GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

September 1999 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Evaluation of the 

Navy’s 1999 Naval 

Surface Fire Support 

Assessment

GAO/NSIAD-99-225

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282966 Letter

September 14, 1999

The Honorable John Warner, Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence, Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

This is our final report to you on naval surface fire-support (NSFS) issues 

required by section 1015 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. In the first report,1

 we assessed the 

readiness of the remaining Iowa class battleships and their associated 

logistic support structure. In our second report,2 we examined the Navy’s 

plans and costs for modernizing its NSFS capabilities. This letter provides 

our analysis of the Navy’s assessment of the short-term and long-term costs 

associated with alternative methods for executing the naval surface fire 

support mission, including the alternative of reactivating two battleships. 

The assessment, entitled Naval Surface Fire-Support Capabilities, was 

provided to Congress in a March 1999 report. 

Results in Brief The Navy’s assessment was limited to a comparison of two alternatives—

reactivation of battleships and its current program of developing an 

improved gun and munition for certain existing and future surface ships. 

Neither alternative will meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support 

requirements. The assessment showed that battleships have significantly 

greater firepower but less range than the destroyers and cruisers. It also 

showed the costs of manning the battleships to be significantly higher than 

both the destroyers and cruisers. We found that the costs and capabilities 

data presented in the assessment were derived from actual information 

1

Force Structure: Navy Is Complying with Battleship Readiness Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-99-62, 

Apr. 12, 1999).

2

Defense Acquisitions: Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plans and Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-91,

June 11, 1999).

Letr
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that was available on these ships. Since neither alternative will meet 

Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements, the assessment 

would have been more valuable if it also compared the cost of upgrading 

the battleships with capabilities necessary to meet requirements with the 

Navy’s current plans to meet these requirements. 

The Navy does not intend to reactivate the battleships because they do not 

meet naval surface fire support requirements and have high operating costs 

and large crews. It said that any modernization alterations to the 

battleships would be driven by the missions that could be assigned to them 

and would require further evaluation to determine their cost and schedule. 

An official responsible for ship programs said that the Navy chose not to 

conduct such an evaluation because it would be time consuming and costly.

Background As we reported in 1997,3

 the Navy has had no credible surface fire-support 

capability since it retired its last four Iowa class battleships in 1992. It does 

not intend to reactivate battleships because the munitions fired by their 

16-inch guns do not meet Marine Corps requirements for range and 

accuracy. It also cites the high cost of manning and operating battleships 

and their age and uniqueness as factors arguing against their reactivation. 

Each battleship requires a crew of about 1,500, whereas modern cruisers 

and destroyers require crews of only 340 and 295, respectively. Although 

the Navy does not intend to reactivate them, it is maintaining two 

battleships—U.S.S. Iowa and U.S.S. Wisconsin—in good condition on the 

Naval Vessel Register, as required by law.

The Navy is executing a two-phase plan to develop modern NSFS 

capabilities. In the first phase, it developed a 5-inch, 62 caliber gun and it is 

developing the associated guided munitions to engage targets between

41 and 63 nautical miles. It also plans to modify its Standard Missile for 

land attack that will have a range of about 150 nautical miles. These 

weapons, and a mission planning system to control their use, are to be 

installed on 27 newly constructed Arleigh Burke class destroyers between 

fiscal year 2001 and 2009 and 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers selected for 

modernization between fiscal year 2004 and 2009. However, these weapons 

are not intended or expected to satisfy the full range of the Marine Corps 

NSFS requirements. The second phase, to be completed by 2020, is 

3

Program Status: Naval Surface Fire Support (GAO/NSIAD-97-179R, Aug. 6, 1997).

Letr
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intended to fully meet Marine Corps requirements. It includes developing a 

longer-range, larger caliber advanced gun and associated munitions and an 

advanced land attack missile for the DD-21 class land attack destroyer. The 

Navy plans to accept delivery of 32 DD-21s between 2008 and 2020. The 

Marine Corps is willing to accept the risks associated with the current lack 

of NSFS capability and supports the Navy modernization plans.

Navy Assessment The Navy compared its planned NSFS development program to the cost of 

reactivating two battleships with the same capabilities they had at the time 

of their last inactivation, but without the Tomahawk missile launch 

capability. During the 1980s, the Navy spent about $1.7 billion to modernize 

and reactivate its four Iowa class battleships. During their reactivation, 

each of these ships was fitted with 16 Harpoon and 32 Tomahawk missile 

launchers, along with updated communications, fire control, and target 

acquisition systems. The estimated cost cited for reactivating the U.S.S.

Wisconsin was $209.4 million and for the U.S.S. Iowa, was $221.3 million, 

including repair of the damaged turret.4 To accomplish the reactivation, the 

Navy estimated 14 months for industrial support and 3 to 6 months for 

modernization and training on and certification of newly installed 

equipment. The estimated cost of reactivating the U.S.S. Wisconsin was 

based on the actual cost to reactivate the U.S.S. New Jersey battleship in 

the 1980s, less the modernization costs that occurred during its 

reactivation, and escalating the figure to fiscal year 1999 dollars. The 

estimated cost of reactivating the U.S.S. Iowa is the same as the U.S.S.

Wisconsin plus $12 to $14 million to repair the damage to the number 

2 turret. 

The Navy compared capabilities, crew size, and annual operating costs of 

battleships to those of Arleigh Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga 

class cruisers that are to be equipped with the improved 5-inch guns and 

extended range guided munitions. The comparison addressed the number 

of guns, their fire rate, and range. For example, it showed that each 

battleship has nine 16-inch guns compared to one 5-inch gun on the 

destroyers and two 5-inch guns on the cruisers. The data showed that 

battleships have significantly greater firepower but less range than the 

destroyers and cruisers, assuming that the new 5-inch guns and munitions 

4

 The center 16-inch gun of the U.S.S. Iowa’s turret II was rendered inoperable by an explosion in April 

1989.
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will perform as planned. The data presented were consistent with 

pre-existing published data on these ships. 

The Navy also compared the crew size and annual operating costs. It 

showed the manning costs of the battleships to be significantly higher than 

both the destroyers and cruisers. The crew size was based on the officer 

and enlisted manpower requirements document and the costs were 

estimated using the programming rates developed for the fiscal year

2002 budget. Fiscal year 2002 was chosen because that year would be the 

earliest a battleship could be reactivated. 

The Navy concluded that the variety of weapons currently being planned 

and developed will provide the soundest and most cost-effective strategy 

for improving its surface fire support capability and that reactivating the 

battleships was neither cost-effective nor a sound strategy. Since the new 

5-inch guns and muntions and the battleships, as currently configured, will 

not meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements, the 

assessment would have been more valuable if it included a comparison of 

providing the battleships with capabilities necessary to meet requirements 

with the Navy’s planned development program to meet these requirements. 

The Navy said that battleship modernization alterations would require 

further evaluation to determine additional costs and schedule impacts. At 

the same time, the alterations would need to fit the mission given to the 

battleship. An official responsible for ship programs said that the Navy 

chose not to conduct such an evaluation because it would be costly and 

take at least a year to complete.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with a draft of this report (see app. I) and noted 

that although neither the first phase of the Navy’s two-phase naval surface 

fire support program nor the battleship alternative will fully meet the 

Marine Corps’ NSFS requirements, the second phase is intended to fully 

meet requirements. This information was already provided in the 

background section of the report.

DOD also said we need to balance our statement that battleships have 

significantly greater firepower than cruisers and destroyers by noting that 

there are only 2 battleships on the Naval Vessel Register compared to

22 Aegis cruisers and 27 Aegis destroyers in the active force slated for land 

attack improvements. This information is also provided in our background 

section.
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Finally, DOD said battleship reactivation costs presented in our report did 

not include modernization costs that would be significant. Our report 

states that the activation costs do not include modernization costs. 

However, we continue to believe that the assessment would have been 

more valuable if it compared the cost of upgrading the battleships with 

capabilities necessary to meet requirements with the Navy’s current plans 

to meet these requirements.

Scope and 

Methodology

To provide our analysis, we reviewed the Navy’s March 1999 assessment 

and the data and information used in its preparation. We held discussions 

with officials of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition; the Surface Warfare and 

Expeditionary Warfare Divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations. We performed our review in June and July 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and 

Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 

Appropriations; Representative C. W. Bill Young, Chairman, and 

Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House 

Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of 

Defense; the Honorable William J. Lynn, Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller); the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management 

and Budget; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; and General

James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will be made 

available to others upon request.
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Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Mr. Richard Price at (202) 512-3630, 

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key 

contributors to this report were Anton Blieberger and Martha Dey.

James F. Wiggins

Associate Director 

Defense Acquisition Issues
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
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Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIdi
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707427) Lret Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Aquisitions
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