2023 UT App 140

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN RICHARD JESSOP,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210544-CA

Filed November 16, 2023

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Michael D. DiReda

No. 191902276

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Melissa Jo Townsend, 

and Scott D. Goodwin, Attorneys for Appellant,

assisted by law students 

Jared Erekson and Rachel Johnson1

Sean D. Reyes and Natalie M. Edmundson, 

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Justin Richard Jessop appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion seeking dismissal of the two charges against him for 

assault against a peace officer, arguing that the court erred in 

holding that State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, does 

not apply where the possibly exculpatory evidence never came

into existence. He also appeals the court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence gathered from police questioning that took 

1. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-807 (governing law student practice 

in the courts of Utah).
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 2 2023 UT App 140

place in the hospital after he was shot by police, arguing that the 

court incorrectly held that he was not in custody at the time of 

questioning. Because we conclude that Tiedemann does not apply 

to evidence that never existed, and because we agree that Jessop 

was not in police custody when he was first interviewed at the 

hospital, we affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Jessop and Lily3 were romantically involved. One night in 

early June 2019, Lily reported to police that, during a heated 

argument, Jessop retrieved a handgun, pointed it at her head, and 

pulled the trigger. But because there was not a live round in the 

gun’s chamber, the gun did not go off. Jessop then turned the gun 

on himself and pulled the trigger. For the same reason, the gun 

again did not fire. He told Lily that if she called the police there 

would be a “blood bath” and, at one point, he threatened to kill 

her. Understandably, Lily fled the house and called the police, but 

Jessop continued to send her text messages. Following Lily’s flight 

from the house, Jessop “fired a .40 caliber handgun” and “a 9mm 

handgun” from his front porch and sent Lily a text message 

saying, “I’m gonna go bad on these fuckers.”

¶3 Based on Lily’s report, the police understood Jessop to be a 

restricted person who could not legally possess firearms. Officers 

from the local SWAT team were called, but they discovered that 

Jessop had left the house. Police contacted Jessop via his cell 

phone and requested that he turn himself in. He refused, and the 

police began searching for him. Though refusing to turn himself 

2. “In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, 

we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

findings.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 4 n.1, 428 P.3d 1052

(quotation simplified).

3. A pseudonym.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 3 2023 UT App 140

in, he continued to talk with a police negotiator, and the police

were able to “ping” his phone and direct officers to Jessop’s 

approximate location. But they were unable to find him.

Subsequently, two Weber County Sheriff deputies (Deputy 1 and 

Deputy 2) were assigned to assist in finding Jessop, and they 

received updates regarding Jessop’s location. 

¶4 After responding to multiple ping locations where Jessop 

was said to be without finding him, the deputies responded to an 

updated location and spotted a lone man walking down the street,

whom Deputy 1 identified as Jessop. Deputy 1 later recounted to 

an investigator that on recognizing Jessop, “He opened his door, 

got out of the vehicle before it was put in park, and started giving 

commands to Mr. Jessop.” But Jessop did not stop or show both 

of his hands, as instructed, and he began to run down a rugged 

trail.

¶5 Following Deputy 1’s identification of Jessop, Deputy 2 

exited his vehicle and “attempted to send his dog after [Jessop] 

but the dog did not see him and started going the other way.”

Disregarding his dog, Deputy 2 returned his attention to Jessop 

and later indicated that he saw Jessop’s “cell phone being held to 

his head with one hand” while “[t]he other hand [was] hidden 

from [Deputy 2’s] view.” Both deputies indicated that they 

continued to command Jessop to “show your hands,” to which 

Jessop responded that he would not and at one point stated, “Fuck 

you.” Following this exchange, the deputies recounted that Jessop 

“turn[ed] and present[ed]—and point[ed] a handgun at” them. At 

this realization, Deputy 2 “fired two rounds at [Jessop], and 

realizing that he had no cover, dropped to the ground and 

continued to fire at [Jessop] until [he] was no longer a threat.”

Deputy 1 also saw Jessop point a gun in his direction and fired his 

weapon at Jessop. 

¶6 During the entirety of this encounter, both deputies were 

wearing body cameras, but neither deputy activated his body 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 4 2023 UT App 140

camera until “shortly after” they fired at Jessop. As recounted in 

a medical report, Jessop sustained multiple serious injuries from

being shot “once in the back, once in the posterior hip region, once 

in the face and once in the wrist.” After being shot, Jessop was 

handcuffed and searched. The search revealed that Jessop 

possessed two handguns. Due to the severity of Jessop’s injuries, 

his handcuffs were removed following the search, and he was 

taken to the hospital, accompanied by a SWAT medic.

¶7 Following the shooting, an Ogden City Police detective 

(Detective) came to the scene of the shooting to be briefed on a 

domestic violence and officer-involved shooting case. Detective 

testified that once on the scene, he was assigned to investigate the 

domestic violence that preceded the officer-involved shooting. He

recounted that as part of his briefing on the domestic violence, he 

was informed that Jessop “had a gun pointed at him” but he was 

not informed that Jessop had pointed a gun at the deputies. 

Detective further recounted that he concluded “it could be a 

possibility” that Jessop was a restricted person because, although 

it was suggested by Lily, Jessop’s status as a restricted person was

at that point “uncertified.”

¶8 Jessop was admitted to the hospital in the early hours of

June 3, 2019, where he promptly underwent surgery. He was 

placed in the ICU around 6:00 a.m. Because of the major surgery

and associated consequences, hospital staff implemented a 

regimen of powerful pain medications and sedatives. But 

beginning at around 5:30 p.m. that same day, hospital staff began 

to “detoxify” Jessop and did not administer any further doses of 

certain powerful medications—specifically a short-acting 

sedative and a highly addictive pain medication. Although Jessop 

was detoxifying from the more powerful medications, hospital 

staff continued to monitor and mitigate Jessop’s pain, 

administering other pain medication again around 8:00 p.m.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 5 2023 UT App 140

¶9 At some point, hospital staff reached out to Detective and 

said that Jessop was “awake and communicating” and that he was

“making statements about wanting to unplug his medical

devices,” which raised concerns that he was suicidal. On the heels 

of this communication, Detective and a second detective arrived 

at the hospital by around 8:00 p.m. to fill out an involuntary 

commitment order as requested by hospital personnel and to 

interview Jessop regarding the domestic violence incident. Prior 

to the interview, Jessop’s nurse advised the detectives that Jessop 

was communicating well and that he “would be able to answer 

their questions appropriately.” Jessop’s nurse testified that Jessop 

“was able to understand her questions, did not have any difficulty 

answering her questions and . . . had been given doses of”

powerful sedatives and pain medications “prior to the detectives 

arriving but the side effects of those medications had worn off 

prior to the interview.”

¶10 Before beginning the interview, Detective informed 

hospital staff that Jessop did not need to be guarded “as he was 

not being detained, was not in custody at that time,” was 

“absolutely not a suspect,” and was “a free person.” The 

detectives also advised Jessop directly “that he was not under 

arrest” and was “not being detained” and “that they just want[ed]

to get his side of the story” but “he was not under any obligation 

to talk to them.”

¶11 At around 9:00 p.m., the detectives began interviewing 

Jessop. For the duration of the interview, the door to the hospital 

room was open so anyone could come in or leave the room at any 

time, and Jessop was not placed in handcuffs or otherwise 

restrained by the detectives. The State maintains that the

interview lasted approximately 30 minutes and consisted of 

mostly “yes or no” questions, which Jessop responded to through 

nonverbal actions and in writing. Detective testified that during 

the interview, there were “only nods and yeses and [answers] in 

written form on a . . . clipboard with a magic marker and a paper.”
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 6 2023 UT App 140

Detective further testified that Jessop was “coherent” and “was 

able to track [their] conversation,” even though he was 

experiencing a visible degree of discomfort during the interview.

But this discomfort did not affect his ability to answer the 

detectives’ questions, although at one point he asked Detective to 

stop the interview to clarify a previous answer.

¶12 At the beginning of the interview, Jessop asked the 

detectives whether he was under arrest. Responding to the 

question, Detective said, “You’ve been shot; you could be a 

victim.” Then, near the end of the interview, Jessop asked what he 

was charged with, and Detective responded, “Nothing yet. I say 

yet, though, because possibly.” At the end of this interview, 

Detective asked Jessop whether they could return the next day to 

ask more questions. Jessop responded by nodding his head in the 

affirmative. 

¶13 Jessop was “not arrested or detained and remained out of 

custody for approximately three months prior to being booked 

into . . . [j]ail for his pending charges” of, in relevant part, two 

counts of assaulting a peace officer. Following his arrest, Jessop

elected to waive his preliminary hearing, and the case was set for 

trial. Jessop filed both a motion to suppress evidence gathered 

from the detectives’ first interview4 and a motion to dismiss all 

charges.

Motion to Suppress Evidence

¶14 In his motion to suppress evidence, Jessop cited the 

seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and 

asserted that “an individual has a Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment right to remain silent as well as a Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel in all criminal proceedings” but that “[t]hose 

rights may be effectively waived when the interrogating officer 

4. Jessop was interviewed on other occasions, but these interviews 

are not at issue in this appeal.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 7 2023 UT App 140

reads the ‘Miranda rights’ admonition and receives a waiver from 

the defendant.” Jessop argued that the detectives’ questioning 

qualified as a custodial interrogation and that he had thus been

“entitled to a valid Miranda warning during his interview with 

detectives on June 3rd, 2019.” Jessop relied on our Supreme 

Court’s decision in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096, 

arguing that a “custodial interrogation occurs, and Miranda

warnings are required where there is both: (1) custody, and 

(2) interrogation.” See id. ¶ 34. Quoting Miranda, Jessop asserted 

that custody attaches “after a person has been taken into custody 

or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 

way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. He also asserted that interrogation 

can be “either express questioning or its functional equivalent”

involving “words or actions on the part of police officers that they 

should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response.” See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 

300–02 (1980) (emphasis omitted).

¶15 Expanding on his assertion that he was interrogated while 

in police custody, Jessop reasoned that after he was shot by the

deputies, which was the sole reason he was hospitalized, “police 

handcuffed him and conducted a search incident to arrest” before 

he was transported to the hospital while “accompanied by a 

SWAT medic.” He argued that “[w]hile bedridden inside an 

intensive care unit at the hospital, [he] was questioned by 

Detectives . . . , who were there to investigate the alleged domestic 

violence and weapons crimes.” He further argued that “[t]he 

detectives’ questions amounted to an interrogation, as they were 

intended to, and did in fact, [elicit] inculpatory responses from 

[him].” Based on these assertions, Jessop reasoned that he had 

been subjected to a custodial interrogation that entitled him to his 

Miranda warning prior to questioning. And absent that warning, 

he contended, his statements should be suppressed.

¶16 The State opposed the motion, arguing that Jessop’s “Fifth 

Amendment rights were not violated as the Miranda rights were 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 8 2023 UT App 140

not required because [he] was not in custody.” The State quoted 

our decision in State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, 272 P.3d 769, 

reiterating that 

the Utah Supreme Court has identified four factors 

that aid in determining whether a person is in 

custody for Miranda purposes: (1) the site of 

interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused 

on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of 

arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of 

interrogation.

Id. ¶ 50 (quotation simplified). See Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 

1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).

¶17 The State contended that after applying those four factors 

to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detectives’

interview, Jessop was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and,

thus, his Miranda rights were not triggered and waiver of those 

rights was not required. In support of this contention, the State 

argued the following:

First, [Jessop] was in a large patient room, he was 

not restrained to the bed in any way other than for 

medical purposes and the door was open. Second, 

during the first interview the detectives did not 

indicate that [Jessop] was under suspicion of any 

crime, instead they told [him] they just wanted to 

get his side of the story and even when [he] asked 

“what am I charged with,” [Detective] responded 

“nothing yet!” . . . . Third, the detectives did not 

position themselves in a way that was threatening 

or menacing, did not inform [Jessop] he was under 

arrest, informed medical personnel that they did not 

need to post an officer outside the room and did not 

make any suggestion or movements that they 

would use their handcuffs. Finally, the detectives
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 9 2023 UT App 140

did not tell [Jessop] that he had to speak with them 

at any time, they only asked minimal question[s] 

that were investigatory in nature and the first 

interview lasted only approximately thirty 

minutes[.]

¶18 Following argument, the court ruled from the bench. The 

court first stated that “it’s a close call, admittedly, because . . . 

[Jessop] clearly [was] in the hospital because he’[d] been shot.”

But the court noted that its focus centered on the crucial question 

of “what a reasonable person would believe under the 

circumstances.” The court indicated that “[w]hen you look at the 

indicia of arrest, it seems like there just isn’t any indicia of arrest. 

He’s just in a hospital room convalescing from some very serious 

wounds that he received.” The court made mention of Detective’s

indication to Jessop “that his focus was not on [Jessop] as a 

suspect,” that “[h]e was just trying to figure out what had 

happened and whether [Jessop] was a victim or whether he was a 

perpetrator,” and that Jessop “wasn’t necessarily being targeted 

as a suspect.”

¶19 The court then considered the initial interaction between 

Jessop and the detectives and noted that when the detectives first 

approached Jessop, they inquired, “Is it okay if we talk to you for 

a minute and get your side of the story?” The court commented

that the detectives’ approach was permissive, which it thought 

was “important.” The court’s focus then turned to the pivotal 

exchange where Detective informed Jessop that he was “not 

under arrest,” to which Jessop responded by inquiring again if he 

was under arrest. Jessop’s nurse confirmed Detective’s earlier 

statement that Jessop was not, in fact, under arrest. The court 

determined that a reasonable person in Jessop’s circumstances 

would not have considered themself to be custodially detained by 

the police even if the person had been previously detained at the 

scene of a shooting and was later hospitalized, because there was 

a detective saying, “You’re not under arrest. You’re not being 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 10 2023 UT App 140

detained. We’re just here to get your side of the story. Can we chat 

with you so we can get all sides of the story?” And the court noted 

that several of these statements were confirmed by a hospital 

nurse. Thus, the court determined that because Jessop was not in 

police custody at the hospital, he had not been subjected to 

custodial interrogation requiring a recital of the Miranda

warnings. The court consequently denied the motion to suppress.

Motion to Dismiss

¶20 In his motion to dismiss, Jessop focused on the deputies’

failure to activate their body cameras prior to the shooting. Jessop 

argued that the deputies violated his right to a fair trial when, 

after locating him, they exited their vehicles without activating 

their body cameras. Quoting State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479

(Utah 1975), he argued that the “right to a fair trial . . . is violated 

if ‘those charged with the prosecution, including police officers,’

deliberately destroy or fail to preserve evidence that is material to 

the guilt or innocence of the accused.” He then cited State v. 

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, contending that our 

Supreme Court adopted a “two-part test for analyzing whether 

dismissal is appropriate in cases involving the loss, destruction or 

failure to preserve material evidence.” See id. ¶ 44. He asserted 

that under Tiedemann, a court must consider 

(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the 

evidence, including the degree of negligence or 

culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the 

degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the 

materiality and importance of the missing evidence 

in the context of the case as a whole, including the 

strength of the remaining evidence.

Id.

¶21 Jessop argued that under the first part of the Tiedemann test, 

“by failing to activate their body worn cameras prior to engaging 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 11 2023 UT App 140

[him], [the deputies] failed to preserve video evidence of what 

actually happened in the moments leading up to and during the 

shooting.” Jessop further argued that the deputies’ failure was 

“negligent per se” because under section 77-7a-104(4) of the Utah 

Code “the officers were required . . . to ‘activate the body-worn 

camera prior to any law enforcement encounter, or as soon as 

reasonably possible,’” and “[t]here was no reason why the officers 

in this case would have been unable to activate their cameras prior 

to engaging [him].” Under the second part of the Tiedemann test, 

Jessop contended that “in light of the material value of [the body 

camera] evidence,” the “degree of prejudice . . . [was] extremely 

high.” Based on these arguments, Jessop contended that “both 

prongs of the test weigh in favor of dismissal” and requested that 

the court “dismiss all charges.”5

¶22 In response, the State contended that the deputies 

had complied with section 77-7a-104(4) “[i]n that they 

activated their body worn cameras as soon as reasonably 

possible given the circumstances they were confronted with.” See

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7a-104(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022).6 The 

State argued that section 77-7a-102(3) directly addressed

law enforcement’s utilization of body cameras and 

specifically provided that chapter 7a of title 77 “does not 

require an officer to jeopardize the safety of the public, other 

law enforcement officers, or himself or herself in order to 

5. Jessop’s motion requested that the district court dismiss this 

matter in its entirety. At the hearing, however, defense counsel 

indicated that the defense was not asking the court to dismiss the 

entire case but instead just the charges pertaining to what the

deputies’ body camera footage would likely have revealed.

6. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at 

the relevant time do not differ from those currently in effect in any 

way material to this appeal, we cite the current version of the code 

for convenience.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 12 2023 UT App 140

activate or deactivate a body-worn camera.” See id. § 77-7a-102(3) 

(2017).

¶23 The State argued that when the deputies finally 

encountered Jessop after responding to multiple possible 

locations, they were operating on information that he had pointed 

a gun at Lily and threatened to kill her, “that he was armed with 

two handguns, that he had fired off two shots in a residential 

neighborhood, that he was a convicted felon and a restricted 

person, and that he had said that if police were called, there would 

be a bloodbath.” The State argued that “[b]ased on all those 

factors, the deputies were legally obligated to take [Jessop] into 

custody to make sure he did not endanger anyone else.” The State 

noted that the deputies “were confronted with an on-going 

emergency and requiring them to stop what they were doing and 

take their attention away from this dangerous suspect in order to 

insure that their cameras were activated . . . is the very type of 

circumstance that was intended when the legislature left the 

exception ‘or as soon as reasonably possible’ in” section 77-7a-104(4).

The State further contended that “[a]s soon as the threat to the 

public and to the officers was alleviated, [the deputies] turned on 

their cameras.”

¶24 The court also ruled on this motion from the bench. The 

court said: “Because nothing was destroyed, this isn’t a 

destruction case. If anything, it’s a failure to preserve case, which 

Tiedemann doesn’t actually speak to.” The court considered the 

“reasonableness or the reason for the lack of preservation of this 

evidence” and “the reasonable thoughts an officer would have”

under the circumstances described above. In its consideration of 

the deputies’ actions, the court observed that it would be 

reasonable for them to be thinking,

I’ve got an armed suspect. He’s agitated. He’s made 

threats that there’s going to be a bloodbath. He’s 

already engaged in alleged aggravated assault. And 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 13 2023 UT App 140

we’re on alert. And so they, of course, are focusing 

first and foremost on public safety and their own 

safety. And . . . to some degree the safety of Mr. 

Jessop.

¶25 With respect to these considerations and the requirements 

under Tiedemann, the court found that there was no lost or 

destroyed evidence. The court then determined that, under the 

statute, the deputies’ activation of their body cameras “at the 

completion of the shooting when there was no longer the threat

. . . was reasonable” in consideration of officer and public safety. 

In that vein, the court determined that the deputies “did not act 

in bad faith” and “did not act unreasonably given the 

ever-changing circumstances and the evolution of facts that . . . 

came about as they were attempting to locate Mr. Jessop.” 

Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss.

¶26 The court later memorialized in writing its rulings from the 

bench denying Jessop’s motions to suppress evidence and to 

dismiss charges. Jessop subsequently entered into a plea 

agreement with the State, in which he entered both a no-contest 

Sery plea7 and an Alford plea8 regarding the two charges of assault 

7. As has been codified for many years in rule 11(j) of the Utah 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, “a Sery plea is a conditional plea in 

which a defendant pleads guilty (or no contest) but reserves the 

right to appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress 

certain evidence. If the appellate court reverses the denial of that 

motion, the defendant’s plea is withdrawn.” Kamoe v. Ridge, 2021 

UT 5, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d 720 (quotation simplified). See State v. Sery, 

758 P.2d 935, 937–39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 

8. An Alford plea 

is a type of guilty plea in which a defendant does 

not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless 

(continued...)
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 14 2023 UT App 140

against a peace officer. He also pled guilty to all other charges not 

dismissed by the State as a part of the plea agreement.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶27 Jessop raises two issues on appeal. He first contends that

the court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the assault 

against a peace officer charges, arguing that his right to due 

process was violated because the State destroyed exculpatory 

evidence. “Whether the State’s destruction of potentially 

exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law that 

we review for correctness, though we incorporate a clearly 

erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual 

determinations.” State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 18, 395 P.3d 111

(quotation simplified).

¶28 Jessop next contends that the court erroneously denied his 

motion to suppress, arguing that the detectives’ questioning while 

he was in the hospital constituted a custodial interrogation

requiring a Miranda warning. “We review the trial court’s factual 

findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear 

error, while we review a trial court’s ensuing conclusions of law 

for correctness.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 16, 272 P.3d 

769 (quotation simplified).

waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court 

for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were 

guilty. These pleas allow courts to impose a prison 

sentence upon an accused who is unwilling 

expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with 

grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and 

accept the sentence.

State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, ¶ 5 n.2, 449 P.3d 223 

(quotation simplified). See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 

35-36 (1970).
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 15 2023 UT App 140

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss9

¶29 The district court denied Jessop’s motion to dismiss,

holding that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Tiedemann, 

2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, was inapplicable to this case. The court 

held that no video evidence of the police shooting had been 

destroyed and, accordingly, concluded that this was not a 

destruction of evidence case, stating, “If anything, it’s a failure to 

preserve case, which Tiedemann doesn’t actually speak to.” Jessop 

argues that the court’s conclusion that Tiedemann did not apply

deprived him of due process.

¶30 The Utah Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be 

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”

Utah Const. art. I, § 7. In Tiedemann, our Supreme Court 

considered the due process right to protection against the State’s 

loss or destruction of possibly exculpatory evidence. With the 

objective of providing an “adequate safeguard,” our Supreme 

Court implemented the following two-part framework to deal 

9. Jessop presents this purely as a constitutional due process issue 

rather than as a claim under the body-worn camera statute, which 

requires that officers “activate the body-worn camera prior to any 

law enforcement encounter, or as soon as reasonably possible.”

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7a-104(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). Within 

the body camera statute, our Legislature has seen fit to include the 

provision that “[a] violation of [section 104] may not serve as the 

sole basis to dismiss a criminal case or charge.” Id. § 77-7a-104(12)

(emphasis added). Thus, while we do not reach the statutory

question here, we think it unlikely that Jessop would have 

prevailed on appeal had he sought relief on the theory that the 

detectives violated the body-worn camera statute, given the “sole 

basis” language in the statute.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 16 2023 UT App 140

with cases where the State has lost or destroyed potentially 

exculpatory evidence: 

In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable 

probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be 

exculpatory, we find it necessary to require 

consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the 

destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 

degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the 

State; and (2) the degree of prejudice to the 

defendant in light of the materiality and importance 

of the missing evidence in the context of the case as 

a whole, including the strength of the remaining 

evidence.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 (emphasis added). See State v. DeJesus, 

2017 UT 22, ¶ 26, 395 P.3d 111. In this appeal, we must consider

whether evidence that never came to exist qualifies as either “lost 

or destroyed.” See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44.

10

10. In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the United States 

Supreme Court held “that unless a criminal defendant can show 

bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially 

useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”

under the federal constitution. Id. at 58. Our Supreme Court’s 

decision in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, departed

from the test articulated in Youngblood because it was “both too 

broad and too narrow to serve as an adequate safeguard of the 

fundamental fairness required by article I, section 7 of the Utah 

Constitution.” Id. ¶ 44 (quotation simplified). In departing from 

Youngblood, Utah joined many other states that have replaced a 

defendant’s required demonstration of bad faith on the part of the 

police with a two-part “balancing process” based on 

“fundamental fairness.” Id. ¶¶ 42, 45.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 17 2023 UT App 140

¶31 In Tiedemann, the defendant was “declared incompetent to 

stand trial” and “then civilly committed to the Utah State 

Hospital.” Id. ¶ 7. Following standard procedure and with 

permission from the prosecutor, the State destroyed the majority

of the physical evidence two years later based on its informed 

expectation that it was “unlikely” that the defendant would “ever 

be found competent to stand trial.” Id. ¶¶ 7–8. But nearly ten years 

after committing the crime, the defendant was found competent

to stand trial. Id. ¶ 10. The trial court later denied the defendant’s

motion “to dismiss the case due to destruction of evidence.” Id.

Our Supreme Court affirmed the decision based on its

determination that “the reasons for the loss of the evidence are

entirely routine and benign.” Id. ¶ 46.

¶32 As the district court correctly noted in the current case, the 

circumstances here materially differ from the circumstances

presented in Tiedemann because in that case there was no dispute

that the evidence had existed or that the State had destroyed it.

But in this case, video evidence from the deputies’ body cameras 

prior to their post-shooting activation never actually existed. This 

presents us with the question of whether it can be said that the 

State “lost” or “destroyed” evidence that never came into 

existence.

¶33 We previously contemplated a similar issue in State v. 

Powell, 2020 UT App 63, 463 P.3d 705. In that case, the defendant 

argued on appeal that defense counsel “performed deficiently by 

not moving to dismiss the case due to the lost or destroyed video

surveillance” evidence, id. ¶ 50, and we considered the

defendant’s entitlement to “information possessed by the State,” id.

¶ 51 (emphasis in original) (quotation simplified). The case 

involved security camera footage from convenience stores, and 

the defendant focused on the stores’ culpability and “the police’s 

purported obligation to immediately make some attempt to 

preserve potential evidence upon receipt of a report.” Id. In our

decision, we cited Tiedemann for the proposition that “criminal 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 18 2023 UT App 140

defendants are entitled to information possessed by the State to aid 

in their defense,” id. (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 40)

(emphasis in Powell), and held that the State was under no 

affirmative duty to protect evidence not in its possession, id.

¶¶ 51, 54–55. Because the defendant in that case was not able to 

show that the State ever had possession of the footage, we 

concluded that the defendant would not be able to demonstrate

that “the State actually lost or destroyed the video footage.” Id.

¶ 51. By logical extension of our reasoning in Powell, if the State is 

not responsible for preserving evidence that existed but that the 

State did not possess, can the State be liable for the loss or 

destruction of evidence that never even existed? We think not.

¶34 Jessop further relies on our decision in Gordon v. State, 2016 

UT App 190, 382 P.3d 1063, cert. denied, 390 P.3d 726 (Utah 2017).

In Gordon, the defendant argued “that his right to due process was 

violated when the police failed to collect or preserve . . . critical 

physical evidence from the crime scene.” Id. ¶ 5 (quotation 

simplified). We held that the defendant “could have discovered 

and raised a due process claim in post-trial motions based on the 

State’s failure to collect the” evidence. Id. ¶ 32. But this decision is 

readily distinguishable from the case at hand because the 

challenged evidence in Gordon actually existed, while here the 

evidence on which Jessop relies never did. Simply stated, 

evidence that never came into existence can neither be lost nor 

destroyed, and so such evidence is beyond the reach of the rule 

explained in Tiedemann.

¶35 For Tiedemann to have applied in this case, the deputies 

would have had to have activated their body cameras, generated 

the video footage that Jessop thinks would have been exculpatory, 

and then lost or destroyed that video footage. But none of that 

happened, so Jessop does not have a claim under Tiedemann. 

Based on the fact that the evidence simply did not exist, and given 

our determination that Tiedemann requires the loss or destruction 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 19 2023 UT App 140

of evidence that had come into existence at some point, the district 

court correctly ruled that Tiedemann did not apply.

II. Motion to Suppress Evidence

¶36 The district court denied Jessop’s motion to suppress 

evidence gathered by the detectives during the hospital interview 

based on the court’s ultimate finding that Jessop “was not ‘in 

custody’ for the purposes of Miranda” and the consequent

conclusion that he “was not subject to custodial interrogation.”

On appeal, Jessop asserts that the district court’s ruling was 

erroneous. He contends that the court’s consideration regarding 

Jessop’s hospitalization is distinguishable from our decision in 

State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, 272 P.3d 769, and that “the 

district court left out many facts that led to the incorrect 

conclusion.” Jessop identifies three factors unaddressed by the 

court. He first argues that the court “made no findings about how 

[he] was brought to the hospital.” He then argues that the court 

made no findings about how Detective “showed up to the hospital 

to fill out involuntary commitment paperwork and actually did 

fill out that paperwork.” And lastly, Jessop argues that the court 

did not make findings that Detective’s disclosure to Jessop that he 

was not under arrest “was belied by the fact that [his] prior officer 

interactions involved the use of weapons and restraint, and had 

the deputies not severely wounded [him], [he] would have been 

arrested and taken to jail.” Ultimately, though, Jessop asserts that

“[d]espite statements from detectives that [he] was not under 

arrest, . . . a reasonable person would not believe he was free to 

terminate the encounter with the detectives and leave” because he 

“could neither speak nor leave the bed or equipment attached to 

him that was preserving his life.”

¶37 Conversely, the State argues that the court properly denied 

Jessop’s motion to suppress. The State contends that “even if 

Jessop could have reasonably believed that he was still in [police] 

custody while receiving medical care, that belief was undercut the 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 20 2023 UT App 140

moment [Detective] explicitly informed him that he was not 

under arrest and he was not detained.” Ultimately, the State 

contends, quoting State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096, that 

“Jessop’s ‘freedom of action’ was not ‘curtailed’ by police in any 

degree, and even if it could be said that it was, it was certainly not 

‘curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.’” See id. ¶ 35

(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). Based on 

all the relevant circumstances, we agree with the State that Jessop 

was not in police custody when he was questioned by the 

detectives.

¶38 Possibly because of its fundamental significance or 

possibly because of the entertainment media’s fascination with 

criminal law, attorneys, and law enforcement, the recitation of 

Miranda warnings may be the most frequently quoted phrasing

from American jurisprudence. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 479 (1966). In Miranda, “the Court adopted a set of 

prophylactic measures to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment 

right from the inherently compelling pressures of custodial 

interrogation,” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) 

(quotation simplified), by requiring that law enforcement inform 

a criminal suspect that “he has the right to remain silent, anything 

he says can be used against him in a court of law, he has the right 

to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney 

one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 

desires,” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 18, 428 P.3d 1052 (quoting 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Miranda warnings are not required every time police ask someone 

questions. But due to their critical importance, “Miranda warnings

must be given to a defendant subject to custodial interrogation.”

State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ¶ 12, 163 P.3d 647 (quotation 

simplified). Otherwise, “[w]here an individual is subject to 

custodial interrogation and not given Miranda warnings, any 

statement made by that individual is inadmissible at trial.”

Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 48.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 21 2023 UT App 140

¶39 Generally, “custodial interrogation occurs where there is 

both (1) custody or other significant deprivation of a suspect’s 

freedom and (2) interrogation.” Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 34. In this 

case, the State does not dispute that Detective “‘interrogated’

Jessop at the hospital.” Therefore, we consider only whether the 

court erroneously found that Jessop was not in police custody for 

the purposes of Miranda when he was interrogated by Detective.

¶40 “[B]ecause Miranda is a matter of federal jurisprudence, our 

courts must be in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court 

on whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda.” 

Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 3. For Miranda purposes, “‘custody’ is a 

term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally 

to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 

499, 508–09 (2012). It “is not synonymous with supervision or 

control.” State v. Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101, ¶ 43, 400 P.3d 

1127, cert. denied, 409 P.3d 1048 (Utah 2017). Under federal 

Miranda jurisprudence, questions of a suspect’s custody are to be 

analyzed using a two-step analysis. “The initial step is to ascertain 

whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the 

interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was 

not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Fullerton, 

2018 UT 49, ¶ 21 (quotation simplified).11 See Howes, 565 U.S. at 

11. In State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, 428 P.3d 1052, our Supreme 

Court addressed Utah’s prior reliance on the Carner factors for

questions of police custody. Id. ¶¶ 19–26. See Salt Lake City v. 

Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (stating that in 

determining whether a suspect was subject to custodial 

interrogation, a court must consider “(1) the site of interrogation; 

(2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether 

objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and 

form of interrogation”). The Court determined that “[s]trict or sole 

reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with the totality of 

the circumstances analysis prescribed by federal law,” and that 

(continued...)
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 22 2023 UT App 140

509. If the court finds that an individual’s freedom of movement 

was not curtailed, then the person was not in custody for Miranda

purposes and the court’s analysis ends there. See Fullerton, 2018 

UT 49, ¶ 36. Conversely, if the court does find that “an 

individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns 

to whether the relevant environment present[ed] the same 

inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house 

questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation simplified).

¶41 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable 

person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” State v. 

Fredrick, 2019 UT App 152, ¶ 30, 450 P.3d 1154, cert. denied, 458 

P.3d 748 (Utah 2020). “In order to determine how a suspect would 

have gauged his freedom of movement, courts must examine all 

of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Howes, 565 

U.S. at 509 (quotation simplified). “Relevant factors include,” but 

“[w]hile these four factors may, at times, be relevant in a custody 

analysis, misplaced reliance on these factors can be highly 

problematic, especially where such reliance leads to conflicts with 

controlling law.” Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 23. Therefore, in cases 

arising after our Supreme Court’s adoption of the Fullerton 

two-step analysis, “[e]ach of the Carner factors should be 

considered when relevant, ignored when not, and given 

appropriate weight according to the circumstances.” Id. As the 

Court explained, 

we consider the Carner factors, as well as any 

additional factors indicated by the [United States] 

Supreme Court, within the broader contextual 

picture. And when, as a background matter, a 

person is subject to extensive, state-imposed 

restrictions on freedom of movement, the custody 

analysis should address all of the features of the 

interrogation, including the manner in which the 

interrogation was conducted.

Id. ¶ 24 (quotation simplified).
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 23 2023 UT App 140

are not limited to, “the location of the questioning, its duration, 

statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of 

physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the 

interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Id. (quotation 

simplified). But in conducting this inquiry, “the subjective views 

harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 

questioned are irrelevant.” Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 22 (quotation 

simplified). See Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 35 (“A suspect may 

understand himself or herself to be in custody based either on 

physical evidence or on the nature of the officer’s instructions and 

questions.”); Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 49 (“Whether this 

standard is met depends on the objective circumstances of the 

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the 

interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”) (quotation 

simplified).

¶42 We ultimately conclude that Jessop was not in police

custody for the purposes of Miranda when he was interrogated by

Detective in the ICU, although clearly his freedom of movement 

was curtailed by his serious injuries and the life-saving medical 

equipment to which he was attached. We first consider whether 

“a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty 

to terminate the interrogation.” Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 21

(quotation simplified). “The most obvious and effective means of 

demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody or 

otherwise deprived of freedom of action is for the police to inform 

the suspect that an arrest is not being made and that the suspect 

may terminate the interview at will.” United States v. Griffin, 922 

F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (quotation simplified).

¶43 Here, before the detectives started to question Jessop, they 

asked, “Is it okay if we talk to you for a minute and get your side 

of the story?” Jessop could have declined the detectives’ request, 

but instead he agreed, affirmatively consenting to speak with 

them. When Detective began the interview, Jessop initially asked

whether he was under arrest. Detective responded by stating that 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 24 2023 UT App 140

Jessop was neither under arrest nor being detained by police and,

further, that Jessop was under no obligation to speak to them.

Near the end of the interview, Detective testified that Jessop asked 

a similar question, “What am I charged with,” to which Detective 

similarly responded, “Nothing yet, I say yet, though, because 

possibly.” Given Detective’s explanations that Jessop was neither 

under arrest nor charged with anything at that time and that 

Jessop was not under any obligation to speak with the detectives, 

a reasonable person in Jessop’s position would feel at liberty to 

terminate the conversation. As such, given all the circumstances, 

the court’s finding that Jessop was not in custody for Miranda

purposes is sound. See Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 21.

¶44 Cases considering the question of custody for Miranda 

purposes typically speak in terms of a person’s liberty “to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.” See, e.g., Howes, 565 U.S. at 

509 (quotation simplified). And in the vast majority of such cases, 

the two rise and fall together. Examples of this include a person 

who was stopped on the street and asked questions without being 

arrested or restrained in any way, see Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT 

App 55, ¶ 11, 998 P.2d 274 (“As long as the person remains free to 

disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no 

intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under 

the Constitution require some particularized and objective 

justification.”) (quotation simplified), and a person who comes to 

the police station voluntarily and is interviewed by the police, 

without being restrained or confined, see Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, 

¶¶ 31–32, 36 (noting that a defendant’s voluntary appearance at 

the police station, in conjunction with a general lack of restraint

and repeated assurance that he was not under arrest and free to 

leave, weighed against a finding that he was subject to police 

custody).

¶45 But in some cases, a defendant’s ability to terminate the 

interrogation is not synonymous with the defendant’s ability to 

leave the premises. For example, when police interview someone 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 25 2023 UT App 140

who is already incarcerated, the fact that the interviewee cannot 

leave the premises is not dispositive of whether the interviewee 

was detained for purposes of Miranda. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 

515-16 (holding that the defendant was not in police custody even 

though he could not have expected to be able to “roam free” 

following his choice to end the interview”); State v. Butt, 2012 UT 

34, ¶ 22, 284 P.3d 605 (holding that the defendant was not in police 

custody for Miranda purposes where his “liberty was not 

restrained beyond his usual status as a jail inmate, nor was he 

coerced in any way”).

¶46 In this case, similar to instances of the police questioning 

an already incarcerated person, Jessop’s abilities “to terminate the 

interrogation and leave,” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (quotation 

simplified), did not rise and fall together. As indicated, it is clear

that Jessop understood that he was free to terminate the 

conversation, and he was told that he was not under arrest, both 

by Detective and a nurse. Had he elected to terminate the 

interview at any time during its thirty-minute course, it is obvious

that he would not have been able to simultaneously exit his 

hospital room and call an Uber but instead that his decision to 

terminate the interview would “merely have returned him to his 

usual environment,” id. at 516, namely, confinement as a matter 

of medical necessity rather than at the direction of law 

enforcement. Similar to someone who is incarcerated prior to a 

police interrogation, Jessop’s inability to leave the interrogation 

was not attributable to the police conducting an interview or 

indicative of coercion. Instead, his inability to leave was a function 

of his serious injuries and his associated hospital confinement. Put 

simply, his inability to leave was a result of his being subject to

medical confinement rather than police restraint.

¶47 For this reason, our focus is directed at Jessop’s awareness

that he was free to end the interview whenever he pleased, even 

though he was not physically able to leave the hospital due to his 

significant injuries and resulting treatment regimen. 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 26 2023 UT App 140

Nevertheless, other factors, such as the open door to his ICU 

room, likewise contributed to his understanding that he was free 

to end the interview at any time. See Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 31 

(noting that even if the door is closed, a defendant’s knowledge 

that it is not locked weighs against a finding of police custody). 

The open door is at odds with any suggestion that he was subject 

to police coercion, and throughout the interview, Jessop received 

ongoing medical attention for his injuries—nurses and other 

healthcare workers were constantly coming and going. Further, 

he was not restrained in any way by the police through the use of

handcuffs, drawn guns, an officer stationed outside his room, or 

a locked door. On the contrary, Detective informed the hospital 

staff that Jessop was “not to be guarded whatsoever” and that he 

was “a free person.” This reality was confirmed a few weeks later 

when Jessop was discharged from the hospital and left as any 

other patient would do.

¶48 We categorically reject Jessop’s efforts to equate his 

gunshot wounds and subsequent life-saving medical treatment 

with a formal arrest and the ensuing restraint on a person’s 

freedom of movement for purposes of Miranda. When the 

detectives arrived, Jessop had been out of surgery for somewhere 

around fifteen hours and, because of his injuries and treatment 

regimen, he was hooked to a feeding tube and undoubtedly any 

number of other medical apparatuses. But being physically 

restrained for “life-saving medical treatment” and by the 

corresponding medical devices can simply not be equated with 

police restraints that are so commonly the focus under Miranda

and its progeny. Indicia of police custody—closed and locked 

doors, drawn weapons, guards, handcuffs, or other factors—are 

qualitatively different from the predictable indicia of a person’s 

necessary medical treatment—medical tubes and hoses, an open 

door in a busy hospital, and the coming and going of medical 

personnel. Jessop does not persuasively argue otherwise.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 27 2023 UT App 140

¶49 Jessop’s best argument is that an individual who has been 

shot by the police and is hospitalized as a direct result of the 

shooting is necessarily in police custody for the purposes of

Miranda while in the hospital. Jessop argues that because the

police shooting was the sole reason for his hospitalization, the 

court erred in separating the underlying circumstances from the 

medical restrictions that facilitated his interrogation by the police.

In support of this argument that where an individual’s 

hospitalization is the result of any police shooting, the 

circumstances call for a per se determination that the person is in 

police custody for the purposes of Miranda, he cites the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 

(1985). In Garner, as a means to apprehend and prevent the escape 

of a perceived home burglar, the police shot a suspect when he

“began to climb over the fence” to elude capture. Id. at 4. The 

Court held that “there can be no question that apprehension by 

the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 7.

¶50 We are not persuaded that Garner is sufficiently similar to 

the facts of our case. There, the police employed deadly force as 

an offensive action to apprehend the suspect and further prevent 

him from eluding capture; but here, the deputies’ use of deadly 

force came as the result of a defensive reaction when they were 

confronted by a person who had earlier discharged multiple 

firearms in a residential neighborhood and was now wielding a 

firearm and pointing it at them in a public place. Because the 

police shooting here was not for the sole purpose of apprehending 

Jessop but instead for the primary purpose of ensuring personal 

and public safety, this case is readily distinguishable from Garner.

Therefore, we reject Jessop’s argument that every police shooting 

results in a per se determination of police custody.

¶51 Jessop also argues that this case is distinguishable from 

State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, 272 P.3d 769, in which we stated 

that a defendant who was interviewed in a hospital emergency 
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 28 2023 UT App 140

room “was, in a sense, in medical, not police custody.” Id. ¶ 51.

Jessop contends that his case is distinguishable because the 

defendant in Maestas was brought to the hospital by civilian 

medical personnel following an automobile accident, see id. ¶ 5, as 

opposed to Jessop’s being brought to the hospital by medical 

personnel, including a SWAT medic, after being shot by the

police. But we are not persuaded that there is a sufficient basis to 

differentiate these two cases. Even though Maestas was decided 

using the Carner factors, see supra note 11, we would still reach the 

same conclusion under current Miranda jurisprudence. In fact, we 

view our decision in Maestas as being very similar to the case at 

hand because the defendant there was also restrained only by the 

hospital’s imposition of medical devices and not by any restraint 

measures imposed by the police. In Maestas, we held that “we do 

not assume an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes 

when his confinement and isolation are the result of medical 

treatment and not police interrogation.” 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 51. 

Here, Jessop was physically restrained only by his feeding tube 

and the other necessary medical apparatuses. While Jessop argues 

that the feeding tube is attributable to the police shooting and 

therefore constitutes police custody, as addressed above, we are 

not persuaded by Jessop’s argument.

¶52 When considering these circumstances in their totality, we 

conclude that at the time of his hospital interview, Jessop was not 

restrained by the police, much less restrained in a manner akin to 

a formal arrest, and that a reasonable person in Jessop’s position 

“would have felt free to terminate the interview.” Fullerton, 2018 

UT 49, ¶ 30. Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded that 

Jessop was in police custody for the purposes of Miranda. 

Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s ruling that Jessop 

was not in custody at the time of Detective’s questioning was by 

no means erroneous.
State v. Jessop

20210544-CA 29 2023 UT App 140

CONCLUSION

¶53 The district court correctly held that Tiedemann did not 

apply in this case because the video evidence from the deputies’

body cameras simply never existed. The police neither lost nor 

destroyed it. We also conclude that the court correctly determined

that Jessop was not in police custody at the time of the detectives’

interview in the hospital and he was therefore not entitled to 

Miranda warnings.

¶54 Affirmed.