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. 70 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA * * * * In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES W. KESLING, Deceased. * * * * APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT WALWORTH COUNTY , SOUTH DAKOTA * * * * THE HONORABLE SCOTT P. MYREN Judge * * * * JOHN R. VON WALD of Von Wald Law Offices Selby, South Dakota Attorneys for appell ant Sandra L. Kesling. ONNA B. HOUCK of Cutler & Donahoe LLP Sioux Falls , South Dakota At torney s for appell ee, Estate

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* * * * CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON MA Y 2 1 , 201 2
OPINION FILED 

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- #26204 GILBERTSON, Chief Justice. [¶ 1. ] James W. Kesling executed a holographic will. After James died, the will was admitted into probate and James’s three daughters were appointed as co

personal representatives of James’s estate. Both the Est ate and James’s wife, Sandra, petitioned the circuit court to construe the will. The Estate moved for summary judgment and the circuit court granted the motion. Sandra appeals, arguing that the will is ambiguous , and thus, the court erred by not consider ing extrinsic evidence as to James’s intent. FACTS [¶ 2. ] James Kesling executed a hologra phic will on April 2, 2008 , and passed away on July 4, 2008. He was survived by his wife, Sandra, and three daughters from a previous marriage, Kandi Smi th, Staci Stern, and Jami Mendoza. Sandra and James had been married for twenty

- nine years and did not have any children together. [¶ 3. ] The holographic will read as follows: April 2, 2008 10:00 A.M. Last Will and Testament of James W. Keslin g Dated this 2 nd Day of April 2008 I James W. Kesling do hereby will all my personal property and personal belongings to Sandra L. Kesling of Mobridge who is my wife. This includes my land in Dewey, Corson and Walworth Counties. I also will my Contract For Deed with Faron Schweitzer, Coffy Enright and Richard Enright. It is my wish that my Estate be Administrated my By my daughters and and [sic] upon Sandra L. Kesling [sic] death the Estate shall be divided Equally between my 3 daughters (over) I James W.#26204

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- Kesling being of Sound Mind and body do Hereby Sign this Document. James signed the document and Sandra notarized it. After James died, t he will was admitted into probate and James’s three daughters were appointed as co

- personal representatives of Jam es’s estate. [¶ 4. ] The daughters and Sandra did not agree on the meaning of James’s will. The daughters believed that James intended to give Sandra a life estate in his real and personal property with a remainder to the three daughters. Sandr a believed that James intended to leave all property with Sandra outright with the “wish” that Sandra would then pass her property to James’s daughters when Sandra passed away, or that if Sandra predeceased James, the daughters would inherit James’s proper ty upon his death. Both the Estate and Sandra petitioned the court to construe the will. [¶ 5. ] The Estate moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit
court granted the motion, holding that the will unambiguously demonstrates Jame s’s intent to devise his real and personal property to Sandra for life with the three daughters as remaindermen. Sandra appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶ 6. ] “We review the interpretation of a will under the de novo standard of review, with no defe rence given to the circuit court’s interpretation.” In re Estate of Seefeldt , 2006 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 720 N.W.2d 647, 649.#26204

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- ANALYSIS [¶ 7. ] “The primary goal in interpreting a will is to determine the testator’s intent.” Id. ¶ 8. “In determining testamentary intent, all words and provisions appearing in a will must be given effect as far as possible, and none should be cas t aside as meaningless.” Id. “If the intent is clear from the language used, that intent controls.” Id. “If doubt exists as to the testator’s intent, the language used and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing will again be examined in light of pertinent rules of construction.” Id. [¶ 8. ] Testamentary “[l]anguage is ambiguous when it is reasona bly capable of being understood in more than one sense.” In re Estate of Klauzer , 2000 S.D. 7, ¶ 10, 604 N.W.2d 474, 477. “An ambiguity is not of itself created simply because the parties differ as to the interpretation of the will.” Id. “E xtrinsic evi dence is admissible to clarify any ambiguity.” Id. [¶ 9. ] Here, the parties’ dispute revolves around the fourth sentence of James’s will, which reads: “It is my wish that my Estate be Administrated my By my daughters and and [sic] upon Sandra L . Kesling [sic] death the Estate shall be divided Equally between my 3 daughters [.]” The Estate argues that this language is unambiguous and demonstrates James’s intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. Sandra responds that the fourth sentence is ambiguous because it is reasonably capable of being understood in at least three ways: (1) devising all property to Sandra with the “wish” that she then pass it on to the daughters upon her death; (2) devising all property to Sandra unless Sandra predeceases James, and in that case, devising all property to the#26204

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- three daughters; and (3) the Estate’s interpretation. Thus, Sandra argues, the circuit court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence to determine Ja mes’s intent. Sandra emphasizes James’s use of the noun “wish” at the beginning of the fourth sentence. We find Sandra’s arguments unpersuasive. [¶ 10. ] Sandra’s first interpretation of the fourth sentence (that it devises all property to Sand ra with the “wish” that she then pass it on to the daughters upon her death) ignores the plain language of the will. James wrote that his estate, not Sandra’s estate, shall be divided among his daughters. James capitalized “estate” which shows that James is referring back to his estate as referenced in the beginning of the sentence. In addition, James used the verb “shall” which demonstrates the mandatory nature of this instruction

. [¶ 11. ] As part of this first interpretation, Sandra emphasize s James’s use of the noun “wish” at the beginning of the sentence, arguing that “wish” equates to a mere suggestion that carries through the entire sentence through the conjunction “and.” Sandra also argues that “wish” makes the will ambiguous. We reject these argument s . The language in the fourth sentence is not ambiguous

– James’s wished that his three daughters would administrate his estate and James mandated that upon Sandra’s death, his estate be divided among his three daughters. There is no need to carry the noun “wish” over because James uses the verb “shall” after the conjunction , leaving two independent clauses

. Furthermore, the will as a whole demonstrates James’s intent to include his daughters from a previous marriage in his estate. The wi ll’s language does not show any intent by James to possibl y disinherit his three daughters by devising all of his property to Sandra outright#26204

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- with the mere hope that she would then pass her estate on to the daughters, especially considering the fact that J ames named the daughters as personal representatives of his estate. Therefore, we conclude that Sandra’s first interpretation of James’s will is unreasonable. [¶ 12. ] Sandra’s second interpretation of the fourth sentence is that it devises all pro perty to Sandra unless Sandra predeceases James, and in that case, it devises all p roperty to the three daughters

. However, in reading James’s will as a whole, we reject this interpretation. No ne of the language James used in the will address es the issue of Sandra predeceasing him

. Instead, the will only addresses issues arising after James’s death. Moreover, i n the first part of the fourth sentence, James discusses who will administrate his estate. It is not reasonable to interpret the second half of the fourth sentence as addressing Sandra predeceasing James when the first half of the same sentence covers the administration of James’s estate, an event independent of Sandra’s death

. Instead, James’s unambiguous language demonstrates that the fourth se ntence concentrates on situations arising after James’s death . Therefore, we also find this interpretation of James’s will unreasonable. [¶ 13. ] The only reasonable interpretation of James’s will is that James intended to give Sandra a life estat e in his real and personal property with James’s three daughters as remaindermen. James used unambiguous language that is not reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense. Extrinsic evidence is only admissible to clarify an ambiguity, an d thus, is not needed in this case

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- determine that [James’s] intent is clearly expressed within the four corners of the document.” See Klauzer , 2000 S.D. 7, ¶ 14, 604 N.W.2d at 478. CONCLUSION [¶ 14. ] We conclude that James’s intent is clearl y expressed within the four corners of his holographic will and extrinsic evidence is not needed. We are bound by the unambiguous language of the will, which demonstrates James’s intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. [¶ 15. ] Affirmed. [¶ 16. ] KONENKAMP and ZINTER, Justices, concur. [¶ 17. ] SEVERSON and WILBUR, Justices, dissent.

SEVERSON, Justice (dissenting). [¶ 18. ] I respectfully dissent. “ Our goal ‘ in interpreti ng a will is to discern the testator’ s intent. ’” Novak v. Novak , 2007 S.D. 108, ¶ 12, 741 N.W.2d 222, 226 (quoting In re Estate of Klauzer , 2000 S.D. 7, ¶ 9, 604 N.W.2d 474, 477). “ If intent is clear from the language used, that intent controls. ” In re Estate of Roehr , 2001 S.D. 85, ¶ 9, 631 N.W.2d 600, 603 (quoting Estate of Klauzer , 2000 S.D. 7, ¶ 9, 604 N.W.2d at 477) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]f doubt exists as to the testator’s intent , ‘ the language used and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing will

. . . be examined in light of pertinent rules of construction. ’ ” In re Estate of Seefeldt , 2006 S.D. 74, ¶ 8, 720 N.W.2d 647, 649 (quoting In re Estate of Brownlee , 2002 S.D. 142, ¶ 16, 654 N.W.2d 206, 210). In this case, t he majority opinion concludes that we need not consider extrinsic#26204

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- evidence because “ [t] he only reasonable interpretation of James’s will is that James intended to give Sandra a life estate in his real and personal property with James’s three daughters as remaindermen.” Majority Opinion, supra ¶ 13. I disagree. [¶ 19. ] James’s will states, “I James W. Kesling do hereby will all my personal

pr operty and personal Belongings to Sandra L. Kesling of Mobridge who is my wife. This Includ es my Land in Dewey, Corson and Walworth Counties. I Also will my Contract For Deed with Faron Schweitzer, Coffy Enright, and Richard Enright.” (Emphasis added.) By using the term “will,” James clearly directed his property to pass to his wife. However , the language James used in the following sentence of his will was less definite: “It is my wish T hat my Estate be Administrated my By my daughters and and [sic] upon Sandra L. Kesling[’s] death the Estate shall be divided Equally between my 3 daughters

. . . . ” (Emphasis added.) If this sentence is read in conjunction with the remaining provisions of the will, it is unclear whether James intended “to control the disposition of his property,” or whether he was “simply indicating what he regard[ed] as a wi se disposition.” In re Estate of Nelson , 274 N.W.2d 584, 587 (S.D. 1978) (citation omitted). [¶ 20. ] We have recognized, “It is not necessary that technical words be used to make a disposition of property.” Estate of Nelson , 274 N.W.2d at 587. But we have noted that “an instrument which is merely precatory, i.e., it advises or recommends a disposition but leaves the actual disposition of the property within the discretion of another, is not testamentary in character.” Id

. “Whether words in

a will are to be construed as mandatory or as merely precatory is not always solely determinable by the nature of the words themselves . . . .” Id . at 588 (citation#26204

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- omitted). T he meaning of such words “ must be determined from the manner in which such words are used in connection with other phraseology of the will. ” In re Walsh ’ s Estate , 59 S.D. 277, 239 N.W. 240, 241 (1931) (citation omitted)

. See Estate of Nelson, 274 N.W.2d at 588 (noting that, to determine the meaning of a will, this Court “will look t o the expressed intention of the testator, as found from the context of the will ”). [¶ 21. ] After reading James’s will in its entirety, one could reasonably conclude, as the majority opinion does, that James intended to grant his wife a life
estat e in his real and personal property, with James’s three daughters as remaindermen. But one could also reasonably conclude that James intended to grant his wife a fee simple interest in his property. Although James expressed a “wish” that his estate would be divided equally between his three daughters upon his wife’s death, one could reasonably conclude that James intended this to be a recommendation to his wife regarding the future disposition of his property , not a binding command. [¶ 22. ] In d etermining whether testamentary language is ambiguous, we have stated: “Language is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.” In re Estate of Jetter, 1997 S

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. 125, ¶ 20, 570 N.W.2d 26,
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- 31 (quoting In re Estate of Olson, 332 N.W.2d 711, 713 (S.D. 1983)). “ Where a will is ambiguous on its face,

. . . extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish the intent of the testator. ” Id . ¶ 27 (citing In re Estate of Nelson , 250 N.W.2d 286, 288 (S.D. 1977) ; In re Estate o f King , 278 N.W.2d 171, 173 (S.D. 1979) ) . Here, James’s will is reasonably capable of being interpreted in more than one sense. The circuit#26204

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- court thus erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of the testator ’s intent

. For th is reason, I respectf ully dissent. [¶ 23. ] WILBUR, Justice, joins this dissent.