IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) I.D.: 1505012411

v. )

)

DAMIAN THOMAS, )

)

Defendant. )

SUBMITTED: August 30, 2021

DECIDED: November 10, 2021

OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION 

FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 

Sean P. Lugg, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Carvel State 

Office Building, 820 N. French Street, 7th floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the 

State of Delaware. 

Christopher Koyste, Esquire, 709 Brandywine Boulevard, Bellefonte, Delaware, 19809, 

Attorney for Defendant Damian Thomas.

Jones, J. 
2

INTRODUCTION

On April 18, 2019, Defendant Damian Thomas (“Thomas”) filed a pro se

Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Appointment of Counsel, and an Evidentiary 

Hearing pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 Motion”). 

Counsel was appointed. On January 22, 2021, Mr. Thomas’ appointed counsel filed 

an Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. Briefing on these motions is 

complete and the case is ready for a decision. For the reasons stated below,

Defendant’s Motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 18, 2016, a New Castle County grand jury charged Thomas with First 

Degree Murder, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony 

(“PFDCF”), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”) and

Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (“CCDW”). Thomas was arrested the same 

day. 

On September 19, 2017, after a five-day trial, a Superior Court jury found 

Thomas guilty of First-Degree Murder, PFDCF, and CCDW. The parties agreed to 

sever the PFBPP charge and to waive a jury trial for the adjudication of that charge. 

A bench trial followed the return of the jury’s trial verdict, and the trial judge found 

Thomas guilty of the PFBPP charge. 
3

On November 2, 2017, the Superior Court sentenced Thomas to serve the 

remainder of his natural life in prison for his First-Degree Murder conviction and to 

5 years incarceration followed by decreasing levels of probation for the remaining 

three charges. Thomas appealed his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court. The 

Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court on March 26, 2019.

In Thomas’ direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found the following:

The evidence against Thomas was considerable and, even 

without Detective Curley's opinion testimony, more than 

sufficient to support Thomas's conviction. Two other 

eyewitnesses—Etta Reid and Leantaye Cassidy—testified 

that they saw Thomas shoot Deshannon Reid before he fled 

through the parking lot.18 Moreover, Thomas's former 

cellmate, testified that Thomas told him that he retrieved a 

gun and shot Deshannon following a drug-related argument. 

Lastly, the jury had the ability to review on its own the 

content of the surveillance videos and determine whether it 

was Thomas on the tapes. This evidence—coupled with the 

facts that Thomas fled from Delaware and his girlfriend of 

seventeen years, remained at large for a year, and admitted 

that he was wanted for murder in Delaware when police 

apprehended him in New Jersey in 2016—is sufficient to 

sustain Thomas's conviction. Thus, even if the Superior 

Court erred in admitting the detective's opinion, such error 

was harmless and does not warrant reversal.1

A third eyewitness, Monique Pruden was called by the State. As to Ms. 

Pruden’s testimony, the Supreme Court had this to say:

A third purported eyewitness was apparently discredited 

when the defense introduced evidence that she was 

1 Thomas v. State, 2019 WL 1380051, at *4 (Del. 2019).
4

incarcerated on the night of the murder. The State 

countered that the evidence suggested that the witness could 

have been on work release at the relevant time, but the 

Superior Court, in the absence of evidence supporting this 

contention, precluded the State from arguing that point to 

the jury.2

It is the testimony of Ms. Pruden that forms the basis of Thomas’ instant 

Rule 61 motion. 

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Thomas advances three arguments as to Pruden’s testimony. Thomas alleges 

that (1) his conviction was tainted by the use of Pruden’s perjured testimony; (2) the 

State committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct Pruden’s perjured 

testimony and by addressing this testimony in its closing and rebuttal arguments; 

and (3) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to search for, uncover, and 

disclose impeachment information pertaining to Pruden. In his fourth claim,

Thomas asserts that an evidentiary hearing is needed to “determine whether the State 

suppressed material impeachment information in relation to Pruden’s June 16, 2015 

statement to Detective Curley.”3

FACTS

The first statement of Monique Pruden was given pretrial to Detective Curley 

on June 16, 2016. His summary of that interview indicates:

2

Id. at n. 18.

3 Amended Motion at 55, State v. Thomas, (No. 1505012411) (Del. Super. 2019). Hereinafter referenced as 

“Amend. Mot.”
5

I conducted an interview with Pruden on 6/16/15 at the 

Wilmington police station. This interview was recorded. 

Pruden advised that she knows the victim, Shannon and 

“Mutt.” She said Shannon was the weed man and “Mutt” 

would buy weed off of him. She has since heard “Mutt” 

owed Shannon money. She explained that she was near 

Pete’s pizza when she heard the gunshots and then “Mutt” 

ran past her onto Market Street. She did not see a gun in his 

hand but stated he could have put it into his waistband by 

then. Pruden was shown a six person photo line-up, and she 

positively identified Damian Thomas as “Mutt.” She 

arrived at the scene and there were people around the 

victim. She explained that everyone was saying it was 

“Mutt” who had just shot DeShannon.4

On September 15, 2017, the State sent an email to trial counsel in which it 

said:

... Today we interviewed Monique Pruden. She was 

previously interviewed by [sic] Detective Curley and her 

interview was provided to you. A transcript of her previous 

interview was also provided. When re-interviewing Ms. 

Pruden she indicated she saw the shooting and that “Mutt 

shot Shannon.” This second interview was recorded and I 

received a copy of this interview this evening. Please let me 

know the best way to get a copy of this interview to you 

tomorrow. 5

On September 18, 2017, the State called Pruden to testify during its case-inchief.

6

 In relevant part, Pruden testified on direct examination that she was “present 

on the block the night that Deshannon Reid was killed.”7 She admitted on direct 

examination that her 2015 statement to Detective Curley would be inconsistent with 

4 A50.

5 A73. Hereinafter, all references to (A) are to the Appendix filed by Thomas in the instant motion.

6 A166. 

7 A168.
6

her soon-to-be-given-in-court testimony, explaining as to the reasons for the 

inconsistencies that “at the time I was just afraid, and I didn’t want anything to do 

with it.”8In explaining what she allegedly saw, Pruden testified, “I was on 27th

Street. I was standing there by the church, and I heard Shannon and Mutt. They 

were arguing. They were on the sidewalk in front of Shannon’s house --.”9 Ms. 

Pruden thereafter identified Mr. Thomas as “Mutt” by pointing him out to the jury.10

Pruden then continued with her testimony, and the following exchange with the 

DAG occurred:

A. They were arguing, and then they were arguing on the sidewalk.

Q. Where on the sidewalk?

A. Like, in front of Deshannon’s house, and then Deshannon spit on Mutt. 

After that, they were - - he said, “Mother fucker, I’ll be back.

Q. Who said that?

A. Mutt, and then, I would say five minutes went by. He came back. They 

were still arguing again.11

According to Pruden, “Mutt walked right by her in the direction of Market 

Street” and was gone for “about five minutes” before he returned.12 Pruden further 

testified that Reid and Thomas resumed arguing, that Reid was “waving his hands 

8 A168-69.

9 A169. 

10 Id.

11 A170.

12 A170-71.
7

around” and that Thomas had a gun and “[w]hen Deshannon turned around, he 

pulled it out and he started shooting.”13 She stated that she saw the gun come out, 

heard the shots, and saw Mutt’s hand extended.14 Pruden testified that “after he shot 

Deshannon Reid,” Mutt “ran through Pete’s parking lot.”15 She further averred that 

she was familiar with Mutt before all of this happened, and that she had no problem 

seeing any of the events that night and that she was testifying from what she saw 

that night.16

On cross-examination, trial counsel asked Pruden, “It is your testimony today 

that you saw everything?”17 Pruden responded “Yes.”18 Trial counsel then inquired 

of Pruden, “It’s your testimony today that you were on 27th & Market on October 

the - - on April the 14th, 2015, correct?”19 Pruden responded “Yes.”20 She specified 

that she was standing on 27th Street by the church, not exactly in front of the church, 

but closer to Deshannon’s home, on the same side that Deshannon lives on.”21 Ms. 

Pruden testified that she did not see Deshannon’s mother, Ms. Reid, outside that 

13 A171. 

14 A172.

15 Id.

16 A173.

17 A176. 

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.
8

day.22 Thereafter, the following exchange occurred between trial counsel and 

Pruden:

Q. And you said earlier you told police you only heard the shooting, 

but this time you’re saying that you saw the shooting, correct?

A. I saw it the first time. I didn’t want anything to do with it.

Q. Okay, and the testimony that you’re giving, you’re giving this 

under oath, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And this is the hundred percent the truth, the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth?

A. Yes.

Q. And how sure are you of that?

A. Cause I was there.

Q. You were there. Is there anything that I could say to make you 

think that you weren’t there?

A. I guess you will; won’t you?

Q. No, I’m just asking you.

A. No, you cannot.23

22 A179, 182.

23 A182-83.
9

Trial counsel then asked Pruden if she was in WCI on April 7, 2015, to which 

Pruden responded yes.24 Trial counsel then requested a recess, at which point trial 

counsel stated:

Your Honor, here’s where we are in this matter. Miss Pruden has testified 

that she was present on April the 14th, 2015 at - - on Market Street and 27th. 

We have evidence to show that on April the 24th, 201525 she was sentenced by 

Judge Street to 3 months at Level V. Her release date would have, and it is, 

4/27/15 - - 4/29/15, Your Honor.

I’ve shown the State a copy of the inmate locator. There’s an inmate locator 

that is sent that shows every person that is incarcerated on a certain day in the 

State of Delaware. I’ve pulled the date to show that on April the 13th, 2015, 

Ms. Pruden was in the custody of the Department of Correction in the Hazel 

Plant Correctional Center at WCI on Baylor on February 13, 2015.

I pulled the date to show that Miss Pruden was also in custody at the 

Department of Correction on April 15, 2015. I show - - I also pulled the date 

that says that she was in custody on April the 29th, 2015, and I pulled the 

records to show that she was no longer in custody on May 1st 2015.

I have the Sentencing Order, Your Honor. I have the Court’s commitment 

paper, and I also have the violation report that was filed on 6/9/2015 that also 

says that she was released from custody on May 1st, 2015 and was violated for 

failure to report to Level III probation, that is currently pending, cause she 

was out on capias since that time.

26

24 A183. 

25 It appears that trial counsel mistakenly said “April” when he meant February. See A246.

26 A185-86.
10

The DAG advised that they had never seen those records and needed time to 

review them.27 The State also agreed to provide trial counsel with DELJIS records 

that would show Pruden’s actual release date from custody.28 Upon returning from 

recess, the DAG stated that “I believe everyone is on the same page now, that she 

was at Hazel D. Plant Center. Mr. Armstrong will cross-examine her about that 

facility and what inmates can or can’t do, and the State will redirect.”29

During trial counsel’s resumed cross-examination of Pruden, she refused to 

acknowledge that she was in the custody of the Department of Correction (“DOC”) 

on the day of the shooting. Instead, she insisted that she was working at Deal$ in 

April 2015 from 12:00 pm to 5:00 pm and was living at 303 West 29th Street.

30

Pruden further stated that she had been sentenced to probation, despite the sentence 

order showing that she received Level V time and that trial counsel was wrong in 

stating that she was released from custody on April 29, 2015.

31 When trial counsel 

asked Pruden whether, factoring in good time, she was released from custody on 

April 29, 2015, she insisted he was incorrect stating that “It wasn’t April 29th. 

You’re trying to say I was in jail when this went down, I was not.”32

27 A187. 

28 Id. 

29 Id.

30 A189, 192, 195-202.

31 A193-94, 196.

32 A195-96.
11

Trial counsel questioned Pruden on her violation paperwork which stated she 

had been released from custody on May 1, 2015 and that she did not live at the 

address she had provided at trial, 303 West 29th Street.33 When trial counsel 

specifically asked, “I want to know if you were incarcerated on April the 14th, 2015,” 

Pruden responded, “No.”34 Trial counsel followed up this question by asking “Even 

though the documents say that you were?” to which Pruden responded “Yes.”35

Regarding the rules of Hazel D. Plant pertaining to curfew and work release, 

the following exchange occurred between trial counsel and Pruden:

Q. And you said you’ve been - - you’ve done Hazel Plant before?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. All right. Part of the rules is that there’s a curfew, right?

A. Yes.

Q. What time’s the curfew?

A. Well, 10:00.

Q. 10:00

A. But I never - - I wasn’t in at 10:00.

Q. So, you weren’t in there at 10:00?

33 A200-01.

34 A210-11.

35 A211.
12

A. No, I was not.

Q. And they also have phases in order for you to get and go on work 

release, right?

A. Yes.

Q. All right, and when you were at Hazel Plant, did you ever make - - what 

phase did you make in those two months that you were there?

A. It wasn’t work - - I had got - - I went home, because I had maxed up. 

So, I didn’t have to end up making any phases.

Q. So, you never - - you went home after you maxed out on April 29th, 

2015; isn’t that correct? That’s when you maxed out, right?

A. If you say so.

Q. That’s exactly when you maxed out; isn’t it?

A. No, it’s not.36

On redirect examination, the DAG read a description of Hazel Plant which 

noted that the facility has “work release as a component.”37 

After the jury left for lunch recess, the State advised the Court that they were 

“going to be looking for some information from the records that we just got from 

Mr. Armstrong during break.”38 Subsequently, trial counsel advised the Court that 

36 A211-12.

37 A214.

38 A221.
13

he may call someone from the Department of Correction as a defense witness.39 In 

response to the Court questioning whether it could potentially be worked out by 

stipulation between the parties, the State responded “hopefully,” and that it was 

attempting to get in contact with someone at the facility but was not successful. This 

was also confirmed by trial counsel who was also unsuccessful in his efforts to reach 

someone at the facility.40 During closing arguments, the State stated:

Now, ladies and gentlemen, the State anticipates Mr. Armstrong is going 

to discuss the inconsistencies in Etta, Taye and Monique’s statements, 

talk about the inconsistencies in the distance of how far they were and 

where exactly they were in the street.

He’s going to talk to you about Monique. Monique was emphatic that 

she was out there. You heard Mr. Armstrong question her about her time 

at Hazel D. Plant Center.

You are going to be instructed that you will be the sole judges of 

credibility in this case....41

During closing arguments, trial counsel made the following comments 

regarding Pruden’s testimony:

Then you have Monique Pruden. In the State’s opening, they truly 

glossed over Monique, and then told you, well, even if you don’t believe 

Monique, you still got three other witnesses. Monique’s testimony 

conflicts with her previous statements, and the worst part of the whole 

thing is she was in jail. She got up on that stand, told you what she said, 

39 A224.

40 A225, 227.

41 A235.
14

collaborated everything everyone else said, and she was in jail. 

Uncontrovertedly, she was in jail.

The question is: Is there a credibility question? Is there a 

credibility gap? Are we really dealing with fake news?

....

Maybe that’s not enough reasonable doubt for you as well. Let’s 

talk about Monique Pruden. That’s the elephant in the room. That’s the 

person that everybody wants to just push aside. Prove to you she’s in jail 

on April 14, 2015. Prove to you she’s in jail on April 14, 2015, and she 

saw everything. Prove to you that she’s in jail on April 14, 2015. 

Released from jail on May 1, 2015. Prove to you that she was released 

from jail on May 1, 2015.

Court order sentenced her to three months in jail. What else do we 

have? When she’s responding it was, it wasn’t me. We’ve got 

institutional records showing that she was in jail from 2/7 to April 29, 

and yet what do we get? Once again, wasn’t me. Institutional records 

showing she was in jail on April 14, April 15 and April 29. Again, wasn’t 

me.

....

Monique Pruden, we can toss her out of there. We know where 

she was. We just don’t know why she said what she said and got up on 

that stand and did what she did.42

Thereafter, during rebuttal argument, the DAG stated:

Mr. Armstrong says to you that it is without a doubt that Monique Pruden 

was in jail. I think he writes jail up there five or six times. She’s 

emphatic. She sits up there. She’s there. The State submits to you, the 

records say she’s at Hazel D. Plant, not jail. Hazel D. Plant.

43

42 Transcript of Trial at 72-73, 81-82, 88, State v. Thomas, No. 1505012411 (Del. Super. 2019).

43 A240.
15

Trial counsel immediately objected, arguing:

At this point, the State is trying to insinuate that Hazel D. Plant is not a 

jail. It is actually a jail housed at WCI. That is a total misrepresentation 

of the facts.44

Thereafter, the following exchange occurred.

THE COURT: Is the State suggesting, because it should know that she 

was out on work release or was at liberty or not in custodial section?

DAG: I think the answer is no one knows. I think we can argue they put 

into evidence that it’s a work release facility.

THE COURT: I know defense put that into evidence, but does the State 

believe that she was at liberty in some fashion on April 14, 2015?

DAG: I do not know.

THE COURT: Well, I think it’s the State’s - - the State is in control of 

the Department of Correction. I don’t think the State should be permitted 

to suggest, just because this document was put into evidence, it was 

partially a work release facility, which probably is - -

DAG: Your Honor, sorry to interrupt.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

44 Id.
16

DAG: On cross-examination she said she has a job at Deals on Miller 

Road in April of 2015.

THE COURT: What has the State found out from the Department of 

Correction as to where she was on April 14.

DAG: I do not have an answer. All I know is that she was at Hazel D. 

Plant, and I don’t have a definitive answer. That’s what we were trying 

to get, and I can’t get it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is a Level V facility, your Honor. The State 

is now saying that it’s not. It’s a prison.

THE COURT: I think just because that document was put into evidence 

and suggests that it can be a work release referral, it is incumbent on the 

State, maybe just because a personnel at the department of Correction 

weren’t there in the last couple days, when this 24 hours almost when 

this came to light, I don’t think the State should be able to suggest that 

she might have been able to leave without affirmative proof given the 

seriousness of this that the defendant – I think it stated another way, I 

think the State is bound by the weight of the facts developing this case, 

that she was in prison on April 14, and I’m just going to preclude the 

State from arguing to the contrary.

The State is the one on this important issue that should be able to tell the 

Court whether or not she was in prison. If you say you can’t tell that one 

way or the other, I’m not going to allow an argument to the contrary.45

The DAG stated that the State disagreed but would move on.46 However, 

defense counsel requested that the record be corrected, noting “She has said that she 

45 A240-41.

46 A241.
17

was not in jail; she was at Hazel D. Plant, which leads the jury to believe she is not 

in jail. That needs to be corrected, Your Honor.47 The DAG disagreed. 

48 However, 

the Court concluded a correction was warranted, noting:

Well, then I think the State should have put on some evidence that she 

was in the work release program or had the ability to leave, other than 

this document. I have to find the question because the State never argued 

until right now in rebuttal, that there was theoretical opportunity of her 

to not have been at Hazel D. Plant.

I’m going to instruct the jury that Hazel D. Plant is a secure facility 

because I think it was incumbent on the State, having called her as a 

witness, found out the fact it did, to have shown one way or the other that 

she was in the custodial situation at Hazel D. Plant or not.

So I’m going to instruct the jury that for the background facts, Hazel D. 

Plant is a, in fact, a jail.49

Thereafter, the Court stated, “Members of the jury, I instruct you that Hazel 

D. Plant facility is a jail.”50

PROCEDURAL BARS UNDER RULE 61(i)

“Postconviction relief is a collateral remedy which provides an avenue for 

upsetting judgments that otherwise have become final. It is not designed as a 

substitute for a direct appeal.”

51

 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 governs motions 

for postconviction relief, establishing the procedures by which a defendant may 

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 William Henry Flamer v. State of Delaware, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990).
18

collaterally attack his conviction. The Court first must determine whether the claim 

is barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). Rule 61 contains several 

procedural bars but only the “procedural default” bar is pertinent to this case.52 

Specifically, Rule 61 (i)(3) prohibits a defendant from raising “any ground for relief 

that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction... 

unless the movant shows (A) cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) 

prejudice from the violation of movant’s rights.”53 In order to show “cause for relief 

from the procedural default,” Defendant must show that “‘some external 

impediment’ prevented him from raising the claim.”54 To show “prejudice from 

violation of the movant’s rights,” Defendant must show that there is a “substantial 

likelihood” that if the issue had been raised on appeal, the outcome would have been 

different.55 

Thomas raises three claims relating to the verdict rendered against him by a jury.

In his first claim, Thomas argues that his “right to due process of law under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the

Delaware Constitution was violated when his conviction was tainted by the use of

perjured testimony.”56 In his second claim, Thomas argues that “the State committed

52 The State concedes the other procedural bars in Rule 61 do not apply to the Thomas’ claims in his amended 

motion.

53 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

54 Younger v. State, 580 A.3d 552, 556 (Del. 1990) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).

55 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d at 748 (quoting United States v. Freddy, 456 U.S. 152, 172, 174 (1982)); see also 

Perez, ID No. 1807009079, at 6.

56 Amend. Mot. at 21.
19

four key errors with respect to calling Monique Pruden as a witness in its case-inchief that cumulatively amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.”57 Thomas argues the

State failed to: (1) adequately review Pruden’s criminal record prior to trial; (2)

secure records or call witnesses after Thomas produced records indicating Pruden

was incarcerated at the time of the murder; (3) correct Pruden’s “nearly certain” false

testimony at trial; and (4) arguing from Pruden’s false testimony in closing and

rebuttal arguments.

58 In his third claim, Thomas argues that “the State violated its

obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to search for and disclose crucial

impeachment information demonstrating the falsity of Ms. Pruden’s testimony,”

which violates Mr. Thomas’ right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

Sates Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.”59

The State asserts that Thomas’ claims are procedurally barred. Specifically,

Thomas failed to raise these claims “leading to the judgment of conviction.”60 To

overcome this procedural bar Thomas must show “cause for relief from the

procedural default and ... prejudice from the violation of [his, as] the movant’s

rights.61 According to the State, Thomas cannot make this showing.

THOMAS FAILS TO SHOW “CAUSE” TO OVERCOME THE

PROCEDURAL BAR OF RULE 61

57 Id. at 38.

58 Id.

59 Id. at 47.

60 Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(3).

61 Id.
20

Thomas argues that he has shown “cause” or “some external impediment”

which prevented him from raising his first three claims on direct appeal relating to

violation of his due process rights, the use of perjured testimony, and a Brady

violation by the State. “‘Cause’ for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily

requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from

constructing or raising the claim.”62 Thomas argues that he could not have raised

these claims on direct appeal because “trial counsel could not have obtained the

documentation needed to conclusively show that Ms. Pruden was in custody at Hazel

Plant on April 14, 2015 and did not have the ability to leave the facility on work

release at that time.”63

Thomas contendsthat he has established cause because the record is now more

expansive then that on the direct appeal. He points to Pruden’s recantation, the

testimony establishing that Pruden was not working at Dollar Tree or Deal$ at the

time of the murder, and the conclusive proof that Pruden did not have the ability to

leave Hazel D. Plant on the day of the murder in support of this argument.

The record is clear that Thomas’ counsel, before trial, had access to inmate

locator sheets, Pruden’s docket sheet, sentencing order, the Court’s commitment

paper, and violation report “all of which raised strong suspicion that Ms. Pruden was

62 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)).

63 Amend. Mot. at 23, 45-46, 53.
21

in custody at Hazel Plant on April 14, 2015.”64 However, Thomas advances that

because the State continued to suggest to the jury, after trial counsel presented

documentation evidencing that Pruden was incarcerated, that she was at some liberty

to leave the facility, that trial counsel did not have documentation to “conclusively

refute” that. Thus, Thomas could not have raised these claims on his direct appeal.

This Court is satisfied that based on the documentation that was available to

trial counsel, and the use to which trial counsel put this material, that there was

sufficient evidence available for these claims to be raised on direct appeal. By the

time of the verdict, everyone was aware of the question of Pruden’s whereabouts at

the time of the murder and the arguments made by each side regarding Pruden. The

trial court went so far as to give an instruction regarding Hazel D. Plant facility and

prevented the State from arguing that Pruden was not incarcerated. On this record,

there was nothing preventing Thomas from raising these issues in his direct appeal.65

THOMAS FAILS TO SHOW THAT HE HAS SUFFERED PREJUDICE

Not only is cause lacking, but so is the conjunctive required showing of 

prejudice under Rule 61(i)(3).

Claim I: Alleged Use of Perjured Testimony

In a Rule 61 motion, to show prejudice from violation of movant’s rights, a 

defendant must show that there is a substantial likelihood that if the issue had been 

64 Amend Mot. at 33-34. 

65 The Dollar Tree records and the affidavit of Darren Carter is evidence that is merely cumulative to that presented 

at trial during the cross examination of Pruden.
22

raised on appeal, the outcome would have been different.66 No such showing can 

be made in this case.

In the direct appeal in this case, the Delaware Supreme Court clearly noted: 

The evidence against Thomas was considerable and, even without 

Detective Curley’s opinion testimony, more than sufficient to support 

Thomas’s conviction. Two other eyewitnesses – Etta Reid and 

Leantaye Cassidy – testified that they saw Thomas shoot Deshannon 

Reid before he fled through the parking lot. Moreover, Thomas’s 

former cellmate, testified that Thomas told him that he retrieved a gun 

and shot Deshannon following a drug-related argument. Lastly, the jury 

had the ability to review on its own the content of the surveillance 

videos and determine whether it was Thomas on the tapes. This 

evidence –coupled with the facts that Thomas fled from Delaware and 

his girlfriend of seventeen years, remained at large for a year, and 

admitted that he was wanted for murder in Delaware when police 

apprehended him in New Jersey in 2016 – is sufficient to sustain 

Thomas’s conviction. Thus, even if the Superior Court erred in 

admitting the detective’s opinion, such error was harmless and does not 

warrant reversal.67

This Court, joining in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the facts here, 

concludes that, Thomas cannot overcome the hurdle of demonstrating that there is a 

substantial likelihood that if the issues had been raised on appeal, the outcome would 

have been different. In short, the issue of Pruden’s whereabouts were before the jury 

and trial court, and the Delaware Supreme Court considered it as well. On this 

record, it cannot be said that there is a substantial likelihood that the outcome would 

66 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d at 748 (quoting Untied States v. Freddy, 456 U.S. 152, 172, 174 (1982)); see also 

Perez, ID No. 1807009079, at 6.

67 Thomas v. State, 2019 WL 1380051, at *4 (Del. 2019).
23

have been different when the issue was fully vetted and obvious at trial.68 The

evidence against Thomas was overwhelming. Moreover, the circumstances 

surrounding Pruden’s whereabouts at the time of the murder was fully vetted at trial.

The issues surrounding Pruden were obvious.

In an effort to get past this hurdle, Thomas argues that a different test should 

be employed by this Court in review of this matter. Citing to various United States 

Supreme Court decisions including, Untied States v. Agurs,

69 Giglio v. United 

States,

70 and Napue v. People of Ill.,71 Thomas asserts that the proper standard for 

this Court to utilize to determine prejudice is whether “there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the perjured testimony of Pruden could have affected the judgment 

of the jury.”

72

Thomas’ reliance on Agurs and Giglio is misplaced. In Agurs, the Court was 

asked to determine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial under Brady 

when the prosecutor failed to provide certain information to her about the victim that 

would have supported her self-defense claim.73 The Court noted that Brady applied 

68 This Court does not agree with Thomas’ argument that the record was incomplete on this issue. The record 

contained sufficient information for the Supreme Court to address any issue surrounding whether perjured testimony 

was offered in the trial court.

69 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding modified by United States v. Bagley, 472 U.S. 667 (1985)).

70 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

71 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

72 Amend. Mot. at 21.

73 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 98-99, 107.
24

in this situation where there was “discovery, after trial, of information which had 

been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”74 

Similarly, in Giglio, the issue before the Court was whether the petitioner was 

entitled to a new trial under Napue due process criteria.75 The basis of the petitioner’s 

motion was newly discovered evidence that the Government had failed to disclose –

an alleged promise of leniency to a key witness in return for his testimony.76 The 

witness in Giglio was an alleged co-conspirator of the petitioner and the only witness 

that linked him to the crime.77

In Napue, the issue before the Court was whether the petitioner was denied 

his due process rights when the prosecutor failed to correct testimony of a witness 

that he knew to be false.78 The witness was the “principal witness,” and his testimony 

“extremely important” because the circumstances made eyewitness identification 

“very difficult and uncertain,” and other relevant witnesses were no longer in the 

state.79 The witness testified that he had not been promised anything for his 

testimony against the petitioner. After trial, the Assistant State’s Attorney filed a 

petition alleging that he had promised the witness that he would make a 

74 Id. at 103 (emphasis added).

75 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151.

76 Id. at 150.

77 Id. at 764.

78 Napue, 360 U.S. at 265.

79 Id. at 265-66.
25

recommendation and effectuate a reduction of his sentence for his testimony against 

the petitioner,

80 prompting the petitioner to then file a post-conviction petition.

In the cases cited by Thomas, the petitioners made allegations regarding 

newly discovered evidence after trial. At most, Thomas has alleged that trial counsel 

was unable to successfully obtain evidence to “conclusively refute” the State’s 

suggestion that Pruden was at liberty to leave Hazel Plant at the time of the murder. 

All of the facts surrounding Pruden’s custody status at the time of the murder were 

presented before the trial court. It is clear from the record that Pruden was in custody 

at Hazel D. Plant on April 14, 2015. The State was not able to obtain any evidence 

to support that Pruden was at liberty to leave the facility at the time of the murder. 

As such, the trial court prevented the State from arguing to the contrary. The trial 

judge further instructed the jury that Hazel Plant is a jail. Based on the evidence 

available at the time of trial, trial counsel was able to effectively cross-examine 

Pruden and discredit her testimony.81 On this record, this Court does not find that 

Thomas suffered prejudice from the use of Pruden’s testimony. 

Claim II: Alleged prosecutorial misconduct

80 Id. at 266.

81 Moreover, in Giglio and Napue, the witnesses who’s testimony was at issue were described as “key,” and 

“principal.” In Giglio, the witness was the only witness linking the petitioner to the crime. The same is not true 

regarding Pruden in the instant case. There were two other eyewitnesses to the shooting, as well as Thomas’ former 

cellmate who testified that Thomas told him he shot Deshannon Reid. There was also a video for the jury to 

consider. The Delaware Supreme Court also described the State’s evidence against Thomas as “considerable,” 

without giving any weight to Pruden’s testimony. 
26

Thomas argues that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct justifying relief under 

Rule 61. At the outset, this Court must determine whether any actions by the State 

constituted misconduct. Thomas first argues that the State’s failure to adequately 

check Pruden’s criminal records prior to trial was “grossly negligent.”82 Thomas 

additionally argues that even if the State did not have the responsibility to determine 

Pruden’s custody status prior to trial, that the responsibility arose once Pruden’s 

custody status was brought to the attention of the State.83

Thomas advances that the State knew about Pruden’s conviction for 

Aggravated Menacing because the DAG actually questioned her about it on direct 

examination. Based on “the docket sheet alone for Ms. Pruden’s Aggravated 

Menacing case leads one to believe that Ms. Pruden was in custody.”84 This Court is 

not persuaded that the State engaged in misconduct because it did not adequately 

review Pruden’s criminal record prior to trial. There is simply no duty on the part of 

a prosecutor to review a witness’s criminal history to determine custody status at the 

time of a specific event, absent some prior notice of the relevance of this issue. As 

this issue first appeared during Pruden’s cross examination, there was no misconduct 

as to this issue.

82 Amend. Mot. at 39. 

83 Id. at 40.

84 Id. at 39, A246.
27

This Court further concludes that when the whereabouts of Pruden became an 

issue at trial, that the State did not engage in misconduct for failure to secure records 

or call witnesses. After trial counsel’s cross examination of Pruden and the State’s 

re-direct examination, the jury left for lunch recess.85 The State advised the Court 

that they were “also going to be looking for some information from the records that 

we just got from Mr. Armstrong during break.”86 These records included the inmate 

locator sheet, sentencing order, the Court’s commitment paper, and Pruden’s 

violation report.87 The Court questioned whether the issue could be worked out by 

stipulation between the parties, to which the State responded “hopefully.” While the 

State did attempt to contact someone at the facility, it was unsuccessful in doing so. 

When the parties reconvened after the lunch recess, the State again explained that 

they were in unsuccessful, despite its efforts, in reaching anyone at the facility with 

the recess happening at lunch time. Trial counsel corroborated the State’s failed 

attempts at reaching someone at the facility, noting he too was unsuccessful and was 

told that, “Apparently the Deputy Warden who is in charge is not in today, or we 

don’t know if we can get it or whatever.”88

Based on this record, it is clear that the State attempted to secure records when 

trial counsel raised the issue of Pruden’s whereabouts at the time of the murder. The 

85 A221.

86 Id.

87 A185-86.

88 A225, 227.
28

State, however, was unable to obtain those records which trial counsel did confirm 

the State attempted to do. Thus, there was no misconduct on the part of the State.

What is more troublesome to this Court is that once the issue arose regarding 

Pruden’s custody status at the time of the murder, and after an apparent agreement 

had been reached as to how the issue would be handled, the State continued to 

suggest in closing and rebuttal argument that Pruden was not incarcerated at the time 

of the murder with no supporting evidence.

Specifically, the State during its closing said:

Now, ladies and gentlemen, the State anticipates Mr. Armstrong is 

going to discuss the inconsistences in Etta, Taye and Monique’s 

statements, talk about the inconsistencies in the distance of how far they 

were and where exactly they were in the street. 

He’s going to talk to you about Monique. Monique was emphatic that 

she was out there. You heard Mr. Armstrong question her about her 

time at Hazel D. Plant center. 

You are going to be instructed that you will be the sole judges of 

credibility in this case....89

Further, during rebuttal, the State said: 

Mr. Armstrong says to you that it is without a doubt that Monique 

Pruden was in jail. I think he writes jail up there five or six times. She’s 

emphatic. She sits up there. She’s there. The State submits to you, the 

records say she’s at Hazel D. Plant, not jail. Hazel D. Plant.90

89 A235.

90 A240.
29

It was then that trial counsel objected to this line of argument by the State and 

which the trial court agreed. Specifically, the trial court stated that it would not 

permit the State to argue the position that Pruden was at liberty to leave the facility 

at the time of the murder without evidence to support it. The trial court further 

provided an instruction to the jury that Hazel Plant is a jail. Based on the record, in 

this Court’s view, the comments made by the State during closing and rebuttal could 

very well constitute misconduct. However, Thomas must still establish prejudice 

from the misconduct, which he cannot.91

Recently, in Trala v. State,

92 the Delaware Supreme Court had occasion to review 

and reaffirm the standards applicable in reviewing a prosecutorial misconduct 

claim.93 In citing to its decision in Saavedra v. State,

94 the Delaware Supreme Court 

explained that where an objection is timely raised by defense counsel or the issue is 

addressed sua sponte by a trial judge, the reviewing court must examine alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct for harmless error.95

In the instant case, trial counsel immediately objected when the State continued 

to suggest to the jury that Pruden was at liberty to leave Hazel Plant with no evidence 

91 This Court has previously addressed why Thomas has failed to show cause to overcome the procedural bar. 

Because Thomas has failed to show cause, whether he makes a showing of prejudice or not will not relieve him of

the procedural bar. However, this Court still determines that even if Thomas showed cause, he fails to show that he 

suffered prejudice from the misconduct.

92 244 A.3d 989 (Del. 2020).

93 Id. at 998.

94 225 A.3d 364 (Del. 2020).

95 Trala, 244 A.3d at 998 (citing Saavedra, 225 A.3d at 373). 
30

to support this position. As an objection was made, the proper test is harmless error 

triggering the Hughes test.96 The Trala Court, citing to Baker v. State, describes this 

analysis. 

First, a court must determine whether misconduct occurred by reviewing the 

record de novo.

97 If no misconduct is found, then the analysis ends.98 If misconduct 

is found, then a court must apply the three-factor Hughes test, since not all 

misconduct warrants reversal.99 The Hughes factors are: (1) the closeness of the case, 

(2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate 

the effects of the error.”100 These factors are not conjunctive and may impact cases 

differently.101 The test is applied “in a contextual, case-by-case, and fact sensitive 

manner.” 102

96 Thomas advances that this Court should engage in an analysis under Hunter v. State which is a misapprehension 

of the law. In doing a plain error analysis, where a court finds that reversal is not warranted, it will continue its 

analysis pursuant to Hunter.

[U]nder Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so 

prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse where the 

misconduct is a part of a “persistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct” over different trials such 

that a failure to reverse would compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Trala v. State, 244 

A.3d 989, 998 (Del. 2020) (citing Saavedra v. State, 225 A.3d 364, 373 (Del. 2020)).

The Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that a Hunter analysis is applicable only in instances of misconduct 

that spread over a number of cases and not to multiple instances of misconduct in the same case as Thomas suggests. 

As such, a Hunter analysis is not applicable to this case.

97 Trala v. State, 244 A.3d at 998.

98 Id. 

99 Id. at 998-99.

100 Id. at 999.

101 Id.

102 Id.
31

In applying the Hughes test to the facts of this case, the Court finds that there was 

no prejudice. As to the first factor, closeness of the case, it was not. Exclusive of 

Pruden’s testimony, the Delaware Supreme Court described the State’s evidence as 

“considerable.”

103 The evidence included testimony of two eyewitnesses and 

Thomas’ former cellmate. Additionally, the jury was able to review surveillance 

video. This evidence, along with Thomas fleeing from Delaware and his longtime 

girlfriend, admitting to being wanted for murder in Delaware when he was 

apprehended by police in New Jersey, was “sufficient to sustain Thomas’s 

conviction,” the Delaware Supreme Court concluded.104

Thus, this first factor weighs heavily in favor of the State. 

The second factor, centrality of the issue, weighs in favor of Thomas. The 

evidence put on by the State has been discussed above. The State bore the burden 

at trial to prove each element of the offenses charged against Thomas beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This included identification of Thomas as the person who 

committed the offenses.105 “[T]he test to establish identity is whether ‘the [trier 

of fact] could rationally [find] sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ that the defendant committed the crime charged.”106 Thus, 

103 Thomas v. State, 2019 WL 1380051, at *4 (Del. 2019).

104 Id.

105 See McDonald v. State, 2016 WL 4699155, at *2 (Del. 2016).

106 Id. 
32

identification of Thomas as the person who shot and killed Deshannon was 

central to the State’s case against him.

As to the third factor, steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error, it weighs in 

favor of the State. This Court has previously discussed the trial court’s response to 

the State’s continued insinuations that Pruden was at liberty to leave Hazel Plant at 

the time of the murder without evidence to support this position. When the State 

attempted to do such, the trial judge precluded it.107 The trial judge then further 

instructed the jury that “Hazel D. Plant is a, in fact, a jail.”108 As such, this Court 

finds that the trial court’s actions did mitigate the effects of the errors by the State. 

Weighing the factors set forth in Hughes, this Court finds that there was 

insufficient prejudice to Thomas for him to overcome the Rule 61 procedural bar as 

to this claim. This case was simply not that close. There was “considerable” evidence 

to support Thomas’ conviction absent Pruden’s testimony. Lastly, the trial court 

played an active role in correcting the State’s error by giving an instruction regarding 

the Hazel D. Plant facility. 

Claim III: Alleged Brady violation

According to Thomas, “the State violated its obligations under Brady v. 

Maryland by failing to search and disclose crucial impeachment information 

107 Id. at n. 18.

108 A241.
33

demonstrating the falsity of Ms. Pruden’s testimony.”109 To establish a Brady

violation, a defendant must show (1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, 

because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the 

State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.110 

The State provided Thomas with the substance of Pruden’s 2015 conversation 

with police investigators111 and her 2017 pre-trial interview.112 Armed with this 

information, Thomas investigated Pruden’s whereabouts at the time of the homicide 

and acquired documents showing her to be incarcerated at the time. Trial counsel

effectively used this information to undermine Pruden’s credibility, rendering her a 

witness unworthy of credit.113 Where, as here, a defendant received and effectively 

used impeachment material, there is no due process violation and Brady is not 

contravened.114

Therefore, Thomas’ alleged Brady violation claim is moot.

109 Amend. Mot. at 47 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).

110 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013).

111 Amend. Mot. at 7; A42, 50.

112 Amend. Mot. at 8; A73.

113 Thomas, 2019 WL 1380051, at *4.

114 See White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 778 (Del. 2003). Having concluded that there is no Brady violation, because 

the defense received and used the impeachment material effectively, there is no need for this Court to address the 

question of whether the Department of Corrections is part of the prosecution’s team for purposes of a Brady 

analysis. 
34

THOMAS FAILS TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING 

Thomas’ final claim is a request for an evidentiary hearing. Thomas submits 

“[a]n evidentiary hearing is needed... to determine whether the State suppressed 

material impeachment evidence in relation to Ms. Pruden’s June 16, 2015 statement 

to Detective Curley.”115 Thomas also maintains that a hearing is necessary to 

determine whether Pruden struck a deal with the State to give favorable testimony 

in exchange for a lighter sentence in a violation of probation against Pruden. “Under 

Rule 61, the Superior Court has broad discretion when determining whether an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary.”116 In determining whether an evidentiary hearing 

is warranted, the stage of the proceedings should be considered by the Superior 

Court.

117 “‘[G]ood cause’ is a heavier burden than the showing needed for pretrial 

discovery.”118 “Especially at the postconviction stage, ‘petitioners are not entitled to 

go on a fishing expedition though the government’s files in hopes of finding some 

damaging evidence.’”119

The record reveals that upon Thomas’ request, the State “provided 

[postconviction counsel] with both the recording and transcript” of Pruden’s June 

16, 2015 statement.120 And, in response to postconviction counsel’s question 

115 Amend. Mot. at 55.

116 Winn v. State, 2015 WL 1469116, at *2 (Del. Mar. 30, 2015) (citing Del. Super. Ct. Crim.R. 61(h)).

117 Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1033 (Del. 2017) (citing Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1198 (Del. 1996)).

118 Cabrera, 173 A.3d at 1033.

119 Id.

120 Amend. Mot. at 55.
35

concerning the completeness of the information provided, Detective Curley 

confirmed with the State that there was no additional footage regarding Pruden’s 

statement. On this record and in light of the Court’s findings in this decision, it views 

the request for an evidentiary hearing as a “fishing expedition” which is contrary to 

well settled Delaware law. 

As for the allegations that there was a deal between Pruden and the State, there 

is simply no evidence that has been produced to support such a charge other than 

mere speculation on the part of the defense. Like the issue with Detective Curley, 

this request appears to the Court to be another request to go on a fishing expedition. 

The Court sees no reason for an evidentiary hearing, and therefore DENIES Thomas’ 

requests.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/S/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.

Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

Original to the Prothonotary