 

FEMA to test the system, according to FCC officials, these testing 

procedures do not extend to state and local alerting authorities that 

wish to use CMAS. As a result, FEMA officials told us they are 

working with FCC and other stakeholders to elevate the importance of 

clarifying rules for public-alerting partners, especially as it relates to 

how state and local alerting authorities can test mobile alerts using 

IPAWS. Although FCC officials told us in January 2013 that it was 

premature to review the CMAS rules, FCC subsequently said it plans 

to have one of its federal advisory committees, the Communications

Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council, review the CMAS

rules, including those related to testing procedures.

34

• CMAS geo-targeting and character limitations.

However, until 

FEMA and FCC develop procedures for state and local alerting 

authorities to test all IPAWS components, the state and local 

authorities have no assurances that emergency alerts will be 

effectively distributed and therefore may be unlikely to use the 

untested IPAWS components. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

FCC noted that while state and local alerting authorities have 

expressed a desire to test CMAS capabilities, wireless industry 

stakeholders have consistently raised concerns about their doing so.

35 Adopted in April 

2008, FCC rules dictate the technical standards and protocols 

governing CMAS and require alerts to be (1) sent to areas no larger 

than the county level and (2) limited to 90 characters.36

 

34FCC re-chartered the Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council, 

which is comprised of representatives from federal, state, tribal and local governments, 

various sectors of the communications industry, and non-profit organizations. Public 

Notice, DA 13-173 (Feb. 12, 2013), 2013 Westlaw 519, 447. The Council advises FCC on 

actions the Commission can take to promote the security, reliability, and interoperability of 

communications systems. At the time of our report, FCC had not published what items the 

Council would be reviewing. 

Several state 

35CMAS enables government officials to target emergency alerts to specific geographic 

areas through cell towers (e.g., lower Manhattan), which pushes the information to 

dedicated receivers in CMAS-enabled mobile devices. 

3647 C.F.R. §§ 10.430 and 10.450. FCC rules do not preclude participating wireless 

carriers from targeting geographic areas more granular than at the county level.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

and local alerting authorities we spoke with raised concerns about the 

possibility of over alerting the public with mobile alerts since the alerts 

may not geo-target the specific area affected. The 90-character 

message limitations of these alerts were also raised as a challenge by 

FEMA and other alerting authorities to sending out clear and accurate 

alerts, as alerts may not contain enough information to be useful. For 

example, according to officials in one state, the National Weather 

Service issued a flash flood warning via CMAS that was distributed 

throughout a large county, which is roughly the size of the state of 

Connecticut, when only one small area of the county was affected. 

According to state officials, some citizens were confused when they 

received this alert as they were not located in the affected area, and 

there was very little information contained in the 90-character alert to 

clarify the specific area affected. In addition, an evacuation notice 

accompanied the flash flood warning, and the local emergency 

management authority was unprepared when citizens called them for 

additional information.37 Officials stated that some citizens might 

ignore or opt out of future mobile alerts if they received previous alerts 

that were not applicable to them. The Commercial Mobile Service 

Alert Advisory Committee,38 which recommended technical standards 

and protocols for CMAS in 2007,39 recommended reviewing and 

updating its recommendations periodically based on advances in 

technology and experiences in deployment, especially related to geotargeting.40

 

37According to FEMA, some specific phone models improperly displayed an evacuation 

notice with the flash-flood warning because of phone-programming error. FEMA said it 

does not edit or restrict the content or targeting of messages sent through IPAWS, as long 

as the target zone is within the bounds of the public-alerting authorities’ jurisdiction, as 

indicated when applying for IPAWS authentication. 

As previously mentioned, FCC plans to have a federal 

advisory committee review the CMAS rules, including those related to 

geo-targeting and character limits. Technological advancements and

experiences in using the system since 2008 may warrant a review on 

a more specific level of geo-targeting and expanded character limits 

38The committee was chaired by the FCC chairman and included 42 other members, 

representing stakeholders in all levels of government and the private sector. 

39In the Matter of the Commercial Mobile Alert System, 22 FCC Rcd. 21,975 (2007). 

40FCC officials noted that both the geo-targeting and message length rules were a 

consensus-based product of a government and industry advisory committee in which 

FEMA and NOAA participated and that the rules were adopted pursuant to a notice and 

opportunity for comment rulemaking.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

for mobile alerts than was previously possible. Such changes to 

CMAS could make state and local authorities more likely to use these

alerts and the public less likely to opt out of the service.

• Insufficient public outreach. According to federal, state, and local 

officials we contacted, the public is generally unaware of IPAWS 

capabilities, especially alerts sent to mobile phones. Although FEMA 

officials told us that a training course to educate the public is under 

development, FEMA has conducted limited outreach to date to inform 

the general public about IPAWS alerts and capabilities beyond 

information on the FEMA website. Executive Order No. 13407 directs 

DHS to provide public education on using, accessing, and responding 

to the public alert and warning system. Because of limited public 

outreach, some state and local alerting authorities expressed concern 

that the public may ignore or opt out of receiving IPAWS alerts, even 

though these alerts may provide important, life-saving information. 

While FEMA has made efforts to improve outreach efforts with IPAWS 

stakeholders since 2009, FEMA officials said they have limited 

resources and experience in educating the general public on IPAWS. 

In previous work, we identified key practices for planning a consumer 

education campaign, including (1) defining goals and objectives; (2) 

analyzing the situation; (3) identifying stakeholders; (4) identifying 

resources; (5) researching target audiences; (6) developing 

consistent, clear messages; (7) identifying credible messenger(s); (8) 

designing media mix; and (9) establishing metrics to measure 

success.41

• Limited resources to implement IPAWS. While there is no charge 

to send messages through IPAWS, there are underlying costs to 

purchasing the software and equipment needed to integrate with 

IPAWS, costs that state and local public alerting authorities said can 

act as a barrier to implementation in difficult financial times.

Public outreach that includes these key practices could 

help ensure that the public is better informed about IPAWS 

capabilities.

42

 

41GAO, Digital Television Transition: Increased Federal Planning and Risk Management 

Could Further Facilitate the DTV Transition, 

According to the FEMA survey of public alerting authorities, 

GAO-08-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2007).

42According to FEMA, funding from the Homeland Security Grant Program and the Tribal 

Homeland Security Grant Program may be used to enhance existing or establish new alert 

and warning programs. 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

decreased revenues and a lack of grant funding at all levels of 

government were reported as primary reasons for authorities’ inability 

to purchase and sustain alerting systems.43

In addition to these barriers, there are some long-standing weaknesses 

that continue to limit the effectiveness of the national-level EAS since we 

last reported on this topic in 2009, including a lack of redundancy in how 

national-level EAS messages are disseminated to the public.

In addition, the FEMA 

survey found that while most state-level alerting authorities reported 

having full-time staff, many local authorities might only have part-time 

or volunteer staff and very limited budgets.

44 FEMA is 

making progress in increasing redundancy between the FEMA operations 

center and designated PEP stations through its deployment of a PEP 

satellite network. However, FEMA continues to rely solely on radio and 

television broadcast for a national-level EAS alert because the nationallevel EAS is not currently integrated with IPAWS capabilities. As a result, 

FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS participants should a 

point in the daisy chain distribution system fail. Moreover, large portions 

of the population would likely not be reached by a national-level alert—

specifically all those who are not watching television or listening to the 

radio at the time of the alert. Executive Order No. 13407 directs DHS to 

ensure presidential alerting capabilities under all conditions and enable 

delivery of coordinated messages to the American people through as 

many communication pathways as practicable. In addition, while 

Executive Order No. 13407 specifies that the public-alerting system 

should provide warnings to non-English speakers and individuals with 

disabilities, it remains difficult for a national-level alert to reach these 

distinct segments of the population. While the President has never 

initiated a national-level alert, according to FEMA, such an alert would be 

provided in English and only through radio and television broadcasts, 

which may not be accessible to individuals with disabilities.45

 

43FEMA, IPAWS Inventory & Evaluation Assessment Report, December 2011.

For 

example, according to the National Council on Disability, most disaster 

warnings broadcast via radio and television may not be accessible to 

44In 2007 and 2009, we reported that a lack of alternative means, or lack of redundancy, 

in reaching EAS participants should its primary connection fail, makes the EAS daisy 

chain prone to failure. See GAO-07-411 and GAO-09-834. 

45FCC officials noted that nothing in FCC’s rules precludes transmission of non-English 

alerts. Alerts sent via IPAWS are provided in any language the alerting authorities can use 

when developing a CAP-formatted alert message.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

people with hearing or vision disabilities.46 IPAWS, which can transmit 

CAP-formatted messages to specialized alerting devices for individuals 

with disabilities and in non-English languages, could help address some 

of these limitations if it were integrated with the national-level EAS.

Our analysis of FCC data found that approximately 82 percent of 

reporting broadcasters (radio and television) and cable operators 

received the November 2011 nationwide test alert.47 Although FEMA has 

been working to implement IPAWS, the November 2011 nationwide EAS 

test used the traditional national-level alert system (i.e., EAS daisy-chain 

relay distribution system) and did not include new IPAWS capabilities.48

 

46National Council on Disability, Effective Emergency Management: Making 

Improvements for Communities and People with Disabilities (Aug. 12, 2009). 

Broadcasters’ and cable operators’ reception of the test alert varied 

widely by state. As shown in figure 3, the reception of the alert ranged 

from approximately 6 percent (in Oregon) to 100 percent (in Delaware) 

among the states. FCC, FEMA, broadcasters, and state alerting 

authorities in Oregon attributed the low reception rate to the absence of a 

47FCC required that EAS participants report to FCC on whether they received the test 

alert, but many did not do so. As of January 2013, we found that about 61 percent of 

broadcasters and cable operators had submitted the report as required. Our analysis is 

based on broadcasters and cable operators that submitted information to FCC that we 

determined usable for our reporting purposes. 

48As previously mentioned, these systems are not integrated, and FEMA is in discussions 

with the White House to determine the use of IPAWS during a presidential alert. 

Most Reporting EAS 

Participants Received 

and Retransmitted the 

Test Alert, but Federal 

Efforts to Address 

Identified Weaknesses 

Are Limited

Results of the Nationwide 

EAS Test
 

Page 22 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

PEP station in the state at the time of the test.49

Figure 3: Percentage of Broadcasters and Cable Operators by State That Received the Nationwide EAS Test Alert

Without a PEP station, 

broadcasters and cable operators in Oregon were directed to monitor a 

Portland-based public radio station, which reported receiving poor audio 

quality of the alert from its designated monitoring source—the National 

Public Radio satellite network.

Note: This figure represents broadcasters’ and cable operators’ reception rates by state and does not 

include reception rates from U.S. territories. Additionally, FCC excused Alaska from the nationwide 

EAS test because of severe weather at the time of the test.

 

49Since that time, as part of FEMA’s PEP Station Expansion and Modernization Program, 

a PEP station in Oregon became operational in December 2012.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Once EAS participants received the national-level test alert, they were 

required to retransmit the audio signal to other EAS participants, as 

designated in state EAS plans, for the daisy chain distribution system to 

work. Our analysis of FCC data found that 61 percent of reporting 

broadcasters and cable operators were able to retransmit the alert to 

stations that were designated to monitor the retransmitting station. The 

retransmission rate of the test alert by broadcasters and cable operators 

also varied widely among the states ranging from approximately 4 percent 

(in Oregon) to 88 percent (in New Jersey). FCC does not know the 

potential percentage of the American people who did not receive the alert 

because, officials noted, the nationwide EAS test was designed to assess 

EAS performance rather than to determine the percentage of public 

receipt of the test. Therefore, it is unknown what percentage of the 

American people failed to receive the test.

Key reasons for EAS participants’ failure to receive and retransmit the 

national-level test alert included (1) PEP station reception failure, (2) poor 

audio quality, (3) shortened test length, (4) outdated monitoring 

assignments, and (5) equipment failure.

• PEP station reception failure. FEMA reported that 3 of the 63 PEP 

stations were unable to receive and retransmit the alert due to 

technical reasons. These PEP stations were located in New Mexico, 

Alabama, and American Samoa. Failures at those stations 

significantly contributed to low national-level alert reception rates in 

those states and that territory. In particular, our analysis of FCC data 

found that nearly 90 percent of broadcasters in New Mexico, almost 

70 percent of broadcasters in Alabama, and 100 percent of 

broadcasters in American Samoa failed to receive the national-level 

alert. According to FEMA, connectivity issues with the specialized 

EAS equipment used at the PEP stations were the reasons for the 

failure. As previously mentioned, FEMA plans to modernize PEP 

stations with a dedicated satellite network, and officials expect this 

dedicated network to provide more reliable connection to the PEP 

stations when fully operational by fall 2013.

• Poor audio quality. FCC also reported that poor audio quality of the 

national-level alert signal resulted in problems ranging from some 

broadcasters’ receiving a garbled and degraded audio message to 

others’ receiving a duplicate alert tone that caused equipment to 

malfunction. These audio problems resulted in some stations’ being 

unable to retransmit the test alert. According to FEMA, the reported 

poor audio quality was due, in part, to a feedback loop that occurred 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

when equipment at a single PEP station rebroadcasted the original 

message back to FEMA. This audio message was then transmitted by 

FEMA over the original audio message, degrading the audio. 

Therefore, fewer stations were able to receive, and thus retransmit, 

the alert to their designated station(s). EAS participants we met with 

consistently stated that the poor audio quality during the nationwide 

EAS test was a significant problem. For example, state and local 

alerting authorities, broadcaster associations, and individual 

broadcast stations we contacted stated that connectivity and audio 

problems occurred during the nationwide test. Officials from one state 

broadcasters association said that broadcasters in their state only 

received 10 seconds of the national-level alert signal with only five or 

six words of the message and then 20 seconds of dead air for the 

remainder of the test. They also stated that problems with the audio 

resulted in the alerts not being retransmitted to other stations in their 

state.

• Shortened test length. The nationwide EAS test was originally 

scheduled to last 3 minutes, but was shortened to 30 seconds. 

According to an industry trade association, the announcement to 

change the test length came about 2 weeks prior to the test. Because 

of the shortened test length, some broadcasters and cable operators 

were unable to receive or retransmit the national-level alert. According 

to FEMA, the test was shortened to mitigate concerns from the cable 

industry that the public who could not hear the audio portion of the 

test would be unable to tell if the alert was a test or a real alert solely 

from the television screen display. More specifically, FCC instructed 

broadcasters to use an on-screen slide just before the test to 

announce that the following message would be a test and not an 

actual alert. However, according to officials from an industry trade 

association, some EAS participants, namely some cable operators, 

were unable to provide this background screen during the nationwide 

test. In these cases, since FCC chose to use a live alert code to 

resemble an actual nationwide test, there was no visual cue that a test 

was taking place. There was concern that this could adversely affect 

some segments of the public, especially individuals who were unable 

to hear the audio portion indicating a test was taking place. According 

to representatives from industry trade associations, use of a test code 

for future nationwide EAS tests could help ensure that all segments of 

the population understand that a nationwide test, rather than an actual 

national emergency, is taking place.

• Outdated monitoring assignments. FCC noted that some state EAS 

plans that designate the monitoring assignments are outdated and its 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

review of the EAS test results revealed some confusion among some 

EAS participants of monitoring assignments. We found that as of 

February 2013, out of 33 state and District of Columbia EAS plans 

available on FCC’s website, 16 state plans were dated 2009 or earlier, 

with 3 of these plans dated in the 1990s. Additionally, 18 state plans 

were not available on FCC’s website with the link to one website 

leading to information completely unrelated to the state.

50 FEMA 

reported that if monitoring assignments in the state EAS plans are not 

followed or the state EAS plans are not up-to-date, EAS participants 

may not receive and relay the messages. According to FEMA, several 

EAS participants reported not being able to receive the national-level 

alert from their assigned sources, and as a result, they were unable to 

relay the alert.

• Equipment failures. Because of specific equipment failures, some 

broadcasters could not receive or retransmit the national-level alert. 

FCC reported that approximately 5 percent of EAS participants 

responding to its data collection effort reported that hardware, 

equipment, or configuration problems precluded them from receiving 

the national-level alert.

At the time of our review, FCC and FEMA had taken limited steps to 

address problems identified in the nationwide EAS test. According to 

FEMA officials, the poor audio quality that was experienced during the 

test is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated PEP 

satellite network, but the remaining issues have yet to be resolved. FEMA 

officials told us that it will take a combination of FCC rulemaking, 

developing best practices, and correcting technical issues to address the 

problems that were identified during the nationwide test, but implementing 

some of these actions could likely take years. According to FCC officials, 

a working group, in coordination with FEMA, has been examining these 

issues, but neither agency could identify progress made by the group 

more than a year after the test. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

FCC told us it issued its final report on the results of the nationwide EAS 

test on April 12, 2013.

51

 

50According to FCC, some state emergency communication committees maintain their 

state plans as official use only documents and do not post them on the Internet. 

According to FCC officials, one of the reasons for 

51FCC, Strengthening the Emergency Alert System (EAS): Lessons Learned from the 

Nationwide EAS Test, April 2013. The report can be found at 

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch//DOC-320152A1.pdf. 

Limited Federal Efforts to 

Address Identified Issues
 

Page 26 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

the delay in issuing a final report on the test result was their effort to 

collect more data from EAS participants. FCC continued to accept paper 

reports on the test results from EAS participants for about a year after the 

test was conducted, despite the December 27, 2011 deadline for 

electronically submitting the test results. EAS participants and state and 

local alerting authorities we contacted said that they were not aware of 

FCC taking any actions to address identified issues, and as a result, their

ability to make improvements and prepare for future tests is limited.

Concerning future tests, FCC rules require a nationwide EAS test to be 

conducted periodically,52 but it is uncertain when the next test will occur. 

FEMA officials told us that they are continuing to work with FCC in 

determining corrective actions from the test results and will not hold 

another test until corrective actions are complete. As we have previously 

reported, regular nationwide EAS testing is essential to ensure that the 

system will work as intended during an emergency.53

FCC recognizes that outdated state EAS plans contributed to some of the 

reception and retransmission problems during the EAS test, and is being 

more proactive in requesting states to submit updated plans. FCC officials 

stated that updating state EAS plans would be valuable to ensure that the 

monitoring assignments for the broadcast stations remain accurate when 

a national-level alert is activated. However, as of October 2012, FCC has 

received 7 of 50 updated state EAS plans.54

 

52In the Matter of Review of the Emergency Alert System, 26 FCC Rcd. 1,460, 1,479 

(2011). According to FCC rules, EAS testing is to be conducted no more frequently than 

annually.

Officials stated that they 

would continue to ask state emergency communications committees to 

submit updated EAS plans to review, but that FCC has no authority to 

require the filing of EAS plans. As a result, FCC is unable to fully verify 

that states are keeping EAS monitoring assignments up to date. In 

addition, some EAS participants we spoke with are waiting for more 

guidance from FCC, including anticipated changes in rules governing 

EAS. For example, FCC officials told us that they plan to issue a notice of 

proposed rulemaking sometime in 2013 seeking comment on issues 

identified from the nationwide EAS test.

53GAO-09-834. 

54An EAS plan is also prepared for the District of Columbia and some territories.
 

Page 27 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

EAS participants and state and local alerting authorities we spoke with 

stated that there are several actions that FCC, in conjunction with FEMA, 

could take that would assist EAS participants in preparing, conducting, 

and reporting on future nationwide EAS test alerts. These actions include 

(1) issuing an after-action plan to help identify and address problems that 

occurred during the test, (2) conducting regular and frequent testing of 

EAS to ensure the system works as intended, and (3) providing guidance 

to update state EAS plans to incorporate IPAWS (e.g., guidance could be 

EAS plan templates, best practices, good examples).

FEMA has made progress since 2009 in developing a more 

comprehensive, integrated nationwide public-alerting system. FEMA has 

improved the capabilities of IPAWS by bringing the IPAWS alert 

aggregator online and integrating it with multiple alerting systems, 

including HazCollect and CMAS. However, for IPAWS to become fully 

operational, several areas of concern need to be addressed. In particular, 

additional guidance for state and local alerting authorities on specific 

steps to integrate and test their public-alerting systems with IPAWS 

components would help to provide assurance on the interoperability and 

effectiveness of IPAWS and facilitate its implementation. Furthermore, 

according to public-alerting authorities we contacted, without additional 

guidance on IPAWS implementation and consideration of CMAS rules, 

state and local alerting authorities we contacted were reluctant to fully 

integrate their systems with IPAWS and rely on IPAWS as a 

comprehensive public-alerting system. In addition, a concerted effort to 

educate state and local governments, the private sector, and the 

American people on the functions of the public-alerting system is 

necessary to inform them on how to access, use, and respond to 

emergency alert messages. Using key practices for conducting a public 

education campaign—such as defining goals and objectives, identifying 

stakeholders and resources, and developing clear and consistent 

messages—could enable FEMA, which has limited experience educating 

the general public on IPAWS, to more effectively and efficiently inform the 

American people on how to access and respond to potentially life-saving 

emergency alerts. 

FEMA has also expanded the number of PEP stations and enhanced 

satellite connectivity to improve direct coverage and dependability of the 

national-level EAS. However, as long as the national-level EAS remains 

independent from IPAWS, portions of the population, including individuals 

with disabilities and non-English speakers, will be less likely to receive or 

fully understand presidential alerts disseminated only through the EAS 

Conclusions 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

daisy chain. If integrated, CMAS, in particular, is capable of providing 

alerts in different formats, including emitting unique ring tone and 

vibration cadences for those who have hearing or visual impairments, 

which would increase the likelihood that individuals with disabilities could 

be informed that a national-level alert is being issued. Furthermore, 

integrating EAS into IPAWS would provide system redundancy for 

national-level alerts.

FEMA and FCC held the first-ever test of the national-level EAS in 

November 2011, an important step. However, the results of the 

nationwide EAS test—which a number of EAS participants could not 

effectively receive or retransmit—show that the reliability of the traditional 

EAS system remains questionable. At the time of our review, we found 

that FEMA and FCC had taken limited steps to address problems 

identified by EAS participants. In addition, some state EAS plans and 

monitoring assignments are outdated, in part, because state emergency 

communications committees are waiting for more guidance from FCC, 

including changes in rules governing EAS. Although states are not 

required to update and submit state EAS plans, FCC could help facilitate 

the process by providing additional guidance. Finally, while FCC rules call 

for periodic nationwide EAS testing, FCC and FEMA currently have not 

scheduled another nationwide test. Without ongoing, regular nationwide 

testing of the relay distribution system, there is no assurance the EAS 

would work should the President need to activate it to communicate with 

the American people.

To ensure that IPAWS is fully functional and capable of distributing alerts 

through multiple pathways as intended, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take the 

following four actions:

• In conjunction with FCC, establish guidance (e.g., procedures, best 

practices) that will assist participating state and local alerting 

authorities to fully implement and test IPAWS components and ensure 

integration and interoperability.

• In conjunction with FCC and NOAA, conduct coordinated outreach to 

educate the American public on IPAWS capabilities, especially 

CMAS.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 29 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

• Develop a plan to disseminate a national-level alert via IPAWS to 

increase redundancy and communicate presidential alerts through 

multiple pathways.

• In conjunction with FCC, develop and implement a strategy for 

regularly testing the national-level EAS, including examining the need 

for a national test code, developing milestones and time frames, 

improving data collection efforts, and reporting on after-action plans.

To ensure that CMAS is effectively used and that the EAS relay 

distribution network is capable of reliably communicating national-level 

alerts, we recommend that the Chairman of FCC, in conjunction with 

FEMA, take the following two actions:

• Review and update rules governing CMAS, including those related to 

geo-targeting, character limitations, and testing procedures.

• Provide states with additional guidance (e.g., templates of EAS plan) 

to facilitate completion of updated state EAS plans that include 

IPAWS-compatible equipment.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FCC, and the Department of 

Commerce for their review and comment. In response, DHS concurred 

with all of the report’s recommendations to improve IPAWS capabilities. 

In its written comments, DHS provided examples of actions FEMA will 

undertake to address the recommendations. For example, DHS noted 

that FEMA intends to create toolkits for state and local alerting authorities 

that will include alerting and governance best practices, technology 

requirements, and operation and usage information on IPAWS. 

Regarding efforts to improve nationwide EAS testing, DHS indicated that 

FEMA plans to work with federal partners, including FCC, to create a 

national test code, develop milestones and timeframes for future testing, 

improve data collection efforts, and report on after-action plans. See 

appendix III for written comments from DHS. 

In commenting on the draft report, FCC did not state whether it agreed or 

disagreed with the report’s recommendations. FCC noted that it issued a

final report on the results of the nationwide EAS test on April 12, 2013, 

and we believe the report includes potential actions that could address 

our recommendations in the future. For example, the April 2013 report

includes recommendations for FCC to commence a rulemaking 

proceeding on state EAS plans and to encourage the groups that typically 

develop state EAS plans to ensure that the plans contain accurate EAS 

Agency Comments
 

Page 30 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

monitoring assignments. Other recommendations in FCC’s April 2013 

report include commencing a rulemaking proceeding to examine 

equipment-performance issues during activation of a test, and developing 

a new Nationwide EAS Test Reporting System database to improve filing 

electronic data from EAS participants. FCC stated that it will conduct a 

review of CMAS rules, as we recommended in this report, and also noted 

that it will work with FEMA to develop a strategy for regular testing of 

EAS. See appendix IV for written comments from FCC. 

The Department of Commerce provided technical comments from its 

component agency NOAA, and we incorporated them as appropriated. In 

the comments, NOAA stated that it believes our report does an accurate 

job in assessing the nationwide EAS test results and the current state of 

IPAWS. With respect to our recommendation on conducting outreach, 

NOAA believes the outreach should be conducted in conjunction with 

FCC and NOAA, and we made the suggested revision. 

In addition to written comments, DHS and FCC provided technical 

comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed upon with your office, unless you publicly announce the 

contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 

from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and the Chairman of FCC. In addition, the report is available at 

no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V. 

Mark Goldstein

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

This report provides information on federal efforts to integrate various 

public-alerting systems and modernize the Emergency Alert System 

(EAS). Specifically, the report examines (1) how the capabilities of the 

Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) have changed 

since 2009 and what barriers, if any, are affecting its implementation and 

(2) the results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts under way to 

address identified weaknesses.

To obtain information on both objectives of this report, we interviewed 

officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Homeland 

Security, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 

We spoke with representatives from national trade industry groups, 

including the National Emergency Management Association, National 

Association of Broadcasters, National Cable and Telecommunications 

Association, CTIA-The Wireless Association, and National Alliance of 

State Broadcasters Associations, to obtain stakeholders’ perspective on 

the results of the first nationwide EAS test and federal efforts to 

implement IPAWS. We also spoke with representatives from the satellite 

industry (DIRECTV), an EAS equipment manufacturer (Monroe 

Electronics), and the National Council on Disability to gather their views 

on IPAWS implementation and the nationwide EAS test. We conducted 

interviews with selected state and local alerting authorities, state 

emergency-communication-committee chairs, state broadcasting 

associations, and selected local broadcasters. We nonstatistically 

selected a sample of six locations—California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, 

Oregon, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia—to obtain information 

from state and local officials on any barriers to implementing IPAWS and 

potential remedies for addressing any identified barriers, as well as to 

determine any problems associated with the nationwide EAS test. We 

selected these states and locality because some had (1) other publicalerting systems, in addition to the EAS; (2) alerting systems that are 

capable of providing alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited 

English; and (3) experienced a breakdown of test alert dissemination 

during the nationwide EAS test. We also selected these states and 

localities because some had been authenticated to be an IPAWS-alerting 

authority and they were geographically diverse. To obtain a regional 

perspective on implementing IPAWS and testing the EAS, we also spoke 

with officials from FEMA regional offices. Because we conducted targeted 

interviews, our results are not generalizable to all states and localities. 

Table 1 provides more detailed information on the state and localities we 

selected and the entities we interviewed.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Table 2: State and Local Interviews

State/Locality Public alerting authorities

State association of broadcasters and 

local broadcasters

FEMA regional 

office 

California • California Emergency Management 

Agency

• Office of Emergency Services, Humboldt 

County Sherriff’s Office

• County of San Diego Office of 

Emergency Services

California Broadcasters Association Region IX

District of Columbia District of Columbia Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management Agency 

WTOP-FM Region III

Kentucky • Kentucky Division of Emergency 

Management

• Daviess County Emergency Management 

Office

Kentucky Broadcasters Association Region IV

Oklahoma • Oklahoma Department of Emergency 

Management

• Oklahoma Association of Broadcasters

• KTUL-FM

• Clear Channel Radio in Oklahoma City

Region VI

Oregon • Oregon Office of Emergency 

Management

• Portland Bureau of Emergency 

Management 

Oregon Association of Broadcasters Region X

Wisconsin • Wisconsin Emergency Management • Wisconsin Broadcasters Association

• WISC-TV

• Wisconsin Educational Communications 

Board 

Region V

Source: GAO.

a

a

We were unable to interview FEMA officials in Region V, despite our attempt to contact them.

To obtain information on how the capabilities of IPAWS have changed 

since 2009 and what barriers, if any, affect its implementation, we also 

reviewed and analyzed agency documents and literature since 2009. We 

reviewed documents on IPAWS program planning, including the 2010 

IPAWS program management plan, and assessed actions that have been 

taken to determine if systems and standards are operational. We also 

attended a number of IPAWS webinars to obtain training and information

that are provided to public-alerting authorities. We reviewed FEMA’s 

IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report, which surveyed 

3,314 state, territorial, tribal, and local emergency management agencies 

to analyze gaps between existing public-alerting capabilities and IPAWS 

and includes recommendations for IPAWS integration. The survey was 

conducted mostly by telephone with structured questionnaires over a 2-

year period from January 2010 through December 2011 and specific 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

procedures were followed to identify emergency management personnel 

for the sites at each level. We assessed the survey’s methodology and 

determined that the estimates from it that we cite are sufficiently valid for 

use in our report. Specifically, we assessed the survey methodology 

against the Office of Management and Budget’s Standards and 

Guidelines for Statistical Surveys. We did not otherwise verify, however, 

the findings and conclusions from the report.

To obtain information on the results of the nationwide EAS test and 

federal efforts to address any identified weaknesses, we reviewed and 

analyzed agency data and documents. Specifically, we examined FCC’s 

and FEMA’s preliminary reports on the nationwide EAS test results; FCC 

orders and rules on EAS; FCC’s website on the nationwide EAS test; 

FEMA’s EAS Best Practices Guide; and briefing documents from FEMA 

and NOAA. We analyzed FCC’s data from EAS participants to determine 

the percentage of radio and television broadcasters and cable operators 

that received and retransmitted the national-level alert on a statewide 

basis. We analyzed FCC’s data for 49 states; we did not include Alaska 

since it was excused from the nationwide test because of severe weather 

conditions. To determine the reliability of the data used in this report, we 

reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials about 

their processes for reviewing the data and ensuring their accuracy. We 

also ensured that FCC data were sufficiently reliable for our review. We 

reviewed and analyzed state EAS plans that were posted on FCC’s 

website to determine if the state’s EAS plans were current. We 

interviewed FCC officials to confirm that the information on FCC’s website 

is current.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: FEMA’s Progress Addressing 

Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security under Executive Order No. 13407

Page 34 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Responsibilities Status/progress/timeline

Inventory and assess existing alert 

infrastructure 

Issued the IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report in January 2012. This 

report surveyed and assessed public-alerting authorities in the United States between 

2009 and 2011.

Develop alert standards and

Protocols

Formally adopted the Commercial Mobile Alerting System (CMAS) Specification in 

December 2009.

Formally adopted the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) standard for IPAWS in 

September 2010. 

Geo-targeted, risk-based alerts Implemented CMAS. Wireless carriers began issuing geo-targeted CMAS alerts in April 

2012; NOAA started sending geo-targeted CMAS messages in June 2012.

a

Alerts for non-English speakers and the 

disabled

Hosted biannual roundtables for industry experts, federal agencies, and advocacy 

organizations representing Americans with access and functional needs to discuss 

emergency alerting.

Shared lessons learned and best practices for communicating to Americans with access 

and functional needs through the EAS to FCC. For example, encouraged FCC to 

consider EAS rule changes or clarifications for broadcasters with regard to: (1) display 

size, color, background contrast, and speed of text crawl during EAS alert and (2) use of 

a test code for future nationwide testing of EAS.

Augment infrastructure Expanded the number of primary entry point (PEP) stations to 65 total—31 PEP stations 

were either modernized or built since 2009. Anticipates a total of 77 PEP stations by fall 

2013 directly covering 90 percent of the American people. Added satellite connectivity in 

50 PEP stations.

Integrated NOAA alerting systems to allow public-alerting authorities to send nonweather emergency messages through HazCollect; allowed NOAA to send mobile alerts 

beginning 2012. 

Conduct training and testing Released IPAWS online training for public-alerting authorities in December 2011. Hosts 

monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.

Conducted two statewide EAS tests in Alaska in January 2010 and 2011; conducted the 

first nationwide EAS test on November 9, 2011.

Conducted CMAS test in New York City in December 2011. Conducts a required monthly 

test of CMAS on the third Wednesday of each month.

Provide public education on uses and 

access to the public alert and warning 

system

Maintains a public website on IPAWS.

Consult, coordinate, and cooperate with 

private sector

Hosts monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.

Participated in federal working groups and roundtables.

Participates in industry conferences, demonstrations, and panels.

Administer EAS as component of public 

alert and warning system

Acts as executive agent for EAS, maintaining the PEP stations.

Ensure presidential alert and warning 

capability under all conditions

Maintains EAS and PEP stations.

Deploying a dedicated PEP satellite network.

Source: GAO analysis of Exec. Order No. 13407 and FEMA.

a

Appendix II: FEMA’s Progress Addressing 

Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security under Executive Order No. 13407 

Ensure the capability to distribute alerts on the basis of geographic location, risks, or personal user 

preferences.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 35 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 36 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 37 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities
Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission

Page 38 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission
Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission

Page 39 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 40 GAO-13-375 Emergency Alerting Capabilities

Mark Goldstein (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant Director; 

Andy Clinton; Jean Cook; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones; Jennifer Kim; Josh 

Ormond; Carl Ramirez; Jerry Sandau; and Andrew Stavisky made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(543307)
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