United States Trade Representative 

June 2013

Report on WTO Enforcement 

Actions: Russia
2
1

Introduction

This report was prepared pursuant to section 201(b) of the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik 

Repeal and Sergei Magnitskiy Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-208). This Act

requires the U.S. Trade Representative not later than 180 days after the United States extends 

permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to the products of the Russian Federation (Russia), and 

annually thereafter, to submit a report to the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate and the 

Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives describing the 

enforcement actions taken by Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) against Russia to 

ensure Russia’s full compliance with its obligations as a Member of the World Trade 

Organization (WTO), including any obligations under agreements with members of the Working 

Party on the accession of Russia to the WTO.1

Russia in the World Trade Organization 

On August 22, 2012, following 18 years of negotiations with the United States and other 

Members of the WTO, Russia became a Member of the WTO. At that time, however, the 

United States and Russia each invoked non-application of the WTO Agreement with respect to 

the other. On December 21, 2012, following the termination of the application of the JacksonVanik amendment to Russia and the extension of PNTR to the products of Russia, the United 

States and Russia both filed letters with the WTO withdrawing their notices of non-application 

and consenting to have the WTO Agreement apply between them. 

 1 P.L. 112-208 also requires the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to submit annual reports to the 

Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 

Representatives regarding Russia’s implementation of the WTO Agreement, as well as its accession to 

and implementation of the Information Technology Agreement and Agreement on Government 

Procurement. The first report is due in December, 2013. In addition, USTR and the Secretary of State 

are required to submit annually to the same committees a report that describes the actions the agencies 

have taken to promote the rule of law in Russia and that discloses the status of any pending petition for 

espousal filed with the Secretary of State by a U.S. investor in Russia. 
2

A significant benefit to the United States of Russia’s WTO Membership is the integration of 

Russia into the WTO system of established, enforceable, multilateral trade rules. As a WTO 

Member, Russia is required to apply its trade regime in a manner consistent with WTO rules, 

including those on national treatment, most favored nation treatment, transparency, technical 

barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and protection and enforcement of 

intellectual property rights, among many others. Not only does the WTO establish these rules, 

but it offers a range of tools and opportunities for Members to hold other Members accountable 

for implementing their WTO commitments. Those tools can include quiet advocacy between 

experts on the margins of WTO meetings, working with other Members with common concerns, 

open expressions of concern and discussions in WTO committee meetings, informal 

consultations, and, if necessary, formal dispute settlement proceedings. Thus, a WTO Member 

can work to ensure that another Member complies with its commitments through a variety of 

engagements, both bilaterally and multilaterally. 

Russia, the Customs Union and the WTO

Russia began its move toward closer economic ties with its neighbors by signing the Treaty on 

the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) on October 10, 2000.2

 On 

January 1, 2010, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus began implementing a Customs Union (the 

Customs Union or CU) by adopting a common external tariff. On July 1, 2010, a common CU 

Customs Code entered into effect, and on July 1, 2011, the CU Parties abolished all customs 

posts on their internal borders, allowing for the free flow of most goods among the CU Parties. 

Beginning in early 2012, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) replaced the CU 

Commission as the supranational body charged with implementing external trade policy for CU 

Parties. When it joined the CU, Russia transferred authority over many aspects of its foreign

trade regime to the CU, including import tariff levels, trade in transit rules, nontariff import 

measures (e.g., tariff-rate quotas, import licensing, and trade remedy procedures), customs 

policies (e.g., customs valuation, customs fees, and country of origin determinations), border 

enforcement of intellectual property rights, establishment and administration of special economic 

 2 EurAsEC includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
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and industrial zones, and the development of technical regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary 

measures. As a result, many of Russia’s WTO commitments are implemented through CU 

measures. In such cases, Russia’s commitments specifically provide that they apply whether the 

Russian government or the competent bodies of the CU are responsible for implementation of the 

relevant commitment. 

Enforcement of Russia’s WTO commitments

When Russia became a WTO Member, it had in place a legal regime allowing compliance with 

its WTO obligations that went into effect from the date of accession.

3

 In fact, during the 18 

years of negotiations to join the WTO, Russia amended or adopted numerous laws, decrees, 

orders, regulations, decisions, and other measures to implement WTO rules and its specific 

commitments through its domestic legal regime. In addition, because certain aspects of Russia’s 

WTO commitments fall under the competence of the CU or EurAsEC, some CU and EurAsEC 

treaties, decisions, regulations and other measures also had to be amended or adopted to 

implement Russia’s WTO commitments. The vast majority of these measures came into effect

prior to Russia’s membership in the WTO.

Even before the WTO Agreement applied between the United States and Russia, USTR

augmented its engagement with the government of Russia by using the tools of the WTO to 

ensure that Russia complied with its WTO commitments. As detailed below, USTR has used 

WTO committee meetings to highlight potentially WTO-inconsistent behavior; has forged 

alliances with other WTO Members to urge Russia to modify its behavior or avoid taking certain 

actions; and has met with representatives of the Russian government in connection with WTO 

committee meetings to press our issues bilaterally prior to raising them in the full committee. 

 3 Russia’s WTO Protocol included transition periods for Russia’s automotive investment 

incentive programs (until July 1, 2018) as well as for its special economic zones (until December 

31, 2014 for Magadan, and March 31, 2016 for Kaliningrad). 
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

As a WTO Member, Russia must implement the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 

Measures (SPS Agreement) and the specific commitments in its Working Party Report. For 

example, Russia committed to align its sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures with 

international standards, recommendations, and guidelines by the date of its accession to the 

WTO or to provide a risk assessment to justify its more stringent requirements. The United 

States has noted its concerns in various WTO meetings about Russia’s implementation of 

particular SPS obligations, such as the harmonization of sanitary and veterinary measures with 

the relevant international standards, the adoption of inspection guidelines in accordance with 

Codex Alimentarius (“Codex”), and ensuring that SPS measures that are more stringent than 

international standards are based on science and risk analyses. For example, Russia has not, to 

date, provided risk assessments conducted consistent with international standards, guidelines and 

recommendations to the United States and other Members requesting them to support more 

stringent requirements for any microorganism or veterinary drug residue. Specifically, Russia 

has a near zero tolerance for tetracycline residues, a standard more stringent than Codex’s 

maximum residue levels (MRL), but has failed to provide to WTO Members an adequate risk 

assessment. Russia also has adopted a zero tolerance for ractopamine, a standard more stringent 

than Codex’s MRL for pork and beef. 

The United States has met with representatives of the Russian government, from the highest 

levels to technical experts on the margins of SPS Committee meetings, to press Russia to address 

these concerns and request that Russia amend its requirements for micro-organisms and 

veterinary drugs either to accept the international standards or to provide a risk assessment 

conducted consistent with international standards, guidelines and recommendations to justify its 

more stringent standards. Russia recently published a purported scientific justification for its 

measure on ractopamine, and the United States, working in close consultation with U.S. industry 

and interested stakeholders, is reviewing the information provided by Russia. 

As part of Russia’s WTO accession negotiations, in November 2006, the United States and 

Russia signed bilateral agreements in which Russia agreed: 1) to grant U.S. regulatory officials

of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the authority to certify new U.S. 
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establishments and U.S. establishments that have remedied a deficiency to export meat and 

poultry to Russia; and 2) to meet specific deadlines for responding to U.S. requests to list 

facilities that U.S. authorities had inspected and determined to be in compliance with the 

requirements to export to Russia. In practice, however, Russia has not recognized consistently 

FSIS’ authority to certify additional U.S. facilities, and there have been delays in responding to 

U.S. requests to update the list of U.S. facilities approved to export to Russia. With the CU now 

having competence over approval of establishments and inspections, in some cases, Russia has 

insisted that FSIS provide guarantees that products for export to Russia meet Customs Union 

requirements, despite the continued validity of our bilateral U.S.-Russia export certificates. The 

United States has met bilaterally with Russia to discuss these concerns and press Russia to 

include FSIS-approved facilities in the list of establishments approved to export to Russia. We

have also pressed Russia, both bilaterally and in the WTO, to cease maintaining lists of 

establishments for certain products in accordance with relevant CU decisions that remove these 

requirements and to implement fully its WTO obligations. 

Motor Vehicle Recycling Fee 

In September 2012, Russia introduced a “recycling fee” on sales of wheeled vehicles for the 

announced purpose of covering the cost of establishing a recycling industry. Domestic 

manufacturers of wheeled vehicles, however, do not have to pay the fee if they agree to assume 

the responsibility to recycle the vehicle at the end of its life. Both bilaterally as well as in 

meetings of the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, the United States, along with other Members, 

has objected strenuously to the apparent discriminatory nature of the fee. The United States also 

has registered its concern with the amount of the fee itself, particularly on large construction 

vehicles, and submitted written questions to the Russian delegation seeking further information 

about implementation of the program. In response to these concerns, on May 30, the Russian 

Duma published proposed amendments to the recycling law that would revise the program and 

apply the fee to domestically produced vehicles as well as to imports. USTR will monitor 

carefully the implementation of this stated commitment to ensure that our objectives are 

achieved. 
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Information Technology Agreement

As part of the terms for its membership in the WTO, Russia committed to join upon accession 

the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). However, when Russia submitted its ITA 

schedule to the ITA Committee, Members noted that a few tariff lines were missing from 

Russia’s draft ITA schedule. The United States and other Members have repeatedly raised 

concerns, in the ITA and other WTO committees, about Russia’s failure to complete its ITA 

accession. As a result of this engagement, Russia has agreed that the missing tariff lines should 

be added, and has completed its domestic political approval process to do so. Russia has sent the 

schedule to the EEC for modification of the Customs Union’s tariff schedule. Once this internal 

review is completed, Russia can submit the revised schedule to the ITA Committee for review 

and, then membership in the ITA. USTR will continue to monitor this process to ensure its 

successful conclusion. 

Intellectual Property Rights

As a condition of WTO membership, Russia amended numerous laws and regulations to bring its 

IPR legal regime into conformity with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 

Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Nevertheless, as part of the TRIPS Council’s mandate to review 

the intellectual property laws of new WTO Members, the United States submitted a number of 

questions to the Russian Federation. The objective of these questions is to enhance our 

understanding of Russia’s Civil Code concerning procedures related to licenses and transfer of 

ownership of intellectual property rights, and the operation of laws regarding copyrights, 

trademarks, industrial design, patents, and data protection. In addition, we sought additional 

information on how Russia provides intellectual property protection for plant varieties and 

integrated circuits.

Transparency

As a WTO Member, Russia has assumed obligations to make its (and the Customs Union’s) 

trade regime more transparent. These obligations include, inter alia, the requirement to publish, 

and to notify the WTO about, measures (laws, decrees, orders, etc.) pertaining to or affecting 

trade in goods, services, and intellectual property, as well as the formal establishment of notice 

and comment procedures for such proposed measures prior to their adoption. Through the WTO 
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accession process, and since becoming a Member, Russia has provided to WTO Members a 

significant number of laws, decisions, regulations, resolutions, and other measures related to its 

foreign trade regime and its implementation of WTO rules. As a Member, Russia has made an 

effort to comply with these transparency obligations, notifying new measures as well as 

amendments to existing measures, but a transparent, standardized system for providing 

notifications on issues such as TBT is not yet in place in Russia. The United States will continue 

to encourage Russia to develop a regularized, comprehensive notification system consistent with 

the TBT transparency requirements. 

Notwithstanding Russia’s many notifications, the United States has used a variety of WTO 

committee meetings, as well as bilateral meetings on the margins of WTO meetings, to identify 

instances in which Russia has not notified measures, as well as to seek additional information 

and to provide comments on certain measures that have been notified. For example, although 

Russia notified some of its import licensing measures, the United States, joined by other WTO 

Members, used meetings of the Import Licensing Committee to remind Russia of its obligation 

under Article 7.3 of the Agreement to respond to the Questionnaire on Import Licensing 

Procedures. The United States has also identified specific Russian and CU laws, decisions, 

regulations, resolutions, and other measures that are a part of Russia’s import licensing regime 

and asked that Russia notify them to the WTO. Russia said that it would respond to the U.S. 

questions. 

The United States has similarly used the meetings of the Committee on Technical Barriers to 

Trade (TBT) to request that Russia notify certain CU and Russian technical regulations which

Russia had not yet notified. To date, Russia has followed up by notifying the regulations in a 

reasonable period of time. The United States has raised concerns about the comment periods 

provided by Russia or the EEC, as appropriate, on draft technical regulations to ensure that the 

United States and interested parties have adequate time to comment. The United States has also 

reminded Russia of its obligation to respond to comments submitted by Members. Finally, the 

United States has asked Russia to notify its regional trade arrangements, including the Customs 

Union, to the WTO. 
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Technical Regulations Governing Alcoholic Beverages

In October 2010, Russia’s Federal Service for Alcohol Market Regulation (FSR) adopted 

regulations under Order Number 59n governing the technical conditions for storage of alcoholic 

beverages. The United States is concerned that these regulations impose burdensome and 

unnecessary restrictions on storage practices. In addition to engaging the Russian government in 

bilateral meetings prior to Russia’s WTO accession, the United States has raised substantive 

concerns about this Order in the WTO TBT Committee, for example, encouraging Russia to take 

steps to ensure that the inspections and licensing of alcoholic beverage warehouses are 

performed in a timely and transparent manner, with clear guidance available for all parties. We 

also suggested that Russia allow businesses to renew their warehouse licenses well before their 

expiration to avoid trade disruptions. Throughout our engagement, the United States has 

reminded Russia of its obligations under the TBT Agreement to avoid creating unnecessary 

obstacles to trade in the process of revising these regulations. Following our engagement, Russia 

amended Order 59n, addressing many of our concerns; however, we continue to monitor the 

situation.

The United States has also raised substantive concerns regarding duplicative registration 

requirements on alcohol in Russia. At the national (i.e., Russian government) level, alcoholic 

beverage products must receive state registration from two different government agencies. In 

2011, the Customs Union introduced yet another level of registration, duplicating in large part

the certification and reporting requirements already applied at the national level. In 2012, a third 

Russian government agency, the FSR, proposed yet another registration requirement. In both 

bilateral engagements as well as in the TBT and other WTO committee meetings, the United 

States has requested that Russia clarify the relationship among these various reporting and 

certification requirements and urged Russia to streamline the process by eliminating the apparent 

duplication of reporting and registration requirements. We also reminded Russia of the 

obligation to respond to Members’ questions. Following this engagement, the CU announced 

that it will remove its registration requirement; we will continue to press for implementation of 

this decision and simplification of the process overall. 
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Safeguard Investigations

As a WTO Member, Russia must ensure that any safeguard measure imposed within its territory, 

including the investigation that led to that measure, is consistent with the WTO Agreement on 

Safeguards. Under the terms of Russia’s WTO Protocol, this obligation applies even though the 

EEC conducts a safeguard investigation. When Russia became a WTO Member, it provided to 

the WTO the applicable CU legislation governing the conduct of EEC safeguard investigations 

and notified three EEC safeguard investigations. The investigation of most interest to U.S. 

stakeholders concerns combine harvesters and modules. The United States has used the 

meetings of the WTO Committee on Safeguards to question Russia about the EEC’s 

methodology, and the consistency of its actions with various provisions of the WTO Agreement 

on Safeguards. In addition, on the margins of the Safeguards Committee meeting, the United 

States, in conjunction with other Members, met with representatives of Russia and the EEC and 

raised concerns specific to the investigation on combine harvesters. On April 30, 2013, Russia 

notified WTO Members of the EEC’s affirmative serious injury determination. The 

investigation now moves to the remedy stage, with a decision due by early July. We will 

continue to monitor the EEC’s safeguard investigations, continue to engage with Russia on the 

investigation of combine harvesters and other matters of concern, and assess any and all 

appropriate next steps in this matter, in consultation with industry once Russia has taken its final 

decision.

Trade-Related Investment Measures

Since 2005, Russia has maintained an automotive industry investment incentive regime which 

allows for the duty-free entry of auto parts used in the production of vehicles that contain a 

certain level of Russian content. In December 2010, Russia initiated a second automotive 

industry investment incentive program that increased the production volume and domestic 

content requirements to qualify for the incentive. As part of its WTO accession protocol, Russia 

agreed to eliminate the elements of both of its investment regimes that are inconsistent with the 

Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) by July 2018, and to begin 

consultations in July 2016 with the United States and other WTO Members on WTO-consistent 

measures it could take in this sector. In a TRIMS Committee meeting, the United States asked 

Russia to confirm that its automotive industry investment incentive program would be brought 
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into conformity with its WTO obligations by July 1, 2018, and solicited information on steps 

Russia was taking to eliminate the WTO-inconsistent aspects of the programs. The United States 

also requested that Russia inform the TRIMs Committee on a regular basis of the steps that will 

be taken with a view to consulting interested WTO Members and eliminating the relevant 

programs. Russia agreed to provide a written response to these requests. 

The United States has also raised concerns in the TRIMS Committee about a leasing program 

established by RosAgroLeasing (RAL), a state-owned leasing company created to supply 

agricultural equipment to farmers in Russia. Under the leasing program, RAL will provide 

favorable leasing terms to farmers on agriculture equipment “manufactured in the Russian 

Federation”. This requirement raises concerns regarding its compliance with the TRIMs 

Agreement and Article III of GATT 1994. The United States asked Russia for additional 

information on the terms under which RAL leases agriculture equipment and on the definition of 

“manufactured in the Russian Federation”. The United States also asked Russia what steps it 

would take to ensure that this program operated in a manner consistent with Russia’s WTO 

commitments.

Committee on Government Procurement 

In its WTO Accession protocol, Russia committed to request observership in the WTO 

Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and to begin negotiations to join the GPA within 

four years of accession. On the margins of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement

meeting, the United States met bilaterally with Russia to urge Russia to request observership. 

Thereafter, on May 15, 2013, Russia submitted its request to become an observer under the GPA. 

Russia became an observer on May 29th when the WTO Committee on Government Procurement 

formally accepted Russia’s request.
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Conclusion

Russia’s membership in the WTO brings the sixth largest economy into the rules-based 

international economic system. The implementation of the commitments Russia made upon 

becoming a Member will benefit U.S. businesses and workers by improving market access for 

U.S. exports of goods and services and generating more exports for American manufacturers and 

farmers, in turn supporting well-paying jobs in the United States. Market-opening changes made 

by Russia during the course of its WTO accession process may already have brought benefits to 

U.S. exporters, as evidenced by the fact that year-on-year percentage growth in U.S. exports to 

Russia was up 29 percent in 2012 over 2011, and up another 10.5 percent through the first 

quarter of 2013 compared with the first quarter of 2012. In order to maximize positive results 

such as these, USTR, in concert with other U.S. government agencies, will continue to monitor 

closely Russia’s implementation of its WTO commitments. If Russia or the CU acts in ways that 

appear not to be consistent with Russia’s scheduled commitments-- for example, by restricting 

market access, imposing discriminatory rules on U.S. exports of goods or services, providing 

prohibited or trade-distorting subsidies to Russia’s domestic enterprises, or other actions --

USTR will investigate and continue to use all appropriate means to resolve the matter, including, 

as needed, the full panoply of WTO tools, including dispute settlement where appropriate, to 

ensure that Russia’s and the CU’s measures (including how they are applied) conform to 

Russia’s WTO obligations.