IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 63S04-1709-CR-570

Brian L. Paquette,

Appellant (Defendant below),

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Argued: October 12, 2017 | Decided: June 29, 2018

Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court, No. 63C01-1602-F3-73

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Biesterveld, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,

No. 63A04-1612-CR-02891

Opinion by Justice David

Chief Justice Rush, Justice Massa, Justice Slaughter, and Justice Goff concur.
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David, Justice.

We are asked to resolve whether a defendant can be convicted of 

multiple felony resisting law enforcement charges when those charges 

stem from a single incident of resisting. For reasons discussed herein, we 

find that Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 authorizes only one conviction 

for felony resisting law enforcement where the defendant engages in a 

single act of resisting while operating a vehicle that causes multiple 

deaths. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for revised 

sentencing.

Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of February 2, 2016, Indiana Police State Trooper James 

Manning (“Trooper Manning”) was parked on the northbound shoulder 

of I-69, near Petersburg, Indiana. A motorist pulled over and informed 

Trooper Manning that he observed a blue Chevy Tahoe driving 

northbound on the southbound lanes of the interstate. Trooper Manning 

activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency signals—the lights and siren—

and gave chase, driving northbound on I-69. Shortly thereafter, he 

spotted a blue SUV driving on the wrong side of the road. Officers later 

learned that Brian L. Paquette was driving that vehicle.

As Trooper Manning approached the blue SUV, he aimed his spotlight 

at the fleeing vehicle. Trooper Manning then pulled into the median, and 

Paquette seemed to slow down. Instead of coming to a full stop, however, 

Paquette made a U-turn onto the northbound lane and continued driving 

on the wrong side of the road, this time heading south. Trooper Manning 

immediately veered onto the southbound road and followed Paquette, 

once again shining his spotlight at the blue SUV.

At the same time, several passenger vehicles traveled north on the 

northbound road. Among those was a vehicle occupied by Jason and 

Samantha Lowe, who were returning to their home in Fishers, Indiana 

after visiting Samantha’s mother at an Evansville hospital. Also traveling 

northbound on I-69 were Stephanie Molinet and Autumn Kapperman, 

who were riding in a Ford Focus to pick up Kapperman’s sister and her 
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newly-born niece from Riley Hospital. Kapperman was expecting a child 

of her own at the time of the incident.

Trooper Manning followed in pursuit and Paquette continued 

southbound, driving between two northbound lanes. Within two miles of 

making the U-turn, Paquette’s SUV collided head-on with Molinet’s Ford 

Focus, striking the passenger side where Kapperman was seated. Molinet, 

Kapperman, and Kapperman’s unborn child died as a result of the crash. 

The impact of the collision caused Paquette’s Chevy Tahoe to flip over 

and land on the driver’s side of the Lowe’s vehicle, instantly killing Jason 

Lowe.

Paquette survived the crash. While officers waited for firefighters to 

extract Paquette from his vehicle, Paquette told an officer that, at the time 

of the crash, he believed he was being chased by farmers through a field. 

He also believed he was carrying a female passenger, but officers found 

no evidence of another passenger at the crash site.

The State charged Paquette with a total of eleven offenses. Among 

those were three counts for each of the following: resisting law 

enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death, a Level 3 felony; 

operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing death, a 

Level 4 felony; and reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony. Each duplicative 

count related to one of the three deceased victims. Paquette was also 

charged with operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his body 

causing serious bodily injury to Samantha Lowe, a Level 6 felony; and 

possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.

Paquette agreed to plead guilty to all charges, but reserved the right to 

ask the court to enter only one conviction and sentence for the felony 

resisting law enforcement charge. Paquette argued that he engaged in 

only one act of resisting, thus conviction on all three resisting law 

enforcement felony charges—one for each deceased victim—violated a 

state and federal prohibition on double-jeopardy. On that issue, the trial 

court ruled against Paquette, finding that conviction and sentence on all

three counts of resisting law enforcement was not barred by doublejeopardy protections.
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The trial court then entered convictions on all three Level 3 felony 

counts of resisting law enforcement and on the charge of operating a 

vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing serious bodily injury. 

The court merged the remaining counts into the four aforementioned 

counts. For each of the three felony resisting law enforcement convictions, 

the trial court imposed 16-year sentences to be served consecutively. For 

the operating while intoxicated conviction, Paquette received a 2.5-year 

sentence to be served consecutively with the resisting sentences. In total, 

Paquette was to serve fifty-and-a-half years executed.

Paquette appealed, making a statutory argument instead of a 

constitutional one. He argued that, as written, Indiana’s resisting law 

enforcement statute authorizes only one conviction for each act of 

resisting and that the trial court, therefore, erred when it entered three 

convictions and sentences against him.1 Relying on its own precedent in 

Armstead v. State, 549 N.E.2d 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), the Court of 

Appeals reversed and remanded for revised sentencing. It held that the 

legislature intended only one conviction for each act of resisting, and since 

Paquette had only engaged in one act of resisting when he fled using a 

vehicle, he could be convicted of only one count of felony resisting law 

enforcement. Paquette v. State, 79 N.E.3d 932, 935-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the 

Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Matters of statutory interpretation, which inherently present pure 

questions of law, are reviewed de novo. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 

(Ind. 2016).

 1 Paquette also argued that the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate, but the 

Court of Appeals declined to address that argument because Paquette’s sentence would be 

modified on remand as a result of its decision.
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Discussion and Decision

The question we address today is identical to the one raised before our 

Court of Appeals: whether multiple convictions and sentences are 

permissible under Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1, where the defendant 

operated a vehicle in a manner that caused death to multiple people. The 

defendant, Paquette, was charged with several offenses, but only three 

felony resisting law enforcement counts are at issue here.

In relevant part, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 states that a person 

commits the crime of resisting law enforcement when he “knowingly or 

intentionally . . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, 

by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement 

officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself . . . and ordered the 

person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

Resisting law enforcement is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, but 

subsection (b) provides several exceptions. Notably, under paragraph 

(b)(3), the offense becomes a Level 3 felony if, while resisting law 

enforcement as described in subsection (a), “the person operates a vehicle 

in a manner that causes the death of another person . . .” Ind. Code § 35-

44.1-3-1(b)(3). Paquette’s three counts for Level 3 felony resisting law 

enforcement relate to three victims killed as a result of his flight.

Whether Paquette resisted law enforcement was not the basis for the 

Court of Appeals’ reversal and is not in dispute today. Paquette fled from 

an officer who was driving a marked police vehicle with the emergency 

lights and siren activated, and Paquette ignored the officer’s signal to pull 

over. Likewise, whether Paquette operated the vehicle in a manner that 

caused death is clear; drug-induced hallucinations led Paquette to drive 

his vehicle on the wrong side of the interstate, which directly caused the 

death of three motorists who had the misfortune of crossing paths with 

Paquette. Instead, the Court of Appeals’ reversal hinged on its 

interpretation of the relevant statute. It held that Indiana Code section 35-

44.1-3-1 authorizes only one conviction where the offense stems from a 

single act of resisting law enforcement. “Because Paquette engaged in 

only one act of resisting,” the Court of Appeals found that “he [could] be 
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convicted and sentenced on only one count of resisting law enforcement.” 

Paquette, 79 N.E.3d at 936.

The State challenges the Court of Appeals’ holding, proposing a 

different interpretation of the statute. It argues that the trial court was 

correct in entering judgment on three counts of resisting law enforcement 

while operating a vehicle in a manner that caused death—one count for 

each deceased victim—because the legislature intended multiple 

convictions for multiple deaths resulting from the same act of resisting. 

Recognizing that our Court of Appeals is split on this issue, we granted 

transfer.

I. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on its own 

precedent in Armstead v. State was not misplaced. 

Our Court of Appeals relied heavily on Armstead, 549 N.E.2d at 400 to 

find that Paquette could not be convicted of multiple felony resisting law 

enforcement charges where a single act of resisting law enforcement led to 

multiple deaths. While Paquette urges us to adopt the Court of Appeals’ 

holding in Armstead, the State argues that reliance on Armstead was

entirely misplaced because Armstead dealt only with offenses against 

multiple officers. We begin by first addressing whether Armstead is 

inapplicable.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Armstead was not misplaced because 

the Armstead court did not limit its holding to harms suffered by police 

officers. While it is true that the Armstead court addressed only section (a) 

and paragraph (b)(1) in its decision and made no mention of acts of 

resisting law enforcement that reach out into the public, the Armstead

panel used language that suggests it intended its holding to extend to 

other portions of the statute—even those portions not at issue in that case. 

Two parts of the Armstead opinion come to mind in examining the extent 

of the holding’s application. First, the court stated that “[t]he offenses set 

forth in title 35, art. 44, ch. 3 do not constitute crimes against the person.” 

Armstead, 549 N.E.2d at 401. Second, it found that “[a] person who 

violates [Indiana Code section] 35-44-3-3 harms the peace and dignity of 
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the State . . . and its law enforcement authority.” Id. In both instances, the 

Armstead court referred to the entire statute instead of limiting its rationale 

to the portions that were at issue in the case. The court’s broad language 

indicates that the panel deciding Armstead contemplated the impact its 

holding would have on other portions of the statute and intended it to 

apply to those as well. Thus, we find unpersuasive the argument that 

Armstead is inapplicable here because its holding has a narrow application.

We recognize that the statute in place at the time of the Armstead

decision was different from the one used to convict Paquette, but we find 

the rationale used by the Court of Appeals to decide Armstead applies with 

equal force to the current version of the statute. When Armstead was 

decided, the resisting law enforcement statute was codified in Indiana 

Code section 35-44-3-3. The structure of the relevant subsections was 

essentially the same as it is now.2 The clause making it a felony to resist 

law enforcement while “operat[ing] a vehicle in a manner that causes the 

death of another person” was added as paragraph (b)(3) in 1993, see P.L. 

 2 In 1990, subsections (a) and (b) of the statute provided:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) Forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or 

a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the 

execution of his duties as an officer;

(2) Forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the authorized service or 

execution of a civil or criminal process or order of a court; or

(3) Flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or 

audible means, identified himself and ordered the person to stop;

Commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, except as provided 

in subsection (b). 

(b) The offense under subsection (a) is a:

(1) Class D felony if, while committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly 

weapon, inflicts bodily injury on another person, or operates a vehicle in 

a manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 

person; and

(2) Class C felony if, while committing it, the person operates a vehicle in a 

manner that causes serious bodily injury to another person . . . . 

Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (1988).
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248-1993, § 1, but its language is substantially similar to portions of the 

statute in the earlier version considered by the Armstead court. 

Specifically, paragraph (b)(2) strikes a significant resemblance to the 

paragraph at issue in this case. While paragraph (b)(2) in the earlier

version made it a felony to resist law enforcement if the offense was 

committed by a person “operat[ing] a vehicle in a manner that cause[d] 

serious bodily injury to another person,” Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(2) (1988), 

the paragraph at issue now enhances the resisting law enforcement 

offense where the defendant operates a vehicle, which causes death of 

another person. The only significant difference between the two is the 

degree of harm caused; the mode and subject of the harms stayed the 

same. Thus, if the Armstead holding was intended to apply to the entire 

statute in place at that time—including paragraph (b)(2)—it also applies to 

paragraph (b)(3) of the current statute.

To be clear, we reiterate that the specific facts of Armstead dealt only 

with injuries suffered by arresting officers, including a broken nose 

sustained by one of the arresting officers, but the State fails to consider 

that the statutory paragraph assessed in Armstead did not itself limit the 

felony enhancement to serious bodily injuries sustained by police officers. 

Rather, that portion served to enhance the offense of resisting law 

enforcement “if, while committing [the offense], the person operate[d] a 

vehicle in a manner that cause[d] serious bodily injury to another person.” 

The critical language—“another person”—left open the possibility that 

serious bodily injury incurred by innocent by-standers could be the basis 

for a felony enhancement of a resisting law enforcement charge. 

Meanwhile, the portion of the statute that served to enhance Paquette’s 

conviction shares the “other person” language that existed in the very 

paragraph the Armstead court considered. Accordingly, we cannot agree 

with the State that Armstead is inapplicable or that the Court of Appeals’ 

reliance on its own holding was entirely misplaced.
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II. Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 permits only one 

conviction for each act of resisting.

Turning to the heart of the issue, we find that the resisting law 

enforcement statute, as written, was intended to permit only one 

conviction for each act of resisting, even where multiple deaths are caused 

by use of a vehicle.

While the Armstead decision is not inapplicable, it does not fully resolve 

the issue before us. The Armstead court was silent on whether subsection 

(b) creates a new and independent offense; it dealt only with a single 

offense under subsection (b). The present case, on the other hand, 

involves a claim that each death constitutes a new and independent 

offense, totaling three offenses under the same subsection. Nonetheless, 

we agree that the Armstead decision is helpful, and we find that it serves as 

a starting point to analyze the legislature’s intent.

Throughout the Armstead opinion, the Court of Appeals referred to 

separate and discrete incidents that may be the basis for a conviction. To 

the extent that the Court of Appeals sought to highlight the separate and 

distinct incidents outlined in subsection (a), we find they were correct. 

Any of the several acts in subsection (a) constitute a separate offense of 

resisting law enforcement, and when more than one of those incidents 

occurs, we may uphold multiple resisting law enforcement convictions. 

Conversely, a single discrete incident can be the basis for only one 

conviction, no matter how many individuals are harmed. This is because, 

as the Armstead court noted, “a person who violates [the statute] harms the 

peace and dignity of the State of Indiana and its law enforcement 

authority.” Armstead, N.E.2d at 401. We agree with the Armstead panel 

that resisting law enforcement is inherently an offense against authority, 

not the individual officers. So, whether a defendant resists one officer or 

twenty-five officers, the offense remains the same.

The above principle applies equally when dealing with an offense 

under subsection (b). We find that an offense committed under subsection 

(b) continues to be a harm against the peace and dignity of the State 

because the offender is, at his core, still resisting law enforcement. As 
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written, no new or independent offense is created when subsection (b) is 

invoked. Rather, subsection (b) enhances the degree of the offenses 

outlined in subsection (a). In other words, it merely moves the needle in 

terms of gravity. Thus, the offense that involves a single affray with 

police will continue to be a single harm to the peace and dignity of the 

State, regardless of how many other people are killed.

To be sure, we examine the statute’s structure and language. Several 

features of the statute indicate that the legislature intended only to 

increase the gravity of the offense, not to create an entirely new offense for 

each individual injured or killed. First, we note that subsection (a)—

which outlines the three ways in which a person knowingly or 

intentionally resists law enforcement—lays the foundation for the offense 

in question. In relevant part, it prohibits a person from fleeing from law 

enforcement where the officer has “by visible or audible means . . . 

identified himself . . . and ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-

44.1-3-1(a)(3). Without this first subsection, the subsequent subsections 

outlined in the statute could not stand.

Second, the legislature’s deliberate use of cross-referencing between 

subsections (a) and (b) bolsters our reading of the statute. Notably, 

subsection (a) states that each paragraph violated is deemed a Class A 

misdemeanor, “except as provided in subsection (b).” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-

3-1(a). Subsection (b), then references back to subsection (a), noting that 

“[t]he offense under subsection (a)” can become a felony or felonies of 

varying levels, depending on certain factors. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b). 

The deliberate manner of cross-referencing between subsections (a) and 

(b) indicates that, rather than a separate offense, the legislature intended 

subsection (b) to be an enhancement that stems from the foundation 

outlined in subsection (a).

Finally, while the use of the word “or” following paragraph (2) of 

subsection (a) makes clear that each paragraph in that subsection was 

intended to be a separate and distinct offense, the legislature chose to 

structure subsection (b) differently. It drafted the various paragraphs in 

the conjunctive, using the word “and” following paragraph (3). This 

indicates that the legislature aimed to accomplish something different 
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with subsection (b). We think that the only logical reading of the statute is 

that the legislature intended the various paragraphs of subsection (b) to

serve as enhancements of a single offense stemming from subsection (a).

For good measure, we compare Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 to 

other statutes, which we find further supports our reading of the statute. 

Specifically, we analyze statutes where our legislature has expressly 

allowed convictions for each death caused by a single act. Indiana Code 

section 9-30-5-5, for example, addresses operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated and authorizes multiple convictions when multiple deaths 

occur. But its structure differs greatly from the resisting law enforcement 

statute at issue here. For starters, it makes operating a vehicle “while 

intoxicated” a stand-alone crime when it “causes the death of another 

person.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(3). Subsection (e) goes on to expressly 

allow multiple convictions if multiple deaths occur; it provides that a 

person who violates the statute “commits a separate offense for each 

[victim] whose death is caused by the violation[.]” Moreover, we glean 

the legislature’s intent to allow multiple convictions from the fact that the 

General Assembly added the provision in subsection (e) after we 

summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding, which allowed only 

one conviction for one violation of the operating while intoxicated statute. 

P.L. 53-1994, § 6. We agreed with the Court of Appeals that, without 

express authorization, multiple convictions arising from a single incident 

could not stand, even if multiple deaths occurred.

Similarly, Indiana Code section 35-43-1-1, a statute making arson 

unlawful, proves instructive here. Subsection (a) of that statute outlines 

the various ways a person may commit arson and then enhances the 

underlying arson offense if “it results in serious bodily injury.” We held 

in Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2006) that the version of the 

statute in place at the time allowed only one arson conviction, regardless 

of the number of people injured. There too, the General Assembly added 

a provision to the statute in response to our decision. While the current 

version of the arson statute neglects to make arson resulting in serious 

bodily injury a stand-alone offense, it explicitly allows separate 

convictions “for each person who suffers a . . . serious bodily injury that is 

caused by violation of subsection (a) . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-1(e). 
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Unlike the arson and operating a vehicle while intoxicated statutes, the 

resisting law enforcement statute is silent on multiple convictions when 

multiple deaths occur.

Ultimately, we find unpersuasive the State’s contention that the 

legislature intended to create an independent criminal offense for each 

person killed when a defendant resists law enforcement using a vehicle. 

Nothing about the structure or language of the statute creates a new or 

independent offense and our inquiry into other similar statutes confirms 

our reading of Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1. Our legislature is aware 

that multiple convictions for multiple harms caused by a single violation 

require explicit authorization and we trust that they would have done so 

if that was their intent.

Since our legislature has drafted the resisting law enforcement statute 

without such explicit authorization and has otherwise remained silent, we 

glean its intent to allow only one resisting law enforcement conviction for 

each act of resisting. Subsection (b) merely enhances the underlying 

offenses in subsection (a), thus the number of resulting deaths does not 

affect the number of convictions allowed—only one is permissible. To 

find otherwise would require us to engraft language into a statute, which 

we have repeatedly said we may not do. See Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco

Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017) (“We may not 

add new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the 

legislature”); see also Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (Ind. 2013) 

(“Further, [c]ourts may not engraft new words onto a statute or add 

restrictions where none exist”) (internal citations and quotation omitted). 

Accordingly, we find that Paquette could not be convicted of multiple 

resisting law enforcement charges stemming from a single act of resisting.

Conclusion

We find that Paquette could not be convicted of more than one felony 

resisting law enforcement charge where multiple deaths occurred from a 

single act of resisting. Because our decision is premised on the statute, we 

need not conduct a double-jeopardy analysis. Our resisting law 
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enforcement statute does not create a new offense for each death that 

occurs. Instead, it enhances the underlying resisting law enforcement 

conviction’s degree in circumstances where the offense is committed using 

a vehicle in a manner that causes another person’s death. Without explicit 

authorization for multiple convictions arising out of the same act, we 

cannot find that Paquette’s three felony resisting law enforcement 

convictions can stand. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court as to two of 

the three convictions for felony resisting law enforcement. Since one of 

Paquette’s other offenses allows for multiple convictions based on a single 

act of operating a vehicle, we remand for the trial court to enter 

convictions under that statute for all victims and instruct the trial court to 

sentence accordingly.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Mark A. Bates

Schererville, Indiana

Thomas W. Vanes

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLE E

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Andrew J. Kobe

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana