[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2011-Ohio-1055.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 JACKSON COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 10CA12 

vs. : 

CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 

 

Defendant-Appellee. : 

________________________________________________________________ 

 APPEARANCES: 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jonathan D. Blanton, Jackson County Prosecuting 

Attorney, 295 Broadway Street, Suite 100, Jackson, Ohio 

45640 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jeremy J. Masters, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

_________________________________________________________________ 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT 

DATE JOURNALIZED: 3-3-11 

ABELE, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Jackson County Common Pleas Court judgment that 

dismissed the indictment against Christopher Chambers, defendant below and appellee herein. 

The court determined that the State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herein, failed to try 

appellee within the statutory speedy trial time limit. 

{¶ 2} Appellant raises the following assignment of error for review: 
JACKSON, 10CA12 2

“DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 

HAD BEEN VIOLATED?” 

{¶ 3} In March 2007, appellee was charged in the Jackson County Municipal Court with 

one count of breaking and entering and one count of assault. He was arrested on March 16, 

2007 and remained in jail until August 29, 2007.1 

{¶ 4} On May 10, 2007, the Jackson County Grand Jury returned an indictment that 

charged appellee with assault and breaking and entering. After appellee's arraignment, the trial 

court set the matter for a July 30, 2008 status conference. Appellee did not appear for the status 

conference. 

{¶ 5} On February 5, 2010, appellee filed a pro se motion to dismiss due to an alleged 

speedy trial violation. On February 17, 2010, appellee entered a guilty plea to the breaking and 

entering charge, and the court dismissed the assault charge. On April 29, 2010, the court 

permitted appellee to withdraw his guilty plea. 

{¶ 6} On June 11, 2010, appellee filed a motion to dismiss due to an alleged speedy trial 

violation. On June 14, 2010, the trial court held a hearing to consider appellee’s motion. 

Following the hearing, the trial court found that appellee had been in jail between March 17, 

2007 and August 29, 2007 on the pending charge. The court then employed the triple-count 

provision and determined that by August 29, 2007, four hundred ninety-eight days elapsed for 

speedy trial purposes. The court thus concluded that the state failed to bring appellee to trial on 

 1

 We could not locate anything in the record submitted to this court to verify these dates. We observe, however, 

that the trial court used these dates to calculate the speedy trial time and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 

presume that the trial court’s factual findings are correct.
JACKSON, 10CA12 3

the pending charges within two hundred seventy days and dismissed the charges. The state now 

appeals. 

{¶ 7} In its sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court erroneously 

determined that the state failed to bring appellee to trial within the statutory speedy trial time 

limits. In particular, the appellant asserts that appellee’s failure to appear at the July 30, 2008 

status conference forfeited his right to assert a violation of the speedy trial statute for those days 

preceding his failure to appear. Under the facts present in the instant case, however, we do not 

agree with the appellant. 

{¶ 8} Initially, we note that a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to dismiss based 

upon a violation of the speedy trial provisions presents a mixed question of law and fact for our 

review. See, e.g., State v. Toler, Ross App. No. 09CA3103, 2009-Ohio-6669, at ¶15; State v. 

Alexander, Scioto App. No. 08CA3221, 2009-Ohio-1401, at ¶15. We accord due deference to 

the trial court’s findings of fact if competent, credible evidence supports them. We will, 

however, independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of the 

case. See, e.g., State v. Skinner, Ross App. No. 06CA2931, 2007-Ohio-6320, at ¶8; State v. 

Thomas, Adams App. No. 06CA825, 2007-Ohio-5340 at ¶8. 

{¶ 9} Ohio's speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73, seek to enforce an 

accused’s constitutional right to a speedy and public trial. State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 

218, 416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus. In Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 661 N.E.2d 

706, 707, the court discussed an accused’s right to a speedy trial: 

“Ohio’s speedy trial statute was implemented to incorporate the 

constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial provided for in the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Section 10, Article I, of the 
JACKSON, 10CA12 4

Ohio Constitution. State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 256, 581 

N.E.2d 541, 544; see Columbus v. Bonner (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 34, 36, 2 Ohio 

B.Rep. 37, 39, 2 Ohio App.3d 34, 440 N.E.2d 606, 608. The constitutional 

guarantee of a speedy trial was originally considered necessary to prevent 

oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize the anxiety of the accused, and to 

limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. State ex rel. Jones v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 130, 131, 9 Ohio 

App.3d 108, 109, 378 N.E.2d 471, 472. 

Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees to the party 

accused in any court ‘a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.’ ‘‘Throughout the 

long history of litigation involving application of the speedy trial statutes, this 

court has repeatedly announced that the trial courts are to strictly enforce the 

legislative mandates evident in these statutes. This court’s announced position of 

strict enforcement has been grounded in the conclusion that the speedy trial 

statutes implement the constitutional guarantee of a public speedy trial.’ (Citations 

omitted.) State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221, 416 N.E.2d 589, 591. 

We are acutely conscious of the magnitude of the rights we interpret today. We 

have also previously explained, however, that ‘the prescribed times for trial set 

forth in R.C. 2945.71 are not absolute in all circumstances, but a certain measure 

of flexibility was intended by the General Assembly by the enactment of R.C. 

2945.72, wherein discretionary authority is granted to extend the trial date beyond 

the R.C. 2945.71 time prescriptions.” 

{¶ 10} In seeking to enforce an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, R.C. 

2945.71(C)(2) requires the state to try a person charged with a felony within two hundred seventy 

days after his arrest. For purposes of computing the two hundred seventy day period, R.C. 

2945.71(E) provides that each day an accused spends in jail awaiting trial on the pending charge 

counts as three days. The date of arrest is not counted in calculating the number of speedy trial 

days that have elapsed. State v. Lautenslager (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 108, 109-110, 677 N.E.2d 

1263; State v. McCornell (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 141, 145, 631 N.E.2d 1110, 1112; State v. 

Steiner (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 249, 250-251, 593 N.E.2d 368, 369. 

{¶ 11} Once an accused demonstrates that more than two hundred seventy days have 

elapsed between his initial arrest and the date of his trial, the accused establishes a prima facie 
JACKSON, 10CA12 5

case for dismissal. State v. Butcher (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 30-31, 500 N.E.2d 1368, 

1369-1370; State v. Baker (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 516, 525, 636 N.E.2d 363, 369; State v. 

Howard (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 705, 707, 607 N.E.2d 1121; State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio 

App.3d 27, 28, 468 N.E.2d 328. The burden then shifts to the state to produce evidence 

demonstrating that the accused was not entitled to be brought to trial within the two hundred 

seventy day period. Baker, 92 Ohio App.3d at 526, 636 N.E.2d at 369; Howard, supra; State v. 

Bowman (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 318, 319, 535 N.E.2d 730. 

{¶ 12} R.C. 2945.72 sets forth the circumstances under which the two hundred seventy 

day period may be extended. R.C. 2945.72 provides: 

The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case 

of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following: 

(A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or 

trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside the 

state, by reason of his confinement in another state, or by reason of the pendency 

of extradition proceedings, provided that the prosecution exercises reasonable 

diligence to secure his availability; 

(B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand 

trial or during which his mental competence to stand trial is being determined, or 

any period during which the accused is physically incapable of standing trial; 

(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused’s lack of counsel, 

provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing 

counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as required by law; 

(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the 

accused; 

(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or 

abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused; 

(F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of venue 

pursuant to law; 

(G) Any period during which trial is stayed pursuant to an express 

statutory requirement, or pursuant to an order of another court competent to issue 

such order; 

(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion 

and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the 

accused’s own motion; 
JACKSON, 10CA12 6

(I) Any period during which an appeal filed pursuant to section 2945.67 of 

the Revised Code is pending. 

{¶ 13} If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limits set forth in the speedy 

trial statutes, and if the R.C. 2945.72 exceptions do not apply, R.C. 2945.73 requires the court, 

upon motion prior to trial, to discharge the accused. 

{¶ 14} After our review of the record in the case sub judice, we agree with the trial 

court’s conclusion that the state failed to bring appellee to trial within the statutory speedy trial 

time limit. As the trial court found, appellee was in jail on the pending charge for one hundred 

sixty-six days. Because appellee was in jail, each of the one hundred sixty-six days counts as 

three days for speedy trial purposes. Under this triple-count mechanism, four hundred 

ninety-eight speedy trial days elapsed between March 17, 2007, and August 29, 2007. During 

this time period, a trial date was not set. Also during this time period, appellee did not fail to 

appear for any scheduled court appearances. The appellant has not offered any explanation as to 

why it did not seek to try appellee before the speedy trial clock expired in 2007. Rather, the 

appellant argues that because appellee failed to appear at a status conference over one year after 

the speedy trial time limit had already expired, he waived his right to assert a speedy trial 

violation. 

{¶ 15} To support its argument, the appellant cites State v. Bauer (1980) 61 Ohio St.2d 

83, 399 N.E.2d 555. In Bauer, the court held: “[A] defendant who fails to appear at a scheduled 

trial, and whose trial must therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives his right to assert the 

provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapses from his initial 

arrest to the date he is subsequently rearrested.” Id. at 85. In Bauer, the court initially set a trial 
JACKSON, 10CA12 7

date within the speedy trial time limit, but the defendant failed to appear for that timely-set court 

date. The Bauer court refused to allow a defendant to assert the speedy trial protections when 

the defendant’s own actions resulted in the expiration of the time limit. 

{¶ 16} By contrast, in the case sub judice it was not the accused’s actions that resulted in 

the expiration of the speedy trial time limit. Rather, the speedy trial time had expired prior to 

the time appellee failed to appear at the July 30, 2008 status conference. Under these 

circumstances, we do not believe that the rule set forth in Bauer applies so as to bar appellee 

from asserting a speedy trial violation. Our holding is limited, however, to those situations 

when the speedy trial time limit expires before the defendant’s failure to appear at a court 

hearing. 

{¶ 17} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons we hereby overrule the appellant’s 

sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Jackson County 

Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Harsha, P.J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion 
JACKSON, 10CA12 8

 For the Court 

BY: 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge 

 NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the 

time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.