1Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-30734

FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, INC.

Plaintiff-Appellee

VERSUS

BILLY RAY BREELAND

 

 Defendant-Appellant

______________________________

No. 95-30754

FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, INCORPORATED

Plaintiff-Appellant

VERSUS

BILLY RAY BREELAND

Defendant-Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(94-CV-1992)

 (April 26, 1996)

Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:1
2

Both parties appeal after the dismissal of a declaratory

judgment action concerning maintenance and cure obligations filed

by Falcon Drilling Company pursuant to federal admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction. Before dismissing the case, the district

court sanctioned Defendant, Billy Ray Breeland, for violating an

injunction. Falcon appeals the dismissal; Breeland appeals the

sanction order. We affirm the dismissal and dismiss Breeland’s

appeal as moot.

Breeland, a seaman employed by Falcon, complains of a neck

injury allegedly resulting from an accident aboard the ACHILLES, a

Falcon vessel. Falcon filed this declaratory judgment action

seeking determination of its general maritime law maintenance and

cure obligations after a dispute arose regarding the necessity of

surgery. The district court enjoined Breeland from having the

surgery until Falcon was able to obtain an independent medical

examination. Breeland underwent surgery in violation of the

injunction. 

Breeland then sued in state court seeking Jones Act remedies

and maintenance and cure benefits and moved to dismiss the

declaratory judgment action promising to hold Falcon harmless for

the cost of surgery. Falcon moved for an order finding Breeland in

contempt of court and for sanctions.

The court sanctioned Breeland ordering that the surgeon’s

opinions and findings during or after surgery were inadmissible and

that Breeland could not recover from Falcon the cost of surgery or
3

for aggravation of his condition caused by the surgery. Three days

later, the district court granted Breeland’s motion and dismissed

the declaratory judgment action for the following reasons:

1) There is currently pending in state court, a civil

suit involving the same parties, on the same issues

as the federal action.

2) The parties have available a forum to receive full

and adequate relief, and may litigate all issues in

the state forum.

3) The suit for declaratory judgment, filed prior to

the state court suit, can and will deprive the

plaintiff of his choice of forum in his Jones Act

suit, or result in piecemeal litigation of the same

issues.

4) This court finds that to entertain this declaratory

judgment complaint would deprive the plaintiff of

his right to a trial by jury on the issue of

maintenance and cure, by severing it from his Jones

Act claim.

 A district court may not dismiss a declaratory judgment action

on whim or personal disinclination or without providing an

explanation for the dismissal. Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin,

876 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1989). Otherwise, in this Circuit, district

courts have broad discretion to retain or dismiss declaratory

judgment actions. Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706

F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1983); Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193

(1991). In making its determination, the district court may

consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the

existence of a pending state court proceeding in which the matters

in controversy may be fully litigated, whether the declaratory

complaint was filed in anticipation of another suit and is being

used for the purpose of forum shopping, possible inequities in
4

permitting the plaintiff to gain precedence in time and forum, or

because of inconvenience to the parties or the witnesses. Rowan,

876 F.2d at 29. 

Falcon argues that consideration of the Rowan factors weighs

against dismissal. Even if we agreed with Falcon, we cannot say

that the district court abused its broad discretion in dismissing

the case in light of the articulated reasons. 

Falcon also argues that the declaratory judgment should not

have been dismissed because Breeland acted in bad faith when he

violated the injunction citing Belle Pass Towing Corp. v. Cheramie,

763 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. La. 1991). The court could have, in the

exercise of its discretion, denied the motion to dismiss because of

the violation of the injunction. Bad faith is a factor that can be

considered and could justify a refusal to dismiss. The court did

not abuse its discretion, however, by dismissing the case despite

the violation.

Having successfully defended the district court’s dismissal of

the declaratory judgment action, Breeland’s appeal of the sanction

order is moot.

Judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. Breeland’s appeal is

DISMISSED as moot.