alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION1350**

 

I, Michael S. Wood, certifythat:

 

1.             I have reviewed thisquarterly report on Form 10-Q of Worldspan, L.P.;

 

2.             Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.             Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.             The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)             designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)            evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)             disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.             The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)             allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)            anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 
| Date:  May 13, 2004 |                     |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
|                     | /s/ Michael  S. Wood     |
|                     | Michael S.  Wood         |
|                     | Chief  Financial Officer |
|                     | Worldspan,  L.P.         |

 

----
No. 58100.

protest 22007A-K (New York).

#### Milton Snedeker Corporation *v.*United States,

*495Opinion by

Johnson, J.

From an examination of the papers in this case, the court was unable to find anything to overcome the presumption of correctness of the collector’s classification. The protest was therefore overruled.
Order entered July 15, 2019

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 19

- 00005

- CV

PRISCILLA ALIA MCCUR DY, Appellant

V.

RANDY LIGGETT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 193rd Jud icial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 17

- 10001



### O RDER

By letter dated June 26, 2019, we directed appellant to file, within ten days, written

verification she had requested the record and either paid or made arrangements to pay the

reporter's fee or was entitled to proceed without payment of costs. Although we cautioned that

failure to comply could result in the appeal being submitted without the reporter's record,

appellant has failed to comply. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). Accordingly, we ORDER the

appeal submitted without the reporter's record. See id.

As the clerk's record has been filed, we ORDER appellant to file her brief no later than

August 14, 2019.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE
(Reap. Dec. 8578)

#### Ulric Weil *v.*United States

Entry No. 105.

(Decided May 11, 1956)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Laweence, Judge:

The question presented by this appeal for a reappraisement is the proper dutiable value of one Mercedes Benz automobile, 180 Saloon, 5-6, 1955, 52 h. p., 4-cylinder, 75-millimeter bore, with radio and heater, imported from England.

When this case was called for hearing, the parties hereto stipulated and agreed that there was no foreign, export, or United States value for said importation and that the cost of production thereof consists of deutschemarks 9,450, less 17.31 per centum, plus the cost of radio and heater, less 10 per centum for use, or a total value of $1,795.

Upon the agreed facts of record, I find and hold that cost of pro-' duction, as that value is defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (f)), is the proper basis of value for the automobile in issue, and that said value is $1,795.

Judgment will issue accordingly.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HYANG LAN LEE,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-70912

Agency No. A079-800-950

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 12, 2011** 

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Hyang Lan Lee, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal. 

FILED

JUL 15 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-70912

 We have jurisdiction under by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence adverse credibility determinations, Chawla v. Holder, 599 F.3d 998, 1001

(9th Cir. 2010), and deny the petition for review.

Lee’s claim for relief in her asylum application and at her merits hearing

differed significantly from the claim for relief she presented to the asylum officer

during her credible fear interview. We reject Lee’s contention that the BIA

improperly relied on the credible fear interview to find her not credible. See Li v.

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2004); cf. Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1022

(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an airport statement lacked sufficient indicia of

reliability and accuracy on its own to support an adverse credibility determination

because there was evidence of translation problems and no evidence of how the

interview was conducted). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

credibility determination based on this inconsistent account of her claim, see

Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he court must

uphold the BIA’s findings unless the evidence presented would compel a

reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result”); Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d

1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (inconsistencies deprived claim of requisite “ring of

truth”), and the agency reasonably rejected Lee’s explanation for the inconsistency,

see Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007).
3 08-70912

In the absence of credible testimony, Lee’s claims for asylum and

withholding of removal fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.

2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
6915

#### STATE v. FOSTER.

Appeal — New Trial — Juror. — Appeal suspended and leave granted to make motion below for new trial, on- ground that since trial one juror is alleged not to have been indifferent.

Motion -in State against Will Foster to suspend appeal, with leave to move the Circuit Court for new trial on after-discovered evidence tending to show a juror sat in case with determination to convict.

*348
      *Messrs. H. T. Rogers*and *Sam I. Nicholls*for the-motion.

*Solicitor T. S.*Sease, contra.

May 21, 1908.

PER Curiam.

The counsel for appellant have moved to suspend the appeal with leave to move in the Circuit Court for a new trial, on the ground that one of the jurors, Jesse Mahaffey, was not indifferent, but, on the contrary, had determined to convict the defendant before the trial commenced. In support of the motion, the defendant’s counsel have presented affidavits of persons who-swear that Mahaffey, after the trial, declared to them his intention, formed before any evidence was offered, to convict the defendant without respect to the testimony. The Solicitor submitted an 'affidavit of Mahaffey, in which 'he denies that he had made up his mind to convict before hearing the evidence, and says any remarks made about his conduct as a juror in the case were not serious, but made in the course of jocular conversation:

The issue to the defendant is life or death. The charge made under oath against the juror is a most serious one, affecting not only the life of the defendant, but the integrity of the jury box.

We express no opinion as to the issue of fact, but it is of such quality as to merit investigation by the Circuit Court. The motion is granted.
No. 49244.

#### Protests 70456-K, etc., of John Heathcoat & Co., Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
### In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06

- 11

- 00 091

- CV

______________________________

IN RE : OLIVER WENDELL HART, III

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Oliver Wendell Hart , III, files this petition for writ of mandamus complaining of

deprivation of personal property from his inmate trust fund account. The respondent is identified

as the “Bowie County District Clerk.” We dismiss Hart’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Mandam us is an extraordinary remedy. State v. Walker , 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.

1984). In order to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief, Hart must show that: (1) there

is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm; and (2) only a minist erial act, not a

discretionary or judicial decision, is being sought. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Court of Appeals at Texarkana , 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Due to the nature

of this remedy, it is Hart’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to the mandamus

relief. Barnes v. State , 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself

entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks

. ”).

This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a “ judge of a district or

county court in the court of appeals district.” T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 22.221(b) (West 2004).

Because we do not have jurisdiction against a d istrict clerk unless necessary to enforce our

jurisdiction, and Hart has not demonstrated that mandamus relief is necessary for this purpose, we

have no jurisdiction over this petition.3

We dismiss Hart’s petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: September 1, 2011

Date Decided: September 2, 2011
No. 46779.

#### Protests 966339-G, etc., of Olivier Straw Goods Corp., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that certain of the items consist of knotted sisal hats, the same as those the subject of Abstract 46497, the claim at 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 1504 (b) (1) was sustained as to these hats only.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T UN I T E D S T AT E S OF AME R I C A, P l ai nt i ff

- A pp el l ee , v. T H O MA S G R A H A M, D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e llan t. N o. 10- 50230 D . C. N o . 2 : 0 8 - c r - 0 0 4 9 0 - D SF ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e C e n tr a l D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia D a l e S . F i s c he r , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d A pr i l5, 2011 ** B efo re: B . F L E T C H E R , C L IF T O N , an dB E A , C i rcu i tJu d g es. T hom a s G r a ha m appe a l s f r om the 100- m onth s e nt e nc e i m pos e d f ol l ow i ng hi s c onvi c t i on f

orpos s e s s i on w i th i nt e ntt o di s tr i but e he r oi n, i n vi ol a t i on of 2 1 U . S. C. § § 8 5 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B) ( i ) . W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r2 8 U . S. C. § 1 2 9 1 , a n dw e a f

f i rm. 

# FI LED APR11 2 011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS10- 50230 2 G r a ha m c ont e nds tha tthe di s tr i c tc ourtpr oc e dur a l l ye rr e d byappl y i ng the c a r e e rof f e nde re nha nc e m e ntunde rU . S . S . G . § 4B 1. 1( a ) ( 3) ba s e d on pr e vi ous c o n v ic tio n s r e s u ltin g f

r o m n o lo c o n te n d e r e p le a s in th e C a lif o rn ias ta te c o u rt. C al i forni a c ou rt s tre ata pl eaof no l o con t endere a s the equi val entof a gui l ty pl ea c o n v ic tio n . Se e U

ni te d States v . A nde rs on , 625 F . 3d 1219, 1220 ( 9th C i r . 2010) ( pe rc ur i a m ) . B e c aus e G r a ha m w a s c onvi c t e d of qua l i f y i ng pr e vi ous f

e l oni e s , the d is tr ic t c o u rt’s ap p lic a tio n o f th e c a r e e ro f

f e n d e re n h a n c e m e n t w a s n o t c le a r ly e rr o n e o u s . Se e, e . g. , Un i te d S ta tes v . Wi l l i a ms , 47 F . 3d 99 3, 99 5 (9th C i r. 19 95 ). AF F I RME D.
No. 61932.

#### Traveler Trading Co. *v.*United States,

protests 278242-K (B) and 281282-K (B) (New York).

Opinion by

Wilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of artificial flowers the same in all material respects as those the subject of Abstract 61346, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 8082** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ROBERT EDWARD PATTERSON , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:04

- cr - 00049

- BO

- 1; 5:07

- cv - 00385

- BO )

Submitted : July 14, 2010 Decided: July 22, 2010

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un publishe d per curiam opinion
. Robert Edward Patterson, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Fesak, Steve R. Matheney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Robert Edward Patterson seeks to appeal the district court’s order s denying him relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion and treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 ( e ) motion as a successive § 2255 motion, and denying it on that basis. The order s are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (2006) ; Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of t he constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Patterson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability , deny3 Patterson’s motion for appointment of counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials befo re the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 28, 2018

No. 04-18-00881-CV

THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,

Appellant

v.

Elena HERRERA,

Appellee

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-CI-10253

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellant’s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED. 

The appellant’s brief is due on January 16, 2019.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 28th day of December, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### Frank E. Allen and others, *Respondents, v.*Same, *Appellant.*

The like judgment.
----

**Exh**
**ibit      32**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO **

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350, **

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO **

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 **

|   | /s/                Charles Handly                                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Charles                Handly, President and Chief Executive Officer of Rio Vista GP LLC,                the                general partner of Rio Vista Energy Partners L.P.                                 |
|   | November                21, 2005                                                                                                                                                                              |
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|   | /s/                Ian T. Bothwell                                                                                                                                                                            |
|   | Ian                T. Bothwell, Chief Financial Officer (principal accounting and financial                officer) of Rio Vista GP LLC, the general partner of Rio Vista Energy                Partners L.P. |
|   | November                21, 2005                                                                                                                                                                              |

----
(V. D. 57)

Entry Nos. 777252; 962546; 804924.

#### E. Leitz, Inc. *v.*United States

(Decided December 11, 1957)

*Eugene B. Pickrell*for the plaintiff.

*■George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Wilson, Judge:

This matter is presently before me on a remand from a classification proceeding decided by the first division of this court in *E. Leitz, Inc.*v. *United States,*36 Cust. Ct. 391, Abstract 59812. The judgment entered therein stated: “ * * * that the matters be remanded to a single judge in reappraisement pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U. S. C. § 2636 (d).”

The matter has been submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts entered into by and between counsel for the respective parties hereto.

Upon the agreed facts, I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (d)), to be the proper basis for determining the values of the involved merchandise and that such values were as follows:

> *534Merchandise United States dollars per each

> 12 Polarizing Microscopes MOP, without front Collector and POEMP diaphragm and other parts_ $454. 44

> 12 wooden containers to fit_ 22. 96

> 5 Greenough Microscopes YEEUW_ 160. 04

> 5 wooden containers to fit_ 14. 40 less 25 per centum discount for each item

I further find such values to be the dutiable values of said merchandise.

Insofar as the matter relates to all other merchandise, it is hereby dismissed.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
No. 64951.

#### World Wide Services, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 60/3229 (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Since the protest was filed more than 60 days after liquidation, it was dismissed as untimely, by virtue of section 514, Tariff Act of 1930.
No. 47441.

#### Protest 68221-K of Dan Brechner & Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Dallinger, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of Abstract 47141 the articles in question were held dutiable at the rate of 3 cents per pound but not less than 22)4 nor more than 45 percent ad valorem under the provision for “articles or wares not specially provided for, if composed wholly or in chief value of lead, but not plated with platinum, gold, or silver, or colored with gold lacquer, whether wholly or partly manufactured” in paragraph 397 as modified by T. D. 49753, as claimed.