U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

National Institute of Justice

Research Report

Two Views on Imprisonment Policies:

Lethal Violence and the Overreach

of American Imprisonment

Supply Side Imprisonment Policy

Presentations From the

1996 Annual Research and

Evaluation Conference

Washington, D.C.
From the Director

Each year, the National Institute of Justice sponsors—in collaboration with other bureaus of the

Office of Justice Programs—a national conference on research and evaluation. NIJ invites to the

conference respected researchers who are asked to share their assessment of the knowledge base

on core topics; NIJ then publishes the presentations to make the debates widely available to

policymakers, practitioners, and researchers nationwide. The 1996 conference, jointly sponsored

by NIJ, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, focused on two themes that reflect crucial national concerns: crime prevention and

sentencing policies.

Because of the far-reaching consequences of sentencing policies on the Nation’s correctional

systems, NIJ sought the views of two prominent scholars on the merits of current sentencing and

imprisonment policies. Their lectures, presented here, reflect the intense national debate over

these issues and offer readers carefully reasoned arguments for opposing interpretations of what

research and experience indicate for the future of public policy in this arena.

This report presents a debate on a topic of considerable consequence—philosophical, practical,

and fiscal—for public policy. NIJ anticipates that the views presented here will spark further

debate as part of our national dialogue on effective crime prevention and control policies for the

coming years.

Jeremy Travis

Director

National Institute of Justice
Two Views on Imprisonment Policies:

Lethal Violence and the Overreach

of American Imprisonment

by Franklin E. Zimring

With the Collaboration of Gordon Hawkins

and

Supply Side Imprisonment Policy

by Michael K. Block

Presentations From the

1996 Annual Research and

Evaluation Conference

Washington, D.C.

July 1997
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

633 Indiana Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

John C. Dwyer

Acting Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice

Justice Information Center

World Wide Web Site

http://www.ncjrs.org

Franklin E. Zimring is Professor of Law and Director of the Earl Warren Legal

Institute at the University of California. Michael K. Block is Professor of Economics and Law, University of Arizona; President of the Goldwater Institute; and

Senior Research Fellow, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document are those of the authors and

do not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of

Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and

the Office for Victims of Crime.

NCJ 165702
iii

Contents

Lethal Violence and the Overreach of American Imprisonment

by Franklin E. Zimring

With the Collaboration of Gordon Hawkins................................................................................. 1

Supply Side Imprisonment Policy

by Michael K. Block ................................................................................................................... 9

Appendix: Data Sources and Estimates for Tables 1–1, 1–3, 1–5, and 3–1. ................................ 29
1

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief

summary of my views on two of what [NIJ Director]

Jeremy Travis has called “core topics” for the

plenary session:

1. What are the differential merits of incarceration

as a sanction with respect to property, violent, and

drug offenses?

2. Does current sentencing policy confine too many

or too few offenders in the United States?

My answers to these two questions are linked. The

serious problem in the United States is not crime

but lethal violence. We have about the same rate of

theft and burglary as other developed nations in the

1990s but very high rates of those offenses that put

life in jeopardy. At current levels, property crime is

not a serious problem in a wealthy nation that has

insurance and other loss-spreading devices. Lifethreatening violence creates fear because government and insurance can do little to ameliorate the

harm that life-threatening assault and rape produce. Life-threatening violence should be a special

priority for criminal sanctions, and prison should

be mainly reserved for these most serious threats.

Instead, the huge escalation in rates of imprisonment during the past two decades has reduced the

share of prison population represented by persons

convicted of violent crimes. No matter what the

question in American criminal justice, prison has

been the answer. From an incapacitation standpoint, this does not reduce the prevention of

violence. But the system’s sense of proportionality

and the moral and educative emphasis on violence

as particularly disapproved have suffered as a

wider variety of offenses are routinely sanctioned

with prison. And deterrent incentives to avoid lifethreatening violence are reduced when property

crime routinely leads to prison.

So American criminal justice systems are

overimprisoning in a quantitative and a qualitative

sense. Restoring the proper priority to lifethreatening violence will mostly require nonprison

sanctions for auto thieves and housebreakers.

The following two sections outline the evidence on

crime and lethal violence and show how broadening the range of prison offenses has shifted the

focus of penal policy away from appropriate

priority.

Most Americans believe they are the victims of

crime far more often than the citizens of other

developed nations. With one important exception,

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Homicide

(53)

Robbery

(4,942)

Burglary

(63,794)

Theft

(90,802)

Los Angeles = 100

Figure 1. Sydney Crime Volume Compared

to Los Angeles, 1992

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the actual number of crimes

committed in 1992.

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform

Crime Reports, 1992; New South Wales Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1992.

Lethal Violence and the Overreach

of American Imprisonment

by Franklin E. Zimring

With the Collaboration of Gordon Hawkins
2

this is not the case. Figure 1 shows police statistics

for Los Angeles and Sydney, Australia.

The two cities have similar levels of nonviolent

property crimes but vastly different levels of

robbery and criminal homicide. In Sydney, victims

are angry about housebreaking but not terrified.

Fear is the more common reaction in Los Angeles.

Living in a city with 20 times the homicide rate,

the citizens of Los Angeles have a specific worry

the citizens of Sydney do not have.

Figure 2 shows crime rate comparisons for New

York City and London.

two cities in 1992. A total of 212,000 incidents in

London caused 7 deaths. But the 191,000 burglaries and robberies in New York caused 378 victim

deaths, a total 54 times as great as in London.

A series of new victimization surveys asking the

same question in many different countries confirms that U.S. crime rates are not much higher

than crime rates in other industrial nations. Rates

of theft, burglary, and even nonaggravated assault

reported in the United States are rarely more than

30 percent above those of many Western nations

(Zimring and Hawkins, 1997, at chapter 3). But

the rates of killing are 4 to 18 times those of other

developed countries (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997,

at figure 1.5 and chapter 3).

Figures 3 and 4 show comparative rates of property

and violent crimes for several nations surveyed, as

reported by van Dijk and Mayhew.

The United States is clustered with five other

nations in property offense victimization, ranging

from Spain to Poland. Further, 11 of the 17 other

countries in figure 3 are within 30 percent of the

U.S. property crime rate.

Figure 4 provides parallel data for offenses of

violence.

For offenses of violence, the United States ranks

second to Australia but has a rate close to the rates

reported by Canada, Poland, and New Zealand.

Eight of the seventeen nations have violent crime

rates within 30 percent of the U.S. rate. The U.S.

rate for lethal violence is a high multiple of rates in

other developed countries.

Why Fear Lethal Violence?

The offender who kills his victim takes something

from that victim and the victim’s family that

cannot be given back. By contrast, a compensation

program can make the victim whole in the theft of

the person’s BMW with insurance or other lossspreading devices. So interests in life and bodily

security are not just more important than property

interests; they also cannot be compensated in a

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Homicide

(2.7)

Robbery

(266)

Burglary

(2,572)

Theft

(6,109)

New York City = 100

Figure 2. London Crime Rates (per 100,000)

Compared to New York City, 1990

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the number of crimes per

100,000 population.

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform

Crime Reports, 1990; United Kingdom Home Office, 1990.

Rates of nonviolent theft offenses were higher in

London than in New York in 1990. Because larceny and burglary are high-volume offenses, this

meant that the aggregate rate of what we call

“index felonies” was higher in London in 1990

than in New York. There were more crimes and

more criminals in London, but the homicide rate

was more than 10 times higher in New York.

Gordon Hawkins and I sought out data on the

homicides that resulted from victims of robbery

and burglary being killed by the offender in these
3

Figure 4. One-Year Victimization Rates for All Violent Offenses, 18 Countries, 1988–1991

Source: van Dijk and Mayhew, 1992.

Figure 3. One-Year Victimization Rates for All Property Offenses, 18 Countries, 1988–1991

Source: van Dijk and Mayhew, 1992.

Norway

Northern Ireland

Finland

Scotland

Belgium

West Germany

Sweden

France

England

Italy

Canada

Spain

Czechoslovakia

Australia

Netherlands

New Zealand

United States

Poland

0

10

20

30

33

Italy

Scotland

Belgium

France

Northern Ireland

Sweden

England

Norway

Finland

Netherlands

West Germany

Spain

Czechoslovakia

New Zealand

Poland

Canada

United States

Australia

0

5

10

15

20
4

truly commensurate fashion. When modern states

make property hard to steal and when they facilitate insurance, they all but guarantee that lethal

violence will be the citizen’s major worry about

crime, even in settings where homicide is low. In

the United States, however, where rates are quite

high, the fear of lethal violence is debilitating.

The rational response of a criminal justice system

to the special importance of lethal violence would

be to make the prevention of serious violence the

dominant priority in criminal justice. Because

prison is our most serious available criminal

sanction, such a focus would create a strong link

between life-threatening violence and the available

sanction of greatest seriousness. That has not,

however, been the trend in American criminal

justice lately, as the next section demonstrates.

U.S. Imprisonment Rates

We begin our discussion of U.S imprisonment

rates in familiar statistical territory, with data about

rates of imprisonment per 100,000 population.

Figure 5 comes from The Economist (June 8,

1996) and shows levels of American imprisonment

and trends over time.

The data in figure 5 support the now familiar litany

of the grandiose levels of imprisonment in

America. As The Economist puts it, “America now

imprisons seven times as many people (proportionately) as does the average European country

largely as a result of get-tough-on-crime laws.”

Even more impressive than the current level of

American imprisonment is the rapidity with which

levels of imprisonment have risen in recent years.

There were more than five times as many people in

prison in the United States in 1996 as there were in

1973. The growth in American imprisonment has

been greater and more sustained during the past two

decades than in any prior period (Zimring and

Hawkins, 1991).

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Incarcerations

 1992–1993

Germany

Australia

England/Wales

Mexico

Canada

Poland

Singapore

South Africa

United States

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

1970

1980

1985

1990

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2.0

Millions

U.S. Prison Population

Number of Incarcerations per 100,000 Population

a

b

Source: Mauer, 1994.

Figure 5. Levels of Imprisonment

aProjected 1996–2000 prison population assumes all States adopt “truth in

sentencing” laws, which would lead to further increases in prison population.

bThis projected 1996–2000 prison population assumes States do not adopt

“truth in sentencing” laws.

Source: Jones and Austin, 1995.
5

This discussion adds two new twists to the familiar

complaints about high rates of imprisonment in the

United States. The first additional item we would

add to the data on imprisonment rates and comparison countries is the information about reported

crime rates provided in figures 3 and 4. It would be

one thing if America’s sevenfold advantage in rates

of imprisonment paralleled a sevenfold higher

crime rate. But this is clearly not the case for the

most common forms of index crime. It appears that

the English have just as many thieves as can be

found in American cities and a larger number of

burglaries. Thus, rates of common crime do not

begin to explain the large difference in American

rates of imprisonment.

But what about the large difference among American rates of homicide, life-threatening assault, and

robbery? The much larger rate of lethal violence in

the United States probably explains one-quarter to

one-third of the difference in rates of imprisonment

between the United States and other countries. The

reason lethal violence differences do not explain a

larger proportion of the difference in imprisonment

is that serious-violence offenders represent a modest

and declining share of the American prison population. Prior to the huge expansion in American

imprisonment, the concentration of violent offenders in American prisons was much more substantial

than in current circumstances.

In California, for example, about 60 percent of all

prisoners in 1979 reached the prison system

because they were convicted of violent crimes.

That was the distribution of offenders in a prison

system with an inmate population under 25,000.

For the 80,000 prison spaces added to the penal

system during the next decade, the concentration

of violent offenders was much smaller. If the 1979

population is held constant and if the criminal

records of the offenders occupying additional

capacity are separately analyzed, only 27 percent

of the new space has been allocated to persons

convicted of offenses of violence.

So if lethal violence is the problem, the mechanism of imprisonment has become less efficient as

the prison population has expanded. This was to be

expected because the most serious offenses produce imprisonment decisions even when prison

populations are relatively low. The system is not

inclined to put Charles Manson or Willie Horton

on probation in any event. Adding dramatically to

prison numbers means pushing into prison many

more people at the margin between prison and

nonprison sanctions. Expanding prison numbers

means imprisoning larger numbers of housebreakers and car thieves to join the armed robbers

already incarcerated under prior policy. Sure

enough, as the rates of imprisonment mushroomed

in California during the 1980s, the number of

burglars in prison grew more than three times as

fast as the number of convicted robbers, and the

number of car thieves grew six times as fast

(Zimring and Hawkins, 1992:39). There can be no

doubt that one natural result of sharp increases in

imprisonment is the watering of the stock by

increasing the proportionate share of less serious

offenders behind bars.

Does this massive addition to a prison population

of offenders not convicted of violent crimes reduce

the capacity of the system to prevent violence?

There are three functions of imprisonment as a

criminal sanction to be considered separately in

addressing this question: (1) incapacitation, (2) the

educative or moralizing function of the threat of

imprisonment, and (3) general deterrence. Considering only incapacitation, the imprisonment of

large numbers of nonviolent offenders does not

reduce the amount of violence prevented by

incapacitation as long as there are no practical

upper limits on the amount of prison space available in the criminal justice system. If extra nonviolent offenders are imprisoned but no violent

offenders avoid imprisonment as a result, the net

amount of violence prevented by imprisonment

will probably be larger as a result of the prison

expansion. Thus, the prison system in California,

which held more than 100,000 prisoners in 1991,

probably prevented a larger number of lifethreatening acts of violence than the prison system

of fewer than 25,000 a decade before. How many
6

extra acts of life-threatening violence were prevented is not known, however, and there are

indications that the number was relatively small

(Zimring and Hawkins, 1995, at chapter 6; Cohen

and Canela-Cacho, 1994). But even if the marginal

returns from extra imprisonment are very low, the

absolute number of violent offenses prevented

should increase.

If the amount of prison capacity available for

incapacitation is limited, using that limited capacity

for those convicted of nonviolent offenses can

reduce the amount of life-threatening violence

prevented if future life-threatening violence is more

common among persons already convicted of

violent offenses. So a huge increase in imprisonment risk for thieves and drug sellers would reduce

the net amount of violence prevented by imprisonment if nonviolent and violent offenders are in a

zero-sum competition for scarce prison space. But if

the scale of imprisonment can be expanded indefinitely, even a large increase in the proportion of

nonviolent offenders imprisoned will not lead to a

palpable reduction in deaths and injuries prevented.

The period 1980–94 appears to have been a time

when additional prison space for nonviolent and

drug offenders could be provided without diminution of the penal resources available for persons

convicted of life-threatening violence. In the more

crowded and resource-competitive conditions of

the late 1990s, however, the prospects for prison

expansion may not be unlimited, and locking up a

large proportion of those without previous records

of violence could reduce the amount of violent

crime restrained by penal confinement.

The American criminal justice system may already

be shooting itself in the foot with respect to the

educative and moralizing influence of criminal

punishments generally and imprisonment specifically. When 60 percent of a prison population is

serving time because of a conviction for violent

crime, the criminal justice system is drawing a clear

boundary between serious violence and other types

of crime. That is an environment where armed

robbery and housebreaking are regarded as very

different types of crime. Vastly expanding the

imprisonment of housebreakers and car thieves

blurs the distinction between crimes that involve the

risk of injury to the victim and those that do not.

There are a number of indicators that the educative

and moralizing influence of criminal sanctions can

be a significant influence on the behavior of

potential criminals. In areas as diverse as drunk

driving and domestic violence, changes in criminal

justice policy that emphasized the seriousness of

driving after drinking and willful domestic injury

played a major role in reducing death rates from

automobile accidents and intimate homicide.

Blurring the distinction between robbery and

burglary in American criminal justice is unwise

because the risk of death in the average robbery is

50 times as great as in the average burglary in the

United States (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997, at

chapter 4).

And an imprisonment policy that treats the robber

and the burglar in a similar fashion mutes more

than the educative and moralizing influence of the

criminal law. Reducing the difference in the threat

of punishment for armed robbery and housebreaking reduces the incentive for the potential criminal

to choose the less serious of the two methods of

obtaining property. Thus, a large increase in imprisonment that reduces the gap between burglary and

robbery may produce more armed robbery as a

result of the smaller gap between the burglary and

robbery punishment, even if the threatened punishment for robbers is expanded. To the extent that the

relative magnitude of punishment threats influences the choice of crime, general crackdowns on

criminality could produce higher rates of lethal

violence. Indeed, if a general crackdown on crime

has to deter 50 additional burglaries for every

burglar it converts to robbery to break even on

crime victim deaths, the impact of such a policy on

the death rate from crime may well be undesirable.

There is one other casualty worthy of mention

when a war on crime greatly extends the range of
7

offenses to be punished with imprisonment, and

that is the sense that the punishments meted out by

the system are proportionate to the seriousness of

the crimes committed (Allen, 1996:43–46). The

diverse offenses found in a modern penal code

involve not only many different kinds of harm but

also substantially different degrees of social cost.

Policies that tend to homogenize punishments and

spread them evenly over offending populations are

not only problematic because potential offenders

may miss important differences in culpability—

this is the earlier point about the educative and

moralizing influence of punishment—but also

misleading because citizens and those who enforce

the law may regard all criminal harms as morally

indistinguishable.

The principal recent misadventure in American

criminal justice that tended in this direction was the

“War on Drugs” in the mid-1980s. Making prison

the presumptive punishment for an ever-widening

list of offenses is a significant symptom of a diminished sense of penal proportion. In this sense, too,

large increases in imprisonment obscure the moral

differences between different types of crime.

References

Allen, Francis A. (1996). The Habits of Legality.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Jacqueline, and José Canela-Cacho.

(1994). “Incapacitation and Violent Crime.” In

Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds.,

Understanding and Preventing Violence. Volume 4,

pp. 296–388. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.

“Crime in America: Violent and Irrational—and

That’s Just the Policy.” The Economist (June 8,

1996), pp. 23–24.

Jones, Michael A., and James Austin. (1995). The

1995 NCCD National Prison Population Forecast.

Washington, D.C.: National Council on Crime and

Delinquency.

Mauer, Marc. (1994). Americans Behind Bars: The

International Use of Incarceration, 1992–1994.

Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project.

New South Wales Bureau of Criminal Statistics.

(1992). Personal communication.

United Kingdom Home Office. (1990). Criminal

Statistics in England and Wales. London.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation. (1993). Uniform Crime Reports,

1992. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation (1991). Uniform Crime Reports,

1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

van Dijk, Jan, and Pat Mayhew. (1992). Criminal

Victimization in the Industrialized World. The

Hague: Ministry of Justice.

Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins.

(1997). Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence

in America. New York: Oxford University Press.

______. (1995). Incapacitation: Penal Confinement

and the Restraint of Crime. New York: Oxford

University Press.

______. (1992). Prison Population and Criminal

Justice Policy in California. Berkeley, California:

Institute of Governmental Studies.

______. (1991). The Scale of Imprisonment.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
9

My hypothesis about how imprisonment affects

public safety is quite straightforward. I am one of

those few but growing number of academics who

believe that threatening and, not too infrequently,

actually imposing noticeable prison sentences helps

to control crime. Moreover, I think the empirical

evidence, such as it is, supports this position.

I am convinced that there are too many prisoners

and prisons in the United States today not because

we overuse imprisonment but, quite the contrary,

because in major part in the past we have not been

willing enough to imprison serious offenders.

There are too many prisoners because there are too

many criminals committing too many crimes, and

we find ourselves in this predicament at the turn of

the century because, for most of the last half of the

20th century, sentencing practices have not been

harsh enough.

This is by no means the conventional wisdom

among my colleagues. More common is the

assertion that we overuse imprisonment. The

unflattering comparison of the ratio of prisoners to

population in the United States with the ratios in

other major industrial powers is adduced as evidence of our wrongheadedness on this score.1

 Even

if one ignored the empirical evidence on the

disincentive effects of imprisonment, the ratio of

prisoners to population would not be particularly

informative. Only if the propensity to commit

crime and the costs of controlling crime were

similar in all of the industrial nations would this

comparison of per capita imprisonment be relevant. Casual empiricism suggests that this precondition is not even roughly satisfied. Why this is the

case is not well understood, but even a brief

treatment of the issue is well beyond the scope of

this paper.

It is also quite conventional to argue that we have

tried getting tough on criminals and have failed.

The refrain here is that the ratio of prisoners to

population has increased dramatically since 1980,

but the crime rate, particularly the violent crime

rate, has not fallen appreciably. In actuality, violent

crime is down quite substantially of late, but, again,

this comparison of ratios of prisoners to population

only makes sense to the extent that the propensity

to commit crime—or, in the vernacular, the “criminal element”—has remained relatively stable over

time. The empirical evidence suggests that this is

not the case. Moreover, if we focus on the more

relevant ratio of imprisonment to crime, the trends

since 1980 are not unambiguously upward.2

Instead of comparing per capita imprisonment

across countries or even over time, a more reliable

comparison to judge imprisonment policy would

be one between the costs and benefits of changing

that policy. As shown in the work that follows,

such a comparison generally indicates that our

imprisonment policy has not been harsh enough

and that the threat of additional imprisonment

would reduce crime and might actually reduce the

number of individuals in prison.

Crime and Punishment in Modern America

Table 1–1 shows that it is possible to gain some

appreciation for the actual magnitude of the crime

problem and the scale of our response in terms of

arrests and imprisonment. According to the most

recent National Crime Victimization Survey,

almost 35 million index crimes (homicide, rape,

robbery, assault, burglary, auto theft, and larceny)

were committed in 1994.3 According to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), about 14 million of

these crimes were reported to them by police

departments around the country. In terms of

arrests, these same police departments made

almost 3 million arrests for index crimes in 1994.

Table 1–2 reveals that only about 1 in 5 reported

crimes (or about 1 in 12 actual victimizations) are

cleared by an arrest.

Supply Side Imprisonment Policy

by Michael K. Block
10

Table 1–1. Crime and Punishment for Index Crimes: 1994

Reported Cleared Convictions Imprisonment

Crime Typea Victimization Crimes by Arrest Arrests (Felony) (NJRP/BJS)b

Homicide n/a 23,310 14,918 22,100 12,319 11,457

Rape 168,000 102,100 53,092 36,610 20,276 13,788

Robbery 1,299,000 618,820 148,517 172,290 51,573 38,164

Aggravated Assault 2,478,000 1,119,950 627,172 547,760 63,683 28,021

Violent Crime 3,945,000 1,864,180 843,699 778,760 147,851 91,430

Burglary 5,482,000 2,712,200 352,586 396,100 107,087 55,685

Auto Theft 1,764,000 1,539,100 215,474 200,200 19,586 8,030

Larceny 23,765,000 7,876,300 1,575,260 1,514,500 100,328 38,125

Property Crime 31,011,000 12,127,600 2,143,320 2,110,800 227,002 101,840

Total 34,956,000 13,991,780 2,987,019 2,889,560 374,853 193,270

aFBI Index Crimes only.

bNational Judicial Reporting Program/Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Sources: See appendix.

What is perhaps most striking about the data

presented in tables 1–1 and 1–2 is the enormous

falloff between arrests and convictions. While there

were almost 3 million arrests for index crimes in

1994, there were only about 375,000 felony convictions for such crimes in State courts during the

same year. Only about 13 percent of the arrests for

index crimes actually ended in a conviction for a

felony. Even for crimes like murder and rape, the

ratio of convictions to arrests was remarkably

low—only slightly over 55 percent in both cases.

Undoubtedly, plea agreements muddy the water

here. A number of those arrested for one crime

were convicted of or pled guilty to another. When

we look at the violent crime category as a whole,

fewer than 1 in 5 of those arrested for a violent

crime were actually convicted of a violent crime.

Table 1–2. Arrest, Conviction, and Imprisonment Risk for Index Crimes: 1994

Arrest Riska Probability of Imprisonment

Reported Conviction Imprisonment Reported

Crime Type Victmizations Crimes Riskb Risk (NJRP/BJS)c Victimizations Crimes

Homicide n/a 64.00 55.74 93.00 n/a 0.332

Rape 31.60 52.00 55.38 68.00 0.119 0.196

Robbery 11.43 24.00 29.93 74.00 0.025 0.053

Aggravated Assault 25.31 56.00 11.63 44.00 0.013 0.029

Violent Crime 21.39 45.26 18.99 61.84 0.025 0.053

Burglary 6.43 13.00 27.04 52.00 0.009 0.018

Auto Theft 12.22 14.00 9.78 41.00 0.005 0.006

Larceny 6.63 20.00 6.62 38.00 0.002 0.005

Property Crime 6.91 17.67 10.75 44.86 0.003 0.009

Total 8.55 21.35 12.97 51.56 0.006 0.014

aCrimes cleared by arrest per 100 crimes of this type.

bNumber of felony convictions for this type of crime per 100 arrestees whose most serious arrest is for this type of crime.

c

Number of felony defendants sent to prison for this type of crime per 100 felony convictions for this type of crime.
11

To account for convictions and pleas to a lesser

offense and to obtain a more precise idea of conviction probabilities, data from the National

Pretrial Reporting Program were used to estimate

the likelihood that an offender arrested for a

specific crime was convicted of any crime (table

1–3). According to table 1–3, when we use this

additional information, the conviction risk for

murder reached a more respectable 71.5 percent.

(The conviction risk for rape in this table is quite

unreliable because of the differences in definitions

of the crime between data sources.) However, even

when all conviction offenses are accounted for, the

overall conviction risk for violent crimes as a

group is still quite modest (27.6 percent) and for

all index crimes as a group it is even less impressive (17.3 percent). If an offender is arrested, and

this is by no means a high-probability event, the

likelihood of actually being convicted of the crime

that he/she was arrested for (or, for that matter, any

crime) is remarkably low.

Given the fact that the likelihood of being arrested

and convicted for an index crime serious enough to

be reported to and by the police is only about 3

percent or 4 percent, the consequences after conviction are enormously important in determining the

expected punishment.4 The “Imprisonment Risk”

column in table 1–2 contains my estimate of the

likelihood of being sent to prison after conviction

for an index crime. The likelihood of an offender

convicted of an index crime being sentenced to

prison is about 52 percent. For an offender convicted

of a violent crime, the offender’s chance of being

sent to prison is estimated to be about 63 percent.

Of course, these ratios misstate the likelihood of

imprisonment for an offender arrested for a specific

crime to the extent they ignore the real possibility

that he/she may be convicted of a less serious

crime than that for which he/she was arrested. As

is clear in table 1–3, this is a common occurrence.

In table 1–4 the estimates of imprisonment risk are

recalculated to reflect the conviction outcomes in

table 1–3. This recalculation, as expected, substantially lowers all of the imprisonment risks.

Using my estimates of arrest, conviction, and

imprisonment risks, the probability of imprisonment was calculated for the various index crimes.

This is presented in the last columns of tables 1–2

and 1–4. What is obvious from the calculations in

the two tables is just how hard it is to get into

prison in the United States. Only about 1 in 100

index crimes reported to the police actually result

in imprisonment for an index crime. Even for

violent crimes, only about 5 in 100 such crimes

result in imprisonment. The ratio varies from 1

in 3 for murder to about 3 in 100 for aggravated

assault. Overall, the likelihood of going to prison

for committing an index crime is surprisingly low.

Table 1–3. Conviction Risk for Those Charged With Index Crimes

Overall

Aggravated Violent Property Conviction

Charge Homicide Rape Robbery Assault Crime Crime Othera Risk

Homicide 55.7 0.7 8.6 4.3 2.1 71.5

Rape 55.4 0.2 20.0 0.9 14.3 90.8

Robbery 29.9 1.3 5.5 5.5 42.1

Aggravated Assault 10.4 1.4 5.3 17.1

Violent Crime 18.1 2.6 6.9 27.6

Property Crime 0.1b 9.8 3.6 13.5

Total 17.3

Boldface italics denote the number of defendants convicted as charged per 100 defendants charged with the same crime.

aMisdemeanors and unknown dispositions.

bThese are burglaries that end in conviction for a minor violent crime and are not considered in the analysis below.

Sources: See appendix.
12

Table 1–4. Arrest, Conviction, and Imprisonment Risk for Those Charged

With Index Crimes: 1994

Charge Arrest RiskaConviction Imprisonment Probability of Imprisonmentc

Crime Type Victimization Reported Crime Riskb Risk (NJRP/BJS) Victimization Reported Crime

Homicide n/a 64.00 71.47 81.25 n/a 0.372

Rape 31.60 52.00 90.79 51.76 0.148 0.244

Robbery 11.43 24.00 42.07 59.69 0.029 0.060

Aggravated Assault 25.31 56.00 17.10 30.43 0.013 0.029

Violent Crime 21.39 45.26 27.63 44.83 0.026 0.056

Property Crime 6.91 17.67 13.50 32.94 0.003 0.008

Total 8.55 21.35 17.31 35.92 0.005 0.013

aCrimes cleared by arrest per 100 crimes of this type.

bNumber of felony convictions per 100 defendants charged with this type of crime.

c

Number of felony defendants sent to prison per 100 defendants charged with this type of crime and convicted of some felony.

And this does not change appreciably when convictions for lesser offenses are considered (table 1–4).

As I will argue below, increasing the probability of

imprisonment for these crimes by even modest

amounts will pay handsome dividends.

Although it is true that imprisonment is not the

only possibility for incarceration after conviction

(the individual could be sent to a county jail), and

that incarceration is not the only form of punishment, imprisonment is clearly the most severe

sanction. Even when jail time is given for an index

offense, it tends to be much shorter than a prison

term. And although probation, especially the more

recent intensive probation programs, imposes

some punishment, it is usually not comparable to

prison. Because prison is still by far the most

severe form of punishment that is used on a regular

basis, it is of special interest to those interested in

the disincentive effect of punishment.5

Up to this point, I have concentrated on the likelihood of being punished for committing a serious

crime. However, in analyzing the disincentive

effect of imprisonment policy, it is also important

to consider the severity of the punishment. As

noted above, the most severe punishment regularly

imposed is prison. As a practical matter, the only

method of increasing the severity of a prison

sentence is to increase its length. Given the propensity of most offenders to think only over the

short term, this turn of events is quite unfortunate.

Recent jurisprudence on the rights of prisoners and

the standards of confinement appear to leave

policymakers with only the weakest instrument

(sentence length) for increasing the severity of

punishment. Policy initiatives aimed at increasing

the unpleasantness of prison life would likely be a

cost-effective method of fighting crime.

In table 1–5 average time served and “to be

served” is displayed for index crimes in 1992. The

time-served data in the first column are the average

or mean time served by offenders convicted of the

specific index crime and released in 1992. For

example, the 71.5 months shown for homicide in

the first column is the average time served by all

offenders (including parole violators) who were

released in 1992. The “to be served” column is the

Bureau of Justice Statistics’ estimate of the average time that will be served to first release of those

convicted of these specific index offenses in 1992.

(I did not attempt to adjust time-to-be-served

estimates for any expected “add on” for parole

violations because of the changes in imprisonment

policy, including elimination of parole, that have

been sweeping the country.) Columns 3 and 4

show the same information adjusted for the fact

that not all those charged with a specific crime

actually get convicted of that crime. These entries
13

reflect the average time served of those charged

with the specific index crime and convicted and

sent to prison for some crime.

What is quite apparent in table 1–5 is how the

length of prison sentences has been increasing in

recent years, especially for some violent crimes.

The average prison time just to first release for

those convicted of murder in 1992 is almost 70

percent longer than the time served by all those

released in 1992 who were convicted of murder.

For index crimes as a whole, time to be served in

1992 was 31 percent longer than the time actually

served for those released in 1992.

Notwithstanding the recent trend of increasing

sentence length, imprisonment is still very rare

relative to crime. This is illustrated in tables 1–6

and 1–7. The “probability of imprisonment” (table

1–2) and the average “time to be served” estimates

(table 1–5) are combined to get expected months

per criminal and reported crime.

Reported index crimes, which are arguably the

most serious crimes, have an expected sentence of

Table 1–5. Mean Prison Time Served: 1992

Months of Prison Time—Conviction Months of Prison Time—Charge

Conviction/Charge Served To Be Served Served To Be Served

Homicide 71.5 120.0 66.8 111.2

Rape 65.5 91.0 58.0 81.0

Robbery 45.7 54.0 42.9 51.1

Aggravated Assault 27.9 41.0 27.3 39.4

Violent Crime 46.5 63.8 44.1 60.1

Burglary 27.4 31.0 n/a n/a

Auto Theft 17.5 30.0 n/a n/a

Larceny 16.7 21.0 n/a n/a

Property Crime 22.6 27.2 22.6 27.2

Total 33.9 44.5 33.9 44.5

Sources: See appendix.

Table 1–6. Expected Months in Prison per

Criminal (Reported Crime)

Expected Expected

Months Months

in Prison by in Prison by

Crime Conviction Charge

Homicide 39.8 41.3

Rape 17.8 19.8

Robbery 2.9 3.1

Aggravated Assault 1.2 1.1

Violent Crime 3.4 3.4

Burglary 0.6 n/a

Auto Theft 0.2 n/a

Larceny 0.1 n/a

Property Crime 0.2 0.2

Index Crime 0.6 0.6

Table 1–7. Expected Months in Prison per

Reported Crime

Expected Expected

Months Months

in Prison in Prison

Crime by Conviction by Charge

Homicide 59.0 61.9

Rape 12.3 13.7

Robbery 3.3 3.8

Aggravated Assault 1.0 1.1

Violent Crime 3.1 3.1

Burglary 0.6 n/a

Auto Theft 0.2 n/a

Larceny 0.1 n/a

Property Crime 0.2 0.2

Index Crime 0.6 0.6
14

18 prison days. In other words, if all of the prison

time given out in a year for index crime is totaled,

it averages out to 18 prison days for every reported

index crime. What this means is that a criminal

committing a number of index crimes can expect

to spend 18 days in prison for every crime he/she

commits. This overall average for all index crimes

hides a good deal of variation. Performing the

expected prison time calculation by type of crime

produces averages that vary from nearly 40 months

for every murderer to 3 days for every petty thief.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the results reported in

tables 1–6 and 1–7 that very little prison time is

delivered relative to the volume of serious crime.

Is Imprisonment an Effective Crime

Control Strategy?

Over the past several decades, a number of efforts

have been made to quantify the deterrent effects of

both the severity and certainty of punishment. In

the mid-1980s Lewis (1986) reviewed most of the

econometric evidence on the deterrent effect of

increases in the length of imprisonment published

up to that time. His review and analysis of the

literature were clearly supportive of the hypothesis

that an increase in the length of prison terms

reduces crime. His results, which are reproduced

in table 2–1, suggest that longer prison sentences

have a deterrent effect and that these effects are

statistically significant at high levels of confidence

for many crimes and categories of crimes.

The studies that Lewis (1986) summarized all

derive their estimates of the deterrent effect of

imprisonment by attempting to statistically control

for nondeterrence-related changes in the environment. Most include some control for changes in

demographic factors over time or differences

between areas at a point in time. Some studies

attempt to control for changes (or variations) in

economic conditions over time or between different areas at the same time. The elasticities that

result from these studies are intended to provide

information on how crime rates would change if

only deterrent variables, such as the likelihood and

severity of punishment, change. To the extent that

other factors are also changing, crime rates will

reflect changes in both deterrent levels and demographic and economic variables.

Lewis finds that in the studies he reviewed, the

mean elasticity of sentence length (for index

crimes) was -0.468. Translated from “econospeak,” this means that, on average, a 10-percent

increase in the sentence length for index crimes is

estimated to result in a 4.68-percent decrease in

such crimes. For homicide he finds that, on averTable 2–1. Average Estimated Elasticity of Sentence Length by Type of Crime

Number of Mean

Number of Separate Elasticity Mean

Crime Type Studies Data Sets Estimate | t |

Homicide 4 4 -0.205 1.625

Rape 3 2 -0.700 1.306

Robbery 8 9 -0.471 1.955

Aggravated Assault 3 4 -0.604 1.834

Violent Crime 4 4 -0.193 1.400

Burglary 6 7 -0.336 1.87

Auto Theft 5 4 -0.283 1.203

Larceny 7 8 -0.244 1.722

Property Crime 4 5 -0.393 1.892

Index Crime 3 3 -0.468 2.137

Source: Lewis, 1986, table 2, p. 50.
15

Table 2–2. Average Estimated Elasticity of Likelihood of Imprisonment by Type of Crime

Number of Mean

Number of Separate Elasticity Mean

Crime Type Studies Data Sets Estimate | t |

Homicide 4 3 -0.527 1.337

Rape 3 2 -1.553 2.202

Robbery 5 4 -1.383 2.536

Aggravated Assault 5 4 -0.638 2.059

Violent Crime 1 1 -0.676 4.302

Burglary 5 4 -0.353 2.195

Auto Theft 3 2 -0.476 3.114

Larceny 5 4 -0.026 2.050

Property Crime 2 2 -0.597 3.035

Index Crime 4 3 -0.484 2.118

age, the studies he reviewed suggest that a 10-

percent increase in sentence length will result in a

2-percent decrease in the murder rate, a 7-percent

decrease in the rate for rape, about a 4.7-percent

decline in the robbery rate, and a 6-percent decrease in the rate for aggravated assault.

Because there is nothing like the Lewis (1986)

survey currently available for the econometric

estimates of the likelihood of imprisonment, Block

and Herbert (1994) adopted his methodology to

assess the effectiveness of increasing the certainty

of imprisonment. The same approach was used to

prepare a similar but much abridged study for this

report. To produce estimates of the deterrent effect

of the certainty of imprisonment comparable to

Lewis’ findings on the deterrent effect of the

length of imprisonment, the elasticity-averaging

technique employed by Lewis was also used in this

study. Most of the articles included in Lewis’ study

are also included here. The exceptions to this rule

were two articles in which it was unclear how the

data were included in Lewis’ study. The present

study also includes three additional articles not

included in Lewis’ survey.

The actual calculation of the certainty elasticity

estimates parallels the method used by Lewis. First,

if any given article contained more than one estimate of a single elasticity for a particular crime, an

unweighted average of those elasticities was calculated. Second, across articles, an unweighted

average of elasticities derived from a common data

set was calculated so that there is only one estimate

for each type of crime per data set. Finally, for each

type of crime, the estimated elasticity of certainty

was calculated by taking the average of the elasticities estimated from each data set.

Increasing the certainty of punishment may involve

increasing one or a number of different probabilities: It may invoke increasing the probability of

arrest, conviction, or imprisonment. Estimates for

all these elasticities are included in Block and

Herbert (1994). However, since the aim of the

present analysis is to demonstrate the power of

increasing imprisonment as a method of controlling

future offense rates, subsequent analysis will focus

on the probability of imprisonment. Estimates for

these elasticities appear in table 2–2. For additional

details on the individual empirical studies used as a

base for table 2–2, see Block and Herbert (1994).6

In table 2–3 Lewis’ (1986) estimates of sentence

length elasticities were contrasted with my estimates of the certainty elasticities. Overall, the

results suggest the existence of deterrent effects for

both severity and certainty. However, with the

exception of larceny, it appears that for most

crimes there is a greater deterrent effect for an

increase in the likelihood of imprisonment than for

an increase in sentence length. Moreover, the
16

Table 2–3. Comparison of Mean Elasticities of Sentence Length

and Likelihood of Imprisonment

Mean Elasticity of Mean Elasticity of

Crime Type Sentence Length Likelihood of Imprisonment

Homicide -0.205 -0.527

Rape -0.700 -1.553

Robbery -0.471 -1.383

Aggravated Assault -0.604 -0.638

Violent Crime -0.193 -0.676

Burglary -0.336 -0.353

Auto Theft -0.283 -0.476

Larceny -0.244 -0.026

Property Crime -0.393 -0.597

Index Crime -0.468 -0.484

Sources: Lewis, 1986; Block and Herbert, 1994.

results of both analyses (with the exception of

murder in Lewis’ analysis) indicate that the effects

of the severity and certainty of punishment are

greater for individual violent crimes than for

individual property crimes.

The findings comport well with conventional

wisdom (it is reassuring that such “wisdom” is not

always wrong) and is buttressed by my experimental findings on deterrence. In a series of economic

experiments that included monetary payoffs and

penalties, convincing evidence was obtained that

prisoners are much more powerfully deterred from

criminal acts by an increase in the likelihood that

the penalty will be imposed than by an increase in

the severity of the penalty.7

More Cops, More Prosecutors,

More Prisons?

In the last several years, a number of econometric

studies have appeared that concentrate on directly

measuring the impact on crime rates of increasing

the prison population and suppress the distinction

between the certainty and severity of punishment.

The most recent of these studies, “The Effect of

Prison Population Size on Crime Rates,” was

authored by Levitt and appeared in the May 1996

Quarterly Journal of Economics. Using a somewhat different approach than the econometric

studies of deterrence summarized above, Levitt

finds that a 10-percent increase in the prison

population leads to between a 3-percent and 4-

percent decline in index crimes. This is roughly

comparable to the findings shown in table 2–3.

Levitt’s estimates are significantly higher than the

elasticities obtained by Marvell and Moody (1994)

in their study—summarized in “Prison Population

Growth and Crime Reduction” in the Journal of

Quantitative Criminology—that also directly

addressed the impact of imprisonment on crime. It

should be noted, however, that Marvell and Moody

did not employ as sophisticated an estimating

technique as Levitt, who used information on

prison litigation to obtain more reliable estimates

of the impact of imprisonment on crime.

Although the results of these studies are comforting because they both suggest that imprisonment

works to control crime, and the implication of

Levitt’s estimate is that additional imprisonment is

likely to be warranted, the blending of the deterrent effects of certainty and severity has a cost.

Specifically, these studies—relating increases in

the prison population to crime rates—are not very

informative about what is the most effective way to

increase the prison population.
17

In the short run, prison populations will increase as

a consequence of changes in either the likelihood of

imprisonment or the length of prison sentences. One

relevant question that previous studies addressed

but that more recent studies do not is whether one

of these approaches is better than the other.

The implication of comparing the empirical estimates of the elasticities in table 2–3 is that change

in the certainty of imprisonment is a more effective

approach to controlling crime, especially violent

crime. However, when comparing the efficacy of

increases in the certainty of imprisonment with the

increases in the length of prison terms, the point

has traditionally been made that increases in

certainty may be even more expensive than increases in prison terms. Even if increases in certainty are more powerful than increases in severity,

cost considerations may be offsetting. Whatever

the merits of this argument in general, and clearly

there is a strong presumption in its favor, in the

current environment it is unlikely to be true.

Although increasing arrest rates and conviction

rates may be resource consuming, they are not the

only, or, for that matter, the most direct, method of

increasing the probability of imprisonment. With

the likelihood of being sentenced to prison after

conviction at only about 52 percent for index

crimes and 62 percent for violent crimes, changes

in sentencing practices could deliver a fairly

substantial increase in the likelihood of imprisonment with costs comparable to simple increases in

sentence length. The quickest and least expensive

way to increase the certainty of imprisonment is

simply to change sentencing policy.

Costs and Benefits of Changes in

Imprisonment Policies

One clear way to illustrate the relative attractiveness of increases in sentence length (average time

served) and imprisonment risk is to present these

alternatives in a cost-benefit framework. To that

end, tables 3–1, 3–2, 3–3, and 3–4 present a costbenefit analysis for both a 5-percent increase in the

average time served and a 5-percent increase in

imprisonment risk. The benefits are the crimes

averted, and they are valued at the total costs that

each type of crime imposes on victims. These

estimates are those used by Levitt (1996) and

include both estimates of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses resulting from each of the index

crimes. The costs of changing either of these

imprisonment policies (length of time served and

sentencing practices) are basically the costs associated with adding additional prisoners. To err on the

conservative side, an estimate of the full cost of

imprisonment of $2,765 per month per prisoner

was used.

Because the monthly cost of other common sentencing outcomes such as probation or jail are not

zero, the appropriate cost for the analysis of

increasing imprisonment risk should be the net

cost, or the difference between the cost of other

options such as probation or jail and prison. Likewise, if an increase in sentence length comes at the

expense of parole time, the costs of the longer

prison terms should reflect an offset for parole

expense avoided. By ignoring these refinements,

the results are biased against finding a positive

benefit-cost ratio of any policy change that leads to

more prison, and, in particular, an increase in

imprisonment risk.

As is apparent in tables 3–1 and 3–2, increasing

the risk of imprisonment has an unambiguously

favorable benefit-cost ratio in all cases except

burglary and larceny. For victimization data the

case is similar for increases in the length of prison

terms. However, for reported index crimes, increases in the length of sentences have marginal

benefit-cost ratios for robbery and rape. Overall, as

one would predict from the relative elasticities,

increases in imprisonment risks are more attractive

policy options. Increasing the likelihood of imprisonment following conviction produces benefit

levels substantially in excess of costs for all violent

crimes and auto theft. The results in tables 3–3 and

3–4 provide benefit-cost calculations for crime

aggregates. The results for the aggregates are
18 Table 3–1. Benefits and Costs of Changes in Imprisonment Policies by Type of Crime:

Index Crime Victimizations 1994

5% Longer Time Served

Violent Property Index

Aggravated Crime Auto Crime Crime

Benefits and Costs Rape Robbery Assault Totala Burglary Theft Larceny Total TotalBenefits

Number of Crimes 168,000 1,299,000 2,478,000 3,945,000 5,482,000 1,764,000 23,765,000 31,011,000 34,956,000Percentage Reduction 3.50% 2.36% 3.02% 2.82% 1.68% 1.42% 1.22% 1.31% 1.48%Number Reduction 5,880 30,591 74,836 111,307 92,098 24,961 289,933 406,991 518,298Cost per Crime $54,952 $19,331 $13,032 n/a $1,200 $4,000 $200 n/a n/aTotal Benefit (mil.) $323.12 $591.36 $975.26 $1,889.73 $110.52 $99.84 $57.99 $268.35 $2,158.08Costs

Number of Prisoners 13,788 38,164 28,021 79,973 55,685 8,030 38,125 101,840 181,8135% Increase in Prisoners 689 1,908 1,401 3,999 2,784 402 1,906 5,092 9,091Average Number of Months in Prison 91 54 41 56 31 30 21 27 40Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $173.48 $284.95 $158.85 $617.28 $238.68 $33.31 $110.70 $382.69 $999.97

Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.86 2.08 6.14 3.06 0.46 3.00 0.52 0.70 2.165% Higher Risk of Imprisonment

Violent Property Index

Aggravated Crime Auto Crime Crime

Benefits and Costs Rape Robbery Assault Totala Burglary Theft Larceny Total Total

BenefitsNumber of Crimes 168,000 1,299,000 2,478,000 3,945,000 5,482,000 1,764,000 23,765,000 31,011,000 34,956,000Percentage Reduction 7.77% 6.92% 3.19% 4.61% 1.77% 2.38% 0.13% 0.55% 1.01%Number Reduction 13,045 89,826 79,048 181,919 96,757 41,983 30,895 169,635 351,554Cost per Crime $54,952 $19,331 $13,032 n/a $1,200 $4,000 $200 n/a n/aTotal Benefit (mil.) $716.85 $1,736.41 $1,030.16 $3,483.42 $116.11 $167.93 $6.18 $290.22 $3,773.64

CostsNumber of Prisoners 13,788 38,164 28,021 79,973 55,685 8,030 38,125 101,840 181,8135% Increase in Prisoners 689 1,908 1,401 3,999 2,784 402 1,906 5,092 9,091Average Number of Months in Prison 91 54 41 56 31 30 21 27 40Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $173.48 $284.95 $158.85 $617.28 $238.68 $33.31 $110.70 $382.69 $999.97

Benefit-Cost Ratio 4.13 6.09 6.49 5.64 0.49 5.04 0.06 0.76 3.77

a Violent crime category in this table excludes homicide.

Note: Benefits are calculated as follows: The “Number of Crimes” in 1994, multiplied by the“Percentage Reduction” due to increased incarceration, equals the “Number Reduction.” The resultingfigure is then multiplied by the “Cost per Crime,” giving the “Total Benefit,” in millions of dollars.

Costs are calculated as follows: The “Number of Prisoners” in 1993, multiplied by the “Increase inPrisoners” due to increased incarceration, multiplied by the “Average Number of Months in Prison,”multiplied by the “Monthly Cost,” equals the “Total Cost,” in millions of dollars.Sources: See appendix.
19

Table 3–2. Benefits and Costs of Changes in Imprisonment Policies by Type of Crime:

Reported Index Crime 1994

5% Longer Time Served

Violent Property Index

Aggravated Crime Auto Crime Crime

Benefits and Costs Homicide Rape Robbery Assault Total Burglary Theft Larceny Total Total

BenefitsNumber of Crimes 23,310 102,100 618,820 1,119,950 1,864,180 2,712,200 1,539,100 7,876,300 12,127,600 13,991,780Percentage Reduction 1.03% 3.50% 2.36% 3.02% 2.80% 1.68% 1.42% 1.22% 1.35% 1.54%Number Reduction 239 3,574 14,573 33,822 52,208 45,565 21,778 96,091 163,434 215,642Cost per Crime $2,950,662 $54,952 $19,331 $13,032 n/a $1,200 $4,000 $200 n/a n/aTotal Benefit (mil.) $704.99 $196.37 $281.71 $440.77 $1,623.85 $54.68 $87.11 $19.22 $161.01 $1,784.86

CostsNumber of Prisoners 11,454 13,788 38,164 28,021 91,427 55,685 8,030 38,125 101,840 193,2675% Increase in Prisoners 573 689 1,908 1,401 4,571 2,784 402 1,906 5,092 49,663Average Number of Months in Prison 120 91 54 41 64 31 30 21 27 45Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $190.04 $173.48 $284.95 $158.85 $807.32 $238.68 $33.31 $110.70 $382.69 $1,190.01Benefit-Cost Ratio 3.71 1.13 0.99 2.77 2.01 0.23 2.62 0.17 0.42 1.50

5% Higher Risk of Imprisonment

Violent Property Index

Aggravated Crime Auto Crime Crime

Benefits and Costs Homicide Rape Robbery Assault Total Burglary Theft Larceny Total TotalBenefitsNumber of Crimes 23,310 102,100 618,820 1,119,950 1,864,180 2,712,200 1,539,100 7,876,300 12,127,600 13,991,780Percentage Reduction 2.64% 7.77% 6.92% 3.19% 4.64% 1.77% 2.38% 0.13% 0.78% 1.29%Number Reduction 614 7,928 42,791 35,726 86,446 47,870 36,631 10,239 94,740 181,186Cost per Crime $2,950,662 $54,952 $19,331 $13,032 n/a $1,200 $4,000 $200 n/a n/aTotal Benefit (mil.) $1,812.35 $435.66 $827.19 $465.59 $3,540.79 $57.44 $146.52 $2.05 $206.01 $3,746.80

CostsNumber of Prisoners 11,454 13,788 38,164 28,021 91,427 55,685 8,030 38,125 101,840 193,2675% Increase in Prisoners 573 689 1,908 1,401 4,571 2,784 402 1,906 5,092 9,663Average Number of Months in Prison 120 91 54 41 64 31 30 21 27 45Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $190.04 $173.48 $284.95 $158.85 $807.32 $238.68 $33.31 $110.70 $382.69 41,190.01

Benefit-Cost Ratio 9.54 2.51 2.90 2.93 4.39 0.24 4.40 0.02 0.54 3.15

Note: Benefits are calculated as follows: The “Number of Crimes” in 1994, multiplied by the “PercentageReduction” due to increased incarceration, equals the “Number Reduction.” The resulting figure is thenmultiplied by the “Cost per Crime,” giving the “Total Benefit,” in millions of dollars.

Costs are calculated as follows: The “Number of Prisoners” in 1993, multiplied by the “Increase inPrisoners” due to increased incarceration, multiplied by the “Average Number of Months in Prison,”multiplied by the “Monthly Cost,” equals the “Total Cost,” in millions of dollars.
20 Table 3–3. Benefit-Cost Calculations for Crime Aggregates:

Index Crime Victimization 1994

5% Longer Time Served

Violent Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Property Crime Index Crime Index Crime

Benefits and Costs Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity)BenefitsNumber of Crimes 3,945,000 3,945,000 31,011,000 31,011,000 34,956,000 34,956,000Percentage Reduction 2.82% 0.97% 1.31% 1.97% 1.48% 2.34%Number Reduction 111,307 38,069 406,991 609,366 518,298 817,970Cost per Crime n/a $16,891 n/a $593 n/a $2,432Total Benefit (mil.) $1,889.73 $643.02 $268.35 $361.49 $2,158.08 $1,989.30

CostsNumber of Prisoners 79,973 79,973 101,840 101,840 181,813 181,8135% Increase in Prisoners 3,999 3,999 5,092 5,092 9,091 9,091Average Number of Months in Prison 56 56 27 27 40 40Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $617.28 $617.28 $382.69 $382.69 $999.97 $999.97Benefit-Cost Ratio 3.06 1.04 0.70 0.94 2.16 1.99

5% Higher Risk of Imprisonment

Violent Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Property Crime Index Crime Index Crime

Benefits and Costs Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity)BenefitsNumber of Crimes 3,945,000 3,945,000 31,011,000 31,011,000 34,956,000 34,956,000Percentage Reduction 4.61% 3.38% 0.55% 2.99% 1.01% 2.42%Number Reduction 181,919 133,341 169,635 925,678 351,554 845,935Cost per Crime n/a $16,891 n/a $593 n/a $2,432Total Benefit (mil.) $3,483.42 $2,252.26 $290.22 $548.93 $3,773.64 $2,057.31

CostsNumber of Prisoners 79,973 79,973 101,840 101,840 181,813 181,8135% Increase in Prisoners 3,999 3,999 5,092 5,092 9,091 9,091Average Number of Months in Prison 56 56 27 27 40 40Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $617.28 $617.28 $382.69 $382.69 $999.97 $999.97

Benefit-Cost Ratio 5.64 3.65 0.76 1.43 3.77 2.06

Note: Benefits are calculated as follows: The “Number of Crimes” in 1994, multiplied by the“Percentage Reduction” due to increased incarceration, equals the “Number Reduction.” The resultingfigure is then multiplied by the “Cost per Crime,” giving the “Total Benefit,” in millions of dollars.

Costs are calculated as follows: The “Number of Prisoners” in 1993, multiplied by the “Increase inPrisoners” due to increased incarceration, multiplied by the “Average Number of Months in Prison,”multiplied by the “Monthly Cost,” equals the “Total Cost,” in millions of dollars.
21

a Violent crime category in this table excludes homicide.

Note: Benefits are calculated as follows: The “Number of Crimes” in 1994, multiplied by the“Percentage Reduction” due to increased incarceration, equals the “Number Reduction.” The resultingfigure is then multiplied by the “Cost per Crime,” giving the “Total Benefit,” in millions of dollars.

Costs are calculated as follows: The “Number of Prisoners” in 1993, multiplied by the “Increase inPrisoners” due to increased incarceration, multiplied by the “Average Number of Months in Prison,”multiplied by the “Monthly Cost,” equals the “Total Cost,” in millions of dollars.

Table 3–4. Benefit-Cost Calculations for Crime Aggregates:

Reported Index Crime 1994

5% Longer Time Served

Violent Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Property Crime Index Crime Index Crime

Benefits and Costs Totala (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity)Benefits

Number of Crimes 1,864,180 1,864,180 12,127,600 12,127,600 13,991,780 13,991,780Percentage Reduction 2.80% 0.97% 1.35% 1.97% 1.54% 2.34%Number Reduction 52,208 17,989 163,434 238,914 215,642 327,408Cost per Crime n/a $54,392 n/a $906 n/a $7,887Total Benefit (mil.) $1,623.85 $978.45 $161.01 $216.46 $1,784.86 $2,582.26Costs

Number of Prisoners 91,427 91,427 101,840 101,840 193,267 193,2675% Increase in Prisoners 4,571 4,571 5,092 5,092 9,663 9,663Average Number of Months in Prison 64 64 27 27 45 45Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $807.32 $807.32 $382.69 $382.69 $1,190.01 $1,190.01Benefit-Cost Ratio 2.01 1.20 0.42 0.57 1.50 2.17

5% Higher Risk of Imprisonment

Violent Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Property Crime Index Crime Index Crime

Benefits and Costs Totala (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity) Total (Elasticity)Benefits

Number of Crimes 1,864,180 1,864,180 12,127,600 12,127,600 13,991,780 13,991,780Percentage Reduction 4.64% 3.38% 0.78% 2.99% 1.29% 2.42%Number Reduction 86,446 63,009 94,740 362,615 181,186 338,601Cost per Crime n/a $54,392 n/a $906 n/a $7,887Total Benefit (mil.) $3,540.79 $3,427.20 $206.01 $328.53 $3,746.80 $2,670.55

CostsNumber of Prisoners 91,427 91,427 101,840 101,840 193,267 193,2675% Increase in Prisoners 4,571 4,571 5,092 5,092 9,663 9,663Average Number of Months in Prison 64 64 27 27 45 45Monthly Cost ($95) $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765 $2,765Total Cost (mil.) $807.32 $807.32 $382.69 $382.69 $1,190.01 $1,190.01

Benefit-Cost Ratio 4.39 4.25 0.54 0.89 3.15 2.24
22

presented as both a simple sum of the relevant

crimes (total) and an independent estimate using

the aggregate elasticities.

Getting Tough and Getting It Wrong

What this exercise highlights is the finding that

there are substantial gains to revamping the sentencing structure so that more criminals, especially

violent criminals, are sentenced to prison rather

than to probation or jail. These benefit-cost results

clearly indicate that too few violent criminals are

imprisoned in the United States.

As noted above, recent attempts at “getting tough”

appear to have taken the form of longer prison

sentences and not higher levels of imprisonment

risk. Contrary to the situation observed in table 1–

5 where it was clear that average time served has

been increasing in recent years, no such trend is

discernible for imprisonment risk in table 3–5. In

fact, if any trend is observed, it is a downward

trend. The benefit-cost results imply that this

concentration on increasing sentence length in

recent years is not particularly good public policy.

To see how a “prison only” approach to sentencing

for violent crime would fare in terms of benefitcost analysis and prison populations, a rough costbenefit analysis was conducted for the case where

all offenders convicted of homicide, rape, robbery,

and aggravated assault are sentenced to prison for

the current average time served.

To construct this hypothetical case, the percentage

change in imprisonment risk implied by a policy of

making prison a certainty for all violent crime

convictions was first calculated. Since the imprisonment risk for violent crime is currently 61.84

percent (table 1–2), it would take an approximately

62-percent increase in the risk of imprisonment to

make imprisonment a certainty for all offenders

convicted of a violent crime.8

Using this 62-percent change in the probability of

imprisonment along with the elasticities in table 2–

2, the year-by-year path of crimes and prisoners as

well as costs and benefits were estimated for

implementing the prison-only sentencing scheme

for violent crime. In these calculations it was

assumed that the representative construction cost

was $40,000 per bed and that all cells were paid

for in the year they were built. The annual cost of

keeping an inmate, exclusive of interest, was

assumed to be $2,500 per month. The results of

this analysis appear in table 3–6.

Again, to err on the conservative side, it was

assumed in each of these examples that the deterrent effect did not begin until the fifth year and that

it did not reach its full effect until the eighth year

after the sentencing reform was instituted. Even

with these unfavorable behavioral assumptions and

the fact that the prisons had to be fully paid for in

the year they went into service, the policy had a

positive benefit-cost ratio by the sixth year, and

every violent crime had a positive total benefit-cost

ratio by the eighth year. This is without considering the reduction in expenditures for arrests and

convictions that will also result from this imprisonment policy.

Do a Violent Crime, Do Time: A Supply

Side Imprisonment Policy

One simple modification of the sentencing structure that would be consistent with the benefit-cost

analysis above would be to adopt a practice of

sentencing all offenders convicted of violent crime

to prison. This would change the sentencing

system so that probation and/or jail were no longer

sentencing options for offenders convicted of

violent crimes.

Table 3–5. Trends in Imprisonment Risk

Imprisonment Riska

Crime Type 1986 1988 1990 1992

Violent Crime 67 68 62 63

Property Crime 47 51 49 45

Index Crime 54 61 54 52

a Number of felony defendants sent to prison per 100 felony convictions

for the same type of crime.
23

Table 3–6. Costs, Benefits, and Prison Populations for a “Prison Only” Approach to Violent Crime Convictions

Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Anticipated Offenses 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180Actual Offenses 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,667,906 1,471,632 1,275,358 1,079,084 1,079,084 1,079,084 1,079,084Deterred Offenses 0 0 0 0 196,274 392,548 588,822 785,096 785,096 785,096 785,096Benefit per Offense $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000Benefit (mil.) 0 0 0 0 $10,599 $21,198 $31,796 $42,395 $42,395 $42,395 $42,395

CostsAnticipated New Prisoners 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429Actual New Prisoners 147,851 147,851 147,851 147,851 132,766 117,142 101,519 85,895 85,895 85,895 85,895Additional New Prisoners 56,422 56,422 56,422 56,422 41,337 25,713 10,090 (5,534) (5,534) (5,534) (5,534)Total Additional Prisoners 56,422 112,844 169,266 225,688 267,025 292,738 246,406 184,450 122,494 60,539 13,668Average Sentence (mos.) 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8Cost per Month per Prisoner $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500Cost of Additional New Prisoners (mil.) $1,693 $1,693 $1,693 $1,693 $1,240 $771 $303 ($166) ($166) ($166) ($166)Total Cost of New Prisoners (mil.) $1,693 $3,385 $5,078 $6,771 $8,011 $7,795 $7,392 $5,534 $3,675 $1,816 $410Construction Costs per Bed $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 0 0 0 0 0Cost of New Beds (mil.) $2,257 $2,257 $2,257 $2,257 $1,653 $429 0 0 0 0 0Costs (mil.) $5,642 $7,335 $9,028 $10,720 $10,904 $8,995 $7,695 $5,367 $3,509 $1,650 $244

Benefits-Costs -$5,642 -$7,335 -$9,028 -$10,720 -$306 $12,203 $24,101 $37,028 $38,886 $40,745 $42,151

Discounted Present Value -$5,642 -$7,053 -$8,346 -$9,530 -$261 $10,030 $19,048 $28,138 $28,414 $28,627 $28,476

Cumulative Discounted Present Value -$5,642 -$12,695 -$21,041 -$30,572 -$30,833 -$20,803 -$1,755 $26,383 $54,797 $83,424 $111,899
24

Not only does this example have favorable total

discounted benefit-cost ratios, it will also eventually induce a lower prison population. Although the

benefit-cost ratio for the policy turns positive

before the prison population stabilizes, it will

stabilize at a level lower than the level it would

have been had there been no change in imprisonment policy. For all types of violent crime, the

initial increase in imprisonment rates results in a

lower prison population as well as a lower crime

rate. It will also eventually result in fewer arrests

and convictions.

A Prison-Only Approach in a Less

Accommodating World

There is, however, one factor discussed above that

may act to reduce the power of imprisonment and,

thus, the benefit-cost ratio reported in table 3–6.

Because the elasticities in table 2–3 were calculated by averaging studies conducted using data

between 1940 and 1970—to the extent that there is

a downward trend in these elasticities, possibly

resulting from the increase in the level of social

pathology since 1960—the elasticities in table 2–3

may overstate the impact of increases in the likelihood of imprisonment on crime rates.9

 Although

there is some evidence that the elasticities, at least

for violent crimes, have declined in recent years,

there are not enough studies to adequately explore

this issue empirically.

We can, nevertheless, provide some perspective on

this potentially important point by asking what the

benefit-cost pattern of the prison-only policy for

violent crime would be if the elasticities were only

half of those reported in table 2–3. The results for

this much less powerful variant appear in table 3–

7. What is observed is that, if the elasticity with

respect to the likelihood of imprisonment is now

substantially less than an estimate based on historical data, the benefits of a prison-only policy for

violent crime are still likely to outweigh the costs

of such a policy. However, in this case the eventual

prison population, while lower than the population

level immediately after the intervention, will not

dip below its original level.

Real Offense Sentencing for Violent Crime

An important aspect of the implementation in a

prison-only policy for violent crime not explicitly

accounted for in the analysis reported in tables 3–6

and 3–7 is the change in plea practices such a

policy might induce. Mandatory prison sentences

for any serious violent crime convictions might, by

their effect on plea practices, increase the number

of violent charges that result in nonviolent convictions. This would reduce somewhat the deterrence

yield of the imprisonment-only policy for violent

crime, but the existing elasticity estimates are not

up to the task of modeling this type of feedback.

One way to avoid some of this undercutting of the

deterrent effect of a prison-only approach is to

adopt “real offense” sentencing, i.e., sentencing

based on offense behavior and not on the offense

of conviction.

Conclusion

Although the benefit-cost calculations in this

report, especially those involving hefty changes in

imprisonment risks, stretch the empirical estimates

of deterrence elasticities to their breaking point,

the examples do make a point. Specifically, there is

a credible argument that the excessive levels of

crime and imprisonment in society have as their

cause a sentencing structure that is not harsh

enough. There is evidence that instituting a more

draconian sentencing structure, i.e., one that

involves imprisonment for essentially all convictions for violent crimes, is likely to be cost justified and may actually reduce the prison population. Imprisoning additional offenders is expensive, and society has to sacrifice current consumption to build and operate prisons. However, the

evidence suggests that the costs are worth it, at

least for violent crimes. Making imprisonment a

certainty for violent crimes will make society

much better off.
25

Table 3–7. Costs, Benefits, and Prison Populations for a “Prison Only” Approach to Violent Crime Convictions—Reduced Elasticity

Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Anticipated Offenses 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180Actual Offenses 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,864,180 1,766,043 1,667,906 1,569,769 1,471,632 1,471,632 1,471,632 1,471,632Deterred Offenses 0 0 0 0 98,137 196,274 294,411 392,548 392,548 392,548 392,548Benefit per Offense $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000 $54,000Benefit (mil.) 0 0 0 0 $5,299 $10,599 $15,898 $21,198 $21,198 $21,198 $21,198

CostsAnticipated New Prisoners 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429 91,429Actual New Prisoners 147,851 147,851 147,851 147,851 140,578 132,766 124,954 117,142 117,142 117,142 117,142Additional New Prisoners 56,422 56,422 56,422 56,422 49,149 41,337 33,525 25,713 25,713 25,713 25,713Total Additional Prisoners 56,422 112,844 169,266 225,688 274,837 316,276 293,276 270,379 231,859 201,150 177,715Average Sentence (mos.) 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8Cost per Month per Prisoner $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500Cost of Additional New Prisoners (mil.) $1,693 $1,693 $1,693 $1,693 $1,474 $1,240 $1,006 $771 $771 $771 $771Total Cost of New Prisoners (mil.) $1,693 $3,386 $5,078 $6,771 $8,245 $8,498 $8,798 $7,877 $6,956 $6,035 $5,331Construction Costs per Bed $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 0 0 0 0 0Cost of New Beds (mil.) $2,257 $2,257 $2,257 $2,257 $1,966 $689 0 0 0 0 0Costs (mil.) $5,642 $7,336 $9,028 $10,721 $11,685 $10,427 $9,804 $8,648 $7,727 $6,806 $6,102

Benefits-Costs -$5,642 -$7,336 -$9,028 -$10,721 -$6,386 $172 $6,094 $12,549 $13,470 $14,391 $15,095

Discounted Present Value -$5,642 -$7,053 -$8,347 -$9,531 -$5,458 $141 $4,817 $9,536 $9,843 $10,111 $10,198

Cumulative Discounted Present Value -$5,642 -$12,696 -$21,042 -$30,573 -$36,032 -$35,890 -$21,074 -$21,537 -$11,695 -$1,584 $8,614
26

Notes

1. “[T]he evidence is that we are quite harsh, in

general harsher than other modern industrial

nations, and that we have gotten strikingly harsher

in recent years.... In 1988, the U.S. rate of incarceration (in jails and prisons) was 388 prisoners

per 100,000 people.... For the same year, the rate

for the United Kingdom was 97.4 per 100,000, for

West Germany it was 84.9, for Belgium it was

65.4. The rate for Canada, with a society in many

ways much like our own, was about 110 persons

for every 100,000 inhabitants.” (Jeffrey Reiman,

The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison:

Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 4th ed.,

Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 1995, p. 18.)

2. In particular, if we consider the ratio of new

prison commitments to crime, we find that in 1980

the ratio was approximately 1 in 100 for index

crimes and 4 in 100 for violent crimes. Both ratios

were essentially unchanged in 1992. It is true that

the average time served has been increasing of

late, and, hence, there have been some increases in

the ratio of prison population to crime. But the

willingness to use prison as a sanction, which is

probably best measured by the new commitment

rate, has not changed appreciably in recent years.

3. Here, and in the work that follows, the term

index crime is used to refer to the crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,

auto theft, and larceny. In actuality, the FBI uses

the term “modified index crime” to refer to this

group of crimes because “index crime” now also

includes the crime of arson.

4. If we ignore the punishment that results simply

from being arrested and assume that imprisonment

is the only substantial punishment, the expected

punishment (EF) can be expressed as

[EF = pA* pC * pI * F]

where pA is the probability of arrest, pC is the

probability of conviction, pI is the probability of

imprisonment given conviction (imprisonment

risk), and F is the average time served.

5. While conviction itself imposes a reputational

penalty, this is most relevant for offenders who

commit white-collar crime, and such crimes are

not a very significant proportion of the index crime

figures used in this report.

6. The elasticities of the likelihood of imprisonment can vary substantially. It is important to bear

in mind when interpreting the elasticities in table

2–2 that these estimates are themselves based on

often disparate estimates.

7. See Block and Gerety (1995).

8. This is equivalent to increasing the probability

of imprisonment for violent crime from 0.053

(table 1–2) to 0.086.

9. The relevant elasticities may also be smaller

than the average based on historical evidence

because we are analyzing such a large change in

the imprisonment rate.

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Table 1–1

Victimization 1994

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization 1994,

Bulletin (Washington, D.C., April 1996), table 1:

“Criminal Victimizations and Victimization Rates,

1993–94: Estimates From the Redesigned National

Crime Victimization Survey.” NCJ 158022.

Reported Crimes 1994

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United

States, 1994 (Washington, D.C., 1995), table 1:

“Index of Crime, United States, 1975–1994.” NCJ

153022.

Arrests 1992

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United

States, 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1993), table 29:

“Total Estimated Arrests, United States, 1992.”

NCJ 144768.

Arrests and Cleared by Arrest 1994

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United

States, 1994 (Washington, D.C., 1995), table 29:

“Total Estimated Arrests, United States, 1994,” and

table 25: “Offenses Known and Percent Cleared by

Arrest, Population Group, 1994.” NCJ 158553.

Convictions (Felony) 1992

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in the

United States, 1992, Bulletin (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, 1996), table 2: “Number of Felony Convictions in State and Federal

Courts, 1992”; column 2: “Felony Convictions—

State.” NCJ 153257.

Convictions (Felony) 1994

Derivation of Estimate: Estimated Convictions

(Felony) 1994 = Convictions (Felony) 1992 multiplied by the result of dividing Total Index Arrests

1994 by Total Index Arrests 1992.

Prisoners 1994

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in the

United States, 1992, Bulletin (Washington, D.C.,

1995), table 4: “Type of State and Federal Felony

Sentences, by Violent Offenses, 1992,” column 3:

“Percent of Felons Sentenced to Incarceration—

Prison.” NCJ 153257.

Derivation of Estimate: Prisoners 1994 = Convictions (Felony) 1994 multiplied by the percentage

of felons sentenced to prison in 1992.

Table 1–3

Charged With Index Crime

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large

Urban Counties, 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1995),

table 22: “Conviction Offense of Defendants

Arrested for a Violent Offense and Subsequently

Convicted, by Most Serious Arrest Charge, 1992,”

and table 23: “Conviction Offense of Defendants

Arrested for a Nonviolent Offense and Subsequently Convicted, by Most Serious Arrest Charge,

1992.” NCJ 148826.

Appendix:

Data Sources and Estimates for Tables

1–1, 1–3, 1–5, and 3–1
30

Table 1–5

Average Time Served in Prison

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, National Corrections Reporting Program, 1992, NCJ 145862 (Washington,

D.C., 1994), table 2–4: “State Prison Releases,

1992: Time Served in Prison, by Offense and

Release Type.”

Derivation of Estimate: Average Time Served in

Prison = weighted average of mean time served by

first releases and subsequent releases for given

offense. NCJ 145862.

Average Time To Be Served in Prison

Data Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in the

United States, 1992, Bulletin (Washington, D.C.,

1996), table 11: “Corresponding Time To Be

Served in State and Federal Prison, by Offense,

1992,” column 9: “Corresponding Time To Be

Served in Prison—State.” NCJ 153257.

Table 3–1

Cost per Crime

Data Source: Levitt (1996), table VIII: “Estimated

Impact on Crime From Adding One Additional

Prisoner” and “Cost per Crime, Adjusted to 1995

Dollars (CPI95/CPI92 = 1.082).”

Note: NCJ numbers listed above identify documents available from the National Criminal Justice

Reference Service (see inside back cover).
For more information on the National Institute of Justice, please contact:

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

800–851–3420

e-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org

You can view or obtain an electronic version of this document from

the NCJRS Justice Information Center World Wide Web site at http://www.ncjrs.org

If you have any questions, call or e-mail NCJRS.