F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

T I M O T H Y L

. B L I X S E T H ,

Appellant
,

v.

Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U N T A I N C L U B , L L C; A D H O C G R O U P O F C L A S S B U N I T H O L D E R S ; CI P S U N R I S E R I D G E O W

N E R L L C; CI P Y E L L O W S T O N E L E N D I N G L L C; C R O S S H A R B O R C A P I T A L P A R T N E R S , L L C; M A R

C S. K I R S C H N E R ; C R E D I T S U I S S E AG, C A Y M A N I S L A N D S B R A N C H ; Y E L L O W S T O N E C L U B L I Q U I D A T I

N G T R U S T , Appellees. No. 12-35986

D.C. No. 11-CV-73-SEH

O RDER

F iled April 18, 2017

B efore: Alex Koz inski, Richard A. Paez
, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.

OrderB L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 2

SUMMARY *

Bankruptcy / Sanctions

The panel filed an order: (1) deny i n g appellant’s counsel’s motion and amended motion for reconsideration o f the Appellate Commissioner’s orders awarding atto r n e y s’ f e e s and n on-tax able costs under F ederal Rule of Appella t e Proc e d u r e 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in a bankruptcy case; (2) deny ing requests f

or r e c usal, appointment of a new panel, conversion of the matter to a criminal proceeding
, transfer o f the matter to the United States A ttorney , and holding o f the awards in abey ance; a

n d (3) deny ing
, on behalf of the court, counsel’s sug g estion for reconsideration en banc.

The panel had o rdered appellant and his counsel to pay appellees’ attorney s’ fees and costs in defending ag ainst the appeal under Rule 38; ordered counsel to pay appe l l e es’ attorney s’ f

ees a nd costs in d efending ag ainst the appeal under § 1927; and referred to the Appellate Commissioner the determination of an appropriate amount of attorney s’ fees a nd
costs. T he Appellate Commissioner entered orders a warding fees and costs.

Deny ing co u n sel’s motion and amended motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Commissioner’s o r ders, the panel held that the Commissioner c orrectly declined to award fees

- o n-fees u nder Rule 38 for the preparation of appellees’
statements reg arding a

ppellant’s p ro se response a nd counsel’s response to the court’s order to show cause ag ainst

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 3

them, a n d correctly awarded fees a nd costs u nder § 1927
ag ainst counsel for preparing the st a tements reg arding counsel’s response. The panel held that because Rule 38 is a damag e provision authoriz ing a n award of “just damag es,” an

a w a r d of fees and costs under Rule 38 must be limited t o appellees’ d irect fees and c osts for defending ag ain s t the fri v o l o u s appeal, and may not include the fees a nd costs incurred r eg arding the impo sition o f sanctions. A g reeing with the E leventh Circuit, the p anel held that, unlike Rule 38, § 1 927 is a fee-shifting provision allowing an award o f fees-on-fees.

COUNSEL

Philip H. Stillman, Stillman & Ass o ciates, Miami B each, F lorida, for Appellant.

Michael J . F ly

nn, B oston, Massachusetts, for himself.

Paul D. Moore, Duane Morris L L P, B oston, Massachusetts; Michael R. L astows ki, Duane Morris L L P, W ilming ton, Delaware; Be n

jamin P. Hursh, Crowley F leck PL L P, Missoula, Montana; fo r Appellees CrossHarbor Capital Partners, L L C, and CI P Sunrise Ridg e Owner L L C.

J ames A

. Patten, Patten Peterman B ekkedahl & Green PL L C, B illing s, Montana, f

or A ppellee Y ello wstone Mountain Club, L L C.

Robert R. B ell, Mullin Hoard & B ro w n L L P, Amarillo, Tex as, f or Appellee s Br ian A. Glasser as Trustee, a nd Yellowstone Club L iquidating Trust.B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 4

ORDER

I

B ackg round

W e ordered Timothy L

. B lix seth and his attorney Michael J

. F ly n n to pay appellees’ attorney s’ fees and costs in defending a g ainst this appeal under F ederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, ordered F ly nn to pay appellees’ attorney s’ fees and c osts in defending ag ainst this appeal unde r 2 8 U

. S.C. § 1927, and referred to the A ppellate Commissioner pursuant to N inth Circuit Rule 39-1.9 the determination of a n appropriate amount of a ttorney s’ fees and costs. See B lixseth

v. Y e llowstone Mountain Club, LLC
, 796 F .3d 1004, 1007–09 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 W e also ordered B lix seth and F ly nn each to pay $500 in damag es to the Clerk of Court as reimbursement for the costs incurred during this frivolous and bad-faith appeal. Id

. at 1 009. B lix seth and F ly nn each have paid $500 to the Clerk, as required.

1 Ru le 3 8 p ro v id es: “ If a co u rt o f ap p eals determ in es th at an ap p eal is f riv o lo u s, it m ay , af

ter a sep arately

f i led m o tio n

o r n o tice f

ro m t h e co u rt

an d reaso n ab le o p p ortu n ity to resp o n d
, aw ard j u st d am ag es an d sin g le or d o u b le co sts to th e ap p ellee.”

S e c tio n 1 9 2 7 p ro v id es: “ A n y atto rn ey o r o th er p erso n ad m itted t o

co n d u ct cases in an y c o u rt o f th e Un ited States o r an y T errito ry th ereo f

w h o so m u ltip lies th e p r o c e e d in g s in an y case u n reaso n ab ly an d

v ex atio u sly

m ay b e req u ired b y

th e co u rt to satisf

y p erso n ally th e ex cess

co sts, ex p en s es, an d atto rn ey s’ f ees reaso n ab ly

in cu rred b ecau se o f

su ch

co n d u ct.”B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 5

The Appellate Commissioner entered a second amended order a nd amended orders (Docket Entry Nos. 148, 149, 150) awarding attorney s’ fees and non-tax able costs as follows:

(1) $105,881.26 in favor of CrossHarbor Capital Partners, L L C and C I P S unrise Ridg e Owner L L C and jointly a nd severally ag ainst B lix seth and F ly

nn;
(2) $24,796.41 in favor of CrossHarbor Capital Partners, L L C and CI P Sunrise Ridg e Owner L L C an d a gainst F ly nn;
(3) $42,031.81 in favor of B rian A. G lasser, Trustee, a nd Yellowstone Club L iquidating T r ust and jointly and severally
ag ainst B lix seth and F ly

nn;
(4) $9,065.50 in f

avor of B ria n A. G lasser, T rustee, a nd Yellowstone Club L iquidating Trust and ag ainst F ly nn;
(5) $9,505. 0 8 in favor of Yellowstone Mountain Club, L L C and CI P Yellowstone L ending L L C a n d j ointly a nd severally ag ainst B lix seth and F ly

nn; and

(6) $712.50 in favor of Yellowstone Mountain Club, L L C and CI P Yellowstone L ending L L C and ag ainst F ly nn.

Fl y n n f iled a motion and an amended motion f o r reconsideration of the Appellate Commissioner’s s e co nd amended order and amen d e d orders. W e deny F ly n n’s motion and amended motion for reconsideration (Docket Entry Nos. 151, 152). The Appellate Commissioner’s second amended order and amended orders awarding attorney s’ fees and non-tax able costs remain in effect.B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 6

The Appellate Commissioner c orrectly declined to award attorney s’ fees and non-tax a ble co s t s u nder Rule 38 ag ainst B lix seth a

nd F ly nn for preparing appellees’ s tatements reg arding B lix seth’s pro se r esponse and F ly nn’s response to the c ourt’s order to show c a use ag ainst B lix seth and Fl y nn (“fees-on-fees”), and correctly awarded fees and costs under § 1927 a g ainst F ly

n n for preparing the statements reg arding F ly nn’s response. W e publish this order t o a ddress the

av ai lability of fees and costs for litig ating sanctions under Rule 38 and § 1927.

I I

Discussion

F ly nn objected to appellees’ reques t s f or attorney s’ fees for preparing joint statements r eg arding B lix seth’s pro se response and F ly

nn’s response to the cou rt’s order to show

cause. F ly

nn arg ued that the court may no t i n clude the

ex p ense of litig ating the o rder to show cause in the attorney ’s fees and non-tax a

ble costs that the court ordered B lix seth a nd F ly nn to pay as a sanction, citing Haeger v. G oodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
, 8 13 F .3d 1 233, 1254 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted
, 201 6 W L 2927901, 137 S. Ct. 30 ( U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1406), and In re S. Cal. Sunbelt Developers, Inc. , 608 F .3d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 2010).

A. Sunbelt D isting uishes F e e-Shifting Provisions F rom Damag es Provisions

I n Sunbelt
, thirteen creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions ag ainst two alleg e d debtors. See Sunbelt , 608 F .3d
at 460. After the petiti o n s were dismissed, the alleg ed debtors filed motions ag ainst the creditors for attorney s’ fees,B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 7

costs, and d amag es under 1 1 U.S.C. § 303(i) and ag ainst two individuals who ex e rcised control over the c r editors for sanctions under the c ourt’s inherent power. Id

. 2 The bankruptcy court awarded f ees and costs ag ainst the creditors under § 303(i), including the fees and c osts incurred by the alleg ed debtors in litig ating the post-dismissal motions

. I d

. at 461. Rely ing on its inherent p ower, the ban kruptcy court also awarded san c tions ag ainst the controlling individuals, and held them jointly and severally liable for th e a l l e g ed debtors’ attorney s’ fees and costs, including the fees and costs incurred in litig ating the motions. Id

. The creditors and the controlling individuals appealed. Id

.

This court affirmed the j u d gments a g ainst the creditors, holding that the bankruptcy court properly awarded fees-onfees because § 303(i) is a fee-shifting provision r ather than a sanctions statute such as Rule 1 1. Id

. a t 460, 462. T h e court

r e l i ed on Business Guides, Inc. v

. Chromatic C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Enterprises, Inc.
, 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991), and Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
, 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990), in which the Supreme Court disting u ished fee-shifting provisions, wh e r e e l i g ibility turns o n the merits or outcome of the litig ation and costs are shift e d fo r the litig ation as a whole, from sanctions statutes lik e the former version of Rule 11, where elig ibility for fees turned on whether a specific pleading was w ell-founded and co sts a re shifted only for a

2 Sectio n 3 0 3 (i) p ro v id es: “ If th e co u rt d ism i sses a petitio n u n d er th is sectio n oth er th an o n co n sen t o f all p etitio n ers an d th e d eb to r, an d if th e d eb to r d o es n o t w a i v e t

h e rig h t to j u d g m en t u n d er th i s su b sectio n , th e

co u rt m ay g ran t j u d g m en t

– (1 ) ag ain st th e p etitio n ers an d in f av o r o f th e d eb to r f o r– (A ) co sts; o r (B ) a reaso n ab l e atto rn ey ’ s f ee; o r (2 ) ag ain st an y p etitio n er th at f

il e d t h e p etitio n in b ad f

aith
, f o r– (A ) an y d am ag es p ro x im ately

cau sed b y

su ch f i lin g ; o r (B ) p u n itiv e d am ag es.”B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 8

d i screte portion of the litig ation. See Sunbelt
, 608 F .3d at 462.

I n Sunbelt
, the court noted that c ourts have uniformly h eld that time spent establishing the entitlement to and amount o f the fee is compensable under federal fee-shifting provisions, and that it woul d b e i nconsistent with the policy of § 303(i) to dilute the fee a

ward by refusing to compensate time spent establishing the rig htful claim to a fee. Id

. at 463. T h e court also observed that, with respect to fee-shifting statutes, a court should make only one determination of fee elig ibility and t h e fee award should e n c o mpass all aspects of the civil action. Id

. (citing Comm’r, INS v. Jean
, 496 U.S. 154, 161–62 (1990) (fee-shifting s t a t u tes favor treating a case a s

an inclusive whole, ra t h er than as atomiz e d line items; approving a

ward o f fees-on-fees under federal fee-shifting
statute f or preparing the fee application and for the ensuing efforts to support the application)). 3

3 T h e S u n b elt co u rt stated th at its co n clu sio n w as co n s isten t w i th S tern berg v. Jo h n sto n , 5 9 5 F.3 d 9 3 7
, 94 6
, 9 4 8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ), w h ere th e

co u rt h eld th at a d eb to r w as n o t en titled to atto rn ey s’ f ees in cu rred in
p u rsu in g a claim f

o r d am ag es f

o r v i o latio n o f t

h e a u t o m a t i c stay u n der 1 1 U.S.C. § 3 6 2 (k ), b ecau se th at p ro v i sio n p erm itted reco v ery o f
atto rn ey s’ f

ees as d am ag es. Su n b elt stated th at § 3 0 3 (i), in co n trast, is a f ee- sh if t in g p ro v i sio n th at p erm its th e reco v ery o f att o rn ey s’ f ees as atto rn ey s’ f

ees, n o t as d am ag es. A lth o u g h an en b an c p an el o f th i s co u rt later o v erru l ed S tern berg in In re Sch w a r t z

- T a lla rd
, 8 03 F.3 d 1 0 9 5
, 1 0 9 7

– 1 1 0 1 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ), read in g § 3 62 (k ) as a f ee- sh if tin g p r o v isio n rath er t h an as a d a m a g e s p ro v isio n , th at ch an g e in th e l aw sin ce S un b elt h as n o sig n i f

ican ce h ere.B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 9

B

. Only Direct Costs May B e Awarded Pursuant To Certain Sanctions Provisions

Sunbelt held otherwise, ho w e v er, with respect to

san c tions under the c ourt’s inherent power ag ainst the

c o ntrolling individuals. As to those sanctions, Sunbelt determined that the bankru p t cy c ourt erred in holding the individuals liable for the debtors’ fees and costs incurred on the § 3 03(i) motions. See S unbelt
, 608 F .3d at 4 66. Only the direct costs of opposing an offending pleading or motion, a nd

no t fees-on-fees, may b e included in an award under the court’s inherent power, we concluded, stating :

I n Cooter & Gell

. . . the Supreme Court held that F ederal Rule of Civil Proc e dure 11 did
not authoriz e recovery of attorney ’ s fees incurred to d ef

e nd an award of Rule 11

s anctions on appeal. Rely ing on lang uage i n t h e version of Rule 11 in effect at that time
, the Court re a s oned that Rule 11 sanctions

were limited to “ t hose ex penses directly caused” by the improper filing
, which did not include costs of appeal. Id

. W e e x tended that principle in Lockary v. Kayfetz
, 974 F .2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992). I n Lockary
, the district court imposed sanctions under its inherent power rather than Rule 11. Id

. at 1170. The sanctions included not o nly the costs incurred by the d efendants to oppose the plaintiffs’ improper filing s, but also the “defe n d a nts’
cost of preparing and supporting their motion for sanc t i o n s

. ” Id

. at 1177. The law firm appealed and, r ely ing o n Cooter & G ell
, we reversed:B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 10

Co oter & Gell sug g ests that

t h e trial court should limit sanctions to the o ppos ing party ’s more “direct” costs, that is, the costs of oppos i ng the offending ple ading or motion. W e thus find that the d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i n c l u d i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t s ’ attorney s’ fees for p reparing the motion for sanctions in the sanctions it imposed.

Id . at 1178.

Sunbelt , 608 F .3d at 466–67. 4

C. Rule 3 8 I s A Damag e Pr o v ision Authoriz ing A ward o f “J ust Damag es”

B lix seth and F ly

nn were not sanctioned under the court’s inherent power, so Sunbelt is not directly applicable. I nstead,

we sanctioned B lix seth and F ly nn under Rule 38 a

nd sanctioned F ly

nn u nder § 1927. See Blixset h
, 796 F .3d at 1007–09.

4 T h e f orm er v ersio n o f Ru le 1 1 discu ssed in Co o ter & Gell p ro v i des th at, if a p lead in g is sig n ed in v io latio n o f th e Ru le, th e co u rt sh all im p ose

u p o n t h e atto rn ey o r clien t “ an ap p ro p riate san ctio n , w h ich m ay in clu d e

an ord er to p ay to th e o th er p arty o r p arties th e am o u n t o f th e reaso n ab le

ex p en ses in cu rred b ecau se o f t h e fi l in g o f th e p lead in g

. . . in clu d in g a

reaso n ab le atto rn ey ’ s f

ee.” Co oter & Gell
, 4 9 6 U.S

. a t 3 9 2

. T h e Decem b er 1
, 1 9 9 3, p o st- Co oter & Gell am en d m en t to Ru le 1 1 sp ecif ically allo w s a d istrict co u

rt to in clu d e t

h e ex p en ses asso ciated w ith s an ctio n s p ro ceed in g s. S

ee Ma rg o lis v. Rya n , 1 40 F.3 d 8 5 0
, 8 5 4

– 5 5 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ).B L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 11

Under Rule 38, appellees’ fees and n on-tax able costs for preparing the statements reg arding B lix seth’s pro se response and F ly n n’s response to the court’s order to show cause may not be awarded. See L

y d d o n v. Geothermal Props., Inc.
, 996 F .2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1993) (based on an analog y to the former, pr e -amendment version of Rule 1 1, declining to award under Rule 38 fees a ssociated wi t h c omputation o f sanctions or cross-appeal o f denial of san c t i ons). The lang uag e of Rule 38 authoriz e s a n a ward of “just damag es” if a court determines that an a p peal is frivolous. “J ust damag es” under Rule 38 may include attorney s’ fees incurred in defending ag ainst the frivolous issues o r frivolous portions of an appeal. See Gaskell v. W eir
, 10 F .3d 626, 6 29 ( 9th Cir. 1993); McConnell v. Critchlow
, 661 F .2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Sun-Tek Indus. v. Kennedy S ky

- L ites, Inc.
, 865 F .2d 1254, 1255 (F e d

. Cir. 1989 ) (unlike the award o f attorney s’ f

e es under fee-shifting statutes, under Rule 38 “the only inquiry in determining the propriety of the amount o f attorney fees to be paid as damag e s by an appellant who has filed a frivolous appeal is whether the a p p ellee actually incurred the f

ees soug ht in defending a ga inst the a ppeal.”). B ut, absent specific lang uag e or i n d i c ation to the contrary , see Schwartz-Tallard , 803 F .3d at 1099, a statute permitting

an award of “damag es” is n ot a f e e -shifting statute, and does not permit an award of fees for obtaining the “damag es.”

T h e award of fees and costs under Rule 38 thus mu s t b e limited to appellees’ direct fees and costs for d e f e nding
ag ainst the f

rivolous appeal, a

nd may n ot include the fees a nd
costs incurred reg arding the i m p o s ition of sanctions. See Cooter & Gell
, 496 U.S. at 406–07; Sunbelt
, 608 F. 3 d at 466–67 & n.4; Lyddon
, 996 F .2d at 214; Lockary
, 974 F .2d at 1178; see also Haeger
, 81 3 F .3d at 1 242, 1 254 (affirming award o f a ttorney s’ fees and c osts incurred after a misleadingB L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 12

discovery response as a sanction under c o urt’s inherent power to compensat e p arty for losses sustained as a r esult o f misconduct).

D. Section 192 7 I s A F ee-Shifting Provision Allowing Award Of F ees-On-F ees

W e conclude o t h e rwise concerning fees-on-fees for sanctions imposed under § 1927. That section does not refer
to “damag es” as Rule 38 does. I nstead, it provi d e s that a court may include the ex cess “costs, ex penses, and attorney s’ fees ” that the party victimiz e d by the sanctionable conduct “incurred because of such conduc t

. ” A different analy sis therefore applies to the award under § 1927, a gainst F ly nn alone, o f the fees incurred in preparing a ppellees’ statements reg arding F ly

nn’s response to the order to show cause.

W ith reg ard to § 1 927, we ag ree with the anal y s is set forth persuasively in Norelus v. D enny’s, Inc.
, 628 F .3d 1270, 1297–1302 ( 11th Cir. 2010). L ike Norelus
, we conclude that the costs of obtain i n g sanctions may be included in a sanctions award under § 1927.

Norelus emphas i z e d that the plain lang uag e o f § 1927 permits recovery of fees “i ncurred because o f [ the sanctionable] conduct ,” and that were there no sanctionable conduct, there would have been no proceeding to i m p o s e sanctions, and n o fees incurred in that proceeding

. I d

. at 1298. So the fees ex pended to o btain the sanctions a ward are, in the statute’s terms, “incurred because of [ the sanctionable] conduct.” Id

. T he Norelus court further noted that ex cluding the costs of obtaining the sanctions award would not f ully compensate the harmed party for the wrong ful conduct it h ad suffered. Id .; see also Haynes v. City & Cn t y

. o f SanB L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 13

Francisco
, 6 88 F .3d 9 84, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2012) (the purpose of § 1927 is to compensate victims o f a t torney ’s malfeasance).

The holding of Norelus is consistent with the analy sis ordinarily applied in other cost- and fee-shifting situations to allow parties to recover the cost of e stablishing their rig ht to and th e a m o unt of attorney s’ fees, or fees-on-fees. See Norelus
, 628 F .3d at 1 301; see a lso Jean
, 496 U.S. at 161–62; Sunbelt
, 608 F .3d at 462–64 & n

. 4

. I n allowing awards o f fees-on-fees, courts have r elied on the lang uag e and purpose of the fee-shifting provision at issue, reason i n g that not allowing fees-on-fees would undermine cong ressional policies g overning attorney s’ f e e s awards. See Norelus
, 628 F .3d at 1301.

L ikewise, § 1927 may be characte r i z e d as a fee-shifting provision, despite its sanctions trig g e r

. Id . (“[ I ] n other costand fee-shifting situations

. . . we have allow e d parties to

recover the cost o f e stablishing their rig ht to, and the amount of attorney ’s fees.

. . . T he same reasoning supports the same rule in the present circumstances [ in awa r d ing fees under § 1927] .”). T hus, § 1927 d i f f ers f r om the former version o f R u l e 11 discussed in Cooter & Gell
, which authoriz ed t h e award only of ex penses incurred with reg ard to a discrete improper pleading
, an d therefore did not permit recovery o f attorney s’ fees incurred to defend an award of Ru l e 11 sanctions on appeal. S

ee Cooter & Gell
, 496 U.S. a t 406–07;

see also Sun b e l t , 608 F .3d at 464 n.4 ( rejecting contention that award of fees pursuant t o a fee-shifting provision is controlled by Cooter & Gel l )

. Section 1927 instead authoriz es the award of ex cess c osts, ex penses, and attorney s’ fees for the litigation as a whole
, reasonably incurred because of a n attorney ’s unreasonable and v ex atious multiplication o fB L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 14

the entire proceeding s, including fees-on-fees. See Norelus
, 628 F .3d at 1298. L ike o ther fee-shifting provisio n s , and in
contrast to the former version of Rule 11 discussed in Cooter & Gell
, § 1927 may shift the entire financial burden o f a n action’s d efense, including attorney s’ f e e s, if the entire course of proceeding s was unwarranted a n d should not have been commenced or pursued. S ee Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc.
, 711 F .2d 1287, 1291–92 (5th Cir. 1983), clarif i e d on reconsideration
, 722 F .2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Jean
, 496 U .S. at 161–62; Sunbelt
, 608 F .3d at 462–64 & n.4.

The r ea s o n ing of Norelus is consistent with Sunbelt a nd
t h i s c o urt’s fees-on-fees case law. According ly
, we f ollow Norelus in holding that § 1927 allows an award of attorney s’ fees incurred in obtaining a sanctions award. See Nor e lus
, 628 F .3d at 1297–1302. Appellees’ attorney s’ fees and nontax able c osts incurred in preparing appellees’ statements reg arding F ly

nn’s responses to the order to show cause a re awardable ag ainst F ly

nn under § 1927. Id.

I I I

Conclusion

W e deny F ly

nn’s m o t ion and amended motion for reconsiderat i o n ( Docket Entry Nos. 151, 152) of the Appellate Commissioner’s second a mended order a nd

am ended orders (Docket Entry Nos. 148, 149, 150). The Appellate Commissioner’s second a mended order a nd amended o rders awarding a ttorney s’ fees an d non-tax able
costs r e m a i n in effect. F ly nn’s requests in the motion a nd amended motion for reconsideration for recusal o f this panel, appointment of a new pane l
, conversion of this matter to a criminal proceeding
, transfer of the matter to the Un i t e dB L I X S E T H V

. Y E L L O W S T O N E M O U

N T A I N C L U B 15

S t ates Attorney
, and holding of the awards in a bey ance ar e d e n ied. F ly

nn’s sug g e stion for reconsideration en b anc i s rejected on behalf of the Court. See 9th Cir. Gen. Order 6.11.

No f urther filing s by B lix seth or F ly n n will be entertained in this closed appeal unless specifically requested by f

urther order of the court.