UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) GARY L . SMI TH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ il A c tio n N o. 07 -1 18 3 ( RWR) ) FED ERALBU REAU OF I NVESTI GATI ON, ) ) ) De fe nd ant. ) __________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON In this Free dom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) case , defe ndant was or dere d to supplement the re cord w ith reg ard to (1) its withhol ding of cer tain information under

FOIA exemption 7(D), (2) its withholding of e ntire docume nts, (3) its searc h for r ecor ds in the FB ITampa f ield office and (4) plaintiff’s re quest for disciplinar y rec ords per

taining to Ag ent Cameron D . Roe. See Memorandum Opinion and O rder (“Me m. Op.”) of

April 27, 2009 [Dkt. No. 58] at 13-14. Def endant now r enew s its mot ion for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. No. 62], which plaintiff has opposed [Dkt. No. 64] . Upon consider ation of the pa rties’ supplementa l submiss ions and the entire r ecor d, the re newe d motion will be grante d. 1. FOIA Exempti on 7(D) Def endant ha d not justi fied withholdinginformation under Ex emption 7(D) ba sed on an implied gr ant of c onfidentiality
. SeeMem. Op. at 10-11. D efe ndant furthe r explains that “plaintiff ha s a prope nsity for violenc e,” a s evidenc ed by a pre trial detention motion filed in the criminal ca se that “highlights the fa ct that the plaintiff wa s indicted on three violent offense s[,]2

and “r aises conc erns that the pla intiff would obstruct or attempt to obst ruct justice by threatening or intimidating witnesses,” and by the FB I ’s re ceipt of “ information that plaintiff thre atene d the victim and a witness in re lation to his criminal trial.” Six th Decla ration of Da

vid M. Hardy (“H ardy 6 Dec l.”) [Dkt. No. 62-2] ¶ 68. Given these a dditional facts and the nature of the th investigated cr ime, i.e. , child sexual ex ploitation, defenda nt has now ade quately

justified withholding information based on an implied g rant of c onfidentiality
. Plaintiff counters that “ any information testified to by any of the witnesse s at the Plaintiff’s criminal trial” is not conf idential and, thus, should have be en disclosed. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defenda

nt’s Renewe d Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pl.’s Opp’n” ) [Dkt. No. 64] ¶ 12. But “[p] rior disclosure of similar information does not suff ice a s a g ener al waive r of a F OIA e xemp tio n; i ns te a d, it mus t be pr ov e n th at th e inf or matio n r e qu e ste d h a s b e e n o ff ic ia lly rele ased into the public domain.” Center for Intern. Environme ntal Law v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep. , 5 05 F . Su

pp .2 d 1 50 , 1 58 (D .D .C. 20 07 ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) . “ ‘[A ] pla int if f a sse rt inga

c la im of pr ior dis c los ur e mus t be ar t

he ini tia l bu

rd e n o f p ointin gto s pe c if ic inf or matio n in the pu bli c domain that appea

rs to duplicate that be ing w ithheld.’ ” W olf v. CIA , 4 73 F .3 d 3 70 , 3 78 (D .C. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Af

sh ar v . D e p't o f St ate , 7 02 F .2 d 1 12 5, 11 30 (D .C. Cir .1 98 3) ). In th e c a se of testimony , the g overnme nt is then obligate d “to disclose only the ‘e x act infor

mation’ to which the source actua lly

testified.” Davis v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 ( D.C. Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Dow Jones &Co. v. Dep’ t of Justice , 9 17 F .2 d 5 71 , 5 77 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 0) ). Thus , “eve n when [a conf

idential] source testifies in open c ourt . . . he doe s not thereby ‘wa ive the [ g o v e r n m e n t ' s ] r i g h tt o i n v o k e E x e mp t i o n7 ( D ) t o w i th h o l d
. . . i n f o r m at i o nf ur n i s h e d b y a confide ntial source not a ctually reve aled in public.’ ” Da v is , 9 6 8 F. 2 d at1 2 8 1 (qu o t i n g Parker v

.3

Dep’ t of Justice , 934 F.2d 375, 379- 80 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff’s g ener al claim of pr ior disclosure through trial testimony fails to car

ry his burden of ide ntifying w ith specificity the
e xac t te sti mony

that is du pli c ate d in

wi thh e ld m ate ri a ls. He ha s th e re fo re no t e sta bli sh e d h is entitlement to the confide ntial source material prope rly withheld under Exemption 7(D). 2. Re c or d Se g re g a

bil ity Def endant ha d not provided any evidenc e to support a f

inding a bout rec ord segreg ability
. SeeMem. Op. at 11. It subsequently deter mined that parts of two pr eviously withheld pag es
c ou ld b e re le a se d, Ha

rd y 6 De c l., Ex. A ., but c ontin ue s to wi thh old

21 6 p a g e s in

the ir e nti re ty th under F OIA exemptions 2, 6, 7(C), 7(D) and 7( E). Ha rdy 6 Dec l. .¶¶ 7-63. In addition, th defe ndant identifies thre e pag es that we re pr operly withheld as duplicate s of re lease d pag es. Id
. ¶ 64. Mr. Ha

rdy ’s desc riptions of the withheld pag es, id . ¶¶ 8- 63, establish their conte nt as thirdparty identifying inf

ormation exempt from disclosure under Ex emption 7(C) and c onfidential
source information exempt from disclosure unde r Exemption 7(D). SeeMem. Op. at 7-11. Moreove r, Mr. Ha

rdy confirms that the w ithheld pag es we re “ car efully examined” for the specific purpose of

deter mining whe ther they

contained e x cisable material -- an examination that resulted in the suppleme ntal rele ase of two reda cted pa g es. Id . ¶ 73. Pla int if f c ha lle ng e s d e fe nd ant’ s w ithho ldi ngof do c ume nt 2 55 (a

bu sin e ss c ard ) b e c a

us e it
a lle g e dly be lon g e d to him . Pl .’ s O pp ’n ¶ 2 1. B e c a

us e a F OIA d isc los ur e is m a de “ to t he pu bli c
as a whole,” Stonehill v. I.R.S. , 558 F.3d 534, 539 ( D.C. Cir. 2009), plaintiff’s possession of the document is irre levant to the ana ly sis. See Swan v. S.E.C ., 96 F.3d 498, 499- 500 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (f inding the ide ntity

of the F OIA re quester to be g ener ally “of no significanc e”) (citing
case s). The w ithheld pag e “is a photocopy

of what appea

rs to be the ba ck of a

business car d,”
co n t ai n i n g ex emp ti n fo rm at i o n , n am el y , a t h i rd -p arty ad dre s s an d

th e “ n am es an d

i d en t i fy i n g4

information of third par

ties merely

mentioned.” Ha

rdy 6 Dec l. ¶ 12. Def

endant ha s now th proper ly justified its wit hholding of 216 responsive pa g es in their entire ty . Plaintiff contends that def endant “ over- reda cted” pag es that we re r elea sed to him and pr of fe rs a s a c omp ari so n a

n unr e da c te d c op y

of a do c ume nt t

hat th e F B Iha d r e le a se d w ith reda ctions, Pl.’s Opp’n at 6 & Ex s. E-F , and a r edac ted document f rom the United States Postal Se rv ic e , Pl .’ s E x. D. Th e latte r d oc ume nt i s ir re le va nt b e c a us e it a pp e ars to h ave c ome fr om a non-par ty and has nothingto do with this case . As for the former two documents, plaintiff doe s not reve al the sourc e of the unreda cted doc ument but assuming that he obtained it during dis c ov e ry in t he c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s, “ a c on sti tut ion a lly

c omp e lle d d isc los ur e to a sin g le pa rt y simply does not enter

the public domain.” Cottone v. Reno , 193 F.3d 550, 556 ( D.C. Cir. 1999). Moreove r, “the fac t that information exis ts in some form in the public domain does not
n e c e s s ar i l y

m e anth ato f

f i c i a l d i s c l o s ur e w i l l n o tc a u s e h ar mc o g n i z a

b l e un d e r a F O IA exemption.” W

olf , 4 7 3 F
. 3 d at2 3 8 ( c i t at i o no m i t t e d )
. T hu s , ana g e n c y r e s p o n d i n gt o a

F O IA reque st is not foreclosed f rom asser ting e x emptions to withhol d information that it had previously

disclosed to a par

ty in a non-F OIA proc eeding
. Se eSto ne hil l , 558 F.3d at 539 (r e je c tin gc ha lle ng e to a g e nc y ’s se pa ra te F OIA r e vie w o f d oc ume nts pr e vio us ly re vie we d in response to civil discovery reque st in part beca

use “the stakes of disclosure [t o the public at larg e] are greater in the F OIA context”). When, as here , the ag ency has shown that it rele ased a ll reasona bly seg reg able r esponsive
rec ords, no issue re mains to be resolve d under the FOI A. See Perry v . Block, 684 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“ [O] nce a ll requested r ecor ds are surre ndere d, fede ral c ourts have no f urtherPlaintiff claims for the f irst time that defenda

nt has failed to r elea se re cords that we re 1 ref err ed to the F BI

from the Executive Of

fice for United States A ttorney s. Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 23 & Ex . A. Any

claim base d on the FB I ’s proc essingof the re fer red r ecor ds is not only

beyond the scope of this li tigation, seeMe m. O p. at 1- 2, but is a lso pr e matur e be c a us e “ the F B Iis c ur

re ntl y proce ssing the[] refer

red r ecor ds.” Pl.’s Ex . A (a g ency response to administrative appea l). 5 statutory function to perf

orm.”). Def

endant is now e ntitled to judgment on its withholdi ngof 1
re sp on siv e mate ri a l. 3. The Sea

rch f or Recor ds in the Tampa F ield Offic e A re lease d memorandum that wa s purportedly sent to the FB I ’s Tampa

Field Of fice raised a question about the ade quacy of def endant’ s sear ch, which ha d located no r ecor ds there. SeeMem. Op. at 13. De fenda nt conducted “ a sec ond sear ch” of files in the Tampa

Field Of fice

“ that [we re ] lik e ly

to y ie ld r e c or ds re sp on siv e to p la int if f’ s r e qu e st, ” inc lud ing“ fo ur ob ta ina ble
cross-r efe renc es,” but located no re sponsive rec ords. Har dy 6 Dec l. ¶ 72. It theref

ore “ has th deter mined that the memora

ndum . . . may

have be en improper ly

indexed in our filing sy stem[.] ” Id . Def endant’ s failure to uncover the memora

ndum from this otherwise a dequate sear ch “doe s not demonstrate the ina dequac y of [the] sear ch.” Boyd v . Criminal Div. of U.S. Dept. of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 390 - 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (c itations omi tted). In the abse nce of any signs of bad faith in the ag ency ’s sea

rch, de fenda

nt is now entitled to judgment on its searc h for r esponsive
rec ords. See Ground Saucer W atch, Inc . v. C.I.A. , 692 F.2d 770, 771 ( D.C. Cir. 1981) (“I n order to preva il on this appea l [ involving the a g ency ’s sea rch], . . . appellant must point to evidence sufficie nt to put the Age ncy ' s g ood faith into doubt.”). 4. Records Per

taining to Ag ent Roe Def endant ha d not responded to plaintiff’ s reque st made to the Atlanta F ield Offic e and FB IHea dquarte rs for disc iplinary rec ords per

taining to Ag ent Cameron D . Roe. SeeMem. Op.6

at 1 n. 1. Defen dan t i s n eit her c on fi rm in g nor d eny in g the e x is ten ce of su ch re cord s as per FBI policy “whe n reque sts have bee n made f or ac cess to informa

tion pertainingto third parties[.] ” 6 th Har dy Dec l. ¶ 69. Such a re sponse is commonly known as a

“Glomar ” re sponse, see Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Age ncy , 546 F.2d 1009 ( D.C. Cir. 1976) (involving a CI A re sponse to a F OIA r e qu e st f

or re c or ds pe rt a ini ngto a

sh ip, the “ Hu g he s G lom ar E xplor e r” ), and is ty pic a lly invoked to protec t the privac y interests of third-pa

rty individuals under FO IA exemptions 6 and 7(C), se eBa rb os a v . D ru

g E nfo rc e me nt A dm in ., 541 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110-11 (D .D.C. 2008) (n oti nga g e nc y

e xplanatio n “ that D EAe mpl oy s G lom ar r e sp on se s to pr ote c t th e pr iva c y int e re sts of third-pa

rty individuals pursuant to FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C) and to pre vent the dra wingof adver se infer ence s from its responses to re quests for c onfidential informa nt rec ords”)
. Although Mr . Har dy

has not cited a

ny FOIA exemptions, he ex plains that any responsive “information [ ] would be ex empt from disclosure in all instances whe re the persona l privacy int e re sts outw e ig hs [sic ] the pu bli c int e re st i n d isc los ur e .” Ha rd y 6 De c l. ¶

69 . M r. Ha

rd y a lso th contends, a ssuming the e x istence of responsive r ecor ds, that the Glomar r esponse avoids “the damag e to the individual’s per sonal privac y [t hat] would have alre ady occur red by the mere confirmation of the exist ence of re sponsive rec ords,” id ., and that if, a s plaintiff sug g ests, Ag ent Roe is an FB Iemploy ee, “ then he would have substantial privac y interests in his name and identifying inf

ormation not beingrele ased.” Id. ¶ 70. FOIA Exempti on 6 protec ts information about individuals in “personnel a nd medical f

iles and similar files the disclosure of which w ould constitute a clea rly unwar rante d invasion of pe rs on a l pr iva c y .” 5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) (6 ). Al l in fo rm atio n th at “ a pp lie s to a

pa rt ic ula r i nd ivi du a l” would qualify

for c onsideration under

this ex emption. U. S. De

p't o f St atev . W as hingto n P os t Co. , 4 56 U. S. 5 95 , 6 02 (1 98 2) ; see also New Y ork Times Co. v. NASA , 920 F.2d 1002, 1005“We do not addre ss the applicability of Exemption 6 because the district court did not 2 rule on that issue.” Dunke lberger , 906 F.2d at 781. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (e n banc) . Although E x emption 7(C) may be equa lly

applicable , seeMem. Op. at 7-8, the r equeste d rec ords fa ll squarely within the ty

pe, i.e . “per sonnel” files, that Ex emption 6 is d e signe d to pr ote c t. See also Carter v. U.S. D ep’t of Commerc e , 8 30 F .2 d 3 88 , 3 90 n. 6 ( D. C. Cir. 1987) (“T he Supreme Court has held spec ifically that rec ords of disciplinary proce eding s are ‘s i m i l ar fi l es ’ w i th i nth e m ea n i n g o f t h e s t atu t e. ”) (c i t i n g De p’ t of theAi r F orc ev . R os e , 4 25 U. S. 35 2, 37 6- 77 (1 97 6) ). Th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

Cir c uit ha s id e nti fi e d “ a

[] g e ne ra l inte re st i n pr ote c tin gthe pr iva c y

of [one ’s ] em

plo y me nt r e c or ds a g a ins t pu

bli c dis c los ur e . . . [and ] at le a st
a min ima l inte re st i n n ot h avin git k no wn wh e the r t ho se re c or ds c onta in o r d o n ot c onta in [di sciplinary

action].” Dunke lberger v. D ep’t of Justice , 906 F.2d 779, 781 ( D.C. Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s rea sons for see king A g ent Roe’s disciplinary rec ords wer e pre viously

found ins uf fi c ie nt t o w arr ant d isc los ur e of the e xemp t r e c or ds ba se d o n a n o ve rr idi ngpu

bli c int e re st, Mem. Op. at 8-9, a

nd “something , even a

modest privacy

interest, outweighs nothing e very time.” Nat’l Ass'

n of Retired Fed. Em

ployee s v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 879 ( D.C. Cir. 1989);
acc ord Consumers’ Check book Center for the Study of Se rvice s v. U.S. De

p’t of Health and Human Serv ices , 554 F.3d 1046, 1056 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). Be cause defe ndant’s conf irmation of
rec ords conc erning“[a]ny adver se ac tion or disciplinary repor ts on Ag ent Cameron D . Roe” would nece ssarily

reve al the pre cise infor

mation Ex emption 6 shields, the Glomar re sponse was proper . See Dunke lberger , 906 F.2d at 781 (holding w ith respec t to request for ag ent’s re cords “that Exemption 7(C) was proper ly invoked and the F BI ' s ref usal to confirm or de ny

the exis tence of letters of

repr imand or suspension [was] fully justified”). 28 CONCLUSI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the F BI ’s final motion for summary judgme nt is gra

nted. A separ ate f inal Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.
_________/s/_____________ RI CHARD W. R OB ERTS DA T E : Oc t o b er

1 9 th , 2 0 0 9 Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge