U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

December 1983

NTIS order #PB84-182609
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600632

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

Passenger rail transportation has been the subject of much concern and congressional action for the past two decades in the United States. As the country’s transportation system evolved to include increased use of air and automobile technologies for intercity travel, passenger rail service experienced significant ridership declines, resulting

in institutional changes from private to public sector operation.

For the decade of the IWO’S, Federal attention focused primarily on determining

and stabilizing a core passenger rail system for the country. While history reflects that

the United States, since the early 1960’s, has been interested in high-speed rail and advanced ground transport technologies, including magnetic levitation, the more pressing societal issues of a failing rail infrastructure and institutional reform have taken

precedence in the policymaking arena for the past decade. Thus, expertise in high-speed

rail now rests primarily abroad.

At this juncture, however, discussion related to growth and change in passenger

rail technology, particularly high-speed rail and magnetic levitation, is increasing. Nine

corridors are being actively explored by State and local governments, regional agencies, and U.S. and foreign technology developers and suppliers for possible application

of high-speed ground transport systems.

This OTA assessment seeks to lay out in general form what is known about these

high-speed technologies and the foreign experience with them. It also seeks to identify

the areas of uncertainty relative to their application in the United States. The study

is intended to identify significant policy questions and issues that will be pertinent to

Federal, State, and local debate on this subject.

Director

iii
Railcar Manufacturing

Frank Cihak

Director of Technical and Research Services

American Public Transit Association

Ross Higginbotham

Director of Car Engineering

Mechanical Department

Amtrak

Workshop Participants

Richard Sklar

Entertainment Express

Jeff Stayer

Engineering Department

Westinghouse Electric

George Krambles

Consultant

Magnetic Levitation Workshop Participants

Robert Borcherts

Research Scientist

Ford Motor Co.

Mike Daly

Economic Development Director

City of Las Vegas

John A. Darling

Director of Cost Analysis and Research

Santa Fe Railway

John Harrison

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Ross Higginbotham

Director of Car Engineering

Mechanical Department

Amtrak

George Krambles

Consultant

Myles Mitchell

Freight and Passenger Systems

Federal Railroad Administration

Herbert Richardson

Associate Dean of Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard Sklar

Entertainment Express

William Wieters

General Manager, Passenger Transport

Conrail

Roger Katz

Sperry Corp.

Demand, Economics, Institutional Considerations of High-Speed Rail Workshop Participants

Ross Capon Arrego Mongini

Executive Director Northeast Corridor

National Association of Railroad Passengers Federal Railroad Administration

Steve Ditmeyer Gordon Peters

Director of Research and Development Rail Division

Burlington Northern Railroad New York State Department of Transportation

John Fischer Lenore Sek

Economics Division Economics Division

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress Library of Congress

Anthony Gomez-Ibanez Richard Sklar

John F. Kennedy School of Government Entertainment Express

Harvard University Saul Sokolsky

Ross Higginbotham Aerospace Corp.

Director of Car Engineering

Mechanical Department Lou Thompson

Amtrak Northeast Corridor

Federal Railroad Administration

Mike Mates

Consultant
U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies OTA Project Staff

John Andelin,

Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTA

and Natural Resources Division

William F. Mills, Program Manager*

Nancy Naismith, Program Manager**

Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program

Lucia Turnbull, Project Director

John Burns, Editor

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

R. Bryan Harrison, Word Processing Specialist

Contractor s

Jane Holt Riverside Research Institute John G. Smith

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. .Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

Glenda Lawing Linda A. Leahy Cheryl J. Manning

‘Through September 1983

● *After September 1983.
Acknowledgments

The following people were asked to review the report, and provided either written or oral comments.

Nicholas Brand

American High Speed Rail Corp.

David Buckner

Chief, Rail Operations

Illinois Department of Transportation

Robert Casey

Executive Director

Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Passenger

Committee

Hughes de Villele

American TGV

Bill Dickhart

Marketing Manager

The Budd Co.

William Garrison

Institute of Transportation Studies

University of California

Kevin Kayes

Government Affairs Office

Amtrak

William Kleppinger, Jr.

The Budd Co.

John Lagomarcino

Vice President

American High Speed Rail Corp.

Ichiroh Mitsui

Director, Washington Office

Japanese National Railways

Jeff Mora

Urban Mass Transportation Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation

James Rankin

Administrator, Rail Development

Florida Department of Transportation

Bill Taylor

Florida State Department of Transportation

Warren D. Weber

State of California

Department of Transportation

Division of Mass Transportation

James C. Kellogg

Chief Administrative Officer

Urban and Public Transportation

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience . . . . . . . . . . .

Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of

High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Social and Institutional Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Passenger Rail History and Current Corridor Activity . . . . . . .

Magnetic Levitation: Status and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

‘3

15

29

45

57

71

83
OVERVIEW

High-speed passenger rail systems (125 mph and above) now operate in Japan, France,

and Great Britain. There is growing interest in introducing such passenger rail service in this

country, and several State and local governments and private sector groups recently have undertaken feasibility studies for this purpose. Prompted by these initiatives, the Subcommittee on

Transportation of the House Committee on Appropriations; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce asked

the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to examine the experience of foreign countries

and to assess the outlook for high-speed passenger rail technology in the United States. As part

of this study, OTA also was asked to examine the prospects of magnetic levitation (maglev)

technologies—ultra-high-speed ground transportation that relies on magnetic suspension instead of conventional steel wheels on rail—and the status of railcar manufacturing industries.

High-speed rail.—The technologies for high-speed rail are well understood. High-speed

rail systems are costly to construct, and all foreign high-speed lines have been built with government assistance. They generally report favorable financial results, with regard to operating costs,

though independent audits to confirm this are not available.

The lowest cost option, typically used for lower volume operations, is conventional

diesel-powered equipment on existing track, the system the British have in operation. The most

expensive option is to build new track, which the Japanese have done. The cost of building

new track, although higher than upgrading existing track, varies widely depending on terrain,

land use, and population density. For example, although the new French high-speed line cost

$4 million per mile to construct, the most recently completed two links of the Japanese system

cost an estimated $35 million to $40 million per mile. The original route cost about $20 million

per mile. *

High-speed systems require high ridership to generate enough revenue to cover operating

costs. The high-speed rail systems of Europe and Japan are situated in corridors that have higher

population densities than any of those being considered in the United States, with the exception of the Washington, New York, Boston Corridor (the Northeast Corridor or NEC). Also,

both Japan and France had reached capacity on sections of their conventional lines before implementing high-speed service.

OTA’s analysis of the factors that influence a passenger’s choice of travel mode suggests

that a potential high-speed passenger rail corridor should have some or all of the following

characteristics: 1. cities grouped along a route giving major passenger travel flows in the 100-

to 300-mile-trip range; 2. cities with high population and high population densities; 3. cities

with developed local transit systems to feed the high-speed line; and 4. a strong travel affinity

(reason to travel) between cities, generally because one city is a dominant center of commercial, cultural, or governmental activity.

OTA did not evaluate specific proposals for high-speed corridors in the United States. Based

on foreign experience and current U.S. market factors, however, it seems that any U.S. corridor with totally newhigh-speed rail service would have difficulty generating sufficient revenues

to pay entirely for operating and capital costs. This same comment does not necessarily apply

to upgraded rail lines or other improvements.

Maglev technologies. -Different types of maglev systems for high-speed intercity passenger

service are being developed independently by the Federal Republic of Germany and by Japan.

Although neither system appears to have insurmountable technical obstacles, both require further development and testing to substantiate technical feasibility and to

and operating costs under conditions that fairly reflect those of actual

*Per-mile costs for the Japanese lines are shown in 1979 dollars.

25-413 0 - 84 - 2

determine the capital

revenue service. Not

ix
until 1985 will sufficient information be available from the West German tests to determine

if the system can meet performance standards under operating conditions at costs suitable for

revenue service. Japan is seeking to build a new test track and continue testing the advanced

technology developments, including the superconducting magnets used in their system.

Railcar manufacturing. —As a result of adverse market conditions, all U.S.-owned passenger railcar manufacturers have abandoned the field. * U.S. sales are being filled by foreign

owners. U.S. manufacturers (other than the Budd Co. ) are not likely to reenter the field unless

the United States follows the example of Europe and Japan, which sustain their passenger railcar

manufacturing industries by ensuring a stable, predictable, and planned market for rail equipment. At present, the U.S. market for railcars is small and uncertain. Most railcar orders for

the rest of the 1980’s already have been placed, and the market for the 1990’s and beyond is

not likely to be large enough to support more than a few small U.S. manufacturers.

● The Budd Co., though located in the United States and employing U.S. labor, was purchased by Thyssen, a West German corporation, in 1978.

x
Chapter 1

SUMMARY
Contents

Major Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems and Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maglev: Status and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Passenger Rail Manufacturing Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Benefits and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table

3

3

6

7

8

8

10

11

Table No. Page

l. Population and Population Densities in Europe, Japan, and the United States ... 6

. ’
Chapter 1

SUMMARY

At the request of the Subcommittee on Transportation of the House Committee on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science and Transportation, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, OTA examined

five questions concerning high-speed rail and

magnetic levitation (maglev) passenger technology, and railcar manufacturing:*

1. What is the status of high-speed rail technologies and passenger service abroad?

2. What activities are underway to bring such

technologies and service to the United States?

3. What is the outlook and what are the impli-

*For purposes of this study high-speed rail was defined as systems

with maximum design speeds of 125 mph and above. Chapters 2,

3, 4, 5, and 6 focus on technology, economic and institutional considerations pertinent to intercity transportation. The focus of Chapter

7: U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing includes manufacture of

intercity, commuter, and urban transit railcars.

4.

5.

cations of introducing high-speed passenger

rail systems in the United States?

What is the status of maglev technologies?

What is the status and outlook for the U.S.

passenger railcar manufacturing industry?

The information for this assessment was obtained through analysis of technical literature,

supplemented by interviews and workshops with

experts in the field of passenger rail technology.**

OTA did not evaluate the economic feasibility of

any individual corridor proposal. However, based

on foreign experience and analysis of market factors likely to affect rail ridership, OTA did draw

some general conclusions regarding high-speed rail

application in the United States. The following

is a discussion of these conclusions.

**A complete bibliography of literature reviewed for this study

is available from the OTA Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Office.

MAJOR FINDINGS

High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems

and Technologies

Foreign Experience

The development of high-speed passenger rail

technologies has taken place almost entirely in

France, Great Britain, and Japan. These countries

consistently have placed a high priority on passenger rail service as a matter of explicit national

policy and have developed extensive passenger rail

networks that are, in varying degrees, government

subsidized. Development of rail systems with improved speed is underway in other countries as

well, though not studied in this report.

The Japanese, in the mid-1960’s, were the first

to introduce regular high-speed passenger rail

service with the Shinkansen, or “bullet train, ”

service between Tokyo and Osaka. That line, and

the later high-speed extension between Tokyo and

Hakata, are the only dedicated high-speed lines

in the world to have earned a profit and repaid

capital investment costs. In the mid-1970’s, the

British began to introduce high-speed rail service

on existing, upgraded routes throughout their national system. In 1981, the initial segment of the

new French high-speed line between Paris and

Lyon—the TGV—began operation, with service

over the entire line scheduled for 1983. The French

are confident of profitability and the British

achieve a satisfactory return, repaying all but 10

to 15 percent of operating and capital costs.

The Three Foreign Systems

The three foreign high-speed systems differ significantly; each is tailored to its particular

topography, transport needs, demographic conditions, and economic circumstances.

Japan .-The Japanese chose to construct entirely new track and equipment, because they had

no alternative. The existing narrow gage rail lines

were unsuitable for high-speed service and heavily

overloaded with traffic. There was a fully devel3
4 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

oped transit feeder system. The early bullet trains

attracted a large ridership—85 million on the

Tokyo-Osaka line in 1970. Ridership for the entire Shinkansen system in 1980 was approximately

125 million.

Great Britain.—The British, concerned that

their existing passenger rail network increasingly would lose riders to competing travel modes,

decided in the early 1970’s to introduce high-speed

service. They considered the construction of an

entirely new high-speed railway, but rejected it

on the grounds of projected high costs and probable environmental opposition. Instead they chose

to employ conventional technology and designed

trains with maximum speeds of 125 mph that

could share existing track with freight and commuter trains.

France.—To ease severe congestion on the

Paris-Lyon line, the French chose to build a new

high-speed line to divert a major part of the intercity passenger train traffic away from that area.

The new high-speed track runs through sparsely

populated country between Paris and Lyon, where

the line connects with existing track on the outskirts of the two cities. Because the new system

was designed to traverse steep grades (avoiding

the expense of tunneling) and sparsely populated

areas, the construction costs reportedly have been

low. In just over a year, the French have carried

5.6 million riders on the Paris-Lyon run and expect to attract 16 million riders annually when the

network is completed. The French Government

has also encouraged TGV travel by restricting intercity bus travel along highway routes.

Photo credits: TGV America

SNCF Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV) first class car

(interior view). Maximum seating of 111 passengers in first

class, 275 passengers for second class

Photo credit: Japanese National Railways

Shinkansen, “Bullet Train,” on elevated guideway

Photo credit: TRANSMARK

British Rail High Speed Train

Photo credit: TGV America

SNCF Train a Grande Vitesse
Ch. 1—Summaty ● 5

U.S. Activity

In the United States, a number of private and

State-sponsored initiatives to introduce either

high-speed rail or maglev are at different stages

of planning—notably in California, Florida,

Michigan, New York, Vermont, Nevada, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In addition,

a Midwest Rail Compact of States interested in

high-speed rail has been formed to investigate a

possible five-State network. These efforts are being promoted, in part, by U.S. and foreign firms

that might undertake corridor development or

supply the technology. Some advocates of these

ventures have suggested some form of Federal

assistance will be needed, while others claim none

or very little will be required.

Technology Options

The basic technology options for high-speed rail

service include combinations of equipment, track,

and propulsion systems. All equipment and track

options and several of the propulsion options are

in use or under development abroad.

Equipment and Track Options.—

● Improved conventional equipment on upgraded existing track (Great Britain). This

/east-cost option uses conventional equipment at a maximum speed of 125 mph on existing track, shared to some degree with

freight and/or commuter trains. (The Northeast Corridor (NEC) now is operating trains

at speeds up to 120 mph on certain segments

of the corridor. )

● Advanced technology on existing track

(Great Britain, Canada). Great Britain and

Canada as well as others are developing different versions of a “tilt-body” train that can

provide improved schedules on existing

track, because of its ability to take curves at

higher speeds than conventional trains. However, technical problems with the tilt-body

equipment make transforming prototype

equipment into an attractive commercial

operation difficult.

● New equipment, part new track, or totally

new track (France, Japan). For its new TGV

high-speed service between Paris and Lyon,

France uses state-of-the-art equipment on existing track into and out of Paris and Lyon,

●

and on new track between the two cities. The

amount of new track constructed, the terrain,

and the population density determine the

costliness of this option. Japan used state-ofthe-art equipment on totally new track, including access to cities, for its Shinkansen

service because the original narrow gage

track was not suitable for new high-speed

trains.

Very high-speed new modes beyond steel .

wheel on rail—maglev (West ‘Germany,

Japan). Japan and West Germany currently

are conducting development work on maglev

systems, which are capable of speeds in excess of 250 mph. The West German system

is being tested under conditions and at performance levels that the West Germans believe are necessary to prove revenue service

application. The Japanese also are conducting further test and development; their systems employ more new technology than the

West German system. The United States terminated its maglev research program in the

mid-1970’s.

Propulsion Systems.—The propulsion system

options include diesel power, electric power (including linear synchronous motors), and gas turbinepower. Gas turbine power has been virtually abandoned due to poor fuel efficiency. Linear

synchronous motors are being developed for highspeed maglev systems. Only electric and diesel

power are suitable for state-of-the-art high-speed

rail systems. Diesel power is cheaper and more

flexible than electric power for low-volume operations; however, electric power can provide improved acceleration, higher speeds, and better

braking. It is less expensive than diesel for highdensity operations, and in the long term maybe

preferred over dependence on liquid fuel.

Comparison of Options.-The cheapest capital

costs for high-speed service result from dieselpowered conventional equipment on existing

track at a maximum speed of 125 mph. A highdensity operation is required before the economies

offered by electric power can overcome the high

fixed-capital costs associated with electric catenary

and transformers. The most expensive option is

to use electrically powered high-speed trains on

completely new track at speeds well in excess of
6 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

125 mph. The costs of building new track, although always higher than upgrading existing

track, can vary significantly from one place to

another. The costs of the system depend on such

factors as location, terrain, length of route, rightof-way issues, the high-speed technology selected,

and the service levels to be provided. The construction cost of the French TGV line, for example, was reported to be $4 million per mile. The

two latest sections of the Japanese Shinkansen are

estimated to have cost about $35 million to $40

million per mile, principally because of the extensive tunneling and viaducts required in Japan. The

earlier Shinkansen lines cost approximately $20

million per mile in 1979 dollars. The upgrading

costs for the NEC have ranged between $4.5 million and $5 million per mile with an additional

$2.5 million per mile for electrification. *

Minimum Characteristics

of High-Speed Corridors

High-speed passenger rail systems require high

ridership to generate enough revenue to cover

most or all of operating costs, let alone capital

costs. Thus, all existing foreign high-speed rail

services have been introduced on corridors serving major population centers.

Analysis of the factors that influence the passenger’s choice of travel mode, and of the experience of foreign high-speed systems, suggests that

before a corridor is considered for high-speed

passenger rail service, it should have some or all

of the following minimum characteristics:

●

●

●

●

cities grouped along a route giving major passenger travel flows in the 100- to 300-mile trip

range;

cities with high population and high population densities;

cities with developed local transit systems to

feed the high-speed rail line; and

a strong “travel affinity” (reason to travel)

between cities, generally because one city is

a dominant center of commercial, cultural,

financial, governmental, or other activity.

High population and high population densities

are probably the most important characteristics

of a potential high-speed rail corridor because they

make possible the ridership levels and the support

for the local transit infrastructure required for successful high-speed service.

Methods of measurement vary slightly, but,

with few exceptions, U.S. cities have lower

population densities than cities in either Europe

or Japan with high-speed rail service. Table 1

shows 1980 population and population densities

for selected European, Japanese, and U.S. cities.

The data used in the table is for center city populations and excludes outlying suburban areas.

Based on foreign experience and current U.S.

market factors, it appears that any U.S. corridor

with totally new high-speed rail service would

have difficulty generating sufficient revenues to

pay entirely for operating and capital costs. Introduction of high-speed rail service, therefore,

well may depend on whether the public benefits

are judged sufficient to justify public support.

Maglev: Status and Outlook

Two different maglev technologies capable of

speeds 250 mph and above are being developed

abroad for high-speed intercity passenger service.

Table 1 .—Population and Population Densities

in Europe, Japan, and the United States

Density

Population Square (population per

City pairs (000s) miles square mile)

Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,548 827 10,300

Lyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,171 279 4,200

Tokyo . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,649 357 32,800

Osaka . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,648 98 27,100

London . . . . . . . . . . . 6,900 621 11,100

Glasgow . . . . . . . . . . 763 61 12,447

New York . . . . . . . . . 7,072 302 23,500

Washington . . . . . . . 638 63 10,200

Chicago . . . . . . . . . . 3,005 228 13,174

Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . 1,203 136 8,874

Los Angeles . . . . . . 2,967 468 6,400

San Diego . . . . . . . . 876 320 2,700

● Costs include system design, program management, and construction, according to Department of Transportation officials.

SOURCE: “Far East and Australia Statistics,” 19S182, Europa Publications; “U.K.

Statistical Yaarbook, 19S1, by HMSO (Her Majesty’s Statistics Office);

“Whittaker’s Almanac,” 1963; “19S0 Census of Population,” U.S. Department of Commerce, PC80 Series, Februa~ 1982.
Ch. 1—Summary ● 7

The attraction maglev technology, which employs

conventional iron-core electromagnets, is being

developed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

The repulsion maglev technology, which employs

superconducting magnets, is being developed by

Japan.

Both systems rely on electromagnetic forces to

provide support (levitation), lateral guidance, propulsion, and braking without direct physical contact between the vehicle and the guideway. To

date, neither system has been tested and operated

at speeds and conditions necessary to determine

if it can perform to desired standards at costs that

will justify actual revenue service. The West

German system is now in the final developmental testing stage. The results of the tests are expected in late 1985. The Japanese system is still

in the experimental stage, and plans for a new test

track are being considered.

Although capital costs can be estimated, the reliability of current guideway cost projections has

been questioned by some because of the extremely

close guideway/vehicle tolerances required in constructing a maglev system. Operating costs cannot be determined accurately until testing has

occurred, though theoretical operating estimates

are available.

West German and Japanese developers and

other potential suppliers of maglev technologies

are discussing with a few U.S. State and local

governments the possibility of testing or eventually introducing maglev systems. According to a

feasibility study prepared by technology suppliers

for a Las Vegas-Los Angeles route, Federal support is not required to build a maglev route,

although the feasibility study assumes that rightof-way would be made available at little or no

cost by the Federal and State Governments. The

feasibility study provides a joint public-private

sector financing plan, in recognition of the risk

involved in implementing the new technology.

Additional feasibility studies for this corridor are

being conducted by the Department of Transportation.

U.S. Passenger Rail

Manufacturing Industry

Status and Outlook

There is currently no U.S.-owned passenger

railcar manufacturer. * U.S. manufacturers are not

likely to decide to reenter the market and manufacture railcars unless the U.S. Government (like

other major Western countries and Japan) assures

a stable, predictable, and planned rail equipment

market that spreads orders out more or less evenly

and in manageable sizes. Other factors likely to

influence U.S. industry reentry into the railcar

market are continued standardization of railcar

requirements for the various passenger rail systems in this country, and continued improvements

in some local procurement requirements.

Few U.S. passenger car orders are expected for

the rest of this decade. For the 1990’s, the total

average annual railcar construction orders in the

United States are estimated to be between 450 and

550 cars—possibly large enough, under the right

conditions, to support a few small U.S. manufacturers. The addition of a new high-speed rail corridor would not significantly alter the overall market picture for railcar manufacturing.

Today, purchases by New York City and Chicago together represent about 77 percent of the

total U.S. transit market and more than 40 percent of the total U.S. railcar market with six

different railcar designs. Their plans for fleet

replacement or expansion are the most important

factors in determining the size and nature of the

railcar market in this country. Amtrak now has

a largely new fleet, and replacement needs for the

next decade are likely to be small.

● The Budd Co., though located in the United States and employing

U.S. labor, was purchased by Thyssen, a West German corporation, in 1978. U.S. passenger rail manufacturing refers to intercity,

commuter, and transit cars.

25-413 0 - 84 - 3
8 • U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Questions for Public Policy

Interest in high-speed rail development in the

United States dates to the early 1960’s when Congress began examining passenger rail along the

Northeast Corridor (NEC) and when the Government began exploring ways of retaining intercity

passenger rail service. The basic policy questions

considered at that time—including economic

viability, corridor suitability, and technology

options—still apply. However, today the available technologies (particularly equipment) are

more advanced and typically are provided by

foreign suppliers. The demographic characteristics

of some U.S. corridors also have undergone some

change during the last two decades.

Recent proposals for high-speed rail and maglev

corridor development have tended to focus on

private sector development or some form of

public-private sector cooperative enterprise. However undertaken, any high-speed corridor developed will affect substantially a region’s structure,

environment, and total transportation system as

well as pose fundamental questions of public policy at all levels of government. These include:

●

●

●

what anticipated public benefits are to be

derived from introducing high-speed or

maglev service?

what are the anticipated public costs?

if the benefits of implementing such a system

are judged sufficient, what funding will be

necessary, and who should pay for implementation of the service?

Some benefits of high-speed systems are quantifiable. Others are a matter of societal and

political judgment. Similarly, some costs, particularly those associated with economic efficiency

of the system, can be projected; others are more

difficult to estimate. As discussed in the following section, some claimed benefits, when taken

individually, appear small. However, when all

benefits, tangible and intangible, are taken into

account, a given region or locality may well wish

to implement a high-speed system. Benefits and

costs, however, must be examined for the nearterm as well as long-term impacts.

PUBLIC BENEFITS AND COSTS

The public benefits often cited for high-speed

rail

●

●

●

●

service include:

increased transport system capacity and mobility;

reduced congestion in highway and airport

ground traffic and other environmental

gains;

energy efficiency, economic development,

and employment; and

safety.

In addition to these explicit reasons, national pride

and a desire for continued and modern rail service are also reasons that appear to influence public

opinion in favor of high-speed services. “If other

countries can provide such service successfully,

then why can’t the United States?” is a question

frequently raised.

Possible public costs of a high-speed passenger

rail system include near- and long-term subsidy

of the system if ridership and revenues are insufficient; environmental concerns; adverse effects

on competing travel modes, services, and employment; and questions of regional equity.

Following is a discussion of the potential benefits, costs, and tradeoffs that may influence decisionmaking regarding high-speed rail.

Benefits

Several types of benefits potentially occur from

introduction of high-speed transport systems:

some result from long-term improved transport

system capacity (high ridership) and mobility;

others from system implementation irrespective

of improved capacity and the resulting ridership.

The latter benefits typically have more near-term

impacts, whereas the benefits resulting from improved capacity have longer term implications for

the region involved.
Ch. 1—Surnrnary ● 9

The large ridership capacity inherent in a highspeed system allows for new travel demand, for

accommodation of population growth of a region,

and provides for a competitive alternative to

divert some travelers from other modes. To illustrate the ridership levels that can be achieved by

frequent high-speed service, the original TokyoOsaka line attracted 85 million riders in 1970. Five

years later, the total line, extending from Tokyo

to Hakata, attracted a high ridership of 157 million passengers. Assuming that high ridership

volumes result, other potential benefits that could

stem from the improved transport system capacity

include reduced energy consumption, regional

economic development (including tourism) and

resulting employment, reduced air traffic and

highway congestion, and improved transportation safety.

Analysis of available data suggests that rail is

an energy-efficient mode only in high-volume corridors. Like other individual means of conserving energy, it should not be overlooked, but, by

itself, it will make only a small contribution on

high density routes. One proposal for a high-speed

passenger rail corridor in Florida views the advantage of the system not as a means of saving

energy, but as a means of shifting some transportation to a reliance on electricity, thus backing

up Florida’s ability to attract and care for tourists

in the event of another oil shortage and to provide mobility for the State’s citizens. Changes in

the future availability and cost of transportation

energy may alter the perspective on transportation needs and high-speed rail applications in the

United States.

Regional economic growth, including tourism

and real estate development and the resulting

employment, also are benefits that may result

from the improved capacity offered by implementation of high-speed rail. The newness of maglev

technologies in particular is thought by its advocates to be a major stimulus of new travel demand in corridors where it is being proposed.

More transportation options would result from

the introduction of high-speed rail. There is little

evidence provided to indicate that it will significantly affect highway and airport congestion. The

former generally is caused by commuter and other

urban area access traffic rather than intercity traffic. Hence, those benefits of a high-speed rail

system inferred from its ability to relieve highway

congestion need careful analysis, as does the relationship of commuter services and fares to the

overall system design. Whether a high-speed system will relieve airport ground congestion depends, again, on the individual corridor. With the

possible exception of NEC and southern California, it does not appear that high-speed rail service would have an appreciable effect on airport

ground congestion. Much of the activity for other

large airports that now have or are soon to have

severe congestion results from passenger flight

transfers. High-speed rail would not alleviate this.

With regard to safety, high-speed rail systems

have fared well. The record of the Japanese Shinkansen system essentially is perfect. There have

been no passenger fatalities on that system since

it became operational in 1964. The British system,

even though it operates shared facilities with commuter and freight rail, is considered to have a

good record as well. The new French TGV reports

no passenger fatalities for its operation to date.

If new technology for high-speed passenger rail

is introduced in this country, several issues associated with safety standards and practices will require consideration and review. In addition, operational and safety certification of these new

technologies also will be required. Potential maglev developers already are beginning to investigate

U.S. certification procedures.

One safety issue of concern for the United States

will be that of protection for rail/highway grade

crossings. While it is less costly to provide warning signals and gates at grade crossings (as is done

in rural areas of Europe) than grade separation,

grade crossing accidents in the United States account for the highest fatality category in rail safety. According to some State officials, rural populations probably will seek to ensure that grade

separations are provided if a high-speed rail route

is to be implemented in their area, and grade separation—an expensive step—could well be mandatory.

Regulatory standards for track currently included in the Federal Code also will have to be

reexamined. U.S. practices for building railcar
IO ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

equipment could be inadequate as well. Countries

that have high-speed services have found it necessary to modify vehicle construction methods in

the interest of ride quality, weight reduction, and

fuel economy. There appears to be no evidence

that these changes have reduced the safety of the

vehicles, and both the French and the British agree

that features of the designs would make them safer

in a collision than the conventional equipment.

U.S. construction is such that a U.S. vehicle of

a given capacity weighs more than those now built

abroad, adversely affecting fuel consumption. If

high-speed rail is introduced in the United States,

equipment specifications may need to be reviewed

and the issues of track shared with the heavier

U.S. freight equipment will need to be addressed.

U.S. track standards also would need revision to

permit higher speed operations.

The potential benefits described above are

based on near capacity ridership. OTA’s review

of foreign experience and U.S. market conditions

suggests that if ridership sufficient to justify

system implementation is to be attracted, the following characteristics of a corridor are necessary:

cities with major passenger travel flows of 100-

to 300-mile trip range; cities with high populations and high population densities; a strong travel

affinity (reason to travel) between cities; and cities

with developed transit systems to feed the rail

link. At these distances and with these conditions,

assuming frequent service and effective fare policies, rail can compete with air and automobile

transportation. For shorter distances, rail will only

compete where special circumstances exist. For

longer distances air is likely to dominate the market. Predicting the level of travel resulting from

the introduction of high-speed systems is difficult;

and is the most uncertain factor in the decisionmaking process.

Other benefits will result from high-speed rail

systems including employment during construction of the rail system itself. As discussed in

chapter 7 of this report, foreign firms now have

an exclusive hold on the U.S. railcar market,

though one foreign-owned firm located in the

United States employs U.S. labor. Rail system

employment is dependent on service frequency,

labor agreements, and degree of system automation. Construction employment would be corridor

specific.

costs

There are likely to be public costs associated

with the provision of any high-speed passenger

rail system in the United States. The market for

intercity passenger rail has been eroded steadily

by air travel and automobiles. If rail is to attract

the ridership necessary to help meet operating

costs, it must compete with other transport modes

both private and public. If it does not compete

effectively, public assistance for operating expenses may become necessary. Some argue that

the loss of ridership and consequent service losses

from other modes, were high-speed rail to be successful, should be considered a public cost, particularly if the new rail service receives some

Government support. A recent Congressional

Budget Office study concludes that rail receives

much higher Federal subsidies than any other intercity passenger mode, although rail proponents

disagree with this analysis.

A second public cost maybe that of capital subsidy, whether directly for the construction, or indirectly, as the associated costs of building public

facilities (e.g., parking) to support the rail system,

or those required for relocation or redesign of existing public facilities. As indicated elsewhere in

this report, every high-speed system in the world

initially has received some form of Government

support. If some rail corridors are undertaken as

private sector, State and local ventures, Federal

Government assistance may eventually be sought

to complete such projects, if construction timetables and costs are not met as planned. Additional support may be required if original market and cost forecasts are inaccurate.

An interesting institutional question arises regarding Amtrak, the congressionally designated

passenger rail carrier in the United States. Amtrak negotiates agreements with freight carriers

for use of their rights-of-way in all but NEC and

a few other segments. The fact that several highspeed passenger rail corridors may be developed

as privately operated enterprises raises questions

of the effect of such new service on existing Amtrak service and on the provisions of services Amtrak may offer to such an enterprise. Amtrak

could compete with the new rail service on the

same corridor, or it could drop service if it could

not make an adequate percentage of its operating
Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 1

revenues from that line, In the latter instance it

might also be reimbursed by private sector operators for lost revenues resulting from the new service, as is now planned in an agreement between

Amtrak and the American High Speed Rail Corp.

Legal questions have been raised about whether

Amtrak’s licensing authority extends to all passenger services in this country, or whether it is confined to routes and corridors on which Amtrak

currently provides service.

Another issue related to costs is the question

of regional equity. Since there are a number of

corridors currently being reviewed for possible introduction of high-speed passenger rail or maglev

service introduction, and from all indications

some Government support appears necessary,

then questions of the equity of Government support among regions of the country becomes an

issue. Which, if any, corridors should receive support? What criteria should be used to evaluate

such support?

Finally, the potential environmental impact of

noise has tended to be a critical issue associated

with high-speed rail introduction. The Japanese

high-speed system encountered initial strong opposition due to the noise and vibrational effects

generated by the passing trains. These effects later

were mitigated by technical and social adjustments. Noise levels of foreign systems fall within

U.S. Government standards. Maglev systems are

reported to be environmentally preferable in terms

of noise. Tests to verify this are included in the

West German test plans.

Congressional Role

Independent of specific consideration of technology or corridor decisions on high-speed rail,

it is important to rethink the fundamental role to

be played by rail in a changing transportation network. The present rail infrastructure in the United

States is essentially the remaining core of a past

system. Other nations have developed the highspeed rail technologies as a means of transforming their rail systems. Accordingly, Congress may

wish to encourage further research on transportation systems of the future and to formulate

guidelines for the contributions that could be

made to them by differing technologies.

There are a number of uncertainties associated

with U.S. development of high-speed rail. The

technologies themselves are the least uncertain;

they can be made to work. Decisions on location,

number of stops, and frequency of service will

contribute strongly to the attractiveness of the system; these decisions, appropriately reflecting local

political and social concerns, cannot be predicted.

Costs of construction and operation, while likely to exceed initial projections, can probably be

forecast to some acceptable certainty. By far the

most uncertain factor is the issue of ridership over

time. Realizing very large ridership projections

now being made will require a major change in

current U.S. transportation patterns.

If Federal assistance is required for development

of U.S. high-speed corridors, questions of competing transportation priorities, regional equity

among corridors, likely public benefit, and economic success, will confront policymakers. Most

of the estimated long-term benefits and costs depend on the accuracy of ridership projections and

the effect of such ridership on other transportation modes. The gains that occur irrespective of

the ridership tend to be more near term, accruing to those involved in building the system.

In light of these facts, if Congress should decide

to support the development of high-speed passenger rail, several activities warrant consideration:

● Detailed independent evaluations of those

corridors with high-speed rail potential are

needed to assess carefully the benefits and

costs of introduction of a high-speed passenger rail system. The evaluations should include:

—range of potential ridership and factors

affecting it;

—probable costs (including those due to

mishaps or delays) and certainty of cost

forecasts;

—magnitude of regional support;

—estimates of potential revenues and effects

of possible shortfalls;

—availability and suitability of proposed

technology; and,

—environmental, economic, and transportation impacts on the region, and on other

transport modes.
12 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

● Because benefits and costs of a high-speed rail Congress may wish to determine whether it

system are so dependent on the actual rider- is feasible for the Department of Transporship achieved, it would be desirable to have tation to support such experiments.

better data from which to estimate future ● The relationship between institutions, includpassenger demand. Experimental verification ing Amtrak and possible private rail operaof the importance of individual factors that tors, as well as State and Federal agencies,

affect ridership would be particularly useful. should be further clarified.
Chapter 2

HIGH-SPEED RAIL TECHNOLOGIES

AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment and Track Options.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Propulsion System Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conventional Equipment on Existing Track.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Equipment on Existing Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State-of-the-Art Equipment on New Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

15

16

17

18

18

20

21

List of Tables

Table No. Page

2. SNCF 125-mph Trains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. HST Comparison of Trip Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Ridership: Shinkansen, 1965-70, 1975-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. Trip Times on Shinkansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Proportion of Tunnels and Viaducts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. TGV: Comparison of Trip Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

20

21

23

23

26

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

1. Rail Travel: Tokyo-Osaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2. Japanese National Railways Standard Gage (Shinkansen) Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3. SNCF-TCV Line Between Paris-Lyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 23
Chapter 2

HIGH-SPEED RAIL TECHNOLOGIES

AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

In this assessment, a high-speed passenger rail This chapter examines the high-speed rail operasystem is defined as one that can attain speeds of tions of foreign countries and, on the basis of that

125 mph or more. With the exception of the analysis, describes the technology options for

Northeast Corridor (NEC) in the United States high-speed rail service, and the various conditions

where trains now achieve speeds of 120 mph on that may make one option more attractive than

some parts of its right-of-way, all development the others.

and use of these systems has occurred abroad.

SUMMARY

The technological options for high-speed rail

service include combinations of equipment, track,

and power systems. Two of the equipment and

track options—conventional equipment on upgraded track, and state-of-the-art equipment on

new track or on partly new track—are now employed in the regular high-speed passenger rail

service offered by Great Britain, Japan, and

France. Advanced technology (tilt-body equipment) on existing track is being actively pursued

by Britain and Canada, but is not yet fully

developed or implemented. The final equipment,

track, and power option—the ultra-high-speed

mode, magnetic levitation (maglev)—is still in the

developmental stage in West Germany and Japan.

Of the propulsion system options, either diesel or

electric are used on all state-of-the-art trains. A

brief discussion of each of these technology options is presented below.

Equipment and Track Options

Improved Conventional Equipment Run On

Upgraded Existing Track (Great Britain,

United States, Canada)

This least-cost option uses conventional equipment at a maximum speed of 125 mph on existing

track shared with freight and/or commuter trains.

Foreign experience, particularly in Great Britain,

shows that such equipment can run comfortably

and safely at speeds of 125 mph. Grade crossings

usually are eliminated on high-speed sections.

Stringent safety precautions are required where

freight shares the high-speed route with the passenger trains. Frequencies of service are contingent

on coordination with freight and commuter services and are adversely affected when the speeds

of each service differ widely.

New technology applied to vehicles and signal

and control systems make faster trips possible on

existing track. At speeds of more than 125 mph,

however, automatic speed controls are desirable

as are technologies that reduce weight and

pressure on the track. Where speeds are limited

by curves, the use of tilt-body vehicles (if further

developed) might improve trip times. Above 125

mph, complete grade separation is essential, and,

on the high-speed sections, tracks cannot be

shared with other types of trains.

State-of-the-Art Equipment, Partly

or Totally New Track (France, Japan)

Where speeds substantially above 125 mph are

desired, dedicated track becomes essential. The

equipment must be designed to new and more

stringent specifications to keep the ride quality

and the forces exerted on the track within the

proper limits. Lightweight materials, new and sophisticated signaling, and train control systems

are required, and radii of curves must be increased. For relatively small changes in elevation

en route, heavier gradients can be used to reduce

the need for expensive viaducts and cuts.

This option technically allows for design speeds

up to 200 mph on new track between cities,

15

25-413 0 - 84 - 6
16 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

though lower speeds typically are used in revenue

service. The French avoided the major capital expenditure of new track into city centers at the cost

of lower speeds (125 mph maximum) at each end

of the trip. The Japanese, because of overcapacity on existing lines and unsuitable track gage,

constructed totally new track for their bullet train.

Very High-Speed New Modes—Maglev

(Developmental: West Germany, Japan)

Maglev is the only new surface mode for highspeed intercity transport still in the development

stages. Speeds in excess of 250 mph are possible

using such systems. The Japanese have tested an

experimental vehicle at 320 mph. The West Germans are beginning final testing of their maglev

vehicles this year. Theoretical operating costs for

a maglev system have been projected to be lower

than those of a conventional new high-speed railway corridor, however, verification of operating

costs under conditions that fairly reflect revenue

service await test results.

Maglev would be competitive with air travel

from station to station on routes characterized by

high population densities at one or both ends,

“travel affinity” between the cities, and long

distances between stops.

Propulsion System Options

Diesel Power

The diesel power unit carries its own primary

power supply (the diesel engine) with fuel for

1,000 miles or more. It uses an onboard generator

to provide electric power to motors that drive the

axles of the power car and to provide heating,

cooling, ventilation, and lighting. Although limited in size and weight, the diesel-powered train

is very flexible and can be moved around the system as traffic needs dictate. Nevertheless, a design

speed much higher than 125 mph is regarded as

impractical by engineers because of power constraints inherent in diesel traction.

Electric Power

Electric locomotives basically are simpler,

lighter in weight per horsepower, and cheaper to

maintain than diesel locomotives. They make it

possible to use at least twice as much power continuously as a diesel locomotive, with a significantly higher short-term power output and acceleration rate, as well as improved braking. However, the necessary overhead power supply installations and substations are very expensive, and

existing signaling systems usually require renewal

to prevent magnetic interference from the traction system. Replacement of signaling systems also

is required to accommodate safe train spacing at

higher speeds. To transfer the amount of power

needed, high voltage systems are a necessity,

usually by means of an overhead power supply.

Whatever traction is used, as speed increases,

unsprung axle load* must be kept to lower values

to avoid too great an impact on the track and

vehicle. Unsprung axle load can be reduced by

suspending heavy electric motors on the truck

above the primary springs or on the vehicle body

itself with flexible drive. Total weight on each axle

also is important and must be reduced as speed

increases to ensure good ride quality.

Gas Turbine Power

While gas turbine power units offer the advantages of rapid power buildup and are very lightweight, the escalating fuel costs in the 1970’s and

the engine’s lower efficiency except at full power

led to the virtual abandonment of this technology. ** Turbotrains, which use gas turbine engines,

are run routinely from Buffalo to New York.

Linear Motors

To date, electric propulsion has used rotary

motors carried on the train. With linear motors,

the magnetic parts of the conventional rotating

motor are replaced by a passive element on the

vehicle and an active element in the track that interact to accelerate, maintain speed, or decelerate

the train. Problems of power transmission and

wheel to rail adhesion may be reduced by linear

induction motors (LIMs). The first commercial installations of LIMs (noncontact propulsion) for

● Unsprung axle load is the weight not supported by springs, and

therefore in immediate contact with track structure. This type of

contact will result in higher impact loads for the same weight because

of the absence of a cushioning effect of the springs.

● *However, the French National Railways (SNCF) still operates

a few trains at 100 mph maximum speed.
Ch. 2—High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience ● 17

revenue operation are under construction now as

low-speed transit lines in Toronto, Vancouver,

and Detroit.

Maglev vehicles use linear motors for noncontacting propulsion. A variety of such motor types

have been developed and tested with maglev vehicles; however, only the linear synchronous

motor (LSM) currently is being developed for

high-speed applications. While the principle of

linear motors is simple, maglev requires a sophisticated power conditioning and distribution system to control the proper amount and frequency

of electrical power for propulsion.

Comparison of various propulsion system options, indicates that diesel power is flexible and

does not require a large capital expenditure for

fixed installations for power supply. However, it

limits train size and speed. Electric propulsion

depends on expensive fixed installations but offers much higher power to weight ratio and thus

larger and faster trains. For frequent service, it

is simpler and cheaper to operate than the diesel

and does not necessarily depend directly on oil

as fuel. Gas turbine power has been discarded

because of high fuel consumption and maintenance cost. LSMS for maglev systems theoretically

offer very high speed at reduced costs but require

new guideway construction, and sophisticated

power conditioning systems.

Foreign Experience

France, Great Britain, and Japan now operate

rail services at 125 mph and above. However,

each country tailored its system to its own unique

demographic and transport needs and to its

geography. Consequently, significant differences

exist among these three high-speed passenger rail

systems.

France uses existing track into and out of Paris

and Lyon and new track between the population

centers and state-of-the-art vehicles that were

developed jointly by French National Railways

(SNCF) and French manufacturers. The equipment is being used on other routes as well. The

French system, TGV (Train a Grand Vitesse), has

exceeded 200 mph in test runs. In actual service,

its top speed initially was restricted to 160 mph,

though it was recently increased to approximately

170 mph.

Great Britain uses conventional equipment

(diesel- and electric-powered lightweight trains)

on existing track at maximum speeds of 125 mph.

The British decided not to build new track because

of projected high costs and probable opposition

on environmental grounds. Great Britain and

Canada also are developing separate versions of

tilt-body equipment, designed to improve train

speeds on curves through the use of tilt mechanisms. Viable commercial application of tilt-body

equipment is still in question.

Japan’s Shinkansen bullet train system uses

state-of-the-art equipment on completely new

track. The trains are designed for speeds of 160

mph, although they currently are operated at 131

mph. The original Tokyo-Osaka bullet train was

built to alleviate the overload on the existing rail

route and to meet new traffic demand. During the

first 5 years of operation, ridership increased

substantially. Later, additional extensions and

routes were built. Because population densities are

lower in the areas served by the newest routes,

the ridership is less, and train numbers and sizes

are smaller. Economic success is likely to be more

difficult to achieve with the recent lines.

The French, British, and Japanese vehicles all

could be adapted for suitable existing track in the

United States, although the TGV and Shinkansen

vehicles cannot operate at full design speed without new track and signaling equipment. The Japanese built entirely new track, in part, because

they could not interrupt service on their existing

lines. With the new right-of-way, they also reduced the number and degree of curves and built

a wider (standard) gage, rather than the narrow

gage used by the rest of the system. The French

and British trains are designed for electric and

diesel traction respectively, but could be redesigned for the alternative. Every car in the Japanese trains is electric-powered.

Electric power requires expensive wayside facilities to enable the trains to pick up current for

traction and train use. Thus, the lowest capital

requirement is for diesel-powered trains. High ridership is required before the benefits or revenues

of electric traction can overcome the additional
18 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

fixed capital cost. However, the use of existing the relatively open country. The two latest sectrack avoids the very high capital expenditure re- tions of the Shinkansen are estimated to have cost

quired by new track, with either diesel or elec- about $35 million to $40 million per mile, due to

tric traction. The costs of building new track, al- the high percentage of tunnels and viaducts that

though always higher than upgrading existing had to be constructed. Earlier Shinkansen lines

track, can vary greatly with topography. The con- cost approximately $20 million per mile in 1979

struction cost of the French line, for example, is dollars.

reported at $4 million per mile, in part owing to

DISCUSSION

In recent years, several foreign railways have

operated conventional equipment at speeds in excess of 100 mph, the previously accepted maximum speed of operation. The Japanese National

Railways (JNR) opened its Shinkansen (131 mph

maximum) in 1964, which from the outset was

a phenomenal success. The first sector was followed by a second completed in 1975, and two

more sectors recently have been added.1 In 1975,

British Railways (BR) inaugurated the first daytime high-speed passenger train line on tracks

shared with other trains. It has since opened five

other such lines. In France, a new high-speed line

from suburban Paris to suburban Lyon used by

TGV has been built. It permits operation at speeds

up to 170 mph (with potential of 186 mph) and

will be fully operational in 1983. It has been in

limited use since 1981.

Current plans for additional high-speed trains

include, in Britain, the introduction of a tilt-body

train at 125 mph connecting London, Glasgow,

Manchester, and Liverpool. France plans a line

serving Bordeaux and Rennes, and in West

Germany, two new sections of railway are under

construction to be used at maximum speeds of 125

mph.

‘Japanese National Railways, “Shinkansen,” February 1982.

Conventional Equipment

Existing Track

France

With the introduction of diesel and electric traction in the 1960’s, maximum speeds of 100 mph

became commonplace. Regular use of maximum

speeds of 125 mph first occurred in France when

SNCF introduced a limited number of trains on

three routes. Normally, such speeds were limited

to morning and evening trains to and from Paris

with first class accommodation at a supplementary fare.2 Table 2 shows trip times and speeds

for major flows.

Most trains on each route operated no faster

than 100 mph. The high-speed trains were aimed

at the business market, against growing air competition. A small number of special locomotives

were built and used with new conventional

coaches (known as “grand comfort”). No special

attention was given to the track, and existing

signaling was used.

West Germany

The Deutches Bundesbahn (DB) introduced a

small number of locomotive-hauled trains at 125

2SNCF.

Table 2.—SNCF 125-mph Trains

Overall trip time Average

Sector Miles Hours Minutes speed (mph)

Paris — Bordeaux . . . . . . . . . 363 3 50 95

Paris — Limoges . . . . . . . . . . 250 2 50 88

Paris — Dijon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 2 19 85

Paris — Lyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 3 47 85

SOURCE: SNCF Timetable.
Ch. 2—High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience ● 19

mph, and an experimental electric multiple-unit

train ran for a period between Munich and Hamburg. 3 These trains, like the French, were placed

on the existing network as a separate luxury service at supplemental fares.

Details are not available on costs of these highspeed services, but both SNCF and DB state that

the extra maintenance costs for the trains were

offset by the increased mileage per vehicle, so that

extra cost resulted only from

consumed at higher speeds.

Great Britain

the additional fuel

BR is operating complete routes at maximum

speeds of 125 mph on existing track. The British

considered the possibility of a new high-speed railway similar to the Japanese system, but rejected

3DB Timetable.

it because of extremely high projected capital costs

and anticipated environmental opposition. Instead

they designed high-speed trains (known in Britain

as “HSTs”) for existing track, at wear-and-tear

levels equal to the existing intercity trains, but

with maximum speeds of 125 mph and braking

systems capable of stopping the trains within the

distances provided by the existing signaling. All

main routes were examined for opportunities to

reduce trip times by eliminating speed restrictions

and upgrading line at moderate capital expenditure. When applied to U.S. conditions, BR officials estimate that upgrading for high-speed trains

approximates $2.5 million per mile, * though it can

vary considerably by route and condition of the ‘

track.

● British Rail data extrapolated to U.S. track conditions for a

Michigan corridor.

Photo credits: TRANSMARK

British Railways High Speed Train: insert shows the interior
20 • U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

In addition to the HST designs, and to prevent

having to develop totally new railbeds to meet

long-term needs, the British decided to develop

the advanced passenger train (APT), which has

a tilt mechanism** to improve speeds on curves.

To date, however, APT has been delayed by technical difficulties.

First introduced in the mid-1970’s, HSTs now

provide daytime service on six routes, a total of

18 million train-miles per year, at speeds up to

125 mph.4 They are standard intercity trains,

available to all riders, and marketed with the full

range of selective fares offered on the whole intercity network.

The characteristics of the lines where HSTs were

introduced varied widely. On some routes, up to

50 miles between stops was common; others had

nonstop runs of up to 220 miles. Table 3 gives

a cross section of trip times and speeds before and

after introduction.

In 1982, HSTs ran 18 million train-miles and

probably will continue at this level. BR officials

state that ridership increases of 30 percent have

been achieved in areas where there already was

a major intercity route. 5 HST service reportedly

covers operating costs (including depreciation)

and makes a significant contribution to track and

signaling costs. However, it does not earn enough

revenues to repay full expenses and capital investment, typically running 10 to 15 percent short.

The 87 HSTs sets now in service provide

205,000 miles per year each. This compares with

100,000 to 150,000 miles per year by the diesel

locomotives the HSTs replaced.’

● ● The tilt mechanism reduces lateral forces on passengers and is

analogous to banking in an aircraft.

‘British Rail Information.

‘Contractor discussions with British Rail Passenger Department.

bBritish Rail statistics.

New Equipment on Existing Track

Great Britain, Canada

BR has continued development of APT. This

train has advanced concepts including a hydrokinetics braking system, * articulation (using one

truck to support the ends of adjoining cars), and

an active tilting system. APT has experienced persistent troubles and is still undergoing refinement

to the tilting mechanism. APT is designed for

speeds of 150 mph, but could be engineered to

200 mph. Present plans are to use APT for all daytime service on the electrified lines at 125 mph

within 5 years.7 APT operating costs per passenger-mile are expected to be comparable with HST,

with the additional costs of maintaining the

tilt mechanism being offset by improved fuel

economy.8

The Canadian LRC train (light, rapid, comfortable) also features an active tilt-body system

designed to improve trip times by better performance on heavily curved track.

In 1981, two LRC train sets were leased to Amtrak for 2 years with an option to purchase. At

the end of the lease, they were returned to the

manufacturer (Bombardier), Amtrak having decided that the benefits in reduced trip times did

not offset the disbenefits of lack of compatibility

with other equipment. In addition to British and

Canadian tilt-body equipment, Swiss, Italian, and

Swedish manufacturers are also developing such

equipment.

● Hydrokinetics braking is a nonwearing braking system which

allows the train’s kinetic energy to be converted into heat in the braking fluid rather than heat in a braking disk or wheel tread.

‘British Rail officials.

8D. Boocock and M. Newman, The Advanced Passenger Train,

(London: Institute of Mechanical Engineers, December 1976).

Table 3.—HST Comparison of Trip Times

Before HST With HST

Time Average Time Average

Sector Miles (hours/minutes) speed (mph) (hours/minutes speed (mph)

London — Reading ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 0.30 72 0.22 98

London — Chippenham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 1.27 58 0.54 104

Reading — Swindon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 0.44 56 0.26 95

London — Bristol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.55 62 1.05 103

London — Doncaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 2.12 71 1.39 95

London — Newcastle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 3,35 75 2.57 91

SOURCE: British Rail Timetable,
Ch. 2—High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience ● 21

Generally, tilt-body equipment has some problems that remain unresolved, particularly commercial viability of the equipment due to maintenance costs.

State-of-the-Art Equipment on New Track

The construction cost of new track is high and

typically is considered for use with state-of-theart equipment only where existing track is unsuitable. Some situations may require the construction of new track for high-speed trains, e.g., where

the tracks have been used extensively by other

trains, or where the tracks may be completely

unsuitable for high speed.

Japan

In Japan, the existing lines were both unsuitable

for high speed and overloaded with traffic. Ridership was expected to increase rapidly. There was

no question of running high-speed trains on the

existing track because of narrow track gage, nor

of running more trains to increase capacity. The

new railway built by JNR had a design speed of

160 mph, although until now it has been operated

at a maximum of 131 mph.

The World Bank provided part of the original

financing for the first bullet train. The 320-mile

line between Tokyo and Osaka (Tokaido) opened

in 1964 and was an immediate success. Circumstances were especially favorable for development

of a high-speed railway:

Photo credit: /SP Photo by Joan B/uestone

Shinkansen Bullet Train in station

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

the existing railroad line, the predominant

transportation system, was overloaded;

traffic was expanding rapidly;

competition from road and highway use was

minimal;

the costs of a new highway (as an alternative) were estimated at more than five times

that of the railway; and

there was a fully developed transit feeder

system. Japan at that time did not build an

interstate system for automobile use.

Table 4 shows ridership figures for the original

Shinkansen as well as ridership resulting from the

additions built from 1972 to 1975. While ridership increased dramatically on the Shinkansen,

it began dropping on the conventional routes, as

shown in figure 1. Ridership on the conventional

route stabilized in the early 1970’s while Shinkansen ridership grew with the addition of the Okayama extension in 1972 and the Hakata extension

in 1975. The average distance traveled per passenger remained fairly constant. Ridership for the

entire line peaked at 157 million (33,3oo million

passenger-miles) in 1975. However, fare increases

(resulting from overall JNR system deficits) reduced demand by about 20 percent in the late

1970’s, and ridership stabilized at about 125 million annually in 1980. With the extension from

Tokyo to Hakata, the route mileage increased to

663. The express trains call at a limited number

of major cities, with the second service reaching

stations not served by the faster trains.

Table 4.—Ridership: Shinkansen, 1965-70, 1975.80

Average distance

Passengers Passenger- per passenger

Year (millions) miles (miles)

1965 . . . . . . 31 6,658 213

1966 . . . . . . 44 9,058 205

1967 . . . . . . 55 1 1,18a 200

1968 . . . . . . 66 13,139 198

1969 . . . . . . 72 14,270 198

1970 . . . . . . 85 17,454 204

Line extensions occurred-1972, 1975:

1975 . . . . . . 157 33,300 210

1976 . . . . . . 143 29,850 208

1977 . . . . . . 127 26,160 206

1978 . . . . . . 124 26,700 206

1979 . . . . . . 124 25,400 205

1980 . . . . . . 126 25,900 205

SOURCE: Japanese National Railways, “Shinkansen,” February 1982; Japanese

National Railways, Facts and Figures, 1981 edition.
22 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

As of October 1982, according to JNR, express

trains between Tokyo and Hakata carry approximately 69 percent of all passengers on the route.

On weekdays, 58 percent of travel is for business

reasons. Access to the rail station is approximately

75 percent by public transit, 20 percent by taxi,

and 5 percent by auto. Access from the train to

final destination is 60 percent public transit, 35

percent taxi, and 5 percent auto.9

Between Nagoya and Osaka on the original

(Tokaido) section, 204 trains are run daily. On

the three sections between Osaka and Hakata, this

number reduces to 131 trains, 100 trains, and 75

trains. 1°

Two new northern lines, the Tohoku and JoetSU, have been opened recently. The new lines start

from Omiya, a suburb of Tokyo, with access by

a shuttle service on existing tracks. It will be some

time before the connection from Omiya to Tokyo

is completed (see fig. 2). The scheduled trips are

fewer on the two new lines than on other Shinkansen sectors, and the trains have only 12 cars instead of the standard 16 used on the Tokaido

Shinkansen. Ridership on the new lines is expected

to be less than on the existing network, and revenue is likely to fall short of operating costs. JNR

expects that these two sectors eventually will become profitable, but there are substantial doubts

about the remainder of the planned network* be-

‘Ichiroh Mitsui, Japanese National Railways representative,

Washington, D.C.

loJapanese National Railways, op. cit.

● JNR anticipates building additional Shinkansen lines however,

whether this construction will occur appears uncertain according

to recent trade journals.

cause the ridership forecast in sparsely populated

areas is less than 10 percent of the capacity of the

proposed new lines.11

Tables shows the trip times and average speeds

for the two new sections of the Shinkansen service.

The construction of the new lines has been

expensive, largely as a result of the very difficult

climatic conditions, difficult terrain, the need for

shallow curves and easy gradients to permit

speeds of 160 mph, and the high cost of providing

access to cities. Table 6 shows the proportion of

each Shinkansen line in tunnels or viaducts. Because of the Japanese terrain, Japanese engineers

working on the Shinkansen system have become

the world leaders in tunneling technology.

The two latest sections are estimated to have

cost about $35 million to $4o million per mile,

while the earlier routes were estimated to cost

about $2o million per mile in 1979 dollars.12

The original section from Tokyo to Osaka has

been highly profitable, and the sections from

Osaka to Hakata currently are recovering costs.

Operating costs for 1980 were reported by JNR

as 4.3 cents per passenger-mile, with total costs

as 6.9 cents per passenger-mile. Revenue earned

was 11.7 cents per passenger-mile. From a review

of JNR’s trends in operating ratios, it is apparent

that opening lines south of Osaka did not significantly improve the overall financial performance

of the system. The operating ratio (costs to revenues) was a low of 0.44 in 1970. A decade later

in 1980 it was 0.59; still a better ratio than anywhere else in the world.13

The first section that opened between Tokyo

and Osaka created a great deal of opposition

because of noise and vibration. Later sections

featured construction methods designed to reduce

noise and vibration, including noise barriers on

certain sections. Because of the original problems,

however, there has been very vocal opposition

to increasing the speed to 160 mph. However, JNR

still expects to increase speeds to perhaps 140 mph

soon as a first step toward achieving design speed

(160 mph) for the line and equipment. While the

1lMitsui, op. cit.

121bid.

13Japane5e National Railways, oP. Cit.
Ch. 2—High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience ● 23

Figure 2.—Japanese National Railways Standard Gage (Shinkansen) Lines

As of January 198 3

Yonago

In operation AC 25 KV 1,127 miles

Under construction AC 25 KV 60 miles

Projected AC 25 KV — ~ 872 miles

Total 2.059 miles

Hakata ~

SOURCE: Japanese National Railways.

Akita’ P

Morioka

Kanazawa

Table 5.—Trip Times on Shinkansen

Before Average Shinkansen Average

trip-time speed trip-time speed

Miles (hours/minutes) (mph) (hours/minutes) (mph)

Omiya-Marioka . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 5.37 52 3.17 89

Omiya-Nigata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 3.30 48 1.50 92

SOURCE: Japanese National Railways.

Table 6.—Proportion of Tunnels and Viaducts

Total viaduct

Tunnel Viaduct Other and tunnel

Miles Percentage Miles Percentage Miles Percentage Miles Percentage

Tokyo — Osaka . . . . . . . 43 13 36 11 243 76 79 24

Osaka — Hakata . . . . . . 176 51 32 9 138 40 208 60

Omiya — Marioka . . . . . 72 23 49 16 189 61 121 39

Omiya — Niigata . . . . . . 66 39 19 11 84 50 85 50

SOURCE: Ichiroh Mitsui, Japanese National Railways Representative, Washington, D.C.

25-413 0 - 84 - 5
24 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

early bullet trains have been highly successful in

terms of ridership and costs, the entire JNR

system, like those of other countries, experiences

financial problems.

France

In France, the use of conventional trains at 125

mph demonstrated the benefits in ridership from

faster trip times. In the late 1960’s, the French

Government faced two choices for relieving severe

congestion in the Dijon area: add tracks in the

hilly area approaching Dijon, or build a completely new line diverting a major part of the intercity

passenger train service away from the congested

areas. The Government decided to build a new

line (see fig. 3).1

4 The French have maintained national policy of promoting their rail service. As

a part of that policy, intercity bus travel on highways and expressways has been prohibited in

order to encourage rail use, according to SNCF

officials. Buses are permitted on other roads.ls

The French designed their system to fit their

needs and topography. It used existing track into

Paris and Lyon, eliminating the high construction

costs in urban areas. The intermediate sections of

line pass through sparsely populated areas. Gradients, mainly into and out of river valleys, were

negotiated at up to 3.5 percent, eliminating the

need for expensive tunnels and requiring only 2

miles of viaduct. The line has excellent feeder

systems serving surrounding Dijon and Lyon, and

existing routes provide good access to many cities

farther south. The long distances with few intermediate stops afford maximum opportunity to

utilize the trains’ speed—currently to 170 mph,

with an average speed between Paris and Lyon

of 133 mph. The Paris to Lyon TGV line includes

244 miles of new track. The remaining mileage

used existing right-of-way into Paris and Lyon.

SNCF estimates the construction cost was $4

million per mile. Total land acquisition was about

9 square miles. Ridership forecasts were for 25

percent of the total between Paris and Lyon and

the remaining from the wider areas surrounding

the end points. In just over 1 year, the French have

ItContractor &CuSSiOn with SNCF officials.

IsHughes devi]]eie, French National Railways, U.S. Office.

Figure 3.—SNCF-TGV Line Between Paris-Lyon

— New line in service as of October 1981

‘*- New line in service as of October 1983

— Present Paris-Lyons lin e

‘ -- Present lines used by TGV trains in October 1981

— - Present lines used subsequently by TGV trains

SOURCE: SNCF.

achieved 5.6 million riders on the Paris-Lyon axis

alone and in 16 months the ridership has increased

to 10 million. SNCF officials are confident of

reaching the forecast of 16 million riders for the

whole network by 1987. Revenues in the first full

year were reported $140 million, and operating

costs were estimated at $70 million, with revenue

per passenger-mile estimated at 10 cents and costs
Ch. 2—High-Speed Rail Technologies and Foreign Experience ● 25

4

I I

t

I

L \ I

t

. i-

. ?

. . .

*

TGV from

at 5 cents per passenger-mile. * SNCF expects to

cover fully allocated costs (including track, signaling, etc. ) in 1984 and to break even in 1989. l6

When the new line is in full operation, 87 train

sets will be used, of which 64 were in service at

the end of 1982. Each set is expected to run between 280,000 and 300,000 miles per year. All

maintenance is confined to one facility outside

*Operating costs include different items for each railway and are

not comparable with one another.

‘%NCF.

I

Photo credits: SNCF, American Office

Paris to Lyon

Paris, and most servicing is performed at a single

facility, also at the Paris end of the route. New

maintenance facilities were not constructed for the

new TGV route. Sophisticated pantographs (for

electric current collection) allowed for the use of

a simple catenary (overhead wire system of power

supply). The trains have been designed with overall axle weight of 161/2 metric tons (tonnes), and

the vehicles are articulated (with one truck supporting the ends of two cars). Lightweight construction (64 tonnes per power car and 36 tonnes

per passenger car) has reduced wear on the track
26 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

and the new line is maintained to the standards SNCF plans the construction of a second line

required for 100-mph operation. Fuel consump- of 120 miles between Paris and Bordeaux, altion is less per seat-mile than the conventional though the increased traffic forecast will be intrains displaced by TGV.17 sufficient to pay interest charges on the investTable 7 gives details of trip times and speeds ment. It will therefore only consider actual confor a selection of routes served by TGV. In each struction of this line if the government offsets the

case, the times are those for full operation, interest charges.18

planned for September 1983.

ITData provided by SNCF-TGV Maintenance Facility OffiCkik,

Villeneuve, Paris, January 1983. IsSNCF discussions.

Table 7.—TGV: Comparison of Trip Times

Conventional TGV

Miles Time Speed Time Average

Sector (original route) (hours/minutes) (mph) (hours/minutes) speed (mph)

Paris — Dijon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 2.19 85 1.37 122

Paris — Lyon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 3.47 85 2.00 133

Paris — Marseilles . . . . . . . . . . 439 6.35 82 4.43 99

Paris — Besancon . . . . . . . . . . 254 3.30 73 2.21 108

SOURCE: TGV Timetable.
Chapter 3

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ECONOMIC

FEASIBILITY OF HIGH-SPEED

PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS
Contents

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Market Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

The Intercity Travel Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Market Requirements of a High-Speed Rail System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Market Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 37

Methods of Evaluating Future Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Cost Analysis of High-Speed Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

List of Tables

Table No. Page

8. Population Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

9. Intercity Passenger-Miles by Mode of Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

10.60 Percent of Maximum Round-Trip Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

4. Components of Total Trip Time for a 100-Mile Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

5. Effect of Increased Maximum Speed on Trip Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

6. Effect of Distance and Mode: Nonstop Trips Up to 400 Miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

7. One-Way Fare-Price in Dollars per Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Chapter 3

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY

OF HIGHSPEED PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS

This chapter discusses the basic factors likely will enable a system to attract ridership. It exto affect the economic feasibility of high-speed amines methods for developing economic forepassenger rail systems in the United States. It casts for a system and outlines the basic cost to

describes the overall size and character of the revenue relationships of building and operating

travel market required for a successful high-speed a high-speed service.

system as well as the basic service features that

SUMMARY

OTA’s analysis of the factors that influence

transportation preferences and of the experience

of foreign high-speed systems suggests that the

following minimum corridor characteristics are

important for economic feasibility of high-speed

systems:

cities with high populations and high population densities;

cities with a strong “travel affinity” between

them, generally because one is a dominant

center of commercial, cultural, financial,

governmental, or other activity;

cities grouped along a route giving major passenger traffic flows in the 100- to 300-mile

trip range; and

cities with developed local transit systems to

feed the high-speed rail.

Data on current U.S. travel, aggregated on a

national basis, show that automobiles and airplanes are the most extensively used modes for

intercity travel. Rail represents less than 1 percent of current intercity revenue travel. Nationally, rail’s share of the intercity market is not likely to increase dramatically if additionalhigh-speed

rail systems are built, because only a few U.S. corridors may be likely candidates for such systems.

Considering speed and schedule frequency together, it appears that the major rail markets start

at about 100 miles and reach up to 300 miles. Outside these limits, rail competes successfully only

where special factors compensate for the relative

disadvantage in trip time compared with the automobile at short distances, and aircraft at long distances. For shorter distances, the use of a highspeed rail is essentially equivalent to creating a

transit system.

The overall ridership and the choice of travel

modes by riders are determined by a number of

interrelated factors: total trip times, speed, frequency, distance, cost, comfort, and convenience.

Each of these factors, and the tradeoffs among

them, must be examined for specific rail corridors.

In terms of time, what matters to the traveler is

not the speed of the main mode used on any single

trip but the total time (the trip time) it takes to

travel—by whatever combination of modes—

from departure to final destination. Thus, the

speed of the airplane may be offset by the time

spent getting to and from airports or of getting

around within airports. Conversely, the slower

speed of the automobile is often outweighed by

the fact that it does not involve the access, egress,

and terminal waiting times—or the relatively infrequent departure times—required by the public

modes.

Major purposes for intercity travel are business,

family, and other private travel. For each of these

trip purposes, the factors discussed above have

different relative values. The business traveler

places a high value on time and will pay for comfort and convenience. Thus, fare is often less

important than trip time, frequency, comfort, or

convenience. At the other end of the spectrum are

riders for whom the cost of the trip is paramount.

For example, a family of four would calculate the

cost of a 200-mile round trip by automobile at

perhaps $26 ($20 gasoline plus $6 parking), or

29
30 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

$6.50 per person. The family would find unacceptable the standard rail fare of about $100 plus

access costs (over $25 per person). Even a total

round-trip fare of $7o for a family of four would

be only nominally more attractive.

Frequency of service equates to increased convenience and attractiveness and can have the same

perceived value to the customer as increasing

speed.

High-speedrail systems are costly to construct.

How costly depends on such factors as location,

length of route, right-of-way, terrain, technology

selected, and the service levels to be provided. The

French estimate, for example, that the construction of their TGV cost an average of $4 million

per mile. The Japanese estimate that the last two

links of the Bullet Train will cost an average of

between $35 million to $40 million per mile due

to significant tunneling and viaduct requirements.

The earlier links cost about $20 million per mile

in 1979 dollars. For purposes of comparison, the

$35 million to $40 million per mile costs are similar

to those of the Century Freeway in Los Angeles.

The costs of the infrastructure (land, track, signaling and control systems, terminals) will vary

widely among corridors. Infrastructure costs depend on topography and technology selected.

Operating costs primarily include maintenance

costs for track and equipment and “over the road”

costs such as the labor and fuel. As such, the operating costs can vary according to the technology

selected and the corridor characteristics.

Travel demand required to support high-speed

rail service can be much lower where existing

track can be used or, alternatively, new track

added to existing rights-of-way. Demand must be

extremely high to support newly constructed highspeed rail lines, even if the land acquisition costs

for expensive city sections of the route are avoided

by using the existing right-of-way. Demand also

must be extremely high if it is to pay back all capital costs and to break even on operating costs.

Mathematical models can be and have been

used to develop forecasts of passenger demand,

Such models, however, have suffered from the

paucity of good data on automobile travel. The

most prudent approach to developing reliable

ridership forecasts is to construct a realistic

multimodal profile of the traveler through indepth surveys (similar to the National Travel

Survey), then use that data to validate the computer model.

DISCUSSION

Market Size

All high-speed passenger rail systems are costly and require high ridership if they are to generate

enough revenue to cover operating costs, let alone

capital costs. Existing high-speed rail corridors including corridors between Tokyo and Osaka, the

West Coast Main Line between London and Glasgow, and the Northeast Corridor (NEC) between

Boston, New York, and Washington, D. C., typically serve only major population centers. Each

corridor links very large cities that are between

100 and 400 miles apart, one of which dominates

as a national center (although not necessarily the

administrative capital city). Table 8 shows the

population densities for the countries now operating some part of their intercity network of rail

services at high frequency and speed and for the

city pairs linked by high-speed rail service. It also

shows population densities of selected U.S. cities.

Population and population density determine

both the size and potential of the market to support the high-speed rail service and transit feeder

systems. The greater the population density, the

more highly developed the transit system is likely

to be. The ability of the NEC to provide highspeed intercity rail service is aided by the substantial local transit systems feeding the high-speed

trains. Unless there is a heavy concentration of

population in a relatively small area, such an infrastructure is not feasible. Without a highly developed local transit system, i.e., “feeder system, ”

a great deal of the potential travel by high-speed

rail is not likely to be achieved. Some argue that

improved local transit should be part of the plans
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 31

Table 8.—Population Density (approximate)

Population Population density Approximate

1980 (000s) Area (mi2) per square mile “radius” (mi)

U.S. population density:

Chicago (S)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,005

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,104

Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,203

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,353

Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,899

Cincinnati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,401

St. Louis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,356

Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,626

New York(S)(C).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,072

Newark (S)(C). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Philadelphia(S)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,688

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,717

Baltimore (S)(C)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,174

Washington, D.C. (S)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,061

Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,967

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,478

San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,862

Anaheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

SMSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,932

All USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229,300

Foreign population and density—Japan Corridor:Tokyo-Hakata:

Tokyo (S)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,649

Kyoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,470

Osaka (S)(C). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,648

Okayama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546

Hiroshima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899

All Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117,059

Foreign population and density—France:

Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,548

Dijon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Lyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,171

All France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,500,000

Forelgn popu/ation anddenslty—United Kingdom:

Greater London. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,900

Outer metropolitan area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,400

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,300

West Midlands Metrop County . . . . . . . . . . 2,700

Includes Birmingham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,007

Greater Manchester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,617

Merseyside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500

Includes Liverpool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504

Lothian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736

Includes Edinburgh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446

Central Clydeside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,700

Includes Glasgow.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763

All United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

228.1

3,723.6

135.6

3,939.0

79.0

1,519.7

78.1

2,139.0

61.4

4,967.6

34.3

1,955.3

301.5

24.1

136.0

3,531.7

80.3

2,246.9

62.7

2,809.7

464.7

4,070.1

320.0

4,211.6

41.7

797.8

3,615,000

357.3

70.7

97.7

42.8

50.4

147,517

827.1

52.3

278.7

213,000

621

3,557

4,178

353

81.6

499

252

44.1

100

527

666

61.3

50,300

13,174

1,908

8,874

1,105

7,264

1,250

4,935

655

7,379

474

10,113

831

23,455

13,662

12,413

1,336

9,793

968

10,181

1,089

6,384

1,837

2,736

442

5,259

2,422

60

32,604

20,796

27,106

13,107

17,859

794

10,335

3,988

4,201

251

11,105

1,518

2,944

7,652

12,335

5,243

5,962

11,418

7,360

8,463

2,552

12,447

910

9

7

5

5

4

3

10

3

7

5

5

12

10

4

11

5

6

2

4

16

4

9

14

—

36

11

5

13

9

4

6

4

15

4

KEY: S=Subway, C=Commuter.

SOURCE: U.S.Department of Commerce, 1980Censusof Population, PC&lSeries, February 1882; Far East and AustraliaStatistics, 1881-82) EuropaPublications; Whittaker’s

Almanac, 1983; U.K. Statistical Yearbook, 1981, by HerMajesty’sSt atistics Office.

25-413 0 - 84 - 4
32 • U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

for high-speed rail systems. However, such systems are in themselves extremely costly and unlikely to be justified solely on the grounds of providing feeder service to high-speed systems.1 According to Japanese National Railways (JNR), as

of October 1982, access to the Shinkansen from

‘A study of “The Full Costs of An Urban Work Trip” concluded:

“Given that practically all commutation corridors in the (San Francisco) Bay Area have peak traffic densities below 20,000, it would

seem possible that BART trips were costlier to provide than the auto

trips they were supposed to supplant. . . . Given these results, it

would appear that the only circumstance under which it could make

economic sense for a metropolitan area with characteristics of the

San Francisco Bay Area to build a new fixed-rail transit system such

as BART would be if a very large fraction of commuters were willing to pay a stiff premium price, in both fares and in their own time,

for the privilege of riding a train instead of a bus.” From Theodore

E. Keeler, “Chapter III, The Full Costs of An Urban Work Trip:

Auto vs. Bus and Rail Transit, ” The Full Costs of Urban Transport

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, July 1975).

home to station is 75 percent by public transit,

20 percent by taxi, and 5 percent by auto. Access

from the train to final destination is 60 percent

public transit, 35 percent taxi, and 5 percent auto.

The Intercity Travel Market

Intercity travel consists of trips between urban

areas conducted by airplane, bus, railroad, and

automobile. Travel forecasts are as difficult to

make as economic forecasts, and there is a wide

divergence of views on the future growth rates

in travel.

As presented in the aggregated data, air and

automobile are preferred intercity modes of travel

(see table 9). However, these patterns are likely

to be less uniform between individual city pairs

because modal choice depends on factors which

Table 9.—lntercity Passenger-Miles by Mode of Travel

Railways,

Motor Total motor revenue Airways, domestic

Automobiles a

coaches a

vehicies a

passengers revenue services Total

Passenger-miles by mode (in billions):

1981 . . . . . . 1,344.0 27.2

1980 b . . . . . 1,300.4 27.7

1979 b . . . . . 1,322.4 27.2

1978 b . . . . . 1,362.3 25.4

1977 b . . . . . 1,316.0 25.7

1976 b . . . . . 1,259.6 25.1

1975 b . . . . . 1,170.7 25.4

1974 b . . . . . 1,121.9 27.7

1973 b ., . . . 1,162.8 26.4

1972 . . . . . . 1,129.0 25.6

1971 . . . . . . 1,071.0 25.5

1970 . . . . . . 1,026.0 25.3

1965 . . . . . . 817.7 23.8

1960 . . . . . . 706.1 19.3

Passenger-miles by mode (percent):

1981 . . . . 84.1 1.7

1980 b . . . . . 83.4 1.8

1979 b 

. . . . . 83.2 1.7

1978 b ., . . . 85.1 1.6

1977 b . . . . . 86.1 1.7

1976 b . . . . . 86.3 1.7

1975 b . . . . . 86.5 1.9

1974 b 

., . . . 85.8 2.1

1973 . . . . . . 86.7 2.0

1972 . . . . . . 87.1 1.9

1971 . . . . . . 87.4 2.1

1970 . . . . . . 86.9 2.1

1965 . . . . . . 89.2 2.6

1960 . . . . . . 90.4 2.5

1,371.2

1,328.1

1,349.6

1,387.7

1,341.7

1,284.7

1,196.1

1,149.6

1,189.2

1,154,6

1,096.5

1,051.3

841.4

725.4

85.8

85.2

84.9

86.7

87.8

88.0

88.4

87.9

88.7

89.0

89.5

89.0

91.8

92.9

11.8

11.5

11.6

10.5

10.4

10.5

10.1

10.5

9.3

8.7

8.9

10.9

17.6

21.6

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.9

1.9

2.8

216.0

219.4

228.2

203.2

177.0

164.4

148.3

146.6

143.1

133.0

119.9

118.6

58.1

34.0

13.5

14.1

14,4

12.6

11.5

11.3

10.9

11.3

10.6

10.3

9.8

10.1

6.4

4.4

1,599,0

1,559.0

1,589.4

1,601.4

1,529.1

1,459.6

1,354.5

1,306.7

1,341.6

1,296.3

1,225.3

1,180,8

917.2

781.0

100 %

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

a Includes Intracity ~ofi~on~ of intercity trips, Omits rural t. rural trips, and intracity trips with both origin and destination confined to same CitY for local bus or transit

b movements, nonrevenue school and government bus operations.

Revised.

SOURCE: Interstate Commerce Commission and Transportation Association of America.
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 33

vary by geographic location. Typically, distance

between cities and trip purpose are two major factors influencing modal choice. For very long distances, the airplane is the preferred mode of

travel; for shorter distances, the automobile. Between extremes, choices between carriers involve

a compromise between two other critical factors—

cost and speed. Business travelers, who place a

higher monetary value on time than do nonbusiness travelers, tend to be more heavily influenced

by speed than costs, though cost does factor in

their decision. Nonbusiness travelers are also

attracted by fast trip times, but are primarily

concerned with total trip costs.

The automobile is the predominant mode of

travel today in the United States. For any given

intercity trip, people typically consider only the

marginal costs of operating the automobile (fuel,

tolls, oil, etc. )—rather than including the cost of

the automobile—in comparing prices of one mode

with another.

Market Requirements of a

High-Speed Rail System

Any high-speed rail system must compete for

riders with other public and private transport.

Travel surveys show that ridership and choice of

mode are influenced by several major factors:

total trip time, speed, frequency, distance, cost,

comfort, and convenience. Each of these factors,

as well as the tradeoffs among them, must be

examined in any market analysis of specific

corridors.

Trip Time

The total time required to get from the point

of departure to the final destination is defined as

the trip time. This includes travel to and from the

station or airport, access time or waiting time in

the station or while parking, actual travel time,

and egress time (time to obtain transportation

from main mode to the final destination). Generally what matters to a traveler is the total elapsed

time it takes from origin to destination rather than

simply the speed of the mode used for the main

part of the trip. Figure 4 portrays the modal

choices for a hypothetical 100-mile trip available

to a potential rider desiring to reach his arrival

point at a set time. As the figure shows, all modes

have a similar total elapsed time at a 100-mile

distance despite the differences in speed between

the main modes, assuming an hourly frequency

for the public modes. Other assumptions concerning terminal access and egress, and the speed and

frequency of the public modes, would swing the

balance one way or the other. In general, the

speed of the aircraft is tempered by the long access and egress times, while the slower speed of

the automobile largely is offset by the fact that

it does not involve the access and terminal service time of the public modes. Thus, the speed of

the main mode cannot be considered apart from

the extra access and service time required by that

mode.

Frequency and Speed

There is a tradeoff between frequency and

speed, where increased frequency can, to a certain extent, provide the additional attraction that

increased speed can also give. The exact nature

of this tradeoff is difficult to quantify. Figure 5

shows the effect of increased maximum speed on

trip time for a 100-mile high-speed system.

The Effect of Distance

The relative value of speed will vary with

distance, as shown in figure 6. At short distances,

the transit bus and automobile dominate the market in both convenience and trip time. Rail is attractive for short trips only where special circumstances nullify the advantages of the automobile, such as peak time commuting access to

a major city, center city congestion, cost of parking, access to airports or other major attractions

for large numbers of people such as an exhibition

center. In these cases, at short distances, frequency

of service is essential, as is a single point of access. Travel time to and from stations is increasingly important to the individual traveler as trends

show the U.S. population spreading out. Many

people live further away from city centers, thus

increasing travel times to and from stations and

airports. Use of a rail link for airports usually involves some form of shuttle transport from the

railhead to individual terminals, as at Logan Airport in Boston. Unless a high frequency service

is maintained, all the benefit of a high-speed
34 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Figure 4.—Components of Total Trip Time for a 100-Mile Trip (hypothetical)

SOURCE: Jack SmNh, Office of Technology Assessment contractor report.

movement will be lost in waiting time where trip

distances are short.

As demonstrated in figure 6, for a trip of 30

miles the automobile has a substantial time advantage over a train that runs hourly at a 125-mph

maximum speed. Increasing the top speed to 200

mph or even 300 mph still leaves rail at a substantial disadvantage in trip time. At this distance,

increases in frequency do more than increases in

speed to improve the trip times of trains. (Note

that the figure assumes a nonstop rail trip. Each

intermediate stop adds at least 4 minutes to trip

time, and increases the rail trip time disadvantage. ) For a trip of 50 to 100 miles, rail becomes

progressively more competitive on trip time. At

the lower end of the range, flows between intermediate stations will be confined to those trips

where no automobile is available, or there are

special circumstances favorable to rail.

At a distance of about 100 miles, the automobile loses all trip time advantage and competes

only on price and convenience. At this distance,

the trip time advantages of improved rail frequency and higher top speed are about the same. This
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 3 5

Figure 5.—Effect of Increased Maximum Speed

on Trip Time

110 ““~

20

10 t

I

I

I

I

‘ o 100 200 300

Maximum speed—miles per hour

SOURCE Jack Smith, Office of Technology Assessment contractor report.

Data derived from Information on acceleration/deceleration rates,

Brltlsh Rail Research Department, SNCF.

raises the difficult question of what should be the

planned top speed of the rail link. Most rail lines

are likely to have less than 100-mile intervals between stations. For example, between New York

and Washington, there are, on average, major stations at 45-mile intervals. Only four trains a day

each way run 90 miles nonstop (Philadelphia to

New York). In these cases, the intermediate stations have the best overall trip times from high

frequency trains at maximum 120 mph. However,

major long-distance flows achieve greater benefit

from higher top speeds.

Fares

Fare is the most complex of the factors the rider

considers, but it is a fundamental determinant of

demand and the financial viability of any public

mode of transportation. Figure 7 illustrates the

range of current rail fares and perceived marginal

automobile costs, including access and parking

costs.

At the shorter distances, the price of travel by

public mode is most often measured against the

perceived marginal cost of the automobile, except

in cases where an automobile is not an available

alternative. It is sometimes argued that intercity

automobile trip costs should include maintenance,

tire wear, and even depreciation and interest on

capital. However, intercity trips in competition

with public modes are normally only a tiny fraction of the trips made by automobile; only on rare

occasions is intercity use part of the justification

for purchase of an automobile. Maintenance and

tire wear both have an element related to total

mileage, but are small, and in most cases are not

included by riders in cost calculations. Thus, for

the rider, the calculation of trip cost by automobile normally includes gasoline, parking, and tolls,

if any. This cost is then divided by the number

of persons in the automobile. A cost of perhaps

10 cents per mile becomes 21⁄2 cents per mile for

four riders. Party size, therefore, is a major factor in its own right. The typical automobile load

factor for intercity trips is 1.6 passengers per vehicle, which means that probably less than 40 percent of automobile riders travel alone. To compete in a market where the dominant mode (automobile) has a competitive price that can vary

widely with party size requires very sophisticated

fare policies on the part of the operators of public

modes of transportation.

Political or social objectives can alter the competitive position. For example, the French Government pays French National Railways (SNCF) a

large annual sum to provide cheaper fares for children, the elderly, and socially disadvantaged

groups. This payment is calculated as the difference between the fare charged by SNCF to these

groups and the standard fare. Other railroads such

as British Railways (BR) and Amtrak provide such

reduced fares as a matter of commercial judgment

to widen the market covered.

Comfort

Comfort is a subjective judgment. For the rail

mode, it involves the travel environment—seating, company, catering facilities, relaxation, and

ability to read, work, or sleep. While other modes

offer comfort in seating and environment, flying,

or driving or riding in an automobile all present

added anxieties. Food choice will be more limited

on short-haul flights and an automobile trip will

require stops.

Convenience

Auto travel, with its infinite choice of starting

times, is far more convenient than public modes
.

36 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Figure 6.—Effect of Distance and Mode: Nonstop Trips Up to 400 Miles

1 |

. ,

| . |.

0 30 100 200 300 400

125

hourly

30 min.

10 min.

200

hourly

2 hourly

300

hourly

hourly

Trip distance—miles

SOURCE: Jack Smith, Office of Technology Assessment contractor report
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 3 7

Figure 7.—0ne-Way Fare-Price in Dollars per Person (includes access/parking)

.

.

Air full

Rail-full

Alr-EXCN

Rail-EXCN

Auto 1

Auto 2

Hire 4

Auto 4

0 30 100 200

Trip distance—miles

SOURCE: Jack Smith, Off Ice of Technology Assessment contractor report. Data compiled from modal fare comparisons using the following assumptions automobile— 10u/m ile plus $2.50 parking; train — N EC Am fleet fares, air— Los

Angeles-San Diego and New York-Washington.

with limited service frequencies. With auto travel,

changes in itinerary can be made at any suitable

time, and luggage handling is minimal.

Public modes always involve transfer, which

is inconvenient and time-consuming. Some travel

modes allow an elapsed time of up to 40 minutes

as the perceived time equivalent to the inconvenience factor of having to change from one mode

to another. Even where arrangements are made

to handle luggage at terminals, public transportation cannot match the convenience of the automobile which moves large quantities of baggage

from origin to destination without any intermediate handling.

Market Sectors

Major purposes for intercity travel are business,

family, and other private travel. For each of these

trip purposes, the factors discussed above have

different relative values. The business traveler

places a high value on time and will pay for comfort and convenience. Thus, fare is often less important than trip time, frequency, comfort, or

convenience. At the other end of the spectrum are

riders for whom the cost of the trip is paramount.

For example, a family of four would calculate the

cost of a 200-mile round trip by automobile at

perhaps $26 ($20 gasoline plus $6 parking or $6.5o

per person). The family would find unacceptable

the standard rail fare of about $100 plus access

costs (over $25 per person). Even a total roundtrip fare of $70 for a family of four would be only

nominally more attractive.

Between these extremes are other groups traveling on personal business or for leisure and recreation. The public modes become more attractive

to the extent that riders travel alone, value time

more than money, or find the convenience of rail

preferable in major cities where auto congestion

and parking are difficult in downtown areas.

Much of such travel is commuter, traditionally

at cheap fares, and by nature confined to peak

periods or to special events. Public modes can capture sizable shares of these markets only by incurring high peak costs, and such market penetration requires low fares to offset the advantage of

a multiple-occupancy automobile.

Figure 7 shows the present pattern of rail, air

fares, and automobile cost. The rail round-trip

excursion fare is at about the level of cost of an
38 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

automobile used by only one person. Multiple use

brings automobile costs substantially below rail

fare. Thus, for trips where two or more people

travel together, some further reduction in rail fare

may well be needed, even where rail is competitive

on trip time, for example, for trips of 100 miles

or more. At distances less than 100 miles, the rail

mode becomes progressively less attractive compared with automobiles in multiple use, since rail

travel is slower, more expensive, and less convenient in many cases.

Air fares have fluctuated widely recently, but

figure 7 shows a typical situation where excursion discounts of up to perhaps 30 percent are offered for certain times of the day or week. At present fare levels, rail has a clear fare advantage to

offset any time disadvantage. Any move to raise

fares on high-speed rail to increase revenue could

erode the differential between rail and air fares.

However, for the business market, higher rail fares

should be possible if rail trip time is brought significantly nearer to air. Rail fares need to distinguish between the air and auto markets by time

of day and duration of stay if rail is to have maximum ridership and revenue. At 100 and 300

miles, competition exists between air and automobile, with rail having a slower overall trip than

either. Those individuals who now prefer the

automobile have had the option of a faster, more

expensive air mode, but did not take it. For this

group, the costs and the convenience of the automobile have priority over speed at the longer distances. High-speed rail would offer a speed advantage, and a smaller fare differential, than the

existing air mode. The likelihood of attracting

automobile users to the new rail mode will depend on the level of fare that can be offered, and

on whether use of these fares can be protected

against penetration from the business sector,

which is carried by rail at higher fares.

In each of the market sectors, there is an interaction between fare and ridership, as well as between trip time and ridership. Selective fare reductions to achieve high market success will have the

effect of reducing the average fare per mile (the

“fares yield”). Where trip times are relatively

close, rail can offer a fare approaching the air fare

(although in self defense the airlines could reduce

fares), but substantial penetration of the automobile sector, or generation of new travel, will take

place only at much lower fares. It maybe unwise

for rail planners to expect the overall rail fare to

be higher than it is now; it may have to be lower

to generate the required level of travel and, in

some cases, to realize the maximum cost to

revenue ratio.

Methods of Evaluating Future Demand

Demand for travel by any mode (including rail)

can be forecast in either of two ways:

1. by predicting directly the future of the mode

in question, taking into account its relationship with other modes; or

2. by first predicting the future level of all intercity travel and then determining the share

likely to fall to the mode in question.

Regardless of the approach taken, the task of

trying to forecast the demand for a particular

mode, or even travel in general, is a difficult one.

The process by which the public chooses between

competing modes for any particular trip is complex, and changes in the price, speed, or frequency

of one or more modes may alter their relative attractiveness. Computer models have been used to

develop forecasts of travel demand. However, for

prediction of intercity demand for high-speed rail,

such models have been adversely affected by the

paucity of good data on automobile travel. For

most U.S. corridors, the rail demand data are

available only for the currently limited train service. The present service is offered at speeds lower

than those envisioned for high-speed service.

Thus, models may have limitations in predicting

ridership, which is clearly critical to predicting accurately the economic potential of a proposed rail

system.

High-speed rail is an intercity mass transit mode

requiring high frequencies to be attractive. Table

10 is a matrix of frequency, train size, and capacity showing one possible calculation of annual ridership. In table 10 an average load factor of 60

percent has been assumed for rail, which is above

the present Shinkansen level of 53 percent, and

probably is as high as can be expected even under

favorable circumstances in the United States. The

load factor used in the table is translated into

ridership on the assumption that the average trip
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 39

Table 10.—60 Percent of Maximum Round-Trip

Capacitya (In millions per year)

Size of train Frequency

Cars Seats Hourly 30 min. 10 min.

3 200 3 5 16

7 7 13 40

14 1,000 13 26 79

aA~~u~~~ average trip length IS one-half route length. A=urnes ~~ice for 16

hours per day.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

is about half the length of the route, which is

roughly equal to the travel distance for the upgraded NEC and not quite as high as Shinkansen

experience.

Cost Analysis of High-Speed Rail

Basically, there are two categories of costs:

●

●

capital costs (the costs of assembling and constructing the infrastructure), and

operating costs (the costs of running the system once it has been constructed): -

Capital Investment Costs

Capital costs for new high-speed railways comprises several elements:

● Land acquisition. —Land acquisition cost

generally is lower in rural and desert areas

than in urbanized areas.

● Terrain.—On relatively flat, unobstructed

terrain, a new line can be built without major excavation, or viaduct and tunnel construction. In such circumstances, costs will

be lowest, although still substantially more

than using existing right-of-way.

On the other hand, it is very expensive to

construct embankments and to cut through

hillsides to make acceptable gradients, and

even more expensive where long viaducts

and tunnels are needed. The costs for this

work will increase with the maximum speed

planned. As speed increases, the acceptable

curve radius will increase. This, in turn, increases the need to cut through the natural

features of the terrain rather than avoiding

them.

●

●

●

Also, environmental

a substantial effect on

problems may have

construction cost—

if, for example, tunneling is needed to avoid

exposure in sensitive areas, or if diversion is

needed to avoid residential areas or areas of

natural beauty.

Urban areas. —Construction in urban areas

would be difficult without powers of eminent

domain. In addition to the cost of land required for the right-of-way, it may be necessary to purchase land and buildings likely

to be affected environmentally. Road crossings are a major cost item, and the track may

have to be sunk below ground level for environmental reasons.

New construction in urban areas therefore

generally will be the most expensive and difficult to achieve.

Buildings and facilities. —Using existing facilities avoids capital costs for stations, parking, and service facilities. For new construction, the very substantial costs of these items

are inevitable, and, in addition, operating

costs may be higher because sharing with

other operations on routes will not be possible. Where the new route becomes part of

an existing network, much of the cost of new

buildings and facilities can be avoided.

Use of existing track.—Where an existing

railway route is available and suitable for

high-speed rail, construction costs will be

minimized by using it. However, major realinement of tracks to improve speed can be

very expensive and may approach the cost

of new construction.

Thus, the options for high-speed railway are,

in ascending cost order:

25-413 0 - 84 - 7
40 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

1.

2.

3.

4.

use existing right-of-way where suitable,

with minimum upgrading (BR—$21⁄2 million

per mile);*

use existing right-of-way with major upgrading (NEC—$4.5 million to $6 million per

mile);

construct new right-of-way for inexpensive

sectors (SNCF—$4 million per mile);

construct completely new right-of-way

(JNR–$20 million to $40 million per mile).2

Operating Costs

Operating costs can vary considerably depending on track, equipment technology options, and

operating conditions in a given corridor, including

service frequencies and equipment utilization.

Higher levels of service frequency and equipment

use should result in lower unit operating costs.

For the purposes of simplicity, there are three

basic operating cost components: “over the road”

operating costs, maintenance of equipment, and

maintenance of track. The discussion of these

costs that follows is based on steel-wheel on steel

rail technology. Magnetic levitation (maglev) is

not a technology with a history of revenue service operation. However, manufacturers have suggested that track and equipment maintenance

costs promise to be lower for maglev because of

friction-free operation and reduction in the number of moving parts.

Equipment maintenance costs naturally are dependent on the type of equipment operated. Electric-powered trains have inherently lower maintenance costs than diesel units. Within a given

category of propulsion, operating costs will differ somewhat according to the basic equipment

design and construction. Tilt-body equipment, for

example, would require more maintenance than

nontilting equipment. Equipment utilization depends on the number of train sets required to provide service, the length of the corridor, the schedule, and the required maintenance cycle. Labor

agreements and productivity levels also will affect equipment maintenance costs.

*British Rail data extrapolated for U.S. track conditions for a

Michigan corridor. Cost per mile will vary with the corridor.

2

JNR costs are likely to be the maximum due to rugged terrain

and congested city areas encountered in building its lines. Elsewhere

costs could be cheaper.

A number of variables similarly influence track

maintenance costs. These variables include equipment weight, ride characteristics, springs, and

wheel profiles. Another important variable is

track technology and the relation between it and

the vehicles to be operated. Elements of track design include the use of cross ties or slab track construction. The design and formulation of the rail

itself is another influence. The most successful

systems have designed the track and trains as a

unified system. Both the French and British highspeed trains have been designed to run at much

higher top speeds than the trains they replaced

without adding to the level of track wear. Specific

corridor conditions also have an effect on railbed

maintenance costs. These include climate, type of

subgrade material, and the nature of the alinement

selected (e.g., number and extent of curves).

Track maintenance costs also depend on vehicle weight and on unsuspended mass. Heavier

trains place greater stress on the track structure.

Consequently, maintenance requirements are

greater. Variation in equipment design is the principle component of vehicle weight. If higher

speeds are to be achieved with locomotive hauled

trains, lighter axle loading is necessary. Some

high-speed rail systems have managed successfully

to reduce track maintenance costs by locating several power units within each train for more uniform, lower axle loadings. Trains also have been

designed so that adjacent cars share a single set

of axles. Maintenance-of-way costs also depend

somewhat on the type of motive power used. In

U.S. experience, electric trains generally weigh less

than diesel-powered trains and, therefore, require

less track maintenance. However, there are design

differences. For example, French trains have been

designed specifically with low axle loadings in

mind and weigh less than the Shinkansen trains.

Direct operating costs associated with actual

“over-the-road” operations such as energy, depend on several variables noted earlier; namely,

type of propulsion and equipment design, operating speeds, and the specific corridor alinement.

Lightweight trains offer lower energy consumption rates. Corridors with low gradients and few

curves similarly offer the optimum conditions for
Ch. 3—Factors Affecting the Economic Feasibility of High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems ● 41

low energy costs. Perhaps the most important (hourly v. mileage rates), and the need to change

component of “over-the-road” costs is that crews.3

associated with labor. Here, costs will depend on 31nformation on operating costs was provided by Gordon Peters, such factors as the number of workers required Chief, Rail Marketing, New York State Department of Transporto operate a given train, the basis and rates of pay tation.
Chapter 4

SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Social Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Sentiment Favoring Modem Rail Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Energy Savings Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased Mobility and Transport Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alleviating Airport Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Promotion of Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regional Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passenger Safety and Comfort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Environmental Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Amtrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Railroad Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Local Governments . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sources offending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Money... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

46

46

46

46

48

48

48

49

51

52

52

52

52

53

53

53

54
Chapter 4

SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Considerations other than economic efficien- ence decisions on potential high-speed rail corricy also must be taken into account in a decision dors in the United States. Following is a brief sumto construct high-speed rail. This chapter discusses mary of the main points made in this chapter.

the social and institutional factors likely to influSUMMARY

Given the uncertainties surrounding the ability of high-speed passenger rail to pay for itself

from operating revenues, its introduction into any

U.S. corridors probably will hinge on whether the

projected public long-term benefits are sufficient

to justify governmental support. Short-term benefits, such as employment during construction,

typically will accrue to developers and will occur irrespective of ridership levels achieved by the

system.

The public benefits often cited for high-speed

rail service include: increased mobility, reduced

highway and airport ground congestion, energy

efficiency and security, and economic development and employment. In addition to these explicit reasons, national pride and a desire for continued and updated rail service also are reasons

that appear to influence public opinion in favor

of high-speed services. “If other countries can provide such service successfully, then why can’t the

United States?” is a question frequently raised.

However, as indicated elsewhere in this report,

foreign high-speed rail systems typically were implemented in densely populated corridors, and,

in France and Japan, along corridors where existing capacity had been reached.

Costs to be considered are not solely economic

in character but include environmental concerns,

adverse effects on competing modes and services,

and questions of regional equity.

Some benefits cited can be quantified. Others

are a matter of subjective judgment. Some costs,

particularly those associated with economic efficiency of the system can be projected, while others

are more difficult to quantify. Some claimed benefits, such as energy efficiency and reduction in

highway and airport congestion, when taken individually appear marginal. However, when all

benefits, tangible and intangible, are taken into

account, a given region or locality may well wish

to implement a high-speed system—be it rail or

magnetic levitation (maglev). With the exception

of improved mobility, all factors cited as longterm benefits for a high-speed system will be contingent on the actual ridership a system attracts.

Short-term benefits, such as employment during

construction, typically will accrue to developers

and will occur irrespective of ridership levels

achieved by the system.

The social costs of introducing high-speed rail

service may be high. If the venture cannot pay

for itself, continual subsidies in addition to high

capital costs may be required. If a system is to

be federally subsidized, political disputes may well

occur over which State should host it, and at issue

would be the appropriate criteria for selection of

a site.

The need to work out some sort of joint use

or lease/purchase agreement with existing private

railroads is a prerequisite to the implementation

of any high-speed rail project using existing track.

Because of the high construction costs for an entirely new right-of-way, it could be very advantageous, where possible, to use existing rights-ofway. With the exception of the Northeast Corridor (NEC) and several isolated segments elsewhere, however, all railroad rights-of-way are

privately owned.

The National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) has statutory authority to provide intercity

passenger rail service in the United States. Therefore, licensing agreements must be reached before

45
46 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

any private company can begin intercity rail service over Amtrak routes. Amtrak has indicated that

it does not view high-speed service as a substitute

for its own passenger service. Thus, Amtrak intends to continue operating in corridors where

high-speed service could exist and expects to be

reimbursed for any operating losses attributable

to competition lost to the high-speed rail service.

However, some questions have been raised regarding Amtrak’s statutory authority and the apSOCIAL

Public Sentiment Favoring

Modern Rail Services

Polls reveal that a majority of Americans wish

to preserve rail service as a transportation option,

even when subsidy is required.1 Some advocates

of high-speed rail in this country regard it as a

matter of national pride. “If other industrialized

nations can afford to have high-speed rail travel,

why can’t the United States?” they ask. Those who

believe that our country’s status as the technological world leader should be preserved and

promoted may well support the introduction of

high-speed rail. Others question whether implementation of rail, considered by many as a mature

technology, is advisable.

Energy Savings Considerations

The energy crisis that emerged in 1973 triggered

many efforts to curb the Nation’s use of petroleum

resources and to lessen dependence on foreign oil.

Among the alternatives examined was upgrading

intercity rail service to higher speeds so that, as

fuel prices continued to increase, travelers increasingly would turn to rail and reduce less fuelefficient automobile travel.

As required by section 1003 of the Rail Passenger Service Act, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and Amtrak made estimates of

the degree to which ridership might increase if fuel

prices increased significantly and train service

ILouis Harris & Associates, “The Continuing Mandate to Improve

Intercity Rail Passenger Travel,” summary, for Amtrak, 1978.

placability of licensing in those corridors where

Amtrak service is not presently provided.

If high-speed intercity service is provided in the

United States, existing equipment specifications

and track standards will require revision to incorporate speed, weight, and design modifications. Questions concerning shared v. dedicated

rights-of-way will have to be resolved.

FACTORS

were improved substantially. Although projections indicated that ridership would increase under

these circumstances, DOT’s overall conclusion

was that “energy impacts of rail corridor development are at best insignificant .“2 Although Amtrak

believed the energy savings would be much higher

than DOT estimated, it agreed that any energy

savings were an incidental benefit of corridor service and could not serve as the sole or major justification for upgrading service.3

Any significant energy savings are likely to occur only if substantial displacement of automobile

use occurs which means current U.S. transportation patterns would have to change.

Increased Mobility and Transport

Alternatives

Increased mobility and improved transport system capacity are important reasons for implementing high-speed rail, particularly in regions

of the country experiencing population growth.

As discussed in other chapters, high ridership

levels are made possible by the capacities typically

offered by high-speed trains with frequent service.

For example, the original Tokyo-Osaka line attracted 85 million riders in 1970. The total line,

extending from Tokyo to Hakata attracted a high

ridership in 1975 of 157 million passengers.

‘Federal Railroad Administration and National Rahad Passengw

Corp., Rail Passenger Com”dom, Final Evaluation (Washington,

D. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, April 1981), transmittal letter to The Hon. George Bush, President of the Senate, from

Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation.

31bid.
Ch. 4—Social and Institutional Factors ● 4 7

In the United States the market for intercity passenger rail has been eroded by the introduction

and extensive use of air and automobile technologies. If rail is to attract the ridership necessary

to sustain at least operating costs at the very

minimum, it must compete with other transport

modes in the private sectors. Some would argue

that the loss of ridership and the potential service

losses of these other modes, were high-speed rail

to be successful, should be considered a public

cost, particularly if the new rail service receives

Government support. Others argue that other

modes are already subsidized, and rail deserves

parity in treatment. While rail proponents strongly disagree with the report, a recent analysis by

the Congressional Budget Office indicates that for

1978, “the federal government spent $2.50 for each

dollar collected in fares or state and local subsidies

for passenger rail service. By comparison, for each

$1.00 that motorists or air travelers spent, the federal government spent 0.2 cents and 5.o cents, respectively. ”4

Crucial to evaluating increased mobility are answers to questions related to: What are near- and

long-term transport systems capacities and needs

for a given region? What are the likely tradeoffs

among transport options? Are conditions on a

corridor such that people would use the rail system if implemented?

Recently, high-speed rail has been proposed in

corridors where current heavy use is straining capacity of intercity highways, where long-term additional capacity needs are foreseen, and where

the building of additional highways runs up

against land-use or availability constraints. The

extent to which high-speed rail could be expected

to alleviate highway congestion depends on the

following factors:

. the degree to which the congestion is or will

remain unsolvable by other means,

. the degree to which automobile drivers will

choose to ride the train to avoid the highway,

. the degree to which there is room to install

high-speed rail, and

4“Federal Subsidies for Rail Passenger Service: An Assessment of

Amtrak” (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget

Office, July 1982), p. 13.

. the degree to which it may provide service

to potentially offset long-term capacity needs

for a region.

To evaluate these factors, current traffic patterns and future alternatives must be understood

first. Studies indicate that congestion on the Interstate Highway Systems results more from commuter traffic than from intercity travel. Therefore,

the issue is whether commuters making relatively short daily trips could be induced to use highspeed rail for commuting, whether the corridor

service is convenient for other urban area trips

and whether high-speed trains are the appropriate technology for such a service. Current U.S.

intercity rail service typically is not designed as

a commuter or transit system. Studies and experiments by transit agencies trying to woo commuters show that most people will discontinue using

their automobile only under severe parking restriations. s Some rail proponents now suggest that

the trend toward longer term ownership and use

of older vehicles may begin to alter people’s

choices for intercity travel modes.

To evaluate the impact of high-speed rail on

long-term capacity and congestion problems, answers are required to the following questions:

What is the projected population growth of the

area? What regional plans exist for development

of the area, and to what extent are the long-term

transportation options being evaluated? What factors are likely to shift that would encourage eventual diversion to any proposed rail system?

Other questions regarding tradeoffs between

highway and rail include: How many drivers use

the highway to make the full intercity trip? Would

drivers be willing to pay more to arrive at their

destination quicker (recognizing that, if so, they

might prefer taking the plane)? Would the station location and transit service availability at

their destination affect their decision? Is highspeed rail an appropriate application of technology to alleviate commuter or urban congestion?

50ECD Road Research Group, Road Research, Transpoti Choices

for Urban Passenger (Measures and M~eM (paris: organisation

for Economic Cooperation and Development, September 1980).
48 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Alleviating Airport Congestion

High-speed rail also has been proposed for corridors where heavy demand is straining airport

ground capacity. The extent to which high-speed

rail would alleviate this type of airport congestion

●

●

●

In

depends on several factors: - —

the degree to which the high-speed rail route

matches the destinations of air travelers,

the degree to which the congestion is unsolvable by other means, and

the degree to which air travelers can be induced to select the train over the airplane.

the early 1970’s, a major argument for highspeed rail in- the NEC was that-New York City

could avoid building a fourth airport, which at

the time appeared inevitable. Yet today, even

though the NEC still does not permit high-speed

rail service of the sort then contemplated, New

York City is no longer seeking to build a fourth

airport. The prognosis changed because: 1) New

York’s forecasted growth in air travel did not materialize, 2) larger planes and more efficient air

traffic control systems allowed the existing airports to handle more traffic without building new

facilities, and 3) the problems of finding a suitable

airport site proved more difficult than planners

imagined.

With the exception of the NEC and southern

California, it does not appear that high-speed rail

service would have an appreciable effect on airport ground congestion. The travel patterns for

other large hub airports that now have, or are

soon expected to have, severe congestion (e.g.,

Chicago’s O’Hare, Atlanta’s Hartsfield, and Denver’s Stapleton) are not such that high-speed rail

would be an appropriate substitute for air. These

airports are served by a hub-and-spoke pattern

of air routes, and much of the congestion results

from passengers transferring between flights.

High-speed rail, which works best when there is

a high volume of origin-destination traffic along

a corridor, would not compete effectively in most

hub-and-spoke markets.6 If an airport is to also

serve as a high-speed rail station, frequency of

service from the airport must be a major consideration.

‘Airport and Air Traffic Control System (Washington, D. C.: U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-175, January

1982).

Promotion of Tourism

Regions of the country where tourism is vital

to the economy are looking at high-speed rail for

two

1.

2.

reasons:

to maintain access for tourists should other

forms of transportation become constrained,

and

to increase tourist travel by building a highspeed rail system so technologically advanced that the rail trip itself will serve as

an attraction and inducement.

Whether high-speed rail itself can lure additional tourists to a given location is uncertain.

Estimating the degree to which technology may

induce demand is difficult since it is not always

possible to predict with certainty the desires of

tourists. Understanding how and why tourists currently come to the location in question, together

with surveys to determine the likelihood of their

using high-speed rail or other advanced ground

technologies, would contribute to the analysis.

Typically, tourists prefer to travel by car because

they wish to visit widely scattered sights, and,

families frequently travel with much luggage. The

auto provides flexibility not offered by public

modes of transportation.

Regional Development

High-speed rail systems also are being proposed

on the grounds that they would stimulate economic development and employment in a region, generating new development along the route as did

the Erie Canal and the railroads in the l9th century. Historically, regional development has followed new transportation development because

transportation provided a new, more efficient

means of reaching an area. Questions concerning high-speed rail include whether it meets a need

that is not already being met and whether this

need is significant enough to bring about the sort

of economic development contemplated by proposers. At best, quantification of regional impact

in terms of employment or development will be

difficult. However, proponent’s consider such development a strong reason for implementing highspeed rail systems. While economic development

might occur, tradeoffs such as high-speed rail

competition with air, automobile, and bus for pas-
Ch. 4—Social and Institutional Factors ● 4 9

sengers must also be examined. The regional benefits of economic development around a corridor

must be analyzed against the possibility that the

region or Nation eventually may have to support

operating losses if the rail system does not prove

profitable or if ridership levels projected do not

materialize.

Passenger Safety and Comfort

If high-speed rail or maglev were to be introduced in the United States, certain existing regulations regarding passenger safety and comfort

would need review, and certification of new technologies would be necessary. The following is a

brief discussion of the regulatory questions which

would need to be addressed.

Speed Limits

Currently the only high-speed trains (120 mph

or more) in the United States, operate on sections

of the NEC. Elsewhere, speed limits are generally 79 mph; speeds of 90 mph are permitted on

small sections of track, and New York State now

has trains operating at 110 mph on portions of

its rail network. On many lines, lower speeds

often are in effect because of track conditions or

traffic mix. Limitations on speed usually are set

for safety reasons. Restrictions on speed of passenger trains through curves is also based on

passenger comfort, although the trains themselves

could negotiate the curves safely at higher speeds.

Speed limitations that would affect implementation of high-speed rail cover such items as track

conditions, signaling requirements, and maximum

speed through curves.

Track Conditions. —Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) track safety standards specify that

the maximum allowable operating speed for passenger trains is 110 mph on Class 6 track, * and

lower speed must be observed on track of lower categories. Both French National Railways

(SNCF) and British Railways (BR) have trains designed to run safely at much higher speeds on

track designed originally for 100-mph operation.

● Class 6 track is defined as “a track that meets all of the requirements prescribed in Part 213 (Track Safety Standards, Code of

Federal Regulations, 49 Transportation), with a maximum allowable

operating speed for passenger trains of 110 mph. ”

France’s TGV has a technical design speed approaching 200 mph, and BR says that its highspeed trains and advanced passenger trains could

operate safely at 150 mph. Japan can operate its

equipment at 160 mph. In any case, the U.S. signaling requirements change according to the maximum speeds permitted.

Signaling Requirements. -FRA’s existing signaling requirements limit train speed to 79 mph

unless signals are displayed in the engineman’s cab

or intermittent inductive train stop equipment is

in use. Some experts believe that above 125 mph,

fully automatic train control should be part of the

signaling system. Fully automatic control causes

problems where high-speed passenger, commuter,

and freight trains of widely different braking characteristics use the same tracks. BR and SNCF have

increased the train speed for a given signal spacing by using more sophisticated braking systems,

which can reduce the distance required to stop the

train. New York State has petitioned FRA to review its signaling requirements for purposes of

upgrading speeds to 90 or 95 mph on certain track

segments. This matter is pending, although an

earlier request for complete review of cab signaling requirements was denied.

Maximum Speed Through Curves. -Speed limits through curves depend on the radius of curvature and the superelevation of the outer rail.

When a train negotiates a curve, centrifugal force

causes more of the total weight to be transferred

onto the outer rail, and passengers are pulled

toward the side of the seat nearer the outside of

the curve. Thus, speed through curves is determined by the need to avoid or mitigate the following:

●

●

●

●

outward weight shifts that could cause the

vehicles overturn;

overload on the outer rail so that it is displaced, and the train derails;

discomfort to the passengers from excessive

centrifugal forces; and

maintenance costs caused by these forces on

the rail.

The lateral component of centrifugal force can

be reduced by banking the track (superelevation).

Very high superelevation (as on auto racetracks)

would permit much higher speeds for passenger
50 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

trains; however, if the track is also used for heavy,

slow-moving freight trains, the weight of the train

on the inner rail would be excessive and rapid

wear and damage would result. Thus, superelevation in the United States is limited by Federal

regulation to 6 inches. *

Safety and Strength Requirements

of Passenger Equipment

Concerned about the possibility of collisions

among dissimilar types of equipment, U.S. practice is to prescribe vehicle strengths for passenger

equipment that are higher than those in Europe.

As a result, U.S. passenger railcars are far heavier.

Power requirements to move these heavier vehicles are correspondingly greater as is wear on the

track. European rail practice suggests that the U.S.

specifications used for railcar equipment strength

may, in fact, be counterproductive in a collision.

Data to support the European experience were not

analyzed for this report. However, such practices

as well as energy savings from lighter weight

equipment might well be investigated for possible adoption in the United States. Questions of

shared v. dedicated rights-of-way no doubt would

be raised in the context of this issue assuming that

heavier freight equipment would be operated on

the same line with the new, lighter weight designs

in passenger equipment.

Safety Issues at the Highway/Rail Interface

(Grade Crossings) —

For safety reasons, any proposed high-speed

system should avoid crossing highways at grade

level. Grade crossing fatalities, though declining,

represent the highest fatality category for rail in

the United States.7 (In Europe, however, French

and British trains traveling at 100 to 125 mph routinely cross highways at grade with gates, warning sounds, and closed circuit television. ) New

York State has some nongrade separated rail

crossings with special sensors for warning automobile traffic of approaching trains. Location of

the grade crossing and type of equipment may dictate optimum grade crossing systems for highspeed rails. Rail grade crossings may represent a

significant public concern in any implementation

plan for a high-speed system, according to State

transportation officials.

Safety Certification of High-Speed Rail

Technology for Operational Use

For the most part, high-speed rail technology

consists of tried and tested “off-the-shelf” technology. Two exceptions, which require separate

consideration, are tilt-body equipment and

maglev.

Tilt-body equipment, in varying degrees, is an

important feature of the British, Canadian, Swiss,

Italian, and Swedish efforts to develop high-speed

rail systems. The tilt-body is intended to enable

trains to travel faster through curves without

sacrificing passenger comfort. The car “tilts” to

counteract centrifugal force and maintain passenger comfort while the train traverses curves at

high-speeds. Not all tilt-body equipment has been

tested on an operational basis. At present none

of the tilt-body developments is free from technical problems. There have yet to be satisfactory

commercial ventures due to high maintenance

costs. Use in this country-if operational and economic feasibility is proved-will depend on relax7An Evaluation of RaiZroad Stiety (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-T-61, May 1978).
Ch. 4—Social and Institutional Factors ● 5 1

ation of the 3-inch unbalance rule and standards

set for equipment reliability, safety, and comfort.

Maglev for high-speed operation is so new that

it has yet to be proved to be an operational largescale people mover for revenue service. Developers and prospective buyers are beginning to raise

questions about which U.S. Government institutions should certify the systems and when they

should be certified.

As indicated in previous chapters, maglev systems are being developed in West Germany and

Japan. Because of differences in the technology,

the West German system is further along in development than the Japanese. Tests of the West

German system are scheduled to begin in 1983 at

the West German Emsland Test Facility in Lower

Saxony. At the earliest, results are projected to

be available in late 1985. However, in light of

ongoing. development efforts in both countries it

may be prudent for U.S. transportation agencies

to remain as informed as possible about the technology status.

Environmental Concerns

Land Use: Assembling Rights-of-Way

For purposes of this report, high-speed rail has

been defined as trains that travel at 125 mph or

greater. While it is possible (by substantially limiting freight travel), to mix freight with passenger

trains traveling at this rate of speed, high-speed

rail is often likely to involve separate dedicated

tracks, if not dedicated rights-of-way. Freight traffic aside, high-speed rail could be instituted on

existing U.S. rights-of-way, although most corridors would require modification including upgrading of track, elimination of existing curves,

and signaling improvements. Reaction of public

and private groups to proposals to do so will depend on the impacts, benefits, and costs of the

changes that have to be made. Land-use issues

would be subject to negotiation.

Proposals calling for the construction of entirely

new rights-of-way, or for any transportation alternative, will require public agreement on land-use

questions. The degree to which local governments, institutions, environmentalists, individuals, or other citizen groups will support the implementation of high-speed rail probably will be

influenced by projections of demand for the service, by the amount of urban land and areas of natural beauty through which the line must travel,

and by the perceived need to reduce congestion

elsewhere. These basic concerns will not differ

among most transportation alternatives studied.

The French avoided high capital costs and environmental opposition in building the TGV by

using the existing line into and out of Paris. The

population density of Western Europe indicates

that the problems of building a new rail line between Paris-Lyon were made much easier by the

relatively low density of population between the

cities. In England, and elsewhere in Europe,

choosing an acceptable alinement would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. In the United

States, the NEC and portions of Los Angeles are

as densely populated as much of England; Ohio

and Florida are more similar to France (but without any cities on the Paris scale of population);

Nevada has a far lower populaton density than

anywhere in Europe.

In sum, assembly of urban land parcels in a line

sufficiently straight to permit genuine high-speed

rail service is a legally complicated and costly

undertaking. The irony of the land-use issue is that

high-speed rail promises to be most successful in

corridors where there are many people to ride it,

yet these very same densities make the establishment of new high-speed rail lines exceedingly difficult and costly.

Noise, Vibration, and Visual Barriers

Japan’s bullet train, in operation nearly 20

years, initially produced severe noise and vibration due to the materials used in track construction. These problems have been mitigated for the

most part by cushioning tracks on viaducts and

erecting sound proof barriers along the right of

way. The extent to which such problems exist and

the measures necessary to satisfy residents of large

urban areas through which the train would go

probably depend on the type of high-speed rail

system in question and the measures taken to

overcome any problems. The noise generated by
52 ● U.S. passenger Rail Technologies

various rail systems tends to differ slightly due

to the way it is measured.8

Any train traveling at high speed will induce

vibrations, particularly on viaducts and bridges.

‘Current noise measurements for selected systems indicate the

following:

● Amtrak AEM7 locomotives @ 108 mph —89dB @ 100 ft from

track,

• TGV @ 160 mph—95 dB @ 82 ft from track, and

● Japanese National Railways (JNR) (on embankment) @ 130

mph—85 dB @ 62 ft from track.

Amtrak Specification #NL 77-8, IPEEP Report on SNCF, JNR

Staff.

Maglev systems are theoretically quieter than

high-speed rail. Noise levels of the West German

maglev will be tested at Emsland.

In addition to noise, visual effects of viaducts

and elevated track may also raise environmental

concern and affect route designation. However,

any transportation alternative is going to raise environmental questions, and the strength of specific

environmental objections cannot be known without analysis on a corridor-specific basis.

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Amtrak

Amtrak currently has statutory authority to

provide intercity passenger rail service in the

United States.9 Although some questions exist

about whether such authority extends only to

routes over which Amtrak trains now operate or

to any proposed route, implementation of highspeed passenger rail today cannot be accomplished without prior agreement with Amtrak.1

°

If Amtrak is not the operator of the proposed

high-speed system, a number of institutional questions must be addressed. Will high-speed service

conflict with any Amtrak trains? How would a

competing system affect Amtrak’s finances?

Would the existence of profitable high-speed rail

service in the United States put pressure on Amtrak to provide high-speed rail service in the corridors it serves, and what would the effect be?

Private Railroad Companies

A second institutional consideration is that

most railroad track in America is owned by private railroads. Introducing high-speed rail in most

corridors, therefore, would require some sort of

lease/purchase agreement with existing owners.

If the high-speed system requires a dedicated

track, acquisition of an existing right-of-way may

hinge on whether there is a practical alternative

route to handle the freight now being carried on

“Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.

loJohn D. Heffner, “The Legal Obstacles for Initiating InterCity

Rail Passenger Service Outside Amtrak,” paper, Apr. 28, 1983.

the line. Competitive reasons may also severely

limit the degree to which private railroads would

share their freight lines. It is possible, however,

to work out some agreements. In some cases,

lightly used or abandoned lines for the high-speed

rail rights-of-way may provide an alternative to

be explored. New York State, as an example, upgraded lightly used Conrail line from Class 4* to

Class 6 at a cost of about $200,000 a mile.11

Local Governments

Where construction of a high-speed rail system

can be shown to attract enough ridership, sitespecific concerns will have to be taken into account by local governments as well as developers.

For example, to make best use of their high-speed,

trains should not make frequent stops. Local governments may base decisions to compete for a stop

on whether the system is expected to be self-sufficient, whether demands will be made on them

to improve the station surroundings, and on

whether local development may occur as a result

of a station. For example, parking lots large

enough to permit riders to “park and ride” may

be required before owners will agree to an intermediate stop. By the same token, if the system

draws many riders, local governments and private

entrepreneurs may wish to develop the area

around the station.

*Class 4 track limits passenger and freight train speeds to 80 and

60 mph respectively.

llI~omation provided by Gordon Peters, New York State

Department of Transportation.
.——.

Ch. 4—Social and Institutional Factors ● 5 3

In most instances in which high-speed rail may both systems. If local transit systems are inadebe contemplated, local transit is assumed neces- quate, the potential of high-speed rail proposals

sary to feed riders into the intercity service, as may be reduced. Or, if demand for the high-speed

illustrated in many European and Japanese cities. intercity service is strong enough, there could be

Proponents of the high-speed rail system in ques- pressures on the city and the Federal Government

tion may locate stations to maximize ridership for to strengthen the local transit systems.

SOURCES OF FUNDING

Reaction to high-speed rail proposals also will

depend on the sources of funding. Broadly speaking, there are four funding possibilities:

● Federal support,

● State support,

● private support, and

● a combination of private and public support

(State or Federal).

Federal Support

Potential use of Federal money may range from

direct subsidy to land grants or loan guarantees.

Federal support of any kind raises a number of

issues. Is the proposed system cost effective? If

not, does use of Federal funds for high-speed rail

fit into national priorities? Are there alternative

options for service that will cost the public less?

If Federal support is used for high-speed rail, how

will that affect the financial situation of other

modes and Amtrak?

Another issue likely to arise is the fairness of

using Federal money to establish high-speed rail

service in one or two locations or corridors and

not on a broad national basis. Whether a consensus can be reached on such an issue probably will

depend on how much Federal money is involved,

and whether only an initial expense or a sustained

subsidy is required. Also relevant is the willingness of a region in which the rail service is being

contemplated to invest its own resources to ensure success, and the political support from the

given region.

Federal money also could precipitate opposition by groups that stand to lose from the use of

high-speed rail. Among these are proponents of

traditional train service and competitors of highspeed rail. Not all rail advocates are proponents

of high-speed rail. Some feel that the establishment of high-speed rail could lead to the decline

of Amtrak and existing long-distance rail service.

There is also a belief that if Federal investment

were to occur, the logical next step is upgrading

existing service. If Federal money is used, however, some worry that Amtrak’s budget for existing service will be cut in proportion to Federal

money spent on high-speed service or that, at the

least, attention will be diverted from the broader

question of national rail service.

Opposition to the use of Federal funds for highspeed rail is also likely to come from bus companies and airlines offering competing service. The

bus companies have testified repeatedly in Amtrak hearings that they regard the subsidization

of train service with Federal money to be anticompetitive and unfair. The airlines may feel likewise. On the other hand, Amtrak previously has

argued that other transportation modes are subsidized, through infrastructure programs and the

like. As previously indicated, recent Congressional Budget Office analysis show passenger rail receives greater subsidies than other intercity travel

modes.

In short, the use of Federal money for highspeed rail raises three questions: 1) is the money

being spent to best ensure an efficient national

transportation system, 2) who should benefit from

a corridor development if it is to be federally

funded, and 3) is it in the long-term interests of

the country to develop a high-speed rail irrespective of the short-term costs and possible subsidy?

State Support

Use of State money raises issues similar to that

of Federal money but on a State level. If the prop-
54 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

osition is not expected to pay for itself, one can

certainly expect outcry from others competing for

State funds.

Private Money

Use of private money presupposes that the highspeed rail venture is expected to be self-sufficient

and operated for the benefit of investors in the

project. If money for such a venture is to be raised

in the private capital markets, the borrowing company will have to be a creditworthy. Even if the

equity is financed by venture capitalists, there typically will be substantial amounts of debt which

would be raised publicly or in private placements.

In either situation, the creditworthiness of the

company will be evaluated. Underwriters will

have to certify that the prospectus is not unrealistic or misleading.

However a new venture is financed, any private

group interested in providing high-speed rail service along routes Amtrak now operates must obtain a license from Amtrak. Amtrak has indicated

that it is willing to grant a license only if the

private group is willing to reimburse Amtrak for

reduced passenger revenues attributable to competition from the new high-speed rail system.12

Amtrak currently loses money on most of its

routes. Its short-term avoidable costs are likely

to increase with further loss of riders (unless service levels are decreased substantially or the route

is dropped from Amtrak’s route system).

IZOTA inte~iew with W. Graham Claytor, Jr., President of Amtrack, Feb. 10, 1983.
Chapter 5

U.S. PASSENGER RAIL HISTORY AND

CURRENT CORRIDOR ACTIVITY
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recent History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. High-Speed Rail Proposals. . . . . . . . . . .

California: Los Angeles to San Diego . . . .

California and Nevada: Las Vegas to Los

Florida: Tampa to Orlando to Miami. . . .

Michigan: Chicago to Detroit. . . . . . . . . . .

Midwest High-Speed Rail Compact . . . . . .

New York: Montreal to New York City .

Northeast Corridor. . .

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pennsylvania . . . . . . . .

Wisconsin: Chicago to

Texas . . . . . . . . .

Other Corridor

Table

Table No.

Plans

11. Corridor Fact Sheet .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Milwaukee . . . . . .

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Angeles

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Rail Corridors Under Consideration by State and Local Governments

and Private Sector Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

g. Los Angeles-San Diego Proposed Route . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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57

60

61

61

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65

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Page

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Page

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Chapter 5

U.S. PASSENGER RAIL HISTORY AND

CURRENT CORRIDOR ACTIVITY

SUMMARY

Interest in high-speed corridor development is

emerging at both the local and national level.

Feasibility studies of varying detail have been

undertaken for corridors in California, Nevada,

Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, Florida, and New York,

and other studies are being discussed and initiated

for Texas and Pennsylvania. Many of these studies have been conducted and funded by potential

technology suppliers and developers, both foreign

and U.S. —some with Federal and State assistance.

Various technology options—including the Japanese bullet train (Shinkansen), the French TGV

(Train a Grand Vitesse), the British HST (highspeed train), the West German and Japanese maglev (currently under development) —have been

discussed in these studies.

Reasons for new corridor development are as

diverse as the regions in which they are being proposed. For southern California, one of the most

rapidly growing areas in the country, the system

is seen as a means of alleviating the already staggering traffic congestion and the long-term demands for a fixed guideway transit infrastructure.

For the Las Vegas-Los Angeles corridor, maglev

is being proposed as the transportation system of

tomorrow, a draw for tourists who might wish

to take a new “transportation experience,” and

a potential spur to the development of Las Vegas.

For Florida, a system is seen as a backup for any

future energy crises that may threaten the State’s

tourist economy, and, as in Nevada, as a tourist

attraction. In the Midwest, a new rail system has

been advocated as a potential remedy to the economic problems of a region in transition.

Private initiatives to implement high-speed rail

are in different planning stages in California,

Florida, Michigan, New York, Vermont, Wisconsin, Ohio, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Nevada. In

addition, a Midwest High-Speed Rail Compact

made up of States interested in high-speed rail

development also has been formed. These corridor

efforts are being promoted, in part, by potential

U.S. and foreign developers, suppliers of the technology, State and local government officials, and

private companies interested in passenger rail

service (see fig. 8).

Among the reasons for high-speed rail service

advanced by various States and private parties

are improving transport capacity, relieving highway congestion, attracting tourists, spurring economic development, and serving as a backup form

of transportation in the event of future energy

crises.

The American High Speed Rail Corp. (AHSR),

a private corporation, plans to construct a highspeed rail system between Los Angeles and San

Diego. Ridership and revenue forecasts on the

project have been conducted and engineering feasibility work is being undertaken by the Japanese.

In the proposed New York and Florida corridors, preliminary technical feasibility studies are

being conducted by French, Canadian, and Japaese firms. However, results of these studies are

not available to the public. Demand and economic

analyses have not yet been conducted.

In Nevada and Wisconsin, studies conducted

by potential suppliers of maglev technology have

concluded that maglev is an appropriate, cost effective new transportation technology for the Las

Vegas-Los Angeles and Milwaukee-Chicago corridors. The city of Las Vegas is actively seeking

venture capital for the proposed Las Vegas to Los

Angeles line and an additional feasibility study

is being undertaken by the Department of Transportation as a result of recent congressional action. However, neither of the two maglev technologies currently under development in West

Germany and Japan has been tested yet for operational feasibility under conditions that reflect

revenue service. The West German system is

undergoing testing that is scheduled for completion in late 1985.

57
58 ● u.s. Passenger Rail Technologies

Figure 8.—Raii Corridors Under Consideration by State and Locai Governments and Private Sector Groups

Montreal ●

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

The Michigan Department of Transportation

has undertaken a series of studies on several Michigan corridors, examining alternatives that include

upgrading existing lines and service and introducing frequent high-speed trains. These studies concluded that development of such services could

reduce travel times, costs, and energy consumption in southern Michigan (particularly for a Chicago to Detroit line). The State sees the introduction of high-speed rail service as offering improved

mobility and economic opportunities.

A proposed high-speed system in Ohio was to

be financed by a one percent State sales tax. A

referendum on the sales tax was defeated in 1982,

although proponents believe the system is still a

possibility for the State.

Other States, including Pennsylvania and Texas, have indicated an interest in high-speed rail

corridors. Pennsylvania has established a Rail

Commission to study the prospects. Texas has

held statewide hearings. However, Texas has not

conducted engineering or economic feasibility

studies. Pennsylvania is undertaking initial study

efforts.

In addition to high-speed initiatives, a number

of corridors are being examined for upgrading

service, although not necessarily to speeds of 125

mph and above. Atlantic City-Philadelphia and

Buffalo-Albany are among these corridors. A corridor “fact sheet” describing each corridor is

shown in table 11.
Table 11 .—Corridor Fact Sheet

Estimated Proposed funding

Corridor Proposer Technology option .

capital cost institutional arrangement Studied by

Los Angeles-San Diego American High Speed Rail 130-mile system, new equipment, $3 billion (1983 $) Private/foreign investment-private rail Fluor Corp. Proj. Engineers, Japanese

Corp. (AHSR) entirely new track, partly on inflated over

existing right-of-way, Japanese construction time

technology of 1984-88

Los Angeles-Las Vegas City of Las Vegas 230-mile, totally new single guideway $1.9 billion (1982 $)

maglev system (West German or

Japanese)

Florida corridor(s): AHSR, State Rail Committee Undecided

Tampa-Orlando-Miami appointed by Governor

Montreal-New York Mayor of Montreal with New French TGV-type system

York cooperation

Northeast Corridor: Completion of upgrading anticipated for

Unknown

Unknown

1986

Washington-New York;

New York-Boston

Ohio Ohio Rail Transportation

Authority

Pennsylvania

Chicago-Milwaukee

State legislature authorized

3-year Rail Study

Commission

Cong. Henry S. Reuss;

Gov. Dreyfus;

Milwaukee County Executive

William O’Donnell;

Wisconsin Electric Power Co

Chicago-Detroit Michigan State DOT

Federal investment $2.19 billion

500-mile network, TGV-type system, $5.7 B (1978 $)

technology not chosen +2.5 B

$8.2 B

350-mile route Philadelphia-Pittsburg Unknown

79-mile system between Chicago- $1.2 billion

Milwaukee and two airports,

Maglev system

279 miles upgrading existing line/ $2.5 million per

possible new system route mile

aAdditlOnal announcements have been made regarding Interest In a possible Te~s corridor

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

operation.

Private investment: 75% domestic,

25% foreign, Industrial development

bonds/tax free authorized by State

Tax-free bonds, private funding, public

incentives (guaranteed loans, etc. )

Public/private ownership

Anticipated private funding

Unknown

Route-shared/commuter, freight

National Railways _Technology Corp.

(engineering study), A. D. Little

(market feasibility), First Boston Corp.

(financial advisors)

Budd Co. /Thyssen Henschel; Bechtel

Corp.; Transrapid International;

Transtech International

Japanese National Railways Technology

Corp. (preliminary engineering), AHSR

French manufacturers–preliminary

engineering study/Canadians

passenger service. Maximum speed:

120 mph along selected sections of the

route

1 % State sales tax was defeated in

1982 referendum–no subsequent Dalton, Dalton, Newport

action on proposal

Unknown Rail Committee authorized to spend up to

$6 million on study over 3-year period

Unknown Budd Co. /Thyssen Henschel

Public/private Transmark Worldwide Co.; General

Motors System Center; Michigan State

University

I

I
. -

60 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

RECENT HISTORY

The 1960’s witnessed two major trends in U.S.

passenger rail transportation:

● the promotion of advanced ground transport

research and development (R&D), reflected

in the passage of the High-Speed Ground

Transportation Act of 1965 (HSGTA), which

for a decade was intended to spur technology

development in the public sector; and

● the transfer of the declining passenger rail industry from the private to public domain,

culminating in 1970 with the passage of the

National Railroad Passenger Act (NRPA).

The Northeast Corridor Transportation Project,

started in 1963, foreshadowed HSGTA and eventually attempted to use some HSGTA developments to reverse declining rail ridership trends,

and to show the continued value of rail in the most

heavily populated U.S. corridor.

HSGTA came at a time when the U.S. space

program had created an atmosphere of technological optimism and a national desire to apply

scientific knowledge and expertise to domestic

problems. The act resulted in a decade of research,

development, and demonstration programs in

state-of-the-art and advanced fixed guideway

ground transportation technologies. Efforts included a wide range of research in new technologies such as tracked air cushion vehicles and magnetic levitation (maglev), demonstration of the

Metroliner cars and turbotrains on the Northeast

Corridor (NEC), and NEC ridership data-gathering efforts. At about the same time, Congress

authorized a comprehensive study of improved

trains in the NEC. Continued funding of the act

into the 1970’s led to the construction and development of the Pueblo test site in Colorado for advanced ground transport testing.

Various rail technology options were studied

for the NEC in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.

By 1971, a report was released by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) recommending improved high-speed rail service for the NEC and

calling for a definite investment plan by 1976.

Later cost overruns and project reevaluation

resulted in improved service to a maximum speed

of 120 mph on sections of the NEC, rather than

to higher speeds that had been anticipated. Also,

in 1973, DOT released a High Speed Ground

Transportation Alternatives Study which reviewed additional interurban corridors in the context of potential economic viability and technology applicability. The report recommended

continued R&D, and cautioned against any corridor implementation without thorough cost

analyses. 1 However, the Southwest Coast Corridor (SWC) of San Diego-Los Angeles ranked

second to the NEC in potential for improved rail

service.

The second change that occurred in the 1960’s

and culminated in 1970 was the evolution of passenger rail service from private operation to public

ownership. The decline in intercity rail ridership

in the 1950’s—brought on by the introduction of

the interstate highway system, the national airport system, increasing auto ownership, and a

decline of local transit services, meant growing

deficits in passenger rail services. As a result, railroads petitioned throughout the 196o’s to abandon passenger service. In 1970, Congress enacted

the NRPA creating the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) as the quasi-public operator

for intercity rail passenger services in this country.

In the mid-1970’s, Federal attention in passenger

rail transportation concentrated on establishing

and monitoring the rehabilitation of the NEC and

overseeing the newly created Amtrak. National

passenger rail policy in the years since has sought

to reconcile the conflicting objectives of reducing

operating deficits and at the same time providing

national rail transportation services. The original

Amtrak charter called for a profitmaking basis of

operation. Congress currently requires Amtrak to

maintain a national route system, to follow a prescribed formula for determining route profitability, and to meet a mandatory revenue-to-cost ratio

of better than 50 percent for the railroad by the

mid-1980’s. Amtrak’s goal is to cover all shortterm avoidable costs with revenues by 1985.

W.S. Department of Transportation, “High Speed Ground

Transportation Alternatives Study,” January 1973, pp. 1-10.
Ch. 5—U.S. Passenger Rail History and Current Corridor Activity ● 61

In 1980-81, Amtrak and DOT, in response to

section 1003 of the Rail Passenger Service Act,

undertook a study of 25 passenger rail corridors

to determine the effects of corridor upgrading on

deficit reductions. Corridors were evaluated on

the basis of ridership potential, energy savings,

and cost effectiveness—with cost effectiveness

measured as dollars of public expenditure per passenger-mile and per gallon of gasoline saved, for

both capital and operating investments.z Amtrak

did not agree that both capital and operating costs

should be used to measure cost effectiveness.

However, DOT officials maintained that the language of the legislation required such measurements. Although the study did not analyze highspeed (125 mph rail or higher), it did analyze the

potential for upgrading service to 79 and 110 mph

and increasing service frequency. The study provided a rank ordering of the corridors likely to

lose the least money with higher speeds and frequency. None of the corridors analyzed were ex2U. S. Department of Transportation and Amtrak, “Rail Passenger

Corridors, Final Evaluation,” April 1981.

Following are

to date on each

U.S. HIGH-SPEED

brief descriptions of the activities

of the U.S. corridors for which

fixed-guideway systems operating at speeds of 125

mph or above are being contemplated. This section discusses the feasibility data (ridership and

revenue forecasts) generated to date, and raises

additional questions that may be addressed by the

communities and their leaders—local, State, and

Federal—who may decide further courses of

action.

The descriptions are not exhaustive. OTA has

not undertaken independent analyses of ridership

and revenue forecasts. The purpose of the section

that follows is to review the current state of these

projects and to raise some of the questions that

bear on their feasibility. *

● Information contained in the following sections was obtained

in the first seven months of 1983. While specific Rail Plans are subject to change, the questions raised for each corridor are fundamental

to the policy discussion.

pected to show operating profits once the service

was improved, nor were they expected to pay

back the costs of improvements. However, several

corridors showed an improved financial operating

picture. Again, the Los Angeles-San Diego corridor compared favorably with the WashingtonNew York segment of the NEC on the basis of

avoidable loss per passenger-mile and a public expenditure per passenger-mile.

Today, U.S. intercity passenger rail accounts

for less than 1 percent of intercity revenue miles.

Amtrak operates approximately 240 daily trains

over 24,000 miles of track (most of which is

owned by the freight railroads) with approximately 1,600 vehicles serving 525 stations. Annual

ridership has grown from 15,800,000 in 1972 to

19 million in 1982, with ridership surges during

the energy crisis years of 1974, 1979, and 1980.3

Federal subsidy to Amtrak was $735 million in

1982.

3Responses to OTA questions from W. Graham Claytor, Jr., President, National Rail Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), Feb. 10, 1983.

RAIL PROPOSALS

California: Los

San Diego

Angeles to

(SWC)

One of the most serious proposals for highspeed rail in the United States has been made by

AHSR for the 131-mile SWC with a segment linking Los Angeles airport to downtown (see fig. 9).

Next to the NEC, the SWC historically has been

regarded as the most likely candidate for possible passenger rail improvements.’ The SWC also

has been the subject of a number of studies by

the California State Department of Transportation.

In April 1982, AHSR, a private corporation

headed by Alan Boyd, then President of Amtrak,

‘U.S. Department of Transportation, “High Speed Ground

Transportation Alternatives Study,” January 1973, pp. 1-10; U.S.

Department of Transportation and Amtrak, “Rail Passenger Corridors, Final Evaluation,” April 1981.
62 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Figure 9.—Los Angeles-San Diego Proposed Route

announced plans to construct a high-speed rail

system between Los Angeles and San Diego. The

First Boston Corp. was retained as the company’s

financial investment advisor. The Fluor Corp. has

been retained as project engineer. AHSR’s ridership and revenue forecast studies have been conducted by Arthur D. Little Co., and its engineering feasibility work is being undertaken by the

Japanese National Railroad Technology Corp., a

consulting arm of the Japanese National Railways.

AHSR has deemed the complete ridership and revenue forecasts as proprietary for investment financing reasons and has declined to make these

or the engineering cost analyses available to the

public or OTA. Information used in this discussion has been extracted from summary documents

and interviews with AHSR officials.

Initially, AHSR estimated that the overall capital cost of the system would be $2 billion. More

recent estimates add $1.1 billion for inflation provisions, plus interest during construction, for a

total cost of approximately $3.1 billion. The

planned 5-year construction phase is scheduled

to begin in 1984 with completion by 1989. Operating expenses for the first full year of operation

(1989) are estimated at $200 million and revenues

at $575 million. The Bank of Tokyo Trust Co.

has agreed to raise 25 percent of the original $2

billion in capital. The remaining is to be raised

in the private investment market.

In the summer of 1982, the California Legislature passed a law allowing potential rail companies to apply for up to $1.25 billion in tax-free

bonds and exempting certain actions such as the

granting of rights-of-way from environmental review by the State Public Utilities Commission. Review and approval must be obtained by the State

Treasurer and State Rail Passenger Financing

Commission, established for the purpose of issuing the bonds. AHSR officials indicated that a

complete environmental review in compliance

with both Federal and State environmental protection standards will be undertaken.

AHSR’s original plan called for using the Interstate Highway right-of-way to construct, for

$2 billion, new grade-separated tracks over which

it hoped to run modified Japanese bullet train sets

of eight cars each at average speeds of 125 mph

and top speeds of 160 mph. Nonstop travel time

from Los Angeles to San Diego was estimated at

59 minutes, with a 15- to 20-minute run scheduled

from downtown Los Angeles to the airports More

recently, AHSR indicated that it intends to build

new track along the existing railroad rights-ofway, sections of which are owned by the Atchison, Topeka, and Sante Fe Railroad, and by the

Southern Pacific Railroad. A significant portion

of new right-of-way still would be required, since

plans call for saving time by cutting through the

mountains into San Diego and for better access

into Los Angeles. A small portion of Interstate

5 right-of-way is also needed.

The AHSR proposal calls for 16 miles (12 percent) of tunnel, 50 miles (38 percent) of elevated

grade-separated viaduct guideway, and 65.5 miles

(50 percent) cut-and-fill grade. According to

AHSR, the greatest proportion of tunneling will

use direct bore techniques.

‘Information regarding AHSR plans was drawn from the summary reports on “Engineering and Construction” and “Market

Study,” published by American High Speed Rail Corp., March 1983,

as well as by conversation with AHSP staff.
Ch. 5—U.S. Passenger Rail History and Current Corridor Activity ● 63

AHSR reportedly expects to carry, on 86 trains,

100,000 persons daily (36.5 million passengers annually) with trains running at 30- and 10-minute

frequencies. The ridership projections represent

over 12 percent of the total automobile, rail, air,

and bus trips made daily in the region, according

to AHSR data, with more than 20 million trips

diverted from the automobile. By contrast,

Amtrak currently carries 3,OOO passengers daily

(about 1 million passengers annually) on seven

round trips between Los Angeles and San Diego. b

Current Amtrak service provides for departures

every other hour.

AHSR assumes that by 1988 traffic on Interstate

5 will become so congested that highway travel

time between San Diego and Los Angeles will increase to 31⁄2 hours from the present 21⁄2hours.

AHSR ridership estimates also were calculated on

the basis of total trips generated in areas within

a 5- to 10-mile radius of the station locations,

assuming six or seven stations. *

Current demographic characteristics of the

SWC indicate a population of approximately 10

million people, with 1990 projections at 12.6 million. Using AHSR ridership figures of 36.5 million

passengers annually, the data indicates that on the

average every person would take at least 3.7 rail

trips annually.

A number of unanswered questions remain

about the current proposal: Would local travelers

use high-speed rail? At what fare? Does AHSR

intend the high-speed rail line as a commuter transit system as well as an intercity system? If so,

how do these plans mesh with current city of Los

Angeles plans for a transit system? Are the projected construction costs reasonable given the anticipated tunneling and viaducts required? Is there

a sufficient local transit infrastructure to feed the

high-speed rail link? Will the highways become

so congested that people will divert to rail, or are

there alternatives available that may be less costly

bResponses to OTA questions from Amtrak, February 1983.

● Some OTA workshop participants believe that, for intercity

travel, the base travel level used by AHSR to determine projected

ridership may have been too large, because local trips were calculated

in AHSR assumptions. Participants suggested that fare costs and

overall trip time constraints for local trips may preclude people from

using the 160 mph system to travel locally or for commuting. If local

trips are included, as AHSR brochures suggest, then larger theoretical

amounts of travel result.

than a completely new rail system? What effects

will a high-speed service have on the air and bus

market? What will happen to Amtrak’s service if

AHSR plans to use existing rights-of-way to construct its bullet train route? Legally, Amtrak maintains sole licensing responsibility for passenger rail

service in the United States. In an interview with

OTA, Amtrak President W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,

indicated that Amtrak has negotiated an agreement so that AHSR can provide high-speed rail

in the same corridor as long as it is reimbursed

for its lost revenues and receives a percentage of

the profits.

California and Nevada: Las Vegas

to Los Angeles

The mayor of Las Vegas has proposed a superspeed (250 mph) maglev ground transportation

system between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. On

January 27, 1983, the city of Las Vegas, in conjunction with the Clark County Board of Commissioners, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors

Authority, and the State of Nevada, released a

feasibility study of the system. The study was

prepared by the Budd Co., a potential supplier

of maglev equipment—assisted by Bechtel Corp.,

Transrapid International, * and Transtech International, Inc. ** The study recommends construction of a 230-mile route from the Ontario airport

outside Los Angeles, through the Cajon Pass, and

into Union Plaza in Las Vegas. The route parallels

Interstate 15 much of the way and would require

little land acquisition since most of the proposed

right-of-way is on Federal or State-owned property, assuming such property is made available.

The study recommends that the system be implemented by a joint public-private enterprise, in

order to “permit utilization of available Federal

tax incentives, encourage funding from a variety

of sources, and result in a broader ownership

base.”7 However, it also indicates that the system

‘Transrapid International is an association of firms including

Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), Krauss Maffei, and Thyssen

Henschel, who are responsible for the development of the maglev

system in the Federal Republic of West Germany. Thyssen Henschel

owns the Budd Co., located in the United States.

**A $150,000 DOT grant was also used in the initial feasibility

effort.

7Executive Summary, Las Vegas to Los Angeles High Speed/Super

Speed Transportation System Feasibility Study, 1983, p. 25.
. — —

64 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

can be built by the private sector. According to

the study, a 20-percent return on equity would

be possible if the system could attract 2.6 million

passengers annually at a projected round trip fare

of $65 (1980 values). Today, nearly 12 million

people visit Las Vegas each year. Residents of the

Los Angeles area account for approximately 3.6

million visitors, or about 30 percent of the total,

most of whom travel to Las Vegas by car. The

study projects that between 1.9 million to 2.7 million people, or over half of the ridership, could

be induced to try the new mode.g The proposal

calls for the line to originate near the Ontario airport, which is approximately a 45-minute drive

for patrons living in Los Angeles and the surrounding coastal communities.

Even with these ridership projections, the study

states that “this is probably not a high enough

return to attract equity investors in view of the

perceived risks associated with the project and the

fact that positive returns to equity investors are

several years into the future. ”9 Financial analysis

reveals that, for private ownership, operating income would be negative from 1983-96. Return on

equity investment varies considerably from year

to year and changes from negative to positive to

negative, respectively, until 1999, when an increasing return is realized each year.

The results are similar for public ownership, although the years are slightly different due to an

assumption that interest rates on capital costs

would be 10 percent rather than 13 percent as in

the case of private ownership. In public ownership, positive cash flow would occur 2 years after

startup of operations (1992) and increase substantially thereafter.

In both cases, ridership would grow more slowly than net income and cash flow, because as the

study assumes, fares would increase by 7 percent

annually while debt costs would remain fixed. At

the same time, operating costs are estimated to

be very low. Excluding interest, operating costs

are projected to be $55.2 million in 1991, while

revenues from fares and food concessions are projected to be $395.2 million—a ratio of 14 percent.

By 1991, the study also assumes the 1980 ridership will have increased to 3.1 million.

‘Ibid.

‘Ibid.

The total cost of the project is estimated to be

$1.8 billion. Construction (guideway) and electrification costs are estimated $1.2 billion ($5.12

million per mile). Single-track operation is

planned, limiting construction costs. Until cost

verification and operational feasibility testing

have been completed for the West German and

Japanese systems, questions regarding maglev

operating and capital costs for this, or any corridor, cannot be answered fully.

Florida: Tampa to Orlando to Miami

Florida has been interested in high-speed rail

since the energy crisis of 1973-74 cut into the

State’s tourism revenues. Florida’s flat terrain, low

population densities between major coastal cities,

and high tourism provide some advantages for

high-speed rail systems. In addition, the population is one of the fastest growing in the country.

Florida expects to attract 35 million to 40 million

tourists in 1983.1

° However, while Florida’s population and tourist levels indicate some potential

for generating rail ridership at levels that may

cover operating costs, most visitors to Florida now

come by automobile, and many travel as part of

a group (family or otherwise). Modal splits are

currently estimated as 86 percent by automobile,

11 percent by air, 3 percent by bus and rail.

In April 1982, Florida established a High-Speed

Rail Committee to investigate the potential application for the technology in the State. About

the same time, AHSR announced its interest in

a Tampa-Orlando-Miami corridor. The Japanese

National Railways Technology Corp. and AHSR

are conducting preliminary engineering and marketing studies of that corridor. Initial State efforts

are concentrated on examining the feasibility of

establishing a 255-mile high-speed rail route between Tampa and Miami via Orlando. No technology has been chosen yet for the route, though

the State believes it must be a proven technology

in order to attract investment.

The State Department of Transportation has

provided topographic data for Japanese engineers,

conducting the preliminary engineering study of

the area, and the State DOT has also examined

the feasibility of using median strips of the Florida

101fiomation p~ovided by Florida Department of Transportation.
—— —

Ch. 5—U.S. Passenger Rail History and Current Corridor Activity ● 65

Turnpike for a high-speed rail corridor. However,

highway curvature may limit the amount of rightof-way that could be used for this purpose, although the State assumes public-owned rights-ofway will be made available. To date, Florida has

not conducted a study to estimate ridership or

determine economic feasibility.

A number of questions exist concerning this

corridor: Are sufficient transit infrastructures

available (or planned) to feed the rail system?

Would tourists, many of whom now come in by

car from out of State, switch modes once in Florida? Could other tourists be induced to ride the

train with the current cost, service, and convenience factors provided by competing modes?

Would private capital be sufficient to cover a project of that magnitude? Are there transportation

alternatives that might better meet the State’s

needs?

Michigan: Chicago to Detroit

The Michigan Department of Transportation

(MDOT) has conducted several studies of corridors within the State, analyzing options for

upgrading and for introducing high-speed rail

service. MDOT considers the Chicago-Detroit

corridor to offer the most significant potential.

The improved service offered by the proposed

route, and the potential for improved economic

and employment opportunities, are seen as the

chief reasons for the new or improved rail service.

The Chicago-Detroit corridor has a number of

the features necessary for a high-speed rail route,

including a route distance of 279 miles, and a corridor population of 12,5 million people. State rail

officials view the corridor as having travel affinity

between the two cities, especially for business and

for the connecting links to Canada’s most populated corridor. Amtrak currently operates daily

trains between Chicago and Detroit.

Feasibility studies of the corridor have been

conducted by Transportation Systems and Market

Research Ltd. (TRANSMARK), a British consulting firm. Ridership of 4.6 million to 6 million intercity passengers annually for the year 2000 was

projected for the corridor with intermediate feeder

routes extending to Lansing and Grand Rapids.

It is expected that most of the travel will be diversion from other modes (77 percent), with only 15

percent of new induced demand. Service assumed

125-mph speeds. The analysis examined the option for upgrading service, using available technology, to achieve the 125-mph speeds. Additional work is being conducted to determine rightsof-way that may permit speeds up to 160 mph.

The upgrading options suggest a cost of $2.5 million per mile is necessary to achieve the 125-mph

speeds .11

The MDOT studies suggest that revenue from

the Chicago-Detroit corridor may not be sufficient

to support total operating, maintenance, and investment costs and offer a return on investment.

However, they believe nearly sufficient revenues

will be generated to cover operating costs. MDOT

believes some form of public sector incentive or

stimulus is necessary to generate private sector

participation. Key questions remain about the

projected financing options that could be used for

such a project.

Midwest High-Speed Rail Compact

In 1980, the State Legislatures of Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania established the High-Speed Rail Compact to foster the

potential economic development, employment,

and transport benefits that might result in the

Midwest from new rail service. The Compact

called for the Governors of each State to appoint

two representatives. The Compact meets twice a

year to exchange information on new rail developments and to foster interest at State, regional,

and Federal levels in high-speed rail projects.

New York: Montreal to New York City

(State Rail Plans)

The State of New York has undertaken perhaps

the most comprehensive passenger rail upgrading

program of any State in the Union. In the late

1960’s, the State DOT began looking at foreign

passenger rail activity in France and Japan. In the

early 1970’s, the State undertook a conceptual

I IInformation provided by Michigan Department of Transportation.
66l U.S. passenger Rail Technologies

study designed to analyze high-speed rail in

several corridors. In 1974, $50 million of a $250

million State bond issue was devoted to upgrading

passenger rail rights-of-way. Another bond issue

for which additional moneys were allocated to rail

was passed in 1979. Using a phased approach with

rail bond funds (State initiated), this effort has

brought over 94 miles of the New York CityAlbany-Niagara Falls passenger corridor to speeds

up to 110 mph. An additional 42 miles of route

are due to be similarly posted for high speeds in

the near future. According to State rail officials,

the State’s incremental approach to rail improvement is designed to build a ridership base while

ascertaining the revenue increases that result from

the capital improvements the State has made. The

State has invested about $80 million in track improvements. One project currently under study

for a high-speed rail system is the Montreal-New

York City corridor. The projected corridor is a

cooperative effort between the mayor of Montreal

and the States of New York and Vermont. To

date, a preliminary engineering feasibility study

of an advanced French TGV-type system has been

conducted, funded by Montreal. New York DOT

provided technical assistance to the study. The

study has not yet been released.

The next phase, which New York and Vermont

are discussing with Canada, includes economic

feasibility studies and patronage forecasts. Since

the project would be a joint venture, both New

York and Vermont have requested that Montreal

obtain a formal commitment with the Province

of Quebec supporting the project, since Quebec

will be affected by the route. Approximately 40

miles of the route would be in Canada, while the

remaining portions (330 miles) of the system

would be in Vermont and New York.12

Northeast Corridor

Due to its population densities and transit systems, the corridor with the greatest potential market for high-speed rail is the NEC (Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of

Columbia). Because of this potential, Congress

enacted legislation to purchase the right-of-way

in the corridor from Conrail* and to improve the

Iz]nfomation provided by the New York State Department of

Transportation.

● Consolidated Rail Corp.

roadbed to permit higher speed passenger train

travel. The Northeast Corridor Improvement

Project (NECIP) was authorized in 1976, and some

construction began in 1977. Completion is scheduled for 1986, and funding authorized for the corridor totals $2.5 billion.

The NECIP investment will permit Amtrak passenger trains to reach speeds of 120 to 125 mph.

Current best schedules permit maximum speed of

110 mph with an average 80 mph. Speeds up to

120 mph on selected sections of the corridor now

have been approved. Twenty-six round trips daily

are offered between New York City and Washington, D.C. In 1982, ridership for the corridor

was 10.5 million people. The U.S. DOT estimates

that approximately 80 percent of those passengers

travel on the 224-mile sector between Washington

and New York. Fastest trip time between New

York City and Washington currently is 2 hours

49 minutes; upon completion of the project, best

nonstop trip time is expected to be 2 hours 40

minutes. Additional incremental improvements to

reduce trip times could be made with additional

investment. At this time, however, there are no

plans by the current administration for further investments beyond the $2.19 billion already allocated, until the current project is completed. According to DOT officials, the average cost per mile

for NEC upgrading has been $4.5 million to $5

million with an additional $2.5 million per mile

for electrification.13

Ohio

In 1980, the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority (ORTA) released the results of a high-speed rail

study with the recommendation that a high-speed

rail network be established to connect major cities

of Ohio via three main corridors. The plan called

for new grade-separated track and signals/communication facilities to permit operating speeds

of 150 mph. The type of equipment to be operated

on these tracks (TGV, bullet train, or APT) was

left to further study, but costs were based on TGV

equipment costs and capabilities. It was projected

that it would take up to 15 years to acquire the

land, complete construction, and begin operations.

13 Riego Mongini, Northeast corridor Improvement project, Intercity Programs Office, Federal Railroad Administration.
Ch. 5—U.S. Passenger Rail History and Current Corridor Activity ● 67

Capital costs of the basic 500-mile network were

estimated to be $5.7 billion (1978 dollars) ($11.4

million per mile). The additional Toledo-Detroit

and Youngstown-Pittsburgh segments were estimated to cost an additional $2.5 billion. In current dollars, the total cost for the basic network

is $14.6 billion .14

Construction of the network was to be financed

from a l-percent increase in the State sales tax.

The tax referendum for the construction of such

a system was defeated by Ohio voters in the November 1982 election by a 3:1 margin. Proponents

argue that the defeat signaled opposition to the

financing mechanism more than to the concept

itself.

Impetus for the proposal was twofold: to provide energy-efficient intercity transportation (the

system was to be electric-powered allowing use

of Ohio coal as a source of energy) and to serve

as a catalyst for economic revitalization.

Total ridership over the system was projected

to reach 8.7 million passengers by the year 2000.

Passenger trips would be spread out over 500

miles of rail network, with the average trip length

(for the Ohio passengers) expected to be 109

miles. 1s

Ohio’s rail service today consists of Amtrak’s

Lakeshore Ltd. & Broadway Ltd., and Cardinal

trains running east-west through Ohio to Chicago.

There is no north-south rail service, nor does Ohio

now have any 403 (b)* rail service. Rail ridership

is expected to be generated by diverting travelers

from the automobile to the train as fuel prices

increase and as population grows.

In the proposed Ohio network, where distances

are short, as from Cleveland to Akron, rail would

not be able to compete as successfully as other

modes and is projected to get only 5 percent of

the market. On the longest segment, from ClevelfInformation on the Ohio plan was obtained from Ohio Rail

Transportation Authority documents on the “Ohio High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Program,” published July 1980, with Dalton,

Dalton & Newport as project consultants.

‘51bid.

● 4o3 (b) service is a State-Federal matching program for provision of passenger rail services. The States provide 4S percent of the

operating funds and 50 percent of capital costs in the first year of

operation. After that, the State provides 65 percent of the operating

costs annually and the Federal Government provides 3S percent.

land to Cincinnati, the rail mode is projected to

capture 58 percent of the market. The bulk of the

traffic is projected to be diversion from the automobile. In 1977, approximately 74 percent of all

traffic between these two cities moved by auto;

by 2000, proponents of the network estimate automobile share of the market would have dropped

to only 27 percent.

The network is projected to generate a profit;

the operating ratio in 2000 is projected to be 69

percent. Operating income (before taxes) is expected to be $47.6 million which, if used for such

a purpose, could support a debt load of only $470

million at 10-percent interest rates. The projected

profits from the railroad do not appear to equal

the construction costs of the network. For this reason, an increase in the State sales tax of 1 percent was proposed as a financing mechanism.

On a unit basis, operating costs are estimated

to be 11 cents per passenger-mile. This compares

with current air costs in the range of 10 to 15 cents

per passenger-mile for travel in short (200-mile)

corridors.

Although not defined as high-speed rail, the

Ohio Association of Railroad Passengers recently has proposed the establishment of a 110-mph

service on a 1,650-mile network within the State.

The Association claims this would cost $2.4 billion

in contrast to the ORTA proposal of $11.5 billion

for 526 route-miles. l6

Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Legislature formed a HighSpeed Rail Commission in 1982 to study highspeed passenger rail feasibility in the State. Prior

to legislative approval of the Commission, the

Milrite (Make Industry and Labor Right in Today’s Economy) Commission, a group of business,

labor, and political leaders convened to investigate the subject. On the basis of their findings,

the Legislature approved a $6 million authorization for the State’s High-Speed Rail Commission.

The original Milrite study looked at a 351-mile

route between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. The

High-Speed Rail Commission is authorized for 5

l~Information provided by the National Railroad passenger

Association.
68 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

years. A request for proposals to study the corridor has been issued. A 2-year study effort is

being conducted.17

Wisconsin: Chicago to Milwaukee

An 80-mile maglev system has been proposed

between Chicago and Milwaukee, at a cost of $1.2

billion ($15 million per mile). One goal of the

route would be to divert air travelers from Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport to Mitchell

field, located outside Milwaukee, alleviating congestion at O’Hare.

Amtrak currently serves the Chicago-Milwaukee market with three daily trains round trip.

Service was formerly six trains daily but was cut

in 1981. Ridership in 1980 on the Amtrak between

Chicago and Milwaukee was about 311,000 people, an increase of 100,000 over the decade. The

operating deficit of the route was $6.2 million for

the 1979-80 period. A feasibility study of the

maglev proposal was undertaken by the Budd

Co., a potential supplier of the maglev system.

Annual operating costs for 24 daily round trips

with seven 400-passenger trains are estimated at

$13 million. At this cost, the Budd study concluded that such a system was “technically feasible, assuming the round-trip fare is $40.00, and

an annual ridership of 2.5 million passengers is

attracted. ”18

An actual ridership forecast, however, was not

part of the feasibility study. The theoretical $2.5

million break-even ridership described in the Budd

study represents 30 percent of the present Milwaukee-Chicago traffic. The projected fare of 25 cents

per mile is substantially higher than the automobile costs.

In 1981, the Wisconsin DOT issued a study that

concluded the large public investment in capital

improvements to existing service, and the continuing operating subsidies necessary for new passenger train services in existing and new corridors

could not be justified in the near future. Further,

the study indicated that if Amtrak service were

ever discontinued, alternatives including bus service to existing Amtrak service are available to provide adequate, comparable, cost-effective and energy-efficient service to the public. While this

study did not examine high-speed or maglev applications in the proposed corridor, it did indicate

that the Wisconsin DOT does not seek to implement any new rail corridors unless financial feasibility can be shown and public benefit justified.19

Texas

Texas State legislators and AHSR have indicated interest in a high-speed rail system for sections of the State. Recently, the Texas Railroad

Transportation Co., formed in July 1983, announced plans for a high-speed rail system between Dallas and Houston using French equipment and bankrupt Rock Island Railroad rightsof-way. While general hearings have been conducted in the State, feasibility studies have not

yet been undertaken by either the State or the

interested corporations.

Other Corridor Plans

The Atlantic City-Philadelphia corridor has

been the subject of several studies. Recent Federal

legislation authorized $3o million to restore rail

service on what was badly deteriorated track.

While not anticipated as high-speed, the service

is intended to provide relief on the congested

routes between Atlantic City and Philadelphia by

allowing for “chartered trains” and six round trips

daily for commuters and others. In the DOT/Amtrak “Emerging Corridors” study—not a highspeed analysis—the Philadelphia-Atlantic City

Corridor was reported to have a favorable performance for system upgrading in terms of ridership projections and the annual public expenditure

cost per incremental passenger-mile. zo

In addition to the New Jersey plans for upgrading service, significant improvements have been

made on the New York-Albany-Buffalo corridor.

ITInfomation provided by Robert Casey, Pennsylvania HighSpeed Rail Commission.

ls]nfomation drawn from the “Final Report: Milwaukee to

Chicago Maglev System Feasibility Study,” by the Budd Technical

Center, Dec. 10, 1982.

lsWiXonsin Transportation Planning Program, “Rail pa~enger

Services Study,” Wisconsin Department of Transportation, August

1981.

‘“’’Rail Passenger Corridors: Final Evaluation, ” U.S. Department

of Transportation and Amtrak, April 1981, p. vii.
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Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Feasibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison With Other Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maglev Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Current Stage of Development of Maglev Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Areas of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure

71

71

72

72

73

73

75

76

Figure No. Page

10. The Principle of Linear Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Chapter 6

MAGNETIC LEVITATION:

STATUS AND OUTLOOK

SUMMARY

Technology Status

Two different technologies using magnetic levitation (maglev) for high-speed intercity passenger

service are being developed abroad. One, called

attraction or electromagnetic suspension (EMS)

maglev technology, employs conventional ironcore electromagnets, and is being developed by

the Federal Republic of Germany. The other,

called repulsion or electrodynamics suspension

(EDS) maglev technology, employs superconducting magnets, and is being developed by Japan.

Both systems rely on electromagnetic forces to

provide support (levitation), lateral guidance and

propulsion (and braking) without direct physical

contact between the vehicle and the guideway.

The attraction maglev system floats about 1⁄2

inch from the guideway surface and can levitate

at any speed. The repulsion system floats about

4 inches away, but only works after sufficient forward velocity to achieve electrodynamics levitation is reached. Repulsion systems also require

auxiliary wheels for support at low speeds.

The attraction system requires electronic sensing of the gap and continuous control of the

magnetic current to achieve stable levitation. The

repulsion system can levitate stably once sufficient

forward velocity is attained.

Maglev systems are reported to have several

advantageous features including:

low track and vehicle repair and maintenance

costs because of the low guideway loading

and freedom from mechanical contact;

higher speed capabilities with the resulting

potential for improved productivity;

enhanced safety, since derailment is theoretically impossible;

less vibration and noise than conventional

rail technologies; and

● low sensitivity to weather conditions due to

elimination of mechanical contact between

the guideway and the vehicle.

To date, neither technology has been tested and

operated at sustained speeds or under the conditions required to demonstrate performance at

levels and costs suitable for actual revenue service. However, the West German attraction maglev

technology now has moved to the developmental testing stage. The West German tests are being conducted at the Emsland Test Facility in

Lower Saxony. Complete test results are anticipated in late 1985 or early 1986. They will put

one (two-car) system through approximately

160,000 miles of operation in the initial year of

testing. * The Japanese repulsion maglev technology is still in the experimental stage, and, according to the Japanese National Railways (JNR), it

will probably take 10 years before testing and

demonstration are completed. ’

Substantial technical development and testing

still is required for both technologies, although

there appear to be no insurmountable technical

obstacles. A West German power distribution and

conditioning system which controls the large

amounts of power and the frequency required for

propulsion is to be tested.2 There are operational

and cost uncertainties to be tested in this system.

Additional development and funding may be required before it is ready for revenue service.

For the Japanese (repulsion) technology, development of a power conditioning system, and further research is required as well on the cryogenics

*According to Budd Co. officials, the initial year and 160,000 miles

of tests will occur on the Emsland test track before the Southern

loop of the facility is completed. Thereafter, they anticipate approximately 500,000 miles of tests annually as published in the Transrapid brochure.

‘Responses to OTA questions by JNR official, Ichiroh Mitsui,

February 1983.

‘The Budd Co.

71
72 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

(the cryostat and refrigerator necessary for the

superconducting magnets).

Concerns about maglev technologies that remain to be addressed in demonstration and testing

include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

suitable, reliable, and stable guideway structures since the gaps are small (1⁄2 inch for the

attraction and 4 inches for the repulsion system) between the guideway and the vehicle,

and the ability of the maglev suspension to

follow gap variation is limited;

emergency procedures and the suitability of

current service restoration schemes in the

event of breakdowns;

possible electromagnetic interference in the

electrical systems near maglev corridors;

for the repulsion system, the effects of the

superconducting magnets’ electromagnetic

fields on the passengers;

the reliability and maintenance costs for both

wheel and levitation components to be used

in the repulsion system and, for the levitation components in the attraction system.

Also whether wheels (currently not included

in the attraction system design) will be

needed as a backup in case of system failure;

the performance level of switching devices;

and

positive detection and safety in the event of

guideway defects and obstacles.

Economic Feasibility

Capital and operating costs of maglev systems

have been projected by technology developers.

Those theoretical projections were not studied in

this report. While some approximation of capital

costs may be possible, the reliability of such projections must be examined in the context of the

actual experience, testing and demonstration, particularly for guideways. Similarly, operating costs

must be verified through tests and demonstrations

under conditions that fully reflect revenue service.

Given the fact that the systems have never been

run at speeds and under conditions that reflect actual service, reliability of cost projections remains

a concern.

Preliminary cost estimates have been included

in several feasibility studies of maglev corridors

in the United States by potential suppliers of the

technologies. Experts and developers of the technologies claim operating cost as well as other

advantages over conventional high-speed rail

technologies.

Comparison With Other Modes

Maglev technologies are often termed “flying

trains” because they are noncontacting and combine the high speeds of aircraft and the fixed

guideway of trains. In a technical sense, maglev

differs from conventional high-speed rail technology in many ways. In terms of the service it

offers, however, the primary difference between

maglev and conventional high-speed rail is speeds

up to 50 to 150 mph higher than steel-wheel on

rail technology.

Maglev proponents cite as an advantage the expected reduction in maintenance costs from having fewer moving parts with no friction from

movement and pressure as in wheels on rails.

Developers also claim reductions in land costs for

the guideway if the structure is elevated, reductions in labor costs since the technology is highly

automated, and reductions in noise and vibrational effect. Noise tests are scheduled at Emsland.

Economic comparisons between maglev and

wheel-on-rail high-speed technologies are subject

to question until more is known about the operating characteristics, and the operating and capital

costs of maglev technologies. Aside from any cost

differences, the “induced” demand that maglev

might create because of its greater speed and

novelty is a major factor making a maglev corridor appear more attractive to planners than other

high-speed rail systems. Although there is no reliable way to predict how great “induced” demand

might be, in one corridor proposal, estimates of

“induced” demand represented approximately 50

percent of the total projected ridership.3

3Budd Co. Technical Center, “Executive Summary, Las Vegas to

Los Angeles High Speed/Super Speed Ground Transportation

System Feasibility Study, ” January 1983.
Ch. 6—Magnetic Levitation: Status and Outlook • 73

Two U.S. corridors have been considered for the developers or potential suppliers of the techpossible maglev introduction: Las Vegas-Los nologies. Las Vegas officials are actively seeking

Angeles and Milwaukee-Chicago. Feasibility stud- $10 million in venture capital for the project.

ies have been conducted on these corridors, by

DISCUSSION

The search for an alternative to steel wheel on

rail technology-with its high maintenance costs,

noise, and energy consumption—is not new.

Technologies explored include air and water cushion systems as well as magnetic levitation. However, attention increasingly has focused on maglev

technologies as the most promising means to

avoid many of the costs and problems associated

with wheel-on-rail technology and, at the same

time, to provide a smoother ride and much higher

top speed than conventional rail could ever

achieve. It became a serious contender as an alternative to the conventional airline in the 1960’s,

when it was believed that the capacity of airports

in major cities soon would be exceeded and additional airports would be needed. New York considered a fourth airport, and London a third. Maglev seemed worth exploring as an alternative to

the major expenditure, congestion, and environmental problems that additional airports would

entail.4

Although the U.S. Government-sponsored

maglev research programs from the National

Science Foundation (NSF) and the Federal Rail

Administration did not start until 1971, there were

other U.S. programs supporting research and development of tracked air cushion vehicles and

linear induction motors. U.S. maglev research and

development was on a par with similar foreign

research programs at the time the U.S. Governrnent canceled it in the mid-1970’s to shift to

research in freight and conventional rail technology problems. The British, French, Canadian,

and U.S. Governments, after study and some experimentation and have since abandoned work

on high-speed maglev. The practical development

of maglev technologies is now confined to West

Germany and Japan.

‘Comparative Assessment of New Forms of Intercity Transport,

T. R. R. L., Report S. R.3., December 1971.

Maglev Systems

There are two basic kinds of magnetic suspension—attraction and repulsion—and both have

been combined with a variety of linear motor configurations in the pasts

Attraction/Repulsion

Suspension Technologies

Magnetic levitation can be achieved by attraction or repulsion technology. In the attraction

system, the track is suspended from the guideway

and the vehicle drawn magnetically upwards

toward it. The vehicle has conventional iron-core

electromagnets which are controlled to maintain

a gap between track and vehicle. Similar devices

maintain a gap between the side of the guideway

and the vehicle. In the repulsion system, the

aluminum track is below the vehicle and suspension is achieved by magnetic forces which push

the vehicle away from the guideway. These forces

result from vehicle speed and do not exist when

the vehicle is at rest.

In the West German attraction system, the

clearance between vehicle and guideway is about

1⁄2 inch and suspension is independent of speed.

In the Japanese repulsion system, the vehicles

have a clearance of about 4 inches increasing with

speed. At speeds below about 50 mph, the vehicle runs on wheels. Magnetic suspension occurs,

and the vehicle “lifts off, ” as higher speeds are

reached.

Propulsion

Maglev vehicles use linear motors for noncontacting propulsion. The principle of linear motors

‘Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library, “Long Term

Assessment of Passenger Ground Transportation System Technology,” 1982.
74 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Photo credit: Japanese National Rai/ways

Repulsion maglev MLV-001 test vehicle in Japan

is simple; they are analogous to common electric

rotory motors, but with their components “unwound” as shown in figure 10. The primary (rotor) is the onboard component, and the secondary

(stator) is the guideway bound component of the

motor. Such motors also require a power-conditioning unit (PCU) to regulate the current

(amount) and frequency of electrical power to

develop the propulsion forces.

A variety of linear motor types have been developed and tested with maglev vehicles, but only

the linear synchronous motor (LSM) is being developed currently for the high-speed application

for either attraction and repulsion systems. LSMs

locate the PCUs wayside primarily because of the

size and weight of the PCUs and the problems of

power supply to fast-moving vehicles.

To avoid powering the entire route (which

would have unacceptable power losses), only the

short sections of guideway on which vehicles are

traveling are powered at a given time. This system

provides automatically for safety separation of

following tracks. These sections, called blocks,

are typically 0.5 to 5 km long. The system for providing the sequential block activation is called the

power distribution and conditioning system and

includes the PCU.

Power Distribution and Conditioning System

A major technical problem for both maglev

systems is developing a power distribution and

conditioning system suitable for revenue service.

This system must control the large amounts of

power required for propulsion of the vehicle. Two

key aspects of this system are: 1) the power controlled by an individual PCU, and 2) the networking of PCUs required for the entire route.

A very sophisticated piece of electronics, the

PCU provides closed loop, variable voltage, variable frequency (VVVF) electrical power for propulsion. The size of the individual PCU is determined by both the vehicle speed and train length

of the individual system. But very few PCUs of

the size required for high-speed, high-density systems exist today. Furthermore, they require more

sophisticated control than typical industrial PCUs.

The number of PCUs employed in the network

is of concern since the PCUs are expensive. The

absolute minimum number of PCUs is determined
Ch. 6—Magnetic Levitation: Status and Outlook ● 7 5

Figure 10.—The Principle of Linear Motors

rimary (rotor)

/

Primary (rotor)

I

~

LIM

Secondary (stator)

SOURCE: “Long Term Assessment of Passenger Ground Transportation System

Technology,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982.

by either: 1) the number of vehicles simultaneously on a route (since each vehicle requires a dedicated PCU), or 2) the minimum practical spacing due to the problem of distributing VVVF

power over large distances—whichever dominates. The basic design issue is that the network

of PCUs must consider both the state-of-the-art

individual PCUs and the optimum sequential

switching schemes, which can be costly. * How-

● The Budd Co., a subsidiary of Thyssen Henschel, developers

of power-conditioning systems for several new locomotives and for

the West German maglev system, indicates that the power distribution and conditioning system required for revenue service of the German maglev system will be demonstrated at the Emsland facility.

According to Budd, the power distribution and conditioning system

at the Emsland Maglev Test Facility includes a network transformer

of 31.5 MVA, intermediate circuit transformers of 11.2 MVA each,

ever, since the state of the art in individual PCUs

is advancing rapidly, the overall network design

most suitable for a maglev system could change

in the near future.

Current Stage of Development

of Maglev Systems

In Japan and West Germany, both the attraction and repulsion technologies of levitation have

been tested and shown to be operational at an advanced experimental level. In each country, one

system has now been discarded, and work has

been concentrated on the other (each country rejected the opposite system).

In Japan, the Government is funding the development of a repulsion system by JNR. Although

still in the experimental stage, very high-speeds

(exceeding 300 mph) have been achieved with

small vehicles (5 to 9 tons). The latest vehicle can

carry eight passengers, but public demonstrations

have not taken place nor are any planned at this

time. JNR has now asked Government permission

to build a larger scale test track.

The development program sponsored by the

West German Government is in a more advanced

stage. After success with experimental vehicles,

a complete system using maglev vehicles on an

elevated guideway was built and operated for several months. A track of about 0.6 miles was constructed in Hamburg in 1979 for the International

Transportation Exhibition, on which a two-section vehicle, weighing 26 tons with seating for 72

passengers, was operated at speeds up to 50 mph.

Although operated at low speed, the vehicles and

guideway employed the same basic technology

that is being developed for a 250-mph system. At

present, an elevated guideway of 20 miles in

length is under construction for the testing of two

two rectifiers of 17.2 MW each, two puls-inverter groups of 19.2

MVA each and two output transformer groups for higher frequency operation of 16.0 MVA each. The complex portion of the power

distribution and conditioning system is the puls-inverters. At

Emsland, each puls-inverter group will use two of these units in

parallel. Revenue service application will require 30 to 3S MVA,

thus necessitating the use of three or four of the puls-inverters in

parallel. According to Budd, the use of these inverters in parallel

and series has been demonstrated, as the Thyssen Henschel

locomotive unit is composed of smaller capacity inverters configured

in parallel and series to achieve 1O-MW capacity.
76 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

preproduction vehicles. The track will make possible sustained testing at 200 mph and limited travel

at speeds up to 250 mph. Evaluations will be conducted by an independent group consisting of the

West German Railways (DB), the West German

national airline (Lufthansa) and the Federal Government. A likely candidate for initial commercial operation would be a high-speed connection

between Hamburg and Hanover airport. Although timescales are vague, West German scientists and developers hope to consider possible

future maglev corridors in their 1985 planning.

If included in the 1985 Strategic Transportation

Plan, construction of a corridor could begin in

1990 ,

6 otherwise consideration of maglev for application in West Germany would not occur again

until the 1990 Strategic Transportation Plan.

Both West Germany and Japan have spent significant amounts of research money over the last

decade to bring their respective systems to their

current stages of development. The German system is further developed than the Japanese, not

because the Japanese have placed less emphasis

on research, but because more time is required

to develop the technology of the superconducting

magnets and cryogenics for the Japanese repulsion system.

Areas of Uncertainty

The Japanese System—Repulsion Maglev

This system is still in an advanced experimental stage. Significant changes in the overall system

design are still occurring, from cryogenics to power conditioning to guideway shape.

The technology of superconducting magnets is

new and untried in the field of public transportation. Although the cryogenics have not yet been

shown to be sufficiently reliable for revenue service, JNR runs about a hundred levitation tests a

year on this system. A recent advance in the refrigeration technology (for the magnet cooling)

has been its location onboard the test vehicle.

The superconducting magnets, cryostat, and

refrigeration are the areas in which continued

development will occur.

bDiscussions, January/February 1983. Dietmar Frenzel, West German Embassy; Udo PollvogtMBB/ERNO; Horst Hesler, Managing

Director, Transrapid International.

The West German System—

Attraction Maglev

This system is now at the preproduction stage.

In the summer of 1983 the two vehicles were to

be tested for system performance on 20 miles of

guideway built to production system specifications. Speed will be increased progressively to 190

mph, and, for about a half mile on each circuit

of the track, at speeds up to 250 mph.

The test facility is located in Lower Saxony,

near the Dutch border in low lying, marshy country. It will experience a wide range of weather conditions ( –15° to +105° F), and the soil structure

is poor from the point of view of track pylon stability.

The vehicles will be operated for 18 hours each

day–in 30-minute operating cycles, constantly

repeated. Two laps of track (about 48 miles when

the track is completed) will be undertaken in 20

minutes, followed by a 10-minute stop.7

This program will test vehicle reliability in service by routines of starting, running at high-speed,

and stopping repeatedly. A 90-percent availability

rate is planned with the vehicles traveling about

160,000 miles in the initial year of testing. Thereafter, additional test miles are to be run assuming completion of the Southern loop of the Emsland facility. Tests are scheduled for completion

by late 1985 or early 1986.’

If the test program goes as planned, it should

be completed by 1986. It would be unusual if the

system performs perfectly on initial testing, but

Transrapid is confident that the system will perform to the standards and costs forecast.

Comparison of Attraction

and Repulsion Systems

For both systems there are still substantial areas

of uncertainty: the ability of each system to operate in multiple units, to reliably meet the performance standards required for revenue service, and

construction of the new guideway systems to the

close tolerances required are some.

7Transrapid Consortium, “The Emsland Transrapid Test Facility, ” 1982.

‘Information provided by Transrapid Consortium in initial review

of draft OTA document.
Ch. 6—Magnetic Levitation: Status and Outlook • 77

Photo credit: The Budd Co.

Attraction maglev vehicles to be tested at Emsland Test Facility in West Germany

One major difference between the systems concerns the air gap between guideway and vehicle.

In the Japanese system, the air gap increases with

speed and levels off at about 4 inches, and in the

West German system it is about % inch and remains constant. There is disagreement in the scientific community over the significance of gap sizes

in terms of vehicle operation.

A second major difference between the systems

concerns the magnets on the vehicles. The repulsion system depends on superconducting magnets

necessarily cooled to within a few degrees of absolute zero. The attraction system uses electromagnets of developed technology making them

closer to deployment for commercial application.

So far the superconducting magnets have been

tested only under strict supervision and control,

and only recently with refrigeration on the vehicle

itself. Questions regarding operational and system

concerns still remain regarding the superconducting magnets.

In both systems, hotel power* is required on

the vehicles. In addition, both systems require

power for the magnets. In the attraction system,

the power required for the magnets increases with

speed, while in the repulsion system, this power

is constant. However, the repulsion system requires refrigeration power for maintaining the

cryogenic refrigeration for the superconducting

magnets. Onboard power plus hotel power for

either system are sufficiently low so that it can

be inductively coupled from the guideway as the

Japanese and West German developers are doing.9

*Hotel power includes power necessary to light, cool, and heat

the vehicles.

9Dr. Robert Borcherts, Research Scientist, Ford Motor Co.
78 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Maglev test guideway at Emsland

Magnetic drag is substantial in the repulsion

system, requiring greater propulsion power than

the attraction system. Since propulsion power to

overcome this drag is relatively independent of

speed, and is a significant fraction of total drag

(magnetic and aerodynamic) at lower speeds, the

repulsion system is much less favorable at speeds

under 250 mph.

The next stage in West Germany might have

been the construction of a full-scale vehicle for

use on a limited length track for test purposes.

However, the West Germans have telescoped this

stage with the final stage of demonstration of the

system under operational conditions. The new

Photo credit: The Budd Co.

Test Facility in West Germany

track at Emsland is a replica of a section of the

proposed guideway and is suited to testing the vehicles at 190 to 200 mph for long periods and for

speeds up to 250 mph for short stretches. The vehicles have been constructed of the materials, according to the final design, and by the methods

that will be used for production. Nevertheless,

questions have to be answered before the system

can

●

●

be said to be fully operational:

The two vehicles must be shown to meet the

performance levels forecast under controlled

conditions.

The system (i.e., vehicles, guideway, power

distribution and conditioning system) must
Ch. 6—Magnetic Levitation: Status and Outlook ● 7 9

then be shown to continue to perform under

operational conditions for a substantial test

period, with an acceptable level of maintenance.

The main test schedule provides for 160,000

miles of operation in the initial year of testing with

additional mileage anticipated thereafter until test

results become available by 1985.1

° Success at this

locommunique from Transrapid International, Apr. 6, 1983.

level would undoubtedly lead to full certification

in Germany.

Failure in the initial first 160,000 miles of tests

could lead to modifications of certain systems or

components involving a new cycle of experimental

work. This need not take as long as the past development work, since only some of the components would have to be reviewed, however, it

would probably delay the project.
Chapter 7

U.S. PASSENGER RAILCAR

MANUFACTURING
. —

Contents

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Trends in Travel Demand and Equipment Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Institutional Shifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Current Industrial Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Projected Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Foreign Passenger Railcar Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Prospects for a U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

List of Tables

Table No. Page

12.

13.

1 4 .

1 5 .

1 6 .

1 7 .

1 8 .

1 9 .

20.

21.

22.

Volume of U.S. Intercity Passenger Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Trend of Originating Transit Passenger Trips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Transit Passenger Vehicles Owned and Leased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Federal Transit Commitments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

U.S. Passenger Railcar Deliveries, 1971-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Innovation Matrix for Railcard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Projected Passenger Railcar Demand... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

JNR’s Purchase of Rolling Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Community Exports and Intra-Community Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Passenger Car Production, 1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Construction of Railway Passenger Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

11. Long-Term Trend for Passenger Car Use in Railroad Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

12. New Passenger Railroad Cars Delivered From U.S. Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

13. New Transit Passenger Vehicle Deliveries From U.S. Carbuilders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

14. Annual U.S. Production Capacity and Output of All Types of Passenger Railcars 89
Chapter 7

U.S. PASSENGER RAILCAR MANUFACTURING

SUMMARY

It is unlikely that a U.S. manufacturer will decide to manufacture railcars, or be able to compete against foreign manufacturers, unless the

United States, like other industrialized countries

with rail systems and rail manufacturing industries, has a stable, predictable, and planned rail

equipment market, one in which orders are spread

out in time and in manageable sizes. *

OTA’s analysis suggests the following reasons

for the decline and demise of the U.S. passenger

railcar manufacturing industry:

●

●

●

●

●

the steep drop over the past 50 years in the

size of the U.S. intercity passenger railcar

market, and in passenger rail’s share of the

growing travel market, as passengers increasingly chose other modes—particularly air

and auto;

the continuing erratic nature of U.S. urban

rail transit orders, exacerbated by the sudden infusion, and later subsidence, of Federal

funds for mass transit between the late 1960’s

and the present;

the entrance in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s

of new U.S. aerospace manufacturers drawn

in by the dramatic increase in Federal funds,

the prospect of a growing mass transit market

and by Federal encouragement. This market

turned out to be too small to support all the

suppliers;

inflation, sophisticated equipment requirements, and technical difficulties resulted in

heavy financial losses for most manufacturers

as they sought to fill the large orders generated in the last decade under fixed price contracts with no escalation clauses; and

the lack of standardized equipment among

various transit agencies plus the diverse special features required by them.

● The section of this chapter on U.S. railcars encompasses all

passenger rail manufacturing markets including intercity, commuter,

rapid rail, and light rail vehicles. Typically the term “railcar” has

referred to transit cars. In this report, it includes all vehicle categories.

The section on EEC countries pertains to intercity cars and also to

transit cars. However, full information on transit cars was not

obtained.

The U.S. manufacturing industry was not destroyed by foreign competition. Foreign manufacturers did not enter the U.S. market until most

U.S. manufacturers had announced plans to leave

the market.

Without exception, the passenger railcar manufacturing industries in Europe and Japan export

a small proportion of their production, and most

of that goes to countries that do not have production facilities of their own such as Third World

countries. The bulk of foreign production is

geared to meeting the basic demand for passenger

railcars within their home countries.

In practice the market for passenger railcars in

the other nations with extensive nationalized systems is closed to outside manufacturers. The national railways, with the approval of the various

governments, normally expect to buy equipment

from suppliers within the home country, and only

buy abroad when the home industry cannot supply what is needed. The governments in those

countries have invested heavily in passenger rail

networks according to a clear and consistent policy and policy implementation. Thus, the manufacturers in those countries are assured of a stable,

predictable market that is effectively closed to outsiders. Manufacturers abroad typically also have

a close and continuing relationship with the railways, jointly conducting research and development with them and developing the basic designs.

Few U.S. passenger car orders are expected for

the rest of this decade. A recent report shows that,

for the 1980’s, most of the light railcar purchases

have been made, and only orders for 438 rapid

railcars have not been placed. * The effect of recent tax increases for urban rail transit purchases,

to date, is unknown.

Intercity railcar fleet additions are not anticipated for at least the next 8 years. Today, Amtrak operates some 1,600 cars, 1,000 of which

● Several additional light railcar orders not included in the N. D.

Lea report have been or are being placed, according to participants

in the OTA Workshop on Railcar Manufacturing.

83
—

84 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

were purchased in the 1970’s. The remaining 600

have been rebuilt at Amtrak’s Beech Grove, Ind.,

facility.

Between 1990 and 2000, the total average annual rail transit orders in the United States are

expected to be between 450 and 550, and in the

first decade of the next century, the average annual car order is predicted to be no more than approximately 550.1 Transit accounts for nearly 63

percent of the total current railcar market in the

United States. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority accounts for 65 percent and

IN. D. Lea Associates, Survey of the Rai]car Equipment Market,

June 1982.

the Chicago Transit Authority for 12 percent of

the total transit market. Together, New York and

Chicago dominate with 77 percent of the total

transit market, and more than 40 percent of the

total railcar market. Between them, they utilize

at least six different irreducible railcar designs.

Their plans, or lack of plans, for fleet replacement

or expansion and size of order are an important

factor in determining the size and shape of any

new railcar market in this country.

The construction of several advanced highspeed intercity rail corridors would not add significantly to the fleet. Although this would create

a small surge in orders with construction spread

over several years, it would have no major longterm impact on the railcar market.

DISCUSSION

The passenger rail equipment market covers a

variety of locomotive and railcar types for a wide

range of services. For purposes of this chapter,

the passenger rail services are divided into the four

broad categories of intercity, commuter, rapid

transit, and light rail. Equipment for providing

these services includes conventional diesel and

electric locomotive-hauled passenger car trains as

well as self-propelled cars for intercity, subway,

and street railway use. The light rail vehicle (LRV,

once referred to as the street or trolley car) also

is included in the transit equipment category.

Following is a discussion of the main trends and

changes in travel markets, service and supply industries, and institutions that led to the demise

of the U.S. passenger railcar industry.

Trends in Travel Demand

and Equipment Use

The single most important factor that led to the

decline in the passenger railcar manufacturing industry was the widespread introduction and use

of automobile and airplane. As people could afford increasingly to purchase and travel by these

alternative modes, the demand for intercity travel

by rail fell, as did the demand for transit services.

Although intercity passenger travel increased by

550 percent from 1929 to the present (table 12),

the demand for intercity passenger travel by rail

decreased by 65 percent over that same time period. Transit demand decreased 43 percent from

1940 to 1975 as shown in table 13. Changes in reporting occurred in 1975 for transit. A 13-percent

increase in originated transit trips has occurred

from 1976 to 1980.

The decline in rail travel demand meant a decline in demand for passenger rail equipment as

well. At least 10 times as many railcars were in

service in 1929 as there are today (fig. 11). New

equipment was added to the fleets during the

1930’s to replace old railcars and provide highquality service. This practice continued until

World War II when a number of older railcars

were brought out of retirement to provide essential cross-country transport. These were retired

again at the end of the war.

In 1946, the railroads began to modernize their

fleets, and railcar building reached its peak in

1950, although the total number of cars in service continued to decline. The construction of intercity passenger and commuter railcars remained

at a low level after the final building surge in the

1940’s and 1950’s. Thereafter, few intercity cars

were built until the Amtrak orders of the 1970’s.
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 85

Table 12.-Volume of U.S. Intercity Passenger Traffic

(millions of revenue passenger.miies and percentage of totai (except private))

Total Total

Air Inland (except Private Private (including

Year Railroadsa Percentage Buses Percentage carriers Percentage waterways Percentage private) automobiles airplanes private)

1929 , 33,965 77.1 6,800 15.4 — — 3,300 7.5 44,065 175,000 – 219,065

1939, . . . 23,669 67.7 9,100 26.0 683 2.0 1,486 4.3 34,938 275,000 – 309,938

1944, . . 97,705 75.7 26,920 20.9 2,177 1.7 2,187 1.7 128,989 181,000 1 309,990

1950 . . . . . . 32,481 47.2 26,436 38.4 8,773 12.7 1,190 1.7 68,880 438,293 1,299 508,472

1960, ., 21,574 28.6 19,327 25.7 31,730 42.1 2,688 3.6 75,319 706,079 2,228 783,626

1970 . . . . . . 10,903 5.7 25,300 14.3 109,499 77.7 4,000 2.3 149,702 1,026,000 9,101 1,184,803

1974 ,,,. 10,475 5.9 26,700 15.1 135,469 76.7 4,000 2.3 178,644 1,143,440 11,000 1,331,044

1980p., . 11,500 4.6 27,700 11.2 204,400 82.6 4,000 1.6 247,600 1,300,400 15,000 1,583,000

19811.) ...,, 11,800 4.8 27,200 11.1 201,300 82.5 4,000 1.6 244,300 1,344,000 14,700 1,603,000

NOTE Am camerdataf romreportsofCAB and TAA, Great Lakes andrwers and canals from Corps of Engineers and TAA, ail 1980 and 1981 hgures are from TAAdata, except ratifreighttraffx Is bythe AAR

a~~roads Ot a~ classes mcludmg elemc raflways, Amtrak and AUtO-Train

PTheseare pre~rnlna~~ sfimates mdwesub~ct to frequent subsequent adwstrnents

SOURCE YearkWofr ?atiroadFacfs, 1982, p 33

Table 13.—Trend of Originating Transit Passenger Trips

Railway All modes

Light Heavy Total Trolley Motor passenger

rail rail rail a

coach bus rides/trips

Calendar year (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions)

Revenue passenger rides:b

1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Linked transit passenger trips:b

1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1980p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4,182

7,081

2,790

845

335

204

172

155

147

144

114

86

79

80

83

81

2,282

2,555

2,213

1,741

1,670

1,678

1,574

1,494

1,446

1,424

1,435

1,388

1,353

5,464

9,636

4,903

2,586

2,005

1,882

1,746

1,649

1,593

1,567

1,549

1,492

1,450

419

1,001

1,261

889

447

186

128

113

100

74

60

56

54

1,335 1,425 51

1,415 1,506 51

1,474 1,569 55

1,420 1,513 71

3,620

8,335

7,681

5,734

5,069

4,730

4,058

3,735

3,561

3,653

3,998

4,095

4,168

10,504

18,982

13,845

9,189

7,521

6,798

5,932

5,497

5,253

5,294

5,606

5,643

5,673

4,246 5,723

4,406 5,983

4,746 6,370

4,774 6,358

NOTE: Tabie excludes automated guideway transit, commuter railroad, and urban ferryboat,

alnclude~ cable car and inclined plane beginning in 1975.

b“Revenuep aasengerrldes” from 1940 through 197e; ’’Linked transit passenger trips’’ beginning in 1977.

PTheseare pre~mirla~ estimates andare subject to frequent subsequent adjustments.

SOURCE: Trarrs/t Facf600/r (Washington, D,C; American Public Transit Association, 1981)

To accommodate the decrease in demand in the

1950’s, railcar builders began to shift production

to transit cars. Figure 12 charts the trends and

numbers of intercity and commuter railcars delivered from 1960 to 1982. As the figure shows,

few commuter cars were delivered in the 1960’s,

and a small number of intercity cars were delivered compared to car requirements of the previous

railroad era.

The U.S. railcar market has always been erratic.

The fluctuations generally stemmed from the fact

that the rail systems, going into operation at different times, initially ordered entire fleets, or large

portions of fleets, all at once. Since the average

car historically was used up to 30 years before

being replaced or overhauled, the only additional

orders these companies placed in the interim were

those required for any expansion of service. Since
86 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Figure 11 .—Long-Term Trend for Passenger Car

Use in Railroad Service

NOTE:

Calendar year

All cars, Includlna commuter cars and cars retained bv railroads after

)

the format!on of ~mtrak (excludes urban transit cars) ‘

SOURCE, AAR Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1982 Data and chart compiled by

John Bachman

the lines opened at different times with relatively

large orders, replacement orders occurred at different times. As will be explained later, however,

the phenomenon of huge orders—such as the New

York City Transit orders for 1,250 cars did not

occur until the infusion of Federal funds, starting

in the 1960’s enabled transit operators to undertake wholesale and often long deferred modernization of their fleets.

Prior to the 1960’s, subway (rapid transit) service operated in five major cities: Boston, Chicago,

Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia. Light rail

electric streetcar service flourished for years.

Streetcar building, resumed after World War II,

remained high as transit companies, then privately

owned, reequipped their fleets with the new PCC

(President’s Conference Committee) type streetcars. However, with the public’s growing use of

automobiles, and the transition of transit companies to motor bus operations, the production

of streetcars was suspended between 1952 and

1972. Heavy railcar deliveries, however, went

through a replacement cycle in the early 1970’s

partly due to increases in Federal funding. Table

14 shows the trends in light rail and heavy rail

vehicles owned and leased from 1940 to 1980. Figure 13 shows historical trends in light rail and

heavy rail vehicle deliveries from 1960 to 1980.

New York City accounts for approximately 6,500

of the 9,500 transit cars in the total existing rapid

rail fleet.

Institutional Shifts

As the operations of transit and intercity services suffered growing financial losses after World

War II, Federal financial assistance was sought

and eventually secured, and ownership passed

from private to public hands.

Federal loans for transit cars began in 1961,

with $5o million made available for capital needs

Table 14.—Transit Passenger Vehicles

Owned and Leased

Calendar year Light rail Heavy rail Total raila

1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,630 11,032 37,662

1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,160 10,217 36,377

1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,228 9,758 22,986

1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,300 9,232 14,532

1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,856 9,010 11,866

1985 ... , . . . . . . . . . . 1,549 9,115 10,664

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,262 9,338 10,800

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,225 9,325 10,550

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,176 9,423 10,599

1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,123 9,387 10,510

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,068 9,403 10,471

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,061 9,608 10,712

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 9,714 10,720

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 9,639 10,674

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 9,567 10,556

1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 9,522 10,524

1980 (preliminary) . . . 1,013 9,693 10,749

NOTE: Table excludes automated guldeway transit commuter railroad and urban

ferry boat.

alncludeg cable cars and inclined plane cars beginning ‘n 1975.

SOURCE: Trarrs/t Fact Book (Washington, D. C.: American Public Transit Association, 1981).
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 87

Figure 12.— New Passenger Railroad Cars Delivered From U.S. Manufacturersa

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

1 I Commuter car s I I

- n

- J

1

!

I I I f

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980

Calendar year

aFrench turbo tra(.ls, butlt (n the 1970’s were not Included (n the calcula!tons

SOURCE Compiled by John Bachman

Figure 13.— New Transit Passenger Vehicle Deliveries From U.S. Carbuilders

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Light railcars

Heavy rail vehicles

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980

Year

SOURCE Compiled by John Bachman
88 • U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

and $25 million for demonstration projects. However, the initial loan program was not sufficient

to meet the needs of the ailing transit industry and,

by 1964, the Federal Government passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA), which became the basis for Federal financial assistance to

transit operators.

Commuter lines were consolidated into regional

operating authorities funded by various local governments and the communities served. Before

1965, eight cities were served by 24 different

railroads providing commuter services. Between

1965 and 1982, 15 new operating authorities were

formed to serve those eight cities. Conrail’s relinquishment of commuter responsibility in 1982 is

the most recent institutional change in commuter

rail service.

Intercity passenger rail services, initially provided by the Class I carriers, * also experienced

significant changes in the late 1950’s and 1960’s.

Routes were abandoned to the maximum extent

permitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission or operated at losses. Concerned about the

bankrupt New Haven Railroad, increased population projections along the Northeast Corridor

(NEC), and airport congestion, Congress enacted

the High Speed Ground Transportation Act

(HSGTA) in 1965.2 Funding and development and

demonstration of two types of cars, the Metroliner

cars and the turbotrains, for intercity service along

the corridor were provided by the act. However,

the remainder of the Nation’s passenger rail services continued to decline to the point that Congress created the National Railroad Passenger

Corp. (Amtrak) in 1970 to maintain an essential

core of intercity passenger rail services. Original

equipment for Amtrak operations came from the

railroads that had discontinued services and joined

Amtrak.

The shift from private to public sector passenger

rail operations, together with the infusion of

Federal funds, had significant implications for

the passenger railcar manufacturing industry.

Through UMTA legislation, large capital resources became available for buying transit equipment and for financing major extensions to existing systems and construction of new systems.

For intercity passenger services, the new funds

allowed the rebuilding and replacement of much

of the aging car fleet. Table 15 shows the federally

financed purchases for rail transit and commuter

equipment between 1965 and 1982. Intercity

railcar purchases by Amtrak have totaled approximately 1,000 cars and some 320 locomotives. 3

Federal legislation also made funds available for

the construction of several new transit systems,

and the entry of new manufacturers from tile aerospace industries was encouraged.4 According to

a General Accounting Office report, “U.S. manufacturers anticipated a boom and entered the

market amid forecasts of large, profitable railcar

orders. However, the market turned out to be far

smaller and more erratic than the companies anticipated. ”5

Entry of new manufacturers into an

already small and unsteady market altered the

competitive market structure. Figure 14 shows a

chronology of major suppliers for the passenger

railcar market from 1960 to the present, their

market entry and exit dates, and the approximate

annual production capacity of each manufacturer.

Art R. J. Barber Associates report in 1978 notes

that both U.S. and world passenger railcar manufacturers were operating below plant capacity.

According to that report, between 1971 and 1977

U.S. passenger railcar deliveries averaged jus t

under 600, when the capacity of the Pullman plant

alone was 700. 

b According to data provided in

a study by N. D. Lea Associates, total foreign railcar orders by U.S. transit agencies between 1970

and 1982 were for approximately 2,300 railcars

of which only 19 percent were ordered by 1979.

Table 16 shows U.S. and foreign railcar deliveries

to the United States from 1971 to 1982.

*Class I rail carriers are currently defined as line haul railroads

with annual operating revenues of $50 million or more effective

January 1978. Prior to 1956, the carriers were defined as Class I if

they had operating revenues of over $1 million. The revenue level

was raised several times between 1956 and 1978.

‘Second Report on the High Speed Ground Transportation Act

of 1965 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation,

September 1967), p. 1.

3“Amtrak’s Second Decade, ” draft paper, pp. 10-11.

4UMTA Legislative Record.

W.S. General Accounting Office, “Problems Confronting the U.S.

Urban Railcar Manufacturers in the International Markets,” July

1979, p. 5.

‘R. J. Barber Associates, Inc., “The United States and the International Market for Rail Equipment, ” prepared for UMTA, March

1978, pp. 19-21.
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 89

Table 15.—Federal Transit Commitments (new railcars, by type and fiscal year) (commuter, transit)

Rapid Light Commuter Commuter Diesel

Fiscal year Total transit rail electric diesel Iocomotives a

1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 64 — — — —

1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 400 — — — —

1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 — — 35 — —

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 226 — 144 — —

1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 260 — 123 — —

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 — — 309 — —

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 — 80 237 — —

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509b420 — 64b25 —

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 650 150 15 36 13

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 200 45 170 5 2

1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 140 — 160 20 —

1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 — — 58 50 22

Transition quarter . . . . . . . . . . . 71 71 — — — 8

1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 320 48 50 2 9

1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 125 141 — 90 23

1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 326 — — 91 19

1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 16 26 36 —

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 204 26 — 80 7

1982. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538 414 55 21 48 24

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,276 3,836 571 1,422 447 127

a~Or ~Ommuter Service.

bDoes not include21 cars funded In fiscal year 1972 whlchwefe subsequently canceled.

SOURCE: information provided by Robert Abrams, Urban Mass Transportation Administration.

Figure 14.—Annual U.S. Production Capacity and Output of All Types of Passenger Railcars

DeleteSt. Louis car

—

Add GE(280/yr) Add Boeing Vertol (480/yr)

GE reduces capacit y

Add ROHR(180/yr)

Production capacit y

Delete Boeing Vertol

Delete Pullman-Standard

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984

Calendar years

aAlthough not reflected in GAO report, the BuddCo, Indlcatedaddltlons to thelrcapac!ty fr0m245 to465 after 1980.

SOURCE: Compiled byJohn Bachman. U.S. General Accounting Office, ”ProblemsConfronting the U.S. Urban Railcar ManufWurers in the lntemational Markets:’

JuIY1979.
. —

90 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Table 16.-U.S. Passenger Railcar Deliveries, 1971-82 (foreign company deliveries in parentheses)

Year Light rail Rapid transit Commuter rail Intercity Total

1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 (118)

O (87)

30 (16)

71

16

61

30

—

—

118 (16)

14 (158)

O (127)

10 (60)

170 (lo)

500

500

145

101

254

34& (46)

o (86)

36

126 (40)

131

165 (36)

128

127

167

169

376

319

97

100

134

61

1

113

409

132 (20)

—

10 (lo) —

—

216

150

239

268

318

839

1,067

404

268

433

716

405

(220)

(245)

(392)

(loo)

(lo)

(36)

(20)

(lo)

(46)

1971-79 U.S. average annual delivery = 524

SOURCE: Raiiway Age, Passenger Car-Market at aGlance.

●

The shift to Federal funds brought changes in

procurement procedures. More parties were involved in the development and approval of specifications, and financial procedures for obtaining

funds.7

Lack of escalation clauses in the fixed-price contracts, lack of progress payments, and technical

problems which occurred on many railcar orders,

compounded by large order sizes, resulted in

heavy financial losses for most manufacturers.

Federal funding enabled transit authorities to

replace very large numbers of similar cars over

a very short time. Thus instead of a series of

orders for a relatively small number of cars every

year, the pattern changed to one of a very small

number of orders each for a large number of cars.

This meant that success would absorb a manufacturer’s complete capacity for one or more years,

while failure would leave him without work.*

What happened perhaps was inevitable—one

by one, manufacturers decided that the losses and

risks in continuing were unacceptable, and left the

industry.

Since 1967, inflation, as measuredly the Consumer Price Index, increased prices by 250 percent. However, the General Rail Equipment Index showed industry prices increasing over 330

percent. 8 Table 17 illustrates the type and number

of changes in rail orders that occurred over the

‘U.S. General Accounting Office, op. cit.

*Car prices currently average about $1 million each.

‘Jeffrey Mora, “Factors Affecting Railcar Costs, ” presented at the

Third National Conference on Light Rail Transit, March 1982, p. 2.

past 20 years. Many resulted in initial and sometimes persistent technical difficulties for railcar

builders and transit agencies, leading to increases

in warranty and protection provisions and car

costs. The innovations were developed to improve

car performance, increase ridership, and reduce

maintenance. However, the innovations were not

standardized. All of the reasons listed finally

brought about the virtual demise of the domestic

passenger railcar manufacturing industry in the

late 1970’s—at a time when several large new

orders were about to be placed.

Current Industrial Base

The United States now has only one prime manufacturer—the Budd Co., owned by Thyssen of

West Germany—and four assembly plants currently in use for the passenger rail industry. The

Budd Co. currently operates its railcar plant in

Pennsylvania. The Canadian firm, Bombardier,

Inc., recently built an assembly plant in Barre,

Vt., which employs approximately 250 people.

Boeing-Vertol, though no longer a prime contractor for passenger railcar manufacturing, maintains

a subcontracting business for assembly of foreign

manufactured railcars. The General Electric Co.

has a Cleveland facility for assembly.

Amtrak maintains its own railcar repair and

rebuilding facilities at Beech Grove, Ind., with approximately 1,000 employees. According to Amtrak President, W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Amtrak

is bidding competitively with other railcar manufacturers and assemblers only when Amtrak

equipment repair needs have been met by the
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 91

Table 17.-lnnovation Matrix for Railcars

x

u

3

2

s

s

MARTA—Franco Beige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Miama/Baltimore- Budd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MBTA—Boeing LRV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X

San Francisco—Boeing LRV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X

MBTA—Hawker Siddeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MBTA—Pullman Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

San Diego—Duwag U2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CTA—Pullman Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CTA—Budd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CTA—Boeing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GCRTA—Pullman Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GCRTA—Breda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PATH—Hawker Siddeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PATH—St. Louis Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NYCTA R46 Pullman Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X

NYCTA R44 St. Louis Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NYCTA R42 St. Louis Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NYCTA R38 & R40 St. Louis Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PATH—Budd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WMATA—Rohr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BART—Rohr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X r

SOURCE” N. D, Lea Associates, Benefits of f?ai/car Standardization, February 198

Beech Grove facility. Amtrak seeks to maintain

the existing employment level at Beech Grove and

hopes to increase overall revenues. It does not anticipate expanding Beech Grove, nor bidding on

assembly projects that offer no profit margin.9

Amtrak currently is assembling the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority order for

Breda of Italy. Private sector suppliers argue that

Amtrak is competing with them by using Beech

Grove.

In addition to passenger car manufacturers and

assembly facilities, both the General Motors Corp.

and the General Electric Co. manufacture locomotives for passenger as well as freight service.

Both manufacturers have a history of foreign export of motive power equipment for freight and

passenger service. According to the Barber study,

the United States was the world’s leading exporter

of diesel locomotives in 1975, capturing 72 per91nterview with W. Graham Claytor, Jr., President of Amtrak,

Feb. 10, 1983.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

7

6

4

4

1

1

0

2

2

2

2

4

1

1

4

3

1

0

4

5

7

x

x

x

cent of the world market. Most exports were to

Third World countries. However, U.S. exported

locomotives accounted for 85 percent of Canadian, 60 percent of Italian, 35 percent of Swedish,

and 31 percent of Belgian and Luxembourg imports of diesel locomotives.l0

Projected Demand

A recent report by N. D. Lea Associates outlines projected U.S. demand for transit (light and

heavy rail) and commuter cars from 1980 to 2010.

Table 18 shows the results of this market survey.

Fleet replacement projections assume a life expectancy of 25 years; however, many railcars in the

past have exceeded that life expectancy by as

much as 25 years, although rebuilding was required. According to the Lea report, for the 1980’s

most of the light railcar bids have been awarded,

and only orders for 438 heavy railcars remain to

be placed. Between 1990 and 2000, the total averIOR. J, Barber Associates, ]nc., Op. Cit., p. 7.
—

92 ● u.s. Passenger Rail Technologies

Table 18.—Projected Passenger Railcar Demand

Car type 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Transit:

Light rail. . . . . . . . . 497 (76) 233 (35) – 45 230 274 (74) 233 (35)

Heavy rail . . . . . . . . 1,450 (242) 1,175 (200) 804 2,717 1,806 1,042 1,609

Commuter . . . . . . . . . 696 323 135 421 515 1,099 869

Total replacement

(new starts) . . . . . . 2,643 (318) 1,731 (235) 939 3,183 2,551 2,435 (74) 2,711 (59)

Annual average . . . . . 528 (63) 346 (47) 187 636 510 483 (15) 542 (10)

NOTE: Parentheses Indicate fleet expansion and new starts. All other numbers indicate replacements.

SOURCE: N. D. Lea Associates, Survey of U.S. Railcar Market 1$%7, June 19S2.

age annual car building orders are estimated to

be approximately 470; in the first decade of the

21st century, the average annual car order will

be approximately 560.

Participants in OTA’s workshop indicated that

the assumptions underlying the Lea report may

be overly conservative. Several additional small

light railcar orders are expected in California.

These projections, it should be stressed, assume

current funding levels and practices. For example, New York—according to a workshop participant-could, in the next 10 years, replace another

1,000 cars but does not have the money to buy

them. A number of transit agencies that are not

planning now to order new cars would do so if

they had the funds. Thus, according to transit

operators, the potential market could be larger

than the market actually projected.

Some experts in the field estimate that with a

rational procurement system and a reasonable allocation of orders among manufacturers, the market of 470 cars per year projected for the 1990’s

could sustain several medium- or small-sized manufacturers.

Additions to the intercity railcar fleet are not

anticipated for at least 8 years, since much of the

current fleet was replaced in the 1970’s. At its

inception, Amtrak acquired 2,OOO cars. Today it

operates 1,600 cars, 1,000 of which have been purchased in the last decade. The remaining 600 have

been rebuilt at Amtrak’s Beech Grove facility or

by contractors. For the near term, Amtrak plans

undertaking prototype development of new cars

for their eventual fleet replacement. To minimize

annual capital requirements, replacement is

planned at 40 to 60 cars per year, with a typical

40-year lifecycle for the fleet. According to Amtrak officials, their plans are sensitive to changes

in market conditions and technology .11

At current levels of demand, the market for railcars in this country could support a $400 million

to $500 million per year industry for the 1990’s,

with perhaps a $100 million annual increase in the

next century, assuming prices remain constant.

The addition of several high-speed corridors

would add cars to the demand base, with construction spread over several years though it is

unlikely that such additions would change the

overall market structure significantly.

Foreign Passenger Railcar

Manufacturing

The European and Japanese railway equipment

construction industries historically focused nearly

all their efforts on meeting domestic needs. Until

recently, with few exceptions, they have exported

rail equipment only to those countries with no

manufacturing capacity of their own. Foreign exports of rail equipment continue to account for

only a small share of foreign production. Their

entrance in the U.S. market occurred primarily

when U.S. manufacturers were announcing plans

to leave in the late 1970’s.

The national railway systems, which the foreign

manufacturing industries support, are subsidized

in accordance with explicit and consistent national

policies that regard passenger rail service as a vital

part of the national transportation system. In

these countries, the passenger rail service and the

rail equipment manufacturing industry function

not as separate industries, but rather as two closely related and mutually supporting elements of

“Questions raised for Amtrak response, Feb. 10, 1983.
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 93

what is, essentially, a single national passenger

rail enterprise.

Japan

Five major companies supply the needs of the

railways in Japan for locomotives and passenger

cars. The major exporting companies are Hitachi,

Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, and Tokyu.

It is the practice in Japan for the purchaser to

have a list of suppliers who have shown that they

can meet the specifications and production rates

likely to be desired. Procurement is then by competitive tender from the list of authorized suppliers. However, in recent years orders have been

allocated among the available Japanese suppliers

so that they all have been able to maintain an economic production rate. Japanese National Railways (JNR) has been a major buyer in the last 5

years, requiring an average of 330 commuter cars

and 94o intercity vehicles per year (table 19). 12

Between 1979 and 1982, U.S. transit agencies

have ordered 625 cars from Japanese firms. ’3 In

addition the Japanese Rail Technology Corp., a

subsidiary of JNR, is conducting preliminary engineering feasibility studies of several U.S. corridors for provision of high-speed intercity rail service similar to that provided in Japan.

The European Economic Community (EEC)

Over the period 1972-75, exports represented

about one-fifth of total equipment production of

EEC countries (see table 20). Only 5 percent of

production was exported to other EEC countries,

usually to those without manufacturing capability. The remainder of exports (14 percent of total

railcar production) went to countries outside the

EEC. Clearly, internal demand for equipment during that period was satisfied by national suppliers;

exports were a relatively small proportion of production and were concentrated on markets outside the EEC.

Within the EEC, certain firms specialize exclusively in the production of one type of railway

equipment while others produce the entire range.

Many firms are diversified and active in areas outside the railway industry. Especially in the traction sector, the larger firms are subsidiaries of major national consortia. On the other hand, many

of the firms are private, particularly those concerned with hauled vehicles. In Italy and in Great

Britain, the largest firms are State owned.14

In the construction of intercity passenger vehicles, the majority of the work in the EEC is carried out by small- and medium-sized firms. In

1975, there was substantial and sustained demand

for passenger cars in EEC countries (see table 21).

Exports were generally around 3 percent of production, although France built up exports from

4 to 32 percent by 1975. The major part of railcar

construction was commissioned by the national

railways, but a substantial part of the selfpropelled vehicles were needed to replace worn

out equipment on transit systems and for limited

construction of new systems. Table 22 shows the

construction of railway passenger vehicles for EEC

countries between 1965 and 1975.

In West Germany, most of the firms are incorporated in major industrial groups, including four

IZDiscussions with Japanese National Railways, January 1983.

13N. D. Lea Associatesr Railcar Market 1967-1982.

1~Report on the Railway Rolling S&l Industry (Brussels: commission of the European Communities, 1977).

Table 19.—JNR’s Purchase of Rolling Stocks (number of cars)

Average

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 per year

Electric MU cars:

Commuter . . . . . . . . . . . 72 175 247 177 165 183 190 200 176

lntercity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645 512 282 558 891 322 430 520 520

Shinkansen . . . . . . . . . . 462 96 211 190 127 120 156 296 208

Diesel MU cars . . . . . . . . . 34 2 32 20 111 322 217 204 118

Coaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 60 151 285 356 300 307 224 223

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313 845 923 1,230 1,650 1,247 1,300 1,444 1,244

SOURCE: Ichiroh Mitsui, Japanese National Railway representative, Washington, D.C.
94 ● U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

Table 20.-Community Exports and lntra-Community Trade

1972 1973 1974 1975

Percent Percent Percent Percent

Value exports Value exports Value exports Value exports

Stock x.u.a. Tot. Wed. x.u. a. Tot. prod. x.u.a. Tot. prod. x.u.a. Tot. prod.

Locomotives:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.1

Intra CEE. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4

Extra CEE . . . . . . . . . . . 68.7

Multiple units railcars:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3

Intra CEE . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4

Extra CEE . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9

Vans, carriages, and luggage etc.:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3

Intra CEE. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2

Extra CEE . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1

Wagons:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187.1

Intra CEE. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.5

Extra CEE . . . . . . . . . . . 133.6

Total:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 275.8

Intra CEE . . . . . . . . 65.5

Extra CEE . . . . . . . 210.2

Production total EEC . 1,185.7

6.1 ‘/0 57.8

0.3 7.0

5.8 50.8

1.2 34.8

0.7 16.9

0.5 27.9

0.2 17.0

0.02 4.7

0.18 12.3

15.8 86.3

4.5 30.8

11.3 55.5

23.3 195.8

5.5 59.4

17.8 135.4

1,227.7

4.7%0 64.7 4.80/o 44.8 3.0

0.6 4.8 0.4 3.9 0.3

4.1 59,9 4.4 40.9 2.7

2.8 42.1 3.1 52.7 3.5

1.4 21.1 1.6 24.1 1.6

1.4 21.0 1.5 28.6 1.9

1.4 18.2 1.3 29.8 2.0

0.4 4.5 0.3 1.8 0.1

1.0 13.7 1.0 28.0 1.9

7.0 108.0 8.0 152.3 10.2

2.5 40.0 2.9 38.2 2.6

4,5 68.0 5.1 114.1 7.7

16.0 232.9 17.2 279.5 18.8

4.8 70.4 5.2 68.0 4.6

11.2 162.5 12.0 211.5 14.2

1,358.0 1,487.9

Key = x.u.a. = ? ; Tot. prod, = total productivity.

SOURCE: Nisexe 1975—analytical tables of foreign trade.

Table 21.-Passenger Car Production, 1975 (value: million U.A..a)

Self-propelled Hauled Total Export Percentage

Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 1.0 10.3 —

West Germany . . . . . . .

—

91.5 52.4 143.9 3.6 3

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.4 99.6 162.0 51.4 32

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 24.0 32.3 1.1 3

Great Britain . . . . . . . . 11.8 14.2 26.0 0.7 3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183.3 191.2 374.5 56.8 15

U. A.–Unit of account for EEC = approximately $1.

SOURCE:

Table 22.—Construction of Railway Passenger

Vehicles (including transit)

Year Self-propelled Hauled Total Index

1963/64 average. . NA 2,486 NA (118) a

1965/66 average. . 401 2,112 2,513 100

1967 . . . . . . . . . . . 879 1,891 2,770 110

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . 674 1,549 2,223 88

1971 0 . . . . . . . . . . 1,648 2,228 89

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . 604 1,609 2,213 88

1973 , . . . . . . . . . . 688 1,809 2,497 99

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . 837 1,538 2,375 95

1975 . . . . . . . . . . 832 1,816 2,648 105

NA = Not available. a Breed on hauled cars onlY.

SOURCE: John G. Smith.

that are part of iron and steel groups. In Belgium

and Denmark, only one manufacturer produces

passenger rolling stock. In France, the majority

of the 16 manufacturers concentrate either exclusively or primarily on rail rolling stock. The exception is Alsthom Atlantique, where railway activity represents only 15 percent of the group’s

total sales. In Great Britain, only British Rail

Engineering Ltd. (BREL) (a subsidiary of British

Railways) manufacturers intercity railway passenger vehicles. One other company specializes in

equipment for transit systems. In Italy, 80 percent of the firms operate exclusively in the railway
Ch. 7—U.S. Passenger Railcar Manufacturing ● 95

construction or repair sector. State policy to develop Southern Italy has led to investment by

EFIM (a body responsible for State holdings) in

the railway equipment construction industry.

For the EEC railway manufacturing industry,

of 120 firms involved, 91 employed less than 1,000

people in 1975, and only 12 exceeded 2,OOO employees. Of these, only 2 employed more than

5,000 people (Alsthom in France and BREL in

Great Britain).

In 1974, the EEC fleet of self-propelled cars was

20,800, and there were 51,400 hauled cars, so that

the construction rate represented about a 25-year

vehicle life. Very few changes have been made in

passenger train service levels since that time. If

Government policies regarding the support level

for passenger train services do not change, an annual production rate in excess of 2,500 vehicles

per year will be required to sustain the fleet.

Under EEC regulations, Governments may support railway systems only in the passenger sector, and then by way of payments to recompense

the railway for continuing to run passenger trains

that are socially desirable but economically unsound. Each year, the Government and the railway in each EEC country reach agreement on

which passenger routes will be supported and on

the level of payment. In recent years, there has

been virtually no change in the routes to be supported, and argument has centered on the appropriate level of support payment. The payment

is based on total costs, including depreciation and

interest, and, to the extent that revenues fall short

of operating costs, some part of the support payment eventually is used to pay for new passenger

vehicles.

Capital investment in passenger vehicles for the

railways is controlled by the EEC Governments,

but different methods are employed to finance the

shortfall between accrued depreciations and purchase price. In the case of British Railways, the

Government procures funds and lends directly to

the railway, while in France and West Germany

the railways raise funds in the open market. To

do this, they obtain a Government guarantee of

repayment, without which it would be impossible to raise the money.

EEC Governments also aid the railway systems

in a variety of other ways that also could be

regarded as support payments. In 1980, such support payments in France totaled $2.4 billion, an

increase of 76 percent from the 1970 level (at 1980

prices).’s In West Germany in the same year, support payments totaled $6.2 billion, an increase of

$4 billion (175 percent) from the 1970 level (at

1980 prices).lb In Great Britain, support payments

for 1980 totaled $1,2 billion, an increase of $1

billion on the 1970 level (at 1980 prices) .17

Prospects for a U.S. Passenger Railcar

Manufacturing Industry

Based on examination of U.S. conditions and

foreign markets, reemergence of a U.S. passenger

railcar manufacturing industry is not likely to occur unless there is an assured and predictable market. Continued improvements in standardization

of U.S. railcars, and continued improvements in

procurement procedures also have been suggested

as important factors in creating a climate favorable for manufacturer reentry into the U.S. market. However, the first requirement is by far the

most critical. Without such a market, which all

foreign railcar manufacturers have, no potential

American manufacturer is likely to regard making railcars as a profitable line of endeavor.

IsFrench Nationa] Railways (SNCF), Report and Accounts. IQSO.

“West German National Railways (DB), Report and Accounts,

1980.

17British Railways (BR), Report and Accounts, 1980.
Appendix

ACRONYMS
Appendix

ACRONYMS

AHSR —American High Speed Rail Corp.

Amtrak — National Railroad Passenger Corp.

APT – advanced passenger train

BR – British Railways

DB – Deutches Bundesbahn (West German

Railways)

EEC – European Economic Community

FRA – Federal Railroad Administration

HSGTA — High-Speed Ground Transportation

Act of 1965

HST – high-speed train

JNR – Japanese National Railways

LIM – linear induction motor

LRC – light, rapid, comfortable

LRV – light rail vehicle

LSM – linear synchronous motor

maglev —

NEC –

NECIP –

NRPA –

NSF –

OTA –

PCC –

PCU –

SNCF –

SWC –

TGV –

UMTA –

VVVF –

magnetic levitation

Northeast Corridor

Northeast Corridor Improvement

Project

National Railroad Passenger Act

National Science Foundation

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.

Congress

President’s Conference Committee

power-conditioning unit

French National Railways

Southwest Coast Corridor

Train a Grand Vitesse–French highspeed line between Paris and Lyon

Urban Mass Transportation Act

variable voltage, variable frequency

99
INDEX
INDEX

American High Speed Rail Corp., 11, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64,

68

Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corp.), 7, 10, 11,

35, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54, 60, 61, 63, 65, 84, 88, 91,

92

Arthur D. Little Co., 62

Atchison, Topeka, and Sante Fe Railroad, 62

Atlanta, Ga., 48

Bank of Tokyo Trust Co., 62

Bechtel Corp., 63

benefits, 8-10, 11

Boeing-Vertol, 90

Bombardier Inc., 90

Boston, Mass., 30, 33

Boyd, Alan, 61

British Railways (BR), 18, 19, 20, 35, 49, 94

British Rail Engineering Ltd., 94

Budd Co., 7, 63, 90

Buffalo, N. Y., 16

California, 5, 9, 48, 51, 57, 61, 62, 63, 92

California State Department of Transportation, 61

Chicago, 111., 7, 48, 67, 68

Clayton, W. Graham, Jr., 63, 90

Colorado, 60

Congress:

Congressional Budget Office, 10, 47, 53

General Accounting Office, 88

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee

on Transportation, 3

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 3

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 3, 10, 61,

62, 83, 92

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, 3

congressional role, 11-12

Consumer Price Index, 90

Denver, Colo., 48

Deutches Bundesbahn (DB), 18, 19, 76

environmental concerns, 51

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), 49, 73

First Boston Corp., 62

Florida, 5, 9, 51, 57, 64

Florida State Department of Transportation, 64

Fluor Corp., 62

French National Railways (SNCF), 16, 17, 18, 19, 24,

25, 26, 35, 40, 49

funding:

Federal, 53

private, 54

State, 53

General Electric Co., 90, 91

General Motors Corp., 91

General Rail Equipment Index, 90

high-speed passenger rail:

Atlantic City-Philadelphia, 58, 68

Buffalo-Albany, 58

Chicago-Detroit, 58, 65

Cleveland-Akron, 67

Cleveland-Cincinnati, 67

corridor fact sheet, 59

cost options, comparison of, 5, 30, 62

current corridor activity, 57

Dallas-Houston, 68

economic feasibility, 29-41

capital investment costs, 39

comfort, 35

convenience, 35

cost analysis, 39

effect of distance, 33

evaluating future demand, 38

fares, 35

frequency and speed, 33

intercity travel market, 32

market requirements, 33

market sectors, 37

market size, 30, 31

operating costs, 40

trip time, 33

equipment and track options, 5, 15, 20, 21

benefits, 8-10, 11

characteristics, 6

costs, 10-11, 18, 30

environmental impact of noise, 11

public policy, 8

technology options, 5

uncertainties, 11

foreign experience and systems:

Canada, S, 15, 17, 66

LRC train, 20

new equipment, 20

France, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 45, 73

Paris-Lyon TGV, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26,

30, 49, 51, 57, 66

population density, 31

Great Britain, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18

advanced passenger train (APT), 20

high-speed trains (HSTs), 19, 20, 57

new equipment, 20

population density, 31

TRANSMARK, 65

West Coast Main Line, 30

Japan, 3, 5, 7, 15, 17, 45, 64

environmental impact of noise, 11, 51

maglev development, 16, 71, 73, 74, 76

103
104 . U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies

population densities, 6, 31

Tokyo-Osaka, 3, 4, 9, 21, 22, 30, 46

West Germany, 5, 7, 11, 15, 18, 64

Emsland Test Facility, 51, 71, 78

maglev development, 16, 57, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78

history, 60

Las Vegas-Los Angeles, 7, 57, 63

Los Angeles-San Diego, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63

Milwaukee-Chicago, 57, 68

Montreal-New York, 65

proposals, 61

propulsion systems, 5, 15

diesel, 16, 17

electric, 16, 17

gas turbine, 16

linear motors, 16

speed limits, 49

Tampa-Orlando-Miami, 64

history, 60-61

Illinois, 57, 65

Indiana, 65, 90, 91, 92

International Transportation Exhibition, 75

Interstate Commerce Commission, 88

Japanese National Railways (JNR), 18, 21, 22, 23, 32,

40, 62, 71, 75, 76, 93

Japanese National Railroad Technology Corp., 62, 64,

93

legislation:

High-Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965

(HSGTA), 60, 88

National Railroad Passenger Act (NRPA), 60

Rail Passenger Service Act, 46, 52, 61

Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA), 88

linear motors, 16, 74, 75

magnetic levitation (maglev) technology, ix, 3, 5, 6, 7,

9, 11, 15, 16, 40, 45, 51, 57, 60

comparison with other modes, 72

concerns, 72

development, 75

economic feasibility, 72

propulsion, 73, 74

technology status, 71

major findings, 3-8

Michigan, 5, 57, 65

Michigan Department of Transportation, 58, 65

Midwest High-Speed Rail Compact, 5, 57, 65

Milrite Commission, 67

National Science Foundation (NSF), 73

National Travel Survey, 30

N. D. Lea Associates, 88, 91

Nevada, 5, 51, 57, 63

New Haven Railroad, 88

New Jersey, 68

New York, 5, 49, 50, 52, 57, 65, 66, 92

New York City, 7, 30, 35, 48, 65, 66, 86

Northeast Corridor (NEC), 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 39, 40,

45, 48, 49, 51, 60, 61, 66, 88

Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP), 66

Northeast Corridor Transportation Project, 60

Ohio, 5, 51, 57, 58, 65, 66, 67

Ohio Association of Railroad Passengers, 67

Pennsylvania, 5, 57, 58, 65, 67, 90

Pennsylvania Legislature, 67

Philadelphia, Pa., 35

population density, 31

power-conditioning unit (PCU), 74

President’s Conference Committee (PCC), 86

public benefits and costs, 8-11

public policy, question for, 8

railcar manufacturing, x, 7, 83-95

current industrial base, 90

European Economic Community (EEC), 93, 95

Federal transit commitments, 89

foreign passenger railcar manufacturing, 92

innovation matrix for railcars, 91

institutional shifts, 86

Japan, 93

long-term trend for passenger car use, 86

projected demand, 91

prospects for a U.S. industry, 95

railroad cars delivered from U.S. manufacturers, 87

trends in travel demand, 84

R. J. Barber Associates, 88

Shinkansen “bullet train,” 3, 4, 6, 9, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30,

57

social and institutional factors:

alleviating airport congestion, 48

Amtrak, 52

energy savings, 46

environmental concerns, 51

increased mobility and transport alternatives, 46

local governments, 52

passenger safety and comfort, 49

private railroad companies, 52

promotion of tourism, 48

public sentiment, 46

regional development, 48

safety and strength requirements of passenger equipment, 50

safety certification of high-speed rail technology for

operational use, 50

safety issues at the highway/rail interface (grade

crossings), 50

Southern Pacific Railroad, 62

Southwest Coast Corridor (SWC), 60, 63

Texas, 5, 57, 58, 68

Texas Railroad Transportation Co., 68

tilt-body equipment, 5, 15, 18, 20, 40, 50
Index ● 1 0 5

Transportation Systems and Market Research Ltd. Vermont, 5, 57

(TRANSMARK), 65

Transrapid International, 63 Washington, D. C., 30, 35, 61, 66

Transtech International, Inc., 63 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 91

West German Railways (DB), 76

U.S. Department of Transportation, 7, 11, 46, 57, 60, Wisconsin, 5, 57, 68

61, 66 World Bank, 21

High Speed Ground Transportation Alternatives

Study, 60

0