alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2009

Decided March 31, 2009

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee,

v.

ALAN M. JUNGELS,

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 06 CR 33

‐ 4

James B. Zagel,

Judge

.

O R D E R

Alan Jungels pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement that included an

appeal waiver, to one count of distributing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).

The district court sentenced Jungels to 240 months in prison, the statutory maximum.

Jungels filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seek to withdraw under

Anders v. California

, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because they cannot discern a nonfrivolous basis for

appeal. Jungels has not accepted our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion. See C IR

. R.

51(b). Because counsel’s supporting brief is adequate, we limit our review to the potential

issues identified in the brief. See United States v. Schuh

, 289 F.3d 968, 973

‐ 74 (7th Cir. 2002). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 2018 Page 2

Counsel begin by telling us that Jungels does not wish to challenge his guilty plea.

So counsel appropriately refrain from discussing whether Jungels could argue that his plea

was not voluntary. See United States v. Knox

, 287 F.3d 667, 670

‐ 71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel consider only one potential issue: whether Jungels can challenge his

sentence. But as counsel note, the appeal waiver forecloses any argument challenging his

sentence except a claim that the district court relied on a constitutionally impermissible

factor or that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. See United States v. Lockwood

,

416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bownes

, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).

Neither of those issues is relevant here; thus, any argument that the court erred in imposing

Jungels’s sentence would be frivolous.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 836 

To redesignate Gravelly Point Park, located along the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway in Arlington County, Virginia, as the Nancy Reagan 

Memorial Park, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 6, 2023 

Mr. ISSA (for himself, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. LAMALFA, Mr. ADERHOLT, Mr. 

BUCK, Mr. CAREY, Mr. BABIN, Mr. OBERNOLTE, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mrs. 

KIM of California, Mr. MIKE GARCIA of California, and Mr. CALVERT) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To redesignate Gravelly Point Park, located along the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway in Arlington County, Virginia, as the Nancy Reagan Memorial Park, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION. 

4 Gravelly Point Park, located along the George Wash5 ington Memorial Parkway in Arlington County, Virginia, 

6 shall be redesignated as the ‘‘Nancy Reagan Memorial 

7 Park’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 836 IH

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

3 paper, or other record of the United States to Gravelly 

4 Point Park shall be deemed to be a reference to the Nancy 

5 Reagan Memorial Park. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PENTAIR WATER POOL AND SPA, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

HAYWARD INDUSTRIES, INC., HAYWARD POOL 

PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1722

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 2:11-cv-10280-GWMRW, Judge George H. Wu.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

MARK BOLAND, Sughrue Mion, PLLC, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

RAJA N. SALIBA, GRANT SIMON SHACKELFORD, KENNETH J.

BURCHFIEL. 

LEE CARL BROMBERG, McCarter & English, LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by KEITH E. TOMS, LORI JANE SHYAVITZ, AMY JOY 
 

TINDELL; SCOTT S. CHRISTIE, MATTHEW ADAM SKLAR, 

Newark, NJ.

______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (MOORE, O’MALLEY, and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

February 8, 2016 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

 Date Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Clerk of Court
#### MARY DONATE, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT-PETITIONER.

*Messrs. Stryker, Tams ■& Dill*and *Mr. John J. Monigan, Jr.*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Joseph Butt*for the respondent.

March 26, 1968.

Denied.
#### Anastasia Britt, *Administratrix, etc., Respondent, v.*Francis Alexandre and others, *Appellants.*

Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to abide event. Opinion by Barker, J.
* Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy** Electronic Copy * MS Public Service Commission * 8/13/2015 * MS Public Service Commission * Electronic Copy*
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 56 (Friday, March 23, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 13825]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5391]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Manufacturer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Application

    Pursuant to Sec.  1301.33(a) of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), this is notice that on December 7, 2006, Sigma 
Aldrich Research, Biochemicals, Inc., 1-3 Strathmore Road, Natick, 
Massachusetts 01760, made application by letter to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of the 
basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedule I:

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Drug                               Schedule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Psilocybin (7437)..........................  I
5-Methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine (7439).  I
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The company plans on manufacturing reference standards for research 
purposes only.
    Any other such applicant and any person who is presently registered 
with DEA to manufacture such a substance may file comments or 
objections to the issuance of the proposed registration pursuant to 21 
CFR 1301.33(a).
    Any such written comments or objections being sent via regular mail 
should be addressed, in quintuplicate, to the Deputy Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Washington, DC 20537, Attention: DEA Federal Register 
Representative/ODL; or any being sent via express mail should be sent 
to DEA Headquarters, Attention: DEA >Federal Register Representative/
ODL, 2401 Jefferson-Davis Highway, Alexandria, Virginia 22301; and must 
be filed no later than May 22, 2007.

    Dated: March 9, 2007.
Joseph T. Rannazzisi,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
 [FR Doc. E7-5391 Filed 3-22-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lpath, Inc. (the Corporation) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Scott R. Pancoast, President and Chief Executive Officer and I, Gary J. G. Atkinson, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,
of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Corporation.

Date: May 12, 2010



/s/    Scott R. PancoastScott R. PancoastPresident and Chief Executive Officer/s/    Gary J.G. AtkinsonGary J.G. AtkinsonVice President and Chief Financial Officer


A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Lpath, Inc. and will be retained by Lpath, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of Lpath, Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 22

- 00301

- CR

Jonathan Guia , Appellant

v.

The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. CR

- 17

- 0025

- C , THE HONORABLE DWIGHT E. PESCHEL , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Jonathan Guia has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. The motion is

signed by both appellant and his attorney. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). We g rant the motion and

dismiss the appeal. See id

.

____ ________ ____ _

_________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Smith

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: June 10, 2022

D o Not Publish
No. 58627.

protests 227701-K and 229767-K (New York).

#### Continental Importing Co. and Morco Trading Co. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise is composed of rush and is not of grass nor of rice straw; that merchandise of like character is now being assessed at 20 percent under said paragraph 1021, as modified, *supra;*and that the termination of the said General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with respect to concessions therein initially negotiated with China (T. D. 52587), insofar as said paragraph 1021 is concerned, related only to floor coverings of grass or of rice straw. Upon the agreed statement of facts, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### THELMA GLASICO, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND LIMITED APPELLANT, v. ROSE RIBBON & CARBON MFG. CO., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

Argued December 16, 1963

Decided May 4, 1964.

Jír. *Isidor Kalisch*argued the cause for respondent-appellant, by its insurance carrier, New Jersey Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company.

*Mr. Bobert J. 8. Mc-Coid*argued the cause for respondent, by its insurance carrier, Insurance Company of North America *(Messrs. Schneider & Morgan,*attorneys; *Mr. Henry G. Morgan,*of counsel; *Mr. Stanley J. Perwin,*on the brief).

*314*Mr. Seymour B. Jacobs*argued the cause for petitioner-respondent and limited appellant *(Messrs. Balk & Jacobs,*attorneys; *Mr. Seymour B. Jacobs,*of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered

Pee Curiam.

This is a companion case to *Bond v. Rose Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,*42 *N. J.*308 (1964). Both matters accompanied each other through the various proceedings. We granted the petition to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Division, 40 *N. J.*499. Their marked factual-legal similarity obviates the necessity of separate treatment, and we conceive that what we have said in *Bond*applies with equal force here.

We therefore affirm for the reasons stated by the Appellate Division in *Bond v. Rose Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,*78 *N. J. Super.*505*(App. Div.*1963), subject to our additional statements contained in *Bond,*42 *N. J.*308, including those pertaining to costs, fees and interest.

Affirmed subject as aforesaid.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Erancis, Proctor, Hall, Sohettino and Haneman — 7.

*For reversal*— Hone.
#### Sheldon Blittner, Appellant, v Friesch-Groningshe Hypotheebank Realty Credit Corporation, Respondent.

[633 NYS2d 148]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered June 1, 1994, which, *inter alia,*granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and granted defendant summary judgment as to liability on its counterclaim for reimbursement of certain expenses, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Despite language in the commitment letter that there could be no oral modification of its, terms, plaintiff argues that the deadline for closing of the loan was modified orally several times. There is, however, no evidence of performance unequivocally referable to the alleged waiver of the original closing deadline *(see, Absolute Direction v Anderson,*201 AD2d 256). No deadline was extended orally on the basis of a "specific, identifiable promise” *(Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Gramercy Twins Assocs.,*199 AD2d 214, 217). Nothing in the written agreement remotely suggests that defendant’s expenses would be paid from the $250,000 commitment fee. Concur— Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ross and Tom, JJ.
No. 38911.

#### Protests 796127-G, etc., of American Aniline Products, Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Evans, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
No. 58622.

protest 209777-K (New York).

#### Rosenfeld Kent Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise is similar in all material respects to the linoleum the subject of *United States*v. *Pacific Overseas Co., W. J. Byrnes & Co.*(42 C. C. P. A. 1, C. A. D. 559), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
Company's unaudited interim  Consolidated  Financial  Statements as of March 31,
2000  contained  in the  Company's  Annual  Report on Form 10-KSB for the period
ended March 31, 2000 and is  qualified  in its  entirety  by  reference  to such
Financial Statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                             MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                                APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                                  MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           2,274
<SECURITIES>                                   603,790
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,093
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    171,053
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               793,611
<PP&E>                                         379,651
<DEPRECIATION>                                  46,437
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,813,293
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          640,335
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,454
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,160,933
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,813,293
<SALES>                                        750,456
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               849,486
<CGS>                                          629,040
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,057,011
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,431
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,431
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,148,314)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,148,314)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,148,314)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.08)

</TABLE>
#### The People on the relation of Peter R. Messler v. Silas Simonson.

An appeal to tlie Supreme Court will lie from an order of tlio Circuit Court in Chancery, adjudging a party guilty of a contempt in violating an iojunction, and awarding a sum of money to the opposite party, to indemnify him for the violation

*Heard November*27th, 1861.

*Decided January*20th.

Motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for the county of Shiawassee in Chancery.

*A. Pond,*for the motion.

*M C. Wallcer,*contra.

Manning J.:

This is an appeal from an order made under §4094 of Compiled Laws, punishing defendants for a contempt for violating an injunction, which the relator moves to have dismissed. The section is as follows:

> “If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any 'party, by the misconduct alleged, the Court shall order a sufficient sum to be paid by the defendant to such party to indemnify him, and to satisfy his costs and expenses, instead of imposing a fine upon such defendant; and in such case, the payment and acceptance of such sum shall be an absolute bar to any action by such aggrieved party to recover damages for such injury or loss.”

The order is final, and can not be reviewed unless on an appeal from the order itself. It is more of a oivil than criminal nature; its principal object being to compel defendants to make compensation to the relator for the injury they have done him in violating the injunction, rather than to vindicate the dignity of the Court and the majesty of the laws. For these reasons wo are all of opinion the motion should be denied.

The other Justices concurred.'
#### Wolfley et al. *v.*Lebanon Mining Co.

In oases of appeal to the supreme court, tlie order of the court allowing the appeal, must prescribe the amount of the bond.

*Appeal from the District Court of Clear Creek County.*

Judgment in ejectment was rendered Juñe 80,1875, from which the district court allowed an appeal, but the penalty of the bond was not specified in the order. Time was allowed for filing bond until the 15th day of October, 1875, the same to be approved by the clerk, and on the 9th day of that month appellants filed a bond in the sum of $300.

Mr. H. M. Teller now moved to dismiss the appeal upon several grounds, one of which was that the court had not prescribed the penalty of the bond.

Mr. L. C. Rockwell, for appellees, suggested that the court did in fact fix the penalty of the bond, and that the amount was entered in the judge’s minutes, and so the clerk certified.

*Per Curiam.*

The statute (R. S. 513) requires in cases of appeal that a bond shall be given in a reasonable sum, sufficient to cover the amount of the judgment appealed from and costs.

How this reasonable sum shall be ascertained is not stated, but it is clear that the court should fix it. If the statute prescribed the amount of the bond there would be nothing required of the court in respect to that matter, but as that has not been done in the law the order of the court is necessary.

We think that the amount of the bond is an essential part of an order allowing an appeal, and in the present case the order is fatally defective.

As, howefer, it is suggested that the amount of the bond was in fact fixed by the district court, we will con*65tinue the cause to enable appellants to move in the district court to amend the order.