2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-8-2013

Baojin Liu v. Attorney General United States

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-3970

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3970

___________

BAOJIN LIU,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A088-782-488)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 7, 2013

Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 8, 2013)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Baojin Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying a motion to reopen. For the reasons that 

follow, we will deny the petition for review.
2

I.

Liu entered the United States in 2007 without inspection. He appeared before an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in 2008 and conceded removability, but sought asylum and 

related relief on the ground that he fled China due to its family planning policy. The IJ 

denied Liu’s applications. ( A.R. at 206.) The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and 

dismissed Liu’s appeal on September 16, 2009. (Id. at 171-74.)

Over two years later, Liu moved to reopen his removal proceedings based on his 

practice of Falun Gong and changed country conditions. (Id. at 16.) He claimed that he 

started practicing Falun Gong in January 2011, and learned that Falun Gong practitioners 

were “persecuted by the Chinese government.” (Id. at 21.) According to Liu, someone 

took his picture while he was participating in parades supporting Falun Gong, and those 

pictures were provided to the Chinese government. (Id. 21-23.) The “village cadres” 

then visited Liu’s wife in China and told her that he would be “severely punished” by the 

Chinese government due to his Falun Gong activities. (Id. at 23.) In support of his 

motion to reopen, Liu submitted documentary evidence, including pictures, a notice from 

the “Village Committee” in China, and an affidavit from his wife. (Id. at 67-97.)

The BIA denied the motion to reopen, reasoning that Liu’s documentary evidence 

was not properly authenticated or supported by any persuasive evidence, and was of 

“essentially unknown reliability.” (Id. at 8.) The BIA further reasoned that the State 

Department’s report on China does not indicate that Chinese citizens who practice or 
3

support Falun Gong suffer mistreatment amounting to persecution in China. (Id. at 9.) 

The BIA concluded that Liu’s motion was filed well outside of the ninety days provided 

by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), and that he did not prove by sufficient evidence that 

there was a change in circumstances or country conditions arising in China so as to create 

an exception to that time limit, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). (Id.) Liu now seeks 

review of the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s denial of 

Liu’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review. See

Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007). The BIA’s decision is entitled to 

“broad deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), and “will not be disturbed unless [it is] found to be 

arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 

2004) (citation omitted).

With limited exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of 

the date of entry of a final administrative order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). It is 

undisputed that Liu’s motion to reopen was filed over two years after the BIA’s final 

administrative order dismissing his appeal. Therefore, to circumvent that time limit, Liu 

had to provide material evidence of changed conditions in China that could not have been 

discovered or presented during the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Liu argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen 
4

because he provided “sufficiently reliable evidence” to support it. (Pet’r. Br. at 11.) 

However, we agree with the BIA that the unauthenticated documentary evidence Liu 

submitted was of dubious value. Further, the BIA’s conclusion, based on the State 

Department’s report, that practitioners of Falun Gong do not suffer mistreatment 

amounting to persecution in China, was well-founded. There was no material change in 

China’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners after Liu’s 2008 hearing. The only change

in circumstance Liu could demonstrate was personal, given that his participation in Falun 

Gong began in 2011. That does not suffice to excuse the time limitation on his motion to 

reopen. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 149-51 (3d Cir. 2009). Because Liu did not 

meet the standard set forth in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 

denying his motion to reopen as untimely.

III.

Because the denial of Liu’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion, see

Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 153, we will deny his petition for review.1

 

1 We need not reach the Respondent’s alternative argument that Liu failed to set 

forth a prima facie relief or protection claim. (Resp’t Br. at 14.)