PAKISTAN

Reporting on Visa 

Delays That Disrupt 

U.S. Assistance Could 

Be Improved

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Near Eastern and South and Central 

Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate

May 2013

GAO-13-427

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-427, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Near Eastern 

and South and Central Asian Affairs, 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

May 2013

PAKISTAN

Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. 

Assistance Could Be Improved

Why GAO Did This Study

Pakistan is a key U.S. partner in the 

effort to combat terrorism and violent 

extremism. In fiscal years 2002

through 2012, Pakistan received more 

than $26 billion in U.S. funding. To 

travel to Pakistan to implement and 

oversee programs, U.S. officials are 

required to obtain a Pakistani visa and, 

depending on the length of their stay, 

may need to apply for a visa extension 

once in Pakistan. U.S. officials have 

expressed concerns about delays in 

obtaining Pakistani visas. Congress 

has also expressed interest in 

receiving information on Pakistani visa 

delays, such as requiring that State 

and DOD certify information regarding 

timely issuance of visas to officials 

before providing or reimbursing certain 

funding for Pakistan. 

GAO was asked to review issues 

related to visa delays. This report 

examines (1) the extent to which U.S. 

officials experience delays obtaining 

Pakistani visas and the effects of these 

delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies 

have taken to address Pakistani visa 

delays. GAO analyzed data on visa 

wait times, reviewed planning 

documents, and met with officials from 

DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State consult 

with U.S. agencies engaged in 

providing assistance to Pakistan to 

obtain information on visa delays and 

include this information in its reporting 

to Congress. State partially concurred, 

citing challenges with interagency 

coordination, but noted that GAO’s 

report has prompted State to improve 

its tracking of visa applications to 

Pakistan government-wide.

What GAO Found

U.S. officials have experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas that disrupt 

the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. According to Pakistani 

Consular Services, and as confirmed by the Department of State (State), the goal

of the embassy of Pakistan is to issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks.

GAO’s analysis of data provided by State, the Departments of Defense (DOD) 

and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

found that U.S. officials experience delays in the issuance of both visas to travel 

to Pakistan and visa extensions. For instance, GAO found that of about 4,000 

issued visas, approximately 18 percent took more than 6 weeks, with 

approximately 3 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. Moreover, of approximately 

2,200 visa extensions, about 59 percent took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, 

with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. U.S. officials stated that 

they receive little specific information from Pakistan on the reasons for visa 

delays, but they noted that visa delays disrupt the effective implementation and 

oversight of U.S. programs and efficient use of resources in Pakistan. Visa 

delays also have created staffing gaps for critical embassy positions, such as 

Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards, and have necessitated 

the cancellation of training to assist the Pakistani government in areas such as 

antiterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement assistance.

Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but 

reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of 

visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 

2009 requires State to identify and report to Congress on a semiannual basis 

about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to Pakistan, such as any 

shortfall in U.S. human resources. In addition, federal standards for internal 

control state that once agencies identify a risk to their programs, they should 

collect and analyze information to allow them to develop better approaches to 

manage it. According to officials, agencies have taken various steps to manage 

visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has conducted high-level 

discussions with the Pakistani government regarding visa delays and has 

reprogrammed $10 million budgeted for antiterrorism trainings in Pakistan, which 

were canceled due to visa delays, toward other priority initiatives. However, GAO 

found that State’s reporting does not include comprehensive information on the 

risks of visa delays government-wide. State has reported to Congress that visa 

delays create challenges to the implementation of its programs in Pakistan. 

However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the risks of visa 

delays to the human resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, 

DOJ, and USAID told GAO that they experience staffing gaps caused by visa 

delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa delays could 

provide a more complete picture of the challenges that the United States faces in 

managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan. More comprehensive 

reporting may also help to better inform any potential diplomatic discussions 

between the United States and Pakistan regarding visa delays. 

View GAO-13-427. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Letter 1 

Background 3

U.S. Officials Experience Delays in Obtaining Pakistani Visas, 

Which Disrupt Implementation and Oversight of U.S. Assistance 

to Pakistan 8

Agencies Have Taken Various Steps to Address Pakistani Visa 

Delays, but Reporting on These Delays Could Be Improved 17

Conclusions 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 26

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 28

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Related GAO Products 30

Tables

Table 1: Key U.S. Agencies’ Roles and Activities in Pakistan 4

Table 2: Principal U.S. Agency Components That Assist U.S. 

Officials in Obtaining Pakistani Visas 6

Table 3: Examples of Staffing Gaps at U.S. Embassy in Islamabad 

Resulting from Visa Delays 14

Table 4: Examples of Steps Agencies Reported They Have Taken to 

Address Effects of Visa Delays 18

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Figures

Figure 1: Process of Applying for a Pakistani Visa 7

Figure 2: Official Pakistani Visas 8

Figure 3: Processing Times for U.S. Officials’ Applications for 

Pakistani Visas, Fiscal Years 2010-2012 9

Figure 4: Processing Times for Pakistani Visa Extensions Issued to 

U.S. Officials, 2010-2012 11

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

State Department of State

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 7, 2013

The Honorable Robert P. Casey, Jr.

Chairman

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pakistan is a key partner in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and violent 

extremism, including efforts to defeat al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 

that have used Pakistan to plan attacks on the U.S. homeland and 

against U.S. and NATO personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002

through 2012, Pakistan received more than $26 billion in U.S. funding, 

including assistance to help the government overcome economic and 

security challenges that threaten its stability. However, U.S. officials 

implementing this assistance report encountering delays in obtaining 

visas to travel to Pakistan. For example, in May 2012, we reported that 

difficulties in obtaining visas for U.S. officials to travel to Pakistan had 

resulted in delays and cancellations of training classes on countering 

improvised explosive devices.1 That same month, the Department of 

State (State) Office of Inspector General reported that U.S. officials 

operating in Pakistan were subjected to government-initiated 

obstructionism and harassment including delayed visa issuances.2

You requested that we review issues related to Pakistani visa delays, 

including their extent and implications. This report examines (1) the extent 

to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the 

effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address 

Pakistani visa delays.

 

1

GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for 

Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices, GAO-12-614

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012).

2

U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector 

General, Compliance Followup Review of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts, 

Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: May 2012).
Page 2 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays in 

obtaining Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected 

available data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa 

applications to Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from 

components of State; the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland 

Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ); and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). To assess the reliability of these data, we 

interviewed agency officials responsible for compiling these data and 

performed basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious 

inconsistency errors and completeness. When we found discrepancies, 

we brought them to the attention of relevant agency officials and worked 

with the officials to correct the discrepancies before conducting our 

analyses. According to agency officials, these data may not include all 

visa applications to Pakistan, because U.S. officials may not have always 

involved agency travel offices in processing their applications. Despite 

these limitations, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 

the purpose of making broad statements about Pakistan’s visa processing 

times for U.S. officials. We determined visa processing times by 

comparing the date of each visa application with the date the agency 

received the visa. We defined a delay as a processing time exceeding 6 

weeks, because, according to the embassy of Pakistan, the stated 

processing time for visas for U.S. officials is within 6 weeks of their 

application date. Further, to discuss the effects of Pakistani visa delays 

on the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance in Pakistan, including 

assistance implemented by U.S. contractors, we examined agency 

planning, budget, and oversight documents discussing visa delays and 

interviewed DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID officials. To examine the 

steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays, we 

reviewed relevant documents from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID, 

including planning and budget documents, available data on visa 

processing times, and letters of agreement. We also conducted interviews 

with knowledgeable officials to determine the steps agencies had taken to 

address the visa delays that they had identified. We compared these 

steps with risk assessment standards in our Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government.

3

 

3

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

In addition, we examined 

semiannual reports that were prepared by State and submitted to 

Congress in compliance with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
Page 3 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

of 2009,

4

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

to determine the extent to which these reports include 

information regarding the risks of visa delays affecting U.S. assistance to 

Pakistan. The government of Pakistan did not respond to our requests to 

discuss visa delays for U.S. officials. See appendix I for a complete 

description of our scope and methodology.

Pakistan is central to U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al 

Qaeda and deny its resurgence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The 

United States has sought to secure these interests through 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation with Pakistan as well 

as through a long-term partnership anchored, in part, by civilian and 

military assistance. In fiscal years 2002 through 2012, the U.S. 

government provided the Pakistani government more than $26 billion in 

assistance and reimbursements toward these goals.5 To achieve U.S. 

goals, multiple U.S. agencies provide assistance to Pakistan. Table 1 

summarizes example activities of key U.S. agencies providing this 

assistance.

 

4

Pub. L. No. 111-73 (Oct. 15, 2009).

5

The $26 billion provided to Pakistan in fiscal years 2002 through 2012 includes about $15 

billion in U.S. assistance and about $11 billion in reimbursements for Pakistan’s 

counterterrorism efforts in direct support of U.S. military operations.

Background 

U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
Page 4 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Table 1: Key U.S. Agencies’ Roles and Activities in Pakistan

U.S. agency Roles and example activities 

State • Leads the U.S. mission in Pakistan. 

• Provides economic, humanitarian, and security assistance to Pakistan, including activities such as aviation 

and counternarcotics programs, police assistance and training programs in partnership with DOJ, and 

antiterrorism assistance training programs.

DOD • Staffs the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, which promotes U.S. security goals by assisting 

counterinsurgency efforts by the Pakistani military, conducting security cooperation and assistance activities, 

and maintaining relationships with the Pakistani military.

DHS • Conducts border management and customs investigation training.

DOJ • Assists with counternarcotics and police training programs, with staff from the Drug Enforcement 

Administration and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, respectively.

• Liaises with principal law enforcement and security services to conduct its responsibilities in combating 

criminal matters, such as international terrorism.

• Provides training opportunities for prosecutors.

USAID • Conducts a variety of assistance programs focused on improving energy management, enhancing economic 

growth, stabilizing communities, expanding education, and improving health and well-being. USAID also 

works to enhance accountable governance and gender equity in Pakistan.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews.

We have previously reported on U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including 

certification requirements and oversight of civilian assistance.6 For more 

information, please see the list of related GAO products at the end of this 

report.

To enter and exit Pakistan, U.S. citizens—including U.S. government 

personnel traveling on official business—must hold a valid passport and a 

valid Pakistani visa. Visas must be obtained at a Pakistani embassy or 

consulate prior to entry into Pakistan. According to State, those arriving in 

Pakistan without a valid passport or visa are subject to fine, arrest, 

incarceration, or deportation.

According to State, to obtain a visa for official and diplomatic travel to 

Pakistan, U.S. government personnel must complete a visa application 

form issued by the government of Pakistan and obtain a visa request 

 

6

See GAO, Pakistan Assistance: Relatively Little of the $3 Billion in Requested Assistance 

Is Subject to State's Certification of Pakistan's Progress on Nonproliferation and 

Counterterrorism Issues, GAO-11-786R (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 19, 2011); and 

Department of State’s Report to Congress and U.S. Oversight of Civilian Assistance to 

Pakistan Can Be Further Enhanced, GAO-11-310R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2011).

Process of Obtaining a 

Pakistani Visa or Visa 

Extension for U.S. Officials
Page 5 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

letter. The visa application form requests information on an applicant’s 

reasons for visiting Pakistan, employment and family background, and 

passport details, among other information.7 The visa request letter, issued 

by State or the applicant’s sponsoring agency, includes information such 

as the applicant’s full name, dates of travel, and purpose of travel, among 

other information. Additionally, U.S. government personnel must have a 

valid official or diplomatic passport and provide passport photos. Some 

U.S. government officials are also required to provide additional 

documentation. For instance, U.S. military personnel must submit, with 

their application package, documentation from the Pakistani government, 

known as either a non-objection certificate or a letter of invitation, 

acknowledging their travel.8

U.S. agencies have various components that assist U.S. government 

personnel with obtaining a visa for travel to Pakistan. These components 

may assist U.S. officials by reviewing their visa applications for errors and 

submitting completed visa applications to the Pakistani embassy on the 

applicants’ behalf. Table 2 provides information on the principal 

components that assist U.S. officials in obtaining Pakistani visas.

 

7

Other information on the visa application includes the duration of the applicant’s stay in 

Pakistan, the applicant’s travel history, and the applicant’s address and contact details.

8

According to DOD’s Foreign Clearance Guide for travel to Pakistan, non-objection 

certificates are issued by the Pakistani agency or organization hosting the U.S. military 

official, while letters of invitation are issued by the Joint Pakistani Staff Headquarters.
Page 6 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Table 2: Principal U.S. Agency Components That Assist U.S. Officials in Obtaining Pakistani Visas

U.S. agency Component Description

State Orientation and In-Processing Center Processes visa applications for U.S. officials filling an assigned 

position in Pakistan for greater than 6 months or those traveling under 

orders funded by State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. 

Pakistan Desk, Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs

Assists in processing visa applications for selected State officials 

traveling to Pakistan. May assist in drafting visa request letters for 

applicants.

Special Issuance Agency Processes visas applications for State personnel and facilitates visa 

applications for U.S. officials from across the U.S. government.

U.S. embassy in Islamabad Processes applications for visa extensions for U.S. officials posted to 

Pakistan who are accredited to the U.S. mission.

DOD Passport Matters Works with the Liaison Office of the Office of Defense Representative 

Pakistan to assist in processing visa applications for DOD personnel.

DHS U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

Homeland Security Investigations

Offices of International Affairs in these components process visa 

applications for DHS personnel.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

DOJ Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters staff from these components process visa applications 

for DOJ personnel. Federal Bureau of Investigation

International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 

Assistance and Training

USAID Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs Processes visa applications for USAID personnel traveling to Pakistan.

Source: GAO analysis of agency interviews and documents.

Completed visa applications are submitted to the Pakistani embassy. 

According to State, the Pakistani embassy in Washington, D.C., issues 

visas for U.S. government personnel traveling to Pakistan based on 

clearances obtained from the Pakistani Ministry of Interior. Figure 1 

provides an overview of the visa application process.
Page 7 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Figure 1: Process of Applying for a Pakistani Visa

a

Letter of invitation or non-objection certificate is required only for some U.S. government personnel, 

such as U.S. military personnel.

b

Agencies provide assistance when requested; however, agency officials told us that U.S. government 

personnel traveling to Pakistan may not always involve agency travel offices in processing their 

applications.

Visas provided to U.S. officials specify, among other things, the expiration 

date of the visa as well as the number of entries into Pakistan, and the 

length of each stay that the visa allows. For instance, a visa may allow a 

U.S. official a single entry into Pakistan over a period of 30 days; the U.S. 

official using this visa could make one entry at any time during the 30 

days covered by the visa. Alternatively, a visa may allow a U.S. official 

multiple entries into Pakistan for 1 year, with a maximum stay of 90 days 

at a time. The U.S. official using this visa could enter and exit Pakistan 

multiple times during the 1 year period but could not stay longer than 90 

days on any visit. Figure 2 shows Pakistani visas for various numbers of 

visits and durations of stays.
Page 8 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Figure 2: Official Pakistani Visas

Once in Pakistan, U.S. government personnel must monitor their visa 

status to ensure that they are in compliance with Pakistani immigration 

regulations. Depending on the type of visa they receive, U.S. government 

personnel may need to seek a visa extension once in Pakistan. According 

to State, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs grants the visa 

extension, which authorizes a U.S. official to legally extend his or her stay 

in Pakistan. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad assists U.S. government 

personnel in Pakistan in submitting requests for visa extensions.

Available agency data show that U.S. officials experience delays in the 

issuance of both visas for travel to Pakistan and visa extensions, which 

have affected the implementation and oversight of U.S. assistance to 

Pakistan. Agencies reported that these delays affect the implementation 

of U.S. programs in multiple ways—for example, creating staffing gaps for 

critical embassy positions and necessitating the cancellation of training to 

assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism and 

counternarcotics.

U.S. Officials 

Experience Delays in 

Obtaining Pakistani 

Visas, Which Disrupt 

Implementation and 

Oversight of U.S. 

Assistance to 

Pakistan 
Page 9 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Our analysis of available agency data shows that U.S. officials have 

experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas. According to the 

Pakistani embassy, and as reported by State, the embassy’s policy is to 

issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks of their application date. We 

obtained data from components of DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID on 

processing times for U.S. officials’ applications for official or diplomatic 

Pakistani visas in fiscal years 2010 through 2012.9

Figure 3: Processing Times for U.S. Officials’ Applications for Pakistani Visas, 

Fiscal Years 2010-2012

Our analysis of these 

data shows that approximately 82 percent of visas for U.S. officials were 

issued within 6 weeks or less. However, about 18 percent of the visas 

took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 3 percent 

taking 16 weeks or longer. See figure 3 for more information.

Note: Not all agency components provided data for the entire period of fiscal years 2010 through 

2012. Please see Appendix I for more information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Processing time for issued visas varies depending on the agency or 

component submitting applications. For instance, for visas issued by the 

 

9

See appendix I for additional information about our analysis.

Data Show Delays in the 

Issuance of Pakistani Visas 

to U.S. Officials
Page 10 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Pakistani embassy, processing took more than 6 weeks for about 4 

percent of applications submitted by USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan Affairs, compared with approximately 33 percent of applications 

submitted by State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center.

Moreover, according to U.S. officials, an analysis of issued visas may 

underestimate the extent of visa delays. First, it may exclude cases in 

which a visa was not issued, including cases where (1) an individual 

withdrew a visa application because the visa was not received prior to the 

planned departure date or (2) a visa application that had taken longer 

than 6 weeks to process was still pending at the Pakistani embassy at the 

time of our analysis.10 For instance, from November 2009 to June 2012, 

State’s Special Issuance Agency pulled about 180 passports—

representing approximately 10 percent of the Pakistani visa applications 

that it submitted during this period—from the Pakistani embassy without 

visa issuance, including approximately 140 passports that the agency 

pulled after a visa was not issued prior to the individual’s planned 

departure date.11

U.S. officials also experience delays in obtaining visa extensions after 

arrival in Pakistan. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad monitors the visa 

status of U.S. officials accredited to the U.S. mission in Pakistan and 

processes applications for any required visa extensions for these officials. 

Further, an analysis of visa processing time may not 

include delays that certain DOD officials face in obtaining non-objection 

certificates and letters of invitation required for their visa applications. For 

instance, DOD officials told us that obtaining this documentation takes 

approximately 6 weeks and that visa applications for DOD personnel are 

submitted only after a non-objection certificate or letter of invitation has 

been obtained. Therefore, visa delays that DOD personnel may 

experience are in addition to the wait time to obtain a non-objection 

certificate or letter of invitation. For instance, DOD officials told us that in 

addition to waiting 4 to 6 weeks to obtain a Pakistani visa, some DOD 

travelers have waited months for the documentation that must 

accompany the visa application. 

 

10Officials from State and DOD told us that the Pakistani embassy does not deny visas in 

practice, but may take no action on issuing a visa to the extent that a traveler may request 

the return of his or her passport.

11Officials from State’s Special Issuance Agency cautioned that they do not record the 

reason that a passport was pulled and that it is not possible to conclude that visas would 

not have been issued in all cases.
Page 11 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

According to State, visa extensions are granted by the Pakistani Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs. Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. embassy processed 

applications for approximately 2,200 visa extensions for U.S. officials in 

Pakistan. Approximately 59 percent of these visa extensions took longer 

than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks 

or longer. See figure 4 for more information.

Figure 4: Processing Times for Pakistani Visa Extensions Issued to U.S. Officials, 

2010-2012 

Additionally, data from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad show that it never 

received approximately 50 visa extensions for which it had applied. U.S. 

officials told us that in some of these cases, the applicants experienced 

such a lengthy delay in receiving their visa extensions that they decided 

to leave Pakistan rather than overstay their initial visa while waiting for the 

extension.

In addition to reporting delays related to obtaining visas for U.S. officials, 

agencies noted challenges in obtaining visas for contractors assisting in 
Page 12 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

implementing programs for U.S. agencies in Pakistan.12

Reasons for the delays in processing Pakistani visas are not well 

understood. Officials from DOD, DOJ, State, USAID, and the U.S. 

embassy in Islamabad said that they receive little specific information 

from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays. Officials from those 

agencies stated that factors in the bilateral relationship between the 

United States and Pakistan appear to affect the length of visa processing.

For instance, 

State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and DOJ’s International 

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program rely on contractor 

staff to provide training to Pakistani law enforcement personnel. However, 

both agencies noted delays in obtaining visas for these instructors. For 

example, State reported that it applied for approximately 40 instructor 

visas for its Antiterrorism Assistance Program between October and 

December 2012 but that no instructors received visas in time to provide 

instruction as planned. Similarly, officials of DOJ International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program told us that they have 

experienced delays in obtaining visas for their contractor staff. According 

to State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Office of Aviation for Pakistan, it has experienced delays in obtaining 

contractor visas, including one visa that it applied for in October 2010 and 

that was still pending as of January 2013. In addition, as of February 

2013, State told us it had experienced visa wait times of longer than 6 

weeks for approximately 30 facilities maintenance contractors overseeing 

reconstruction of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.

Agencies have identified visa delays as a risk to effective implementation 

of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Agencies noted that visa delays cause

staffing gaps, limit opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel, 

constrain oversight and monitoring of U.S. programs, and complicate 

program planning and implementation. 

First, according to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID officials, visa 

delays cause staffing gaps for positions at the U.S. embassy in 

Islamabad, including those providing security and law enforcement 

assistance to Pakistan. For example, DOD officials told us that visas for 

 

12U.S. officials told us that contractors generally travel to Pakistan using personal 

passports rather than official or diplomatic passports.

Agencies Have Reported 

Multiple Effects of Visa 

Delays on Program 

Implementation and 

Oversight in Pakistan
Page 13 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

key positions have been significantly delayed. Specifically, DOD officials 

noted that the visa for the training officer for the International Military 

Training and Education program in Pakistan was delayed for several 

months, during which the position was vacant.13 Additionally, they told us 

that two individuals scheduled to staff the Defense Attaché Office waited 

approximately 8 months for their visas and were ultimately reassigned 

because of the delays. State officials also noted staffing gaps due to 

delays in obtaining visas for security staff and staff managing 

counternarcotics and law enforcement programs. According to State 

officials, visa delays particularly affect Regional Security Office and 

Marine Security Guard staff, who provide protection for the U.S. embassy 

in Islamabad. State noted that visas for approximately 40 Regional 

Security Officers and Marine Security Guards were significantly delayed, 

some for as long as 9 months. Officials told us that such delays can lead 

to staffing gaps and that these gaps cannot always be filled by obtaining 

personnel on temporary assignment. Moreover, because embassy 

staffing plans are designed to align the number of staff with U.S. foreign 

policy priorities, security concerns, and other constraints, staffing gaps 

can undermine this alignment. See table 3 for additional examples of 

staffing gaps at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad that have resulted from 

visa delays.

 

13The International Military Education and Training program was established to provide 

military education and training to foreign security forces, see GAO, International Military 

Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve 

Evaluations, GAO-12-123, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2011).
Page 14 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Table 3: Examples of Staffing Gaps at U.S. Embassy in Islamabad Resulting from Visa Delays

U.S. agency

Types of positions where staffing gaps have 

occurred Position description

State Regional Security Office staff Advises ambassador or chief of mission on all security issues 

and coordinates all aspects of mission's security program. 

Develops and implements security programs to protect U.S. 

employees from terrorist, criminal, and technical attacks.

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs staff

• Senior Counternarcotics Advisor

• Corrections Advisor

• Police Advisor for Sindh province

Oversees criminal justice programs to support the government 

of Pakistan’s efforts to improve law enforcement, rule-of-law, 

corrections, and counternarcotics sectors.

DOD Marine Security Guard staff Works with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security to protect U.S. 

mission in Pakistan. Stands duty at U.S. embassy and ensures 

emergency communications are properly routed during times of 

emergency or heightened alert.

Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan 

Security Assistance Office staff

• International Military Education and Training 

Recruitment Officer

Guides and implements U.S. security assistance in Pakistan 

and conducts military exchange programs that enable Pakistan's 

military officers to study temporarily at U.S. military schools.

Defense Attaché Office staff Maintains military-to-military contact with Pakistani counterparts.

DOJ Resident Legal Advisor Represents DOJ in establishing and maintaining relationships 

with Pakistani law enforcement and government officials, 

including prosecutors and judges. Works with State to help 

develop and implement tailored criminal justice assistance 

programs in Pakistan.

DHS U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Homeland Security Investigations Attaché 

Serves as DHS liaison to Pakistani government. Coordinates 

investigations with Pakistani law enforcement, and provides 

training and capacity building.

USAID USAID Office of Inspector General staff Conducts investigations and audits of USAID assistance 

programs in Pakistan.

Source: GAO interviews with officials and analysis of documents from State, DOD, DOJ, DHS, and USAID.

In addition, according to agency officials, visa delays and related staffing 

gaps have limited their opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel. 

The officials said that the delays in obtaining visas for instructors 

scheduled to train Pakistani officials have caused agencies to postpone 

or cancel training in a variety of areas, including antiterrorism, 

counternarcotics and law enforcement, use and maintenance of military 

equipment, and countering improvised explosive devices. For example, in 

the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, State’s Antiterrorism Assistance 

program canceled 14 of 31 classes on critical management topics, such 

as tactical, negotiation, and investigation skills in combating terrorism, 

because of delays in obtaining visas for instructors. In addition, State 

continued to operate and maintain its training facility in Pakistan for the 
Page 15 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Antiterrorism Assistance program, although the classrooms were empty 

because of canceled trainings. Moreover, officials at State’s Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs told us that visa 

delays have disrupted the delivery of law enforcement and rule-of-law 

assistance to Pakistan’s criminal justice sector. According to these 

officials, the bureau has provided Pakistan with 17 aircraft for 

counternarcotics assistance at a value of $50 million. However, officials at 

the bureau’s Office of Aviation for Pakistan told us that in June 2010 and 

November 2012, respectively, the office placed three C-208 aircraft and 

six Huey-II helicopters in storage owing to a shortage of personnel in 

Pakistan that had resulted from visa delays. According to these officials, 

this personnel shortage limited the office’s ability to train Pakistanis and 

perform aircraft inspections and repairs necessary for the proper use of 

the equipment.14

Moreover, visa delays have reportedly constrained oversight and 

monitoring of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Officials from Inspectors 

General for USAID, State, and DOD’s U.S. Central Command stated that 

visa delays have disrupted inspections and audits. State and USAID 

officials also noted that visa delays create challenges for conducting 

monitoring and evaluation of program assistance, including monitoring 

and evaluation of antiterrorism and development programs. For instance, 

according to State officials, an assessment and evaluation of the Pakistan 

Antiterrorism Assistance program in June 2012 was delayed when 

several team members were unable to participate in the trip because their 

visas were not issued in a timely manner. DHS officials also told us that 

because of visa delays, DHS cannot conduct an audit of the inventory of 

supplies or replace outdated nonintrusive inspection technology used for 

the Secure Freight Initiative in Pakistan, which captures data on 

In addition, State officials noted that they had canceled 

police and rule-of-law training because of visa delays. DOD officials noted 

similar cancellations of counternarcotics training, and several agencies 

noted cancellation of training on countering improvised explosive devices. 

DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

officials told us that delays in obtaining visas for instructors were so 

pervasive that the program would be forced to reduce training after March 

2013, unless it receives new visas for its instructor staff.

 

14According to officials from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, the backlog of Air Wing visas was resolved after three months of 

consultation with the Pakistani Ministry of Interior.
Page 16 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

containers bound for the United States and alerts U.S. and Pakistani 

officials of security risks. 

Further, even when visa delays do not lead to staffing gaps, the delays 

complicate program planning and implementation, according to agency 

officials. Regarding planning, DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that 

visa delays create challenges planning travel to Pakistan, as it is not 

unusual for U.S. officials to receive visas very close to the day of their 

planned departure. Visa delays also slow program implementation. 

USAID officials stated that visa delays can affect programs in Pakistan by 

slowing the arrival of technical experts needed to assist with project 

design and implementation. Similarly, DOJ International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program officials told us that visa delays 

make it very challenging for them to plan courses and training schedules. 

Additionally, officials told us that the issuance of visas with travel 

restrictions can also create challenges and increase project costs. For 

instance, according to officials from USAID, various types of visas 

received by U.S. officials create challenges for staff once they are in 

Pakistan, as they must constantly monitor their visa status and may have 

to leave Pakistan to reset their visas in compliance with Pakistani 

immigration regulation. For example, U.S. officials in Pakistan with visas 

that allow multiple entries for 1 year, with a maximum stay of 90 days at a 

time, must exit Pakistan every 90 days to reset their visas. USAID’s Office 

of Inspector General estimated that it has spent approximately $25,000 in 

additional travel costs due to delays in receiving visa extensions for staff 

traveling on visas that require a reset every 90 days. In addition, State 

officials told us that they have experienced challenges in obtaining 1-year

multi-entry visas for staff providing oversight of construction on the U.S. 

embassy compound in Islamabad. According to State, the need for staff 

to reset their short-term visas limits the efficiency of embassy construction 

and adds to the cost of the project. For instance, State reported in May 

2012 that these disruptions added approximately $2 million to the 

project’s overall cost.
Page 17 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but 

reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the 

risk of visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with 

Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in consultation with DOD, to identify 

and report to Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S. 

funds, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other 

things. In addition, according to federal standards for internal control, 

analyzing information on identified risks could help agencies better 

manage such risks. According to officials, agencies have taken various 

steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has 

conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government 

regarding visa delays, and agencies affected by Pakistani visa delays 

have shifted training to other countries. However, State’s reporting to 

Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa 

delays government-wide. State has reported visa delays as a challenge to 

the implementation of its programs. However, State’s reports do not 

include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human 

resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and 

USAID told us that they had experienced staffing gaps caused by visa 

delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa 

delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges to 

implementing U.S. assistance and better inform any potential diplomatic 

discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding delays.

Agencies have taken steps to address the effects of delays on their 

operations, including reprogramming funds for other priority initiatives, 

shifting training to other countries, and tracking information on the status 

of obtaining Pakistani visas and visa extensions. According to federal 

standards for internal control, analyzing information on identified risks 

could help agencies better manage such risks. See table 4 for more 

examples of steps that agencies reported having taken to address the 

effects of visa delays on their operations. 

Agencies Have Taken 

Various Steps to 

Address Pakistani 

Visa Delays, but 

Reporting on These 

Delays Could Be 

Improved 

Agencies Have Taken 

Steps to Address Visa 

Delays
Page 18 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Table 4: Examples of Steps Agencies Reported They Have Taken to Address Effects of Visa Delays

Mitigation step Agency example

Track staff’s visa wait times and visa 

statusa

• DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan analyzed information on staff’s 

processing times for obtaining non-objection certificates, letters of invitation, and 

Pakistani visas, to calculate total average wait times that staff should anticipate. 

• DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program tracks 

instructors’ visa status to determine instructors’ availability to travel to Pakistan and 

to ensure that they do not overstay their visas once in Pakistan.

Provide additional guidance or assistance 

to applicants

• State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center advises Foreign Service and 

Diplomatic Security staff to apply for a Pakistani visa 4 and 6 months, respectively, 

before their scheduled date of departure to Pakistan.

• DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan advises staff to apply for a 

Pakistani visa more than 2 months earlier than guidance from the Pakistani embassy 

recommends.

Reprogram funds • In fiscal year 2011, State reprogrammed $10 million of $20 million in Antiterrorism 

Assistance training funds intended for Pakistan, to support other initiatives such as 

counterterrorism in Somalia and law enforcement in Tunisia.

Relocate training to another country • In 2012, DOD relocated counternarcotics training to Bahrain.

• In 2012, DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 

Training relocated training to Dubai.

Rely on local Pakistanis to help implement 

activities

• Locally employed staff in Pakistan assist State’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs in the delivery and monitoring of its programs.

Source: GAO interviews with officials and analysis of documents from State, DOD, and DOJ.

a

DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program tracks the status of 

contractors’ visas.

In addition to taking steps to address the effects of visa delays, officials at 

State—the agency responsible for conducting diplomatic discussions with 

Pakistan—told us that they had engaged in high-level discussions with 

Pakistani officials in an attempt to expedite visa processing times for U.S. 

officials. State officials noted that mission leadership in Pakistan have 

raised the issue of visa delays, and particular staffing gaps at the U.S. 

embassy that have resulted from delays, with Pakistani ministerial 

personnel. The U.S. Secretary of State has also discussed visa delays 

with the Pakistani Foreign Minister to try to resolve the issue. State 

officials told us State will continue to discuss these issues with Pakistan 

as warranted by events.

While operations generally continue, agencies noted that their mitigation 

actions do not fully resolve the effects of visa delays and that they cannot 

implement programs as effectively or efficiently. Staff from the Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs said that although 

they take steps to deliver assistance despite visa delays, the difficulty in 

maintaining the continuous presence of in-country staff reduces readily 
Page 19 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

available subject matter expertise, slows interaction with Pakistani 

officials, and lessens the ability to quickly increase staff to address 

emerging needs. Regarding efficiency, DOD staff said that shifting 

training to third-country locations raises costs significantly, including costs 

for airlifting Pakistani personnel and providing funds for insurance and 

other incidental needs, and results in the training of fewer Pakistani 

personnel. DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 

Assistance and Training staff similarly noted that although relocating 

training has had a positive outcome, it has incurred higher costs for the 

U.S. government. 

In reporting to Congress, State has not provided comprehensive 

information on the risks of Pakistani visa delays government-wide. The 

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in 

consultation with DOD, to identify and report on a semiannual basis to 

Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to 

Pakistan, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other 

things. In compliance with the act, State has produced semiannual

monitoring reports describing the assistance provided to Pakistan during 

the preceding 180-day period. State’s report for the period of March 2010 

to December 2010 did not cite visa delays as a risk to its programs. In its 

reports covering January 2011 to November 2011 and December 2011 to 

June 2012, State broadly cited challenges to program implementation due 

to visa delays, and in the latter report, State included the example of 

disruptions to its antiterrorism training efforts in Pakistan caused by visa 

delays. However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the 

risks of Pakistani visa delays affecting U.S. human resources for other 

State programs and for agencies other than State, although officials from 

components of DOD, USAID, and DOJ reported to us that such delays 

had caused staffing gaps during this time period. For instance, DOD 

experienced visa delays that created staffing gaps affecting its security 

assistance office, including a vacancy in the position of the officer 

responsible for coordinating military exchange programs, while DOJ 

experienced a staffing gap for its Resident Legal Advisor. Information 

from DOD, USAID, and DOJ components could be included in State’s 

reports, given that officials from these agencies told us that they track 

information related to visa delays. Officials of other agency components, 

such as DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration and DHS’s U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, told us that they do not retain 

data about visa processing times although they maintain information on 

their staff’s ability to travel to Pakistan.

Reporting to Congress 

Does Not Provide 

Comprehensive 

Information on the Risks 

of Pakistani Visa Delays 

Government-wide 
Page 20 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

In addition, since passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 

in October 2009, Congress has expressed continued interest in receiving 

information on visa delays. For instance, in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012, Congress required State to certify requested 

information about the timeliness of issuance of Pakistani visas to U.S. 

officials before certain funding for Pakistan could be provided. State 

waived the certification requirements for fiscal year 2012 as allowed in the 

act.15

Although the United States invested more than $26 billion in fiscal years 

2002 through 2012 to assist the government of Pakistan, U.S. officials 

applying for Pakistani visas continue to face delays that they have 

identified as disrupting their efforts to provide assistance. Despite 

identifying these disruptions as a risk, State does not report 

comprehensive information on the extent of visa delays across the U.S. 

government. Complete and consistent reporting of such information could 

help the United States diagnose problems related to visa delays, enhance 

planning, and improve decision making to address the effects of such 

delays. In addition, tracking information on the risks of visa delays could 

help State provide more complete information in response to 

congressional reporting requirements and may help to inform future 

diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Pakistan to 

resolve this issue.

DOD’s fiscal year 2013 appropriation requires a similar certification 

from the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 

before funds may be reimbursed to Pakistan for support provided to U.S. 

military operations. Without comprehensive reporting about the risks of 

visa delays and related staffing gaps, State’s reporting to Congress may 

not provide a complete picture of the challenges the United States faces 

in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and agencies 

may lack information that could help them manage such risks.

To improve the information provided to Congress and to inform potential 

diplomatic discussions, we recommend that the Secretary of State consult 

with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain 

information on Pakistani visa delays and include this information in 

State’s future reporting to Congress.

 

15The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, allows the Secretary of State to waive the 

limitations on assistance if the Secretary determines that it is important to the national 

security interests of the United States to do so.

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
Page 21 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID 

for their review and comment. State and DOD provided written 

comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. 

State and DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate. DHS and USAID had no comments.

In commenting on our report, State partially concurred with our 

recommendation that it should consult with U.S. agencies engaged in 

providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on visa delays and 

include this information in its future reporting to Congress. State noted 

that interagency coordination regarding Pakistani visa applications can be 

difficult and additional staff would be required for State to coordinate all 

U.S. government Pakistani visa applications. In addition, according to 

State, it is important to note that certain visa applicants, such as U.S. 

officials traveling to Pakistan on short-term assignments and military or 

security personnel, experience longer wait times than other applicants. 

State noted that reporting to Congress that differentiates between these 

applicants would be more effective. However, State stated that our report 

prompted State and Embassy Islamabad to improve coordination 

procedures to better track visa applications within State and, to the extent 

possible, throughout the interagency.

We maintain that reporting of more comprehensive information by State 

on the risks of visa delays could better inform Congress regarding the 

challenges of implementing U.S. assistance in Pakistan. While we 

acknowledge that interagency coordination can be challenging, officials 

from various agencies—including DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID—told us 

they track or maintain information related to visa delays, which could 

facilitate State’s efforts to obtain and report such information. Moreover, 

our recommendation would not require State to “coordinate all U.S. 

government visa applications for Pakistan,” but rather recommends that 

State consult with other agencies to obtain information these agencies 

already collect regarding visa delays to Pakistan. In addition, we are 

encouraged that our report prompted State to develop new procedures to 

enhance its tracking of visa applications government-wide. We agree with 

State that certain visa applicants may experience longer wait times than 

other applicants, including, as we note in our report, those providing 

security and law enforcement assistance to Pakistan. We believe that our 

recommendation is consistent with State identifying and reporting on 

which visa applicants experience longer wait times, and that such 

reporting could better inform Congress.

In commenting on our report, DOD agreed with the report’s findings and 

observations. DOD also noted that Pakistani officials experience delays 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 22 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

obtaining visas to travel to the United States, which “feed the narrative 

that the Pakistanis treat us no differently than we treat them,” 

undermining requests for process improvements. While DOD notes that 

visa delays experienced by Pakistani officials may affect processing of 

visas for U.S. officials, we could not verify whether this has been a 

contributing cause because the government of Pakistan did not respond 

to our requests to discuss visa delays.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, and officials at DOD, DHS, DOJ, and 

USAID. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 23 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

This report reviews issues related to visa delays, including their extent 

and implications. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which U.S. 

officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of 

these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani 

visa delays.

Our work focused on Pakistani visa applications of the Departments of 

Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We met with 

officials from relevant components of these agencies, including DOD’s 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Defense 

Representative Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, and DOD Passport 

Matters; DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DOJ’s Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program, and Office of Overseas 

Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; State’s Bureau of 

South and Central Asian Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and Office of Inspector General; and USAID’s Office 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and Office of Inspector General. We 

focused on these agencies and components because personnel of these 

agencies constituted 99 percent of U.S. officials stationed in Pakistan as 

of May 2012.

To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining 

Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected available 

data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa applications to 

Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from DOD’s Office of the 

Defense Representative Pakistan, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

State’s Special Issuance Agency and Orientation and In-Processing 

Center, and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Not all 

components had data available for the entire period of fiscal years 2010 

through 2012. Although DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation provided 

data for the entire period, DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative 

Pakistan provided data for December 2009 through September 2012, 

State’s Special Issuance Agency provided data for November 2009 

through September 2012, State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center

provided data for March 2010 through September 2012, and USAID’s 

Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs provided data for December 

2010 through September 2012. We also obtained data for January 2010 

through December 2012 from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad on 

processing times for visa extensions for U.S. officials in Pakistan. We 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 24 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

determined visa processing times by examining the date of a visa 

application and the date the visa was received by the agency. We defined 

a delay as a processing time exceeding 6 weeks, because, according to 

the embassy of Pakistan, the stated processing time for visas for U.S. 

officials is within 6 weeks of their application date. To determine the 

extent of delays, we grouped processing times into categories by week. 

The category “1 week” includes processing times of 0 to 7 days, the 

category “2 weeks” includes processing times of 8 to 14 days, and the 

category “3 weeks” includes processing times of 15 to 21 days. 

Categories continue sequentially in this manner until the “16+ week” 

category, which includes processing times of 106 to 440 days. 

Additionally, we obtained data on visa processing times for contractors 

from DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs. However, because contractors are not U.S. officials, 

we did not combine these data with the data on visa processing times for 

U.S. officials. Further, to discuss the effects of Pakistani visa delays on 

the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance in Pakistan, including the 

implementation of such assistance by contractors, we examined agency 

planning, budget, and oversight documents discussing visa delays, 

including mission strategic resource plans and quarterly progress and 

oversight reports on the civilian assistance program in Pakistan from 

2010 to 2012. Additionally, we interviewed officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, 

State, and USAID to discuss the effects of visa delays on program 

delivery and oversight. The government of Pakistan did not respond to 

our requests to discuss visa delays for U.S. officials.

To examine the steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa 

delays, including steps to address associated risks that they had 

identified, we reviewed relevant agency documents, including planning 

and budget documents and available data on visa processing times, and 

conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials. We compared these 

steps with risk assessment standards in our Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government.

1

 

1

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

We also examined semiannual

monitoring reports that State had provided to Congress in compliance 

with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov.1999).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

To assess the reliability of visa processing data, we (1) interviewed 

agency officials responsible for compiling these data and (2) performed 

basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious inconsistency errors 

and completeness. When we found discrepancies, we brought them to 

the attention of relevant agency officials and worked with officials to 

correct the discrepancies before conducting our analyses. According to 

agency officials, these data may not include all visa applications to 

Pakistan, because U.S. officials may not always involve agency travel 

offices in processing their applications. Furthermore, as we report, our 

analysis of issued visas may understate processing time because it 

excludes cases in which a visa was not issued, such as cases in which 

(1) an individual withdrew a visa application because the visa was not 

received prior to the individual’s planned departure date or (2) a visa 

application that had taken longer than 6 weeks to process was still 

pending at the Pakistani embassy at the time of our analysis. In addition, 

our analysis covers only visa processing time and does not include wait 

times to obtain non-objection certificates or letters of invitation. Despite 

these limitations, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 

the purpose of making broad statements about processing times for 

completed visas. We also make a recommendation to address existing 

limitations in reporting of visa delays across agencies. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 26 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 27 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 29 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 

Director), Lina Khan, Lisa Reijula, and Biza Repko made key 

contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Jenny Chanley, Karen Deans, 

Carol E. Finkler, Rebecca Gambler, and Mary Moutsos provided 

additional support.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 30 GAO-13-427 Pakistan Visa Delays

Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of 

Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region. 

GAO-12-907T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012.

Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures 

for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive 

Devices. GAO-12-614. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.

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Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2011.

Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development 

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GAO-09-1015T.Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

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Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed 

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(320938)
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