~~A~~~OIRNEY GENEIKAL 

OFTEXAS 

GROVER SELLERS AUSTIN ~~.T%xan 

-ON 

A1T"RNWY G:lrNERAl. 

Hon. Geo. R. Sheppard 

Comptroller~~ of Public 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Sir: 

Accounts 

Re: Opinion No. o-6828 

The date of "cessation of 

hostilities" as referred to 

In Sec. 1, S.B. No. 130, Acts 

of 48th Legislature 

We have your request for an opinion as to "the date of 

the cessation of hostllltles as referred to In Sectlon 1 of 

Senate Bill 130, Acts of the Regular Session of the Fortyeighth Legislature." 

Many wartime statutes, both state and federal, contain 

provisions for termination upon "cessation of hostilities," 

"termination of the emergency-," "termination of then war," etc. 

(See "Report to the President by the Attorney General ooncernlng the Limitation, Suspension, OP Termlnatlon of Emergency, 

National Defense and War Legislation," dated September 1, 1945.) 

Each statute must be construed in the light of Its particular 

wording and purpose and In the light of the factual conditions 

prevailing at the time the questlon is raised, 

Senate Bill 130 releases interest and penalties on certain ad valorem taxes, 

I! . . 0 providing that the release of such Interest 

and penalties shall extend for the duration of World War 

JI, and providing that the respective members of such 

Armed Forces 0 . 0 shall be allowed a period of not to 

exceed six (6) months after the cessation of hostilities 

In which to pay without penalty and interest their taxes 

which have accrued and which shall accrue durlng the 

duratlon of the war." (Underscoring ours) - 

It is apparent from the above quoted language that the 

phrases "the cessation of hostilltles ' "the duration of World 

War II," and "the duration of the war' are inter-related and 

must necessarllg refer to the same time. Conceivably, actual 

fighting might cease more than slx.months prlor to the formal 

termination of the war. Obviously, the Legislature did not 

intend that the six-months' perlod of grace should terminate 
Ron. Geo. R. Sheppard, page 2 o-6828 

prior to the acrual of the taxes. The Intent of the Act is 

that taxes which accrue against persons entitled-to the benefit of the Act prior to the termlnatlon of the war, If paid 

within SIX months thereaftier, are Interest-free and penaltgfree. 

~Furthermore, Section 3 of the Act states, "The fact 

that many persons affected by the provisions of this Act 'are 

In distant countries In the service of their county and may 

unavoldablg permit their taxes to become delinquent" creates 

an emergency. This clause shows that the Legislature intended 

to provide relief for persons who might unavoidably delay pagment of-taxes until. termination of their service in the Armed 

Forces and subsequent return to their homes. It Is reasonable 

to assume, therefore, that the Legislature, in fixing the time 

allowed such persons for payment of taxes wlthout penalty and 

interest, considered the Federal laws fixing the period of 

military service. 

Prior to enactment of'the Act in question the 77th Congress of the United States had, by Public Law 336 extended the 

period of service of members of the Army of the United States, 

and suspended restrlctlons on their terrltorlal use, "durlrig 

the existence of any war In which the United States 1s engaged, 

and during the six months immediately followlng‘~the,termlnatlo~n 

of any such war," 55 Stat. 799; and by Public Law 360, author; 

lzed the President to extend the period of service of Inductees 

a~sslgned ko the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, provided 

that the 0 0 e perlod~ of service s D . shall be terminated not 

later than six months after the terminatlon of the war," 55 

Stat. 844. 

It Is our opinion, therefore, that "the cessation of~~~hostillties" as used In Senate Bill130 means the legal termination 

of World War II, rather than the actual cessation of flghtlng 

on the fields of battle. 

Upon what date did, or will, World War II terminate, in 

the legal sense? 

It is the province of the political department, and not 

of the judicial department, of the federal-government to deter-- 

mine when war is at an end. The-Protector, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 

20 L.~ ed. 463; Perklns v, Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am, Rep. 639,;’ 

Kneeland-Bigelow Co, v. Michigan Cent. RR. Co., 207 Mlch. 546, 

174 N.W. 605; 67 Corpus J'uris. 429. 

The War of X360-66 did not terminate upon surrender of 

the last Confederate general (May 26,1865) but continued until 

the proclamation of the President (August20, 1866). United 
The War with Spain did not end when actual: hostilftles 

were suspended by theprotocol of August 12, 1898, but contlnued.untl.1 the ratlflcatibn of the treaty ,of peace In April, 

1899. Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 48 L. ed. 994, 24 

s. ct. 727. 

World War I did not terminate,when the actual flghtlng 

ceased and the Armlstlce was signed (November 11, 1918). Hamllton-v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146,, 64 L. ed,. 

194, 40 S. Ct. 1.06; Kahn v. Anderson, 25 

In re Miller, 281.F. 764 (CCA, 2nd Clrc. 7 

U.S. 1, 65 L. edb 469; 

; Zimmerman v. Hicks, 

Hon. Geo. H. Sheppard, page 3 O-6828 

States v. Anderson, 9 Wall, (U,S,) 56; The Protector, supra; 

McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426. 

7 F (2d) 443 (CCA, 2nd Clrc.); Kneeland-Blgelow Co. v.'Michlgan 

Cent. R.R. Co., supra; Palmer v. Pokorny, 186 N.W. 

Sup. Ct.); State v. Dixon, 213 P. 227 (Mont. Sup. 

50 i'(Mlch'. 

Ct. 

trial Comm. of Ohlo v, Rotar, 179 N.E. 135 (Ohio Sup. 

7 ; IndusCt.); 

contra: United States v. Hicks, 256 F. 707 (Dist. Ct.). 

Most cases ln which the point is directly involved hold 

that World War 1 terminated by the joint resolution of Congress 

of July 2, 1921. Clemens v. Perry, 51 S.W. (2d) 267 (Tex.~ Comm. 

App.); In re Miller, supra; Zimmerman v. Hicks, snpra; State 

v. Dlxon,'supra; Industrlal Comm. of Ohlo v.'Rotar, supra; see 

SWISS Nat, Ins. CO. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42, 69 L. ed. 504. But 

some cases have held that it co tlnued until the ratification 

of the treaty of peace. First a at. Bank v. Anglo-Ceslerrelchische 

Bank; 37 F. (2d) 564 (CCA, 3d Clrc.); Palmer v. Pokorng, 186 

N.W. 505. (Mlch. Sup. Ct.). And other decisions have Indicated, 

by d~lcta, that a war Is not concluded until the treaty of peace 

Is made and becomes effective. See United States v, Anderson, 

supra; Hamilton v. Kentucky Dlstlllerles & W. Co., supra; Commercial Cable Co. v, Burleson, 255 F. 99 (Dlst. Ct.); Slplyak 

v. Davis, 119 Atl. 745 (Pa. Sup. Ct.). 

The 77th Congress of the United States, by joint resolutions, formally declared a state of war between the United 

States and certain foreign governments, Public Laws 328 (Japan), 

331 Gerinany 

i 1 

332 (Italy), 563 (Bulgaria), 564 (Hungary), and 

565 ~Rumanla ~: To date, neither Congress nor the President has 

formally declared a termination of these wars. 

It is our opinion, therefore, that World War II has not 

yet terminated, and will not terminate, In the legal sense, 

and ln the sense that the words "cessation of hostllltles" are 

used In Senate Bill 130, until the Congress of the Unlted States, 

or the President by authority from Congress, formally Proclaims 

that It is terminated. 
Hon. Geo. H, Sheppard, page 4 o-6828 

We have heretofore forwarded to you copies of our Opinions 

Nos. O-5566, o-6258, and O-6565, which we believe answer the 

other qnestlons asked in your letter. 

Yours very truly, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

By s/Raymond A. Lynch; 

Raymona A. Lynch, 

Assistant. 

RAL/rt/wc 

APPROm OCT 19 1945 

s/Grover Sellers 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

Approved Opinion Committee By s/BWB ChaIrman