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POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE
Responsibility of Comman

How UN and NATO Commander

Influenced Airpower over Bosni

MARK A. BUCKNAM

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2003
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sole

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United 

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleare

release: distribution unlimited.

ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Bucknam, Mark A.

Responsibility of command : how UN and NATO commanders influence

over Bosnia / Mark A. Bucknam. 

p. ; cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-115-5

1. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 -- Aerial operations. 2. Command of troo

power -- Political aspects. 4. Military planning. 5. Combined operation

science) I. Title.

949.7103dc21

Air University Press

131 West Shumacher Avenue

Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6615

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil
To all who serve or have served in our armed forces

and especially to the spouses, children, and other suppo

family members, whose unheralded sacrifices make possib

service of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coa
Contents

Chapter 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Existing Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE

OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Influence and Autonomy:

The US Military and the Use of Force . . . . . . . 

Deciding to Use Force:

Military Reluctance and Influence . . . . . . 

How To Use Force: Options, 

Influence, and Overwhelming Force . . . . . 

Theoretical Bases of Demands for

Operational Autonomy: Expertise

and Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Political Constraints on Airpower:

Targeting and Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . 

Targeting as Air Strategy:

What to Attack, What Not to Attack. . . . . . 

Bombing Pauses:

When to Bomb or Not Bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rules of Engagement:

Circumstances for Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Soldiers and Airmen:

Efficacy and Control of Airpower . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

v
Chapter 

3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER

IN BOSNIA: 1992–APRIL 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Airpower and Policy Making in the United

States, France, and the United Kingdom . . . 

Early USAFE Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATO Involvement in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Enforcing the No-Fly Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

“Safe Areas” and “Lift and Strike”. . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES:

MAY–DECEMBER 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

UNSCR 836: “Safe Areas” and

Airpower—Expanding the UNPROFOR Mandat

and the Role of NATO: May–July 1993 . . . . . 

UNSCR 844: Implementing

an Ambiguous Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Leadership for UNPROFOR . . . . . . . . . . 

NATO Air-to-Ground Missions:

June–August 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Airpower and Coercion at

Mount Igman: August 1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Command without Control:

September–December 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

UNPROFOR Commanders Strive to Control 

NATO Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Absent Political Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Responsibility, Risks, and Accountability. . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND 

DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY–JUNE 1994 . . . 

Commanders and Command Relationships . . 

General Rose, Peacekeeping, and Airpower. . . 

Command Relationships, Air Strikes,

and Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

vi
Chapter 

The Sarajevo Ultimatum: February 1994 . . . . 

Military Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Airpower, Control, and Autonomy . . . . . . . . . 

No-Fly Zone Enforcement and First CAS 

Approval: February–March 1994. . . . . . . . . . . 

NATO Downs Serb Aircraft

in the No-Fly Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Turning Point: Gorazde, April 1994 . . . . . . . 

North Atlantic Council Decisions 

and the Gorazde Ultimatum . . . . . . . . . . . 

UN and NATO Missions in Bosnia: 

A Matter of Interpretation

and Political Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Trust, Expertise, and Forces at Risk . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS

FOR FORCE PROTECTION:

AUGUST–DECEMBER 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATO Air Strikes and the Clash over Warnings

and Control: August–October 1994. . . . . . . . . 

NATO’s First Air Strike, 5 August 1994 . . . . 

Warnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NATO’s Second Air Strike,

22 September 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Attempts to Control Air Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . 

Udbina: Mission Accomplishment

Versus Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Udbina: November 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Targeting Udbina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Interpreting the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

“Retrospective SEAD” and the Growing

UN-NATO Rift: November–December 1994 . . . 

Udbina and Otoka: November 1994 . . . . . . . 

vii
Chapter 

NATO and UN Split over Airpower:

December 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT:

JANUARY–JUNE 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Campaign Plans and UNPROFOR Changes

Winter 1994–1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dead Eye. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New UN Commanders and

Redefining UNPROFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Beginning of the End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rupert Smith on the

Use of Airpower in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pale Air Strikes and UNPROFOR Hostages: 

25–26 May 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

F-16 Downing and Hostage Deals. . . . . . . . . . 

Kicking the Problem Back Upstairs . . . . . . . . 

US Response to the F-16 Downing . . . . . . . 

NATO Response to the F-16 Downing. . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS

TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY–AUGUST 1995 . . . . 

Srebrenica: 6–11 July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Fall of Srebrenica: July 1995. . . . . . . . . 

Expectations and Blame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The London Conference and 

the Decisions to Use Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Decision to Use Airpower to

Protect Gorazde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Decision to Use Airpower in Defense of

Other “Safe Areas” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Changing Landscape and US

Political Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

viii
Chapter 

AFSOUTH and UNPF

Subject to Close Coordination . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9 DELIBERATE FORCE:

AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Collateral Damage and Other Priorities . . . . 

The Bombing Pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Leveling the Playing Field and Coercing 

the Serbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Battle Damage Assessment

and Target Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SEAD, Option 21

⁄2, and Coercion . . . . . . . . . . 

Aftermath: More of the Same . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE 

ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

How UN Commanders Influenced 

Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Why UN Commanders Influenced

Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

How NATO Commanders Influenced 

Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Why NATO Commanders Influenced 

Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Objectives, Authority, and Responsibility . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ix
INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Illustrations

Figure

1 Outline of Events around the Time

of the Udbina Air Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 Six-Day Outline of Attack on Srebrenica . . . . . 

3 Zones of Action and Target Distribution for

Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 Time Line of Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . 

Photo

Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Yasushi

Akashi, and Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose . . . . . . . 

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose and

Lt Gen Joseph Ashy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lt Gen Rupert Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Gen Jean Cot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lt Gen Bernard Janvier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lt Gen James “Bear” Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . 

x
Col Mark A. Bucknam is chief of the organizationa

branch within the Policy Division, under the director for 

gic plans and policy (J-5) of the Joint Staff at the Pe

Colonel Bucknam was born 25 September 1959 in Philad

Pennsylvania. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in 

and a Master of Science degree in materials science an

neering from Virginia Tech in June 1981 and April 1982, 

tively. He was a distinguished graduate from Squadron 

School in 1985 and from Air Command and Staff Co

1995. In 1996 Colonel Bucknam graduated from the Sc

Advanced Airpower Studies, and in 1999 he was awarded 

in war studies from the University of London. He is a 

guished graduate of the National War College.

Colonel Bucknam earned his wings in May 1983 at Sh

Air Force Base, Texas. His first operational tour was to R

Force Bentwaters, United Kingdom, where he flew the A

served as an instructor pilot, air show demonstration pi

the wing’s chief functional check-flight pilot. From Octob

until October 1988, Colonel Bucknam worked in the Pe

xi

About the

Author
as an air staff training (ASTRA) officer in the Inspector G

and Programming Directorates.

Colonel Bucknam’s next assignment was as an instruc

in the fighter lead-in training program at Holloman Ai

Base, New Mexico, where he served as a flight comman

later as chief of wing training. In 1990 he was the Tact

Command instructor pilot of the year for the AT-38 a

and in 1991 he was named by the Big Brothers/Big Si

America organization as the national big brother of the 

the entire United States.

After completing F-16 qualification training in Sep

1991, Colonel Bucknam flew the F-16 at Homestead A

Base until August 1992, when Hurricane Andrew forced 

to move to Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. At Sh

spent a year as an assistant operations officer, during 

his squadron transitioned to the newest variant of th

the Block-50. Colonel Bucknam then moved up to h

current operations flight of the 20th Operations Support 

ron for a year.

He moved to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, wh

attended Air Command and Staff College and the Sc

Advanced Airpower Studies. In 1996 Colonel Buckna

assigned to King’s College, University of London, wh

1999, he earned a doctoral degree in war studies. His 

tation focused on the use of airpower over Bosnia 

Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force. Colonel Bu

next commanded the 8th Operations Support Squadron

san Air Base, Korea, flying F-16s with the Wolf Pack.

Colonel Bucknam is a command pilot with nearly 2,40

in the A-10, AT-38, and F-16 aircraft. He is married to 

mer Barbara Ann Russell of Norfolk, Virginia. They h

children: eight-year-old Elaine and six-year-old John.

xii
Preface

This book examines the role that theater-level comm

in the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of a

over Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end o

It also uncovers factors explaining why top UN and 

commanders in the region acted as they did. The cent

sis of this study is that the commanders’ needs to bala

various responsibilities inherent in command pow

affected their actions when they tried to influence the 

airpower. Stress on these commanders was greatest wh

felt forced to make trade-offs that put their forces at ris

out a corresponding payoff in terms of mission acco

ment. In attempting to strike the proper balance betwe

sion accomplishment, acceptable risk, and obedience to 

political control, commanders drew on their own expert

that of their staffs. Not surprisingly then the tradition

sion between soldiers and airmen over the utility of a

manifested itself in a split dividing UN army genera

senior NATO airmen. That split also helps to explain th

manders’ actions.

Because this case is presented in a chronological fas

offers a coherent account of Operation Deny Flight—th

air operations over Bosnia from April 1993 until De

1995. From start to finish, theater-level commanders a

more than mere executors of policy. They helped to 

their own missions, strove to control the use of airpow

generally struggled to maintain operational autonomy 

could fulfill their responsibilities for mission accompli

at acceptable levels of risk to their forces.

When people are killed in military service, there is a 

ful need to justify their deaths and to understand wh

died. Even in World War II, where the cause was ma

just and where the stakes were high, good commande

nized over the rectitude of decisions that led to the de

their troops. The Academy Award-winning film Saving 

Ryan illustrated this point well. Actor Tom Hanks playe

John Miller, an Army officer who survived the D day la

of World War II. While the Allies were attempting to 

xiii
their foothold on Europe, Miller was tapped to lead a s

soldiers on a seemingly impossible mission to find and 

a private whose three brothers had been killed in com

one poignant scene, at the end of a long, grueling day C

Miller sits with a sergeant in a dark, shattered buildi

two laughingly reminisce about a particularly amusing 

soldier who had served with them months earlier durin

bat in Italy. Suddenly, Miller turns somber. Reflecting o

dier who died in the Italian campaign, Miller explains 

sergeant: “Ya see, when you end up killing one of you

you tell yourself it happened so you could save the live

or three or 10 others. Maybe a hundred. . . . And tha

simple it is. That’s how you rationalize making the 

between mission and men.” The audience is left knowi

the captain is not entirely satisfied with his rationale

worked. It justified the deaths of the captain’s forces.

Imagine, then, the difficulty of rationalizing the loss 

forces in military actions where nothing is accomplished

no vital interest is at stake, or where the cause is ambigu

many observers, that was the situation in Bosnia in th

1990s. It was difficult to explain how events in the B

related to the national interests of the United States, 

France, Canada, or any of the other nations involved in th

to remedy the humanitarian disaster that accompan

breakup of Yugoslavia. The use of force seemed to ser

purpose, and outside observers who spent time in 

reported atrocities by all three warring factions: Bosnia

lims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. That mora

guity and the lack of a compelling national interest tra

into an intolerance for costs, a mental attitude that cha

ized the policies of Western nations as they interve

Bosnia. Of course, commanders sent to the region were in

by political leaders back home that costs, such as co

damage, spent resources, and most importantly, friendly 

ties, were to be avoided.

And so the situation festered unhappily through 1992

and 1994. An inadequate force of peacekeepers led by Eu

nations did what they could to dampen the fighting. Mea

to protect the Bosnian Muslims, the United States thre

xiv
to bomb the Bosnian Serbs, who were widely seen as th

gators of the war in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs could 

retaliate against the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, so gover

of nations providing those peacekeepers strongly opposed 

ing. Before long NATO’s airpower was checked by Bosni

threats against UN peacekeepers.

In the summer of 1994, things were going badly for 

and the Bosnian Serbs became more aggressive in thre

NATO aircraft enforcing the UN-declared no-fly zon

Bosnia. Washington grew increasingly frustrated as 

there struggled unsuccessfully to forge an effective po

Bosnia that would be politically acceptable at home an

patible with the approach of America’s friends and a

NATO and the UN. Throughout that autumn, the prosp

successful intervention appeared to grow ever dimmer, 

December, it seemed likely that the UN peacekeepers 

have to be pulled out of Bosnia. That was expected 

messy operation that would precipitate an even blood

war than Bosnia had experienced up to that point. 

months later, a NATO bombing campaign played an im

part in helping Amb. Richard C. Holbrooke achieve a 

ated end to the war in Bosnia. While much has been 

about the war in Bosnia and the efforts to end it t

diplomacy and peacekeeping, this book is the first to 

the significant role of military commanders in influenc

use of airpower during Operations Deny Flight and De

Force, which lasted from April 1993 until September 1

For some policy makers and editorialists, airpower—s

employed in the 1991 Gulf War—had always promised a 

clean, and cheap solution to the problem in Bosnia. 

day some of them believe airpower could have ended t

in Bosnia had it been used properly early on. However, 

vast majority of professional military officers, Bosnia 

the least propitious environment for using airpower. F

latter group, airpower was just one of several necess

ments in a confluence of events leading to an end to t

in Bosnia.

One reason Bosnia presented a difficult environm

employing airpower is that the intervening nations co

xv
come to consensus on an appropriate approach to the 

Bosnia. Should they try peacekeeping? Should they try 

muscular form of intervention, such as peace enforcem

should they coerce the warring factions through aerial 

ing? Intervening powers could not agree, and the ques

whether, when, and how to employ airpower became 

cably intertwined with debates over policy for Bosnia.

Because of the disagreement in the international p

arena, military commanders were dragged deeper into p

struggles than they, or some observers, believed appr

According to the precepts of democracy, especially the c

of civilian control of the military, political leaders set poli

where appropriate, military leaders carry it out. That tidy 

did not pertain to Western intervention in Bosnia. To b

military commanders tried to be responsive to their 

bosses. However, when those bosses disagreed—that is

political leaders in the UN, NATO, and within individual 

delivered conflicting guidance—military commanders 

field were left to decide what to do. Time and again, a

manders tried to reconcile their conflicting policy gu

they confronted the choice between taking action and a

unnecessary risks to their troops. When the missi

unclear, the objectives ill defined, or chances for s

seemed dubious, the imperative to avoid casualties w

heavily in the balance. How could risks be justified wh

consequences of military action were so much in dou

following account challenges some popular assum

about military leaders, their motivations, and the state 

military relations during the conflict in Bosnia. For in

the supposed American sensitivity to casualties—purp

born of experience in Vietnam—could be seen in the b

of Belgian, French, and British commanders as well.

xvi
Acknowledgments

This research would not have been possible had seni

ers in the US Air Force not believed in the value of high

cation for serving officers. It has been my great fortun

part of an organization that invests so generously in its 

My special thanks go to the faculty at the School of Ad

Air and Space Studies for selecting me to pursue my w

King’s College, especially Col Phillip Meilinger, who stee

toward London, Col Robert Owen, who supported my us

valuable information his team compiled for the Balk

Campaign Study (BACS), and Prof. Hal Winton, for h

stant support and stellar example of scholarship. Th

and women at the US Air Force’s Historical Research 

were a great help during my research with the BACS a

material, and, in particular, I owe Lt Col Rick Sargen

thanks for making my time with the BACS Collection s

itable.

My deep, sincere, and personal thanks go to Phil Sa

advisor. His patience, high standards, thought-provokin

and occasional gentle prodding helped to guide me t

the travails of research. Though I am solely responsible 

defects or limitations of this study, its merits owe m

Phil’s mentoring. I would also like to acknowledge the 

faculty of the War Studies Department. My main regret 

the demands on both their time and mine kept m

spending more hours with them than I did. The chief of 

Staff’s Airpower Workshop acted as an adjunct faculty 

learning, and I would particularly like to thank Group C

Andy Lambert and Stuart Peach for including me in the

lectually stimulating work. In addition, I want to expr

appreciation to Chris Hobson, senior librarian at th

Services Command and Staff College, Bracknell, for his 

assistance.

A glance through the footnotes and bibliography 

reveal the enormous debt I owe to the many military o

interviewed for this study—too many to recognize indiv

here. Often their candor was startling, and their enth

xvii
for my research was an encouraging sign to me of the w

my chosen topic.

My deepest affection and gratitude go to my wife Barb

her friendship and support throughout this unique an

lenging endeavor.

xviii
Chapter 1

Introduction

This thin edge between what is appropriate for the milit

to decide and what the civilians decide is a constantly sh

ing kaleidoscope in history, depending on the circumstan

and political factors. It is the core of the decision on wh

you use airpower.

—Amb. Richard C. Holbro

Interview, 24 May 1996—

This study focuses on the influence theater-level com

ers had on the use of airpower in Bosnia during Deny F

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air op

over Bosnia between April 1993 and December 1995. 

ticular, the aim here is to examine how theater-level com

ers in the United Nations (UN) and NATO affected the 

airpower and, to the extent possible, to explain why the

as they did. This is the first in-depth, academic study 

Flight as a whole.

Military influence on the use of force has often been a

but not researched, according to Richard Betts, in his s

post-1945 interventions: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Co

Crises.

1 Betts broke new ground and found that senior 

itary officers have generally been less influential than 

believed in decisions over whether to use force. But, 

came to the question of how to intervene, Betts conclud

military leaders jealously protected what they saw as th

rogative for control over operational matters.2 A decad

Betts’s pioneering work, further research by author D

Petraeus into military influence on the use of force 

that the military has been far more influential in de

over how force is used than whether it is used.3 Mo

Petraeus found that theater commanders had the g

impact when they ‘‘submitted plans that satisfied the 

tives of the decision makers in Washington.’’4 Petraeus

considered intervention decision making prior to 198

1
when congressionally legislated defense reorganizatio

theater commanders a stronger role in controlling de

over the use of force.5

A hypothesis tested in this study is that theater-lev

manders were influential in affecting decisions over the 

airpower in Bosnia, rather than being mere executors 

icy. Theater-level commanders are defined here as m

commanders responsible for a given theater of operatio

their principal subordinate commanders.6 A theater co

der’s job is to help plan military options to obtain policy 

tives and, when directed, to translate military actio

political objectives.7 If theater-level commanders som

played a leading role in shaping policy, rather than jus

ning for and executing policies on the use of force, it w

interesting to know why they did so. Some observers ha

the apparent risk-averse nature of the American m

largely ascribed to experiences of the Vietnam War, as t

cause for military transgressions into policy dec

Indeed, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ge

Powell, was a prime example of the Vietnam generation 

cers, and his opposition to US intervention in Bosnia h

scrutinized by commentators interested in civil-milita

tions.9 However, Petraeus noted that the US military’s in

reluctance to intervene abroad after Vietnam was an in

cation of existing attitudes rather than a newfound ca

ness.10 This suggested the basis for risk aversion lay i

enduring elements of the military profession. Another h

esis tested here, then, is that the role UN and NATO t

level commanders chose to play, when acting as mo

just executors of policy in Bosnia, was rooted in milita

fessionalism and can be explained, in part, in terms 

manders’ special expertise and responsibility as mana

violence.

The central question of this study is how did theat

commanders in the UN and NATO influence the use 

power in Bosnia? To analyze this military influence, fir

sider several subsidiary questions. First, what pattern

there to the military positions on using airpower in B

Were American commanders more apt to push for 

2
measures than officers from other nations? Were Army 

als consistently more or less willing than Air Force gen

support the use of airpower? Second, what were the p

factors that shaped the various military attitudes towar

airpower? Specifically, how well do expertise and respons

two elements of military professionalism—explain th

sions and actions of the theater-level commanders? Thi

were the demands for impartiality and proportionality 

ciled with traditional military principles of the objective, 

mass, and surprise? Fourth, what methods did militar

ers use to exert their influence? To what extent were m

attempts to influence the use of force confined to tradit

prescribed military roles, and when, if ever, did militar

ers seek unconventional means of influencing polic

commanders work strictly through the chains of com

Did subordinate commanders follow policy decision

orders from above so as to implement policy, or did the

affect the shape of policy? Finally, what happened? I

ways did military advisors and commanders succeed o

influencing the use of airpower? How was airpower us

Existing Literature

Of the books, articles, and other studies on the 

Bosnia, few focus on Deny Flight, and none takes m

influence on the use of airpower as its central theme. H

other works touch upon the topic studied here and are 

here into three categories according to the primary focu

by their authors: political and diplomatic, UN milita

airpower. Lord David Owen recorded important elem

the debates about using airpower in Bosnia in 

Odyssey, the detailed accounting of his role as the Eu

Union’s (EU) principal negotiator to the Intern

Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).11 Desp

numerous references to airpower, though, Lord Owen w

marily concerned with providing an accurate and d

account of the attempts by the ICFY to produce a neg

settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, in his b

understandably gave pride of place to the role of politic

ers rather than to operational commanders. However

3
provided sporadic glimpses of theater commanders serv

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Of pa

interest here, he noted the political-military friction i

1994 between Gen Jean Cot, the overall force command

senior civilian officials with the UN, including Sec

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, over the control of airp

Lord Owen also delivered a snapshot of the tension betw

Gen Sir Michael Rose, the UN commander in Bosnia 

1994, and US officials over the need for suppressing the B

Serb surface-to-air missile threat in November 1994.1

captured the issue well in the brief coverage he gave to 

his anonymous references to NATO missed the importa

played by the alliance’s two theater-level commanders 

4

Left to right (foreground): Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UN Secretary

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and Lt Gen Sir Michael R
region, Lt Gen Michael Ryan and Adm Leighton Smith. 

Balkan Odyssey is a valuable reference book that detail

national diplomacy in the region, thus establishing par

broader context for viewing theater-level commanders

gles to control airpower.

Dick Leurdijk’s The United Nations and NATO in 

Yugoslavia, 1991–1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force 

more on international efforts to use force in Bosni

Balkan Odyssey.

14 Leurdijk’s book also presented the U

spective of the conflict, thus complementing the Eu

viewpoint offered by Lord Owen.15 Leurdijk recons

events and important decisions related to the UN’s ‘‘sa

policy in Bosnia and NATO’s use of airpower. Though 

insights into the give-and-take amongst the various na

NATO, Leurdijk diplomatically sidestepped or down

5

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, British army, commander of Bosnia-Her

Command, 1994 (right), shown with US military official Lt Gen Jose

USAF, commander AIRSOUTH, 1992–94

Photo by Tim Ripley
major points of friction that lay at the heart of debat

NATO’s use of airpower in Bosnia.16 This masked som

tension that existed within NATO and glossed over sig

strains in civil-military relations within the UN

Leurdijk’s work served as a ready reference for docume

on NATO decisions to use airpower in Bosnia.

Amb. Richard Holbrooke’s memoir, To End a War, t

side of the story about disputes he had with Adm L

Smith, the theater commander of forces in NATO’s so

region, while Holbrooke was serving as assistant secr

state for European and Canadian affairs. Holbrooke 

more control over NATO bombing during his coercive 

macy with the Serbs in September 1995, but Smith r

interference in operational matters from outside the c

command. Holbrooke recognized the admiral’s respon

for the lives of NATO airmen, but he interpreted Smith

that NATO was running out of targets during the De

Force bombing campaign to mean: “Smith did not wis

the bombing be ‘used’ by the negotiators, and would 

when to stop based on his own judgment.”17 The th

Holbrooke’s account was that for his important nego

he needed some control over the coercive ‘‘sticks’’ bein

and Admiral Smith was overly cautious in re

Holbrooke’s inputs into bombing decisions.

James Gow, research officer in the Centre for D

Studies at the University of London, proposes as his 

thesis in Triumph of the Lack of Will that the intern

community could have intervened before the summer 

to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia.18 Echoing 

sounded by Lord Owen, Gow argued that had there be

ficient international political will to use force to imp

Vance-Owen Peace Plan in the spring of 1993—or to 

successive settlement plans thereafter—then much of 

lence over the next two and one-half years probably 

have been avoided. Gow went further than Leurdijk in 

ing the problems of ‘‘dual key’’ command and contr

NATO airpower, and the friction generated between U

tary commanders and their civilian superiors over the 

reluctance to use force.19 He also gave a fuller accoun

6
divisions within NATO over air strikes, though, for th

part, he focused on differences between the nations 

than on the tensions between civilian and military leaders

divisions within the various military organizations involv

significance to this study, Gow analyzed the change of h

Gen Sir Michael Rose after the failed attempt to use a

7

Lt Gen Rupert Smith, British army, UN commander in Bosnia, 1995

Photo by Tim Ripley
effectively at Gorazde in April 1994.21 Of General Ros

noted, “Like any good commander, his loyalty was w

troops: if the UN could not be relied on to back him a

force in critical moments, then for the sake of the s

morale and credibility it was simply better not to move t

of force.”22 Gow has also described how Rose’s success

Rupert Smith, precipitated a hostage crisis for the U

ultimately helped to make a NATO air campaign in B

viable option.23 Chapter 7 of this study builds on the f

tion set by Gow.

In contrast to Gow, Jane Sharp, a senior research fe

the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College in L

England, took a highly critical view of General Rose 

report: Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion. For Sharp

consistently acted as a surrogate for the British gover

and, together their concern for British peacekeepers in 

and alleged sympathy toward the Serbs led them to do 

thing within their power to block NATO air strikes.24 

Gow and Sharp believed General Rose played an im

role in reducing the likelihood of the UN’s use of ai

Sharp saw greater continuity in Rose’s reluctance 

enforcement action against the Bosnian Serbs. Sharp’s 

for General Smith reinforced Gow’s argument about 

role in paving the way for NATO air strikes in Bosnia.25 

however, Sharp downplayed the dangers UN forces faced 

ever NATO used airpower, and she did not address leg

concerns of UN commanders responsible for those forc

Two works on political-military interaction durin

Flight shed a little light on the influence of theater-lev

manders in affecting policy and the use of airpower in 

Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting of the British army 

as Lord Owen’s first military advisor in Geneva. Al

Messervy-Whiting left his post in Geneva in August 19

after NATO authorized air-to-ground operations in Bos

recorded General Cot’s role in establishing a NATO liais

ment to compensate for the lack of airpower expertise 

the UN.26 In a broader look at civil-military relations, M

Williams argued that “France and the UK, rather than 

Secretariat, tended to define UNPROFOR’s operation

8
sion.

27 Williams, who served as director of informati

senior spokesman for UNPROFOR, also claimed that 

and French officers effectively restricted UNPROFOR’s m

to humanitarian assistance.’’28 Williams was in a good p

to draw his conclusions but gave few details to suppor

The second category of literature on intervention in 

describes the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, th

viding a ground view of events rather than an airman

spective. Firsthand accounts by commanders during th

stages of the UN’s presence in Bosnia give excellent i

into the ad hoc workings of UNPROFOR and the scope 

tiative and influence afforded to commanders by the UN 

quarters’ lax oversight and its inability to manage event

away from New York.29 UNPROFOR’s first command

Satish Nambiar of India, particularly praised the Fre

bringing to Bosnia five times the number of armored 

nel carriers authorized by the UN.30 Canada’s Maj Gen 

MacKenzie, the first UN commander in Bosnia, recoun

July 1992 role in securing extra firepower for Canadian 

keepers by working around the UN bureaucracy and 

with his own government:

The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for the TOW 

tank weapon]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle [it was mo

on]. In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. Ca

imagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the ammun

We were also told we could bring mortars, but not high-exp

ammunition—only illuminating rounds to help us see at nigh

ignored that order also. (Emphasis added)31

Interestingly, these early UN commanders had next to 

to say on the topic of airpower, even though a public 

about using airpower in Bosnia was underway durin

tours of duty in late 1992 and early 1993. When they d

ment on possible air operations, their views were mi

July 1992, MacKenzie urged Nambiar to refuse offers f

air support, writing ‘‘the use of air power on our behal

clearly associate us with the side not being attacke

thereafter we would very quickly be branded an inter

force, as opposed to an impartial peacekeeping force.

Philippe Morillon of France commanded UN troops in 

9
after they had been given a more muscular mandate 

chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In his memoir, Morillon

remark about airpower was more positive than MacK

‘‘It is not sufficient to be passively protected against the 

it is necessary to be able to make them stop by respon

them . . . against artillery, the use of aviation is essen

However, Morillon, like the other early commanders, 

former Yugoslavia before NATO airpower was ready for 

ground missions in Bosnia.

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont of Belgium succeeded G

Morillon, and Briquemont had much more to say abou

airpower in his memoir, Do Something, General! 34 The 

his book characterized the specificity of the political gu

given to Briquemont and his superior, General Cot of 

during most of their time in Bosnia.35 They were the f

generals to exercise some influence on the use of airp

Bosnia, as is discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5 

study. However, no bombs fell while either of them serv

the UN. Briquemont’s replacement, General Rose, als

about his experiences as head of the UN’s Bosnia-Herz

Command.36 Though generally restrained in his r

about the limitations of airpower37 during and just a

tour in Bosnia, in his memoir Rose vented some of th

tration from his run-ins with the theater-level comman

NATO who wanted to use airpower more aggressively.38 

book also gave his version of the large role he played in 

ing NATO air action through the end of 1994—

addressed in chapters 5 and 6 of this study.

In Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, Jan Honig and 

Both revealed the divergence of views between the two 

pal UN commanders, French general Bernard Janvier 

subordinate British commander in Bosnia, Gen Rupert 

during 1995.39 During the spring of 1995, UN comm

disagreed over whether to take more forceful action in 

including air strikes. Of special interest were the autho

elations about the role of Rupert Smith in helping sta

in the UN and NATO confront the impossibility of sim

ously attempting to do peacekeeping and enforcement.40 

Honig and Both provided excellent evidence and anal

10
11

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Belgian army, commander of Bosnia-Her

Command from July 1993 to January 1994

Photo by Tim Ripley
the role of UN commanders in influencing the use of a

in Bosnia, that was not the principal focus of their boo

did not discuss the role of NATO commanders, and in t

footnote of the book, the authors erroneously conclud

attacks, which the Clinton administration so favour

executed, proved relatively ineffective in September 19

NATO air forces quickly ran out of targets and, in 750 

missions, bombed the same 56 targets over and over a

Such a misconception by these otherwise well-informed 

ars was indicative of the paucity of information on NA

operations available at the time they wrote. Another b

Srebrenica by investigative journalist David Rohde, p

supplementary evidence and worthwhile analysis of th

played by the top UNPROFOR officials in decisions o

use of airpower during the summer of 1995.42

Hans-Christian Hagman’s PhD thesis, ‘‘UN-NATO Oper

Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 1992–1995,’’ examin

efforts by the two international organizations to work t

12

Gen Jean Cot, French army, commander of UNPROFOR from July 

March 1994

Photo by Tim Ripley
in Bosnia.43 In 1994, Hagman was a staff office

UNPROFOR. For that reason he was an authoritative so

UNPROFOR’s views on the use of airpower, and he ma

some of the staff analysis he himself produced as evide

his research. Because his focus was on peacekeeping 

than on enforcement, he devoted very little atten

NATO’s responsibility to enforce the no-fly zone over 

Moreover, throughout the thesis, the term air strike 

preceded by the word punitive or followed by the word 

tion. Air attacks, other than close air support requested 

UN, were virtually illegitimate in Hagman’s view, becau

of his key assumptions was that NATO air operation

subordinate to UNPROFOR’s mission. As such, airpow

really meant to be supporting UN peacekeeping. That w

view of what NATO should have been doing in Bosnia, 

Hagman noted, NATO officers held different views.

Only a handful of works have focused specifically 

power in Bosnia; however, in research theses and repo

duced after Deny Flight, several air force officers took a

native view from the one taken by Hagman of NATO’s r

Bosnia. According to Maj George Kramlinger, in ‘‘Su

Coercive Air Presence (SCAP),’’ from February 1994 o

NATO was in a struggle with the UN over whether to coe

Bosnian Serbs.44 As with the other researchers, Kra

captured the high points of Deny Flight, but did not d

or analyze decisions over the use of airpower. Norwegia

mentator Per Erik Solli also saw Deny Flight as an exe

coercion rather than as a peacekeeping venture.45 Simi

Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herze

Maj Michael O. Beale aimed to provide an account wit

political and historical context of the war in Bosnia o

Flight’s evolution from constrained deterrence to more 

tive coercion.46 By going out of his way to consider th

viewpoint, Beale revealed many of the complexities o

force in Bosnia. Finally, a pair of research reports on a

in coalition operations built on the assumption that NA

power was over Bosnia for coercion and that the UN was 

in the way.47 In addition to their informative texts, these 

contained useful bibliographies.

13
One of the earliest treatments of airpower in 

appeared as a book chapter in Air Vice-Marshal Tony M

Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal.

48 The air vice-ma

description of the airpower debates at the policy-maki

was informative, and he documented the debate in 

particularly well. At the time of the book’s writing t

NATO and the UN had used airpower primarily to enfo

no-fly zone over Bosnia, and NATO attempts to affect th

ing on the ground were just beginning. Mason’s later 

butions on the use of airpower over Bosnia have been 

theoretical—extracting the broader lessons about us

power in peace-support operations.49 Therefore, while 

identified and discussed issues such as proporti

impartiality, and consent—which lay at the heart of 

power disputes—he did so in an attempt to generalize fr

experiences of Bosnia, rather than to document the ac

the theater-level commanders.

Tim Ripley, a journalist and photographer who cover

itary operations in the former Yugoslavia, purveyed 

overview of Deny Flight in his book, Air War Bosnia.

50 Th

supplemented Ripley’s many magazine articles,51 prov

wealth of detailed information about air operations 

Deny Flight.52

Col Robert Owen headed a team of researchers to p

the “Balkans Air Campaign Study” (BACS) sponsored 

University, the center for professional military educa

the US Air Force. The BACS report is the most compre

work on the planning and execution of Operation De

Force—the brief NATO bombing campaign in late Augu

September of 1995. Though the study deals primari

Deliberate Force, which was technically a part of Deny 

it also reveals many previously unpublished aspects o

Flight stretching back to 1993. The message of the re

that airpower played a significant role in coercing the B

Serbs to comply with UN and NATO demands, thus end

three and one-half-year siege of Sarajevo and paving t

for the Dayton peace talks. Because the study was dire

and for the US Air Force, its strengths are its practica

and its wealth of information from American sources

14
strengths, however, tend to eclipse the role played by U

sors and commanders in influencing the use of airpow

the study does not analyze events before the Pale air st

May 1995. Two summary articles appeared in A

Journal,53 and a final report was published in 2000.54

15

Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, French army, commander of UN Peace Force

Photo by Tim Ripley
Method

This study employs a single case study method bef

contemporary history. The techniques of identifying, 

ing, ordering, and evaluating evidence that one would 

for writing history were enriched with interviews an

hand observations.55 This single case was addressed b

the use of airpower over Bosnia fits what Robert Yin ca

‘‘extreme or unique case’’—to be used when a situatio

rare that any single case is worth documenting and 

ing.’’56 Deny Flight is worth documenting and analyzin

number of reasons. Others have studied it in order t

theoretical lessons about the employment of airpower i

support activities,57 but no one has yet studied the role

theater-level commanders and their influence on the 

airpower. Deny Flight was unique in that divisions at th

ical level within the UN, within NATO, and between 

and NATO made it impossible for political authorities in 

the UN or NATO to give clear instructions to their theat

manders about the objective for employing airpower

argued at the outset of chapter 4, this left the operation

manders a great deal of leeway in helping their politic

ters sort out who would control NATO airpower, and 

end. Moreover, the divided command chain between 

and NATO left army generals serving with the UN to c

with senior NATO airmen about how to use airpower—a 

gle for control that has been ongoing for many years.

To test the hypotheses on the influence of theater-lev

manders, this study endeavors to find the origins of th

they used, the objectives served by those plans, and th

manders’ methods of and success in promoting their pla

uses of airpower that were responses to provocations 

than planned operations, this study attempts to det

who made the targeting decisions and how targeting 

were constrained in advance. To determine the role that 

ise and command responsibility played in affecting the 

and decisions of commanders, commanders were as

explain their concerns and frustrations. They also wer

if there were any actual or potential issues over whi

considered resigning. More importantly, in evaluatin

16
manders

 actions, this study looks for patterns reflectin

approaches to using airpower and checked for chang

time. Interviews and documentary evidence sought to 

lish the causes of the apparent patterns and any chan

analyzing evidence, the focus is on cases where co

responsibilities and military expertise were likely to 

courses of action different from those predicted if other 

were driving the commanders’ decisions; for example, n

political pressures, peacekeeping doctrine, personal ad

ment, and UN or NATO organizational biases.

Evidence for this case study was gathered from 

accounts, secondary studies of Deny Flight and UNPR

investigative journalists’ accounts, memoirs, and tran

from press conferences and press releases from the 

House, the Pentagon, NATO headquarters in Brusse

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. T

demic version of Lord Owen’s encyclopedic CD-ROM c

ion to Balkan Odyssey provided useful data, as d

archival holdings for the BBC/Discovery Channel pr

Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, held at the Liddell Hart A

King’s College, University of London. Sources includ

documents, including records of Security Council d

resolutions, and reports from the secretary-general.

information was drawn from US congressional and 

Kingdom (UK) parliamentary reports, unclassified por

military studies (mainly US), organizational histories

ings, and reports. Extensive travel in Britain, B

Germany, France, Italy, and the US to interview dip

NATO and UN staff officers, and participants—peace

and pilots—allowed identification of important events

decision points, and actors involved in shaping Deny 

Theater-level commanders and other senior officials in 

UK, France, and Belgium were interviewed. Accessing 

sources and securing and conducting interviews in 

meant learning French. In all, over 60 separate int

were conducted, roughly half of them with general off

admirals. Two separate two-week-long visits to the 

Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) were made 

duct documentary research and to review oral histories 

17
the BACS collection. The second of those trips netted o

pages of notes from classified sources, which were revie

classification and then declassified as necessary.

In five of the interviews conducted, including the int

with General Janvier and Air Force general James 

Chambers, the limitations of interview data were r

somewhat because the interviewees kept journals an

documentary evidence from their tours of duty, an

referred to those notes during the interviews. In addit

interview with the commander of NATO air forces 

southern region, Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, was based on a d

classified briefing, and the redacted transcript of the in

contained 66 pages of text accompanied by more than 4

head slides. It included a verbatim mission statement fr

North Atlantic Council, concepts of operations for d

types of missions, and air orders of battle for the 

states. Interviews with principal decision makers also r

information unlikely to be captured in documents, s

details of important meetings, briefings, and phon

When several individuals from different organization

potentially different interests at stake provided 

accounts of events that were also consistent with p

available information, the information was considered r

Where accounts differed, interviewees were invited to 

the apparent contradictions or to elaborate on the diff

in perspective. Sometimes this helped to clarify wh

place. In other cases this resulted in conflicting or inco

versions of what had occurred. The text and en

throughout this study indicate where differing account

same events were not reconciled or where alternative e

tions should be considered. Unfortunately, some of t

cials interviewed spoke only on the condition of ano

Others asked to see the work before agreeing to be c

name. Both the anonymous interviewees and those wh

be named later are cited in the endnotes as Military Of

MOD Official B, and so on. Regrettably, Gen Rupert Sm

UN commander in Bosnia during 1995 was not inter

Given General Smith’s pivotal role, the absence of an in

may have implications for the absolute reliability of 

18
19

Lt Gen James “Bear” Chambers was the first director of NATO’s Com

Operations Center as a theater-level commander.
judgments. However, General Smith

s NATO count

were consulted and, at his suggestion, so were some 

subordinates. The consistency of these supporting int

lends credence to the findings.

This study assumes that all theater-level commande

subjected to political pressures from their respective n

capitals.59 All of the commanders in the UN and NAT

sure that other commanders were receiving guidanc

home, though most of them denied receiving explicit 

themselves.60 In NATO, direct political pressure proba

not reach below the regional commander, the four-sta

ral in charge of Allied Forces, South (AFSOUTH). Howev

study also assumes the two- and three-star Air Force g

who were subordinate to the AFSOUTH commanders 

have been aware of guidance from Washington.

Structure

Chapter 2 discusses background theory concerning m

influence on the use of airpower. It first explores the f

of Betts and Petraeus on the subject of military influe

the use of force and then goes on to propose a theoretic

for military demands for autonomy in operational m

focusing on the special expertise and responsibility com

ers have for managing violence. Chapter 2 also exami

countervailing political controls that constrain a comm

autonomy when using airpower. The chapter ends with 

discussion of the traditional division between soldiers a

men over the utility and control of airpower.

Chapter 3 briefly describes the background to Deny 

giving special attention to the national policies of the 

UK, and France for using airpower in Bosnia. The org

principle of chapters 4 through 9 is chronological, w

break points between chapters determined by change

commanders in Bosnia or turning points in the miss

either UNPROFOR or the Deny Flight air forces. Those c

present the case study evidence and analysis. The fina

ter states conclusions, answering the questions set ou

and addressing the hypotheses of whether and why theat

commanders influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia.

20
Notes

1. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprinted w

preface and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)

2. Ibid., 11–12.

3. David H. Petraeus, “Military Influence and the Post–Vietna

Force,” Armed Forces and Society 15, no. 4 (summer 1989): 495; a

H. Petraeus, “American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A 

Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post–Vietnam Era” (P

Princeton University, 1987), 249–53.

4. Petraeus, “American Military,” 255.

5. Some observers believed legislation went too far in empowerin

commanders. See Robert Previdi, Civilian Control versus Military R

York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 123; and Christopher Bourne, Un

Consequences of Goldwater-Nichols: The Effect on Civilian Contr

Military, Essays on Strategy XIV, ed. Mary A. Sommerville (Washingt

National Defense University Press, 1997), 249–56.

6. The UN side focuses on the overall force commanders headq

in Zagreb and their subordinate commanders for operations in Bo

NATO, the focus is on officers filling the positions of Suprem

Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Commander in Chief Allied 

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and Commander of Allied Ai

Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). This study also includes 

Chambers, the first director of NATO’s Combined Air Operations C

a theater-level commander, because he was the US joint force air co

commander until his departure in November 1994.

7. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Februa

III–4 and III–5. The UK’s Defense Doctrine, published after Deny Fli

sioned the planning function taking place at a higher level, though 

input from the operational commanders. JWP 0-01, British Defence 

1.8–1.9.

8. Previdi, 91; Peter D. Feaver, Civil–Military Conflict and the Use 

eds. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washingto

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 114 and 122

H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The 

Interest, no. 35 (spring 1994): 3–17; Edward N. Luttwak, “Was

Biggest Scandal,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 109–

9. Michael R. Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No o

Limited Force in Bosnia,” New York Times, 28 September 1992; 

Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” New York Times, 8 October 1

claims of a crisis in civil-military relations, see Russell F. Weig

American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McC

Powell,” The Journal of Military History, Special Issue 57 (Octob

27–58; Kohn, 3–17; and Luttwak, 29–33. For examples of comm

uncomfortable with Powell’s actions but who stop short of declaring 

see Andrew J. Bacevich, “Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?” Joi

21
Quarterly, no. 6 (autumn/winter 1994

1995): 7679; and Thomas 

“The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,” The Atlantic 

280, no. 1 (July 1997): 66–78.

10. Petraeus, “American Military,” 258.

11. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Indigo, 1996).

12. Ibid., 264–65.

13. Owen, 329.

14. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yu

1991–1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (The Hague: The Net

Atlantic Commission, 1996).

15. The London Conference of August 1992 established the ICF

was cochaired by a UN and an EC/EU negotiator. The UN chair

Cyrus Vance until 1 May 1993, then Thorvald Stoltenberg. The 

chairman was Lord Owen until 12 June 1995, then Carl Bildt

overview of NATO’s role and perspective, see Gregory L. Schulte, 

Yugoslavia and the New NATO,” Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 1

16. For instance, Leurdijk provides little discussion on the “d

command and control arrangements whereby NATO and the UN joi

trolled the authority to authorize air strikes.

17. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random Hous

146.

18. James Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International D

and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997

19. Ibid., 137–39 and 149–54.

20. Ibid., 136 and 146.

21. Ibid., 151.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 267–69.

24. Jane M. O. Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion: British 

Former Yugoslavia (London: Institute for Public Policy Research

32–34 and 42–46.

25. Ibid., 50–54.

26. Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference o

Yugoslavia: The Politico–Military Interface, London Defence Stu

(London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1944), 16.

27. Michael C. Williams, Civil–Military Relations and Peac

(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the International 

for Strategic Studies, 1998), 46.

28. Ibid.

29. Maj Gen Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to 

(Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993); Gen Philippe Morillon, 

Oser: Chronique de Sarajevo (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1993); Lt Ge

Nambiar, “A Commander’s Perspective on the Role of the Developin

in Peace Operations,” in Meeting the Challenges of Inte

Peacekeeping Operations: Assessing the Contribution of Technology

Gliksman (Livermore, Calif.: Center for Global Security Resear

22
1998); and Col Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the 

Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1993).

30. Nambiar, 89.

31. MacKenzie, 310.

32. Ibid., 428.

33. Morillon, 213.

34. Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Do Something, General! Chro

Bosnie–Herzégovine, 12 juillet 1993–24 janvier 1994 (Bruxelles: 

Labor, 1997).

35. Gen Jean Cot, “Dayton ou la Porte Etroite: Genese et Av

Désastre,” Dernère Guerre Balkanique? ed. Jean Cot (France: Éd

Harmattan, 1996), 113–38; Gen Jean Cot, “L’Europe et l’Otan,” 

Nationale 53, no. 4 (October 1997): 89–97; and Gen Jean Cot, “Le

de l’ex-Yugoslavie,” Défense, no. 65 (March 1995): 85–86.

36. Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 

The Harvill Press, 1998).

37. Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, “Bosnia Herzegovina 1994 - NATO 

for UN Wider Peacekeeping Operations,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations 

(1994): 8–11; Idem, “A Year In Bosnia: What Has Been Achieve

Journal 140, no. 3 (June 1995): 22–25; Idem, “A Year in Bosnia: W

Achieved,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 3 (July–S

1996): 221–28.

38. Rose, Fighting, 177.

39. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record 

Crime (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

40. Ibid., 141–59.

41. Ibid., 186.

42. David Rohde, A Safe Area, Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massa

the Second World War (London: Pocket Books, 1997).

43. Hans-Christian Hagman, “UN–NATO Operational Co-ope

Peacekeeping 1992–1995” (PhD diss., King’s College, University of 

1997).

44. George D. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presenc

(Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University, Air Command 

College, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996), 48–76.

45. Per Erik Solli, ‘‘In Bosnia, Deterrence Failed and Coercion 

in Use of Air Power in Peace Operations, ed. Carsten F. Ronnfeldt 

Erik Solli, NUPI Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations Rep

(Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997); and Solli

NATO Air Power in the Former Yugoslavia, NUPI Report no. 20

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997).

46. Maj Michael O. Beale, Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Air

Bosnia-Herzegovina (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997

47. Group Capt Stuart W. Peach, Royal Air Force (RAF), Air 

Peace Support Operations: Coercion versus Coalition, MPhil thesis 

College, University of Cambridge, 1997), 70–76; and Maj Peter 

23
Coalition Warfare Considerations for the Air Component Commander 

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 48–65. Also see Matthew C. 

“Coalitions and Limits on Coercive Diplomacy,” Strategic Review 

(winter 1997): 38–47.

48. Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, RAF, Air Power: A C

Appraisal (London and Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 168–97.

49. Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, RAF, “Operations in Search o

Air Power in Operations Other than War,” in Air Power Confronts an 

World, ed. Dick Hallion (London: Brassey’s, 1997), 157–77.

50. Tim Ripley, Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower (Osceo

Motorbooks International, 1996).

51. The articles by Ripley include: “Operation Deny Flight

Airpower Journal 16 (spring 1994): 20–29; “Blue Sword over Bosni

Airpower Journal 19 (winter 1994): 18–25; “NATO Strikes Back

Airpower Journal 22 (autumn/winter 1995): 18–27; “Operation D

Force,” World Airpower Journal 24 (spring 1996): 20–29; “

Vindicated,” Flight International, 1–7 January 1995, 31–35; “Rea

Being,” Flight International, 24–30 January 1996, 25–28; “A ‘Delibera

on the Mountain,” International Defense Review 28 (October 1995

“NATO’s Air Command—Backing Up the Blue Helmets,” Internationa

Review 28 (November 1995): 61–62; and “Bosnia Mission Stretches 

Eyes and Ears,” International Defense Review 27, no. 1 (1994): 54–

52. In 1999, Ripley published a book on intervention in Bosnia. 

presents a lot of new information on the ground campaigns in Bo

Croatia during 1995. Tim Ripley with foreword by Nik Gowing, O

Deliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campain in Bosnia 1995 (L

England: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1

53. Robert Owen, “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1,” A

Journal 11, no. 2 (summer 1997): 4–24; and idem, “The Balkans Air C

Study: Part 2,” Air Power Journal 11, no. 3 (autumn 1997): 6–26 

cited as Owen, “Balkans: Part 1,” and Owen, “Balkans: Part 2).”

54. Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in 

Air Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000).

55. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods 

Sage Publications, 1984), 18–20.

56. Ibid., 44.

57. For instance, see Mason, Operations in Search of a Title, 157

Group Capt Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson, eds., The D

of Air Power (RAF Staff College, Bracknell, UK: HMSO, 1996), 105–

58. A valuable compendium of UN Security Council resolutions, 

and UN secretary-general reports prior to May of 1994 is contained 

Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., The ‘Yugoslav’ Crisis in Internatio

General Issues Part I, Cambridge International Documents Serie

(Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

59. Williams, 46.

24
60. General Briquemont appears to have been the exception, th

was pressured by the European Community (EC) at a time when h

try, Belgium, filled the rotating post of EC president.

25
Chapter 2

Military Influence

on the Use of Airpower

The military in the post–Vietnam period have exercis

considerable influence over how force has been use

particularly in those cases in which the missions have b

especially demanding and complex, thereby increasing 

dependence of civilian policy makers on military judgme

expertise, and information.

—David H. Petraeus————

“Military Influence and th

Post–Vietnam Use of Forc

PhD diss.,————————

Princeton University, 198

Airpower was the central military component in the 

icy for intervention in Bosnia. Airpower has also been 

core of a long-running debate in the United States ov

much influence the military should exercise vis-à-v

civilian masters when it comes to using force.1 To fra

discussion in this study about the influence of theat

commanders on the use of airpower in Bosnia, the first 

of this chapter briefly addresses the larger issue of m

influence on the US use of force. The second section n

the focus to look at political controls on the use of ai

namely targeting controls, bombing pauses, and rules of 

ment. In addition to the political-military dimension 

trols on the use of airpower, soldiers and airmen hav

tionally held contending beliefs about how best to emp

type of military force.2 The third section, therefore, hig

the major causes and consequences of the disparate m

views on airpower. This chapter provides a theoretical co

for analyzing the various dimensions of the struggle by t

level commanders to influence the use of airpower in 

between the summers of 1993 and 1995.

27
Influence and Autonomy:

The US Military and the Use of Force

This section explores American military influence aft

on when, how, and with what constraints on military 

omy force has been used. Since World War II, America

tary leaders have usually played only a minor role in de

over whether the United States should employ militar

Once decisions to use force have been made, military in

over how force is used has been relatively more sign

Furthermore, when force has been called for, military 

have lobbied hard to preserve their autonomy in oper

matters. Two elements of military professionalism—ex

and responsibility—create the foundation for military de

for autonomy. Contrary to the military’s desire for aut

American political leaders have felt the need to const

even control the use of force in military operations sinc

Balancing the imperatives of policy against the dema

military autonomy has often led to tension in civil-m

relations.

This study uses the word influence in a rather o

sense. Influence is the ‘‘power to sway or affect based o

tige, wealth, ability, or position.’’3 This avoids unne

restrictions found in more technical definitions. For in

Roger Scruton excludes coercion from the definition o

ence. However, if a military commander attempted to 

other military or political authorities in order to shape 

of airpower, that would certainly be of interest here.4 

Wrong makes a distinction between intended and unin

influence. The focus here is on intended influence though 

ing Wrong’s definition would be impractical since intende

ence is what Wrong calls “power”—the definition of whic

up two chapters of his book.5 Richard Betts defines in

as ‘‘causing decision makers to do something they p

would not have done otherwise.’’6 Though generally com

with the definition used in this study, Betts’s definitio

be interpreted to mean that military influence had to be 

This would exclude military influence that served mer

catalyst, enabler, or shaper of action that decision 

would have taken anyway. Finally, the ordinary de

28
adopted for this study is somewhat broader than Samuel 

concept of influence, which, in his typology, is the lowe

of military intervention into politics for countries with 

oped political cultures.7 For Finer, influence meant ‘‘th

to convince the civil authorities by appealing to their re

their emotions.” This level is the constitutional and leg

one, entirely consistent with the supremacy of the civil 

However, Finer’s definition would exclude influence 

military organizations themselves and would presupp

legitimacy of military influence. For this study, the sim

inition of influence will work best.

Deciding to Use Force: Military Reluctance and

Influence

In the period since World War II, the American milit

been neither as belligerent nor as influential in interventi

sion making as popular stereotypes suggest.9 In fact, the 

has become quite the opposite of the hawkish image onc

larized in movies and books. Writing in 1960, Morris J

described and decried this stereotype in his classic soci

portrait of the American military elite, The Professional S

But in the recriminations over Vietnam, the limitations 

‘‘military mind’’ and the military stereotype found renewe

in the United States.11 Writing in 1973, Bernard Brodie 

that a ‘‘Chief of Staff is one who shares with his collea

great belief in the efficacy of force in dealing with reca

peoples or regimes abroad.’’12 Though the stereotype w

tainly exaggerated and far from universal, the pugnacio

tudes of certain military leaders of the early 1960s, espec

Air Force generals at the top of Strategic Air Command, 

to lend credence to the popular images.13

Contrary to the view of American military leaders a

cose elites who have pushed their reluctant civilian m

unwillingly into foreign interventions, military leader

not been particularly warlike or influential when it co

decisions over whether or not to use force.14 That profe

military officers would normally caution against using m

force was a point argued by Samuel Huntington in The 

and the State,15 and subsequent research has tended to 

29
Huntington

s claim.16 In the first systematic study of th

tary’s role in intervention decision making, Richard 

examined decisions during the period from 1945 unti

He discovered that American military leaders tended to 

bellicose than the most aggressive civilian advisors 

presidents.17 Moreover, military leaders tended to b

effective when they advocated the use of force and mos

tive when they united in opposition to armed intervent

decade after Betts debunked the myth of military warm

ing, David Petraeus found that the Vietnam War had 

chastening effect on the American military.19 By t

1980s, US military leaders were even less likely to a

the use of force than either their predecessors or the 

civilian advisors of the day. Thus, Petraeus concluded 

short, the military since 1973 had conformed more cl

the Huntington view (originally presented in 1957) th

had during the period of Betts’s analysis.’’20

How to Use Force: Options, Influence, and

Overwhelming Force

As Richard Haass has argued, decisions about whe

use force should be inextricably linked to consideration

what force is available and how that force is to be 

Betts’s study countered the ‘‘bureaucratic revisionist

suggested that military capabilities drove foreign polic

also noted that the traditional theoretical model—w

clearly articulated foreign policy served as a basis for m

strategy—was too neat for the real world.23 Describing t

itary role in foreign policy making, Betts observed that

military officials’ task was not simply to study a policy, dedu

appropriate strategy and forces to implement it, and recommen

results to political leaders. Instead they were often in the po

where their advice on what could be achieved was to determine 

would be achieved.24

As American involvement in Vietnam began to escalate

officers saw untested theories of limited war substitu

their professional advice on the use of force.25 This wa

cially true of the bombing of North Vietnam, where a s

of graduated pressure was employed to convince Hanoi’s 

30
to abandon their support for the insurgent Vietcong gu

fighting in South Vietnam.26 A vignette from the outse

bombing operations illustrated the disparate civilian a

itary views:

In early 1965, Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald had ret

from a White House meeting where, over the objections of the 

Chiefs who favored heavy and decisive bombing, the civilian 

makers were planning the program of limited and graduated bom

He reportedly told his aide that graduated response was mi

senseless and that when the war was over, the civilians respo

would no longer be in office and the only group left answerable 

war would be the military.27

Air Force plans called for hitting the entire list of 94 s

targets in North Vietnam within a month.28 Regardless 

views on the wisdom of either bombing strategy, the p

be noted here is that even when the questions of wheth

how to use force were considered together, the answers 

always reflect the preferred military options. This left m

commanders to implement a strategy that they believe

not succeed.29

As Petraeus studied the period after Vietnam, he fou

military influence over how force was used surpass

influence that uniformed leaders exercised on decisio

whether force was to be used. Petraeus concluded that

the military have exercised the most influence, however, once th

sion to use force has been made—when the focus has become h

use force, and when decision makers have turned to considera

the options available to accomplish the objectives established 

president. Options are the military’s area of expertise, and exp

particularly when concentrated in one institution, yields influen

Thus, with responsibility for formulating plans, the m

gains influence. In describing the military’s unique ex

in this area Petraeus averred that

the development of military options is a complex undertakin

requires knowledge, experience, and creativity. Detailed and 

information about one’s own forces is essential, as is current 

gence on the target of the military action. An understanding 

systems established for planning, coordination, and comman

control of military operations is necessary as well. Military oper

31
are complicated affairs, and only senior military officers fully m

their conduct.31

These observations are axiomatic rather than lessons 

particular conflict, but they again underscore the imp

of expertise in giving the military influence over how fo

used.

From the Vietnam War, Army and Air Force officer

somewhat different lessons about the use of force. P

found that the American military emerged from Vietna

an acute and lasting awareness of (1) the ‘‘finite limits 

lic support for protracted military operations,’’ (2) ‘

about the efficacy of military force in solving certain i

tional problems,’’ and (3) ‘‘greater disillusionment wi

heightened wariness of, civilian officials.’’32 The Arm

Marine Corps bore the deepest scars, according to Pe

while the Navy was the least affected service.33 H

Petraeus did not elaborate on the US Air Force

Clodfelter has argued that Air Force leaders conclude

Vietnam that ‘‘since Linebacker II demonstrated b

effectiveness, political leaders must realize that bomb

win limited wars if unhampered by political controls.

suggested that senior Air Force officers might be just a

of civilian officials as their Army counterparts, but th

less pessimistic about the utility of airpower. Edward M

study of the Vietnam generation of professional milita

cers found that career officers from all of the services 

supported civilian supremacy, insisted on clear-cut p

decisions and clear objectives for using force, and wa

know that risks taken with American lives would “b

worthwhile purpose.’’35 Marks’s study also found th

Vietnam generation of officers believed that once the m

was given clear objectives, it should then be free from p

interference in achieving those aims; that is, the 

believed they should be given operational autonomy

while soldiers and airmen drew different conclusions 

the effectiveness of airpower in Vietnam, both groups 

the military should control decisions about how to use 

future operations.

32
The lessons of Vietnam were reinforced by American 

ences in Lebanon, Operation Desert Storm, and Somalia

combined experiences produced a military culture av

engaging in small wars, and committed to ensuring rap

cess whenever and wherever military force was 

employed.37 As Frank Hoffman has pointed out, the a

tion of this military ‘‘doctrine’’ owed much to Gen Colin 

who formally propounded the ideas in the 1992 N

Military Strategy.38 This preferred approach to employin

was called ‘‘Decisive Force’’ by its authors. Less cha

Cong. Les Aspin labeled it the ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ sc

thought.39 Aspin, who was then chairman of the House 

Services Committee, claimed the most important tene

all-or-nothing school stipulated that ‘‘military force sh

used only in an overwhelming fashion.’’40 He criticized 

or-nothing school, which he associated with Colin Pow

stated that his own views were more closely aligned wit

he called the ‘‘limited objectives’’ school.41 For Aspin, c

lence and airpower lay at ‘‘the heart of the limited ob

argument,’’ and Operation Desert Storm had demon

airpower’s potential to deliver limited political objectives t

precise applications of force.42 Aspin’s comments about 

use force, especially airpower, were made with an eye 

US intervention in Bosnia. For now, one should note 

US policy makers considered whether to get invo

Bosnia, they were dealing with a generation of military 

who expected the freedom to decide how to use force o

decision to use it was made.

Theoretical Bases of Demands for Operational

Autonomy: Expertise and Responsibility

Military commanders demand autonomy in oper

matters because they are experts in the employment 

and are held accountable for their actions. Autonomy 

them to influence how force is used.

While acknowledging the prerogative of political aut

in questions of when and how to intervene, military 

have resented infringements into the area of operation

trol of military forces.43 Tensions in political-military re

33
have arisen when political authorities have dispense

military advice and entered the professional military do

managing violence. Clausewitz testified to the abiding 

tion of problems arising when nonexpert political aut

attempt to control military force:

When people talk, as they often do, about harmful political inf

on the management of war, they are not really saying what they 

Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influenc

Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to pr

effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions inf

operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has no

mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himse

rectly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose th

meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which d

strates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in 

of general policy.44

Thus, military expertise has long been recognized as 

for effective control over operational matters. S

Huntington went so far as to say that military disobed

political orders would be justified in cases where a ‘‘m

officer . . . is ordered by a statesman to take a measur

is militarily absurd when judged by professional sta

and which is strictly within the military realm witho

political implications.’’45 The final qualification, ‘‘witho

political implications,’’ was as crucial to Huntington’

ment as it was unlikely to pertain in the limited militar

ations following World War II. Moreover, at th

Huntington wrote, the advent of nuclear weapons was 

rendering traditional military expertise largely irrele

Still, for Huntington, the superior expertise of soldie

statesmen in their respective military and political d

served as the basis for a civil-military division of labor

fortified military demands for autonomy.47

Writing in 1960, Morris Janowitz argued for more int

civil-military relations, and he was far less deferential 

military expertise than Huntington.48 For Janowitz, th

tary had to forego its absolutist tendencies and acc

blurring of civilian-military responsibilities.49 For the w

survive in the nuclear age, the management of violenc

no longer be governed by military logic; rather, the m

34
needed to develop new expertise in ways of limiting the 

force.50 Janowitz warned that until the military became 

with a ‘‘constabulary force’’ outlook, it threatened to 

gress the boundaries of civilian control.51 He foresaw th

likely problem in limited wars and wars against insurg

So, while Janowitz accepted the connection between ex

and professionalism, he was not sanguine about giv

military autonomy to use its expertise until the milita

fession could be rid of the outdated and dangerous inf

of the ‘‘absolutist’’ heroic leaders and transformed into 

fession led by ‘‘pragmatic’’ military managers. Moreo

perceived the greatest need for change to be in the 

Force, dominated as it was by generals from the Strat

Command.53

Betts showed how expertise could be used by the mil

help preserve autonomy in operational affairs.54 Som

limitations in military capabilities impose constraints o

can be achieved in a given situation. This is known as 

determinism, where the means more or less determ

ends. In the past, military leaders have falsely asserte

cal determinism or built plans around real limitations 

tary capabilities so as to prevent political authoritie

interfering in operational matters. A classic example, c

Betts, occurred at the outset of World War I when ‘‘G

Moltke falsely claimed the rigidity of plans as an ex

refuse a last-minute change in strategy to concentra

the Russian front.’’55 However, tactical determinism 

merely a ploy used by experts to maximize their cont

the use of force. It is often a real and important factor 

sions over when and how to use force. As an example

showed that Graham Allison was wrong to accuse m

leaders of falsely asserting the limits of airpower dur

Cuban missile crisis in order to strengthen the chanc

more robust bombing operation or a full-scale invasion

limitations of airpower were all too real. This exampl

lights an important point: in the absence of mutual 

and trust, political leaders might dismiss relevant an

rate military advice, or come to believe that their ow

ments on the use of force can substitute for military ex

35
Petraeus found that critics of military advice have su

false claims of tactical determinism, while military p

have supposed that the critics were willing to ignore rea

limitations if they clashed with the critics’ preferre

tions.57 The point to note here is that special military ex

is needed to judge the limits of what military mea

accomplish, and that the same expertise can give the m

leverage in gaining autonomy.

Another element of professionalism, responsibility, 

as a basis for the military insistence on autonomy in 

tional matters. The unique requirement for the mili

manage violence on behalf of the state implies certain 

sibilities. Huntington discussed three forms of military re

bility: representative, advisory, and executive.58 This 

focuses mainly on executive responsibility, because t

level commanders are primarily responsible for execut

icy. Huntington argued that in its executive capacity th

tary profession’s first duty was obedience, even w

professional officer disagreed with a policy he was ta

fulfill. Two military ethicists, Kenneth Kemp and 

Hudlin, examined the limits of the obligation for milita

dience.59 They analyzed the possible moral, legal, politic

private bases for disobedience, and they concluded th

almost no scope for either passively refusing orders or 

itively acting in defiance of orders, unless the order

clearly illegal or grossly immoral.60 However, for Kem

Hudlin, as with Huntington, the rigid distinction betwe

dience and disobedience mirrored an equally inflexib

sion of labor between policy making and policy imple

tion that seldom, if ever, exists.61 Moreover, the respons

faced by a commander are more complex than the o

model—from the military to the political authority—po

Huntington.

Commanders are also responsible for and to the peo

serve under them.62 As James Toner argued, to comma

exercise moral and military competence in fulfillment of e

dinary responsibilities.63 Furthermore, he claimed th

foremost sign of military incompetence is being care

wasteful with the lives of the people under one’s comm

36
A competent commander, then, would be one who so

fulfill military and policy objectives with the least ris

losses to his forces.65 A more explicit statement of th

nection between responsibility and command was put f

Martin Edmonds. Edmonds pointed out that military 

zational structures linked rank with authority; rank, i

was linked to responsibility—not just to the state, b

‘‘responsibility to the individuals within the military fo

operations mean risking their lives.’’66 ‘‘Above all,’’ a

Edmonds, “the dominant consideration affecting arme

ices as organizations is the prospect of their member

killed in the course of fulfilling their duty; it is this tha

inates their organizational practices.’’67 Military organi

link operational responsibility and accountability in 

chain of command. And, Edmonds noted, a comm

responsibility ‘‘must include the responsibility for b

operational effectiveness of the unit under his or her co

and the lives of the people in it in difficult and dangerou

ations’’ (emphasis added).68

Military demands for autonomy in operations are a 

outgrowth of these responsibilities and the clear accou

ity that commanders face. Theater-level commanders 

marily responsible and accountable for both mission 

plishment and the lives of the people under their com

The responsibilities of command are lightened for 

mander who is free to pursue a course of action that ful

mission and poses the least amount of risk to his 

However, when circumstances demand a trade-off, 

mander has to have a clear objective and some sens

worth before being able to strike an appropriate b

between mission accomplishment and force prot

Moreover, a commander must also have the means to 

plish his mission, and control over those means, to s

manage the risks his forces will face in fulfilling the m

Without autonomy, a commander cannot work the oft

cate balancing act needed to best achieve his given o

with the least risk of getting his people killed.

Like expertise, responsibility is not only a basis for m

demands for autonomy, it can also work as a tool for ob

37
autonomy. Despite suspicions that military leaders 

exaggerate the risks involved in a given military oper

not just of failure, but of losing lives—it is politically 

order operations which the military advises against. P

leaders can order operations despite military objection

ever, as Edward Luttwak noted,

If they choose to go ahead, they must accept both the inherent 

cal risk of the envisaged action and the added political risk of h

overruled military advice—not something that is likely to remain 

for very long in the aftermath of failure. . . . Understandably in t

cumstances, prime ministers and presidents rarely overrule m

chiefs to order action. That, too, is a diminution of civilian cont

To the extent civilian political leaders take control over 

tional matters, they become accountable for the conseq

This leads back to the issue of expertise. For as L

observed, “micro-management . . . implies responsibilit

prudent leaders must strive to avoid’’ because the abi

authority to control does not confer the expertise to m

successfully.

To summarize, in the military tradition of Western de

cies, promotion in rank is ostensibly based on one’s a

handle increased responsibility. The highest ranking 

selected for operational command are expected to us

professional expertise to fulfill their responsibilities for 

ing mission success with the least risk and cost to their 

Demands for operational autonomy are a natural conse

of holding a person accountable for human lives and 

accomplishment of a mission for which that person po

a special expertise. Therefore, military commanders d

autonomy in operational matters because they are exp

the employment of force and because they expect to 

accountable for both mission success and the lives of t

ple under their command. They can also use their ex

and the responsibility inherent in command to obtain 

tional autonomy. To the extent theater commanders ar

or can otherwise get autonomy, they can influence ho

is used.

38
Political Constraints on Airpower:

Targeting and Rules of Engagement

We turn now from the broader issues of whether a

force is used to the means of constraining military au

in the use of a particular form of military force—airpow

the purposes of this study, “airpower” is defined as th

ponent of military power derived from aerospace v

capable of sustained and controlled flight. More spec

this study is concerned with the use, or threatened 

conventional force,70 rather than with the variety of m

services or support functions that airpower can per

Constraints on the use of force can take many forms, a

have been a common feature in limited wars and militar

ations other than war since World War II. For NATO m

states, all uses of military force since 1945 have been 

in the sense of the term offered by Robert Osgood—

limited in the means employed and the objectives pur

According to Christopher Gacek, the difficulty in reco

military means with limited political ends stems fr

nature of military force itself. Drawing heavily 

Clausewitz, Gacek describes the ‘‘logic of force’’ as tha

erful tendency of war to reach for higher levels of viole

Political constraints on the use of force serve the ‘‘logic 

icy,’’ which seeks “to subordinate all means including 

its own purposes.’’74 The primacy of policy operates reg

of the impact on the means that serve it—that is, regar

the effect it might have on the military.75 In contrast to 

view, Bernard Brodie and other observers have ascrib

escalatory nature of conflict to the professional m

unmitigated urge to ‘‘win at any cost.’’76 Unsurprisingly

observers valued tight political controls over military 

omy.77 The degree to which American political authoriti

sought to control military force and inhibit operational 

omy has varied greatly from the hands-on tech

employed during the Vietnam War to the relatively ha

approach adopted during the Gulf War.78 However, in 

flicts, the political controls on airpower have generally c

three forms: direct control over targeting, bombing 

and rules of engagement (ROE).79

39
Political controls on airpower can be meant to serve 

positive or a negative objective. Political authorities ca

military autonomy and exercise control over airpower 

force becomes part of policy in helping to achieve a 

positive political objective. The types of positive object

which force might be used include signaling, coercion

bution, or destruction through bombing (e.g., the Israel

on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility in 1981).80 In contrast t

positive objectives, negative objectives, as Mark Clodfe

called them,81 are likely to come into play in all wars bu

cially in limited wars and operations other than war wh

ditional military objectives may compete with, rathe

complement, important policy aims.82 In highly cons

uses of force, what gets bombed—if bombing occurs a

often determined less by the positive aim for using for

by what is left over after satisfying all of the negative 

tives. The negative objectives that might be served by p

controls on bombing include preventing the spread of 

flict outside its current boundaries, preventing escalat

conflict within its given boundaries, avoiding collatera

age, and avoiding friendly losses. Significantly, this las

tive objective—casualty avoidance—overlaps with a co

der’s responsibility to protect his forces. Thus, e

pressure to limit friendly casualties can serve to rein

commander’s own internal pressures to minimize the lo

his forces. If any of these negative objectives are 

firmly—thus becoming absolute prohibitions—they ca

fere with achievement of the positive objective for whic

is being used. As discussed under ROE below, that m

an acceptable price to pay, and it will be up to political 

ities to decide whether the negative objectives that co

force outweigh the positive objectives for using force.

Targeting as Air Strategy: What to Attack,

What Not to Attack

Civilian political authorities have exercised control o

geting in order to keep the military means of airpower 

with their policy objectives. Controls over targeting 

beyond decisions on what targets to bomb to inclu

40
rapidity with which targets are struck, their geographic

tions, the sequence in which they are to be hit, the w

effort assigned to each target, and the weapon system

types of ordnance employed against the targets. Short

World War I, Guilio Douhet averred that strategy in air 

was no more than the sum of these targeting factor

selection of objectives, the grouping of zones, and deter

the order in which they are to be destroyed is the mo

cult and delicate task in aerial warfare, constituting wh

be defined as aerial strategy.’’83 In 1995, Col Phillip Me

then dean of the US Air Force School of Advanced A

Studies, demonstrated that Douhet’s idea still had cu

when he wrote “In essence, air power is targeting;’’ and 

ing objectives to strike or influence is the essence of ai

egy.’’84 Direct controls on targeting, then, constitute on

greatest infringements on the autonomy of airmen.

The nadir in US military autonomy over targeting 

operations came during the Vietnam War. According 

prevailing theories of limited war, a nuanced appro

using force was needed to send the right message to 

and military considerations about what was to be stru

decidedly secondary. As Richard Betts put it,

Orchestration of the use of force was a political tool, a signaling d

Whether the United States bombed a surface-to-air missile site 

depot near Hanoi would communicate a message to the enem

was hence a political decision that had to be made by political a

ity; it was not a purely military decision to be made by a subor

commander.85

President Johnson’s personal control over target select

summed up in his boast that ‘‘I won’t let those Air For

erals bomb the smallest outhouse north of the 17th 

without checking with me.’’86 Significantly, up until mid

Johnson operated without the benefit of any direct m

advice.87 After congressional intervention, Gen Earl W

then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was perm

attend weekly White House targeting sessions.88 Later, 

the Nixon administration, bombing of the North was 

cantly curtailed.89 However, up until 1972, targets in 

Vietnam were still being selected by civilians in Washin

41
When political authorities are using military force 

naling, they are likely to demand more direct control o

geting in order to ensure that the intended signal i

Moreover, when signaling is a positive aim, negative ob

will usually play a strong role in determining what 

does not get bombed. Such was the case in the air 

against Libya in April 1986, which, according to the ch

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, Adm Bill Crow

meant to ‘‘send an unequivocal signal that Washingt

serious and that terrorist actions would not go unpunis

Crowe later wrote that ‘‘In the final analysis, our tactic

sions were based on political considerations. . . . We 

want casualties . . . and the other major political goal 

minimize Libyan civilian casualties.’’92 The final targe

tion list included ‘‘about half’’ of what Crowe had 

mended, but it also included suspected terrorist targe

were not on the admiral’s list but were added in order 

a signal about terrorism.93 Because of concerns over p

collateral damage, the decision makers in Washington 

ficed a number of the best targets.’’94 When signaling 

than achieving military results is the positive aim, p

authorities will take a more direct role in targeting de

and those decisions can easily be driven more by n

objectives than by the positive purpose for the bombin

Bombing Pauses: When to Bomb or Not Bomb

The ultimate targeting control is the ability to stop 

bombing. When bombing forms part of coercive dip

military commanders will likely find themselves com

with diplomats for control over decisions about how t

late bombing. Whether bombing should be halted to 

negotiations or continued to enhance leverage during n

tions is clearly a matter for political authorities to d

However, they should expect their commanders to 

bombing cessation whenever a pause might erase the g

which the military has already paid a significant p

whenever the pause is expected to increase the costs o

ations once bombing is resumed.96

42
In Vietnam, American political leaders ordered b

pauses in futile attempts to win similar restraint from H

President Johnson did not consult with the military 

suddenly ordering the first bombing halt of the 

Thunder campaign in May of 1965.98 Had he done 

would have met resistance from his top comma

Commander in chief of the Pacific theater Admiral Sha

wrote, “We had enough experience in negotiating w

Communists to know that military pressures must b

tained throughout the negotiating period.”99 The J

administration ordered subsequent cessations in the b

of North Vietnam despite warnings from commanders 

field that the North ‘‘exploited them to resupply, prep

attacks, redeploy forces and commit violations.’’100 To A

Sharp, ‘‘It seemed pointless to allow the enemy the lu

such respites, which, in the end, would only trans

higher casualties on our side.’’101 The bombing of 

Vietnam had been drastically reduced before the Nixon 

istration came to Washington. However, Henry Kis

Nixon’s chief negotiator noted: ‘‘Hanoi bargained only 

was under severe pressure—in particular, whenever A

resumed bombing.’’102

Political authorities may wish to turn bombing off o

suit their strategies for coercive diplomacy. But, as Ale

George has noted, ‘‘If pushed too far, the civilian aut

effort to transform military force into a highly refine

criminating instrument of diplomacy and coercive bar

will eventually break down.’’103 Such breakdowns, 

noted, leave negotiators with one of two unpalatable c

make major negotiating concessions or escalate.104 C

that regulate bombing in conjunction with coercive dip

are meant to serve positive objectives; however, they se

infringe upon a commander’s autonomy, and command

likely oppose them, especially if the pauses increase c

friendly forces.

Rules of Engagement: Circumstances for Force

Rules of engagement have also served as a powerf

straint on military autonomy in air operations. T

43
Department of Defense defined rules of engagement as 

tives issued by competent military authority which de

the circumstances and limitations under which United 

forces will initiate and/or continue combat engageme

other forces encountered.’’105 Academic instruction g

the US Air Force to its newly recruited lawyers explain

ROE ‘‘are the primary means by which political authori

provide guidance to deployed forces in peacetime for h

crises and, in wartime, to help control the level of viole

Rules of engagement have usually been derived from 

political, and operational considerations.107 The follow

cussion does not examine the legal dimension of RO

instead addresses political considerations then oper

concerns.108 In general, ROE serves negative objectiv

tension between positive objectives for using force an

tive objectives served by ROE was reflected in an ana

Scott Sagan:

Rules of engagement . . . are designed to balance two competing 

the need to use force effectively to achieve the objective of an off

or defensive mission and the desire not to use military force in u

essary circumstances or in an excessively aggressive manner.109

Rules of engagement can constrain the use of force so 

that it becomes militarily ineffective. Sagan referred to 

a ‘‘weakness error.’’110 Alternatively, lax ROE can lead 

much force being used for a given situation, resulting 

he called an “escalatory error.’’111 The trick, as Sagan 

was to set the ROE between these two errors. Recognizi

this demands an act of judgment on which political an

tary authorities might differ, Sagan observed, ‘‘ROE de

involving trade-offs between military effectiveness and b

political objectives, are legitimately the province of 

political authorities.’’112 Sagan’s analysis and conc

were sound, yet he failed to give adequate attention 

responsibility commanders have for protecting their fo

Highly restrictive rules of engagement, useful for pre

unwanted escalation, can also increase the risks to th

involved in an operation. In Vietnam, the aerial r

engagement significantly increased the risks to Americ

crews and prevented them from taking appropriate me

44
for self-defense. The rules of engagement prohibited 

against surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and other air 

targets except in reaction to an immediate threat.113 B

the North had networked its radar, SAM batteries could 

ing cues without turning on their own radar, thus a

them to shoot with little or no warning to US aircraft. B

ing the aircrews to wait for clear indications of a thre

ROE greatly reduced the chances that the crews cou

effective defensive actions.114

In the spring of 1972, Gen John Ryan, Air Force 

staff, relieved Gen John Lavelle, commander of US Air 

in Vietnam, when subordinates in Lavelle’s comman

found to be falsifying reports to cover up the fact that 

had ordered preplanned strikes against the Nort

defenses.115 It frustrated Lavelle, as it had other comm

before him, to operate under complex rules that see

needlessly jeopardize the lives of his men.116 In his tes

before the House subcommittee investigating the un

rized bombings, Lavelle jokingly told the congressme

have a saying we used in Vietnam, that we finally fou

why there were two crew members in the F-4. One is to 

airplane and one is to carry the briefcase full of the r

engagement.’’117 However, it was no joking matter for 

crews involved, as one study later explained: 

To many aircrews, it seemed impossible to find a way to do wh

ordered and not get killed by the enemy or hanged by the United 

government in the process. The ROEs made many aircrews fee

they were fighting two enemies: the North Vietnamese and Am

leaders in the White House.118

Lavelle’s solution was to interpret the rules of engagem

a way that allowed strikes against elements of the Nor

defenses even in the absence of a clear indication that 

defenses were about to engage US aircraft.119 Although 

on the joint staff at the Pentagon apparently sympathiz

what Lavelle was trying to do, authorities in Washing

not change the rules until after—and perhaps as a res

Lavelle’s dismissal.120 Despite giving guidance that led 

ROE violations, Lavelle was praised by several congr

during the hearings on the unauthorized bombings fo

45
to protect American airmen.121 In Cong. William Dick

words to General Lavelle, ‘‘I think if I had been in you

tion, . . . I would have done exactly what you did. I th

would be less than a man if you were not trying to do 

could, and if stretching the rules [of engagement] is pa

then good for you.’’122 The Lavelle case demonstra

dilemma commanders faced in Vietnam, where overly 

tive ROE were costing US airmen their lives.123

The principle of civilian control of the military dictat

commanders abide by political restrictions even if that 

failing to achieve the desired positive objective for us

power. Commanders are still obliged to apply their expe

an effort to fulfill their responsibilities for mission succ

force protection within the bounds of the constraints 

their political masters. When political restrictions jeo

the safety of a commander’s forces, he must decide ho

go in risking the lives of the people under his comman

losing friendly forces will be an undesired side effe

restriction, rather than an intended consequence. Th

lem for the commander is that it may take expertise

those above him setting the restrictions lack, to recogn

the constraints are increasing the risks to friendly forc

commander balks at political constraints, he might 

ceived as falsely exaggerating the dangers they cause, 

military advisors are sometimes suspected of makin

claims of tactical determinism. A commander’s difficul

compounded if his mission is not in pursuit of a 

defined objective because he will be unable to judge e

himself whether or not the risks to friendly forces are j

by the expected outcome. Little of the foregoing discus

unique to airpower, but the problems can be especiall

for airpower because of its potential to cause collatera

age, the inordinate stigma that goes with losing an aircr

its crew, and the political sensitivities over dropping bo

Moreover, the complexities of electronic warfare and aer

tics required for self-defense are not as easily grasped 

requirements for self-defense by ground forces.

46
Soldiers and Airmen:

Efficacy and Control of Airpower

One of the main justifications for firm civilian politic

trol over the use of force, according to Bernard Brodie, 

parochial mindset of senior military officers married 

unbalanced commitment to victory.125 The down side 

expertise officers gained from combat experience and 

sional study was that it tended to create a situation wh

services are normally not strategy-minded but rather 

minded.’’126 Moreover, Brodie asserted,

Military officers have usually spent their entire careers perfectin

skills with respect to some means of war, whether those means b

tleships, or carriers, or bombers, and they become deeply att

emotionally to those means.127

In examining the American uses of force from World 

through the end of the Vietnam War, Richard Betts foun

port for Brodie’s assertion, especially on the issue of ai

Since World War II the debates have pitted the air force, a majo

the Navy, and right-of-center civilians against the army, a mino

the navy, and left-of-center civilians. The former coalition has a

that bombing is more decisive and economical than a strategy 

on ground forces and has been decisive except in those ins

where civilian authorities refused to let it be so by curtailing the 

and intensity of the air campaigns. The latter group has argue

bombing can only support the achievement of a military de

which must be done primarily on the ground by occupying te

and controlling population and that air campaigns are not 

effective. Both theories have become articles of faith.128

Soldiers, though doubtful about what independent air 

tions can achieve, have generally recognized the valu

support. As Hal Winton has pointed out, soldiers on t

tlefield usually depend on air support in a way that is n

anced by a reciprocal need amongst airmen for Army s

“The asymmetry of this dependence lies at the root of m

the tensions that exist between the Army and the Ai

regarding air-ground operations.’’129 Principal manifes

of these tensions have been the doctrinal and operation

tests over who should control airpower and to what en

47
Despite the relative surfeits of airpower American 

have enjoyed in the conflicts since 1945, the struggle 

the US military to control airpower has, at times, been i

Army and Marine Corps officers have long felt, with ju

tion, that their needs for close air support would fare p

left entirely to the Air Force.130 Conversely, Air Force 

have traditionally believed, also with justification, that s

tend not to appreciate airpower’s potential to influence 

beyond the battlefield.131 As a consequence of these com

views, centralized control of airpower by an airman h

been a leading tenet of Air Force doctrine:

Aerospace forces should be centrally controlled by an airm

achieve advantageous synergies, establish effective priorities, c

ize on unique strategic and operational flexibilities, ensure un

purpose, and minimize the potential for conflicting objectives.132

Steve McNamara has detailed the resulting soldier-

struggle to control airpower.133 When the US military r

ized in the mid-1980s, airmen succeeded in having the p

of an ‘‘air boss’’ written into joint doctrine. In 1986 the 

of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) w

cially sanctioned in doctrine on counterair operations

idea gradually gained wider currency in the joint are

was applied to all airpower missions. Of course estab

and defining the position of an air boss in US doctrine 

eliminate the services’ different approaches to warfare 

desires to control airpower.135 The concept was first te

the Gulf War, where it was criticized by ground comm

who felt that the targets they nominated were too often 

by the Air Force officers running the air war.136 In addit

Marine Corps had difficulty accepting infringement on 

of its airpower.137 The issue was finally settled after t

War and after more than a little friction. The secon

JFACC stood for “commander,” which implied the auth

control air assets, and not “coordinator”—as the Marin

argued—which implied a much weaker position.138

The relative control that an airman or a soldier exercis

airpower will depend largely on who is supporting whom

military doctrine, the ‘‘supported’’ commander and for

the focus of an operation; they have the predominant 

48
play and they command priority when it comes to res

Supporting forces, on the other hand, give aid, ass

resources, firepower, and so on, to the supported elem

This concept applies across military theaters as well as 

a given theater of operations. As applied in its intra-

sense, the supported-supporting concept determines 

forces (e.g., air, land, or maritime) play the predomina

and which ones assist.140 Col John Warden has argu

airpower ought to be the key instrument or force (i.e., t

ported force) in operations where ‘‘ground or sea for

incapable of doing the job because of insufficient num

inability to reach the enemy military centers of gravity.

prescription for theater commanders was to identify a 

supported) element for each phase of a campaign and 

that competing service viewpoints did not interfere wi

campaign plans.142 As obvious and logical as this s

Warden noted that in joint military operations theate

manders often “failed to identify a key force, and . . . eac

ponent] either thought it was dominant or didn’t realiz

its role was in producing a coherent performance.’’143

The concept of supported and supporting forces is r

to military operations other than war, but, as this 

demonstrates, that concept was not easily or well ap

Bosnia. The problems were due, in part, to the differen

held by soldiers and airmen on the uses and control 

power. This problem was compounded by the lack of a

all theater commander, with the added complexity of 

soldiers from European nations commanding UN forces 

ground while airmen from the United States commande

air operations overhead. This created problems due t

peting national agendas typical of coalition operations w

the compensating benefits of unity of command and 

lishment of a common coalition objective. When NAT

contemplating intervention in the spring of 1993, Field M

Sir Richard Vincent, chairman of NATO’s Military Com

warned: “For God’s sake, decide what you’re trying to 

before you go out.’’144 However, after Deny Flight ende

Joe Ashy, the first commander of NATO air operatio

49
Bosnia observed, 

The bottom line was we did not hav

of command and unity of purpose.’’145

Summary

There are at least four dimensions to military influe

the use of airpower that might come into play once m

forces are committed in a situation where airpower is l

be used. First, there is the logic of force or the urge f

tary victory, which is in tension with the logic of policy; 

the necessity to make sure the ends dictate the means 

vice-versa. Second, while acting under political constr

commander must try to balance his responsibilities f

mission success and force protection. Third, one mu

sider the competing views that soldiers and airmen ar

to hold on the proper uses of airpower. Fourth, in m

tional operations there are likely to be different defini

success stemming from different views of the conflict a

ferent organizational doctrines. These various dimens

military influence should be borne in mind as we turn 

the question of the theater-level commanders’ roles in 

encing the use of airpower in Bosnia.

Notes

1. For recent contributions to the debate, see Richard Holbrook

a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 60–152; and Edward N. 

‘‘From Vietnam to Desert Fox, Civil-Military Relations in 

Democracies,’’ Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 99–112.

2. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 203; Lt Col 

McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot: Centralized versus Organi

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 81–85; and H

Winton, ‘‘An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air Force Per

on Air-Ground Operations’’ in Col Philip S. Meilinger, ed., The 

Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air U

Press, 1997), 399–442.

3. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3d 

York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992).

4. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought, 2d ed. 

Macmillan, 1982; Pan Books, 1996), 262.

5. Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (N

Harper and Row, 1995), 1–32.

50
6. Betts, 5.

7. S. E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962

edition, Peregrine Books, 1976), 86.

8. Ibid.

9. Betts, 1–2.

10. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and 

Portrait (London: Collier and Macmillan, 1960; reprinted with new 

and preface, 1971), 3–5.

11. Karen A. McPherson, ‘‘The American Military in Fiction Sinc

Armed Forces and Society 9, no. 4 (summer 1983): 650; and 

Petraeus, “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A 

Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era” (P

Princeton University, 1987), 3. Brodie is particularly critical of the 

mind.’’ See Bernard Brodie, War & Politics (New York: Macmilla

1973), 479–96.

12. Brodie, 486.

13. Betts, 116–17, 120, and 127–28.

14. Ibid., 5–6.

15. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: Theory and 

of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universit

68–69.

16. Petraeus, 258.

17. Betts, 5–6.

18. Ibid., 11–12 and 96.

19. Petraeus, 6; and David H. Petraeus, ‘‘Military Influence and 

Vietnam Use of Force,” Armed Forces and Society 15, no. 4 (summ

493.

20. Petraeus, ‘‘American Military,’’ 6.

21. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military 

the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutio

Carnegie Institution for International Peace, 1994), 68.

22. Betts, 103.

23. Ibid., 96.

24. Ibid., 97.

25. Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘‘Vietnam and the American Theory o

War,’’ International Security 7, no. 2 (fall 1982): 84–94.

26. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson

McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietn

York: HarperCollins, 1947), 40–47.

27. Betts, 11.

28. Earl H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), 104; Mark Clodfe

Limits of Air Power; the American Bombing of North Vietnam (New Y

Press; Collier Macmillan, 1989), 76–77; and McMaster, 143.

29. McMaster, 106.

30. Petraeus, ‘‘American Military,’’ 249–50.

51
31. Petraeus, 

Military Influence, 495.

32. Petraeus, ‘‘American Military,’’ 104.

33. Ibid., 104 and 276.

34. Clodfelter, 208. Also see Guenter Lewy, ‘‘Some Politica

Lessons of the Vietnam War,’’ Parameters 14, no. 1 (spring 1984): 

35. Edward Marks, “The Vietnam Generation of Professional A

Military Officers,” Conflict 5, no. 1 (1983): 51.

36. Ibid.

37. F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way 

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1966), 5–12, 100–102, and 103–5.

38. Ibid., 100.

39. Les Aspin, ‘‘The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in 

Cold War, Post-Soviet World,’’ address to the Jewish Institute for 

Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1992, excerp

reproduced as Appendix D in Haass, 185.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 185–87.

42. Ibid., 188–89.

43. Betts, 9.

44. Carl Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard a

Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 608.

45. Huntington, 77.

46. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeto

Princeton University Press, 1959), 400–409.

47. Huntington, 11–14 and 71.

48. Janowitz, 418–23.

49. Ibid., 426–30.

50. Ibid., 266–77 and 418–20.

51. Ibid., 343 and 420–21.

52. Ibid., 305–11 and 343.

53. Ibid., 304–7, 315–18, and 430.

54. Betts, 12–13. Also see Petraeus, ‘‘Military Influence,’’ 495; 

American Military,’’ 249–50.

55. Betts, 155.

56. Betts, 155–56; and Graham T. Allison, Essence of 

Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (n.p.: HarperCollins, 1971), 12

205–6.

57. Petraeus, ‘‘American Military,’’ 231 and 246.

58. Huntington, 14–16 and 72.

59. Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, ‘‘Civil Supremacy 

Military: Its Nature and Limits,” Armed Forces and Society 19, n

1992): 7–26.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., 8; and Huntington, 72. On the lack of clear boundaries 

policy making and implementation, see Betts, 14; Allison, 162

52
Michael Clarke, 

Foreign Policy Implementation: Problems and App

British Journal of International Studies 5 (1979): 114.

62. Michael Walzer, ‘‘Two Kinds of Military Responsibility,’

Parameters of Military Ethics, eds. Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E

(London: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 67–68; and Lewis S. 

‘‘Competence as Ethical Imperative: Issues of Professionalism,” in 

Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays, eds. James Br

Michael J. Collins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Universi

1981), 39–40 and 47–48.

63. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden o

Ethics (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 43–44

64. Ibid. The point of departure for Toner’s discussion on milit

petence is Norman Dixon’s list of 14 aspects of military incompete

Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London

1976), 152–53.

65. Ibid.; and Sorely, 39–40 and 47–48.

66. Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (King’s Lynn, 

Leicester University Press, 1988), 30–31.

67. Ibid., 31.

68. Ibid., 33.

69. Luttwak, 102.

70. Nuclear operations will not be addressed because they are i

to the case of Bosnia.

71. For a discussion of airpower in the broader sense of the term

use in peace support operations, see Air Vice-Marshal Tony Ma

Power in the Peace Support Environment,’’ in The Dynamics of A

eds. Group Capt Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson (B

England: HMSO, 1996), 112–25; and idem, ‘‘Operations in Search 

Air Power in Operations Other than War,’’ 157–77.

72. Robert Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, Colo.: 

Press, 1979), 3.

73. Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Lim

in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 199

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Janowitz, 264; Brodie, War & Politics, 191–92; and T

Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David Mckay Co., 19

77. Janowitz, 343 and 435; Brodie, War & Politics, 496; Hoopes

78. Lt Col John G. Humphries, ‘‘Operations Law and the 

Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,’’ 

Journal 6, no. 3 (fall 1992): 25–26 and 39.

79. Sanctuaries are distinct from ROE, but often the two ar

together. For the purposes of this study, the distinction is not 

enough importance to warrant a separate discussion of sanctua

more on the topic of sanctuaries, see Brodie, War & Politics, 67

Ricky James Drake, The Rules for Defeat: The Impact of Aerial 

53
Engagement on USAF Operations in North Vietnam (Maxwell AFB, 

University Press, 1993), 4–5 and 25–26; Adm U.S. Grant Sharp, Str

Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), 

Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (N

Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 288–90; Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over 

Power in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institu

1992), 199; Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The 

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Br

Co., 1995), 326–29; and Wayne W. Thompson, ‘‘Al Firdos: The 

Weeks of Strategic Bombing in Desert Storm,” Air Power History 

(summer 1996): 52.

80. For a more thorough discussion of the types of positive o

that might be served by using force, see Haass, Intervention, especia

3; and idem “Military Intervention: A Taxonomy of Challen

Responses’’ in The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-

Era (Queenstown, Md.: Aspen Institute, 1995), 1–18.

81. Clodfelter, 141.

82. David Gates, ‘‘Air Power and Aspects of Civil-Military Rela

Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power in Its Wider Context, ed., Stua

(London: HMSO, 1998), 28; Also Mason, ‘‘Operations in Search,’

Michael Clarke, ‘‘Air Power and Force in Peace Support Operatio

Sabin, ‘‘The Counter-Air Mission in Peace Support Operations

Dynamics of Air Power, 158.

83. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. by Dino Fer

York: Coward-McCann, 1942; reprinted, Washington: Office of A

History, 1983), 50.

84. Col Philip S. Meilinger, Ten Propositions Regarding A

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1995), 20–21.

85. Betts, 14.

86. Johnson is quoted in Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, L

Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: New American Librar

538–39, cited in Betts, 10.

87. McMaster, 208–9.

88. Betts, 8.

89. Tilford, 153.

90. House Committee on Armed Services, Unauthorized Bo

Military Targets in North Vietnam: Hearing Before the Armed 

Investigating Subcommittee, 12 June 1972, 46 (hereafter cited a

Bombing Hearing).

91. Adm William J. Crowe with David Chanoff, The Line of F

Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military (N

Simon & Schuster, 1993), 132. Also see Caspar Weinberger, Fighting 

Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990

92. Crowe with Chanoff, 134.

93. Ibid., 135.

94. Ibid., 134.

54
95. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuste

684; Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends & Means (N

Basic Books, 1989), 246.

96. Gen William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (WWI

Vietnam) (Washington, D.C.: US Air Force Office of History, 1978

and Admiral Sharp, 81–83 and 145.

97. Kissinger, 684; and Seabury and Codevilla, 246–53.

98. McMaster, 283–85; and Admiral Sharp, 81–82. 

99. Admiral Sharp, 83. Also see Kissinger, 488 and 684; Seab

Codevilla, 246–53.

100. Admiral Sharp, 145.

101. Ibid.

102. Kissinger, 684.

103. Alexander L. George, ‘‘Crisis Management: The Intera

Political and Military Considerations,” Survival 26, 

(September/October 1984): 226–27.

104. Ibid., 227.

105. Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense Dict

Military Terms (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), 341.

106. “Operations Law Deployment Deskbook,” vol. 2 (Maxwell A

International and Operations Law Division, Office of the Judge 

General, Department of the Air Force, 1996), H–1 and H–2.

107. For excellent primers on ROE, see Capt J. Ashley Roach, 

Engagement,’’ Naval War College Review 36, no. 1 (January/Februa

46–55; and Bradd C. Hayes, Naval Rules of Engagement: Managem

for Crisis (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corp., 1989), 1–34.

108. For an authoritative discussion of the legal dimension, se

Hays Parks, USMCR, ‘‘Air War and the Law of War,’’ The Air F

Review (1990): 1–225.

109. Scott D. Sagan, ‘‘Rules of Engagement,’’ Security Studies 

(autumn 1991): 88.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., 87.

113. House Committee on Armed Services, Unauthorized Bo

Military Targets in North Vietnam, report of the Armed Services Inve

Subcommittee, 15 December 1972, 2–4, 8, and 9 (hereafter cited as 

Unauthorized report’’).

114. Ibid.

115. House, Bombing Hearing, 4, 35, 45, 48–49, and 52.

116. Ibid., 50–51; Col Jack Broughton, Going Downtown: 

Against Hanoi and Washington (New York: Orion Books, 1988), 

173–74; Sharp, 4, 13, and 102–3; and Drake, 14–15.

117. House, Bombing Hearing, 51.

118. Drake, 15.

119. House, Bombing Hearing, 7.

55
120. House, Unauthorized report, 2

4, 8, and 9.

121. For words of praise from four congressmen, see House, 

Hearing, 45, 48, 49, and 50.

122. Ibid., 45.

123. For an essay on leadership, integrity, and ROE, which fo

the Lavelle case, see Maj Lee E. DeRemer, ‘‘ROE: Leadership Betwee

and a Hard Place,’’ Air Power Journal 10, no. 3 (fall 1996): 87–94.

124. Luttwak, 108; Gates, 30; and Michael Clarke, ‘‘Thre

Challenges in the UK’s Security Environment,’’ in Perspectives on A

Air Power in Its Wider Context, ed. Stuart Peach (London: HMSO

16–17.

125. Brodie, War & Politics, 475 and 492.

126. Ibid., 465.

127. Ibid., 471–72.

128. Betts, 203.

129. Harold R. Winton, ‘‘An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army 

Force Perspectives on Air-Ground Operations,” in The Paths of Hea

Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF 

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 401–2.

130. James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Op

Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Press, 1993), 10–11; and Michael Leurs, ‘‘Joint Doctrine: New P

Controversies,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 10 (summer 1994), 111

131. Betts, 203.

132. Air Force Manual 1–1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unit

Air Force, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19

133. McNamara, 103–13.

134. See for instance, Gordon and Trainor, 310–12.

135. Ibid., 310–12, 330–31, and 410–11.

136. Winnefeld and Johnson, 163–64; and McNamara, 2–3.

137. Leurs, 12; and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operatio

and 12; and II–20.

138. Joint Pub 3–0, GL–12.

139. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 58.

140. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, The Air Campaign: Pla

Combat (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Pres

Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 126.

141. Ibid., 124–27.

142. Ibid., 127.

143. Michael Evans, ‘‘RAF Prepares for NATO Bombing Raids o

Times, 28 April 1993.

144. Gen Joe Ashy, interviewed by author, 3 July 1998, Fairfax, 

recording, author’s personal collection.

145. Ibid.

56
Chapter 3

Background on the Use of

Airpower in Bosnia: 1992–April 19

The one cliché as popular as “air power can do anything

“bombing doesn’t work.”

—Richard Betts

———- Soldiers, Statesme

and Cold War Cri

The long-lived debates over the utility of airpowe

have gone on without the crisis in the former Yugoslavi

1990s, but the war in Bosnia emerged as a useful foil f

one wishing to caution against drawing too many lesso

the experiences of the Gulf War.1 For some observers

technology airpower, showcased in the 1991 Gulf War, 

a politically attractive option for intervention.2

Precision-guided munitions and the survivability of m

aircraft seemed to provide a means for threatening o

force while simultaneously minimizing risks and costs. H

the majority view amongst senior military officers in t

the most influential NATO nations—the United States, 

and France—was one of deep skepticism about the pr

for using airpower to quell the violence in B

Notwithstanding these military misgivings, NATO a

was gradually added to the Balkan equation. Air ca

planning modeled on the Gulf War began shortly after 

Nations peacekeepers started arriving in Bosnia under 

date that authorized ‘‘all measures necessary’’ for 

humanitarian aid to victims of the war. To establish th

ground necessary for analyzing the role of theater-lev

manders in influencing the use of airpower in Bosn

chapter describes United States, United Kingdom (U

French national policies for using airpower in Bosn

reveals the actions of the American commanders who 

Operation Deny Flight in NATO.

57
Airpower and Policy Making in the

United States, France, and the United Kin

By late June of 1992, having ‘‘exhausted virtually al

ble political and diplomatic measures’’ for a solution to 

uation in Bosnia, US Secretary of State James Baker 

National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and the tw

agreed to propose ‘‘the use of force for the sole pur

delivering humanitarian assistance.’’4 To support this 

objective, a team of State Department advisors prod

two-page outline plan calling for, inter alia, ‘‘multilat

strikes (e.g., against artillery in hills) as necessary to 

conditions for delivery of humanitarian relief.’’5 Even 

the plan specified that there would be no US combat tro

the ground, Baker was chary enough about oppositio

Gen Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Chen

he took his proposal and ‘‘went directly to George Bus

to work around the interagency process and pre-co

result.’’6 Baker’s efforts paid off; on Friday, 26 June 19

a vigorous debate amongst the administration’s top 

makers, Baker noted that President Bush “squarely 

the game plan I had outlined.’’7 By 10 July US Secre

Defense Dick Cheney had gone public with a proposal 

airpower to support the delivery of humanitarian 

Bosnia.8 Presumably, this would have accelerated th

ning already being conducted by the US Air Force.

In France, air strikes apparently were not given serio

sideration by the military. President François Mi

opposed the idea of air strikes,9 and Roland Dumas, the 

foreign minister until April of 1993, was reportedly symp

toward the Serb cause.10 With French foreign and secur

icy traditionally dominated by the ‘‘Quai,’’ or foreign m

any military initiative for air strikes would likely hav

blocked.11 The French air force chief of staff, Gen 

Lanata, believed that airpower could have imposed an 

the fighting, not by threatening the Bosnian Serbs, but 

ing an ultimatum to the Serb leaders in Belgrade to r

their forces in Bosnia, or face bombing in Serbia.12 H

the French military in general viewed intervention in Bo

a job for the army.13 As long as the French peacekeeper

58
Balkans remained vulnerable to reprisals, there was no 

thought of conducting air strikes.14 Adm Jacques Lanxa

chief of defense staff, ruled out the use of force in No

only to do an about-face in December by speaking in 

either using force in Bosnia or getting out.15 Howev

apparent change of heart did not signal a change in 

opposition to air strikes in Bosnia.16

The British military and government appear to hav

slightly further than the French in considering the pos

of air action. The UK’s military leaders, like observe

where, were concerned that Bosnia was the most unpro

environment for attempting limited precision air st

Among the challenges to be overcome in Bosnia were it

terrain and frequent poor weather, the lack of clear fron

and the potential for simple countermeasures again

power such as hiding artillery, mortars, and tanks, or 

them near schools, hospitals, or religious buildings.18 

trast to the limited objective of using air strikes in sup

humanitarian aid delivery as proposed by the Bush a

tration, the British military produced plans with th

ambitious aim of compelling Belgrade to stop foment

war.19 Senior British officers were convinced that for a

to be used effectively, it would have to be used in a b

not in small doses.20 The strategic bombing campaig

sioned by the UK focused on targets in Serbia proper, a

cuting it was within the capabilities of the Royal Air 

provided certain intelligence, command and control, an

tronic warfare assets were made available through N

Though the strategic air attacks were deemed politicall

ceptable, the option was at least considered.

Early USAFE Planning

Senior American Air Force officers began plann

December 1992 for an air campaign in the Balkans, a

initially modeled their plan on Gulf War air ope

Though the first plan was shelved and never impleme

helped to initiate a continuous cycle of US plannin

would coexist alongside NATO efforts to enforce the no-

over Bosnia.

59
During the first week of December 1992, senior officers 

the US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) command, ba

Ramstein Air Base in Germany, began developing an a

paign plan for Bosnia. The detailed work fell to C

Lushbaugh, chief of operations on the USAFE staff, wh

his Air Force career by flying 200 night missions as a 

air controller over Vietnam.22 Lushbaugh had arr

Ramstein six months before Saddam Hussein invaded 

and during Operation Desert Storm he served as chief 

for Joint Task Force Proven Force (Proven Force inclu

quasi-independent bombing missions against Iraq con

under USAFE leadership from Incirlik Air Base in Tu

Early in December 1992, the vice commander of 

tasked Lushbaugh to “draft a CONOPS [Concept of Ope

for an air campaign in Bosnia like we did in Desert St

A few days later when the USAFE commander ap

Lushbaugh’s concept for an air campaign, Lushbau

assigned to work under the direction of Maj Gen James 

Chambers, commander of the US Seventeenth Air Forc

Besides commanding an American numbered Air 

Chambers also ‘‘wore a NATO hat’’; that is, his positio

him simultaneously responsible to both US and Allied 

ities. However, at this stage planning for an air camp

Bosnia was conducted strictly within US channels.26 

strong build, and a gruff, aggressive manner, Bear Ch

had a reputation within the Air Force for possessing gr

tical expertise. He had begun his Air Force career as 

instructor when Dwight Eisenhower was president, 

later served two combat tours as a fighter pilot flying m

over North Vietnam. As a two-star general, he flew 

again in combat during Desert Storm, and he would c

to log combat flying hours over Bosnia until he retired 

1994. During his career, Chambers amassed an asto

number of flying hours for a fighter pilot—topping 5,50

before NATO air operations began over Bosnia.27 Th

American officers who conducted the initial planning 

operations in Bosnia had learned their profession in th

over Vietnam and had recently been involved in the 

Storm air campaign.

60
Around mid-December 1992, shortly after planning 

at USAFE, Lt Gen Joseph Ashy took command of Al

Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), making him the 

Air Force officer in NATO’s southern region. Like mos

Air Force’s senior leadership, Ashy was a fighter pilot w

flown in Vietnam. As a general officer, Ashy had comm

the prestigious 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, and la

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. He was well known 

the Air Force fighter community for his direct, no-no

and sometimes abrupt style. Though Ashy was respons

NATO air operations in the southern region and out

Chambers, it would have been inappropriate for Ashy 

the US-only planning because he was not directly in 

chain of command.28

NATO Involvement in Bosnia

General Ashy became involved in planning air operat

the Balkans on his first day on the job, and he quickly 

aware of the planning being done by USAFE. NATO 

ministers meeting in Brussels on 17 December agreed 

port a UN call to enforce the Bosnia no-fly zone, which 

had declared in October.29 General Ashy recalled being 

NATO officers’ club at Naples just after his change o

mand and still greeting guests in the reception line whe

a tap on the shoulder and [they] said, ‘We really need y

at Admiral Boorda’s office ASAP [as soon as possible].’

Jeremy M. Boorda was the American commander of 

southern region, or Allied Forces Southern 

(AFSOUTH). In Admiral Boorda’s office, General Ashy a

other assembled officers were informed that they ‘‘ne

do some serious planning for an air operation in the B

. . . specifically over Bosnia, in response to a possible 

olution and . . . NAC [North Atlantic Council] guida

police a no-fly zone.”31

Chambers and Lushbaugh flew to Naples the next m

and they briefed their concept of operations for an a

paign to General Ashy and a small group of American p

from Boorda’s command.32 The objective of the nasce

was ‘‘to cause the Bosnian Serbs to cease and desist, 

61
get them to the bargaining table.

33 The plan consisted 

phases and, like its Gulf War progenitor, the first pha

designed to achieve control of the airspace over the 

operations—this served as a starting point for AFSOUT

ning of the no-fly zone.34 However, NATO enforcemen

zone would not begin until April 1993. In the me

Chambers and Lushbaugh continued to work on an a

paign plan as part of a larger US joint-service effort, a

kept General Ashy informed about it.35 By the end of J

1993, Chambers’s team had completed their pla

General Chambers briefed it in Washington; then ‘‘it got 

the shelf,’’ never to be implemented.36 However, G

Chambers’s plan was the first air plan built within the 

and General Chambers perceived a similarity betwe

first plan and plans later built by General Ashy for NA

strikes.37

Enforcing the No-Fly Zone

On 13 March, aircraft flying from Serbia bomb

Bosnian villages of Gladovici and Osatica.38 The fligh

Serbia were observed by UN military monitors, and the 

were condemned by the UN Security Council.39 On 31 

1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 816 

Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorizing ‘‘all ne

measures’’ for enforcement of the six-month-old no-f

over Bosnia.40 The ban covered ‘‘flights by all fixed-wi

rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Republic of 

and Herzegovina’’ other than those authorized by th

Responses to violations were to be ‘‘proportionate’’ an

ject to close coordination with the secretary-gener

UNPROFOR.’’42

Originally, General Chambers was named the joint f

component commander for US air operations in the B

but the advent of the NATO no-fly zone caused Ashy’s 

sibilities to overlap with Chambers’s.43 Sometime 

February 1993, with preparations well under way for e

ment of the ban on military flights over Bosnia, 

demanded that the operation be directed by a non

European.44 Plans to run air operations from Aviano A

62
in Italy—a base long used by the Americans—were s

because planners felt that using Aviano would tend 

America’s allies out of the operation.45 In the end, NAT

Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF) Headquarters at Vicen

selected as the site from which to direct the no-f

enforcement, and its commander, Lt Gen Antonio Ros

Italy, was to head the operation.46 Because Rossetti wor

General Ashy, the NATO chain of command in the so

region ran from Admiral Boorda, to General Ashy, to G

Rossetti, to General Chambers, who quickly began d

the day-to-day operations from Vicenza’s combined air 

tions center (CAOC).47 This arrangement increased G

Ashy’s role in controlling the air operations over Bosni

ever, the command relations were a bit muddled, b

General Chambers retained both his title as a US JFA

commander of the non-NATO, US air operations in the 

such as the Provide Promise humanitarian airdrops.48

The way NATO commanders in the southern regio

with helicopters violating the no-fly zone illustrated th

ence of these theater-level commanders on the use 

power. In order to maintain tight control over Operatio

Flight, NATO authorities decided that orders to shoo

aircraft caught violating the no-fly zone could not be m

anyone below the CAOC director, General Chambers

no-fly zone resolution banned unauthorized flights by h

ters, as well as by fixed-wing aircraft.50 Initially NAT

some success at curtailing helicopter flights. By inter

the helicopters and making warning passes, NATO pi

many of the helicopters to land during the first weeks 

Flight.51 But, as General Chambers later recalled, 

worked for about the first 100 intercepts, after wh

unauthorized helicopters began to heed NATO’s warnin

and less, eventually flouting the no-fly zone openly.52 

no one below Chambers knew it at the time, he and hi

riors, Ashy and Boorda, were not going to authorize the 

ing of helicopters over Bosnia.53 However the mountin

ber of violations by helicopters soon drew criticism 

above.54 In defending the decision, Chambers later ex

that if NATO did shoot down a helicopter (1) it would tu

63
to be the wrong helicopter; (2) it would be the right hel

but it would fall on the wrong spot, perhaps killing in

people on the ground; or (3) failing (1) or (2) the down

helicopter would not have an appreciable effect on the m

operations of the faction using the helicopter—and a

were conducting unauthorized helicopter flight

Chambers’s view, despite some high-level discontent w

helicopter violations, no one wanted to take the respon

for overriding the commanders in the field by orderi

helicopters be shot down.56

“Safe Areas’’ and “Lift and Strike’’

On Wednesday, 20 January 1993, Bill Clinton was i

rated as the 42d president of the United States, a

National Security Council soon took up the issue of m

intervention in Bosnia. Gen Colin Powell, in describ

advice to the council about using airpower in Bosnia, c

I laid out the same military options that I had presented to Pre

Bush. Our choices ranged from limited air strikes around Saraj

heavy bombing of the Serbs throughout the theater. I emphasize

none of these actions was guaranteed to change Serb behavior

troops on the ground could do that. Heavy bombing might per

them to give in, but would not compel them to quit. And, face

limited air strikes, the Serbs would have little difficulty hiding 

and artillery in the woods and fog of Bosnia or keeping them c

civilian populations. Furthermore, no matter what we did, it wo

easy for the Serbs to respond by seizing UN humanitarian per

as hostages.57

It was during one of these early meetings that G

Powell’s protestations prompted Madeleine Albrigh

ambassador to the UN, to ask her now famous question: 

the point of having this superb military that you’re 

talking about if we can’t use it?’’58 The Joint Chiefs 

chairman replied by explaining the need for a clear p

objective, much as he had argued months earlier in 

The national security advisor, Tony Lake, who had se

the National Security Council staff as a young man dur

Vietnam War, sided with General Powell, saying: ‘‘You 

Madeleine . . . the kinds of questions Colin is asking 

64
goals are exactly the ones the military never asked 

Vietnam.’’60 By 10 February, the new administration ha

pleted a policy review, and it soon became clear that Am

military intervention was not in the offing.61

However, by the beginning of May 1993 the situa

Bosnia had worsened, and the Clinton administration 

on the ‘‘lift and strike’’ policy that it pursued over the n

and one-half years. Lift and strike referred to lifting th

embargo on the Bosnian government, and conduct

strikes against Serb military targets. The US ambass

the UN, Madeleine Albright, advocated unilateral US 

‘‘under existing United Nations authority.’’62 But Pr

Clinton decided he was not ready to act without allied 

ipation.63 Under intense media and public pressure 

something’’ in Bosnia, both London and Paris expressed 

ingness to consider using airpower in Bosnia.64 H

France and Britain remained firmly opposed to any li

the arms embargo because they feared such action wou

to increased fighting in Bosnia, which, in turn, woul

ardize the safety of French and British peacekeeping fo

Bosnia as part of the UN Protection Force.65 Neither 

nor the United States was willing to send troops to in

in the ground fighting, and France would not take t

measures on the ground in Bosnia without the oth

countries.66 Unless something were done to affect the b

of power on the ground, there seemed little point in co

ing air strikes.67 When US Secretary of State 

Christopher toured European capitals in early May, h

to win support for the administration’s lift and strike 

Throughout the month of May, NATO nations contin

mull over the idea of using military force, especially ai

either to implement the moribund Vance-Owen peace 

to help protect the six newly created ‘‘safe areas.’’68

On 6 May 1993, just after the Bosnian Serb Par

rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan, the UN Security 

passed Resolution 824 declaring Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla

and Gorazde safe areas.

69 Altogether there were six safe 

because Srebrenica had been made a safe area in Ap

they were not safe havens—a label which, under intern

65
law, would have implied far greater responsibilities for 

in seeing that they were indeed safe.70 Signifi

Resolution 824 invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 

paragraph 4 of the resolution, the council called for

the immediate cessation of armed attacks or any hostile act a

these safe areas, and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb milit

paramilitary units from the towns to a distance where from they 

to constitute a menace to their security and that of their inhab

(Emphasis added)71

Hopes for the Vance-Owen plan dwindled, and in ear

the Security Council tried to make the safe areas safe, 

ing UNPROFOR a tougher mandate and by support

force with NATO airpower.72

Conclusion

The Gulf War had a big impact on the debates over w

to use airpower in Bosnia. By the time the Gulf War e

March 1991, high-technology airpower had acquired an 

as a near antiseptic instrument capable of destroying w

killing, and winning without risking. Most military prof

als in the United States, United Kingdom, and France 

nized the limitations as well as the capabilities of ai

and they knew that expectations were running ahead o

bilities. Informed commentators tended to highlight air

limitations and the challenges of using it in Bosnia, b

lic debates on the issue were often ill informed.73 Furthe

the well-known difficulty of measuring the effectivenes

power only served to confound efforts, even by in

observers, to separate the enduring and general lesson

Gulf War from observations applicable only to fighting a

dictator in a desert environment. A less obvious, thou

surprising, consequence of the Gulf War was that it cr

cadre of airmen—especially in America—who were conf

airpower’s abilities and schooled in its application.

By May of 1993, the American and British policies fo

airpower in Bosnia had been set and would change litt

1995. Consistent with the findings of Betts and Petrae

US military had relatively little influence in shaping that 

Despite Powell’s protestations, the Clinton adminis

66
adopted a policy of 

lift and strike. The weak commitm

this policy owed less to military reluctance to get invo

Bosnia than to internal divisions within the adminis

objections from America’s European allies, and the pre

tendency to focus on domestic programs, such as natio

health care.74 The British and French governments pr

to dampen the effects of the war through the pres

lightly armed, impartial UN peacekeepers, who were ob

vulnerable to retaliation should the Serbs respond 

being attacked from the air. Over the next two years, 

and flow of the war in Bosnia, and the consequent 

attention on human rights violations, generated und

pressure behind US ambitions for launching air 

against the Serbs. British and French resistance to air 

rose and fell as necessary to head off such US action, 

policies in Washington, London, and Paris hardly cha

With policies set, the influence of senior military off

America, the United Kingdom, and France diminished, 

influence of theater-level commanders serving in NAT

the UN gradually increased.

Notes

1. Lawrence Freedman, “The Future of Air Power,” Hawk Jou

Independent Journal of the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1993), 44

Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal 

Brassey’s, 1994), 137–97.

2. Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign A

no. 3 (May–June 1995): 109–22; Les Aspin, “The Use and Usefu

Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World,” addres

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, 

September 1992; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London

Gallancz, 1995; Indigo, 1996), 15–16.

3. In addition to the evidence given below, see the testimony by G

Shalikashvili, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe: Senate, De

of Defense Authorization for Appropriations 1994, 1, 20, 21, and 22 

May; 17 and 23 June 1993, 222–53.

4. James A. Baker III and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of D

Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam

1995), 648.

5. Ibid., 648–49.

6. Ibid., 649.

7. Ibid., 649–50.

67
8. Mason, 169.

9. Lord David Owen, 27; and Pia Christina Wood, “France and 

Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia,” European Security 3, no. 

1994): 142.

10. Philippe Guillot, “France, Peacekeeping and Huma

Intervention,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 1 (spring 1994): 38

11. William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, “France’s 

Policy Toward NATO,” Strategic Review 23, no. 3 (summer 1995): 1

12. Gen Vincent Lanata, chief of staff of the French air force, int

by author, 8 September 1998, Paris, and tape recording, author’s 

collection.

13. Lanata interview; Gen Jean Cot, interviewed by author, 30 S

1998, Paris, transcription and translation of tape recording, author’s 

collection; Lt Gen François Régnault, French air force, chief of Emplo

Forces Division of the Joint Services Headquarters, 1 October 1992–

1993, interviewed by author, 9 September 1998, Paris, tape r

author’s personal collection; and Oliver Lepick, “French Perspe

International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, eds. Alex Dan

Thomas Halverson (London: Macmillan, 1996), 80–81.

14. Cot interview; Lanata interview; Régnault interview. The Fre

ernment provided peacekeepers for operations in former Yugosla

March 1992, when the UN Protection Force mission began. A ba

British peacekeepers were first sent to Bosnia in October 1992.

15. Wood, 143.

16. Lepick, 81–82.

17. MOD Officials B and D. MOD stands for the British Mi

Defence.

18. MOD Officials B and E. Also see congressional testimony by t

chief of staff Gen Merrill M. McPeak warning of these problems

Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994, Part 1, 2

and 29 April 1993, 213–14.

19. MOD Official G. 

20. Ibid., and MOD Official D.

21. MOD Official G.

22. Col Robert Lushbaugh, USAF, retired, interviewed by author

Air Force Base (AFB), Va., 9 July 1998, author’s notes, author’s pers

lection.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.; and Lt Gen James E. Chambers, USAF, retired, interv

author, Fairfax, Va., 10 February 1998, author’s notes, author’s 

collection.

26. Chambers interview.

27. Ibid.

28. Gen Joseph W. Ashy was deputy commander in chief of U

the Southern Region. That was a titular position without much rea

68
ity. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, 

1996, unclassified version redacted by the Air Force Historical 

Agency for the Director of History at Air Force Space Command, 

1997, Peterson AFB, Colo.

29. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 781, 9 

1992; and Facts On File Yearbook 1992 (USA: Facts on File, Inc., 19

and 988.

30. Ashy interview.

31. Ibid.

32. Lushbaugh interview.

33. Chambers interview.

34. Ibid.

35. Lushbaugh interview; and Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interv

author, Fairfax, Va., 3 July 1998, author’s notes, author’s personal c

36. Chambers interview; Lushbaugh interview; and Ashy inte

author.

37. Chambers interview.

38. Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., “The Yugoslav 

International Law,” General Issues Part 1, Cambridge Inter

Documents Series, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Universi

1997), 45; and Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Re

War Crime (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 89.

39. Honig and Both, 89; and Bethlehem and Weller, 32 and 45

40. UNSCR 816, 31 March 1993, par. 4.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Dr. Thomas S. Snyder and Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, USAFE 

History, USAFE Historical Highlights, 1942–1997: Fifty-fifth An

Edition (Ramstein Air Base, Germany: Headquarters USAFE, 1997

44. Lushbaugh interview.

45. Chambers interview.

46. Lushbaugh interview; and Ashy, interview by Colonel Ow

General Rossetti took over command of 5ATAF on 7 April 1993, rep

Gen Giuseppe Degli Innocenti.

47. Ashy interview by Colonel Owen; Chambers intervi

Lushbaugh interview.

48. Ashy interview by Colonel Owen; Chambers intervi

Lushbaugh interview. Under Operation Provide Promise, the US b

dropping food in Bosnia in March 1993, shortly after the Clinton 

tration took office.

49. Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effe

Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000), 381.

50. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Airborne Early Warnin

Operation Deny Flight: A History (U), February 1997, n.p., 17-page 

tory, History Office, NATO CAOC, Vicenza, Italy, 9. 

51. Chambers interview.

69
52. Ibid.; and Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., USAF, AFSOUTH sta

Naples, Italy, April 1993–December 1995, interviewed by Lt Col Ro

6 December 1995, Naples, Italy, transcript of taped interview, Ba

Campaign Study (BACS) Collection, Air Force Historical Research 

Maxwell AFB, Ala. Colonel Boyd recalled the issue of intercepting he

coming to a head and being resolved in the first two weeks of De

operations.

53. Chambers interview; Ashy interview by author; and Low

interview.

54. Chambers interview.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. The wisdom of AFSOUTH’s policy on helicopters was 

a year later when USAF F-15s accidentally downed two US Army Bl

helicopters in the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, killing 26 people.

57. Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (N

Random House, 1995), 576.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., 576–77; Colin Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” N

Times, 8 October 1992, A35; and Colin Powell, “US Forces: Ch

Ahead,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5, (winter 1992–1993): 32–45.

60. Powell, My American Journey, 577.

61. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 

Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 306; an

Balkan Odyssey, 123.

62. Michael R. Gordon, “12 In State Department Ask Milita

Against Serbs,” New York Times, 23 April 1993, sec. A1 and A12.

63. Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Considers Bosnia Air Strikes; Sees Allied 

New York Times, 24 April 1993, sec. A1 and A6.

64. Ifill; and Robert Morgan, “Hurd Warns of Dangers in Ai

Against Serbs,” Times (London), 20 April 1993, 8.

65. James Gow, “British Perspectives,” in International Perspe

the Yugoslav Conflict, eds. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson 

Macmillan, 1996), 95; and Oliver Lepik, “French Perspec

International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, eds. Alex Dan

Thomas Halverson (London: Macmillan, 1996), 83.

66. Peter Riddell and Martin Ivens, “Hurd Presses on for 

Response to Global Ills,” Times (London), 21 April 1993, 9; and 

Halverson, “American Perspective,” in International Perspective

Yugoslav Conflict, eds. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson 

Macmillan, 1996), 13.

67. Michael Evans, “West Weighs Risks and Rewards of Air 

Times (London), 29 April 1993, 12; Elaine Sciolino, “US Military 

Using Air Power Against the Serbs,” New York Times, 29 April 1993

A6; and Michael Gordon, “NATO General Is Reticent About Air S

Bosnia,” New York Times, 23 April 1993, A1 and A12.

70
68. Edward Mortimer, 

Twin Track to Bosnia Peace: Air Atta

Military Aid Are Complimentary, Not Alternatives,” Financia

(London), 12 May 1993, 18; David White, “NATO Backs Vanc

Financial Times (London), 26 May 1993, 3; and David White, “NATO 

on Bosnia,” Financial Times (London), 27 May 1993, 3. Former US 

of state Cyrus Vance and former British foreign secretary Lord Da

had crafted a peace plan under the auspices of the International Co

on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). ICFY was a joint UN-EU effort. V

the representative of the UN Secretary General, and Owen was the E

Community (later the European Union) representative. Vance an

began to work together in September 1992, and their proposed p

became known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

69. UNSCR 824, 6 May 1993.

70. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation 

Books, Inc., 1996), 274; Honig and Both, 104; Dick A. Leurdijk, Th

Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991–1996: Limits to D

and Force (The Hague: The Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1996

71. UNSCR 824, par. 4.

72. UNSCR 836, 4 June 1993.

73. Mason, Air Power, 168.

74. James A. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International D

and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997

75. The French policy seemed to migrate slightly toward that o

in February 1994 when the French proposed a heavy weapons e

zone around Sarajevo, a measure long sought by the Bosnian Mus

one that would be enforced through air strikes. In August and Se

when limited air strikes took place, they were in the vicinity of Sar

which the French were primarily responsible. However, it was Fren

sition in the UN and NATO which first limited, then blocked, more r

strikes in November 1994. British opposition to air strikes was mu

uniform and resolute, at least until 1995.

71
Chapter 4

NATO Air Support and Air Strike

May–December 1993

The politicians had a great deal of difficulty understand

the problems faced by the military in operations.

—Gen Francis Briquem

Do Something, Genera

During the second half of 1993, UNPROFOR’s comm

could not strike an acceptable balance between m

accomplishment and force protection. In part, their diff

lay in the muddle of conflicting political guidelines go

UNPROFOR’s mission and the failure or inability of UN 

cal authorities to provide their commanders with clear

tized aims. In part, UNPROFOR’s problem lay in its 

ground forces needed to fully accomplish the enforcem

ments of its mission. This shortage of means was exac

by three factors. First, UN and EC political authorities 

edly pressed the commanders to take risks for which th

manders felt they alone would be held accountable 

things go wrong. Second, UN political authorities refu

were unable, to give their commanders control over t

power, which was supposed to make up for the shortfa

ground forces. Third, American Air Force generals in 

southern region were pressing UNPROFOR’s top comm

to support air strikes that would have endangered UN 

and wrecked UNPROFOR’s prospects for fulfilling the h

itarian elements of the UN mission. Deprived of a clea

tive and lacking the means and authority to accompl

tasks thrust upon them, the UNPROFOR commande

nothing against which to balance the weight of respon

for protecting their forces.

In contrast to their UN counterparts, solving the 

drum over using airpower in Bosnia was less of a challe

NATO’s commanders. Because General Ashy had been w

73
on air campaign plans since December 1992, he and A

Boorda were able to quickly meet the needs of NATO p

authorities during the crisis in August at Mount Igma

Sarajevo. The political-military tension that migh

resulted from the struggle to control such a ca

remained in the background because no bombs were d

The AFSOUTH commanders also smoothly discharge

responsibilities for supporting UNPROFOR with close a

port but, again, with no bombs dropped and with self-re

from the Serb air defenses, the AFSOUTH commande

not subjected to the same challenges that actual ope

would have imposed.

UNSCR 836: “Safe Areas” and

Airpower—Expanding the UNPROFOR

Mandate and the Role of NATO: May–July 

On 4 June 1993, after the Bosnian Serbs had rep

rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the UN Security 

resolved, in Resolution 836, to protect the populations 

safe areas by expanding UNPROFOR’s mandate and by 

ing UN member states to use airpower to support UNPR

However, Resolution 836 was not a political comp

between governments for and against using airpo

Bosnia; it was in fact a failure to compromise, which 

the focus of the airpower debate from the political aren

military. It embodied contradictions and vague langua

reflected the divisions between Security Council mem

not least those who had sponsored it: France, Russ

United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain.1 One 

Security Council’s leading proponents of safe areas in 

Amb. Diego Arria of Venezuela, felt compelled to absta

voting for 836, which he described as a charade cloakin

tion.2 He reproached the council for failing to address 

mental questions, such as: “What would be the 

Nations’s responsibility if the aggressors were to acc

establishment of safe areas but later refused to withdra

their surroundings? Would the United Nations then be 

to use force in order to make them withdraw? Wou

74
Security Council be prepared to authorize military ac

order to meet this objective?’’3 In the weeks following t

sage of Resolution 836, comments by the UN represen

from the US and the UK would make clear that nothi

changed in their nations’ stances toward the use of a

in Bosnia.4 Indeed, immediately after the vote o

Madeleine Albright told the council, ‘‘The United State

for this resolution with no illusions. It is an interm

step—no more, no less.’’5 And, in an allusion to the 

administration’s lift and strike policy, she added th

Security Council had agreed to ‘‘keep open options for n

tougher measures. . . . My government’s view of wha

tougher measures should be has not changed.’’6

Resolution 836 represented a wobbly step toward 

enforcement. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Ch

was designed ‘‘to ensure full respect for the safe areas r

to in Resolution 824.’’7 Until that time UNPROFOR h

been mandated to use force to guarantee the deli

humanitarian aid in Bosnia.8 In paragraph 5 of Res

836, the Security Council charged UNPROFOR with fou

which, depending on interpretation, might have r

UNPROFOR to use force other than in self-defense. Th

(1) ‘‘deter attacks against safe areas’’; (2) ‘‘promote th

drawal of military or paramilitary units other than thos

Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi

‘‘occupy some key points on the ground’’; and (4) par

‘‘in the delivery of humanitarian relief’’ (emphasis a

The first three of these four tasks were new.10 To discharg

new responsibilities, the resolution authorized UNPRO

use force, and it allowed UN member states to use airp

support of UNPROFOR.11 But these authorizations we

hearted and unclear.

In long, convoluted sentences, Resolution 836 spun a 

connections and conditions that would confound those 

officers whose duty it would be to implement it. Wh

Security Council clearly decided to vest UNPROFOR with 

responsibility for protecting the safe areas, it simultane

though less clearly—made it difficult for the force t

that responsibility. In paragraph 9, the resolution aut

75
UNPROFOR 

to take the necessary measures, includ

use of force, in reply to bombardments against the saf

. . . or to armed incursion into them or in the event 

deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the f

of movement of the Force or of protected humanitaria

voys.’’12 This authorization circumscribed the range o

ble interpretations open to UNPROFOR and, for examp

cluded its commanders from proactively using force 

the Bosnian Serbs as a means to fulfill the task to ‘‘p

the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units’’ from 

the safe areas. More importantly, at the insistence 

British, French, and Spanish,13 the debilitating clause 

in self-defence’’ appeared just before the authorization 

force,14 and rendered the new authorization mean

because UNPROFOR had always had the right to use 

self-defense.15 Permission to use force in self-defense w

something the Security Council needed to grant to UNPR

nor could the council properly proscribe it.16 Inde

clause acting in self-defence could have been seen as 

backwards from the authority UNPROFOR already po

because, from its inception, the force in Bosnia ha

allowed to use ‘‘all necessary measures’’ to assist in th

ery of humanitarian aid.17 Thus, while paragraph 9 ost

added to UNPROFOR’s authority to use force in Bosnia

contained a clause undermining that same authority.

Paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 added airpower to t

but in a way that was open to conflicting interpretatio

stated that ‘‘Member-states, acting nationally or t

regional organizations may take . . . all necessary me

through the use of air power . . . to support the force 

performance of its mandate.’’19 Airpower had not been 

ically included or excluded in the paragraph auth

UNPROFOR to use force (para. 9), and UNPROFOR had 

power of its own. This seemed to imply a division o

whereby UNPROFOR was only authorized to use force ‘‘a

self-defence,’’ but NATO—or indeed any individual UN m

state acting alone or in cooperation with others—could 

tially use airpower to pursue options barred to UNPROFO

freedom to use airpower was, however, constrained 

76
ways. First, any use of airpower had to be 

subject t

coordination with the secretary-general and the Force.

second, the use of airpower was meant to support UNP

‘‘in the performance of its mandate set out in paragr

and 9 above.’’21 By requiring close coordination with 

and linking the use of airpower to both UNPR

expanded mandate and its convoluted authority for 

force (when ‘‘acting in self-defence’’), the authors of Res

836 left open the possibility for two very different inte

tions of how airpower could be used in Bosnia. One 

interpret this constraint was to give precedence to the 

tive of the resolution—protecting the people in the safe 

and to argue that airpower could be used proactively 

strikes in order to execute the tasks spelled out in par

5, which UNPROFOR was proscribed from accomplish

paragraph 9 (e.g., bombing the Bosnian Serb forces i

‘‘to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary 

from around the safe areas). In addition, this first inte

tion would permit airpower to be used in support of UNP

forces when they lacked adequate means for self-d

Alternatively, another interpretation—which appealed t

objecting to the widespread use of airpower—was to s

paragraph 9 of Resolution 836 clarified UNPROFOR’s 

as a peacekeeping force by limiting it to the use of for

when ‘‘acting in self-defence.’’22 Since airpower was in

to support UNPROFOR, it could only be used legitima

air support. Rather than resolving conflicting agendas t

compromise, Resolution 836 merely served as a veh

transferring the struggle to a new stage—a stage where 

commanders in UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH would play 

tant roles.

UNSCR 844: Implementing an Ambiguous Policy

The ambiguity over airpower continued as the S

Council took steps to implement its safe areas policy. 

June, Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted a report advis

Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 

which he noted, “NATO confirmed its willingness t

‘protective air power in case of attack against UNPRO

77
Most of the references to airpower in the report dea

close air support for UNPROFOR, not air strikes. Howev

eral remarks alluded to the possibility for broader air 

These included ‘‘emphasis must be placed on a cred

strike capability’’ to help UNPROFOR ‘‘resist a conce

assault on any of the safe areas.’’24 Despite an assessm

UNPROFOR’s commander, Lt Gen Lars Eric Wahlgre

some 34,000 troops would be needed to implement t

areas policy, Boutros-Ghali justified recommending 

option’’ of only 7,600 reinforcements because ‘‘wh

option cannot, in itself, completely guarantee the def

the safe areas, it relies on the threat of air action agai

belligerent.’’25 On 18 June 1993, the Security Council 

Resolution 844, approving Boutros-Ghali’s report, auth

7,600 reinforcements for UNPROFOR and reaffirmi

decision in paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 (1993) on 

of airpower in and around the safe areas to support th

in the performance of its mandate.’’26 In brief speeche

Security Council made immediately after passing Res

844, the representatives from the US, France, Russia, 

UK emphasized their own national spins on implement

safe areas policy.27 Nothing had changed. Much was be

to the interpretations of those who would have to imp

these resolutions.

According to Michael Williams, a former director of in

tion and senior UNPROFOR spokesman who has writte

the UN’s troubled political-military relations, G

Wahlgren and Morillon ‘‘had little idea how to procee

the implementation of the safe areas resolutions.28 Ho

Both have shown that on 5 June, the day before the S

Council authorized enforcement of the safe areas, G

Wahlgren prophetically warned UN political authorities 

York, ‘‘If one allowed no controls of the military or param

units of the Bosnian government, one would create a s

which would encourage the use of the safe areas as 

where forces could refit, rearm, train and prepare for 

military operations.’’29 Moreover, after 836 was issued, 

Wahlgren worried that the safe areas concept jeopardi

impartiality of his forces in Bosnia, who were supp

78
enforce its one-sided restrictions.30 General Morillon

s 

refers to the safe areas only obliquely.31 However, he se

have favored using airpower when necessary to ens

success of UNPROFOR’s mission.32 Though Wahlgren w

the UN’s undersecretary-general for peacekeepin

Annan, proclaiming the importance of airpower in com

ing for the inadequate number of ground reinforcement

force commander’s successor believed Wahlgren was 

mentally opposed to the more forceful bent of his new 

date and, in consequence, wanted nothing to do with 

airpower.34 In any event, Generals Wahlgren and Mori

their UN posts just a few weeks after Resolution 8

passed and before NATO made aircraft available for a

port. Thus, it fell to their successors to sort out wha

about airpower and to try to extract a coherent missio

the tangled verbiage of Resolutions 836 and 844.

New Leadership for UNPROFOR

Weaknesses in the UNPROFOR chain of comman

complicated, not rectified, by changes made in May of 1

the beginning of May, former Norwegian foreign m

Thorvald Stoltenberg took over from Cyrus Vance as 

co-chairman to the peace conference in Geneva.35 

Vance, however, Stoltenberg was designated the UN Sec

General’s special representative for the former Yug

thus making Stoltenberg the civilian head of UNPROFO

assist him in the discharge of his military responsi

Stoltenberg recruited his fellow countryman Gen Viglie

who had recently retired from NATO’s most senior m

post—chairman of the military committee in Brusse

August, General Eide was based in Zagreb, heading a 

three officers who were to act as the liaison b

Stoltenberg and the commander of UNPROFOR.38 Also 

May, around the time of Warren Christopher’s trip to 

Clinton administration’s lift and strike policy, Boutro

received support from Paris in insisting that the UN, 

than NATO, should oversee the implementation of an

plan in the Balkans.39 However, in early May, the 

government also agreed to a chain of command for 

79
menting a Yugoslav peace plan, which put NATO

s A

Boorda at the top, a French general as second in com

and the general commanding NATO’s Allied Rapid R

Corps in charge of operations in Bosnia.40 Though the 

Owen Peace Plan—for which this chain of command w

inally intended—was never implemented, the French 

ment secured the top UNPROFOR billet in Zagreb f

Jean Cot, the man designated as Boorda’s number 

implementing the peace plan.41 Whether the UN or NA

the effort in the former Yugoslavia, General Cot was po

play a central role. Had the UN and NATO worked toge

implement a peace plan, this might not have been 

arrangement. But adding a layer of civilian authority th

geographically separated from the UN military comm

(Stoltenberg was based in Geneva) only complicated 

for the UNPROFOR generals as they later tried to in

their mission.

Two months after Stoltenberg was installed, the UN r

the top two commanders in UNPROFOR with senior i

generals whose backgrounds and experiences suggest

would be likely to hold the traditional army view of ai

On 1 July 1993, General Cot, the only four-star gen

command UNPROFOR, replaced General Wahlgren—th

having lasted just four months in his UN post. Cot, at 5

of age, had spent nearly 40 years of his life in uniform a

one of the most senior generals in the French army.42 

1990, General Cot was promoted to four-star gener

named commander of the French 1st Army. He had 

his post for more than a year by the summer of 1991 w

was tasked to lead secret Western European Union 

planning for possible military intervention in Yugos

After being designated as the ground commander 

Admiral Boorda for implementing the Vance-Owen pl

traveled to Naples at least twice to discuss impleme

planning before taking up command of UNPROFOR; 

these visits he was briefed on the US-authored air ca

plan, and he was not impressed.44

Though France contributed the largest number of tr

UNPROFOR, it could not expect to retain the two 

80
command billets, so General Morillon had to give up h

in Sarajevo.45 In late June, General Morillon learned 

old friend, Lt Gen Francis Briquemont of Belgium, 

replace him.46 General Briquemont was a 58-year-old i

officer who had recently received his third star and wa

to take command of the 1st Belgian Corps headquart

Cologne, Germany, when another of his French coll

General Cot, phoned and invited him to come to work 

former Yugoslavia.47 Briquemont was at the zenith 

career in the Belgian army and had already commande

brigade and division levels in units earmarked for N

Before going to Bosnia, he had not been privy to detail

US-built air campaign plan. On Monday, 12 July 

General Cot presided over the change of command in S

between Generals Morillon and Briquemont. The Fren

erals then departed for Zagreb, leaving Briquem

Sarajevo with his new and ill-defined responsibilities

two francophone army generals at the top of UNPROF

not participated in the Gulf War, and their familiarity w

power was limited mainly to close air support. Nor we

experienced at peacekeeping or peace support operatio

both now held command in organizations virtually de

airpower expertise,50 and they would soon find them

caught up in negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs whi

siders attempted to bring pressure to bear on the S

threatening air strikes. It was the perfect setup for th

tional soldier-airman split over how to use airpower, r

ing the political tensions between France and Britain 

hand and the US on the other. 

NATO Air-to-Ground Missions:

June–August 1993

The need for air support to compensate for UNPR

inadequate ground forces led the UN’s new comman

avail themselves of NATO’s airpower expertise and res

however, from the outset, Cot and Briquemont were 

skeptical of the utility of NATO air strikes. NATO agreed 

vide unspecified air support to UNPROFOR on 10 Jun

Admiral Boorda tasked planners at the CAOC to de

81
concept of operations for adding close air support to Op

Deny Flight.51 Under the direction of Colonel Lushbau

CAOC staff quickly produced this concept of operation

General Chambers and Admiral Boorda took it to Zag

UN coordination.52 However, while NATO forged ahea

plans to implement close air support procedures 

Change-1 to its Deny Flight plan, OPLAN 40101,53 UNP

did nothing to capitalize on its access to NATO airpow

to General Cot’s arrival in July.54 When he showed 

Zagreb, General Cot’s official link to NATO air operatio

through a NATO lieutenant colonel who had been disp

to Zagreb to help coordinate activities for the no-fly zon

quickly made arrangements to have a French-speakin

eral officer from the UK’s Royal Air Force who had exp

in air-to-ground operations assigned to his headqua

head up a NATO liaison team.56

Adding air support to the mission in Bosnia also led 

political authorities to give some clear guidance to the mil

how to interpret the Security Council resolutions. Thoug

had agreed in general terms to provide air support in J

was not until mid-July that the North Atlantic Counci

NATO’s highest political deliberative body, specifically offe

UN secretary-general aircraft for the new mission.57 

ambassadors decided to limit the use of air support to t

tection of UNPROFOR; it was not to be used for the wid

sion of protecting the safe areas.58 Furthermore, althou

two resolutions authorizing airpower (836 and 844) state

could be used ‘‘in and around the safe areas,’’ NATO am

dors decided close air support would be made avail

UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia.59 These two NATO inte

tions of the Security Council resolutions reflected the 

but more so the British, desires to both avoid escalation 

protect their troops in Bosnia. Unlike the French, wh

deployed mainly in and around the safe areas of Bih

Sarajevo, British soldiers were spread out across central 

where there were no safe areas.60 Furthermore, a Bosni

commander had already threatened the British that if NA

attacked the Serbs, then the Serbs would target British t

Through their interpretations, NATO’s political authoriti

82
reducing the chances of Serb reprisals.62 These NATO in

tations were driven as much by objections, or n

objectives—avoiding escalation and friendly casualties

the positive aim of assisting in the delivery of humanitar

though, in this case the positive and negative objectives 

mented each other well.63

In August 1993, Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) press

Sarajevo led NATO to threaten the Bosnian Serbs w

strikes. Because American commanders in NATO ha

planning for air strikes already, they were able to mov

policy toward the sort of forceful use of airpower prefe

the US government. However, NATO political aut

established procedures for controlling the amount o

used and the rules for initiating air strikes. The poten

friction between the American theater-level commande

favored robust air action, and NATO political authoriti

wished to restrain airpower, did not materialize in 

because air strikes were blocked by UN commanders, p

larly General Briquemont. However, tensions quickly 

at the military level, where the vulnerability of UNP

ground forces helped to push the UN commanders ev

ther toward those political authorities who were oppose

strikes. 

Increasing Bosnian Serb pressure on Sarajevo durin

and July of 1993 led the US government to push its a

air strikes against the Serbs. The assault on Sarajevo 

with increased shelling at the end of May, and by lat

BSA units were systematically taking government t

around the Bosnian capital.64 By early August, the Ser

Mount Bjelasnica south of Sarajevo and were threate

capture nearby Mount Igman, creating a crisis for th

national community.65 If left unchecked, Serb forces en

Sarajevo looked set to take control of all land routes in

out of the city.66 As General Briquemont attempted to 

ate a cease-fire with the Bosnian Serbs, the US gove

pressed its allies to accept a broad interpretation of Res

836 by endorsing air strikes to relieve the strangula

Sarajevo.67 The American government even suggested 

ready to act alone, according to Dick Leurdijk.68 S

83
America

s allies remained opposed to air strikes due 

cerns for their soldiers in Bosnia;69 however, follow

hours of debate on 2 August, the alliance issued the fo

warning:

The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparatio

undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and 

areas continues, including wide-scale interference with human

assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against 

responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.7

NATO air forces could mount these air strikes quickly b

of earlier US planning and because air strikes did not 

the complex system for air-ground coordination like 

needed for close air support.

Commanders in AFSOUTH quickly responded to cal

Brussels for a plan of action. The mission statement fr

NATO Council to its military authorities directed th

assist with the relief of the siege of Sarajevo and, if d

help relieve sieges of other safe areas in Bosnia-Herzeg

and in addition ‘‘when authorized conduct expand

strikes elsewhere in B-H.’’71 Working from the plannin

rials that had been accumulated and refined since G

Chambers first built his air campaign plan at the star

year, General Ashy and a few members of his staff in 

quickly put together a list of targets for a robust se

strikes aimed at crippling the BSA.72 Admiral Boorda li

plan, and a colonel from General Ashy’s staff was disp

to Belgium to brief the air strike plan to Gen 

Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander, 

(SACEUR).73 General Shalikashvili accepted the plan, 

within just a few days of the order from Brussels to ge

for air strikes, AFSOUTH had a plan it could execute.

To ensure flexibility and control over air strikes, 

ambassadors ordered their military authorities to consu

UNPROFOR and then to report back with some optio

response to this tasking, staff officers in Brussels and at 

produced a memorandum titled ‘‘Operational Options 

Strikes.’’75 A slim document of about 10 pages, ‘‘Ope

Options’’ spelled out, in broad terms, how air strikes we

authorized.76 Among other things, the memorandum d

84
NATO military authorities to prioritize and group togeth

posed targets by target type and by location in order to f

political oversight and decisions.77 On 9 August NATO 

sadors approved the “Operational Options’’ memo, b

alliance softened the tone of its threat to use air strikes,78 

Air strikes foreseen by the Council decisions of August 2 are lim

the support of humanitarian relief, and must not be interprete

decision to intervene militarily in the conflict. . . . [Furthermore], N

actions take place under the authority of the United Nations Se

Council, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions, i

ing the UN Security Council Resolutions 770, 776, and 836, and i

port of UNPROFOR as it carries out its overall mandate.79

The NAC also agreed ‘‘with the position of the UN Sec

General that the first use of air power in the theatre s

authorized by him,’’ and the council reserved for its

political authority within NATO to launch air strikes, 

than delegating that authority to the NATO secretary-ge

In this way, France and the UK could counter any un

pressure from the US to initiate air strikes, either indire

permanent members of the UN Security Council), by p

ing Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or directly, by blocking th

authorization.81

Despite NATO’s tight political controls over air strik

the limited nature of its stated aims for conducting th

air strike options approved by the NATO council allo

militarily significant attacks in graduated steps. ‘‘Oper

Options for Air Strikes’’ envisaged an escalating applic

force in three phases: an initial demonstrative respon

provocation; a slightly more robust follow-on phase; 

expanded phase of air strikes.82 These graduated 

allowed political authorities to work their way up throu

phases as necessary to increase the coercive pressure 

Bosnian Serbs. NATO and UN authorities—both politi

military—continued to reference these options for air 

until the end of Deny Flight. However, analyses of NA

strikes in Bosnia have been plagued by attempts to dra

clarity about the distinctions between the three pha

options as they came to be called—than the words of th

document could provide.83 While the title of the do

85
referred to options, the guidance on targeting contain

spoke of phases.84 The options stemmed from being 

choose how far to go when executing the phases. Th

options, or phases, originally referred to coherent gr

targets rather than a means of differentiating between 

ual targets for one-off attacks—an interpretation later a

by UNPROFOR.85

Considering the confusion that has grown up 

Option 1, 2, and 3 targets and their discussion later 

study, it is worth pausing to examine them. For each 

three phases in the ‘‘Operational Options’’ memo, the 

ment’s authors offered examples, ‘‘for illustrative pu

only,’’ of the types of targets military authorities shou

sider grouping together when proposing strikes.86 The 

response option, or phase I, could include any militar

nificant target threatening a safe area, and a ‘‘smoking 

weapon which had recently fired on UNPROFOR or a sa

was seen as an ideal target for phase I.87 There was, h

never a requirement to hit only smoking guns in p

Targets outside of Bosnia would not be hit except in p

of a response. But, distinguishing between phases II 

targets inside Bosnia sometimes required an act of ju

because similar examples and words were used to d

appropriate targets for these phases.88 In general, the c

target was to a threatened safe area and the more di

contribution to the threat to that safe area, then th

likely it was to be hit in phase II of a response to a p

tion. Conversely, targets located farther from a threaten

area and bearing a less direct connection to the threat 

it would not be hit unless bombing were expanded to ph

Accordingly, a weapons depot near Sarajevo might b

phase II of an operation if Sarajevo were threatened. B

same target, if it were struck at all, would be attacked in 

III of a response to a threat against Bihac.89 By the tim

executed its first air strike—a year after NATO ap

‘‘Operational Options’’—the idea of conducting strikes 

groups of targets in escalating phases of a coercive b

campaign had given way to the practice of one-off 

against individual targets which were labeled as Optio

86
or 3.90 It was not until operation Deliberate Force in th

mer of 1995 that the original concept of linking groups 

gets to options, or phases, was reapplied. However, by t

safe areas were lumped together in two wider ‘‘zo

action,’’ thus further blurring the distinction betwee

Option 2 and 3 targets.91 On 13 August 1993, NATO pu

Change-2 to the plan governing Deny Flight, CINC

OPLAN 40101, incorporating new procedures and ROE 

strikes.92

Airpower and Coercion at

Mount Igman: August 1993

In his reaction to NATO pressures for air strikes, G

Briquemont demonstrated his traditional army views 

power. With America pushing NATO toward air strikes 

the Bosnian Serbs, General Cot suggested to G

Briquemont that he should go to Vicenza to learn abou

plans for employing airpower; however, General Briq

already held strong convictions about the use and lim

of airpower in Bosnia.93 As General Briquemont saw th

ation,‘‘These ambiguous resolutions (836 and 844), 

everyone could interpret as he liked,’’ were the ca

UNPROFOR’s difficulties, and in his judgment

the UN, lacking the means for these resolutions, turned to NAT

air support to compensate for the shortages of means on the gr

After Vietnam and Afghanistan, and considering the terrain in B

how could anyone still persist in this mistaken thinking about 

tional strategy?94

To General Briquemont, the appeal to airpower was a p

gambit based on the minimal risks to NATO airpow

unrealistic beliefs held by NATO politicians about hi

aerial warfare.95 Moreover, he claimed,‘‘What troubled 

most was that this mission was the responsibility of NA

Boorda) and of M. Cot and that, at least initially, the UNP

commander in Bosnia seemed to be considered a sec

player.’’96 Enroute to Vicenza, General Briquemont reso

himself and told his staff, ‘‘Nothing happens in Bosnia w

my consent, and if it does, I will be returning to B

87
immediately.

97 Thus, before he had arrived at Vicenza, 

Briquemont already held serious doubts about the ab

NATO airpower to compensate for the inadequacies of his 

forces, and he was disturbed that other senior officers m

infringing on his command prerogatives.98

At Vicenza, Briquemont showed the sort of author

control he expected to exercise as the commander in 

On 11 August, General Briquemont met with Genera

and Chambers at Vicenza, where a NATO staff officer 

the UN commander on ‘‘the concept of an air campai

with different phases, and lists of targets for each phas

type, their location, their proximity to UNPROFOR troo

their potential for collateral damage.’’99 After 20 m

General Briquemont interrupted the briefing to point o

this was not what he wanted.100 While the NATO 

seemed to be focused exclusively on bombing Bosnia

targets, General Briquemont’s concerns also includ

fighting in central Bosnia between the Bosnian Croats 

mostly Muslim Bosnian government forces.101 The U

mander went on to tell the NATO officers that he wante

air support only, and not ‘‘a wide ranging air campa

According to General Briquemont, Generals Ash

Chambers understood his situation, but they claim

they had their orders from NATO.103 Briquemont respon

reminding them he was the supported commander in 

and that ‘‘NATO should be supporting me, rather than 

to impose its vision of operations on me.’’104 Briquemo

on to discuss and approve potential air support targets 

ing Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb targets.105 Before G

Briquemont left Vicenza on 12 August, General Ashy t

that one day they would execute the US-authored a

paign, to which Briquemont replied,‘‘As long as I am th

mander in Bosnia, I don’t think so.’’106

The next day, Briquemont used the press to expl

views and to dampen enthusiasm for air strikes; the 

from his comments illustrated the weakness in the UN 

of command.107 On 13 August, when General Briquemo

his chief of staff, Brigadier Vere Hayes, voiced their cri

of the American push for air strikes, Madeleine Albrig

88
US ambassador to the UN, demanded that they be 

plined.108 In Briquemont’s view, what really bothere

Albright was that ‘‘everyone knew’’ that Briquemont ha

‘‘If an aircraft of NATO is firing above Bosnia, without m

mission, I am going back to Brussels immediately.’’109 I

ing this assertion, Briquemont was appealing to a fun

tal principle of war—unity of command—and 

commander in Bosnia, he expected control over all 

within his areas of responsibility.110 Belgian political a

itary authorities backed their general, and said, furthe

that since he was working for the UN, any punishmen

have to be pursued through the UN.111 Through all 

General Briquemont felt he had the support 

Stoltenberg.112 However, an unnamed aide of Kofi Anna

ing without his boss’s permission and apparently on h

imagined authority, sent a letter, bypassing Gener

directly to General Briquemont admonishing him.113 T

ure of senior UN political authorities to clearly support 

sure their commander in Bosnia highlighted a lack of 

ence and efficiency within the UN hierarchy that 

continue to plague UNPROFOR operations. 

Generals Briquemont and Cot were skeptical of t

sponsored air campaign plan, and as they themselve

fied, their disagreements with Generals Chambers an

over the utility of airpower owed much to the traditional 

airman split. Looking back on the meeting in Vicenza, G

Briquemont recalled, 

I had seen the confrontation of two different strategic concepts. O

one hand, there were the American airmen who were convince

the air force could win the war alone—on the other, there we

ground-pounders, to which I belonged, convinced that only the 

coordination of actions between forces on the ground and in t

would permit the attainment of the final objective, and convince

in this kind of internal civil war, the air forces could only be 

porting force.114

General Cot held similar views, noting,

I have endured, in Naples and Vicenza, briefings in the style of a 

Mass, where only the Americans knew the business. One could 

acterize it as directly transposed from the Gulf War, the succ

phases of total war . . . I admit having been concerned, as were 

89
UN military chiefs, about this excitement amongst airmen dream

‘‘breaking the Serbs,’’ and [who] were uninformed about the sit

in Yugoslavia, which they had only seen from their supersonic 

over the country.115

There were other reasons for Generals Cot and Briquem

oppose air strikes but, clearly, their outlook as soldiers 

important factor.

Despite General Briquemont’s refusal to countenanc

air strikes, the threat of such strikes seemed to play an 

tant role in coercing the Serbs into halting their encirc

of Sarajevo and relinquishing the territory they had ca

The Bosnian Serbs had continued their advance 

Sarajevo in violation of their own promises in late July 

the offensive.116 As Dick Leurdijk later explained, 

On 18 August 1993, Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Counc

the UN now had the ‘‘initial operation [sic] capability for the use 

power in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.’’ On tha

day, NATO carried out its first air support exercise. On the groun

Bosnian Serbs stopped their attack on Mount Igman. The area 

under UNPROFOR control. It was the first time that the UN—th

NATO—really threatened to use force and the Bosnian Serbs ga

This outcome would have important consequences for later dec

on air strikes in the context of NAC’s decisions on Sarajevo, Go

and the other safe areas.117

Though this reasoning is essentially correct, the timin

error. Bosnian Serb troops began to withdraw from 

Igman and Mount Bjelasnica a week before the date c

Leurdijk, and they were reportedly gone completely tw

before it.118 Moreover, if it was NATO airpower that coer

Serbs, then it was probably the threat of air strikes, 

than air support, that had motivated them to give in. G

Briquemont, who ran the military negotiations for the 

withdrawal, recorded that the real Bosnian Serb willing

pull back came in the wake of the two NATO decisions t

air strikes.119 The first Bosnian Serb overture cam

Karadzic in Geneva just after the NATO Council’s dec

authorize air strikes on 2 August.120 Following that, G

Mladic negotiated and signed the military agreement t

draw his troops from Mount Igman on 10 August, the d

NATO announced its approval of ‘‘Operational Options 

90
Strikes.

121 Finally, the threat of NATO air strikes w

alive as the terms of the Mount Igman agreement were 

mented.122 Though the sequence of events does not pro

the threat of airpower worked, it would have been reas

for NATO ministers to conclude that there was a con

between their threats and Serb compliance, as L

asserted.

Contrary to the NATO view described by Leurdijk, G

Briquemont believed the threat of air strikes was coun

ductive to his endeavors to negotiate a solution to the 

Igman crisis, and that air strikes exacerbated the risk

troops.123 General Briquemont knew that the Serbs ha

reasons to quit Mount Igman; in particular, General 

was short on manpower and wanted to use UNPROFOR 

consolidate his gains.124 With ambiguous Security Counc

lutions to work from and Do Something, General! as h

ance from Mr. Stoltenberg, General Briquemont began 

to calm the situation in Bosnia by negotiating an end 

fighting around Sarajevo.125 He hoped that the S

agreement would, in turn, enhance negotiations in 

and reduce the suffering amongst the people in Bo

However, the threat of NATO air strikes, ostensibly in s

of UNPROFOR, jeopardized the UN’s impartiality in 

especially since the threats were being directed only 

Serbs.127 The NATO threat, he felt, hindered his nego

and, if carried out, would endanger his forces.128 Briq

did not see how NATO air strikes could help him, and 

not credit them for securing the Serb withdrawal from 

Igman. Just as Betts had observed, proponents and 

nents of airpower could find justification for their op

beliefs in the same evidence.129

Command without Control:

September–December 1993

The crisis over Mount Igman brought General Briq

face-to-face with his responsibilities as a command

forced him to choose between mission accomplishme

force protection. The crisis occurred within six weeks 

91
taking command. And in that time, General Briquemo

come to see a ‘‘strange dysfunction in the strategy of th

national community,’’ whereby nations advocati

strikes—especially the US—were unwilling to take risk

ciated with putting troops on the ground; and those 

taking such risks were unwilling to endorse air strikes

UN commander in Bosnia was acutely aware of the r

himself was taking by putting soldiers on Mount Igma

he felt the weight of his responsibilities.

I had never experienced quite as profoundly what it meant 

responsible for the lives of so many men. The vast majority of 

were the age of my children, because at 58 I was undoubtedly th

est military man in the field. I have always acted with the though

a drop of blood of one of my men was a drop of my own blood, 

am convinced that every officer worthy of the name thinks this w

He knew that in war it was necessary to take casualt

this was not war.132 Though Briquemont’s civilian p

advisor, Viktor Andreev, assured him that the S

Council resolutions were so unclear that the genera

always justify his decisions and his actions,133 G

Briquemont himself worried that what he was doing at 

Igman was both dangerous and beyond the mission ma

to UNPROFOR by the Security Council.134 As he later w

knew that I was engaging in an operation which did n

form at all with the mandate of UNPROFOR, but, on th

hand, I had decided to do everything in order to help 

the negotiations in Geneva.’’135 Five years after send

troops onto Mounts Bjelasnica and Igman, General Briq

recalled that

it was a military mission. If I had thirty casualties or dead soldi

Mount Igman, I’m sure that I [would have been] before the [

martial] in my country, because it was [outside] of the mandate 

United Nations—but Stoltenberg asked [me to do it].136

In fact, though, moving the French onto Mount Igm

entirely consistent with the mandate established in Res

836, which tasked UNPROFOR to ‘‘promote the withdr

military or paramilitary units other than those 

Government of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina,’’ 

‘‘occupy some key points on the ground.’’137 The real p

92
for General Briquemont was doing it without taking 

ties. Recounting a discussion with his civilian political 

at the outset of Briquemont’s tenure in Bosnia, the 

recalled that

I said: “Okay, I have understood. The resolutions of the Se

Council cannot help me in my mission.” And the rules of engag

were foreseen for peacekeeping operations. We had no peace. It w

war between the three parties, and I was there with a few “blu

mets,” and it was impossible to respect the rules of engagement. 

said: “Bon. We shall never speak about the rules of engageme

shall do our best to avoid casualties—point [period, full-stop]” (e

sis added).138

Thus, General Briquemont uneasily confronted the con

tory tasks and restrictions bequeathed to him by the S

Council. Avoiding casualties among UNPROFOR’s pea

ers, easing the suffering of the Bosnian people, and fac

negotiations in Geneva became his priority tasks.139 Pro

the safe areas, the principal objective stated in S

Council Resolution 836 defining UNPROFOR’s man

Bosnia, was impossible with the means availa

Briquemont. He simply could not attempt to accompl

mission within the bounds of acceptable risks to his fo

In late August and September, Admiral Boorda assua

UN commanders’ concerns about air strikes and o

UNPROFOR approval for a joint UN-NATO target list. 

bothered General Briquemont that he had been left ou

decision making and planning for air strikes until senio

officers had tried to pressure him into approving an a

paign.140 And General Ashy had been very direct in atte

to get the UN commander in Bosnia to accept an a

paign.141 On 21 August, Admiral Boorda attended a 

hosted by General Cot in Zagreb during which he conv

Generals Cot and Briquemont a sense that he und

their situation and,142 more importantly, he shared th

cerns about the risks involved with air strikes.143 H

General Briquemont seems to have been left out of furt

cussions on air strikes.144 In September, General C

again with Admiral Boorda for the first UN-NATO joint 

ing board in order to review and approve a list of air str

gets.145 The list included targets for all three warring f

93
in Bosnia—though the Serb military possessed by far th

targets suitable for air strikes.146 The list did not, h

attempt to designate targets in terms of options or ph

was just one list of potential targets.147 Presumably, if th

arose, they would have been grouped into phases to m

needs of a given contingency, and then proposed to U

NATO political authorities for approval. General Cot re

opposed to air strikes, but he recognized NATO’s need 

and he saw no harm in maintaining his input into 

strike planning process.148 Furthermore, General Cot 

incentive to maintain a good working relationshi

Admiral Boorda since he was to be Boorda’s deputy 

UN-NATO arrangements to implement the latest pea

posal for Bosnia—the Union of Three Republics plan

seemed close to being signed during the third w

September 1993.149

UNPROFOR Commanders Strive to Control

NATO Close Air Support

By the end of September, NATO and UN military com

ers had a workable system for close air support, but 

apparatus for authorizing close air support rendered t

tem ineffective. Generals Cot and Briquemont had agre

General Briquemont should be the one to initiate any 

for air support.150 By the end of the month, staff off

Vicenza, using rules of engagement approved by NATO 

cal authorities, had written a set of procedures for con

close air support.151 Just as with the air-to-air missi

enforcing the no-fly zone, the procedures for air-to-

missions stipulated that ordnance could be expend

Bosnia only with clearance from one of five senior NAT

manders, with General Chambers, the CAOC director

the lowest level of approval authority.152 Senior comm

in NATO’s southern region ensured that all aircrews r

into the region for Deny Flight operations were tho

briefed and trained to follow these rules of engagemen

General Ashy described the arrangements, ‘‘We had a 

that was promulgated by me and approved by Admiral 

that had to go to every aircrew before [they] flew . . . y

94
to be personally certified by your unit commander to 

we didn’t want anybody out there winging it.’’154 It 

tightly controlled operation.

On the UN side, air support was also tightly controll

at such a high level that it was useless to UNPROFOR

manders. Only Boutros Boutros-Ghali could approve 

attack. According to General Briquemont, early ex

designed to test the UN’s command and control 

demonstrated that, ‘‘Between Cot and myself, no prob

was very rapid, very quick reaction.’’155 However, the U

mander in Bosnia found that the approval process stall

it got above General Cot.

In the most favorable circumstances, before having the r

[approval for an attack], I needed four to six hours. And we had a

in the sky permanently. And I said to General Cot: “But, it’s im

ble. We have the aircraft above our heads, and I must wait six 

to have the release to . . . engage one tank, or two tanks.”156

Concerned about the security of his troops, G

Briquemont urged General Cot to obtain the autho

approve close air support missions; the UN comma

Bosnia later recalled arguing, ‘‘I can’t have casualties

not enough troops on the ground. I have so many air

the sky, and I cannot use the aircraft to defend m

troops!’’157 But, General Cot needed no prompting; t

senior UN commanders were of the same mind about a

port.158 As General Cot later wrote,

The Secretary-General personally reserved for himself the decis

each possible attack. Yet the delay in the process, between Zagre

New York and back, of around four hours, was totally incomp

with the urgency of such missions. Furthermore, it appeared 

ceptable to me that someone could decide in New York what ou

have been left solely to my authority: the security of my units (em

added).159

General Cot’s petition went unanswered,160 and Boutro

did not delegate the authority to approve air sup

UNPROFOR’s military commanders until 1995.161 Fru

at this lack of control, General Briquemont suggested t

UN commanders would be justified in by-passing thei

cal authorities in order to save the lives of their troops

95
It

s very strange for generals to say that, but when you are respo

for the lives of your soldiers on the ground, you don’t react as in 

time. Eh? I said to General Cot, but, if I am engaged by the Ser

the Croats, or the Muslims, I shall not ask the release of the p

side.162

However, the UN commanders realized that Admiral 

would block any request for air support unless he knew t

UN commanders had political approval for an attack.163 

air strikes, the UN generals wanted close air support. Bu

out the means to approve requests for air support in a 

manner, UNPROFOR could make little use of NATO airp

General Briquemont was also concerned about the v

bility of Belgian troops, who were not under his comma

were stationed in Croatia where close air support had 

been authorized.164 Briquemont pressed General Cot to 

authority from New York for close air support in C

though again, Cot needed no urging.165 On 19 Sep

Boutros-Ghali wrote to the president of the Security 

informing him of General Cot’s desire to have close air s

in Croatia.166 And in early October the Security 

renewed the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia for six mo

this time under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.167 Howe

council postponed authorizing air support there, a

extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia 

come until the end of March of 1994, two weeks after G

Cot relinquished command of UNPROFOR.168

Without effective air support, which the UNPROFO

manders were unable to acquire, the logic of the ‘‘light 

broke down and so, too, did the whole safe areas poli

the logic of the light option was suspect to begin with. 

blush, it seemed logical to assert that the weaker UNP

was on the ground, then the more it would have to 

NATO airpower. The presence of UN forces would deter 

on the safe areas, and if the deterrence broke dow

UNPROFOR soldiers could call on NATO airpower for c

support. This assumed the Bosnian Serbs—the mos

target of air attacks by the very nature of the UN’s saf

policy—would tolerate CAS if the BSA attacked first, bu

respond to other air attacks by taking hostages or by ret

96
against UNPROFOR.169 As discussed earlier in this c

NATO ambassadors had interpreted Resolutions 836 a

to take this into account. However, BSA tolerance for U

defense was likely to evaporate if UNPROFOR’s need f

defense was provoked by UN soldiers aggressively tryin

fill their mandate and then counting on NATO air sup

back them up. Thus, the weaker UNPROFOR was, t

likely it was to deter BSA attacks on the safe areas, a

less aggressive it could afford to be in helping to 

humanitarian aid in Bosnia.

The ‘‘Operational Options’’ approved by the NAC in 

were also of questionable utility. As long as NATO p

authorities remained self-deterred by fears of Bosnia

retaliation, they would have difficulty choosing one of t

two options: the demonstrative phase or the fo

phase.170 Those options would have served merely as a 

to the Bosnian Serbs to begin taking hostages.171 Whil

far from certain that a robust air campaign would suc

compelling the Serbs to quit attacking a safe area, the d

of trying to get to phase III in a graduated fashion see

rule out the possibility of ever making an attempt

somewhat paradoxically, the weaker UNPROFOR was 

ground, the less it could afford to have NATO a

attempting to enforce Serb compliance with the safe are

icy. By keeping UNPROFOR in place and weak, and by 

ing to give its commanders timely access to NATO air s

the responsible political authorities practically gua

that airpower would not be used effectively and that U

FOR could not succeed in helping to enforce the saf

policy. Air strikes and more robust enforcement on the 

could only come at the price of increased ri

UNPROFOR’s soldiers. Thus, under the circumstanc

light option became a prescription for paralysis.

Absent Political Guidance

Without clear political objectives or guidance, UNP

commanders were left to interpret the ambiguous S

Council resolutions and to decide for themselves wh

mission was. In doing so and in light of their 

97
resources, they were driven by their responsibilities a

manders to give priority to force protection. At the sam

they were pressing for more control over NATO airpow

senior UNPROFOR commanders vainly solicited cleare

cal direction from their political authorities. General Briq

recalled,

I have never had terms of reference for my mission. I’ve aske

that. [Brigadier Vere] Hayes asked [for] that. I have said t

Stoltenberg: “Yes, but you asked me to go to Mount Igman, and 

probably the most dangerous mission that we have ever fulfille

‘blue helmets.’ The Security Council has never approved this mis

Mount Igman.”172

General Cot recalled meeting with similar frustration:

I was never able to get Stoltenberg to give me written o

Stoltenberg, as well as Boutros-Ghali, always told me: “There a

UN resolutions which were made by the Security Council; you 

how to read the Security Council resolutions as well as I do, the

we have nothing more to tell you.” And that was very distressing

very distressing.173

General Briquemont later said: ‘‘I think it’s very impor

the generals to understand what [are] the political obj

The problem was that we had no politicians to explain 

us.’’174 While General Briquemont believed that he had 

lent civilian political advisors, and a well-intentioned p

representative, he noted that they possessed no real p

authority: ‘‘It was impossible for them to take a decisio

were permanently reporting to New York for anything

rectify this situation, the UNPROFOR generals rep

asked New York to send them a full-time political repr

tive.176 But, by the time Boutros-Ghali designated on

Generals Briquemont and Cot were on the verge of lea

With poor ties to the UN’s civilian hierarchy, the 

UNPROFOR commanders fell out of step with the shift

diplomacy in Geneva and the career peacekeepers 

York. From mid-June until late September, negotia

Geneva sought agreement from the warring factions 

Union of Three Republics peace plan, also known 

Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.178 Authored by the Serbs and 

the plan embodied the de facto partition of Bosnia int

98
ethnically oriented republics.179 Though General Briq

supported the plan, he did so while holding the som

incoherent conviction that ‘‘the political objective was 

Bosnia; and to save Bosnia means that the three comm

in Bosnia—the Serb community, the Croatian comm

and the Muslims—can live together.’’180 Unlike Briqu

General Cot was critical of the Geneva-based dip

believing it was premature to negotiate while there w

fighting.181 He later blamed the negotiations—includ

tactics allegedly used by Owen and Stoltenberg in the 

half of 1993—for inciting some of the fighting in Bosn

for prolonging the war.182 Furthermore, the UNPROFO

erals were not inclined to take directions from the UN 

keeping department in New York.183 In contrast to som

ous commanders in UNPROFOR, notably Gen Lewis Ma

and Gen Lars Wahlgren, Cot and Briquemont did n

backgrounds as peacekeepers. Generals Cot and Briq

were not part of a UN peacekeeping culture. They and 

their staff officers were NATO officers in blue helm

Absent clear political direction or a firm commitment 

peacekeeping doctrine to guide them, Generals C

Briquemont were left to set their own course.

Responsibility, Risks, and Accountability

Even as they tried to interpret their mission, the 

commanders in the former Yugoslavia discovered they 

have the authority needed to fulfill their responsibil

commanders. As partial fulfillment of the European 

pledge to support the UN’s light option, the D

Norwegian, and Swedish governments sent a joint Nor

talion to Bosnia. When General Briquemont protested 

did not need the Leopard tanks that the Danish were 

ing to send, the Danish military informed him that th

would be coming anyway.185 After the well-armed Nord

talion arrived at Tuzla, General Briquemont ordered it 

that quiet part of Bosnia and to go to Srebrenica wher

needed—twice he gave the order.186 On both occasi

General Briquemont recounted: ‘‘The colonel said: ‘Ge

cannot execute. The governments refuse to deploy any u

99
Srebrenica. It

s too dangerous. A safe area too danger

Rather than receiving support from the UN headquarte

cials there complained to General Briquemont about t

tion he had created amongst the ambassadors in New 

General Cot was not in a good position to help G

Briquemont, for as Cot remembered,

Stoltenberg in Geneva was very much afraid that I would take a 

sion, which would be contrary to the diplomatic negotiations t

was conducting in Geneva. Therefore Stoltenberg often told me t

don’t want you to move a single section of soldiers without my a

izations.” And me, I always responded: “I will move whoever I 

like to, without your authorization.” Therefore we have had d

relations.189

In order to surmount such difficulties, General Cot wou

ically ask the French Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral La

with whom he often spoke, to grant UNPROFOR the res

he needed or to have the French government put pres

Boutros Boutros-Ghali to get him to approve the co

action Cot wanted.190 However, the French were pr

responsible for the safe areas of Bihac and Sarajevo, a

French government had already declined to provide ad

soldiers to implement the safe areas policy elsewh

Bosnia.191 So, Generals Cot and Briquemont could on

until another troop-contributing nation volunteered fo

Srebrenica.192 Despite being commanders, they were d

of the requisite authority for controlling the forces und

respective commands. Without that control, they were 

to execute their mission, which was supposed to inclu

viding protection to the safe areas.

By November 1993, General Briquemont had had en

commanding in a situation where he had insufficient 

and inadequate authority to meet the responsibilities 

mission. Generals Cot and Briquemont, who had no

invited to visit New York or Brussels to discuss their si

with political leaders,193 were delighted to be asked to a

meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Luxem

on 22 November 1993.194 Belgium held the presidency 

EU during the second half of 1993, so its foreign m

Willy Claes, ran the meeting.195 However, Briquemont’s 

100
turned to frustration a week later when it became cle

the European ministers, who were determined t

UNPROFOR guarantee the security of several human

aid routes in Bosnia, were not going to provide the ad

4,000 troops that General Briquemont estimated wo

needed to do the job.196 After a second EU meeting, whi

place in Geneva on 29 November, General Briquemont 

he had had enough: ‘‘At the end of the day, no Europea

try has said one word about my reinforcements. And t

I said to my minister of foreign affairs, ‘No. No, I don

ball. I go back to Belgium.’”197 The UN commander in 

maintained that generals have a stronger obligation in 

war to obey their political authorities than in military 

tions where no vital interests are threatened.198 Furthe

according to Briquemont:

The generals must dare to say ‘‘no’’ to the politicians. I went 

Bosnia, because in November of ’93 I have said: “No. It’s imposs

play that. I don’t accept to risk the lives of so many soldiers wit

a mandate, with such a mission, without the means [which] are 

sary to fulfill the mission. It’s impossible.” (Emphasis added)199

Both Generals Cot and Briquemont were irk

UNPROFOR’s flawed command chain that seemed to 

unaccountable officials to try to usurp the generals’ co

authority. For Cot, Stoltenberg’s absence from Zagreb, 

primacy of his negotiating duties in Geneva, was a pa

problem.200 The UNPROFOR commander rejected the 

that Stoltenberg’s chosen representative, General Eid

any legitimate role in the UN chain of command.201 

later explained,

I never accepted that Eide could give me orders, therefore we ha

big difficulties with Stoltenberg in Zagreb. I had asked to b

deputy, and he sent me a boss. If you like, Stoltenberg made or 

nated Eide his assistant, his deputy, and I did not want to be 

the orders of that general.202

General Briquemont resented politicians pushing for 

act, since he believed that he himself, and not those urg

action, would be held accountable if things went wro

stated,

101
It was not a problem to take decisions. It was not a problem. Be

nobody was criticizing my decisions. So long as you have no casu

you can take all the decisions for the politicians; it’s good. You ta

decisions in place of the politicians. When you have casualtie

another problem. Because then they ask you: “Why have you 

that?” or “Why have you not done that?”203

In contrast to the clear military chain of accountabil

diffuse nature of the political pressures to ‘‘do someth

Bosnia left Briquemont feeling exposed: He went on to s

there was no political leadership . . . General Cot was alone in Z

there was nobody in Sarajevo . . . I can say we were alone ther

we tried to do our best to solve the problems. And it is the reaso

we must answer all of the questions of the Tribunal of The H

Because the Tribunal of The Hague cannot speak with the polit

who were responsible in Bosnia. There were so many politician

were responsible for something in Bosnia that it is impossible 

that: “You were responsible for that, or that, or that.”204

Though he would remain at the head of Bosnia-Herz

Command until late January of 1994, General Briq

decided at the end of November to leave rather than be 

into accepting ever-greater risks and responsibilities b

ical officials who, for the most part, were unaccountabl

selves.205

By the beginning of 1994, with the UN safe areas pol

ing, General Cot precipitated his own departure by p

even harder for the UN to grant him control over NA

power. The average number of artillery and mortar 

falling on the safe area of Sarajevo had climbed to ove

per day, sniping was rampant in the capital, and UNP

had received fewer than 3,000 of the 7,600 reinforc

authorized six months earlier.206 The Bosnian Serb

refused to allow Tuzla airport to be opened.207 At Ze

Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serbs controlled access to t

areas, and blocked the rotation of UNPROFOR u

Though UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had nam

Yasushi Akashi to be his full-time special representa

Zagreb, this was cool comfort for General Cot if all decis

use air support still had to be referred to New York

General Briquemont recalled, ‘‘General Cot has said: 

not discussing with the representatives of Mr. Boutros

102
They are functionaires [functionaries]. . . . They were . 

of the administration, but they had no responsibilities

the beginning of 1994, General Cot began to complain p

about the problems with the UN operation, including t

retary-general’s refusal to give Cot control over NAT

power.211 By Cot’s account this caused Boutros Boutro

to seek his removal.

After having tried in vain, for six months, to obtain the delega

decision [for approving air support] through normal channels, I 

to speak publicly of my requirement, which immediately le

Secretary-General to ask the French government for my dismiss

Though the French government agreed to remove Gene

its foreign minister and defense minister registered their 

isfaction with the UN’s management of UNPROFOR wh

Philippe Guillot phrased it, ‘‘consumed generals at an im

rate’’ rather than fixing problems within the UN hiera

Indeed, only one of the six generals who served in UNPR

top two posts had, by that time, managed to complete 

tour of duty.214 To the diplomats in Geneva, General C

for control was part of an attempt to bypass even the se

general and to open direct communications with the S

Council.215 To UNPROFOR’s commanders it seemed th

were on their own, with all of the responsibility, deprive

means and authority for accomplishing their mission, 

times they did not even know how to get in touch with th

ical authorities who could make decisions.216

Conclusion

The responsibilities of command and the expertise 

service affiliation shaped the actions of the theater-lev

manders who were attempting to find a way to use NA

power in Bosnia during the second half of 1993. Gene

and to a greater degree General Briquemont, struggled 

the weight of their responsibilities in circumstanc

forced them to make trade-offs between accomplishin

mission and protecting their forces. Though their NATO 

terparts, Admiral Boorda and Generals Ashy and Cha

often had to work fast and work hard to fulfill their du

103
commanders, their responsibilities were much lighter b

they did not have to make a similar trade-off between m

and men. In addition to their different responsibilities, 

and NATO commanders came from markedly differen

grounds and had different service expertise. Genera

and Chambers had solid expertise for planning the c

tional air operations called for by NATO, and they wer

dent that airpower could be used to coerce the Bosnian 

Conversely, Generals Briquemont and Cot held the tra

army view that airpower was best used for supporting 

forces, and they were skeptical of plans to coerce th

through bombing.

To a remarkable degree, the factors affecting the com

ers on either side of the airpower debate were mutual

forcing. On one side, senior US airmen serving in a tra

military alliance—NATO—pushed for a US-backed a

paign, which entailed little risk to the forces under the

mand. On the other, European army generals working 

UN strove to fulfill a largely humanitarian mission fav

the European governments with vulnerable ground fo

UNPROFOR. Of these multiple, mutually reinforcing 

the clash of cultures between the UN and NATO pla

least significant role in shaping the decisions and ac

the theater-level commanders. They all considered them

NATO officers, none had any peacekeeping experience, 

UNPROFOR commanders were driven toward a peacek

like mission by the limitations of their means, rathe

starting with traditional peacekeeping doctrine to guid

thoughts and actions.

National ties were stronger than organizational a

tions, and they played an important role in influenci

the theater commanders viewed plans for using ai

However, it is difficult to disentangle the national p

pressures from the responsibilities of the commanders

they were all bound up together. The French govern

approach to Bosnia was part and parcel of General Cot’

helped him to obtain resources and UN permission 

actions, and both Cot and the French government we

cerned for the lives of the French soldiers in UNPR

104
Similarly, on the US side, the Clinton administration

s 

to minimize the risks to US forces led it to adopt a 

strike policy; therefore, political pressure, mission 

plishment, and force protection all pointed in the sam

tion. General Briquemont was the exception. Briquemo

from Belgium, and he was under political pressures fr

EC—led by Belgian foreign minister Willy Claes—t

actions that would have entailed serious risks to the 

under his command. These EC pressures were not mat

resources, and the people urging the action were largel

countable for the consequences should things go 

Unable to strike a satisfactory balance between accomp

the tasks being thrust upon him and an acceptable 

risk to his forces, Briquemont quit—just as he had thre

to do in August when looming NATO air strikes prom

similar inability to manage his command responsibiliti

Notes

1. United Nations (UN) Security Council Provisional Verbatim 

3228 (S/PV.3228), 4 June 1993 (hereafter cited as S/PV.3228).

2. Ibid. Also see Richard Caplan, Post-Mortem on UNPROFOR

Defence Studies, no. 33 (London: Brassey’s for the Centre for 

Studies, 1996), 8–9.

3. Caplan, 287; and S/PV.3228.

4. UN Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record 3241 (S/P

18 June 1993 (hereafter cited as S/PV.3241).

5. S/PV.3228.

6. Ibid.

7. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 836 (1993) (S/RES

June 1993 (hereafter cited as S/RES/836).

8. Ibid.; and Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UN 

Council Resolution 836 (1993) (S/25939), 14 June 1993 (hereafter 

S/25939).

9. S/RES/836, par. 5; and S/25939. Note that UNSCR 836 als

UNPROFOR ‘‘to monitor the cease-fire.’’ However, it would have b

cult to justify the use of force other than in self-defense to fulfill th

10. S/25939.

11. S/RES/836, par. 9.

12. Ibid.

13. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record 

Crime (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 114.

14. S/RES/836, par. 9. 

105
15. L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Ma

England: Manchester University Press, 1993), 323–24.

16. Ibid.

17. UN Security Council Resolution 776 (1992) (S/RES/

September 1992 (hereafter cited as S/RES/776).

18. For other interpretations and discussions, see Dick A. Leur

United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991–96 (The Ha

Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1996), 35–36; Caplan, 7–9; H

Both, 5–6; and James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: Inte

Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia Universi

1997), 135–36 and 270–71 n. 9.

19. S/RES/836, par. 10.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. This ‘‘objectives v. objections’’ manner of expression com

James Gow’s, ‘‘British Perspectives,’’ in International Perspective

Yugoslav Conflict, eds. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson 

Macmillan, 1996), 88 and 97. It is roughly equivalent to Clodfelter’

objectives and negative objectives introduced in chap. 2. Mark C

The Limits of Airpower; the American Bombing of North Vietnam (N

Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1989), 141–42.

23. S/25939.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. Lt Gen Lars Eric Wahlgren of the Swedish army was th

commander of UNPROFOR. He took up his post at the beginning 

1993 and was replaced just four months later.

26. UN Security Council Resolution 844 (1993) (S/RES/844), 

1993 (hereafter cited as S/RES/844).

27. S/PV.3241.

28. Michael Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping

Paper 321 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 

Gen Philippe Morillon of the French army began his assignmen

Balkans as the first chief of staff for UNPROFOR. In October 1992

command of Bosnia-Herzegovina Command.

29. Honig and Both, 115–16.

30. Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference o

Yugoslavia: The Politico-Military Interface, London Defence Stu

(London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defense Studies, 1994), 40 n

31. Gen Philippe Morillon, French army, Croire et Oser: Chro

Sarajevo (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1993), 202.

32. Ibid., 213.

33. Wahlgren to Annan, ‘‘Provision of Air to Ground Support—Sa

23 June 1993, cited in Hans-Christian Hagman, “UN-NATO Operat

operation in Peacekeeping 1992–1995,” (PhD diss., King’s 

University of London, 1997), 171.

106
34. Gen Jean Cot, French army, UNPROFOR force comman

1993–March 1994, interviewed by author, 30 September 199

Transcript and translation of tape recording. Author’s personal col

35. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 199

1996), 157–59.

36. Ibid., 189 and 264; and Gow, Triumph, 101.

37. Messervy-Whiting, 15.

38. Ibid., 28.

39. Michael Littlejohns, ‘‘Bosnia on the Brink: UN Weighs New M

Financial Times (London), 7 May 1993.

40. Messervy-Whiting, 14–15 and 41; and Owen, 161–62.

41. General Morillon says he learned about the shake-up in J

Philippe Guillot has implied that Morillon may have actually fo

about it in May when ‘‘he went back to France for a weekend for fa

sons but reportedly also secretly met the new Minister of Def

Léotard.’’ Morillon, 202; and Philippe Guillot, “France, Peacekeep

Humanitarian Intervention,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 

1994): 38.

42. Cot’s longtime friend, and subordinate commander in UNP

Gen Francis Briquemont claimed Cot was the oldest general in th

army. Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, interviewed by author, 11 Augu

Brussels, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection

43. Gen Jean Cot, French army, ‘‘L’Europe et l’Otan,’’ Défense 

53, no. 3 (July 1997): 94; and idem, ‘‘Dayton ou la Porte Etroite: G

Avenir d’un Désastre,’’ in Dernière Guerre Balkanique? 2d ed., ed. 

(France: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1996), 113. Cot’s chief of staff at 

was Maj Gen Philippe Morillon. Morillon, Croire, 11.

44. Cot interview; and idem, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 113 and 124.

45. Morillon, Croire, 202.

46. Ibid.

47. Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Do Something, General!: Chro

Bosnie–Herzégovine, 12 juillet 1993–24 janvier 1994 (Bruxelles: 

Labor, 1997), 17–20.

48. Briquemont interview.

49. Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 34.

50. Messervy-Whiting, 16.

51. Lushbaugh.

52. Ibid.

53. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., USAF, AFSOUTH staff officer, 

1993–1996, interviewed by Lt Col Robert Owen, 6 December 1995

Italy. Transcript of taped interview. Balkans Air Campaign Stud

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala

54. Messervy-Whiting, 16; and Cot interview.

55. Messervy-Whiting, 16.

56. Ibid.

107
57. David Owen and Laura Silber, 

Hurd Hints at Croatia Sa

Financial Times (London), 15 July 1993, 2; and George Graham

Orders Military Support to the Adriatic,” Financial Times (London)

1993, 2.

58. Gow, Triumph, 136.

59. Atlantic News, No. 2542, 9 July 1993, cited in Leurdijk, 37

60. Col Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnia

(London: HarperCollins, 1993), 86.

61. Ibid., 303.

62. Serb leaders expected UNPROFOR to shoot back in self-def

apparently accepted this. See Briquemont, Do Something, 94.

63. Gow, ‘‘British Perspective,’’ 95–97.

64. Facts On File Yearbook 1993 (USA: Facts on File, Inc., 1993), 

570.

65. Ibid., 570.

66. Leurdijk, 37.

67. Ibid., 37–38.

68. Ibid., 37.

69. Notably Canada and Britain, but also Denmark and, to 

degree, France. Leurdijk, 38; and Facts On File Yearbook 1993, 60

70. Statement of the North Atlantic Council, 2 August 1993, 

Leurdijk, 38.

71. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interviewed by Lt Col Robert Owen

1996, Washington. Unclassified version of General Ashy’s Ora

Interview (66 pp.) redacted by the Air Force Historical Research 

October 1997. Office of History, Air Force Space Command, Peter

Colo.

72. Ibid.; and Lt Gen James E. Chambers, USAF, director o

Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy, interv

author, 10 February 1998, Fairfax, Va., author’s notes, author’s 

collection.

73. Ashy interview by Owen; and Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, in

by author, 3 July 1998, Fairfax, Va., author’s notes, author’s pers

lection.

74. Leurdijk, 38; and Lt Gen Nicholas B. Kehoe, USAF, assistan

staff, Operations and Logistics, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Europe, Mons, Belgium, July 1992–October 1994, interviewed by a

November 1997, Brussels, transcript of tape recording, author’s 

collection.

75. Kehoe interview.

76. MCM-KAD-084-93, ‘‘Operational Options for Air Strikes,’’ Mem

for the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NAC 

Statement, 8 August 1993 (hereafter cited as MCM-KAD-084-93).

77. Ibid.

78. Leurdijk, 38–39.

79. NATO, Press Release (93)52, 9 August 1993.

108
80. Ibid.

81. Since NAC decisions required unanimity, each individual 

state had veto power.

82. MCM-KAD-084-93.

83. Various descriptions of the options can be found in Col Robe

Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxw

Ala.: Air University Press, 2000), 99, 283–85, 399–400, and 471. 

the one on page 99 is, perhaps, the best, though it inexplicably list

an example of a target to be hit under Option 3. For examples 

descriptions, see Per Erik Solli, UN and NATO Air Power in th

Yugoslavia, NUPI Report no. 209 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Inte

Affairs, 1996), 52–53; and Hagman, 229.

84. MCM-KAD-084–93.

85. Ibid.

86. MCM-KAD-084–93.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force, 99.

90. Hagman gets this evolution backward, mistakenly conclud

‘‘Air Strikes were rarely aimed at a specific violating weapon syst

‘‘hot barrel’’) but rather evolved to include any military target de

NATO/UN.’’ Hagman, 131.

91. This is discussed further in chap. 9.

92. Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force, 471.

93. Briquemont, Do Something, 114 and 122; and Cot interview

94. Briquemont, Do Something, 122.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., 123.

97. Ibid., 123–24.

98. Ibid., 110–11 and 120. Extracts from letters General Briquem

to his wife during the week before he went to Vicenza clearly show 

was already seriously concerned about air strikes before his trip to 

99. Ibid., 121 and 124.

100. Ibid., 124–25.

101. Ibid., 125.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid. General Ashy saw this meeting with Briquemont as a 

geting board (JTB), and Ashy believed General Briquemont 

AFSOUTH’s master target list. However, Briquemont’s memoir m

mention of this. During General Briquemont’s interview, he seeme

been unaware of a JTB, or a list of approved air strike targets. 

General Briquemont approved a list of targets he thought was mea

support, while General Ashy believed he had obtained approval fo

air strike targets. Other sources put the date of the first JTB in Se

109
at a meeting between Admiral Boorda and General Cot, as discuss

next section of this chapter.

106. Ibid., 126.

107. Ibid., 128; and Facts On File Yearbook 1993, 606.

108. Briquemont, Do Something, 129; Briquemont interview; a

Silber and Gillian Tett, ‘‘Fighting Threatens Talks on Bosnia,’’ 

Talks (London), 11 August 1993.

109. Briquemont interview.

110. Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 125.

111. Laura Silber, Gillian Tett, and George Graham, ‘‘Sarajev

Puts UN In Charge,” Financial Times (London), 19 August 19

Briquemont interview.

112. Briquemont interview.

113. Briquemont, Do Something, 131.

114. Ibid., 126.

115. Cot, ‘‘Dayton,” 124.

116. Briquemont, Do Something, 103; and Facts On File Yearbo

570.

117. Leurdijk, 39.

118. ‘‘World News in Brief,’’ Financial Times (London), 12 Augu

Laura Silber, ‘‘Bosnia Factions Agree UN Control of Sarajevo,’’ 

Times (London), 17 August 1993; and Briquemont, Do Something, 

119. Briquemont did not credit the threat of NATO air strikes for 

withdrawal. However, his detailed recounting of events between 4–1

1993 provide evidence that Serb concessions in negotiations follow

successive threat of air strikes by NATO.

120. Briquemont, Do Something, 103.

121. Ibid., and 113–18.

122. Laura Silber and Gillian Tett, ‘‘Karadzic Warns of War if N

Strikes Go Ahead,’’ Financial Times (London), 11 August 1993; a

‘‘Serbs Agree to Pull Back Their Forces,’’ Financial Times (Lon

August 1993.

123. Briquemont, Do Something, 109–11, 126–28.

124. Ibid., 104.

125. Ibid., 103 and 122; and Briquemont interview.

126. Briquemont, Do Something, 112 and 119.

127. Ibid., 119; and Briquemont interview.

128. Briquemont, Do Something, 110, 120, and 138.

129. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprint with n

ace and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 20

130. Ibid., 110 and 127–28. Note: This is nearly a direct trans

what Briquemont himself has written, Do Something, 127.

131. Ibid., 112.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

110
134. Ibid., 111

12.

135. Ibid., 112.

136. Briquemont interview. General Briquemont’s interview w

ducted in English. The bracketed comments in the quotation co

general’s grammar without changing the meaning.

137. S/RES/836, par. 5.

138. Briquemont interview.

139. Briquemont, Do Something, 133.

140. Ibid., 123–24.

141. Ashy interview.

142. Briquemont, Do Something, 177.

143. Cot interview; Briquemont interview; and Briquem

Something, 198.

144. In his memoir, General Briquemont notes the meeting with 

Boorda on 22 September, but makes no mention of air strikes. In 

view General Briquemont claimed to be unaware of a JTB list of ta

air strikes. Briquemont, Do Something, 198–99.

145. ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review,’’ 2.2, BACS C

Cot interview; and Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force, 99.

146. Ashy interview; Briquemont, Do Something, 125; and Lau

Gillian Tett, and George Graham, ‘‘Bosnian Peace Plan Und

Financial Times (London), 25 August 1993.

147. Ashy interview.

148. Cot interview; Cot, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 124; and Cot, ‘‘Les Leçons 

Yougoslavie,’’ Défense, no. 67 (March 1995): 85.

149. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 234–35; and Briquem

Something, 198–99.

150. Briquemont, Do Something, 127.

151. In addition to the previously mentioned changes to OPLA

new close air support and air strike procedures were writ

Commander Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force Operations Order 45101

Flight, 30 September 1993. Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force, 39

and Brig Gen William Peck, USAF, chief of plans, Deny Fligh

Vicenza, Italy, July 1993–June 1994, ‘‘Plans Directors’ Thoughts,’’ 

contemporaneous notes.

152. Col Robert Owen, Deliberate Force, 381. The five command 

(commanders) were SACEUR (Shalikashvili/Joulwan), CINCSOUTH 

Leighton Smith), COMAIRSOUTH (Ashy/Ryan), 5ATAF commander 

Fornesiero), and, finally, the CAOC director (Chambers/Hornburg).

153. Brig Gen William Peck, USAF, chief of plans, Deny Fligh

Vicenza, Italy, July 1993–June 1994, interviewed by author, 9 Ju

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, tape recording, author’s person

tion; idem, ‘‘Deny Flight: A Joint and Combined Operation,’’ unp

article dated 2 May 1994; Lowell Boyd interview; and Lushbaugh i

154. Ashy interview by Owen.

155. Briquemont interview.

111
156. Ibid.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.; Briquemont, Do Something, 127; and Cot interview.

159. Cot, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 122.

160. Ibid.

161. Leurdijk, 77.

162. Briquemont interview.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.; and Cot, “Dayton,” 122.

166. Letter from the secretary-general to the president of the 

Council, 19 September 1993 (S/26468, 30 September 1993).

167. The United Nations (UN), The Blue Helmets: A Review 

Nations Peacekeeping, 3d ed. (New York: United Nations Repr

Section, 1996), 518; and UN Security Council Resolution 871 (S/R

4 October 1993.

168. UN, Blue Helmets, 518–19; UN Security Council Pr

Verbatim Record 3286 (S/PV.3286), 4 October 1993; and UN 

Council Resolution 908 (1994) (S/RES/908), 31 March 1994. Eve

close air support for Croatia was authorized by the UN on 31 Mar

NATO authorities did not agree to allow such missions until Decemb

The new NATO authority was to be spelled out in Change 3 to OPLA

but delays caused by negotiations with the Croatian government p

Change 3 from being issued. NATO aircrews finally received auth

CAS in Croatia with Change 4 to the plan, promulgated in May 19

169. Philip Sabin, ‘‘Peace Support Operations—A Strategic Pers

in The Dynamics of Air Power, ed. Group Capt Andrew Lambert an

C. Williamson (Bracknell, England: HMSO, 1996), 105–11.

170. The first air strikes conducted by NATO, derisively ca

pricks,’’ managed to avoid the logic problem described here becaus

commander in Bosnia ensured that the Bosnian Serbs were w

advance and that targets were insignificant. The first significant air 

Bosnia by NATO took place in May 1995 at Pale, with predictable 

171. The argument is not that it had to happen this way 

hostages had to be taken). Nothing was predetermined. The point 

NATO political authorities were convinced that bombing would lead 

erable risks or costs, as seemed to be the case, then their logic for 

ing graduated options broke down.

172. Briquemont interview.

173. Cot interview.

174. Briquemont interview.

175. Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 137–38 and 142–43

176. Briquemont interview.

177. Ibid.; and Cot, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 122.

178. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204 and 232–37; and Gow, 

254–56.

112
179. The partition, which violated the principles laid down by 

London Conference establishing the Geneva-based negotiations, m

Lord Owen to resist efforts by the warring factions to call it th

Stoltenberg plan. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204.

180. Briquemont interview.

181. Cot, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 127 and 129.

182. Ibid.

183. General Cot opined that: ‘‘The civilian component of the U

trolled by mandarins, whose careers depend primarily on the supp

their spines.’’ Cot, ‘‘Dayton,’’ 127. In his interview General Cot noted 

Annan was an exception—that Annan knew when to stand up and 

184. Briquemont, Do Something, 127.

185. Ibid., 138; and Briquemont interview.

186. Briquemont interview; and Briquemont, Do Something, 28

187. Briquemont interview.

188. Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 283.

189. Cot interview.

190. Ibid.

191. Honig and Both, 118.

192. Ibid. As the Dutch reluctantly agreed to do in November 1

193. Briquemont, Do Something, 127.

194. Ibid., 277–78; and Briquemont interview. Also see Dav

Balkan Odyssey, 249–50.

195. Briquemont, Do Something, 92 and 278.

196. Ibid., 286–87; and Briquemont interview.

197. Briquemont interview.

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid.

200. Cot interview; and Briquemont interview.

201. Cot interview.

202. Ibid.

203. Briquemont interview.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid. General Briquemont noted that the French foreign 

Alain Juppé, whose country had the greatest number of peacekeepe

ground in the former Yugoslavia, was one exception to this genera

206. Report of the secretary-general submitted pursuant to paragr

General Assembly Resolution 48/88 (A/48/847, 7 January 1994) 

cited as A/48/847); and Gen Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bos

(London: The Harvill Press, 1998), 1.

207. A/48/847.

208. Letter from the secretary-general to the president of the 

Council, 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94, 28 January 1994). 

209. Cot, “Dayton,” 122.

210. Ibid.

211. Guillot, 39.

113
212. Cot, 

Dayton, 122.

213. Guillot, 39.

214. General Nambiar, the first UNPROFOR commander, serv

one-year tour. General Morillon’s case is ambiguous since he was o

replaced to make room for General Cot; however, it seems that he w

verge of being dismissed in April 1993 but was instead kept on u

when Cot took the top position in UNPROFOR. For various 

Generals Cot, Wahlgren, Briquemont, and MacKenzie left prematu

the same subject, see Gow, Triumph, 139.

215. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 264–65.

216. Briquemont interview.

114
Chapter 5

Airpower Threats, Uses, and

Disappointments: January–June 19

Hitting one tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructu

command and control, logistics, that is war.

—Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose

Roger Cohen, “UN General Oppose

More Bosnia Force,” New York Tim

29 September 1994

And then the business of low passes and flying arou

scaring people with noise—Rose was trying to use 

threat of airpower, and the Bosnian Serbs knew, afte

very short period of time, that Rose wasn’t going to ca

through on that threat.

—Adm Leighton W. Sm

Interviewed by author

10 February 1998

During the first half of 1994, new UN military comm

in the former Yugoslavia aided their civilian superiors in 

ing UNPROFOR’s mission. In the process, UNPROFOR 

to discard the elements of its mandate relating to the e

ment of the safe areas policy. This would bring UNPR

mission, as the UN commanders interpreted it, in lin

UNPROFOR’s capabilities. It was tactical determinism—

the limitations of the means available determine the en

pursues—working at the implementation level.1 Th

approach reduced the need for the UN commanders t

some of the more difficult trade-offs between mission 

plishment and force protection that their predecesso

faced. It also enjoyed political support from the 

Kingdom (UK) and was much more in line with tra

peacekeeping activities favored by UN headquarters 

York. But, redefining the mission came at the price o

doning the safe areas policy. UNPROFOR’s approach n

115
prevented UN forces from taking enforcement action, 

meant that NATO airpower had to be restrained as we

This chapter shows that commanders in NATO’s so

region were moving in the opposite direction from th

counterparts, but for the same reason: tactical determ

The problems associated with finding heavy weapons, 

them, and getting coercive leverage by attacking them 

forced the allied commanders’ preferences for targetin

and more militarily significant targets in Bosnia. A pre

unnoticed aspect of the Sarajevo ultimatum in Fe

shows how NATO commanders sought to preserve their 

omy in case they were given the opportunity to bomb

this chapter highlights the importance of timely decis

the effective employment of NATO airpower over Bosnia

demonstrates that when commanders are accountable 

consequences of military action, they are much more l

demand operational autonomy. After disappointing a

to use airpower around Gorazde in April 1994, the 

obstacle to the effective employment of airpower cam

the civilian and military leaders in UNPROFOR. The 

further argues that Gorazde was a turning point, afte

opposing camps in the contest to control NATO airpowe

ened their positions. Commanders in the UN and NATO 

that their responsibilities for balancing mission acco

ment and force protection pulled them in opposite dir

and added to the mutually reinforcing factors on both 

the struggle over the use of airpower in Bosnia.

Commanders and Command Relationshi

Near the end of January 1994, Lt Gen Francis Briq

relinquished command of UN operations in Bosnia a

replaced by British army officer Lt Gen Sir Michael R

week later, Lt Gen Joseph W. Ashy was named comma

the US Sixteenth Air Force headquartered in Italy. P

that, General Ashy had not been part of the US chain 

mand, and he therefore had not controlled US operatio

Bosnia. These two changes would strengthen the op

military camps vying for control of NATO airpower.

116
General Rose, Peacekeeping, and Airpower

British influence over the UN mission and the use 

power in Bosnia increased markedly when Lt Gen Sir M

Rose replaced UNPROFOR’s Belgian commander in 

General Briquemont. In choosing General Rose, the 

purposely picked a strong-willed individual.2 While Ro

maintained that he was not under explicit instruction

London, that does not mean he was not pursuing Britis

ests.3 Stephen Hart’s observation about Monty’s “casua

servation” approach to warfare during World War II seem

Montgomery’s pursuit of British interests prompts considerat

whether he received any formal instructions from the British g

ment concerning his conduct of the campaign. There is no eviden

any such instructions, but then they were probably unnecessar

inconceivable that a commander as senior as Montgomery . . . 

not have been aware of the British government’s agenda.4

General Rose was well aware of Britain’s agenda. 

before going to Bosnia, Rose met with Britain’s prime m

and later recalled,

I left the meeting with a firm impression that John Major belie

the humanitarian role being played by the UN in Bosnia, an

Britain had a special contribution to make. He was not about 

out the troops. . . . [And] in 1994, he never altered the peacek

basis upon which British troops were deployed.5

Throughout General Rose’s time in Bosnia, his actions 

consonance with the UK’s interests and the British inte

tion of UNPROFOR’s role there.6

From the outset of his tour in Bosnia, General Rose 

on the humanitarian and peacekeeping-like aspects 

mission to the exclusion of enforcing the UN’s safe are

icy. Although UNPROFOR began as a peacekeeping f

Croatia, it never had a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia 

there was no peace to keep.7 The resolutions d

UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia—770, 776, and 836

adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter dealin

enforcement measures.8 However, in attempting to 

what he saw as “a collapsing mission” in Bosnia, Gener

determined that he would concentrate “on the three m

ments of the mission, which were, in order of prior

117
delivery of humanitarian aid, the creation of condition

political settlement of the war, and the prevention of t

flict from spreading beyond Bosnia.”9 While these m

elements might have required enforcement action, th

out the nettlesome safe areas aspect of UNPROFOR’

date. Staff officers at the UK’s Army Staff College in Cam

built a campaign plan around General Rose’s three m

elements, and Rose went to New York to discuss hi

about UNPROFOR’s mission with some of the Security 

ambassadors and department of peacekeeping off

During this trip, he found support for his plans fro

Annan, head of the peacekeeping department. Thu

mutually reinforcing political, military, organization

personal factors uniting the camp opposed to using rob

power in Bosnia to enforce the safe areas policy grew s

with General Rose’s appointment to head UNPROFOR.

General Rose’s interpretation of his mission in Bosn

also a product of his expertise as a British army offi

was well versed in the doctrinal discussions on peacek

then percolating within the UK’s army, which would 

during Rose’s one-year tour in Bosnia in the form of 

British army doctrine, “Wider Peacekeeping.”11 The doc

wider peacekeeping undoubtedly evolved as the Britis

drew lessons from events in Bosnia during Rose’s 

there,12 but many of its fundamental concepts—such 

imperative for consent, and the strict boundary b

peacekeeping and peace enforcement—were prefigured 

parliamentary report from July 1993, which had su

that new peacekeeping doctrine was needed.13 The 

army’s experiences in Northern Ireland, where Ro

served as a brigade commander in the 1980s, was th

spring from which much of the British wisdom on pea

ing flowed.14 Like his predecessor in Bosnia, Rose, too, 

infantry officer and had missed the Gulf War. With a 

record from the Falklands War and as a former comma

British Special Forces, General Rose’s military expert

his outlook on the situation in Bosnia were, unsurpr

those of a soldier.

118
General Rose

s views on airpower were fundamenta

ferent from those of the NATO airmen with whom he 

soon have to cooperate. He did not favor air strikes, tho

believed some use could be made of close air support. 

leaving for Bosnia, General Rose told British prime m

John Major, “Although NATO air power certainly h

important role to play in Bosnia, it could not be applie

above a tactical level without collapsing the entire mis

The day after expressing that view, Rose flew to New 

where US ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright 

him what he thought of air strikes, to which he replied, 

was no case for mounting a strategic air campaign in 

similar to the one in the Gulf War. The circumstance

entirely different. However, I had no problem with the 

close air support in self-defense or to support the man

Significantly, in this recollection of the discussion

lished nearly five years after the event, Rose describ

extremes for using airpower with no middle ground b

those extremes. Lost by this elision was any discussi

robust air campaign against the Bosnian Serb Army (B

seeming to equate bombing other than for close air s

(CAS) with a strategic air campaign akin to the one in t

War, Rose was ruling out what was arguably the most e

airpower option. Even some of the staunchest critics of 

gic bombing during the Gulf War praised airpower for it

at the operational level of war, that is, for destroying th

ing potential of Iraq’s army.17

Furthermore, the air strike options favored by Gener

and approved at SHAPE, focused mainly on the Bosnia

Army, not Belgrade.18 Whether Rose’s apparent a

astigmatism was real or affected was unknown, bu

apparent in the observation of a frustrated NATO airma

during Rose’s time in Bosnia, claimed that “Genera

either cannot, or will not, understand airpower.”19 W

clear, though, is that General Rose did not have the sam

of airpower and its potential usefulness in Bosnia as 

senior American airmen in NATO.

119
Command Relationships, Air Strikes, and Close

Air Support

In the two weeks leading up to General Rose’s ar

Sarajevo, the UN streamlined its chain of comman

strengthened its civilian control over UNPROFOR. Mr. Y

Akashi arrived in Zagreb as the UN secretary-general’s 

representative and the first full-time civilian h

UNPROFOR.20 Shortly after Akashi’s arrival, Boutro

approached the French government about replacing G

Cot, who had had difficulties with his previous civilian 

rior, Thorvald Stoltenberg.21 On 2 February 1994, 

secretary-general informed the Security Council that G

Cot would be replaced by Lt Gen Bertrand de Lap

Though it would be mid-March before de Lapresle too

mand of UNPROFOR, General Cot’s authority over UNP

had been curbed.

While the UN worked on replacing UNPROFOR’s lead

NATO again threatened air strikes to relieve the s

Sarajevo, but obvious divisions between alliance m

weakened the impact of the threat. On 10 and 11 Ja

NATO heads of state gathered in Brussels for a summ

the US had hoped would spotlight the launch 

Partnership for Peace proposal. However, with some 

tion from Paris, NATO’s role in Bosnia—and the abs

American ground forces there—became a major topic 

cussion.23 The summit ended with a communiqué reit

the alliance’s readiness ‘‘to carry out air strikes in order 

vent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas, an

threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.’’24 Asked if 

commitment to use air strikes should be taken serious

similar threats failed to produce any bombing the p

August, President Clinton said that he believed some m

of the alliance were “more prepared to deal with this th

were in August.”25 Indeed, France was more willing to s

air strikes, but the British were not.26

By mid-February, Boutros Boutros-Ghali had deleg

Mr. Akashi the power to authorize close air support, 

air strikes.27 After the NATO summit, Mr. Akashi was ins

to work with NATO to plan for the use of airpower to ov

120
interference with UN operations in Srebrenica, Zepa, 

the Tuzla airport.28 Though plans for using airpowe

aimed ostensibly at all parties, it was obvious that t

was most in danger of becoming the target of NA

action.29 In late January, four days after General Ro

command in Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali informed the UN S

Council by letter that “for operations relating to Sre

and Tuzla, I have delegated to my Special Representat

Akashi, the authority to approve a request for close air s

from the Force Commander.”30 Though UNPROFOR was 

pared to protect these two safe areas, the secretary-

warned that

the parties should, however, be aware that UNPROFOR’s mand

the safe areas has been adopted under Chapter VII of the U

Nations Charter. Accordingly, UNPROFOR is not obliged to se

consent of the parties for operations which fall within the ma

conferred upon it under Security Council Resolutions 836 (199

844 (1993).31

In the same letter, the UN secretary-general made cl

distinction between close air support and air strike

noted that “NATO forces are not authorized to laun

strikes, which would require a further decision of th

Atlantic Council.”32 Finally, on 16 February, Boutro

wrote to the Security Council, stating, “I am delegat

necessary authority to my Special Representative . . . 

ity to approve a request from the Force Comman

UNPROFOR for close air support for the defence of 

Nations personnel anywhere in Bosnia and Herzego

Thus, within five weeks of his arrival in Zagreb as t

civilian head of UNPROFOR, Mr. Akashi was apparently 

with full authority to approve requests for close air s

anywhere in Bosnia.

On 1 February 1994 General Ashy became a comma

the US chain of command, strengthening his position, b

ther tangling the awkward lines of responsibility 

Admiral Boorda.34 Back in September of 1993, the 

Forces in Europe had created a new directorate for G

Chambers, making him the US air component comman

the region.35 By then, Chambers had received his thi

121
raising to three the number of lieutenant generals 

ostensibly responsible for air operations over Bo

General Rossetti, the Italian commander of Fifth 

Tactical Air Forces generally did not play much of a 

operational matters, but instead worked with his co

military and political superiors, keeping them inform

taking care of the many host-nation support issues.37 G

Ashy was senior to General Chambers, and higher up 

NATO chain of command, so Ashy and his staff worked 

icy issues such as coordinating plans and rules of enga

with SHAPE and NATO Headquarters.38 Meanwhile, G

Chambers and the staff at the combined air operations 

planned and ran the day-to-day flying activities.39 

Ashy’s new title as a US commander did not change th

ing arrangements for air operations over Bosnia, it d

him easier access to US resources and strengthened h

tion. By the beginning of February, the two camps con

for control of airpower had fortified their positions at th

ational level.

The Sarajevo Ultimatum: February 199

An explosion in a Sarajevo market triggered a NATO 

to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, and it 

the beginning of increased military influence over the p

use of air strikes. On 5 February 1994, a shell explode

unusually crowded Sarajevo market, killing approxima

people and wounding more than 140 others.40 Though 

gins of the blast could not be confirmed, the presump

Bosnian Serb guilt was strong.41 Referring to Resolutio

Boutros-Ghali informed the UN Security Council of th

to prepare for the use of airpower in Bosnia to forestall 

attacks on Sarajevo.42 He also asked NATO secretary-

Manfred Wörner to secure “a decision by the North A

Council (NAC) to authorize the commander in chief of 

Southern Command [Admiral Boorda] to launch air st

the request of the United Nations, against artillery or 

positions in and around Sarajevo which are determi

UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civil

gets in that city.”43 This amounted to a very limited a

122
cific request to get NAC approval for air strikes, if reque

the UN, and then only against smoking-gun-type targe

ignated by UNPROFOR.44

Despite British reluctance, NATO issued an ulti

backed by the threat of air strikes to compel the Serbs 

the siege of Sarajevo. On 8 February the British Cabin

in emergency session, and Foreign Minister Dougla

reportedly urged his government to put alliance so

ahead of other British concerns by going along with 

and French-sponsored move in NATO toward tougher a

Meanwhile, General Rose worked hard to finalize an 

ment that would obviate any need for NATO air strikes

shuttled, mediated, and even coerced the Bosnian gove

and the Bosnian Serbs into a verbal agreement for d

the situation around Sarajevo.47 The media and the th

air strikes were Rose’s most potent weapons in forcing 

sides to accept his four-point plan for relieving the s

Sarajevo.48 But, as the council met in Brussels, Gener

had nothing but verbal assurances to show for his e

The British were alone within NATO as they sought to d

enthusiasm for enforcement action.50 With France and 

in the fore, alliance ministers issued an ultimatum 

February 1994 establishing a heavy weapons exclusio

around Sarajevo.51

Military Influence

The NATO ultimatum went beyond Boutros-Ghali’s 

in two significant ways: (1) it broadened the list of p

targets, and (2) it included restrictions on Bosnian 

ment forces. The ultimatum called for the Bosnian S

withdraw their heavy weapons from “an area within 2

metres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area 

two kilometres of the centre of Pale.”52 Rather than re

their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone, the Ser

the option of placing them “under UNPROFOR con

Bosnian government forces were called upon to rel

their heavy weapons54 and put them under UNPROFO

trol.55 The real teeth to the ultimatum were contained i

graph 10, which reads as follows: 

123
The Council decides that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10th Feb

1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties found within the Sa

exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, will, along with 

direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NA

strikes which will be conducted in close coordination with t

secretary-general and will be consistent with the North A

Council’s decisions of 2d and 9th August 1993.56

Significantly, paragraph 6 of the ultimatum expand

potential list of targets by defining heavy weapons bey

“artillery or mortar positions . . . responsible for a

which Boutros-Ghali had mentioned in his request

importantly, paragraph 10 included the rather broad c

of potential targets called “direct and essential milita

port facilities.”

The terms of the NATO ultimatum reflected the influe

both General Rose and the commanders in NATO. Con

his influence, General Rose wrote,

Determined not to allow the UN peace process in Bosnia to be hij

by NATO, I phoned an old friend who was involved in the discu

in Brussels, Lt Gen Rupert Smith, and told him it was crucial th

UN and NATO demands regarding the cease-fire and withdra

heavy weapons be completely aligned. . . . It was particularly imp

that the text of the NATO ultimatum being drafted that afternoon 

rately reflected the wording of the negotiated agreement that ha

been obtained in Sarajevo, and that the threat of NATO air s

would be directed against any party that reneged on the Agree

Fortunately, Rupert was able to introduce the necessary clause

the document.57

The same sort of peacekeeping impartiality, in a si

where enforcement was called for, had gotten former UNP

commanders Generals Lars Wahlgren and Philippe Mor

trouble with the UN Security Council 10 months ea

Srebrenica.58 Moreover, it was, arguably, contrary to th

of Resolution 836, which had mandated the use of airp

support UNPROFOR to “promote the withdrawal of mil

paramilitary units other than those of the Governmen

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”59 However, as 

mander, General Rose was responsible for both his m

and force protection. By inserting the reference to Bosn

ernment weapons in the ultimatum, General Rose st

uphold the peacekeeping principle of impartiality neces

124
preserving BSA consent for UNPROFOR. Thus, by hew

peacekeeping, he was limiting his need to make the 

trade-off between mission and men, which enforcing t

areas policy entailed.

NATO military influence—mainly by Gen George J

and General Ashy—affected the potential targets to be 

around Sarajevo, and reflected a desire to enforce t

areas while limiting the risks to NATO aircrews. Greg S

the civilian head of NATO’s Bosnia Task Force at NATO 

quarters, later explained, “From a military perspective, 

and attacking a specific smoking-gun was extremely 

and risky for the aircraft involved. Therefore, NATO ag

establish a 20 km ‘exclusion zone’ around Sarajevo.”6

NAC guidance from the previous summer’s “Oper

Options” memorandum, General Ashy developed 

response options for attacking targets within the ex

zone.61 At least one of Ashy’s options included “dire

essential military support facilities,” which was a cate

targets listed in “Operational Options.”62 General As

also identified the wide range of heavy weapons spelled 

paragraph 6 of the ultimatum; however, it was Gen 

Joulwan, the new SACEUR, who intervened at the end 

council meeting for formulating the ultimatum to sugg

the term heavy weapons be specified.63 As a result, t

added tanks, rocket launchers, missiles, and anti

weapons under the heavy weapons rubric, in addition 

artillery and mortars specified by Boutros-Ghali in his 

for air strikes.64 These inputs from NATO officers were 

cant because the terms of the exclusion zone around S

guided NATO policy on air strikes until the end of Deny 

and they served as a template for the exclusion zone 

at Gorazde in April. Thus, NATO and UN theater-lev

manders influenced the ultimatum in ways that made it s

their forces and more favorable for the missions they pre

Airpower, Control, and Autonomy

The actions of General Rose as well as those of senio

officers during the ultimatum period demonstrated ho

tary commanders sought to preserve autonomy and avo

125
side 

interference in accomplishing their mission. G

Rose knew that he had a hand on the UN key in the d

arrangement for authorizing NATO air strikes,65 and he 

pressures to go along with NATO—including pressure fr

United Kingdom’s chief of defence (CHOD) staff, marsha

Royal Air Force (RAF) Sir Peter Harding.66 In taking this 

Rose was fortified in knowing he enjoyed the support 

John Wilsey, who visited Rose in Sarajevo on the first 

the ultimatum period.67 Wilsey was the UK-based join

mander of British Forces in the former Republic of Yug

and Rose noted,

We spoke almost daily throughout my time in Bosnia as I felt 

important that there was someone in Britain who would defend, 

strategic and political level [sic], what I was trying to do at the t

level. I had seen for myself how British lives had been unnece

lost in the Falklands because of political interference and Joh

suffered the same experience commanding in Northern Irela

John Wilsey I was fortunate to have someone who instinctively u

stood and supported the peace process. . . . It was also perhap

venient for us both that as I was serving in a UN post, he cou

directly give me orders.68

Thus, Rose used his UK connections to push his own aim

shielding himself behind his status as a UN general to w

unwanted national pressures. However, General Rose fe

might be overridden by higher authorities, thus losing 

over military operations in his area of responsibility 

Bosnian Serbs did not comply with the ultimatum.69 Th

were slow to show any sign of compliance, and once the

to move their heavy weapons, it remained unclear wheth

would meet the NATO deadline.70 Meanwhile, approximat

combat and support aircraft from four NATO nations—

Britain, France, and the Netherlands—stood ready to enfo

ultimatum.71 As the deadline approached, General Ros

diers went to extraordinary lengths to verify Bosnian Se

pliance, even assisting the BSA in moving some of its 

ment.72 The reports from his soldiers were essential 

decision not to bomb.73 Rose later remarked that in t

“both sides concealed a substantial number of weapons 

the TEZ [Total Exclusion Zone], but as long as they did 

them, this hardly mattered.”74 What mattered to Gener

126
was that air strikes were avoided, peacekeeping was no

doned, “and that the UN controlled what was happe

Bosnia both from the air as well as on the ground.”75

Commanders in NATO also wanted to control NATO a

but, despite their efforts to maintain operational aut

their actions were subjected to detailed political superv

Admiral Boorda and General Ashy had been to Brusse

sample target folders to brief NATO ambassadors on p

air strikes.77 The commanders used the target folders t

trate the types of targets they intended to strike and t

that had been taken to minimize chances for collatera

age.78 By showing just a few sample targets and avo

detailed presentation on all of them, the commanders so

earn the trust of NATO political authorities while in

micromanagement from Brussels.79 However, on the ev

deadline, the defense ministers and chiefs of defense sta

the four nations providing aircraft for the strikes, plus t

ister of defense (MOD) and chief of defense staff from Ital

ered at Aviano Air Base with the principal NATO comm

General Joulwan, Admiral Boorda, and General Ashy.80 

this high-level supervision, Admiral Boorda and Gener

assessed the level of Bosnian Serb compliance being re

mostly by General Rose.81 As General Ashy recalled,

When we got down to midnight that night, with Secretary Perry, 

Joulwan, and all the MODs and CHODs in that room, we were st

ifying that the last of these was either in a holding point or was 

observed under UN control or had been removed, or we would 

been triggered to bomb this stuff. It was the damndest thing I’v

been through.82

Like General Rose, the NATO commanders had hoped t

political “help” in operational matters, and their contr

information was a tool for maintaining their aut

However, unlike General Rose, they did not succeed.

As discussed in chapter 2, a commander will want 

over forces and autonomy in using those forces if he 

held accountable for the consequences of operations th

place under his command. General Rose had plenty of 

omy and control on the ground but no real control ove

airpower. Conversely, the American commanders con

127
NATO airpower were so closely supervised that they mi

have had autonomy if bombing operations had gone f

The responsibility borne by the NATO commanders wa

by higher military and political authorities who ar

authority over the decision not to bomb. Because there 

bombing, commanders did not need to cope with in

ments on their operational autonomy. Still, the act

these UN and NATO commanders illustrated how com

ers, convinced of their own expertise and charged with 

sibility for their mission and their forces, might seek to 

military operations and preserve their own auto

whether acting against or in concert with political press

General Cot’s role in the run-up to the ultimatum d

also suggested that open political support for a co

action reduces the weight of responsibility borne by 

mander. During the ultimatum period, Cot was in clo

tact with General Rose and Admiral Boorda, and 

dependent on them for his information; moreover they, 

were controlling the forces involved.84 As a result, Cot 

both control and autonomy. Yet, the UN force com

later denied being very apprehensive about the pros

bombing and claimed that, while he was glad there 

bombing, he had been quite prepared to go along with 

BSA had failed to comply.85 In an interview, Cot pro

“You seem to think I was afraid of air strikes. No. I didn

and the UN didn’t want, the Americans to make an Am

war in the former Yugoslavia. And if the Americans m

American war in Yugoslavia, then they needed to send 

ions to Sarajevo, Bihac, and Mostar, eh?” However, 

General Rose’s situation, General Cot’s government wa

paratively supportive of air strikes, and Cot seems t

been more ambivalent about them, later recalling,

Mitterrand telephoned me, and said to me: “Do we strike? Do w

Or do we not fire?” I said to him: “Boorda and I agree that the u

tum is properly respected, therefore we are not going to strike.” 

ultimatum had not been respected, we would have struck. That’

ous, eh?86

President Mitterrand’s willingness to condone air strik

just in the phone call but also openly at the NATO sum

128
January—reduced the weight of Cot

s responsibilit

majority of UN soldiers on the ground in Bosnia cam

France. Cot was a French general, and it was Mitterran

rogative to accept accountability for the consequen

French soldiers as a result of NATO bombing.

No-Fly Zone Enforcement and First

CAS Approval: February–March 1994

Two events between the Sarajevo ultimatum and th

at Gorazde two months later illustrated the value of 

command decisions in the control of airpower over 

The first, the downing of four Serb aircraft caught viola

no-fly zone, showed how quickly a well-designed co

and control (C2) system could function while still main

tight control over operations. In the case of the no-f

enforcement, there was not much risk to the NATO 

involved, thus no real need for NATO commanders t

weighty decisions in choosing between mission acco

ment and force protection. Moreover, they enjoyed cont

autonomy in their actions.

In the second event, a failed CAS mission at Bihac, t

UN approval process caused the mission to fail. Gene

who professed equanimity over the possibility of bombi

result of the Sarajevo ultimatum, was outraged a mon

when Mr. Akashi was slow to approve the CAS missi

French soldiers were under Bosnian Serb fire. Cot thre

to hold Akashi accountable for the consequences of the 

clearly demonstrating the connection Cot saw between 

tional control and responsibility.

NATO Downs Serb Aircraft in the No-Fly Zone

A well-designed C2 system and speedy decision

needed to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. On 28 Fe

1994, UN forces in Croatia saw Serb Galeb aircraft ta

from Udbina Airfield.87 Soon afterwards, two America

ers over Bosnia picked up radar contacts on aircraft e

Bosnian airspace at low-level from Croatia and no

NATO early warning aircraft.88 With permission from 

129
borne warning and control system (AWACS), the flight 

the two F-16s descended to low altitude to visually iden

radar contacts, and found six Galebs—small, single-s

used by the Serbs—in the ground attack role.89 The F-1

lead managed to maneuver into a position behind the 

apparently without his presence being detected.90 Wh

F-16 pilot was waiting for guidance from the NATO AWA

saw the Galebs commit a hostile act—attacking a grou

get in the central Bosnian town of Novi Travnik—and t

reported this to the AWACS.91 When an officer in the 

informed General Chambers of the violation, Chambers 

diately ordered the planes shot down.92 In rapid suc

the F-16 pilot downed three of the Serb jets.93 A secon

of two American F-16s engaged and shot down a 

Galeb.94 Two of the Galebs were not thought to have be

down, but it was suspected that one of the planes mig

crashed in Croatia, perhaps due to fuel starvation.95 A

one Galeb reportedly landed at an air base near Banja 

Serb-controlled northern Bosnia, further underscor

military cooperation amongst the Serb communi

Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia.96 The entire operation, fr

time NATO aircrews first detected the Galebs until the 

one was shot down, lasted approximately 15 minutes.9

The downing of the four Galebs highlighted the imp

of timely decisions for enforcing the no-fly zone, and t

of decision making when mission accomplishment 

achieved with little risk to one’s forces. Though Res

816, which authorized enforcement of the no-fly zone

lated that NATO air operations were “subject to close 

nation with the secretary-general and the force,” there 

dual-key control over decisions to take enforcement 

against aircraft caught violating the zone.98 A few m

delay in authorizing the F-16s to engage and the Galeb

have been safely on the ground somewhere in Bosnia 

side of Bosnian airspace.

Close Air Support

General Cot’s actions during a failed NATO CAS missio

trated how commanders deprived of control over operat

130
political decision makers might insist that individuals 

ing control also take accountability for the consequence

operations. The CAS request system in Bosnia worked 

paths once a request reached the UN’s Air Operations 

Center, and the NATO path required no real decision m

it operated on the assumption that UN approval would c

a timely manner.99 The airplanes would be ushered to t

where CAS was needed while the request worked 

through the UN chain of command.100 The NATO key 

effect, in the “on” position. According to a February 1994 

by seasoned defense journalist Craig Covault, “the CAS 

set up under UN/NATO agreement is designed to r

quickly that [Admiral] Boorda may not know the ac

underway until it has commenced.”101 Though perhaps 

theory, this was a bit of an overstatement.102 In p

General Chambers had time to inform his superiors of t

ation, and they would discuss the pending opera

Typically, Chambers would then direct operations while 

Ashy and Admiral Boorda monitored events closely by ra

phone, and by a computerized aircraft situation dis

Naples.104 Chambers’s superiors never overruled him

NATO never refused a legitimate CAS request from t

though NATO commanders eventually became wary of 

practice of using the threat of airpower as a bluff.105

While NATO could and did respond quickly to CAS re

the UN approval process remained flawed. On 12 Marc

French troops near Bihac came under fire from Bosnia

guns.106 Within minutes, two A-10s were overhead the b

French forces, awaiting clearance from the UN.107 The 

were later replaced by an AC-130 gunship, which orbit

Bihac with an offending Serb weapon under the cross

the plane’s fire-control system, watching the Serb g

from time to time.108 This situation, with NATO aircraft 

ing by for orders to attack, went on for several hours, w

UN hierarchy tried to reach a decision on whether to a

the CAS mission.109 After French soldiers were i

General Cot demanded that Akashi make a deci

Despite having been delegated authority in mid-Febr

issue such approval, Akashi checked with Boutros-G

131
New York before finally giving the go ahead for close a

port.111 Moreover, Akashi caused further delays in an a

to reach Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by ph

Finally, “Cot lost his temper,” according to General Ro

was present in the UN headquarters as Cot and Akash

on a speaker phone:

[Cot] told Akashi that the time for negotiation was over and he w

either a yes or a no from him, warning him that if he said no, th

would bear all responsibility for the decision. Akashi ignored th

. . . Cot repeated that he wanted either a yes or a no, adding 

Akashi said no, then the press would hear about it the next day

At about midnight, when the mission was finally appr

the UN, execution was delayed because of problems w

weather and with communications between the ground

forward air controllers and the gunship.114 During t

delay, the AC-130 had left the target area, and upon 

ing, its crew needed to reacquire sight of the target.11

these problems were finally overcome, the forward a

trollers withheld permission to expend ordnance becau

had lost sight of the Serb weapon and could not verify t

crew aboard the AC-130 had reacquired the correct ta

As with the no-fly zone, timely decision making was nee

CAS to succeed. Unable to control the decision-

process, General Cot refused to be held accountable 

consequences of the delays.

The Bihac CAS episode made a strong impress

General Cot’s replacement, Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapres

had arrived in Zagreb two days before the incident a

due to take command at mid-month.117 General de L

was an armored cavalry officer who had comman

armored division in Germany, and he considered hi

NATO officer who happened to be assigned to the UN 

than a peacekeeper.118 De Lapresle, who was present 

the heated exchange between Cot and Akashi on 12 

drew an important lesson from the incident: never to s

Mr. Akashi with the need for an instantaneous decisio

order for Mr. Akashi to respond favorably to any reques

force, General de Lapresle believed two things were nec

First, Akashi had to be kept appraised of all military a

132
on the ground, and he had to be helped to anticipate de

about the use of force.120 Second, Akashi had to be co

that the UNPROFOR commanders were recommend

right course of action for the situation at hand.121 This 

condition required General de Lapresle to begin a pro

earning Akashi’s trust and educating him on airpow

procedures for controlling it—explaining to him how to 

attacks if necessary and informing him of the likely 

quences of using airpower.122 Significantly, Gene

Lapresle was skeptical of the safe areas concept an

more doubtful about the logic behind the light option.

I had the normal experience of a NATO officer, having served 

armored forces, and used close air support. And I knew how imp

it was in order to obtain some military effect on the ground—t

effect, not strategic—to have this combination of infantry, tanks

copters, and aircraft. I knew very well that you can not hav

infantry—which we had in the UN—and air support, without an

in this huge gap between light infantry and F-18s or F-16s. And 

horrified when, I was not yet in charge, this concept of safe area

imposed to the UN, because in my mind it was completely clea

we would not, or the UN would not, be able to implement the m

as far as safe areas were concerned, if this gap was not filled. G

Wahlgren . . . asked for 35,000 more men. . . . The “light option

7,500 men, and the gap between 7,500 and 35,000 being filled w

fact that aircraft would be overhead. . . . I was not very hopefu

airpower would really make the difference.123

Like the other UN army generals who had come to the 

Yugoslavia, General de Lapresle started his tour wi

ideas about the utility of airpower in Bosnia. Unlike hi

ecessor, de Lapresle would work closely with the UN sec

general’s special representative and would thus have a 

impact on clarifying UNPROFOR’s mission in Bosnia—

military legitimacy to the UN secretariat’s preferred in

tation of UNPROFOR’s mission instead of combating t

retariat as Cot had done.

Turning Point: Gorazde, April 1994

The attempt by UN and NATO commanders to use a

at Gorazde in April 1994 highlighted the bankruptcy 

light option and served as a turning point for the comm

133
and the organizations they represented. As the first a

sary of the resolution creating the safe areas appro

UNPROFOR leaders made their inputs to a UN report e

ing the safe areas policy. In light of their experien

Gorazde and their inability to secure the full complem

reinforcements proposed for the light option, the UNP

commanders began distancing themselves from the e

ment elements of their mandate. Meanwhile, the NA

sides against the Bosnian Serbs and delegated more re

bility to the AFSOUTH commander. The experience at G

taught the senior airmen in AFSOUTH that in order t

their responsibilities as commanders, they needed 

tighter control on the use of NATO airpower. It also rei

their preference for robust air strikes instead of CAS. I

tion to the other mutually reinforcing factors at wo

responsibilities of command were driving command

AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR in different directions.

When the Bosnian Serb Army under General 

attacked Gorazde in early April 1994, UNPROFOR’

manders had no forces in the safe area and had to 

NATO airpower to block the assault. On 6 April, Gener

sent a team of seven or eight special forces soldiers 

guise of UN military observers into the enclave; thi

force doubled the meager UN presence in the safe area

had previously consisted of just a few liaison officers.12

special forces soldiers were deployed to provide Rose w

able information and to act as forward air controllers fo

airpower.125 It was General Rose’s plan to send the forw

controllers into Gorazde with high-tech communication

and it indicated he was willing to try to use airpower to 

the UN mandate to protect the safe areas. General de L

had authorized the operation and,126 in light of his 

from the Bihac incident, his subsequent efforts to educ

gain the trust of Mr. Akashi, and the relative speed with 

CAS was approved at Gorazde, it seems reasonable 

clude that Mr. Akashi also understood the nature and p

of the soldiers deployed to the enclave.

On 8 April 1994, Admiral Smith took command of AF

from Admiral Boorda.127 Smith was a Navy attack pi

134
had flown 280 missions over North Vietnam during thr

bat cruises. The day of Admiral Smith’s change of com

General Mladic “agreed in principle” to withdraw his fo

the line of demarcation between the Serbs and Muslim

existed in late March.128 However, the next day the 

showed their true intentions by resuming the assa

Gorazde, which precipitated NATO’s first real air attac

General Rose warned Mladic to stop or else face NA

attacks, and he asked General de Lapresle and Mr. Ak

approve a close air support mission.130 When Ro

informed of an intelligence intercept revealing that Mla

given orders to his commanders to raze Gorazde, Rose 

the time for diplomacy or negotiations was over and a great weig

lifted from my shoulders as I found myself back in the familiar 

ness of war fighting. It did not cross my mind for a moment th

UN should refrain from using force. The lives of my soldiers an

civilians in Gorazde were being directly threatened.131

However, the only tools General Rose possessed for g

war were NATO aircraft and a handful of forward a

trollers. Given the nature of the attacking Bosnian Serb 

the poor weather he would confront, and his own 

expertise in handling airpower, General Rose was n

strong position from which to fight. UN political appr

close air support came shortly before 5:00 P.M., and w

attack on Gorazde intensifying, General Rose coordinat

Admiral Smith to have NATO attack a tank.132 Because 

weather, the first two flights of fighters failed to fi

tank.133 When a two-ship of F-16s arrived over Gorazde 

P.M., poor weather conditions forced the pilots to go b

cloud deck—with cloud bottoms at about 6,000 feet ab

level—in an attempt to find the tank.134 In so doin

increased their risk of being shot down; for although th

at the upper limits of small arms fire, they were well 

range of antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missile sy

Unable to visually acquire the tank, the F-16 pilots m

an alternate target selected by General Rose—a group 

cles and tents reportedly serving as an artillery comma

on the high ground overlooking Gorazde.135 At approx

6:25 P.M. on Sunday, 10 April 1994, the F-16s droppe

135
500-pound Mk-82 bombs on the command post, m

NATO’s first-ever air-to-ground mission.136 Accord

General Rose, some senior BSA officers were killed 

attack, including friends of Mladic, and the BSA com

threatened Rose that “no UNPROFOR would leave the

tory alive.”137

The BSA assault ended shortly after the bombing, 

Serbs resumed their attack the next day, 11 April.138 C

quickly approved, but before authorizing actual a

General Rose had the planes conduct dramatic air p

passes in the target area.139 Describing the activities 

press in Washington, director of operations for the Join

of Staff Gen Jack Sheehan said,

The F-18s did not attack the targets immediately. They went th

a series of what I would call controlled flight profiles at the requ

General Rose. They did a couple of high speed, supersonic 

against the target set, just to make sure the Serbs knew that the

there, that this was a serious activity.140

The threats had no effect, so shortly before noon Gener

again called for close air support.141 A British forward a

troller directed a pair of F/A-18s to hit some armored v

but once again poor weather created problems.142 Th

attacks against the vehicles did not go well; out of four 

one failed to release from its aircraft, and two others im

without detonating.143 The lead F/A-18 pilot then proce

make low-altitude strafing attacks on the vehicles.144 T

even more dangerous to the attacking aircraft than th

ous day’s CAS mission because the F/A-18 pilot was n

vulnerable to antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air miss

tems but he was also within range of small arms fire a

repeatedly making passes near BSA forces he ha

bombed. Though unnoticed by most observers the

since, NATO’s first two air-to-ground missions set of

bells within AIRSOUTH.145 The attacks demonstrate

NATO aircrews could become so engrossed in succ

accomplishing their missions that they would violate th

basic tactical principles and endanger themselves 

attempt to destroy relatively insignificant targets.146 Suc

might be justified if friendly forces needed immediate r

136
if the air missions were the only way to halt a ground 

However, AFSOUTH commanders believed there wer

ways and more appropriate targets if the goal was to 

Mladic that the UN and NATO meant business.

The BSA assault on Gorazde tapered off after Gener

threatened another air attack, but Bosnian Serb pr

Radovan Karadzic claimed his forces would shoot down 

aircraft, and the Bosnian Serbs broke off all contac

UNPROFOR.147 During the lull in fighting from 12 to 1

General Mladic’s forces took approximately two hund

peacekeepers as hostages or detained them as 

hostages.148 This was the first instance of what would 

the standard Bosnian Serb response to NATO air atta

with subsequent bombings, four things happened: 

Bosnian Serbs interfered with humanitarian aid delive

they broke off negotiations with the UN, 3) they took ho

and 4) they became more aggressive about firing on NA

craft.149

On the 15th, Mladic renewed his assault. That n

Gorazde two British special forces soldiers were injure

the Bosnian government forces defending the city w

precipitately, leaving the British soldiers exposed to fi

onrushing BSA forces.150 General Rose in Sarajevo pho

Akashi who was in Pale meeting with Radovan Kara

Rose desperately wanted immediate approval for close a

port to halt the attack, but Akashi demurred.152 One of 

diers died from the wounds suffered that night, but A

delay most probably was not a factor in the soldier’s d

However, as Gow has argued, what seemed to matter 

General Rose was that in the heat of combat—with sold

had put in harm’s way wounded and still taking fi

general had called upon Mr. Akashi to deliver NATO ai

and Mr. Akashi had balked.154

With UN peacekeepers as hostages, Mladic’s forces 

hitting back at NATO airpower. On 15 April, a reconna

version of the French Etendard fighter-bomber flyin

Gorazde was hit by a heat-seeking surface-to-air miss

managed to land safely back aboard the 

Clemenceau.

155 It was the first NATO combat aircraft t

137
during Deny Flight. The next day, with the Serb assaul

progress, the UN leadership once again authorized c

support. A British Sea Harrier was called in to find a ta

the Sea Harrier was not optimized for such a mission, 

weather was again poor. After several passes at low alti

the target area, the Sea Harrier was shot down by a sh

launched surface-to-air missile.156 The pilot ejected sus

only minor injuries and was able to join his special forc

patriots in Gorazde.157 When later asked by Admiral 

aide why he had made multiple passes in the target are

he knew he was being shot at, the Sea Harrier pilot ex

that he did it because his countrymen were in tro

However, Gorazde was a city of approximately 60,000 

and there were only a half dozen soldiers, whose mo

within the enclave was not restricted. If the soldiers 

were in harm’s way, it would have been because they h

there intentionally—possibly looking for targets for NA

power. Later on 16 April, American A-10s were tasked 

vide air support for the British special forces in Goraz

poor weather prevented them from accomplishing the

sion.159 That evening, Russian mediator Vitaly C

arranged for Mr. Akashi to suspend further air ac

exchange for Bosnian Serb pledges to release the UN h

and to meet for negotiations the next day.160 While K

met with Akashi on 17 April, the UN hostages were su

to be freed, but only a few of them were, and more than 

dred were still being detained by the BSA at day’s 

Meanwhile the attack on Gorazde continued, and as 

readied for air strikes, General Rose ordered his specia

troops out of the enclave.162

North Atlantic Council Decisions and

the Gorazde Ultimatum

On 18 April, the same day General Rose’s forward a

trollers left Gorazde, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to M

Wörner asking for “a decision by the North Atlantic Co

authorize the commander in chief of NATO’s So

Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the 

Nations, against artillery, mortar positions or tanks 

138
around [any] . . . of the safe areas.

163 President 

strongly endorsed the UN request, and on 20 April th

met to consider it.164 However, council members adj

without taking a decision, reportedly because they 

military commanders to assess the targeting options a

probable effectiveness of air strikes.165 Two days late

the Bosnian Serbs repeatedly made and broke pled

cease-fires around Gorazde, the council met again in 

gency session.166 Subsequently, NATO issued two stat

on decisions taken by the NAC that day. The first dea

the immediate relief of the situation at Gorazde, and t

ond established conditions under which NATO air 

might take place for all of the safe areas in B

Significantly, the list of potential targets once again in

direct and essential support facilities, and it also reflec

broader definition of heavy weapons stemming from G

Joulwan’s input during the establishment of the ex

zone for Sarajevo.

Of immediate consequence, the decisions established 

of ultimatums for the Bosnian Serbs with respect to G

one ultimatum demanded that the Bosnian Serbs—an

the Bosnian Serbs—demilitarize the area within three 

ters of the center of the town and that they grant the UN 

peded access to the enclave by 0001 GMT on 24 April 1

the other ultimatum established a 20-kilometer 

weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde, with a dea

0001 GMT on 27 April 1994.168 Of greater long-term 

cance, the NAC removed itself almost completely fr

decision-making process needed to authorize air 

around the safe areas. Council decisions would no lo

necessary for air strikes within 20 kilometers of the saf

so long as the strikes were against Bosnian Serb 

weapons and “their direct and essential military suppo

ities, including but not limited to fuel installations and 

tions sites.”169 It was left for “NATO Military Authorities 

tiate air attacks . . . in coordination with UNPROFOR” 

accordance with the NAC “decisions of 2d and 9th 

1993.”170 NATO’s military authorities would only requ

ther decisions from the NAC if they wanted to cond

139
strikes beyond the parameters spelled out in these tw

decisions (i.e., beyond the vicinity of the safe areas or 

targets of any faction other than the Bosnian 

Furthermore, the NAC decided that

once air attacks have been carried out against a specific target se

suant to these decisions, the NATO military authorities may co

to carry out, in coordination with UNPROFOR, the attacks again

target set until NATO military authorities judge the mission 

accomplished (emphasis added).171

These NAC decisions were a mixed blessing for NAT

manders. While granting the commanders some autono

room for initiative, they also left it to the military to w

arrangements for air attacks with reluctant UNPROFOR 

On the night of 22 April, Mr. Akashi received a briefing 

proposed NATO air strikes, and he and his advisors we

vinced that hitting the dozen or so targets proposed by 

would only upset the Bosnian Serbs without compelling 

tive change in their behavior.172 The Bosnian Serbs mis

first deadline, but Mr. Akashi, who was with General de L

in Belgrade for negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, 

NATO air action.173 The BSA grudgingly, and only partiall

drew in accordance with the NATO ultimatums, burni

destroying sections of Gorazde as they pulled back.174 Hu

of Bosnian Serb combatants remained within three kilom

the center of Gorazde by posing as police officers, and UN 

continued to find Serb heavy weapons within the 20-ki

exclusion zone.175 However, the BSA ground advance and 

weapons fire on Gorazde had stopped. On 26 April, UN 

announced that Bosnian Serb progress toward complian

sufficient to drop the threat of air strikes.176 Though the 

did not fall, and NATO publicly joined the UN in declari

cess, the events around Gorazde marked a turning p

UN-NATO relations and seriously challenged the utility o

airpower in Bosnia.177

UN and NATO Missions in Bosnia: A Matter of

Interpretation and Political Guidance

As a result of the experience at Gorazde and the con

vulnerability of UN forces, Generals Rose and de L

140
virtually gave up trying to use airpower as a means 

protect the safe areas.178 By General Rose’s ac

“Peacekeepers had to believe that any risks they took o

fices they made would be justified by results. No one 

pared to sacrifice himself or his comrades for a faile

sion.”179 Losing a highly skilled soldier due to ap

Bosnian army malfeasance undoubtedly colored G

Rose’s view of the government whose people he was tr

protect at Gorazde.180 Furthermore, if Mr. Akashi could 

counted on to authorize air support and NATO pilots co

find their targets when air support was authorized

General Rose could not ensure that the risks and sacr

his forces “would be justified by the results.”181 G

apparently changed General Rose from being rather 

about using NATO airpower to help protect the safe a

virtually unwilling to call on it. Contrary to that impr

General Rose claimed that he remained willing to u

power; he was just unwilling to go beyond the smokin

type targets that he equated with option 1 air strikes. A

later said, “I was a great exponent of airpower, but I w

going to go to level two.”182 As the next chapter shows, G

Rose was indeed unwilling to go to option 2 targets, 

also seemed to have lost his enthusiasm for airpow

gether.

General de Lapresle saw Gorazde as a turning point f

self and for General Rose. The UNPROFOR comm

recalled, “We had this first experience in Gorazde, 

unfortunately confirmed completely what Michael Ro

myself had in mind as to what Harriers and other 

could bring us in a very woody, and mountainous, an

cult terrain.”183 By all accounts, including their own, 

commanders suffered no lack of confidence in wha

strained airpower was capable of doing in a comb

nario.184 However, UNPROFOR’s vulnerability made 

robust use of airpower off limits.185 Referring to the r

the lives of UN soldiers, General de Lapresle said,

What sort of explanation would we have to give to their childr

their wives, and so on? Was it really worth the lives of those s

141
who came to keep peace and not to fight a war against the Serbs

was a daily concern, of course.186

These concerns were undoubtedly heightened when t

took the first UNPROFOR hostages as a result of 

attacks on 10 and 11 April. It seemed that trying to 

airpower, even in a relatively passive or defensive mode 

for UN soldiers, exceeded the Bosnian Serbs’ toleran

consent for UNPROFOR’s presence. Rather than compe

for the UN’s shortage of ground forces as the light optio

sioned, NATO airpower jeopardized UNPROFOR’s secur

its humanitarian mission with no compensating ret

terms of protecting the safe areas. Although UN comm

had been aware of this potential problem, vivid affirm

their beliefs at Gorazde came just as General de Lapre

Mr. Akashi were making their inputs to a UN report on 

tus of the safe areas.187 Thus, not only was Gorazde a p

turning point for General Rose, it was also a turning p

the UNPROFOR mission.

In a 9 May report to the Security Council, the UN sec

general pointed out the difficulties of using force to sec

safe areas, the risks of retaliation against UNPROFOR, 

vulnerability of peacekeepers to hostage taking. Furthe

he noted that member-states had failed to provide th

troops called for under the light option.188 Given thes

culties and the ambiguities from the accretion of reso

and reports concerning UNPROFOR, Boutros Boutro

conveyed UNPROFOR’s interpretation of its missio

regard to the safe areas. The mission, as UNPROFOR 

preted it, was to deter attacks on the safe areas 

through its own presence.189 If deterrence failed, UNP

“could be required to resort to close air support to pro

own members or to request air strikes to compel an en

attack on the safe areas.”190 Finally, Boutros-Ghali 

Security Council confirmation or clarification on UNPR

interpretation of its mission191 and closed his report 

recommendation that “the Security Council approve th

ment of UNPROFOR’s mission in relation to the safe a

set out in the present report.”192

142
Essentially, by this report, Generals de Lapresle an

received political support for their preferred interpreta

UNPROFOR’s mission—one that reflected the limitat

their forces. This interpretation saw the safe areas as 

nisms to further an overall humanitarian mission ai

alleviating suffering and promoting conditions for p

The UNPROFOR interpretation would prevent the saf

from becoming an end in themselves that would drai

scarce UN resources, or worse still, serve as a mechan

justifying enforcement action that might drag UNPROF

the fighting.194 This interpretation of UNPROFOR’s m

with regard to the safe areas was entirely consistent w

views long held within the UN secretariat.195 Unlike G

Briquemont and Cot, who quarreled with the UN staff 

York, and the secretary-general’s special represen

Generals Rose and de Lapresle added their endorseme

military legitimacy to Mr. Akashi’s report. The shift aw

enforcement was not just a change in policy; it was 

reflection of the reality of UNPROFOR’s inability t

enforcement action. As General de Lapresle noted, “y

change every word of any Security Council resolution

do not have soldiers who have been sent there to fig

cannot change their behavior on the field. So, what I 

when discussing with Akashi . . . [was] that if w

expected to behave differently, we would need some me

Though UNPROFOR commanders increasingly took th

tion that their mission was peacekeeping and not 

enforcement, the Security Council never passed a res

superseding 836, nor did it offer any clarifica

UNPROFOR’s mission in relation to the safe areas.197 H

because the Security Council did not dispute UNPR

interpretation, which obviously enjoyed the support of B

Boutros-Ghali, Generals de Lapresle and Rose ha

grounds for adhering to their view of UNPROFOR’s mis

Trust, Expertise, and Forces at Risk

In May, just as UNPROFOR was seeking Security 

approval for its interpretation of its mission with regar

safe areas, Gen George Joulwan and NATO’s deputy sec

143
general Sergio Balanzino visited UNPROFOR leader

Zagreb and Sarajevo. General Joulwan expressed his c

that the UN had not been forceful enough in its use 

power at Gorazde, and that it was unacceptable for th

to maintain heavy weapons inside the exclusion zo

General Rose assured SACEUR that any weapons ins

exclusion zones were broken down.199 From Zagreb, th

visitors went with General Rose to Sarajevo. En route 

UN commander’s headquarters, the group came und

which General Joulwan was convinced came from a 

General Rose suggested it was merely rocket-pr

grenade fire, hence not from a banned heavy weapon.20

General Rose’s headquarters, General Joulwan asked 

chief of intelligence if red pins dotting a map of the S

area and inside the exclusion zone represented broke

heavy weapons. According to Joulwan, the intelligence 

assured SACEUR that they represented active heavy we

leading General Rose to explain that he had been awa

his headquarters for a while.201 From that point on, G

Joulwan said he felt he could not trust Genera

According to the NATO commander:

It is important that when you commit forces, you must make sur

you have trust and confidence of those you’re working with . . . [fu

more,] it’s not just right to be politically correct; you better be m

ily correct when you have forces involved. And so I insisted upo

tal truth, brutal honesty when you’re putting aircrews, and g

crews, and tank crews, and ships at risk. And I didn’t get bruta

esty; I got a shaky answer from Rose.202

The lack of trust was mutual, for General Rose fe

“Joulwan and his team tried to bounce the UN in M

using more force. And [the UN] just [said]: ‘You’re no

it.’”203 General Rose already had forces at risk, and he 

appreciate a NATO general pushing for risky action

NATO was unwilling to deploy forces on the gro

Bosnia.204 Compounding the difficulties was G

Joulwan’s tendency at this stage to treat the UNP

commanders as his subordinates since they came from 

nations.205 Joulwan’s motto as SACEUR was “one tea

144
fight

; however, the UN wanted neither to be on the te

to join in the fight.206

Though Admiral Smith and General Ashy in Naples 

stood the difficulties the UN faced when it came to usin

against the Serbs, the two senior airmen found that the

no longer blithely countenance the practice of using NA

power for “air presence” missions.207 Restrictions agai

geting anything other than smoking-guns or the actua

threatening the UN was bad enough. Such constraint

ever, could be justified in order to protect the lives 

peacekeepers on the ground. What concerned NATO 

tional commanders was the UN practice of calling on a

to intimidate one of the warring factions (almost alw

Bosnian Serbs), apparently without having the intention 

political approval from within the UN to actually 

force.208 Initially the mere presence of aircraft had bee

by the UN as a show of force to strengthen its hand 

blocks, or to dampen heavy weapons fire.209 But, ‘‘

became addicted to air presence,’’ according to one NA

cer.210 General Chambers noted that over time UNP

found it necessary for the planes to fly lower and to mak

noise in order to intimidate the warring factions. Gener

even requested some high-speed passes below an alti

500 feet, which would have made the aircraft vulner

ground fire.211 As a matter of routine, NATO continu

practice of sending aircraft to the vicinity of UN peace

whenever a situation began to develop that might requi

air support.212 Air presence missions continued to be 

but with some restrictions.213 However, in the wake of 

Harrier loss and the UN’s refusal to employ airpower in 

robust manner, senior NATO airmen became extremely 

tant to give General Rose the same level of control ove

aircraft that he had exercised at Gorazde.214

General Rose held fundamentally different views o

airpower and its role over Bosnia than did the senior 

in AFSOUTH. From General Rose’s perspective, the 

commanders were presenting him with an all-or-

choice—either he had to be willing to go after somethin

than the smoking-guns, or he would get no air support a

145
In his memoir, General Rose says that Admiral Smith 

only accept strategic-level targets, such as major HQ

munications sites, or logistic installations such as am

tion bunkers. I told him that neither NATO nor the U

authority to escalate the use of air power in this man

In truth, these were precisely the sorts of targets spel

under option 2 of NATO’s “Operational Options 

Strikes,” and by labeling them “strategic level targets

indicated the gulf between his view of airpower an

shared by NATO commanders.217 More significantly, G

Rose believed that NATO should be prepared to lose so

craft, noting that the downing of the Sea Harrier “was 

tunate . . . but the incident should be considered a 

hazard of peacekeeping.”218 The American airmen in 

disagreed with this on two counts: first, they did not s

mission as peacekeeping,219 and second, they viewed th

as unjustifiable and unnecessary. The principal rea

attempting to employ airpower in Bosnia was to make u

tool for enforcement action, which carried minimal risk

Admiral Smith felt the risks were unjustified and unne

is clear from General Rose’s account. They were unjus

because the UN would halt the use of airpower as soon 

Bosnian Serbs stopped shooting;220 thus, the result

ephemeral, and the Bosnian Serbs could, and did, 

their attacks when the weather worsened or after th

taken UN hostages. Under these circumstances, the ris

being taken for no discernible payoff. The rationale fo

beyond smoking-gun-type targets during the Sarajevo 

tum was to get more payoff for less risk.221 In the da

months after the downing of the Sea Harrier, senior air

AFSOUTH and their political masters in Brussels 

repeatedly demonstrate just how little risk to NATO 

they were willing to accept.222 Furthermore, the risk

unnecessary in the eyes of the NATO commanders b

they believed there was a better way to use airpower a

was to strike more significant targets that might actual

pel the Bosnian Serbs to respect the UN safe areas a

NATO exclusion zones.223

146
Conclusion

The growing split between UN and NATO command

be viewed in terms of force protection and tactical de

ism; that is, it was impossible to prosecute smoking-gu

targets within the bounds of acceptable risk to NATO 

and the capabilities of NATO airpower. Unfortunately th

realistic and safest way of employing NATO airpower 

with the security needs of UNPROFOR. These dispara

tations and vulnerabilities of NATO and UNPROFOR we

ing the commanders in the two organizations further a

ther apart. Yet NAC decisions increasingly left it 

operational commanders to try to find some workable 

ground to do something whenever political pre

mounted. AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR attempts to 

halfway, however, manifested themselves in the compr

safety of NATO pilots or UN peacekeepers. After G

theater-level commanders gradually began to accept th

cal determinism that pulled them toward the separa

ments in what was supposed to be a cooperative effort. 

than seeking political direction, Generals Rose a

Lapresle sought to help define their own mission. G

Rose began the process with his campaign plan even be

arrived in Bosnia. After Gorazde, the UN generals mad

input and added military legitimacy to the UN sec

general’s report of 9 May, which moved UNPROFOR aw

responsibility for enforcing the safe areas policy. The

the first steps in creating a division of labor, w

UNPROFOR conducted peacekeeping and NATO took 

sibility for enforcement action.

The difficulties and dangers of providing air presen

close air support to UNPROFOR reinforced the AFSOUT

manders’ preference for more militarily meaning

attacks. Moreover, it convinced the NATO commander

wisdom of having airmen controlling airpower. Likew

difficulties and dangers of having close air support at G

reinforced the UNPROFOR commanders’ desire to cont

power. The theater-level commanders in both the U

NATO were trying to strike a proper balance between th

to their forces and accomplishment of their missio

147
UNPROFOR, that meant reinterpreting the mission s

avoid responsibility for the safe areas and the exclusion 

For AFSOUTH, striking the right balance meant not 

forces at risk unless there was a commensurate payof

in turn, led the commanders in AFSOUTH to favor air 

over CAS, and to curtail the reflex of giving UNPROF

presence. As noted before, the commanders’ respons

were reinforced by national political pressures, differin

of expertise, and organizational biases. The next chap

ther assesses the role of responsibility in motivating th

manders and shows their actions as part of a broader 

of behavior.

Notes

1. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprint with n

ace and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 

Betts’s discussion focused on tactical determinism working at th

making level while policy was still being formed. As this chapter 

strates, the process can also work backward, reshaping policy aft

been made. And, in this case, military commanders in the field p

important role.

2. British Ministry of Defence Official F.

3. Gen Sir Michael Rose, British army, retired, Fighting for Peac

1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), 13, 16, and 53.

4. Stephen Hart, “Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservat

Colossal Cracks: Twenty-First Army Group’s Operational Tech

North-West Europe, 1944–45,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 1

(December 1996): 144.

5. Rose, 13.

6. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation 

Books, Inc., 1996), 310–17. For a spirited (if not spleenful) discu

General Rose’s role in pursuing British interests, see Jane Sharp

Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia 

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), 32–34 and 43–46. Also 

Almond, “A Far Away Country,” in With No Peace to Keep: United 

Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yuguslavia, eds. Ben Co

George Stamkoski (London: Grainpress, 1995), 125–41.

7. The principal Security Council resolutions defining UNP

mandate, 770, 776, and 836, were all based on chap. 7 of the United 

(UN) Charter, though Resolution 776’s connection to chap. 7 was 

Resolution 770 rather than an explicit reference in 776 itself. 

Caplan incorrectly claimed that “Res. 776 imposed constraints on t

148
force; unlike 770, it was a chapter 6 resolution.

 Richard Capla

Mortem on UNPROFOR,” London Defense Studies, no. 33 (London: B

for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1996), 11. Also see James Gow, 

of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (N

Columbia University Press, 1997), 270–71, n. 9.

8. Jerzy Ciechanski, “Enforcement Measures under Chapter 7 o

Charter: UN Practice After the Cold War,” in The UN Peace and F

Michael Pugh (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 86–93.

9. Rose, 12.

10. Ibid., 14 and 24; and Military Official G.

11. Rose, 11.

12. John Gerard Ruggie, “The UN and the Collective Use 

Whither and Whether?” in The UN Peace and Force, ed. Mich

(London: Frank Cass, 1997), 9–10.

13. House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fourth Repor

Kingdom Peacekeeping and Intervention Forces, 13 July 1993, 27 an

14. Ibid., 28; and Army Field Manual (AFM) (UK),Wider Peac

(London: HMSO, 1995), 12.

15. Rose, 13.

16. Ibid., 15.

17. See for example: Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Po

Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 240–53

Stephen T. Ganyard, USMC, “Where Air Power Fails,” U.S. Naval 

Proceedings 121, no. 1 (January 1995): 36–39. Also see Unite

Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final 

Congress,” (n.p.: Government Printing Office, April 1992), 158–59 

and Lt Col William F. Andrews, USAF, Airpower Against an Army: C

and Response in CENTAF’s Duel with the Republican Guard, CADR

(Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1998).

18. As discussed in chap. 4.

19. Military Official W.

20. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 199

1996), 264. Akashi’s predecessor as SGSR continued his duties a

cochairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugo

Geneva.

21. Ibid.; and Philippe Guillot, “France, Peacekeeping and Hum

Intervention,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 1 (spring 1994): 39

22. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the 

Council, 2 February 1994 (S/1994/121, 4 February 1994).

23. Alan Ridding, “France Presses U.S. for Stronger Stand on Bos

York Times, 6 January 1994, A8; and Douglas Jehl, “In NATO Talk

Sets Off A Sharp Debate,” New York Times, 11 January 1994, A1 an

24. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Declaration of the 

State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North 

Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10–11 Januar

Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, par. 25.

149
25. R. W. Apple Jr., 

NATO Again Plans Possible Air Raids on 

Bosnia,” New York Times, 12 January 1994, A1 and A8.

26. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yu

1991–1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (The Hague: The Net

Atlantic Commission, 1996), 40; Pia Christina Wood, “France and 

Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia,” European Security 3, no. 

1994): 148; and Apple, A1.

27. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the 

Council, 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94, 28 January 1994) (hereafte

S/1994/94); and Letter from the Secretary-General to the Preside

Security Council, 15 February 1994 (S/1994/182, 15 February 199

after cited as S/1994/182).

28. S/1994/94.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. S/1994/182.

34. The reorganization gave General Ashy command of the US S

Air Force, making him “dual hatted,” since he retained his NATO po

commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOU

Thomas S. Snyder and Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, USAFE Office of 

USAFE Historical Highlights, 1942–1997: Fifty-fifth Anniversary 

(Ramstein Air Base, Germany: Headquarters USAFE, 1997), 168.

35. Ibid., 164–65.

36. The other two were General Ashy and the Italian commande

ATAF, General Rossetti.

37. Lt Gen James E. Chambers, USAF, director of NATO’s Com

Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy, interviewed by author, 10 

1998, Fairfax, Va., transcript of taped interview, author’s personal co

38. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interviewed by Lt Col Robert O

April 1996, Washington, D.C. Unclassified version of “General As

History Interview,” (66 pp.) redacted by the Air Force Historical 

Agency, October 1997. Office of History, Air Force Space Command, 

AFB, Colo.; and Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., USAF, AFSOUTH sta

February 1993–1996, transcript of taped interview by Lt Col Robert 

December 1995, Naples, Italy, Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) C

Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

39. Chambers interview; and Col Robert Lushbaugh, USAF, reti

of Operations for Provide Promise and Deny Flight, CAOC, Vicen

February–June 1993, interviewed by author, 9 July 1998, Langley 

author’s notes, author’s personal collection.

40. Silber and Little, 309; and the United Nations, Blue He

Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3d ed. (New York: United 

Reproduction Section, 1996), 528.

150
41. Silber and Little, 309

31; Blue Helmets, 528; and Gen Sir 

Rose, transcript of filmed interview, “The Death of Yugoslavia” c

Box 18, File 4 (R-Z), 1 (Liddell Hart Archives, King’s College, Uni

London).

42. Blue Helmets, 529.

43. S/1994/131, 6 February 1994, cited in Blue Helmets, 529.

44. Gregory L. Schulte, “Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO,

39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 22–23.

45. BBC and the Discovery Channel, “Episode 5: No Escape.”

46. Gen Sir Michael Rose, interview with author, 10 Decemb

London, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collectio

transcript of filmed interview, 3; and Silber and Little, 310–15.

47. Rose, transcript of filmed interview, 1–6; Silber and Little, 

and Rose, Fighting, 47–51.

48. Rose, Fighting, 47–48; and Silber and Little, 313.

49. Silber and Little, 315.

50. Ibid., 313.

51. Ibid., 313–14; and Wood, 148.

52. NATO, Press Release (94) 15, 9 February 1994, par. 6.

53. Ibid., par. 6.

54. Ibid., par. 7.

55. Senate, Briefing on Bosnia and Other Current Military Opera

February 1994, 13.

56. NATO, Press Release (94) 15, 9 February 1994, par. 10.

57. Rose, Fighting, 51–52.

58. A report by a Security Council team that traveled to Bosnia 

ited Srebrenica criticized the two UNPROFOR commanders for ag

disarm the government forces in Srebrenica and for pressuring the 

leaders into accepting terms dictated by General Mladic for surrend

enclave. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security 

Resolution 819 (1993) (S/25700, 30 April 1993) (Reissued). Also 

Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime 

Penguin Books, 1996), 106.

59. Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) (S/RES/836, 4 Jun

Technically Rose’s agreement did not violate the letter of the re

Because the Bosnian government was not being asked to withdraw 

weapons or any associated units, it merely had to turn them 

UNPROFOR. Arguably, it ran counter to the intent not to dis

Bosnian government forces.

60. Schulte, 22. Obviously the exclusion zone created a mecha

the sort of wider bombing advocated by the United States. 

Schulte’s explanation accurately reflected the limitations of airpow

demonstrating the double nature of tactical determinism (i.e., as a 

straint and as a possible expedient for shaping policy).

61. General Ashy’s interview with Colonel Owen indicated th

were three options based on the level of compliance with the ultima

151
counting option one, which was to simply monitor the exclusion zo

event of full compliance). However, the redacted interview transc

unclear as to what the range of options was and what criteria w

used in selecting the appropriate option.

62. Ashy interview with Col Robert Owen.

63. Gen George Joulwan, interviewed by author, 11 Februa

Washington, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal c

Joulwan replaced General Shalikashvili as SACEUR in October 19

Shalikashvili became chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

64. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998.

65. The term dual key may have entered the lexicon at a NATO 

on 10 February, the day after the NAC ultimatum. Representing the 

at the meeting, Vice Adm Norman Ray, the deputy chairman o

Military Committee, described UNPROFOR’s control over NATO 

using the dual key analogy, thus easing the concerns of ambassa

feared that the ultimatum had gone too far. The term would have be

iar to those in the room who understood nuclear safeguards, whe

keys, far enough apart that one person could not activate them both

to be turned simultaneously in order to launch a nuclear missile. V

Norman W. Ray, USN, interviewed by author, 19 November 1997, 

transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

66. Rose, Fighting, 55–56.

67. Ibid., 52.

68. Ibid., 52–53.

69. Ibid., 55–56; and Silber and Little, 314–17.

70. Gow, Triumph, 147–48; and Silber and Little, 316–17.

71. Leurdijk, 42–43; Craig Covault, “NATO Flights Accelerate for 

Recon,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 February 1994, 3

72. Rose, transcript of filmed interview, 7; and BBC and D

Channel, “Episode 5.”

73. Rose, Fighting, 56 and 61–62; and Senate, Briefing on Bo

February 1994, 15–16.

74. Rose, Fighting, 57.

75. Ibid., 55.

76. Cot interview; Ashy interview by Col Robert Owen.

77. Ashy interview by Col Robert Owen; Lt Gen Nicholas B. Keho

assistant chief of staff, Operations and Logistics, Supreme Head

Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium, July 1992–October 1994, int

by author, 18 November 1997, Brussels. Transcript of tape r

author’s personal collection; Ray interview; and Ashy interview b

The date of Ashy and Boorda’s visit to Brussels remains undeterm

General Ashy’s interview with Colonel Owen, Ashy seemed to indica

place around the time of the Sarajevo ultimatum; however, it mi

been as early as some time in 1993. The timing would not affect 

made here about control of information and operational autonomy

78. Ashy interview by author.

152
79. Ibid.

80. Senate, Briefing on Bosnia, 10 and 15; Ashy interview by C

Owen; and Ashy interview by author.

81. Senate, Briefing on Bosnia, 15–16; Rose, Fighting, 56 an

Ashy interview by Col Robert Owen; and Ashy interview by author.

82. Ashy interview by Col Robert Owen.

83. The point here is to show that commanders do seek to pres

trol and autonomy over operations and how they might do so. This 

and subsequent chapters show that at times it is, in large part, 

commanders have responsibility and expertise that they insist o

and autonomy. Obviously, these demands could be motivated by o

tors, such as national political pressures or military doctrine. In th

the Sarajevo ultimatum, the factors motivating the commanders we

ally reinforcing, so it is difficult to argue persuasively that any of t

most important.

84. Gen Jean Cot, French army, UNPROFOR force comman

1993–March 1994, interviewed by author, 30 September 1998, Pa

script and translation of tape recording, author’s personal collectio

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Per Erik Solli, UN and NATO Airpower in the Former Yugosla

Report no. 209 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1

Within two weeks of the shooting down of the Galebs, the author a

copy of the cockpit video from the F-16 that shot down three of 

planes. The tape was used along with a talking paper to brief office

author’s home unit.

88. Chambers interview; and Maj Mark A. Bucknam, USAF

paper on “Shootdown of Galebs over Bosnia,” 29 April 1994, briefi

author’s personal collection.

89. Bucknam.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.; and Facts On File Yearbook 1994 (Facts on File, Inc

134–35. The Galebs may have divided their formation and made t

rate attacks: one on Novi Travnik and another a few miles to th

Bugojno. See Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, Royal Air Force, Air 

Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994), 180; and Maj M

Beale, USAF, Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Her

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 1.

92. Bucknam; and Chambers interview.

93. Bucknam; and Facts On File 1994, 135.

94. Bucknam; and Ashy interview by author.

95. Bucknam; Chambers interview; and Ashy interview by auth

96. Bucknam; Mason reported two landed at Banja Luka. See A

180. General Rose claimed the Serbs held a funeral for the pilots in 

the week after the downing. Rose, Fighting, 71.

97. Facts On File 1994, 135.

153
98. Chambers interview. Citation from Security Council Resolu

31 March 1993 (S/RES/816, 31 March 1993).

99. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny Flight Air O

Center, HQ AFSOUTH, interviewed by author, 29 April 1997, Span

Germany, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collect

Covault, 35.

100. Brig Gen Charles F. Wald, USAF, interviewed by autho

1997, Aviano, Italy, tape recording, author’s personal collection; Zo

view; and Covault, 35.

101. Covault, 35.

102. Ashy interview by author.

103. Covault, 35; Wald interview; and Chambers interview.

104. Ashy interview by author; and David Miller, “NATO Comm

Information Systems,” International Defense Review 27, no. 6 (1994

105. Chambers interview; and Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, int

by author, 10 February 1998, Arlington, Va., transcript of tape r

author’s personal collection. The next chapter addresses the abor

air support mission at Bihac in November 1994.

106. The number and types of weapons firing on the French a

tain. It seems that a mobile antiaircraft gun and possibly a ta

involved. Rose, Fighting, 85; Mason, 180; Lowell Boyd intervie

49–50; and Hans-Christian Hagman, “UN-NATO Operational Co-o

in Peacekeeping 1992–1995” (PhD diss., King’s College, Univ

London, 1997), 123.

107. Chambers interview; and Zoerb interview.

108. Chambers interview.

109. Ibid.; Ashy interview by author; and Maj Gen James C

“Outstanding Air Support of UNPROFOR,” photocopy of electronic me

March 1994, Vicenza, Italy [to participating NATO units], BACS Colle

110. Gen Jean Cot, French army, “Dayton ou la Porte Etroite: G

Avenir d’un Désastre,” in Dernière Guerre Balkanique?, 2e ed., ed. 

(France: Editions L’Harmattan, 1996), 123; Gen Bertrand de Lapres

viewed by author, 13 January 1998, Paris, transcript of tape r

author’s personal collection; and Rose, Fighting, 85.

111. Cot, “Dayton,” 123; Rose, Fighting, 85; Ashy interview by 

and Chambers interview.

112. Cot, “Dayton,” 123; and Rose, Fighting, 85.

113. Rose, Fighting, 85.

114. Lowell Boyd interview.

115. Solli claimed that NATO aircraft left at the request of the U

UN and NATO, 49. NATO sources indicated that the AC-130 left to 

flight. Lowell Boyd interview; and Zoerb interview.

116. Lowell Boyd interview; and Ashy interview by author.

117. De Lapresle interview.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

154
120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Rose, Fighting, 100; Tim Ripley, “Blue Sword over Bosni

Airpower Journal 19 (winter 1994): 22; and Silber and Little, 327–2

and Little asserted the soldiers were all from the British Special Ai

125. De Lapresle interview; Ashy interview by author; and Hagm

Rose hints at the forward air controller status of these soldiers 

directly saying that that is what they were. Rose, Fighting, 101.

126. De Lapresle interview.

127. Facts On File 1994, 96 and 207.

128. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-ROM version 1.1, A

Edition (The Electric Company, 1995), reference 177.

129. Department of Defense (DOD), “Special DOD News Brie

April 1994.

130. Rose, Fighting, 106–7.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid., 147. General Rose reported that the approval proc

over an hour because Akashi, who was in Paris, had to check with 

before approving the mission.

133. Smith, press conference, 11 April 1994; and Ripley, 22.

134. Smith, press conference; and Zoerb interview.

135. DOD, “Special News Briefing,” 11 April 1994; and Rose, Figh

136. Snyder and Harrington, 170–71; DOD, “Special News Brie

April 1994; and Facts On File 1994, 253.

137. Rose interview by author; Silber and Little, 328; and Rose, 

107–8.

138. DOD, “Special News Briefing,” 11 April 1994; and Rose, Figh

139. DOD, “Special News Briefing,” 11 April 1994; and Ripley, 

140. DOD, “Special News Briefing,” 11 April 1994.

141. Ripley, 23.

142. Ibid.; Smith, press conference, 11 April 1994; and DOD, 

News Briefing,” 11 April 1994.

143. Ripley, 23; and Zoerb interview.

144. DOD, “Special News Briefing,” 11 April 1994; Ripley, 23; a

interview.

145. Zoerb interview.

146. Ibid.

147. Facts On File 1994, 254.

148. Silber and Little, 328; and Facts On File 1994, 269.

149. These consequences did not follow the first NATO air s

August and September of 1994 because the Serbs had been w

advance of the strikes, and UN commanders elected to strike symb

militarily insignificant, targets.

150. Rose interview by author.

155
151. Silber and Little, 329.

152. Ibid.; BBC and Discover Channel, Episode 5; and Rose, 

111–13.

153. Facts On File 1994, 269; and Rose, Fighting, 112.

154. Gow, Triumph, 150–51.

155. AFSOUTH, “Operation Deny Flight Fact Sheet,” 5 Octob

Ripley, 23; and Tim Ripley, Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower 

Wisc.: Motorbooks International, 1996), 70 and 79.

156. Ripley, “Blue Sword,” 23; and Zoerb interview.

157. Ripley, “Blue Sword,” 23.

158. Cmdr Kevin M. Donegan, USN, interviewed by author, 

1998, London, printout of E-mail, author’s personal collection.

159. Ripley, Air War Bosnia, 70; and “Blue Sword,” 23.

160. Silber and Little, 330; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 

version 1.1, reference 177.

161. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-ROM version 1.1, refere

162. Ripley, “Blue Sword,” 23; and Silber and Little, 331.

163. Annex to Letter from the Secretary-General to the Preside

Security Council, 18 April 1994 (S/1994/466, 19 April 1994).

164. Facts On File 1994, 269–70.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., 270 and 293.

167. NATO, Press Release (94)31, 22 April 1994.

168. NATO, Press Release (94)32, 22 April 1994.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Thomas Quiggin, military information analyst, UN

Headquarters, Zagreb, interviewed by author, 20 December 1998, 

of E-mail, author’s personal collection; Ashy interview by author; C

interview; and Military Official Y.

173. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 9

(S/1994/600, 19 May 1994).

174. Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., The “Yugoslav” 

International Law, General Issues Part I, Cambridge Inter

Documents Series, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres

56; and Facts On File 1994, 293–94 and 383.

175. S/1994/600, 19 May 1994.

176. Military Official Y.

177. Silber and Little, 332–34; and Leurdijk, 49–54.

178. De Lapresle interview; Gow, Triumph, 150–51; and Military O

179. Rose, Fighting, 76.

180. Ibid., 111–15.

181. Gow, Triumph, 151.

182. Rose interview by author.

183. De Lapresle interview.

156
184. Ibid.; Rose interview by author; Ashy interview by aut

Zoerb interview.

185. De Lapresle interview; and Rose interview by author.

186. De Lapresle interview.

187. David Owen, CD-ROM reference 177, “UN-NATO disagreem

the use of air power.” According to General de Lapresle, Akashi si

report from Zagreb on which the secretary-general’s report wa

However, Mr. Akashi came to Zagreb unschooled in the working

power, and de Lapresle had mentored him. Moreover, they had spen

time together during the Gorazde crisis. Gen Bertrand de 

UNPROFOR force commander, 15 March 1994–February 1995, int

by author, 8 September 1998, Paris, transcript of tape recording, 

personal collection.

188. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 84

(S/1994/555, 9 May 1994).

189. S/1994/555, pars. 13 and 16.

190. Ibid., par. 17.

191. Ibid., par. 29.

192. Ibid., par. 32.

193. Ibid., pars. 13 and 24.

194. Ibid., pars. 16, 17, and 24.

195. See for instance, Report of the Secretary-General Pur

Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) (S/25939, 14 June 1993).

196. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1998.

197. S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994.

198. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and Rose, Fighting, 

199. Ibid., and Rose, Fighting, 125–27. In General Rose’s acc

weapons were five old artillery pieces barely 100 meters inside the e

zone, and that their range probably precluded them from thr

Sarajevo.

200. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and Rose, Fighting, 

201. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998.

202. Ibid.

203. Rose interview by author.

204. Rose, Fighting, 126. Since there were soldiers from NATO n

UNPROFOR, I take General Rose’s use of “NATO” to mean more sp

the United States.

205. Military Officials X and Z.

206. Rose, Fighting, 125–26.

207. Smith interview; and Donegan interview.

208. Smith interview; Chambers interview; Zoerb interview; a

interview.

209. Smith interview; and Chambers interview.

210. Lowell Boyd interview.

211. Chambers interview.

212. Chambers interview; Smith interview; and Wald interview.

157
213. Smith interview; Zoerb interview; and Wald interview.

214. Smith interview; Donegan interview.

215. Rose interview by author.

216. Rose, Fighting, 114.

217. See discussion in chap. 4 on “Operational Options.” Targe

might have considered “strategic level” would have been part of ph

option 3, as it came to be called.

218. Rose, Fighting, 114.

219. Smith interview. Also note the mission statement given to 

Ashy in August of 1993 cited in chap. 4, the terms of the Sarajevo ul

and the terms of the Gorazde ultimatum, which followed the loss o

Harrier. Each of these directed NATO commanders to prepare for enf

action in situations where Bosnian Serb consent was nonexistent.

220. Smith interview.

221. Schulte, 22–23.

222. The topic of limiting risks to NATO aircrew is discussed ex

in the next chapter.

223. Ashy interview by author; Smith interview; and Zoerb inte

158
Chapter 6

Competing Missions and Demands 

Force Protection: August–December 1

The whole business of dual key again caused a cert

amount of discussion. But when you’ve got two chains 

command, slightly different mandates, you’re going to h

to have a dual key. There’s no other way of running 

operation.

—Gen Sir Michael Ro

Interviewed by auth

10 December 1997

In the second half of 1994, NATO airmen believed th

piecemeal and highly restrained use of airpower he

prospect for affecting the behavior of the Bosnian 

Furthermore, NATO commanders began to believe t

influence of UNPROFOR’s commanders over the condu

attacks unnecessarily jeopardized the safety of NATO a

Conversely, commanders in UNPROFOR became conv

especially after events at Gorazde in April 1994—tha

airpower could easily create more problems than it wa

to solve. Though willing to accept air support in extrem

harbored serious misgivings over NATO plans for air 

Under the ‘‘dual key’’ control arrangements, the UN cou

NATO’s more muscular air options, and an unhealthy 

between soldiers and airmen and the organizations th

resented grew during the summer and fall of 1994.

This chapter shows how military commanders in NA

the UN clashed over their competing concerns for for

tection and mission accomplishment. The first 

addresses UN-NATO friction over the UNPROFOR pra

warning the Bosnian Serbs of pending air attacks. 

examines UN-NATO disputes over ‘‘proportionality’’ in re

ing to Bosnian Serb provocations around Sarajevo. T

dimension of this struggle has been addressed elsewhe

159
the NATO perspective has been largely unrecognized or 

terpreted.1 The second section shows how the comman

UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH accepted short-term degr

of their missions during the air strike against the Serb-con

Udbina airfield and how they cooperated in order to s

each other’s needs for force protection. The third 

details some previously neglected issues concerning 

response in late 1994 to the growing Bosnian Serb sur

air threat. Though NATO commanders won formal p

approval to change the rules of engagement (ROE) go

suppression of air defenses, the commander of UNP

used the dual-key mechanism to prevent NATO airme

acting on their new authority. This inhibited the ab

NATO airmen to act in self-defense, causing a seriou

between UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH. Thus, despite som

promises on both sides, by the end of 1994 the di

responsibilities of UN and NATO commanders contribu

breakdown in cooperation between them, rendering 

Flight virtually ineffective.

NATO Air Strikes and the Clash over

Warnings and Control: August–October 1

By the summer of 1994, commanders in UNPROFO

AFSOUTH were working at cross-purposes in Bosnia 

they tried to cooperate to implement the same S

Council resolutions. The divided UN-NATO command a

ments reflected and were reinforced by conflicting n

political pressures, different means available, differen

of military expertise, and different responsibilities. W

support for the Bosnian government cause, comman

AFSOUTH came under increasing political pressure to 

Bosnian Serb compliance with the NATO-decreed ex

zone around Sarajevo. The one-sided nature of this 

intervention threatened to unhinge Serb consent for 

forces, whose mandate the exclusion zone was meant t

Meanwhile, UNPROFOR commanders endeavored to p

the humanitarian and peacekeeping focus of their m

which meant remaining impartial and maintaining th

160
sent of the warring factions. The division of labor—with 

focusing on peacekeeping and NATO focusing on enforce

led to radically different approaches to using airpower.

From the summer of 1994, planners in Naples wor

target matrices to guide NATO commanders should th

to propose air strikes in response to provocations from 

the warring factions.2 These matrices were to be used 

junction with five thick target books maintained at th

quarters of the principal commanders in the 

AFSOUTH, AIRSOUTH, 5ATAF/CAOC, UNPROFOR

Bosnia-Herzegovina Command.3 Each book contained 

cal information—such as photographs and target descrip

on targets approved by the UN-NATO joint targeting 

Additionally, the books included copies of UN Security 

resolutions and NAC decisions relevant to air operation

former Yugoslavia.5 Targets were divided into cat

according to the type of target and were also divided i

sets—one for each safe area, but with only one set fo

and Srebrenica combined.6 Next to each typical prov

and suggested response, NATO planners identified the 

izing Security Council resolutions and NATO decisions 

as the appropriate ROE from Deny Flight plan 4010

target books incorporated targets for the three warring 

in Bosnia: the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosni

ernment forces.8 However, many factors—including 

safe areas concept, the supporting NATO ultimatums, 

fact that the Bosnian Serbs possessed the preponder

heavy weapons and other likely targets—made it ea

NATO planners to identify Bosnian Serb targets an

likely that those targets would be nominated for air s

Officers working in the air component of Admiral 

headquarters went to great lengths to keep these 

updated so UN and NATO commanders could react 

and appropriately to a provocation.10

During the summer of 1994, General Rose proposed 

scheme for using airpower though the proposal con

some airmen that the UN’s commander in Bosnia 

understand the vulnerabilities of airpower or share the

on its proper employment.11 Labeled Operation Antelo

161
proposal called for NATO to respond to the unaut

removal of heavy weapons from UN control points by s

the exact piece of equipment that had been illegally t

From an airman’s viewpoint, this concept of operatio

grossly inefficient and seemed quite risky for UN and 

forces involved. The CAOC chief of plans who headed th

ect for NATO, Col Chuck Wald, recalled,

[General Rose] wanted to hit the exact weapon or tank they took 

a cantonment area. And he’d asked us if we could get a C-130 gu

to work with their Lynx helicopters, with their special ops gu

them, with FLIR [Forward Looking Infrared] to go out and find

could, a tank that they [the Serbs] had stolen, follow it through 

if we had to, and then hit that particular tank. . . . We planned an 

ation to do that. I planned it. And we practiced it. . . . It was 

crous.13

The large number of supporting aircraft required by 

mission—refueling tankers, defense suppression 

standby close air support aircraft, and search and 

assets—would create a signature, tipping off the Serbs th

air action was about to occur.14 Furthermore, the helicopt

the relatively unmaneuverable AC-130 gunships wou

been vulnerable to BSA air defenses.15 It would have be

ple for the Serbs to counter an operation like Antelope by 

weapons from several sites at the same time or merely wa

poor weather to steal heavy weapons from the United Na

No attempt was ever made to actually execute Op

Antelope, but General Rose apparently had it in mind w

Bosnian Serbs confiscated heavy weapons from UNPRO

early August; Rose later wrote, ‘‘My plan was to hit the 

and weapons with air strikes as they left the weapons co

point.’’17 However, the plan did not work in this case; 

observer noted: ‘‘Once a UN helicopter, which was track

stolen weapons, was struck by ground fire, it was forced 

up the chase. NATO then launched 16 fighters.’’18

NATO’s First Air Strike, 5 August 1994

NATO’s first air strike demonstrated the large and g

gap between the UN and NATO over using airpower. 

morning of 5 August, Bosnian Serb forces injured a Uk

162
peacekeeper in a raid on the Ilidza weapons control poi

of Sarajevo and took five heavy weapons.19 Yasushi 

was away on vacation, and according to General Rose, G

de Lapresle agreed with Admiral Smith ‘‘to authorize N

attack Gulf War-style targets, including Serb amm

bunkers and communications sites.’’20 However, Gener

intervened, asserted his rights as the responsible comm

and designated a new target for the attack, which turn

to be a derelict tank destroyer.21 NATO launched over 

French, British, and Dutch aircraft, but after long dela

problems with weather, two US A-10s under the cont

French forward air controller made the attack.22 NATO

‘‘air strike’’ involved no bombs. The A-10s made severa

ing passes on the vehicle, which was miles from Ilid

which AFSOUTH airmen only later realized had alread

out of commission.23 Throughout the attack, the U

manders held tight control over events. While Gener

coordinated with General Chambers on which target t

General de Lapresle held one phone to Chambers’s 

superiors in one hand, and in the other he held a 

through which he issued demands to Momcilo Krajisni

ident of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.25 The Serbs ag

return the weapons after the attack on the broken dow

cle, and General Rose later rejected notions that this 

‘‘pin prick’’ strike, stating: ‘‘This air strike by NATO p

textbook example of the precise use of force in a peacek

mission.’’26 Admiral Smith had a different view: 

I was frustrated as hell when Michael Rose would give us one 

and drop the bomb, and that was it. And I tried my damndest 

him to understand that you’ve got to do more than go after 

derelict tank in the middle of a field.27

The underlying problem was that the two commande

pursuing different missions. The UN general was pra

peacekeeping, and the NATO admiral was attemp

enforce UN mandates and NATO ultimatums.28

Warnings

Compounding Admiral Smith’s frustration over hav

attack directed against a disused vehicle was his di

163
that General Rose had given the Serbs a warning before 

strike.29 While most observers appreciated the risks fa

peacekeepers in Bosnia, a continual point of frustra

senior NATO airmen was that few, if any, comme

seemed to recognize the dangers confronting NATO airc

General Rose believed warning the Bosnian Serbs was 

sary for limiting collateral damage, and that it was con

with the peacekeeping principles of maintaining conse

the minimum use of force.31 Moreover, the warning

mized the chances of Bosnian Serb retaliation against 

peacekeepers. For Admiral Smith, warnings created an 

tifiable risk to the lives of NATO aircrews, and he becam

ous with General Rose over the issue.32 Despite the ad

remonstrations, though, General Rose would ignore 

concerns and continue to warn the Serbs.33

The warnings helped General Rose to lower the risk

forces. UNPROFOR did not just warn the Serbs in gene

they were about to be attacked but told them specifical

would be attacked just prior to each strike.34 The pra

giving the Serbs warning served the needs of the UN m

in Bosnia and was intended to head off Bosnian Serb 

tion against UNPROFOR peacekeepers. By warni

Bosnian Serbs of NATO air attacks, UN commanders r

the chances of killing any BSA soldiers, thus helping to 

tain the consent of the Serbs for the UN’s presence 

mission in Bosnia. This, in turn, reduced Serb motiva

take revenge against UNPROFOR forces. Therefore, 

warnings prior to air strikes helped to maximize both m

success and force protection for UNPROFOR. Gener

considered warnings a principle of peacekeeping,35 

continued to issue warnings despite Admiral Smith’s 

ous protests.36 Recounting a discussion with Admiral 

General Rose recalled,

He [Admiral Smith] said: “If you issue a warning, you’re hazardi

pilots.” And I would say: “Sure there is a risk to your pilots, be

they’re coming down quite low to deliver their ordnance, and 

guys could be ready for them. But the fact is they’re only comin

the theater of operations for minutes at a time.” I said: “We liv

know, within the range of these weapons all the time, so wha

164
problem? What

s the big deal? When youre a peacekeeper you 

to take risks.”37

Moreover, General Rose claimed his intent was to g

Serbs only 20 or 30 minutes’ warning—enough time fo

to evacuate their own forces and to help minimize co

damage but not enough time to organize their air d

against the attack.38

Warning the Serbs, however salutary for UNPROFO

gated the effects of air strikes and put NATO aircr

increased risk of being shot down. The UN warnings g

Bosnian Serbs an opportunity to move or protect w

NATO was going to attack, and to prepare any availa

defenses already in the area of the intended target. Co

with other factors detracting from airpower’s effectiv

such as poor weather, mountainous and wooded terra

inherent difficulties of spotting individual weapons, a

reticence to authorize more robust air attacks—the w

helped to soften whatever signal air strikes were m

send. As the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat increas

ing the summer of 1994, warnings of NATO attacks 

ened the likelihood the BSA would shoot down anothe

aircraft. So while warnings improved mission accompli

and force protection for UN peacekeeping, it had the o

effect on NATO’s enforcement action.

NATO’s Second Air Strike, 22 September 1994

NATO’s second air strike again highlighted the U

NATO disagreements over targeting and warning, but 

demonstrated that nations with troops on the gro

Bosnia were involved in the air strikes. Maintena

alliance cohesion was an implied objective for NATO 

manders, and participation by as many nations as pos

any air strike was one of NATO’s stated goals.39 Howe

September 1994, only American aircraft had prosecute

air attacks, thus distorting the image of Deny Flight by 

ing its multinational character.40 Commanders in AF

were anxious to include non-US allies in the next use o

airpower, and they got their chance when General 

deputy, Maj Gen André Soubirou, called for an air strik

165
September 1994.41 In the CAOC at Vicenza, G

Chambers sat with the French and British senior nation

resentatives and orchestrated the NATO response; o

next several hours, the CAOC team would endeavor t

this particular air strike more overtly multinational th

vious allied air attacks.42

As with NATO’s first air strike, General Rose onc

intervened to warn the Serbs and to redirect the attack 

a target of lesser military significance than the one ag

by his UNPROFOR superior, General de Lapresle. 

September, French peacekeepers around Sarajevo cam

direct fire from Bosnian Serb forces at several differen

tions, and at least two Frenchmen were injured.43 G

Rose had just returned to the UK temporarily, and his 

deputy, General Soubirou, was in charge in Bo

Generals Soubirou and de Lapresle were preparing to st

ammunition depot at Pale in response to this latest p

tion45 when General Rose was alerted of the pending op

by his staff in Sarajevo.46 Working with General Wilsey 

UK, General Rose was able to halt the planned attack an

redirect it toward a target of Rose’s choosing—a T-55 

the Sarajevo exclusion zone.47 Moreover, General Ros

ensured the Serbs were warned about the planned 

later stating, ‘‘Adm Leighton Smith had ordered that no 

ing be given to the Serbs prior to the attack in order t

giving them time to alert their air defense system, 

NATO pilots at greater risk. I told my chief of staff in Sa

Brinkman, to ignore that order.’’48

Though a pair of US A-10s were the first aircraft on 

and the pilots could see the target, NATO commander

held the A-10s in favor of non-US aircraft.49 Two 

Mirage 2000s were brought in, but the pilots had d

finding the target and eventually departed the target a

in-flight refueling.50 After about an hour’s delay, the si

grew tense at the CAOC.51 The airmen in the CAOC, wh

aware the Serbs had been warned, worried that NATO 

lose credibility if they were unable to follow through w

attack and that the Serbs might shoot down an attack

craft.52 RAF Jaguars were available for the attack, but G

166
Chambers consulted with the British and French 

national representatives, and opted for the French Mi

However, as soon as the Mirage pilots reported the ta

sight, they also announced they were low on fuel and 

to depart.54 Late in the day and with NATO credibility 

line, General Chambers ordered the A-10s to atta

tank.55 At about 6:20 P.M., an A-10 strafed the tank, a

dust kicked up highlighted the vehicle’s location for th

ing Jaguars.56 The British pilots were then called in 

1,000-pound bombs on the tank, and one of the bombs 

edly scored a hit.57 The British bombs demonstrated the 

national nature of Deny Flight, boosting the apparen

macy of the operation and deflating concerns that o

United States—with no troops on the ground—was doin

the bombing in Bosnia.58

Proportionality

NATO’s second air strike also revealed problems U

NATO commanders had in agreeing to what represe

‘‘proportionate’’ response to Serb provocations. In G

Rose’s view: ‘‘By using force in a proportionate way and 

attacking the targets proposed by Adm Leighton Sm

route to a peaceful resolution of the war in Bosnia 

open.’’59 However, NATO commanders did not subsc

General Rose’s judgment on proportionality, and the 

tion this issue caused among NATO airmen was evide

comment later made by Gen Mike Ryan, who replaced G

Ashy in September 1994: 

Proportionality is an awful word and I never want to hear it aga

All of us in our own minds understand proportionality, but none 

would agree on what it is when we come to a certain situation. If 

use it, then we ought to spell out very, very clearly what we me

proportionality.60

However, even if commanders in AFSOUTH and UNP

had agreed upon a definition of proportionality, they w

bound to disagree over how to apply the concept, given 

ferences in the vulnerability of their forces and in thei

pretations of their missions.

167
In part, problems with the word proportionate ma

arisen from its connection to an important concept fro

of armed conflict—one with which the airmen would ha

especially familiar. According to Green, the principle 

portionality is one of the most basic concepts in the 

armed conflict that ‘‘prohibits military action in which t

ative effects (such as collateral civilian casualties) clea

weigh the military gain.’’61 In applying this principle, m

left to ‘‘the discretion of the commander of the forces inv

for he must judge whether the military advantage fr

attack warrants the likely unintended effects or ‘‘inc

injuries’’ it might cause.62 In making this determinati

commander must consider the military gain ‘‘to the 

operation and not merely the particular attack c

plated.’’63 Although the principle of proportionality guid

geting decisions in Bosnia, it was not the primary ca

disagreement between UN and NATO commanders.

The term proportionate, as used to describe Deny Fl

attacks, had to do with responding to provocations by t

ring factions with an amount of force commensurate wi

the provocation and the desired objective, without esc

the level of violence.64 However, UNPROFOR and AF

were pursuing different objectives; and, more impo

UNPROFOR’s judgment of a proportionate response w

tated by its vulnerability—especially to Bosnian 

reprisals.65 The scope for disagreement over the defin

proportionate can be illustrated by considering the fo

questions first from the viewpoint of a UN commande

second, from the perspective of a NATO commander: 

the objective of the air strike to get the BSA to return a 

weapon, or was it to change Bosnian Serb behavior 

greater respect for the “safe areas”? (2) Was the air strik

proportionate to today’s provocation, or should the p

tion be taken as the cumulative weight of transgression

ing up to today’s decision to respond with air strik

Which was more important—attaining the objective for 

strike or avoiding escalation?

UN and NATO commanders had different objectives a

orities. AFSOUTH’s objective was to enforce the exclusi

168
and coerce the Bosnian Serbs into respecting the safe a

Whenever an incident occurred that NATO officers b

merited a response, they would recommend the UN 

(selected from the target books using the target matric

were geographically near the provocation and could l

be linked to it.67 NATO officers preferred fixed targets

could be safely attacked in nearly any weather and by a

of aircraft, not just planes capable of dropping pre

guided munitions.68 Thus, Serb military depots 

Sarajevo, including the ammunition storage site nea

were attractive targets for NATO planners whenever th

a BSA provocation around Sarajevo.69 Moreover, NATO 

were relatively immune from retaliation; thus, thei

manders had less to fear from escalation, making it ea

NATO commanders to prioritize their objective of c

above their desire to avoid escalation. Since May 

UNPROFOR had been trying to shrug off responsibili

the NATO-declared exclusion zones.70 Enforcing the ex

zones reduced UNPROFOR’s ability to fulfill its other 

sibilities, which were closer to peacekeeping.71 When p

to cooperate with NATO, the UN preferred smoking-gu

targets because they could be directly linked to self-def

protection of the safe areas, and attacks against the

less likely to jeopardize the UN’s impartial status.72

In determining UN views on proportionality, UNPR

vulnerability was more important than UN objecti

ordering air strikes; thus, the Bosnian Serbs exercised 

erful vote in deciding what was, or was not, a propor

response.73 As General de Lapresle explained,

My main concern, of course, and so was Michael Rose’s, was to 

first of all, that countries who had sent their boys and girls on a 

mission would find themselves with body bags coming back to 

capital after a sort of military and war action which was not the 

[of the mission]; and the second . . . concern, was not to obtain 

itary victory, but to come to a cease-fire, [and] to have this cea

standing as long as possible in Croatia and in Bosnia. And so wh

tried to combine this first objective of no UN lives lost, and hos

and so on, and so on, and then trying to keep the arms as sil

possible, of course we were not very much enticed into having a 

and efficient use of NATO airpower.74

169
General Rose echoed that sentiment: 

My primary resp

ity was to the countries that had contributed peacek

troops to the mission and I could not allow them to 

combatants, hostages, or casualties in a war.’’75 Throu

dual key mechanism, the UN commanders exercised co

decisions over what constituted a proportionate respo

making their decisions, commanders in UNPROFO

guided by their complementary concerns for force pro

and for accomplishing their mission.

Attempts to Control Air Strikes

At the end of September, NATO defense ministers inte

to give their commanders in AFSOUTH more control o

strikes, but UNPROFOR’s leaders resisted the mov

‘‘Operational Options’’ memo, approved by the NAC in 

1993, stated that if commanders in AFSOUTH and UNP

could not agree about air strikes, then they were to r

matter to higher military and political authorities

UNPROFOR had no higher military authorities. Therefo

agreements in the divided UN-NATO military command 

could only be reconciled by higher political authorities

NATO defense ministers met for an informal confer

Seville at the end of September, US officials, led by Se

of Defense William Perry, urged ending the UNPROFO

tice of issuing tactical warnings in advance of NA

attacks.77 In addition, Perry advocated a process where

UNPROFOR requested an air strike, NATO commander

decide which target to hit using a list of three or four 

lected candidate targets that had been mutually agree

by UNPROFOR and NATO commanders.78 Because this 

informal meeting, no decisions were taken, but Perry

posal was referred to Brussels and New York for form

sideration. After leaving Seville, the American defense 

tary went to visit UNPROFOR’s leaders—Akashi, de La

and Rose—in Split, Croatia, to discuss air strikes in B

Before Perry’s arrival at Split, and again after the m

UNPROFOR’s leaders worked out the arguments agai

Seville proposals and against more forceful air strikes. 

force commander made clear his concern that a more 

170
use of airpower would create unacceptable risks to U

sonnel on the ground.80 Furthermore, he questioned w

the defense ministers really intended to make the use o

airpower a higher priority than the security of United 

ground forces.81 Implicit in the record of the discussio

the question of whether a few activist NATO states oug

recommending policies that might jeopardize the sa

peacekeepers from over 30 troop-contributing countrie

force commander believed a more forceful approach in 

would require a redeployment of UN peacekeepers that 

in turn, change the nature of the tasks UNPROFOR 

accomplish.83 The message from the discussions was 

unless UNPROFOR were given a new mandate by the S

Council, it would not support the proposals for stiffer e

ment action.

In talks with Secretary Perry at Split in early O

UNPROFOR leaders described the vulnerabilities o

forces, their inability to enforce the exclusion zones, a

importance of their humanitarian and peacekeepin

sion.84 UN leaders explained that as a conseque

UNPROFOR’s situation they could not afford to have 

doing the enforcing either.85 General Rose averred, ‘‘An

used had to be within the UN rules of engagement.’’8

the UN rules stipulated force could only be used 

defense, General Rose’s claim virtually ruled out any us

strikes to enforce the exclusion zones.87 UNPROFOR 

did not want NATO air strikes, and they did not want to 

their control over them.

With support from high officials in the UN’s departm

peacekeeping, General de Lapresle managed to retain 

over air strikes. Following the meeting in Split, NATO 

officials conducted talks in New York about implementi

procedures that would end warnings of impending strik

give NATO a stronger voice in selecting targets.88 Forma

tion of these suggestions first raised at Seville was ann

in a late-October joint UN-NATO press statement whic

in part,

While general warning may be given to an offending party, t

warning of impending air strikes, in principle, will not. Under n

171
circumstances, several targets, where possible three or four, w

authorized for each air strike, which will be carried out by NA

close coordination with UNPROFOR.

Dual-key arrangements remain in effect, ensuring that decisio

targeting and execution will be taken jointly by UN and NATO m

commanders. The principle of proportionality in response to a vio

will continue to be respected, as will the need to avoid unacce

casualties.89

Though the agreement proscribed warnings ‘‘in princ

did little else to affect UN control over air strikes. As G

de Lapresle later described his view,

Of course, they [NATO] wanted to be master of the choice of the 

and I could not accept that, because I knew, and they did not 

who was in the proximity and the vicinity of these targets—UN

CIVPOLs, civil affairs guys, and so on.90

It did not take long for NATO commanders to discov

nothing had changed; as Admiral Smith recounted,

De Lapresle goes back to Zagreb; I call him up and I said: “Well, I 

what I’m looking at is ain’t nothing changed. You’re still going 

me one target, and I get to bomb it, and that’s about it?” He 

“That’s exactly correct.” He said: “My conscience is clear. I hav

back to New York; I have read the documents; I have gotten n

political guidance. My conscience is clear.”91

Thus, the political intervention had failed to win NAT

manders greater control over air strikes; the UN w

firmly in charge.

After just two air strikes in the summer of 1994, UNP

and AFSOUTH commanders deadlocked over wheth

how to proceed with future strikes. The paralysis was 

sequence of the commanders’ competing efforts to m

their chances for both mission success (as they had 

preted their different missions) and force protectio

UNPROFOR mission, once its commanders had aba

attempts to enforce the safe areas policy, was one of 

keeping and support for humanitarian aid agencies. C

with its modest military capabilities and its widely dis

mode of deployment on the ground in Bosnia, UNPR

mission dictated that its commanders adhere to peac

ing principles by acting only with the consent of the w

172
factions, with minimum use of force, and with imparti

light of their responsibilities, the military comman

UNPROFOR felt compelled to issue warnings to the t

factions in Bosnia—invariably the Bosnian Serbs—p

authorizing NATO air attacks. Conversely, the w

endangered the lives of NATO airmen and weakened e

ment measures, so, commanders in AFSOUTH wante

flexibility in targeting decisions and an end to the wa

Though the issue was formally reconciled in NATO’s 

according to procedures proposed at Seville and thrash

in New York, the UNPROFOR commanders in Zagr

Sarajevo retained final control over air operations via t

key arrangements. There were no more air strikes rel

enforcing either the safe areas policy or the exclusion 

until May 1995 after new UN commanders replaced G

Rose and de Lapresle.

Udbina: Mission Accomplishment

Versus Force Protection

Subtle Bosnian Serb challenges to the no-fly zone 

summer of 1994 grew more blatant in the fall, prom

NATO response and a serious split between UN soldie

NATO airmen. NATO airmen were convinced of sub

support from Serbia for the summer buildup and con

functioning of the Bosnian Serb integrated air defen

tem.92 In mid-July the United States suspended human

airlift into Sarajevo after two C-141 transports sustain

from small arms fire on consecutive days.93 A month l

American C-130 and a German C-160 cargo aircra

ducted the last airdrops of Operation Provide Promise b

chuting supplies to the isolated Muslim enclave of B

Though the needs of that enclave and others remained 

the increasing Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat ma

ther airdrops in Bosnia too dangerous.95 In a mid-Sep

letter to General Mladic, General Rose warned him 

menacing NATO aircraft, stating,

I am deeply concerned about actions directed against NATO a

flying in Bosnia-Hercegovina airspace. Specifically, I refer to the 

PAD [shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles] missile firing 

173
September and to repeated radar activity over Prijedor/Bihac 

which include activation of target tracking radar modes. These 

ties are perceived to be acts of aggression, and I feel compelled to 

you of NATO’s prerogative for response.

NATO aircraft, having the inherent right of self-defence, can im

ately and decisively exercise that right if challenged by your threa

sile systems. This response is totally a NATO decision and do

require UN coordination.96

This implied that NATO aircraft could shoot in resp

‘‘hostile intent’’ from the Bosnian Serbs and that the U

no control over such actions. Both implications were fa

addition to the growing surface-to-air threat, by Novem

Serbs began flouting the no-fly zone, flying fixed-wing 

bombing missions inside Bosnia to support a BSA cou

fensive around Bihac.98 NATO commanders were los

initiative in the airspace over Bosnia, and they were 

failing in their responsibilities to enforce the no-fly 

However, they could do little to respond to these Bosnia

challenges without additional authority from New Yo

Brussels, and consent from UNPROFOR’s leaders for e

ment measures.

The Serbs used the sanctuary of Croatian airspace an

air defense network to good advantage, making it 

impossible for NATO aircraft to engage Serb planes v

the no-fly zone. After an initially successful Bosnian 

ground offensive launched from within the safe area o

in October, Croatian Serbs joined the BSA and the fo

rebel Muslim leader Fikret Abdic in a counteroffensi

quickly reversed the government forces’ gains.99 Serb pil

supporting missions from Udbina airfield in Serb-co

eastern Croatia. So long as they remained in Croatian ai

Serb aircraft could not be engaged by NATO pilots, 

authority to enforce the no-fly zone was limited to Bos

monitoring NATO combat air patrols via the Serb

defense network, the Udbina-based aircraft could tim

flights into Bosnia whenever NATO aircraft were refu

otherwise not in a position to respond.100 Udbina was 

few minutes’ flying time away from Bihac. Thus, it wa

easy for the Serb pilots to make attacks into Bosnia an

174
before NATO aircraft could engage them. NATO comm

in the region could have mounted more no-fly zone pa

narrow the window of opportunity for the Serb violatio

that would have required more aircraft, aircrews, an

resources.101 More importantly, patrols near Bihac wo

NATO aircraft in the midst of the Serbs’ most lethal SA

erage, which was concentrated in northwest Bosnia an

ern Croatia. In addition to the added costs and risks, a

sequent violation would have been all the more dama

NATO’s credibility. Until NATO commanders obtained 

ity to attack aircraft on the ground in Croatia, there w

they could do to stop the violations.

Udbina: November 1994

NATO commanders in the southern region, includ

recently arrived commander of AIRSOUTH, Lt Gen Mik

wanted to stop the no-fly zone violations; and they ex

options for disabling Serb air activity from Udbina.10

who had taken over from General Ashy in September, w

a fighter pilot who had flown 100 missions over 

Vietnam. His father, Gen John D. Ryan, commanded 

Force units in the Pacific during the time that his so

flew in Vietnam, and the senior Ryan had gone on to 

chief of staff of the US Air Force. As discussed in cha

Gen John Ryan was the man whose duty it had been t

pline Gen John Lavelle for his actions related to the un

rized bombings against North Vietnamese air defense 

in late 1971 and early 1972.103 Gen Mike Ryan arr

Naples, having come from the Pentagon where he 

assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

the new AIRSOUTH commander would have been fami

only with the political mood in Washington where he h

served but also particularly sensitive to political con

such as ROE—that might interfere with a comm

responsibility to protect his forces.

On Friday, 18 November 1994, Serb jets from 

attacked the Bosnian army’s 5th Corps headquarte

Bihac using cluster bombs and napalm.104 Then on Sa

a Serb aircraft making an attack on an ammunition 

175
crashed into an apartment building in Cazin, 10 mile

of Bihac.105 Papers found amongst the dead pilot’s poss

established his Serb identity.106 With support fro

Croatian government, the UN Security Council agreed t

to authorize a NATO air attack against Udbina.107 Th

met on Sunday to issue a decision, giving Admiral Sm

mission to act on the new Security Council authority, p

he did so in close coordination with UNPROFOR.108 

political pressures to strike Udbina, the UNPROFO

mander refused to turn his key that morning until 

given the details of the planned attack.109 In addition 

cerns over NATO targeting, there was a question wit

UNPROFOR chain of command as to whether Gen

Lapresle needed Mr. Akashi, who was in Frankfurt e

back to Zagreb, to authorize the attack.110 The schedul

of attack was slipped back several times while UN com

ers wrestled with these issues and took decisions 

whether or not to evacuate potential hostages from 

Udbina.111 Shortly after noon, Mr. Akashi authoriz

attack, but with NATO aircraft taxiing for takeoff a

throughout Italy, the mission was scrubbed at t

minute.112 High cloud cover over Udbina was the report

son for canceling the mission that day.113 However, th

against Udbina may have been slipped a day because 

delays induced by the UN or because of the need for N

change targets or aircraft ordnance loads.114

Targeting Udbina

Concerned about retaliation against UN forces and 

aid workers in the region, General de Lapresle wanted 

imize the chances of causing Serb casualties, and he i

that only the runway at Udbina could be struck.115 As A

Smith later recounted,

We had looked at Udbina, and I had wanted to take out everyt

wanted to make a parking lot out of that place. I wanted to take 

of the buildings. I didn’t want anything left standing. De Lapresl

“No.” He would only approve hitting the runway, because he 

want to kill anybody.116

176
For General de Lapresle, destroying the buildings, maint

facilities, and aircraft at Udbina, as Admiral Smith 

would have been counterproductive to both UNPROFOR

sion and the security of UN peacekeepers.117

Admiral Smith agreed to forego attacks against the a

buildings, and maintenance facilities, but he would n

promise on the need to aggressively suppress Serb air d

at Udbina.118 As General Ryan later explained, NAT

manders took the position that ‘‘We’re not going to 

hands of the force—to have them shoot at us first befor

after them. . . . So the issue was force protection ver

political fallout of having collateral damage.’’119 Admira

explained to General de Lapresle the need to attack 

radar-guided weapon systems, stating, ‘‘We don’t h

[then] we don’t fly.’’120 General Rose was opposed to the 

on Udbina because of concerns it would lead to Serb re

in nearby Bosnia; in the end, though, the decision on 

advise the UN’s political leaders rested with Gen

Lapresle.121 As the UNPROFOR commander later recal

This, I must say, was a very difficult decision—to give the gree

for an air strike when you know you will have some CIVPOL, or 

UNMOs, or some civil affairs people who will be held [as] hostage

the first thing you have to do is give the go-ahead order, and the

ond, immediately [make] contact with the Serbs . . . in order 

[back] those guys who are hostages.122

Despite his concerns, once General de Lapresle was con

preemptive supression of enemy air defenses [SEAD] 

were essential for protecting NATO airmen, he suppor

demands of the AFSOUTH commanders.123 Ultimately

was allowed to execute a tactically sound attack, 

included preemptively launching high-speed, anti-ra

missiles (HARM) at Serb air defense systems.124

On Monday, 21 November, 39 strike aircraft attack

runway and taxiways at Udbina, and Dutch, American, 

and French aircraft took part in the raid.125 The Serbs res

predictably with fresh provocations in Bosnia and by 

hostages in Croatia. Though publicly touted as a s

behind the scenes some high-level political author

Washington and Brussels were upset that NATO comma

177
especially Admiral Smith—had not ordered bombing 

more lucrative targets at Udbina.126 According to on

ranking NATO official, the decision not to hit aircraft 

political one, and Admiral Smith had gone beyond the 

of his military authority by making the decision to agr

General de Lapresle without first consulting Brus

Responding to a reporter’s question at a press confere

day after the attack, Admiral Smith defended the UN ra

for limiting the attack and explained his own role as t

porting commander:

General de Lapresle and I have had many conversations on thi

ject. He, and the other members of the United Nations Protection 

command structure with whom I talk, believe that their princip

concern is the safety of their forces and their mission, being peac

ing. So, response is going to be, in their view, proportional 

offense and measured, rather than what some of us might co

more militarily effective. General de Lapresle spoke with me s

times before this strike and he specifically asked that we lim

strike to the runways, and I later added the taxiways, and the pu

was to ensure to the best that we could, that we would minimi

number of people on the ground that were injured as a result 

strike, and minimize collateral damage (emphasis added).128

Clearly, negative objectives drove the targeting at U

Despite efforts to limit collateral damage and Serb cas

Serb forces in Croatia threatened retaliation and to

peacekeepers hostage—including two Czech soldiers st

as observers near Udbina.129 The day after the Udbin

Serb air defenses inside Bosnia fired the first radar

missiles at NATO jets patrolling the no-fly zone.

Interpreting the Results

Though not unrelated to the BSA ground offensive 

Bihac, the attack on Udbina was designed primarily 

violations of the UN-declared no-fly zone over Bosnia 

than to affect the BSA.130 Therefore, it would be inappr

to criticize the raid for failing to deter the Serb attack on 

as some observers have done.131 The bombing of Udbin

at political insistence, with urging from AFSOUTH o

and against the desires of UNPROFOR.132 NATO comm

insisted on the attack and wanted to destroy much m

178
Udbina than they did, but they compromised mission 

plishment in deference to the UNPROFOR commande

cerns for the safety of their soldiers. Some officials ma

hoped the raid would deter the Serb assault on Bihac

they did, then UNPROFOR’s efforts to limit attacks to t

way probably undermined that objective. UNPROFOR

reluctance to risk casualties, even amongst Serb milita

sonnel at Udbina, could only enfeeble any deterrent sig

attack might have conveyed. A NATO official later de

the dilemma in using force for deterrent effect in 

Deterrence often depends on a credible threat to use 

deal of force, while peacekeeping operations are base

minimum use of force.133 And, as Sabin has noted, in 

support operations, ‘‘there is a . . . risk that a perceived 

ysis of command could lead to a failure of deterren

could encourage locals to challenge the intervening forc

impunity.’’134 That pretty well describes what happe

Bihac and in the no-fly zone over Bosnia after the Udbin

The Udbina attack forced both General de Lapres

Admiral Smith to make trade-offs between accomplishin

missions and protecting their forces. As one might ex

an intervention where vital national interests were not e

mission accomplishment came in second behind force 

tion. Broadly speaking, UN and NATO commanders we

posed to be cooperating to achieve the same overa

However, practically speaking, the disparate capabilit

vulnerabilities of their forces and the discordant p

voices telling the commanders what to do had driven t

a division of labor—with the UN doing peacekeepin

NATO doing the enforcing.135 Just as Admiral Smith c

mised his mission by targeting only the runways and ta

the UNPROFOR commander accepted the inevitable 

tions to his peacekeeping mission in Croatia. Howeve

commanders stood firm when it came to the issues mos

to affect the safety of their forces; General de Lapresle 

to countenance attacks most likely to give the Serbs ca

retaliation while Admiral Smith demanded permission 

emptive attacks against air defenses. That both comm

resisted compromising on issues most likely to put thei

179
in danger while accepting a short-term degradation 

respective missions also indicated they not only took se

their own responsibilities for protecting their people, b

also respected and honored, as best they could, each 

needs in this regard. Admiral Smith’s decision to forg

lucrative targets at Udbina angered some of his super

leading General de Lapresle to note that: ‘‘Leighton Sm

rather alone in his clear understanding on what was 

mind and what was going on in the field.’’137 Gen

Lapresle reciprocated. After Admiral Smith convinc

UNPROFOR commander of the need for preemptive 

Admiral Smith recalled: ‘‘UN New York tried to disappr

integrated air defense target, and de Lapresle sai

Admiral Smith is exactly correct. He cannot go in ther

out taking those out first.’”138 In peace support ope

where vital interests are not at stake, a commander 

expect to eventually recover from setbacks to the missi

he cannot recoup a lost life. Thus, when trade-offs m

made between force protection and mission accompli

in these types of interventions, protecting people wi

trump mission accomplishment.

‘‘Retrospective SEAD’’ and the Growin

UN-NATO Rift: November–December 19

For AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR, the air strikes at 

began an eventful week that highlighted the growing co

for force protection in NATO. For more than 18 months

aircraft had flown combat air patrols, reconnaissance 

and practice air support missions within range of Serb 

missile defenses without being fired upon.139 Howe

Tuesday, the day after the Udbina airfield attack, 

surface-to-air missile site at Otoka in northwestern 

fired two radar-guided SA-2 missiles at a pair of Brit

Harriers patrolling the no-fly zone.140 Though the jets e

unharmed, the Serb firing of radar-guided missiles sig

serious new challenge to NATO.141 Since the Serbs po

more modern, more capable, and mobile radar-guide

siles such as the SA-6, NATO airmen had to assume tha

too might be used against them. In response to this ch

180
General Ryan ordered the deputy director of the CAO

Gen Dave Sawyer, to locate the exact position of the of

SAM site and to set in motion plans to attack it.142 Mea

General Ryan worked on getting the UN and NAT

turned for an air strike against the site.143 Up until thi

SEAD was not an authorized mission for Deny Flight 

tions except as a defensive element in support of actu

or air-strike missions.144 By autumn of 1994, the growi

face-to-air threat over Bosnia had generated efforts a

headquarters to change this policy even before the mis

ings from Otoka.145 Because it was already under acti

sideration in Brussels, AFSOUTH was able to ge

approval the next day, 23 November, to conduct what 

known as ‘‘retrospective SEAD.’’146

While the Deny Flight rules of engagement had alwa

mitted NATO airmen to use force in self-defense, ne

NATO aircraft flying over Bosnia were unsuited to resp

missile firings. Thus, when threatened, a NATO aircrew 

take evasive action and leave the area covered by the 

system. Once away from the threat, NATO forces were 

ited by ROE from going back and attacking it.147 Such 

ing procedures ceded the initiative to the Serb missile 

who were tied into a larger air defense network and cou

on NATO aircraft that were least likely to be able to 

back.148 Within NATO, the British and French were re

to approve air defense suppression in response to th

practice of menacing NATO aircraft with target t

radar.149 So long as the Serbs were not firing missiles

ministers from some of the troop-contributing n

remained unwilling to authorize a new mission that cou

to an escalating use of force in Bosnia.150 Once the 

began firing radar-guided missiles, NATO commanders 

region wanted to take out the entire Serb integra

defense system.151 Barring that, they pushed to be ab

back ‘‘retrospectively’’ with an appropriately equippe

and eliminate an offending missile site.152 For senior com

ers in NATO’s southern region, it was a matter of self-d

On 23 November, the NAC authorized retrospective SE

stipulated that any response ought to be proportional, w

181
collateral damage, and subject to the dual key arrang

with the UN.153

Udbina and Otoka: November 1994

As NATO aircraft approached Otoka on Wednesday 

ing, several Serb SAM sites in northwestern Bosnia thre

the strike package and fired missiles, thus fueling the e

ing spiral of threats and uses of force from both sides

jets responded by firing high-speed, antiradiation mis

the Serb SAM batteries, including one which happene

inside Croatia, 10 miles north of Otoka.154 Unable to co

the planned destruction of the Otoka site because of th

lenge from the other SAM sites, NATO commanders la

another strike package that afternoon to hit Otoka.155 I

182

Figure 1. Outline of Events around the Time of the Udbina Air 

SUNDDAYY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY

November 14 15 16 17 18 19

Se

Serb jets fro

from Ud

Udbina cr

drop du

napalm at

and Bi

cluster

bombs U

near ok

Bihac ai

in 

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

NAC Largest Two SA-2s Two NATO Bosnian Bosnian NA

authorizes NATO air fired attacks target Serbs fire a Serbs re

Udbina strike to from Otoka Serb SAMs radar-guided advancing na

strike; date hits site at at Otoka, Dvor, SAM at on Bihac pa

UN balks runway, British and Bosanska British F-3s fire at w

taxiways, Sea Harriers Krupa patrolling UNPROFOR; es

Attack and air patrolling the no-fly Gen Rose ab

scrubbed defenses the no-fly zone calls for air

at Udbina zone support

New NACauthor- F-16s shot

izations at

NOVEMBER 14 15 16 17

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SA
iation, the Bosnian Serbs threatened war against UNP

and took hundreds of peacekeepers hostage; thre

reportedly made to lie on the runway at Banja Luka

Thursday, the Bosnian Serbs, operating from a pre

undetected site near Danji Vakuf in central Bosnia, 

radar-guided SAM at two British F-3 Tornado aircra

routine no-fly zone patrol.157 Meanwhile, the ground o

against Bihac continued with the Bosnian Serb forces p

up from south of the enclave and overrunning the p

which they had promised UNPROFOR they would sto

Brussels, the NAC met and declared, inter alia, its will

to activate the heavy weapons exclusion zone it had 

sionally declared seven months earlier when it crea

exclusion zone at Gorazde.159 However, rather than u

ally declaring a new heavy-weapons-free zone at Bihac 

ultimatum as it had with Gorazde, the Council made t

vation of the new zone contingent on UNPROFOR 

ment.160 UNPROFOR found the task of policing the e

exclusion zones burdensome and declined the opportu

create yet another.161

UNPROFOR’s top military commanders opposed NA

strikes, and, while they wanted air support to prot

peacekeepers around Bihac, they refused to authorize 

air operations needed to reduce the surface-to-air th

northwestern Bosnia.162 In a meeting on 25 Novemb

commander of UNPROFOR made it clear he viewed air 

as being fundamentally incompatible with his peacek

mission.163 The NATO officer sent to the meeting repo

General Ryan and Admiral Smith that so long as Gen

Lapresle commanded UNPROFOR, there was little ho

UN would turn its key for air strikes.164 That night, h

when peacekeepers in the Bihac area came under fire, G

Rose personally called the CAOC for air support.

increased SAM threat around Bihac precluded NATO 

manders from sending a pair of fighters already in th

zone in response to the request; a larger package of 

capable of protecting itself against Serb air defenses ne

be assembled.166 Because the peacekeepers in Bihac 

forward air controllers, NATO and UN officers had had 

183
out a scheme whereby an ersatz forward air controller 

clear NATO aircraft to attack Bosnian Serb forces wi

improvised grid.167 A couple of hours later when the re

force was assembled, the situation had quieted and G

Rose did not have a specific target for NATO to st

However, he still wanted NATO aircraft to fly into nor

ern Bosnia.169 NATO airmen demurred; they would pu

forces at risk to fulfill a specific mission, but not, in th

ticular case, for air presence.170

Some UN officials were wary of retrospective SEAD, b

they suspected that NATO airmen were more interested 

ribution than self-defense.171 Others accepted NATO’s n

force protection but still believed the new air ope

against the Serbs created a cycle of escalation that wa

mental to UNPROFOR’s mission and the safety of its 

keepers.172 The Serbs again fired a SAM at a pair of F

the end of the week; however, on Saturday, 26 Nov

General Ryan was thwarted in his efforts to send a 

escorted reconnaissance package into northwestern Bo

pinpoint a SAM site that had fired at NATO aircraft.173 

force marshaled over the Adriatic, high-level French in

tion through NATO headquarters174 forced General R

recall the reconnaissance package.175 With som

UNPROFOR hostages, Britain and France, as well as 

leadership in the former Yugoslavia, were uneasy ab

escalating use of force in Bosnia.176 Moreover, some am

dors believed the AFSOUTH commanders were bait

Serb air defenses, and intense discussions over ROE a

tile intent raged in Brussels.177 The recriminations o

week of activities around Bihac were so intense tha

Owen later described this point in time as ‘‘the nadir 

NATO and US-EU relations.’’178

NATO and UN Split over Airpower: December 1994

By early December, while NATO formalized new ru

protecting its aircraft in the no-fly zone, UNPROFOR p

NATO to minimize its flights over Bosnia. Unable 

actions necessary for protecting NATO airmen, Genera

and Admiral Smith briefly shifted the no-fly zone patrol

184
relative safety of the airspace over the Adriatic.179 Th

made the patrols safer, but virtually ineffective. When 

aircraft returned to the skies over Bosnia on 5 Decemb

were well escorted by SEAD aircraft.180 In an effort to 

release of UNPROFOR hostages and ease Bosnian Se

cerns about NATO airpower, the UNPROFOR com

broached the subject of reducing NATO air operatio

Bosnia with his NATO counterpart, CINCSOUTH.181 A

Smith responded to the request by acknowledging his 

ued support for the UN, but emphasized repeatedly tha

if he were inclined to reduce NATO air activity, it would 

a political decision that he was not empowered to take 

own.182 On 8 December, the day of Admiral Smith’s re

NAC agreed to change the rules of engagement for SE

authorizing it as a stand-alone mission (i.e., no longer 

to the support of CAS or air strike missions); this furth

ified the council’s decision on retrospective SEAD fr

November.183 Two days later, UNPROFOR secured the 

of the remaining hostages taken during the week follow

Udbina air strike.184 That same day, 10 December, in a 

the Bosnian Serb president, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Akashi ex

that NATO operated only in support of the UN missi

that the alliance had four ‘‘primary missions in the a

over Bosnia’’: no-fly zone enforcement, CAS for UNPR

enforcement of the heavy weapons exclusion zones arou

safe areas, and deterrence of armed attacks against t

areas.185 Mr. Akashi tried to assuage Serb fears of NA

power by stating,

Except for self-defense, NATO aircraft will not conduct air-to-g

operations without advance authorization from the S

Representative of the Secretary-General. NATO will not use 

except in pursuit of these missions, or in self-defense when aircr

directly threatened by antiaircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles, l

on of antiaircraft weapon tracking radars, or attack by aircra

automatic firing of missiles will occur. If the armed forces in c

respect the terms of Security Council resolutions and the 

Atlantic Council decisions of 9 February 1994 and 22 April 19

not attack UNPROFOR, and do not threaten NATO aircraft, th

have nothing to fear from NATO.186

185
Mr. Akashi

s letter sent mixed signals, for it implied 

aircrews might act if merely threatened but not fired u

the same time it stated that, ‘‘no automatic firing of m

will occur.’’ In fact, NATO ROE did not allow aircraft pa

the no-fly zone or performing other routine missions s

reconnaissance or CAS training to use force in resp

‘‘hostile intent’’ such as lock-ons by Serb target-t

radar.187 That was why the heavy escorts were needed, 

NATO airmen could shoot back right away in respon

hostile act. The NAC decision of 8 December 1994 mer

ognized the need for stand-alone SEAD missions in re

to hostile acts against UN or NATO aircraft. Even with t

authorization, NATO commanders needed dual key a

to conduct strikes against offending surface-to-air 

sites. The Serbs would have to fire first, then NATO 

manders in AFSOUTH would have to coordinat

UNPROFOR over a proportional response.

UNPROFOR-AFSOUTH agreement on proportional

most unlikely for SEAD because, unlike air strikes, SE

nothing to do with the UN commanders’ responsibiliti

everything to do with the responsibilities of NATO com

ers. From General Ryan’s perspective, the debates on 

tionality reached the point of absurdity over 

‘‘Proportionality by some said that if they shoot at you 

SAM missile and they miss, then you can shoot a missi

but you have to miss them!’’188 In contrast to those u

minimum use of force, the US chairman of the Joint C

Staff had recently published new Standing Ru

Engagement for US Forces (SROE), which included gu

on proportionality for the use of force in self-defense:

Proportionality. The force used must be reasonable in intensity, 

tion, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the comman

the time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent 

ensure the continued safety of US forces (emphasis added).189

Although General Ryan was part of an alliance operatio

did not free him from following the new ROE guidanc

one of the SROE contained a notice that forces under 

national control would remain so, ‘‘only if the combatan

mander and higher authority determine that the ROE 

186
multinational force are consistent with the policy guida

unit self-defense and with rules for individual self-

contained in this document.’’190 However, even after 

ROE changed to reflect a more robust approach to 

with the Bosnian Serb SAM threat, NATO commander

not make the UN accept the US view of proportionality. 

enforcement of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, UNP

had no responsibility to enforce the no-fly zone or to 

thing else in the airspace over Bosnia. Moreover, its 

were not threatened by SAM firings. Conversely, freedo

the SAM threat was the sine qua non for NATO operat

Suppressing Bosnian Serb air defenses was an issue 

defense for the commanders in AFSOUTH, and they co

tolerate dual-key controls over their aircrew’s right 

defense. The dual-key concept was embedded in the S

Council resolutions and supporting NATO decision

authorized the use of airpower in Bosnia. It reflec

ground commanders’ need to have control over air 

affecting the security of ground forces. Although the ter

key was new for air operations, the same fundamental c

had always governed close air support, and was not som

unique to Bosnia. That is to say, the ground command

mately controlled the process for designating targe

approving attacks. However, two aspects of this dual-ke

ciple were new in Bosnia. First, it applied to air strikes

would normally fall under the purview of the air com

commander rather than that of the ground comma

Second, and more importantly, the rationale for the d

stemmed from the ground commanders’ responsibili

force protection and mission success. In a combat s

these responsibilities would normally be complementa

airpower would support both the security of the ground 

and the accomplishment of a common mission. In Bosni

ever, when AFSOUTH commanders used airpower for e

ment, they endangered both UNPROFOR’s forces and 

mary mission. UNPROFOR commanders needed the d

mechanism to fulfill their command responsibilities. H

when the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat increas

187
dual-key control over SEAD strikes interfered with t

men’s right to self-defense.

Nearly every NATO aircraft operating over Bosnia wa

pable of an immediate riposte in self-defense to SAM 

Even multirole aircraft, suitable for air-to-air and 

ground missions, were incapable of effectively respon

having a missile fired at them.192 Unlike certain UN s

who had armored vehicles that were sufficiently well pr

to drive through Serb roadblocks, the NATO airmen f

survival had to depend primarily on avoiding fire rath

withstanding it. An aircraft that had just dodged a 

would not be well positioned to return fire against the 

ing site. Therefore, NATO air forces needed specialized 

aircraft to cope with the Bosnian Serb SAM threat. The

cialized aircraft were scarce resources and were gener

suitable for other missions such as close air support or 

ing the no-fly zone.193 Moreover, the Bosnian Serb int

air defense system allowed the launching of missiles w

little or no warning to the aircrews being fired upon. T

tic greatly reduced the time SEAD aircraft would h

responding to a threat, and this, in turn, would degr

protection afforded by SEAD escort.

Commanders in AFSOUTH were responsible for miss

enforce Security Council resolutions and NATO decisio

in practice these missions were directed almost exc

against the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, the Bosnian Ser

most unlikely to consent to having NATO aircraft overh

parts of Bosnia where enforcement might be needed. T

uation left NATO with five possible courses of action: 

duct a SEAD campaign to destroy the Bosnian S

defenses; (2) make forceful responses through retros

SEAD to induce self-restraint from the Bosnian Serbs; 

vide SEAD escorts for missions over Bosnia; (4) av

Bosnian Serb air defenses; and (5) ignore the threat an

tinue to operate over Bosnia. This last option would ha

a gross dereliction of duty by NATO commanders. Mo

the US SROE clearly and repeatedly stated: ‘‘A com

has the authority and obligation to use all necessary 

available and to take all appropriate action to defen

188
commander

s unit and other US forces in the vicinity 

hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.’’194 Th

option—conducting a SEAD campaign—was too extre

UN authorities.195 The second option—conducting ret

tive SEAD—was permitted on one occasion and then b

by UN commanders mainly because of the vulnerabilit

forces. The UN commanders did not like the third o

heavy SEAD escort over Bosnia—because it meant tha

aircraft could only fly over Bosnia during brief period

the specialized SEAD aircraft were available, thus 

reducing the UN’s ability to call on close air support. Mo

in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, these escorted missio

indistinguishable from the large packages of aircraft u

air strikes. The more threatened the Serbs felt, the mo

used their air defense system. The more they used t

defense system, the more NATO felt the need to actually 

the air defense. So, heavily escorted packages tended 

the cycle of escalating force. The final option—a

Bosnian Serb air defenses—equated to abandoning 

responsibilities over Bosnia, in order to secure force pro

There were no good options that would permit both 

commanders and the NATO commanders to accomplis

disparate missions within the bounds of acceptable r

their forces.

Responsibilities for different missions and for the pro

of different forces led to a temporary end in UN and 

cooperation for using airpower over Bosnia. Senior UNP

officials were unhappy with NATO’s apparent attem

hijack the mission in Bosnia and change its cours

peacekeeping to war fighting.196 The assessment of G

Rose and his staff summed this up well:

We all firmly believed that NATO should not act outside the prin

of peacekeeping. If NATO was [sic] only able to respond to suc

dents [as the SA-2 attack] in a way that risked collapsing the ent

mission, then it would be better not to respond at all.197

General de Lapresle was of the same view:

I could no longer call for . . . air support action because of this 

. . . As these air defense systems appeared, it was more and mo

ficult for me to have this [air support]. And I could either have n

189
. . . no aircraft over Bosnia, or thirty aircraft together, com

changing the spirit of my mission and the psychological percep

the Bosnian Serbs of what I was up to.198

By December, the UN generals no longer wanted air s

on the terms NATO was offering.

The situation was equally vexing for NATO command

also saw their forces and their enforcement mission j

ized by UNPROFOR’s limitations on the use of airpo

General Ryan reflected afterward,

I was the commander of the air campaign in Bosnia and had live

almost-Vietnam rules the first year that I was there, and it w

most frustrating thing that I have ever dealt with. . . . I may hav

frustrated as an aircrewman by some of the stupidity in Vietnam

I was doubly frustrated [in Bosnia] because . . . I guess I took 

myself to be frustrated for all our aircrews, when [the Bosnian 

could shoot at us with SAMs and we had to go back and ask th

permission to come back and take out the same site.199

Despite the NAC authorization for stand-alone air 

suppression missions, in early December NATO comm

could not get their UNPROFOR counterparts to agre

strikes or retrospective SEAD. 

Conclusion

Dual key worked as intended for air strikes; however

seriously dysfunctional for other no-fly zone operatio

giving UNPROFOR commanders veto control over air 

the dual key permitted Generals Rose and de Lapre

power to manage the risks to their forces. UN army g

used the dual key to influence targeting decisions so as 

vail with their concept of proportionality, thus helping 

maintain Bosnian Serb consent for UNPROFOR’s pr

Because air strikes were supposed to be in sup

UNPROFOR’s mandate to deter attacks on the safe 

Admiral Smith and General Ryan had little choice but 

erate this aspect of the dual-key arrangement. Mo

Admiral Smith sympathized with General de Lapresle’s 

protect UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, so he did not pu

hard for air strikes.

190
In contrast to AFSOUTH

s unhappy tolerance for U

trols over enforcement measures relating to the safe 

Admiral Smith and General Ryan refused to accept th

key factors that might endanger NATO airmen. Thou

NATO commanders succeeded in winning support to 

UNPROFOR practice of issuing warnings before air 

their victory had little effect because Generals Rose 

Lapresle never asked for, or approved, another air 

related to the safe areas. When the dual key prevente

tive self-defense of airmen flying over Bosnia, the NAT

manders’ tolerance for the dual key ended. Unlike the 

sibility to deter attacks on the safe areas, which was su

to be shared by the UN and NATO, responsibility for th

zone belonged exclusively to the commanders in AFS

Furthermore, only NATO airmen were endangered by t

of effective SEAD. From the perspective of the army g

serving with the UN, SEAD strikes created the same 

consequences as air strikes for safe area enforcemen

therefore blocked NATO’s retrospective SEAD attack

deprived General Ryan and Admiral Smith of the ab

balance their responsibilities for force protection and m

accomplishment in an area where they alone were a

able. The dual key was not intended to interfere with 

airmen’s right of self-defense or with the enforcemen

no-fly zone. But that is what it did. The conflict engend

the dual key has generally been misplaced. It was not 

ently a bad thing as many NATO airmen came to be

was a necessary tool designed to help the supporte

manders in the UN control risks to their forces on the g

The dual key was merely symptomatic of the real p

which was political disunity over the best approach t

vention in Bosnia. This situation in turn gave birth 

command chains with different missions and forces w

ferent vulnerabilities.

Notes

1. For the United Nations’s perspective, see Hans-Christian 

“UN-NATO Peacekeeping 1992–1995” (PhD diss., King’s College, U

191
of London, 1997), 140

42; and Gen Sir Michael Rose, Fighting f

Bosnia 1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), 160–80.

2. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny Flight Air O

Center, Naples, Italy, January 1994–May 1996, interviewed by au

April 1997, Spangdahlem Air Base (AB), Germany, transcript of tap

ing, author’s personal collection; and Gen Michael E. Ryan, US

mander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) a

mander US Sixteenth Air Force, September 1994–April 1996, interv

author, 6 June 1997, Ramstein, Germany, transcript of taped i

author’s personal collection.

3. “Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review,” draft edi

November 1995, prepared by the CAOC, Balkans Air Campaig

(BACS) Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), 

Air Force Base (AFB), Ala. The first target books shared by the UN a

were built during the second half of 1993 after the Mount Igman c

chap. 4). These were constantly updated to reflect changes, such as 

ation of the exclusion zones at Sarajevo and Gorazde. Gen Joseph 

USAF, interviewed by Lt Col Robert C. Owen, 29 April 1996, Was

unclassified version of “General Ashy’s Oral History Interview” 

redacted by the AFHRA, October 1997, Office of History, Air For

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.; and Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr

AFSOUTH staff officer, February 1993–1996, interviewed by Lt Col 

Owen, 6 December 1995, Naples, Italy, transcript of taped intervie

Collection.

4. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997; and Ashy interview by Owen

5. Ryan interview.

6. “Operation Deliberate Force, Factual Review,” 2–2; and Zoe

view. The targets were divided into six categories: heavy weapon

Exclusion Zone (EZ); heavy weapons outside the EZ; weapons c

points; direct and essential support facilities; command and cont

ties; and air defenses.

7. Zoerb interview; and Ryan interview.

8. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, interviewed by author, 29 Ap

Spangdahlem AB, Germany, transcript of tape recording, author’s 

collection; and Ashy interview by Owen.

9. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997.

10. Ibid.; Lowell Boyd interview; Ashy interview by Owen; a

interview.

11. Military Official W; and Brig Gen Charles F. Wald, USAF, CA

of plans, (June–November 1994), commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Av

Italy, (May 1995–June 1997), interviewed by author, 7 May 1997, Av

Italy, taped recording, author’s personal collection.

12. Wald interview. General Rose hints at this option in his 

Fighting, 144 and 160.

13. Wald interview.

14. Ibid.

192
15. Ibid.; Gen Sir Michael Rose, British army, retired, com

Bosnia-Hercegovina Command, January 1994–January 1995, int

by author, 10 December 1997, London, transcript of taped i

author’s personal collection; and Rose, Fighting, 175.

16. Wald interview.

17. Rose, Fighting, 160.

18. “Maryland’s 175th FG Pilots Go ‘Hot’ and Destroy Serb 

National Guard 49, no. 3 (March 1995): 18.

19. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 95

(S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994).

20. Rose, Fighting, 160; Facts On File Yearbook 1994 (USA: Facts 

Inc., 1994), 561; and S/1994/1389.

21. Rose, Fighting, 160–61; Rose interview by author; Facts On F

561; and S/1994/1389.

22. Facts On File 1994, 561; and “Maryland’s 175th FG Pil

According to General Ashy, the A-10 pilots were not expecting to w

a forward air controller (FAC), because they were on an air strike 

However, the FAC came up on the radio frequency used by the A-

and aborted an attack in progress. After that, the A-10s completed 

sion under the FAC’s control. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, commander, 

Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), December 1992–Septemb

and commander, US Sixteenth Air Force, February–September 199

viewed by author, 3 July 1998, Fairfax, Va., author’s notes, auth

sonal collection.

23. Facts On File 1994, 561; “Maryland’s 175th FG Pilots,” 18

Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

24. Rose, Fighting, 160–61.

25. Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UNPROFOR commander, 1

1994–28 February 1995, interviewed by author, 8 September 199

transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

26. Rose, Fighting, 161.

27. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, interviewed by author, 10 

1998, Arlington, Va., transcript of tape recording, author’s person

tion.

28. Ibid.; Rose, Fighting, throughout. In his memoir, General R

acterized NATO’s goals, as pursued by Admiral Smith, as war-fighti

than peace enforcement. Though the brand of peacekeeping Gene

was practicing allowed a greater use of force than traditional peace

it was based on peacekeeping principles. It also envisioned a defin

between peacekeeping and peace enforcement that was not to be 

General Rose called this dividing line the Mogadishu line.

29. Military Official W; and Admiral Smith interview.

30. Admiral Smith interview; and Ryan interview.

31. Rose interview by author; and Rose, “A Year in Bosnia: W

Been Achieved,” RUSI Journal 140, no. 3 (June 1995): 24.

32. NATO Official W; and Admiral Smith interview.

193
33. Rose interview by author; and Admiral Smith interview.

34. Rose, Fighting, 177; Rose interview by author; Admiral Sm

view; Wald interview; and Military Official W.

35. Rose interview by author; and Rose, “Bosnia-Her

1994–NATO Support for UN Wider Peacekeeping Operations,” 

Sixteen Nations 39, no. 3/4 (1994): 9. Elsewhere, General Rose re

warning as one of the “rules for the use of force in peacekeeping” ra

a principle of peacekeeping, per se. See Rose, “A Year In Bosnia,” 2

36. Rose interview by author; Admiral Smith interview; and 

Official W.

37. Rose interview by author.

38. Ibid.

39. MCM-KAD-084-93, “Operational Options for Air 

Memorandum for the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Orga

NAC Decision Statement, 8 August 1993. File B1c-2, BACS Collect

40. For instance, at a press conference after the air strike on 

1994, a reporter asked Admiral Smith, “Why does it seem that it

American planes that do the bombing?” Admiral Smith, transcript 

conference, 6 August 1994.

41. Wald interview; Lt Gen James E. Chambers, USAF, di

NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy, int

by author, 10 February 1998, Fairfax, Va., author’s notes, author’s 

collection; and Ashy interview by author.

42. Wald interview; and Chambers interview.

43. Facts On File 1994, 710–11; and Rose, Fighting, 176.

44. Rose, Fighting, 176.

45. General Rose has written that his commander, General de 

took a special interest in the event because he had a son comman

of the units involved. Rose, Fighting, 176. Hagman claims that 

Soubirou had a son-in-law in one of the participating Frenc

Hagman, 140.

46. De Lapresle interview; and Rose, Fighting, 176–77.

47. Rose, Fighting, 177.

48. Ibid.

49. Wald interview.

50. Ibid.; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Aircra

Bosnian-Serb Tank,” Press Release (94) 90, 22 September 1994.

51. NATO, Press Release (94) 90; Wald interview; and Chambe

view.

52. Wald interview.

53. Ibid.; and Chambers interview.

54. Wald interview.

55. Ibid.

56. NATO, Press Release (94) 90.

194
57. Ibid.; Wald interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997. T

some question as to whether the bombs actually hit the tank

instance, Rose, Fighting, 177.

58. In some accounts of the attack, only the Jaguar contribu

mentioned. See for instance, Tim Ripley, Air War Bosnia: UN a

Airpower (Osceola, Wisc.: Motorbooks International, 1996), 70; “

Are Back,” Air Forces Monthly, October 1995, 34; and Rose, Fightin

59. Rose, Fighting, 180.

60. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, transcript of briefing to A

Conference, London, 13 September 1996.

61. L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Ma

England: Manchester University Press, 1993), 120, citing Depar

Defense (DOD), Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 611.

62. Green, 120.

63. Ibid., 121.

64. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; and Hagman, 131–32, citi

Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft, 20 October 1993, A

Rules of Engagement).

65. De Lapresle interview; Rose, Fighting, 160–61 and 180; 

Smith interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

66. Admiral Smith interview; and Hagman, 198.

67. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Report to the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 84

(S/1994/555, 9 May 1994), par. 10.

71. Ibid.

72. Hagman, 126, 131–32, and 182–83; Rose, Fighting, 15; a

interview, 29 April 1997.

73. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; Ashy interview by author.

74. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1997.

75. Rose, Fighting, 235–36.

76. MCM-KAD-084-93.

77. “Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff to Rev

Targets, and the Implications of NATO Defence Ministers,” M

Seville—30 September 1994, c. 8 October 1994, File B4-2, BACS C

and Admiral Smith interview.

78. Gregory L. Schulte, “Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO,

39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 27–28; and Admiral Smith interview.

79. “Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff;” 

27–28; and Rose, Fighting, 182.

80. “Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff,” 3.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Rose, Fighting, 182–83.

195
85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., 183.

87. Despite such constraints, General Rose himself threate

Bosnian government with air strikes against its forces in mid-Au

again in September 1994. Rose, Fighting, 163 and 184; and Fact

1994, 562 and 711. In his memoir, Rose erroneously claimed tha

occasion of his threat in September, Bosnian government forces we

ing a September 1993 NATO ultimatum making them subject to 

strikes. There was no such NATO ultimatum.

88. “Discussion between the United Nations and NATO,” 27 

1994, File B4-2, BACS Collection.

89. NATO, “Press Statement Issued Jointly by UN and NATO

Release (94)103, 28 October 1994.

90. Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, interviewed by author, 13 Janua

Paris, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

91. Admiral Smith interview.

92. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; Military Official U; and 

“Briefing on F-16 Shootdown in Bosnia and Current Operations: 

before the Committee on Armed Services,” 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

1995, S. Hrg. 104–421, 33.

93. Dr. Thomas S. Snyder and Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, USAFE 

History, USAFE Historical Highlights, 1942–1997: Fifty-fifth An

Edition (Ramstein AB, Germany: Headquarters USAFE, 1997), 175

94. Ibid., 176.

95. S/1994/1389; and Chambers interview.

96. Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, Sarajevo, TLS (photocopy), to G

Mladic, Han Pijesak, 18 September 1994, BACS Collection.

97. As is discussed in the next section.

98. Alan Warnes, “The Battle for Bihac,” Air Force Monthly, 

1995, 40–41; Facts On File 1994, 874–75; and Ryan interview.

99. Facts On File 1994, 849–50; and Tim Ripley, “NATO Strike

World Airpower Journal 22 (autumn/winter 1995): 18–27.

100. Wald interview; Ryan interview; Admiral Smith interv

Senate, “Briefing on F-16 Shootdown,” 32–33 and 52.

101. Adm Leighton Smith, USN, commander in chief NATO Allie

Southern Europe, briefing to US Air Force Air War College, Maxw

Ala., 9 November 1995, videocassette of briefing, file MISC–19, fo

BACS Collection; and Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, “NATO Air Oper

Bosnia-Herzegovina: ‘Deliberate Force,’ 29 August–14 Septembe

transcript of briefing to Air Power Conference, London, 13 Septemb

102. Admiral Smith interview; Ryan interview; Chambers i

Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997; and Brig Gen David A. Sawyer, USA

director, Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy, interviewe

Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, 11 October 1995, Vicen

BACS Collection.

103. See chap. 2, ROE discussion.

196
104. The United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United 

Peace-keeping, 3d ed. (New York: United Nations Reproduction 

1996), 535.

105. Warnes, 41; and Ryan interview.

106. Ibid.

107. UN Security Council Resolution 958 (1994) (S/RES/

November 1994).

108. Admiral Smith, transcript of press conference, 21 Novemb

and NAMILCOM, “Implementation of Council Decision on Subseq

Attacks against an Identified Surface-to-Air Weapons System,” M

SHAPE, 230800Z NOV 94, File B4-2, BACS Collection.

109. Military Official U.

110. Ibid.; and Admiral Smith interview.

111. Military Official U.

112. Ibid.

113. “Jags Are Back,” 34; and Facts On File 1994, 874.

114. De Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998; and Rose, Fight

Both UN generals indicated targeting decisions made on 20 N

caused the one-day slip. Any changes in targets at that point wo

necessitated replanning and possibly reconfiguring the ordnance 

the jets. The following discussion, however, is not based on the su

that the delay was for any reason other than the one given—high c

erage over the target.

115. De Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998; and Admiral Sm

view.

116. Admiral Smith interview.

117. De Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998.

118. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, “NATO Air Strike Agains

Airfield,” transcript of news conference, Naples, 21 November 19

P.M.).

119. Ryan interview.

120. Admiral Smith interview.

121. De Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998; and Rose, 

200–203.

122. De Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998.

123. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, “NATO Air Strike Agains

Airfield—Mission Assessment,” transcript of news conference, Na

November 1994 (5:00 P.M.); and Admiral Smith interview.

124. Ryan interview.

125. Admiral Smith, transcript of news conference, 22 Novemb

126. NATO Official C; Gen George A. Joulwan, USA, Suprem

Commander Europe, 22 October 1993–11 July 1997, interviewed b

11 February 1998, Washington, transcript of tape recording, auth

sonal collection; and Admiral Smith interview.

127. NATO Official C.

128. Admiral Smith, transcript of news conference, 22 Novemb

197
129. Ripley, 

NATO Strikes Back, 23; and Facts On File 1994, 

130. Admiral Smith interview; Ryan interview; Zoerb interview, 

1997; and Rose, Fighting, 201–2.

131. For instance, see Hagman, 147. In his analysis, Hagman 

notes the strike had “no effect on the Serb encirclement of Bihac” b

rectly concludes that was the raid’s purpose, saying he found “no i

that enforcement of the ‘no-fly zone’ was the primary aim.” My resea

cates that because of no-fly zone violations by aircraft flying from 

planners in AFSOUTH began looking at options for attacking Udbin

mid-1994. This was before the Bosnian government offensive fro

and the ensuing Bosnian Serb counteroffensive. Zoerb interview, 

1997; and Chambers interview.

132. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1998; Rose, Fighting, 

200–202; Ryan interview; and Wald interview.

133. Charles Skinner, political-economic advisor to USNAT

viewed by author, 28 April 1997, Brussels, notes and tape r

author’s personal collection.

134. Philip Sabin, “Counter-Air Mission in Peace Support Opera

The Dynamics of Air Power, eds. Group Capt Andrew Lambert and A

Williamson (Bracknell, England: HMSO, 1996), 165.

135. Admiral Smith interview; and De Lapresle interviews, 13 

1998 and 8 September 1998.

136. NATO Official C; Military Official X; Military Official U; and 

Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Random House, 1998), 61.

137. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1998.

138. Admiral Smith interview. Also see Admiral Smith, transcrip

conference, 22 November 1994.

139. Sawyer interview. General Chambers left the CAOC e

November and retired from the US Air Force; his replacement, Maj 

Hornburg, did not arrive until the end of November.

140. NATO Press Release (94)111, 23 November 1994; and War

141. Prior to this incident, only heat seeking surface-to-air 

(SAM) had been fired at aircraft over Bosnia. The SA-2 radar-guid

could engage NATO aircraft at much greater ranges than could hea

missiles. Moreover, radar-guided missiles such as the SA-2 and S

ried a much larger warhead, and they could engage aircraft at any 

(recall that an early version of the SA-2 shot down Gary Powers in 

flying U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960).

142. Sawyer interview.

143. Ibid.

144. Annex E: “Rules of Engagement (ROE),” to CINCSOUTH 

40101, Change 2, 13 August 1993, File B3e, NPL-21, BACS Collec

145. MCM-KAE-090-94, “Operation Deny Flight ROE,” 22 N

1994, File D2 a-c, BACS Collection.

146. NAMILCOM, “Implementation of Council Decision,” Me

SHAPE, 230800Z NOV 94.

198
147. Ryan interview; and Chambers interview.

148. Ryan interview; Admiral Smith interview; and Senate, “Br

F-16 Shootdown,” 32–33 and 52.

149. A variety of radar types is used in most radar-guided SAM 

The different radar types perform different functions, such as early 

surveillance, target acquisition, and target tracking. Once a target 

radar is locked onto an aircraft and the aircraft is in range of the mi

the missile crew can shoot at the aircraft.

150. Vice Adm Norman W. Ray, USN, deputy chairman of 

Military Committee, July 1992–December 1995, interviewed by au

November 1997, Brussels, transcript of tape recording, author’s 

collection.

151. Admiral Smith interview; Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

152. Ryan interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

153. NAMILCOM, “Implementation of Council Decision,” Me

SHAPE, 230800Z NOV 94.

154. Warnes, 42.

155. NATO, Press Release (94)111, 23 November 1994; and NAT

Release (94)112, 23 November 1994.

156. Warnes, 42; and Facts On File 1994, 889.

157. Sawyer interview.

158. Military Official U.

159. NATO Press Release (94)114, 24 November 1994.

160. Ibid.

161. S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, par. 10; and Report of the S

General Pursuant to Resolution 987 (1995) (S/1995/444, 30 May 19

49 and 50.

162. Facts On File 1994, 889.

163. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1998; and Maj Gen 

Joersz, USAF, message to CINCSOUTH (Adm Leighton W. Smith, U

COMAIRSOUTH (Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF), 25 November 1994

2, BACS Collection.

164. Joersz, message to CINCSOUTH. General de Lapresle la

firmed this was an accurate reading of his position. De Lapresle int

September 1998.

165. Rose interview by author; and Sawyer interview. In his 

General Rose placed this event on 24 rather than 25 November

implied the claim he made about his forces being under fire may h

a ruse to get NATO aircraft to the area when General Ryan might o

have balked at Rose’s request for planes. Rose, Fighting, 209.

166. Sawyer interview.

167. Zoerb interview, 27 May 1998. This type of CAS is known 

cedural control,” and it is inherently riskier, in terms of collatera

and danger of friendly fire, than close control CAS, because the fo

controller cannot see the targets, the aircraft, or the friendly fo

199
might be near the target area. Under close control the forward air c

typically can see all three.

168. Sawyer interview. Jane Sharp, citing a newspaper artic

Vulliamy, claimed that “CIA interceptions of SAS communicati

revealed, however, that as NATO planes took off from Aviano in S

Italy, Rose (who had recently learned that Belgrade had supp

Bosnian Serbs with new SAM antiaircraft missiles) was ordering 

spotters in the field not to identify any targets.” Jane M. O. Sharp

Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia 

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), 43. Whether or not the 

true, it gives an indication of the intensity of the split between A

and UNPROFOR in late November 1994.

169. Admiral Smith interview; and Sawyer interview.

170. Admiral Smith interview; and Sawyer interview.

171. Military Official U, and Hagman, 131, 133, and 148.

172. Rose interview by author; and de Lapresle interview, 13 

1998. For a discussion of the political-military trade-offs when dea

air defense suppression in peace support operations, see Phili

“Counter-Air Mission in Peace Support Operations,” in The Dynam

Power, eds. Group Capt Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. W

(Bracknell, England: HMSO, 1996), 169–71.

173. Sawyer interview; and Ryan interview.

174. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 19

and NATO Official C.

175. Military Official U; Ryan interview. General Ryan and oth

less specific about the origins of the order to recall the package.

176. Military Official U; NATO Official C; and Hagman, 150–51

177. Ray interview; and Lt Gen Patrick K. Gamble, USAF, assist

of staff, Operations and Logistics, SHAPE, interviewed by autho

1998, Washington, tape recording, author’s personal collection.

178. Owen, 331.

179. Sawyer interview; Zoerb interview, 27 May 1998; and Lt Ge

Hornburg, USAF, interviewed by author, 17 July 1998, tape rec

telephone interview, author’s personal collection.

180. Sawyer interview; Hornburg interview; and Tim Ripley, “S

the SAMS,” Aircraft Illustrated 28, no. 1 (November 1995): 25. Ripley 

NATO’s move out of Bosnian airspace was requested by UNPROFOR 

to facilitate peace talks. It seems likely that visits by high-level dip

Sarajevo on 4 December may have prevented the resumption of fli

Bosnia before that date. However, research (including the sources c

revealed that the reason for the pullback to the air space over the 

was because NATO could not defend itself adequately.

181. Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, Zagreb, TLS (photocopy), 

Leighton Smith, Naples, 7 December 1994, File B1a, BACS Collect

182. Adm Leighton Smith, Naples, TLS (photocopy), to Gen Ber

Lapresle, Zagreb, 8 December 1994, File B1a, BACS Collection.

200
183. 

Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review, 21.

184. Facts On File 1994, 995.

185. Note that the first and third missions are not consent-base

keeping activities. Yasushi Akashi, Zagreb, TLS (photocopy), to Dr. 

Karadzic, Pale, 10 December 1994, BACS Collection.

186. Ibid.

187. Gamble interview. The NAC decision of 8 December 1994 

stand-alone SEAD missions in response to hostile acts against UN 

aircraft.

188. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

189. CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U

(Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 

1994), A–5.

190. Ibid., A–1.

191. Under US doctrine, the ground commander and the air com

work for a common superior, the Joint Task Force commander. In 

there was no equivalent overall commander, no unity of command

unity of purpose guided by a common objective. See Admiral Smit

ments in, “The Jane’s Interview: Admiral Leighton W. Smith, USN

Defence Weekly, 28 January 1995, 32.

192. The “Block 50” variant of the F-16C was somewhat of an e

to this generalization; however, these aircraft were just being fiel

were not readily available in Europe. “SEAD Role for F-16 Comes 

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 August 1994, 14.

193. Again, certain fighters adapted for SEAD missions are ra

tions, and even these generally have to be fitted with weapons for a 

lar mission, rather than being able to go out equally well prepare

form SEAD and another mission. Given their scarcity and the high 

for them worldwide, commanders in AFSOUTH could not expect t

them in such an inefficient way for very long.

194. CJCSI 3121.01, A–3, A–4, and A–6. For further discus

SROE, see Lt Col Ronald M. Reed, “Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engag

Operation Deliberate Force,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in 

Air Campaign Planning, ed. Col Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, 

University Press, 2000), 381–430; and Richard Grunawalt, “T

Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate’s Primer,” The 

Law Review 42 (1997): 245–58. 

195. Admiral Smith interview; Rose, Fighting, 200.

196. Military Official U; Rose interview by author; and de Lapres

view, 13 January 1998.

197. Rose, Fighting, 203.

198. De Lapresle interview, 8 September 1998.

199. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, cited in Tirpak, “The Ch

Course,” 39 (bracket comments in original).

201
Chapter 7

Paving the Way to Enforcement:

January–June 1995

Our field commanders carry out political decisions; they 

not make them. Soldiers can prosecute war when ordered 

do so; they cannot declare war.

—Kofi Annan, November 19

Through their planning, initiative, and insistence on 

tional autonomy in the first half of 1995, theater-lev

manders in the UN and NATO paved the way for enfor

action later in the year. The first section of this 

describes the origins of two key NATO plans for ai

Dead Eye and Deliberate Force. Created at General Rya

tiative, these plans later defined the shape of NATO air 

against the Bosnian Serbs. Another step in the pro

clearing the way for NATO air action in Bosnia too

when General Rose’s successor, Gen Rupert Smith, 

tated a hostage crisis for the UN. Though other rese

have analyzed General Smith’s role in that regard, the 

section presents evidence showing that making airpow

useable in Bosnia was probably an element in Smith’s 

lations rather than a coincidence.1 The third section 

that the shooting down of a US F-16 in the no-fly zon

major impact on furthering AFSOUTH plans to use airp

Bosnia. The F-16 downing was important because i

lighted for Western political leaders the dangers to NA

men posed by the Bosnian Serb air defense system, thu

ing AFSOUTH commanders acquire material resourc

broader political support for their Dead Eye and De

Force plans. This chapter’s final section shows how A

Smith helped raise European political awareness—part

within NATO—of problems with the no-fly zone. Fort

his expertise and sense of responsibility to his forc

AFSOUTH commander refused pressures that woul

203
increased the risks to NATO pilots. This precipitated a 

review of operation Deny Flight and lowered political 

ance to the type of forceful SEAD operations favored by 

airmen in AFSOUTH.

Air Campaign Plans and

UNPROFOR Changes: Winter 1994–199

From late December 1994 until June 1995, two ke

were developed to change the status quo. The first was d

to win back the airspace over Bosnia; the second to at

BSA’s military capability.

Dead Eye

Planning for an air campaign that was eventually ex

in the summer of 1995 owed something to plans devel

the CAOC to neutralize the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air 

In the autumn of 1994, planners at the CAOC in 

began looking at ways to deal with the new Serb surfac

threat.2 They solicited and received approval from t

CAOC director, Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, to build a plan 

at destroying the Serb air defense system.3

By mid-December they had put together a plan calle

Eye that would win back control of the airspace over 

by systematically attacking the entire Bosnian Serb int

air defense system.4 When this plan was presented to G

Ryan, he expanded the initiative and ordered that an a

paign plan be built—one aimed at attriting the BSA’s m

capability.5

Deliberate Force

The wider air campaign plan was developed under th

tion of Col Daniel R. ‘‘Doc’’ Zoerb, an American on G

Ryan’s staff in Naples, and it eventually was given t

‘‘Deliberate Force.’’6 Zoerb had worked on various ai

and targeting schemes at Naples since his arrival in J

of 1994.7 Between December 1994 and June 1995, h

drew from existing target lists to craft an air campaign 

take away the BSA’s military advantage over its adver

204
The idea behind the planning was to level the playing 

attriting certain BSA military capabilities so that the B

Serbs would see it as in their best interest to cease m

operations and genuinely seek a negotiated settlem

Bosnia.9 As General Ryan later explained,

that was the premise of the bombing operation. That was the h

the bombing operation—you’d heard about lift and strike. . . . Lift 

going to occur. So if you’re going to level the playing field, you do 

other way around by attriting.10

Ryan and his planners had studied the BSA and had se

it depended upon maneuvering its better armed b

numerous forces to dominate the Bosnian gove

forces.11 During the fighting around Bihac in the aut

1994, NATO planners observed that General Mladic ha

two and one-half weeks to maneuver his forces and equ

through the Posavina corridor into western Bosnia.12 O

place, the BSA forces drew from local caches of amm

and rapidly reversed the gains made by the Bosnian 

ment forces.13 By taking away the command, contr

communications facilities on which Mladic depended for 

ing his forces and by hitting certain arms caches and 

that would limit the BSA’s mobility, Ryan believed he c

a long way toward leveling the playing field.14

General Ryan had not been given political direction 

ate plans for a wider air campaign, nor did he seek p

approval for the planning; he simply believed it pru

have such a plan because the course of events in Bosn

cated that it might be needed.15 Though mildly concern

some NATO nations might object to military planning th

not been directed by the NAC, General Ryan saw it as 

his responsibility as a commander to order the plan

Later he observed,

If we didn’t do the planning, I think we would have been as rem

the UN was in not upholding the mandates they were supposed 

I never did get called on that. We planned it, and I briefed it to Jo

and briefed it to—we started briefing it [in] March [or] April.17

Thus, the need to properly defend NATO air forces over 

served as a catalyst for wider air campaign planning, and 

ties for both issues fell under General Ryan’s responsibi

205
Through the winter and into the early spring of 1995

ners at Naples and Vicenza returned the focus of ai

planning to its original, robust form. By the time Gener

had arrived in theater, the accretion of political rest

and lessons about what air-strike options the UN 

accept had driven air-strike plans to become little mo

a series of disjointed target lists associated with the saf

or with specific attacks like the one at Udbina.18 Gener

reversed that trend and became involved in the plann

spent many hours pondering what it was that constitu

Bosnian Serb’s center of gravity and how to use airp

affect that center of gravity in a way that would com

Serbs to quit fighting.19 Ryan also brought in various 

experts and agencies in an attempt to identify which 

150 possible targets to strike in order to produce the 

effect on the BSA.20 Meanwhile, planners at the 

attempted their own analysis of the Bosnian Serb air 

system.21 After their initial effort, they received (from K

Force Base in San Antonio, Texas) a visit by US Ai

experts who specialized in command, control, and com

cations warfare.22 The planning General Ryan ordered 

1994 was not entirely different from earlier efforts; in 

reversed the evolution that had led to air strikes for 

attacks against individual symbolic targets. General 

initiative returned the planning focus to a more comp

sive view of air operations similar to those envisio

1993.23

NATO air campaign planning could also support p

reinforce or withdraw the UN from Bosnia.24 By De

1994, NATO planners in Belgium had been tasked to 

a plan to extricate UNPROFOR from the former Yug

and the withdrawal from Bosnia was expected to be m

When senior NATO officers saw the magnitude of th

that would be needed to withdraw UNPROFOR, they rai

question of whether such a large force might be better 

reinforce the UN in the former Yugoslavia, rather than 

summate its failure.26 By consequence, allied chiefs of 

staff meeting that winter in The Hague decided that p

reinforcing UNPROFOR should be drawn up.27 Thus, b

206
1995 NATO military staffs were actively planning for 

options ranging from the complete withdrawal of UNP

to its reinforcement.28 The broad-ranging air campaign 

at the Bosnian Serbs could have been used to support 

options, including the one for the withdrawal of UNPRO

However, should UNPROFOR try to withdraw, it was n

clear that the Bosnian Serbs would pose the greatest 

the departing peacekeepers.30 AFSOUTH planners con

to maintain active lists of potential Bosnian governme

Bosnian Croat military targets—though there were s

enough of these to warrant an air campaign plan

uncharacteristic speed with which Western gover

implemented military options in response to crises dur

spring and summer of 1995 underscored the value o

early planning efforts.32

New UN Commanders and Redefining UNPROFOR

Early in 1995, the two top UNPROFOR commander

pleted their one-year tours of duty in the former Yug

General Rose’s replacement had a background that su

he might have a better understanding of airpower and 

flexible approach to ground operations in Bosnia th

rigid peacekeeping formula followed by Rose. Near the 

January, Lt Gen Sir Rupert Smith arrived in Sarajevo 

over Bosnia-Herzegovina command from General 

General Smith was known to be an innovative problem 

who had forged good relations with the US military dur

Gulf War. As commander of the First (UK) Armored D

during Desert Storm, General Smith had witnessed firs

how coalition airpower had prepared the battlefield be

ground war, and he had seen the difficulties of em

CAS.34 In the two years prior to taking command of 

forces in Bosnia, Smith served as the assistant chie

defense staff (Operations and Plans) in London, so he w

mately familiar with the British contributions to both 

and NATO for operations in the former Yugoslavia.35 Th

recent joint-service responsibilities and his backgroun

ably gave Smith a less parochial view of the conflict th

of his predecessor.36

207
At the beginning of March, Lt Gen Bernard Janvier of 

took over from his compatriot, General de Lapresle. J

like Rupert Smith, had also worked well with America

tary officers during Desert Storm where Janvier comm

the ‘‘Daguet Division,’’ or Sixth Light Armored Division

asked after he had left Bosnia about the basis for his 

edge of airpower, Janvier cited first and foremost his 

ences as a young officer in Algeria where in the early 19

had learned about close air support.37 He held views sim

General de Lapresle’s regarding the UN’s role in Bosn

the use of NATO airpower.38 So, Janvier’s arrival d

change the cordial but occasionally tense nature of th

tionship between UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH.

Soon after General Janvier took over in Zagreb, 

Security Council reorganized UNPROFOR. However, th

had no real impact on the responsibilities of UNPR

principal commanders.39 General Smith’s command in S

took the name UNPROFOR, which had previously ap

the overall theater UN force headquartered in Zagreb. T

ater force, commanded by Janvier, was renamed the 

Nations Peace Force (UNPF), and it remained und

Akashi’s political direction.40 Smith’s command contin

be subordinate to Janvier’s.

Calling the overall theater command a ‘‘Peace Force

reflected the growing efforts by the UN secretariat to div

force of any enforcement responsibility in the 

Yugoslavia.41 In December of 1994, Boutros Boutro

issued a report on the safe areas lamenting the failing

light option and the difficulties experienced by the UN wh

ing to use airpower to compensate for UNPROFOR’s ina

ground forces.42 He made it clear that UNPROFOR’s ab

enforce respect for the safe areas by unwilling parties is ex

limited, unless additional troops and the necessary weapo

equipment are made available’’ (emphasis added).43 Thou

ried enforcement action would jeopardize the humanitari

tion of the UN’s mission in Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali at lea

lip service to the idea of taking enforcement action if UNP

were given the necessary forces.44 A month later, when 

secretary-general published his ‘‘Supplement to an Age

208
Peace,

 he sounded a more pessimistic note about the UN

ity to conduct enforcement and the difficulties of subcon

enforcement to regional organizations such as N

Moreover, Boutros-Ghali expressed concern over ‘‘usin

other than in self-defense, in a peace-keeping context.

was one step away from acknowledging the incompati

simultaneously conducting peacekeeping while taking e

ment action.

In late May, at Boutros-Ghali’s insistence, General 

traveled to New York to brief the Security Council on, 

other things, UNPF’s inability to enforce the safe area

and to explain the requirement for a new, more realist

date if UN forces were to stay in Bosnia.47 The US amba

to the UN, Madeleine Albright, and others who viewed 

call to abandon the UN’s principal mission in Bosnia 

criticized Janvier’s presentation.48 Nonetheless, on 3

Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Coun

ommending a new mandate for UNPF that would li

force strictly to peacekeeping duties.49 Gone was the 

early 1994, when Boutros-Ghali wanted to remind the w

factions in Bosnia that ‘‘UNPROFOR’s mandate for t

areas has been adopted under Chapter VII of the 

Nations Charter. Accordingly, UNPROFOR is not obl

seek the consent of the parties for operations which fal

the mandate conferred upon it under Security C

Resolution[s] 836 (1993) and 844 (1993).’’50 UN dema

more resources to carry out its enforcement duties in 

had gradually yielded to an acceptance of the incomp

of simultaneously attempting peacekeeping and e

ment.51 Considering the limitations of UNPROFOR’s 

the UN had little option but to choose peacekeeping.

While UNPROFOR adopted a peacekeeping posture

picked up the enforcement mission in Bosnia. This div

labor made life increasingly difficult for theater comm

especially Admiral Smith. The AFSOUTH commander 

being at a high-level exercise at SHAPE in April 1995 

which the NATO secretary-general and an undersec

general from the UN gave speeches acknowledgi

209
incompatibility of the UN and NATO missions. Accor

Admiral Smith, Willy Claes and the UN official agreed th

“The problem that we have here is that NATO is in peace enforc

and the UN has been peacekeeping, and those are incompatible 

And when they finished up, I thought: God, that’s magnificent. T

finally realized the problem. I’ve been saying that for months.52

The admiral expected this recognition to lead to a res

of the problem. However, the division of labor persist

the two organizations continued to pursue their dicho

agendas through their theater commanders. Admiral 

concluded that the political authorities in NATO and 

were ducking their duties and pinning the blame for fa

Bosnia on the military commanders:

They were shirking their responsibility. . . . So why did they h

have a contact group? Why? Because two political bodies [the U

NATO] that were involved in this thing couldn’t talk to each other

were getting absolutely nowhere, and they were just beating [up

military leaders because that happened to be a lucrative target.

The problem was especially acute for Admiral Smith b

in addition to enforcing the no-fly zone and the heavy w

exclusion zones, he was also supposed to support the U

manders. Conversely, the UN commanders were not ob

help NATO with enforcement, especially since the UN 

tariat backed the move to peacekeeping, and the S

Council failed to insist on enforcement.

The Beginning of the End

Throughout early 1995, in Bosnia peace talks fou

the cessation of hostilities agreement negotiated in De

1994 was repeatedly violated, and the rhetoric and ac

the warring factions prefigured a renewed bout of int

fighting.54 Fighting between Bosnian Serbs and Bosni

ernment forces continued around Bihac through Janu

February.55 During the third week in March, Bosnian 

ment forces launched a major offensive.56 The Serbs 

Tuzla, Gorazde,57 and Sarajevo in reply, and the UN 

ened air strikes to stop attacks on civilians. At the sam

Mr. Akashi condemned the Bosnian government for ins

210
the trouble.58 In April—the third anniversary of the 

Bosnia—the downhill spiral continued as Bosnian Croa

joined government forces against the Bosnian Serbs in 

Bosnia, fighting continued around Bihac, and on two 

utive days near mid-month, sniper fire in Sarajevo claim

lives of French peacekeepers.59

When the four-month cease-fire expired at the begin

May, the most significant fighting was not in Bosnia 

eastern Croatia where Croatian government forces 

western Slavonia—one of four UN protected areas.60 S

Croatia launched rockets into Zagreb in retaliation 

Croatian government offensive.61 The slide toward war 

ued in Bosnia as well, and, by the start of the second w

May, Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo prompted Gen 

Smith to seek authorization for air strikes to silen

guns.62 Smith’s UN superiors rejected the request, b

starter’s gun had been fired in the race by the warring f

to win their shares of Bosnia.

Rupert Smith on the Use of Airpower in Bosnia

As Bosnia stumbled toward open warfare, Gen 

Smith had a vision of how events might unfold and t

airpower might play. In June 1994, Smith had warne

Senate committee that an all-out Bosnian Serb attack 

be ‘‘most unlikely to be halted by airpower al

Furthermore, he cautioned, ‘‘The mission of the air fo

provide protection and support for UNPROFOR is d

from that required for stopping the Serb attacks. It is u

that there would be sufficient resources to conduct 

those missions simultaneously successfully.’’64 After d

ing the messy UN withdrawal that air strikes might p

General Smith rather presciently testified that the pea

ers guarding the heavy weapons control sites would 

nerable to being taken hostage and that the weapons 

fall to whichever faction reached them first.65 Later 

same day that Smith testified, Gen Mike Ryan spoke 

same committee with similar prophetic accuracy, point

that the first steps of a Serb attack would be directed 

‘‘the outlying regions that they could take very quick

211
month after the Senate hearings, General Smith rep

‘‘spelled out the options of extending NATO air action to 

ing a number of Bosnian Serb targets simultaneousl

briefing to the foreign ministers of the contact group 

meeting in Geneva.67

During the winter of 1994–95, General Smith was e

to elements of General Ryan’s emerging air campaig

even though Smith might not have been fully aware o

the details of it. In early 1995 NATO was busy planning 

port a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and the airpower po

those plans was linked to Colonel Zoerb’s air campaign 

As one AFSOUTH officer responsible for withdrawal p

later explained, ‘‘As we were writing the withdrawal pl

were writing in the flexibility for an air campaign. 

Zoerb and the people in the Deny Flight Air Ops Cell w

heavily involved in writing a campaign plan but not c

that’’ because of NATO political sensitivities.69 G

Joulwan recalled,

There was a great hue and cry that the UN might have to withdr

my instructions were to plan a withdrawal option. So we had both a 

implementation option and a withdrawal option for Bosnia. Th

January [of 1995], all the CHODS [NATO Chiefs of Defense Staff] w

The Hague and talked about a reinforcement plan for the UN. So 

was a series of plans by AFSOUTH that had hybrid pieces to it. B

consistent part of that was a series of air targets. We went through 

the detailed planning. Included were the targeting of air defense s

key installations, of all the associated sites. (Emphasis added)70

In February 1995, General Smith traveled to the 

wargaming center at Ramstein, Germany (home of 

Headquarters), for a computer-assisted exercise of a p

UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.71 From an air pl

perspective, preventing the BSA from interferin

UNPROFOR’s withdrawal required the same initial act

for Colonel Zoerb’s campaign plan. Neutralizing the B

Serb air defenses would be the first step. Next would co

BSA command and control sites that had not alread

destroyed when the integrated air defense systems (IAD

attacked. After that the courses of action might vary, 

General Joulwan noted, the core list of targets for a nu

options was pretty much the same. In short, for at l

212
months prior to his request for air strikes in May 

General Smith had been contemplating future scena

UNPROFOR, and airpower seemed to be a recurring th

those scenarios.72 Therefore, it seems reasonable to co

that General Smith’s efforts to reinforce UNPROFOR 

use force proactively in Bosnia were made with the in

of including NATO airpower.

Pale Air Strikes and UNPROFOR Hostages:

25–26 May 1995

Gen Rupert Smith helped to keep UNPROFOR from 

further entangled in the war in Bosnia, and in the pro

made the use of airpower a safer, hence more viable, op

the UN.73 But to do so, he first took what at the time ap

to be an inordinate risk with the lives of his troops.74 R

by Honig and Both has shown that by early Marc

General Smith was pretty sure of Bosnian Serb intent

go on a final offensive that year.75 Furthermore, giv

mutually exclusive options of making UNPROFOR a 

peacekeeping force or turning it into a force capable o

enforcement action, Smith preferred enforcement.76 

Gow suggests the same thing and argues further that 

British support for General Smith and the reinforcem

UNPROFOR that primarily shaped the Western respons

situation in Bosnia in 1995.77 Smith asked for air str

Monday, 8 May, to curb Bosnian Serb shelling near S

but was turned down by Boutros-Ghali who was ac

advice from Akashi and Janvier.78 As Honig and Bot

revealed, in a move uncharacteristic for the British 

ment, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote a le

Boutros-Ghali complaining about the decision to deny 

strikes.79

At a meeting in Paris a few days after the refused air 

Generals Smith and Janvier told Boutros-Ghali that UN 

in Bosnia needed to be able to use force more decis

stick exclusively to peacekeeping.80 For either option, 

generals wanted to redeploy their most vulnerable sold

of the eastern safe areas and away from weapons 

points to more secure positions in central Bosnia.81 T

213
soldiers were potential hostages and, thus, a block to th

forceful option.82 Yet, if the UN eschewed force and UNP

were tasked strictly with peacekeeping, then there 

point in keeping UN soldiers in the safe areas, which 

set to become the center of fighting between the fac

After hearing the commanders’ arguments, the UN sec

general insisted that Janvier brief the Security Cou

these military proposals.84

On 24 May while Janvier was at the UN headqua

New York for his briefing, fighting intensified around Sa

and the Bosnian Serbs removed some heavy weapons 

UN collection point.85 General Smith issued a démarch

Bosnian government and to the Bosnian Serbs warnin

that “their forces would be attacked from the air if al

weapons did not cease firing by 1200 the next day.’’86 I

tion, Smith demanded the Bosnian Serbs return the 

weapons they had recently confiscated from UN weapo

trol sites.87 By this point, little had been done to red

risks to UNPROFOR from Bosnian Serb retaliation.88

On the afternoon of 25 May, after the Serbs failed to 

the stolen heavy weapons by the UN deadline, NATO 

attacked an ammunition storage facility near the B

Serb capital of Pale. The next day, the Bosnian Serbs f

meet another deadline for returning the heavy weapons

second round of strikes destroyed the remainder of the 

nition bunkers at the same storage site near Pale. Wh

more demonstrative than militarily significant, the str

considerably more robust than the two previous air 

requested by the UN.89 General Smith clearly had a d

view of proportionality than his predecessor.90 Genera

later recalled,

If we had an incident occur, we’d pull out the book, go to the m

and say: “What can we do under the current guidelines.” An

guidelines kept getting piled on. . . . It was wacko, but those we

political rules that we were given. I don’t know whether those boo

still around, but it . . . was from that that we did things like th

raid. . . . And we stretched it a little bit actually on that one.91

General Janvier was in New York when the first démarc

issued, and he did not return to Zagreb until after the 

214
air strike.92 According to Janvier, Mr. Akashi consult

Boutros-Ghali before the strikes.93 However, Janvier cr

the UN’s lack of forethought and its failure to give a

warning to its own forces and to the many aid wor

Bosnia.94 Had Janvier been in Zagreb, he probably wou

blocked the strikes or at least picked a less forceful b

option. Moreover, given his criticism of the resulting 

crisis, he would have been unlikely to approve the 

without doing more to prevent UN peacekeepers from 

taken hostage.

Gow, as well as Honig and Both, has suggested that 

Smith was intentionally trying to force the responsible 

in the international community to confront the choice b

peacekeeping and enforcement in Bosnia because 

could no longer go on pretending to do both.95 Genera

and his chief planner in Naples also believed that G

Smith’s decision to strike the Pale ammo dump was a 

took aimed more at influencing the UN than the warr

tions.96 The Serbs responded to the first strike by she

of the safe areas except Zepa with especially appalling 

in Tuzla, where 70 civilians were killed and more than 

dred others were wounded.97 After the second strike, th

rounded up UN peacekeepers throughout Bosnia, takin

than 300 hostages and using many as human shields 

further attacks.98

The Pale air strikes lanced the Bosnia boil, and al

there was an awful mess to be cleaned up, the pro

helped to cure the underlying problems inhibiting the 

airpower in Bosnia.99 The first problem the UN had 

with was getting its hostages back, but the hostage cris

proved useful to UNPROFOR and to those who wished t

vene more forcefully against the Bosnian Serbs. W

Smith’s predecessor had reportedly discouraged the us

term hostage to describe UN peacekeepers taken 

Bosnian Serbs after the air strikes at Gorazde and aga

the SEAD strikes in November of 1994,100 General Sm

nothing to downplay the fact that the Serbs held hund

his men hostage against further NATO air strikes.101 

hostages were seen around the world for what they 

215
including those hostages who were chained to potent

gets as human shields. These images could only stre

the case for people who viewed the Bosnian Serbs as t

guys.” The hostage crisis exposed, in dramatic fashi

dilemma UNPROFOR faced when trying to take enfor

action. It demonstrated the futility of simultaneously co

ing peacekeeping and enforcement action in Bosnia, 

forced the international community to confront the 

between the two.

As Gow has argued, after the Pale air strikes, Genera

was able to strengthen his forces and begin to redu

ready supply of UN hostages.102 In the aftermath of the 

strikes, the British and French governments were un

quick to reinforce UNPROFOR with a 12,000-strong m

tional Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia.103 The Dut

contributed 180 soldiers to the force.104 Honig and Bo

inferred from the speed of the offer to send the RRF t

decision to reinforce UNPROFOR had been made bef

Pale air strikes.105 Gow has suggested it was Rupert 

idea to reinforce UNPROFOR and that British political 

ities were supporting him, rather than Smith being th

executor of policy.106 Later Admiral Smith judged 

Rupert Smith had not received the RRF, then Gen Smit

ably would not have agreed to the Deliberate Force air 

a few months later.107 The Pale air strikes and subs

hostage taking also contributed to the collapse of th

heavy weapons control regime, greatly reducing the nu

UN soldiers deployed in vulnerable positions 

Sarajevo.108 Over the next three months, General Smi

tinued to redeploy his forces to more defensible sites

dramatically demonstrating UNPROFOR’s untenable p

Rupert Smith was able to reinforce and redeploy UNPR

thus removing the main obstacle to NATO air strikes.1

During the hostage crisis General Janvier rep

restrained General Smith from using force in Bosnia an

Akashi, Janvier wanted to keep UNPROFOR from beco

tool for enforcement action. On the evening of 26 May, 

returned from New York, where he had been to brief the S

Council.111 The next afternoon, at Rupert Smith’s urging, 

216
forces in Sarajevo recaptured an observation post at 

Bridge from BSA soldiers who had taken it earlier in the 

Fighting at the bridge cost the French two dead and 14 wo

the Bosnian Serbs suffered four dead and an unknown n

of lesser casualties.113 The Vrbanja Bridge episode also 

the UN four Bosnian Serb ‘‘POWs,’’ putting the world bod

awkward position.114 As Honig and Both have shown, tw

after the Vrbanja Bridge incident, Janvier issued a polic

tive to General Smith stating: ‘‘The execution of the man

secondary to the security of UN personnel. The intention 

avoid loss of life defending positions for their own sa

unnecessary vulnerability to hostage-taking.’’115 On 2 

General Janvier blocked a request from General Smith to 

road into Sarajevo, noting, ‘‘We must definitely avoid any 

which may degenerate into confrontation, further escal

tension, and [thus] the potential use of air power.’’116 

later, Janvier, Akashi, and Rupert Smith met in the C

coastal town of Split to discuss the RRF that was being 

bled to support UNPROFOR in Bosnia.117 During their m

Smith argued that he did not want the RRF unless he co

it for fighting.118 According to Smith, ‘‘the Serbs want to c

this year and will take every risk to accomplish this,’’ an

designs ‘‘will lead to a further squeezing of Sarajevo or an 

on the eastern enclaves, creating a crisis that short of air 

we will have difficulty responding to.’’119 Janvier and Aka

agreed, doubting Smith’s analysis of Serb intention

explaining the need to return to traditional peacekee

When the meeting ended, Akashi informed the press t

arrival of the RRF would not alter UNPROFOR’s peace

mission.121 Later that day, Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter 

Security Council confirming that the RRF ‘‘would operat

the existing UN rules of engagement.’’122 Clearly, Ruper

did not enjoy support from Zagreb or New York in his e

clear the way for stronger action in Bosnia.

F-16 Downing and Hostage Deals

Hostage-taking was, as Gow has argued, the Bosnian 

primary tool for countering Western coercion.123 With G

Smith working successfully to remove this option, th

217
needed to find a new way to exploit international politic

sions and to stymie American intervention. In retrosp

downing of an American aircraft over Bosnia may have b

attempt by the Bosnian Serbs to net a US pilot to help f

more forceful intervention by the international commun

Following the Pale air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs decl

agreements with the UN void and, as with earlier NA

attacks, the Bosnian Serbs also threatened to shoo

NATO aircraft.124 A few days later, on 2 June 1995, a B

Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile system shot down 

Force Capt Scott O’Grady, who was flying an F-16 over 

on a no-fly zone patrol.125 The Serbs were thought 

intentionally targeted a US aircraft.126 In what was la

ognized as a ‘‘trap,’’ the Serbs had moved a mobile SA

the known SAM sites to a position 40 kilometers s

Banja Luka airfield and were flying military jets from 

near the border with Bosnia.127 As Admiral Smith reca

When Scott O’Grady got shot down, we were . . . trying to shoot 

[a Serb] airplane as he came slipping across the border [from C

to Bosnia]. We were hoping he’d come across the border, but the

flying these feints. You know in retrospect it looks like what they 

just set us up, and I should have been smarter—I mean I shoul

seen that. . . . They were setting up a trap. But as you go dow

path, it doesn’t look that way.128

NATO commanders had gradually relaxed the requir

put in place at the end of 1994 for all flights over Bosn

escorted by SEAD aircraft. The escorted packages of 

gradually gave way to unescorted flights relying on loos

tection from specialized SEAD aircraft operating ind

ently over Bosnia instead of being dedicated to protect 

missions.129 Eventually, commanders in AFSOUTH 

flights into Bosnia without any SEAD protection, so 

the aircraft remained outside of the range of know

sites.130

O’Grady’s flight, call-sign BASHER 51, purposely 

Serb SAM coverage.131 The flight lead demonstrated 

measure of complacency by continuing to orbit over 

western Bosnia after he was momentarily illuminated 

SA-6 tracking radar.132 However, given the rules of enga

218
for Deny Flight and the prohibition against preemptive

inating such threats, it was not uncommon for NATO 

to continue their missions after being locked onto b

radar.133 This was precisely the environment Genera

and Admiral Smith had hoped to avoid when they m

eliminate the SAM threat in late 1994, but British and 

reluctance and the dual-key control over NATO airpow

cluded such proactive steps.134 When O’Grady was lock

by the SA-6’s radar, he blindly took evasive maneuve

within a few seconds, the second of two missiles Serb 

fired at him split his aircraft in two.135 The BSA forces 

ing the SA-6 battery were able to take the shots, wi

warning to O’Grady, by drawing on radar information fr

wider integrated air defense network rather than usin

own radar.136 With hundreds of UN hostages—some 

used as human shields—the Bosnian Serbs could be fa

tain that the downing of a US aircraft would not lead 

immediate retaliatory action.

O’Grady’s downing complicated the release of t

hostages taken after the Pale raids and indicated t

Bosnian Serbs may have been trying to capture an Am

pilot. On 2 June the Bosnian Serbs began releasing s

the 377 hostages taken following the raids on Pale, b

began taking additional peacekeepers hostage.137 On

dred twenty-one hostages were freed that day, but 61 

were taken.138 Though Milosevic was credited with he

win the release of UNPROFOR troops, Gow has suggest

General Smith was confident that the Bosnian Serbs 

release the hostages unharmed.139 Whatever Smith’s c

tions, the downing of an American combat aircraft 

renewed pressure from the United States for air 

against the Serb SAM sites.140 Furthermore, any atte

rescue O’Grady threatened to lead to an escalating use 

in Bosnia, especially if one of the rescue aircraft we

down. General Joulwan recalled French anxieties o

F-16 downing,

The French were very concerned that we would mount a res

O’Grady. In fact, I was having a dinner the night O’Grady wa

down. Willy Claes was coming to the dinner. . . . And we already 

219
very extensive search ongoing. And Willy came to dinner that nig

said: “You know the French are concerned that any rescue a

may interfere with their hostage negotiations.” And I said: “Will

is a NATO pilot. We’re going to find him. And I’m going to use 

thing at my disposal to find him.”141

This exchange illustrated a central feature of hostage ta

Bosnia: matters were quickly taken out of military han

worked at the political level. Though the French could n

American generals in NATO from taking action, they cou

tainly give instructions to the French generals working 

UN in the former Yugoslavia.

Even before O’Grady’s fate was known, General 

sought assurances against air strikes in exchange for 

hostages.142 Within two days of the downing, the UN r

that Mladic wanted to meet with General Janvier; Mla

refusing to discuss the hostages until he was given gua

his forces would not come under further air attacks.14

O’Grady was rescued on 8 June, the Bosnian Serbs st

more than 140 UN soldiers hostage.144 Within a week 

rescue, leaders in Pale claimed Serbia’s President M

had secured international guarantees against further 

air strikes.145 Allegations of a secret deal with the Fr

block NATO air strikes arose soon after the last hostag

freed on 18 June,146 and General Janvier’s delay in au

ing close air support for Dutch peacekeepers when Sre

fell in July seemed to lend credence to the charge.147 

end of May, Janvier’s predecessor, General de Lapres

dispatched by the French government to negotiate the 

of the hostages, and he later confirmed that Mladic p

him for guarantees against NATO air strikes.148 But the 

UN commander said he told Mladic that the Bosnian 

would have to discuss that with Janvier and Ak

General de Lapresle recalled that while he was trying 

back the French soldiers, ‘‘Janvier was simultaneou

course, involved in the process of trying to obtain the 

of these hostages, and so, I expect, were a lot of other 

Churkin . . . and many others.’’150 But the problem 

Bosnian Serbs, according to de Lapresle, was that they 

know who could reliably deliver on the promise the

220
seeking.151 General Janvier has denied being involved 

negotiations over the hostages, which seems surpri

However, as other researchers have argued, even if 

was involved in negotiating the release of the hostag

principal deal-making over the French hostages was g

at a higher level, between Presidents Chirac and Milos

Given the Bosnian Serb claims about international gua

to President Milosevic, the most likely explanation is o

gested by David Rohde: ‘‘Milosevic, desperate to curr

with the West and free the hostages, may have lied a

the Bosnian Serbs he received a verbal assurance when 

not.’’154 Whether General Janvier played a role in hel

strike a deal for the release of the French hostages r

unknown. However, if Janvier gave Mladic any assu

against air strikes, he was probably acting under p

instructions.

Apparently, the Bosnian Serbs also wanted to strike 

with the United States over O’Grady. Immediately fo

the downing of O’Grady’s F-16, the Serbs claimed to ha

tured him, only to state a few days later that they had 

Then, on 7 June, one of Mladic’s confidants, working t

a humanitarian organization, managed to contact Col 

Wald, the American wing commander at Aviano Air B

Italy.156 The man claimed the Bosnian Serbs ‘‘were w

release the pilot, unharmed, in exchange for a secret 

communication to the US.’’157 A pilot from O’Grady’s sq

was sent with Air Force special agents and Italian inte

officers to meet Mladic’s representative in the coastal 

Trieste, bordering Slovenia.158 After negotiating throu

night and into the morning, one of the agents received w

cellular phone that O’Grady had been rescued.1

Americans abruptly walked out on the Serb, leaving 

authorities to do as they liked with him.160 Possible e

tions for the Bosnian Serb ruse are (1) they wan

Americans to give up the search for O’Grady so that M

men could find him, or (2) they suspected he was dead 

and would not be found soon, thus giving them a ch

extract guarantees against further air strikes by exploi

uncertainty over the fate of O’Grady.

221
The downing of O

Gradys jet indicated that the B

Serbs may have been trying to capture an American 

order to neutralize the primary force behind NA

strikes—the United States. Netting a US airman held 

advantages over taking UN soldiers hostage. It was 

Bosnian Serbs’ interest to keep the UN in Bosnia,161 a

ing its peacekeepers hostage could only dampen the e

asm of troop-contributing nations and the UN secreta

continuing UNPROFOR’s mission. By 1995, the BSA w

weary and outnumbered.162 Its adversaries were g

stronger with outside help.163 Belgrade was less ab

arguably less willing—to offer assistance to the B

Serbs.164 The best hope for the Serbs was to use the U

to hang on to their territorial gains, much as they had 

Croatia prior to losing Western Slavonia. If war were to 

UNPROFOR could be pushed aside where necessary, 

could be used to block NATO air strikes—either throu

self-deterrence and the dual key, or through more 

taking. If the UN pulled out, the dual key and the p

hostages would be gone. By the spring of 1995, it loo

though UNPROFOR might be withdrawn from Bosni

removing the dual key and the potential hostages. Mo

the Clinton administration was under pressure from C

to act unilaterally.165 The Bosnian Serbs may have re

they needed a US pilot as a hostage to continue to ne

the threat of air strikes.

There is not enough evidence to reach a definite con

about whether the shootdown of O’Grady was a preme

attempt to capture an American airman or just an act 

bution for the Pale air strikes.166 The bid to open a sec

of communication through the US Air Force wing at 

however, suggests the Bosnian Serbs were trying to 

deal with the United States. Because the downing 

American jet held the potential to evoke more of the air 

the Serbs were trying to avoid, retribution would seem 

been an insufficient motive for setting what appears 

been a baited trap. The Serbs were probably trying to 

an American pilot or drive a wedge between the United 

222
and its allies by provoking the United States while sh

themselves behind UN hostages.

Kicking the Problem Back Upstairs

The F-16 downing forced political authorities in the 

States and NATO to recognize the threat posed by the B

Serb air defense system, and, in the process, it paved t

for the execution of air operations planned in AFS

Disagreement between the US, Britain, and France o

best strategy for Bosnia had been one of the principa

nesses of international efforts to intervene in the 

Yugoslavia.

These unresolved political disputes had been passe

to military proxies in AFSOUTH and UNPF, but the m

efforts to work out a solution had failed. The shooting d

O’Grady helped to kick the problem back upstairs w

could get resolved. Because the shootdown failed to 

hostage, there was no US inhibition to counter the in

frustration American political authorities felt over the 

the F-16.167 General Ryan was ready with the Dead E

and a plan for a wider air campaign—Deliberate Force

same time, Admiral Smith forced political authorities in 

to confront the need to eliminate the Bosnian Serb air 

threat by refusing to send aircraft over Bosnia withou

SEAD escorts. These restrictions made it impossible fo

to enforce the no-fly zone or the heavy weapons ex

zones, leading NATO to reassess its Deny Flight operat

US Response to the F-16 Downing

O’Grady’s downing added to the factors impelli

Clinton administration to take a leading role in the B

while simultaneously highlighting the risks American 

faced because of the dual key. At a time when the 199

idential race was starting to heat up, the shooting do

subsequent rescue of O’Grady aroused American publi

est in Bosnia more than any event before it.168 Under 

tic political pressure, the administration backed awa

hints made by the president at the end of May that the 

223
States might send ground troops to help UN forces in 

regroup and reestablish their credibility.169 Though Am

public opinion militated against sending US ground fo

Bosnia, the administration had promised to provide 

soldiers to assist in a NATO withdrawal of UNPR

Leading administration officials believed breaking tha

ise might break the alliance.170 Thus, from a US poli

spective, UNPROFOR had to be made to work, at least 

solution could be found for Bosnia. In the meantime, a

was the only acceptable US military contribution to th

tion. On 6 June, President Clinton’s top national securi

sors gathered at the first in a series of meetings that 

nated in a new administration policy for the Balkans.1

The shooting down of O’Grady also demonstrated to 

other NATO political authorities the sophisticated na

the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system and th

to their airmen over Bosnia, thus adding political sup

military demands to neutralize the air defenses.172 Th

always been a risk to NATO aircrews over Bosnia, and 

increased significantly in late 1994 when the Serbs 

more active at employing their radar-guided SAMs. H

the senior commanders in AFSOUTH had to contend w

distinct lack of appreciation for these risks. The down

state-of-the-art fighter with its American pilot chang

perception in the United States that airpower was a r

option; as General Ryan noted,

We were using force in Bosnia on the air side, and putting peo

risk on the air side, which for some strange reason isn’t cons

putting Americans at risk. It’s only Americans at risk when yo

them on the ground. The stark reality of that was [revealed] 

O’Grady got shot down, and suddenly we have this hue and cry 

in the United States.173

As the facts surrounding the downing emerged, it did n

long for politicians in the US to recognize the risks. Sen

Warner, then second ranking Republican on the Senate 

Services Committee, was the first to question Pentag

cials who had been sent to brief the committee on the 

ing of the F-16. He got straight to the point: ‘‘We are st

jecting our airmen to some measure of risk . . . thrust u

224
by virtue of the UN decision as they balance the risk to 

men against the risk to the ground forces.’’174 The 

wanted to know, ‘‘Why do not the American commande

Well by God, we are not going to put our American air

risk?’’175 When the briefers explained that there were n

free military operations and that technically the NATO 

were not combatants in Bosnia, Warner retorted: ‘‘You 

a combatant, but you are taking combatant consequen

I just do not know how our commander in chief, the pre

and others in authority can continue to submit these 

the aircraft to risks because of a policy decision by the 

Nations.’’176

The downing of O’Grady’s jet was a reveille for Wash

and America’s newfound attention to Bosnia opened th

gates for US resources to the CAOC.177 It strengthen

case of those arguing for preemptive attacks against B

Serb air defenses in the event of any air campaign aga

BSA, and it helped ensure General Ryan would get the 

ment he needed to prosecute air attacks against both 

defenses and the BSA.178 As General Ryan recalled,

O’Grady going down caused an uproar and a substantial incre

the help we were getting. It was very difficult to get funding f

CAOC . . . and after O’Grady went down, we got all kinds of hel

CAOC Director, Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, was later aske

UN hostage crisis was a contributing factor to the sud

interest in Bosnia; his tongue-in-cheek response was 

hostage crisis? It was Scott O’Grady.’’180 According to Ho

We had requirements identified long before Scott O’Grady go

down, but everybody thinks that we only started wondering 

where we were going to go in the CAOC on the 2d of June. That 

true. That is when Washington started caring.181

Generals Ryan and Hornburg invited a Pentagon team 

uate the CAOC and to recommend any changes or ad

equipment needed to modernize it.182 The CAOC expand

nificantly before the end of August with an influx of Am

personnel and computer hardware and software for ma

an air campaign.183

225
In addition, General Ryan began to gain a reputation 

Pentagon for issuing short-term requests for limited

demand aircraft such as KC-10 tankers and electronic 

aircraft, and then holding onto them long past the tim

ered by his requests.184 In another step in the pro

preparing for air action in Bosnia, USAFE established 

command at Aviano Air Base in Italy on 1 July: the 

Wing (Provisional). According to USAFE historians, ‘‘T

pose of the action was to bring all aircraft supportin

Flight at the base under a single chain of command.

Chuck Wald, commander of the 31st Fighter Wing 

nently based at Aviano, commanded the new organiza

The move enhanced America’s ability to employ its airp

the region, whether it intended to act unilaterally or in 

with its NATO allies.

Because General Ryan had ordered air campaign p

months earlier, he had something to offer US political 

ities when the need to settle matters in Bosnia came to 

in June 1995. The week of the Pale air strikes, a team 

Air Force officers from the ‘‘Checkmate’’ division 

Pentagon visited Italy to analyze Colonel Zoerb’s plans 

operations in Bosnia187—hereafter referred to 

Deliberate Force plan.188 Although General Ryan b

Deliberate Force would be needed, he and Admiral Smi

not ready to share the details of the plan with other 

members.189 As General Ryan later recalled,

I briefed it to [General] Shali[kashvili] on the US side, and I bri

to the national security advisor. So, on the US side they were 

familiar with what we were doing, what we were planning. We d

take it around to [the other NATO] capitals.190

Deliberate Force aimed at an objective not all NATO c

were willing to endorse: ‘‘[To] adversely alter BSA advan

conduct military operations against the BiH [i.e., the B

government army].’’191 The Deliberate Force plan also t

the entire Bosnian Serb air defense system as well a

command and control facilities so it overlapped with th

Eye plan.192 Throughout June General Ryan and his st

tinued to refine both plans and the lists of associated 

that went with them.193 General Hornburg invited Co

226
Deptula to come to Vicenza to teach the CAOC sta

Deptula had learned through experience as one of the 

pal ‘‘Black Hole’’ planners for the air campaign in 

Storm.194 Though the date on which General Ryan brie

plan for Deliberate Force to US political authorities is u

evidence suggests the briefing took place sometime in J

early July.195 Broader allied participation in the plann

integration of the air plans with the RRF’s ground sch

action did not begin until late July when NATO wa

united in its approach to Bosnia.196 If General Ry

delayed planning until the North Atlantic Council 

specifically directed it, he would not have had a viable a

paign plan to offer US political authorities when they su

felt compelled to come up with a new policy on Bosnia

NATO Response to the F-16 Downing

While General Ryan worked on the plans, Admira

forced political authorities in NATO to confront the i

tions of the SAM threat; however, doing so strained h

tions with some of his superiors. After the down

O’Grady’s F-16, NATO’s Deny Flight mission took a cle

seat to the safety of forces in the region.197 All practice a

port to UNPROFOR stopped, and combat air patrols to 

the no-fly zone were shifted south from Bosnian airs

the skies above the Adriatic.198 The UN abandoned the w

control regime, and, without UN cooperation, NATO ce

be able to enforce the exclusion zones around th

areas.199 Only essential missions were flown over Bosn

these required heavy SEAD escorts.200 Despite RAF p

Admiral Smith refused to permit British F-3 Tornado 

to fly over Bosnia because he deemed their electronic c

measures equipment inadequate.201 The Dutch min

defense recalled to Holland six of its 18 F-16s supportin

Flight.202 Meanwhile, in a historic move, Germany’s 

ment voted to deploy 16 jets to the southern region, in

eight Tornado aircraft specially equipped for dealing w

face-to-air threats.203 Thus, with help from Admiral Sm

downing of O’Grady’s jet focused the attention of 

227
European political authorities on the air defense th

Bosnia.

Notwithstanding pressures from Brussels for more 

sive policing of the no-fly zone, Admiral Smith refused 

NATO aircrews at risk, forcing NATO to reevaluate th

Flight mission. With Deny Flight operations greatly cu

the Serbs began flying military jets from Banja Luka air

northern Bosnia—perhaps baiting NATO for anothe

trap.204 Admiral Smith recalled General Joulwan’s pres

more intensive air patrols over Bosnia to enforce the 

zone, but Smith refused:

They had SAM sites up there, and we knew we couldn’t take the

and I just said: “I’m not going to put our pilots in danger.” I mean

that in Vietnam. I trolled around trying to get SAM sites to shoo

so that we could knock them down—that’s dumb. And these we

unsophisticated missiles. So I just told George: “We’ve got to c

the way we’re doing business.” They had complete radar coverag

They knew exactly what we were doing . . . I told my boss: “You t

not to do anything stupid, [well] . . . I’m not going to troll for m

up there. I’m not going to do it. Period. They can fly airplanes 

Banja Luka all they want to.205

The AFSOUTH commander saw three options open to 

(1) let the Serbs fly; (2) destroy the Serb SAM threat a

patrols back over Bosnia; or (3) conduct an air strike 

Banja Luka.206 Despite NATO policy requiring its comm

to coordinate closely with their UN counterparts, A

Smith remembered being reprimanded for writing to G

Janvier suggesting air strikes at Banja Luka: ‘‘W

firestorm that was . . . I had to go up to Brussels and s

little time with the secretary-general while he told m

was out of my box. So you’re damned if you do, and d

if you don’t.’’207 The NATO Secretary-General, Willy 

probably wanted to avoid a rerun of the impotent 

Udbina, which occurred in the first month of Claes’s te

NATO. With backing from Mr. Akashi, General Janv

predictably refused the request anyway, so NATO was d

two options: let the Serbs fly, or destroy the SAM threat

Janvier and Akashi were still trying to revive the UN’

bund peacekeeping mission and to reestablish ties w

Bosnian Serbs; they were not about to let NATO go a

228
Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system.209 With 

unwilling to make use of NATO airpower, and NATO

commander in the region refusing to put aircrews at in

risk to enforce the no-fly zone, NATO was forced to con

complete reassessment of Deny Flight operations.210

Admiral Smith believed his expertise and his respon

as a commander obligated him to stand firm when it c

decisions over how to conduct air operations in Bo

Furthermore, he was willing to accept the backlash tha

from standing up to the people above him in both the 

NATO chains of command. The AFSOUTH command

averred,

I knew more about air strikes and air operations than anybody 

me, and I figured if they didn’t like what I was doing, then they 

just remove me, and that was just fine with me. It’s real easy 

that when you have absolutely no promotion potential, but I wa

pared to be fired on a lot of issues. One of them was trolling in 

sites.212

Admiral Smith recognized that General Janvier was th

ported commander, and without the permission of 

counterpart, Admiral Smith could not eliminate th

threat. As Smith saw it:

Western militaries are obligated to follow the political guidance o

masters. They had very clear guidance. I had sort of fuzzy guida

was getting pushed to do more, do more, do more. And yet, I co

do it without the permission of the ground commander, so I wa

of caught between a rock and a hard place.213

Admiral Smith could have easily ordered a resumptio

operations over Bosnia that entailed greater risks to NA

crews, but instead, he stood his ground. As a result, th

lems created by the SAM threat and the dual-key contr

the proper defense for aircrews were kicked back ups

the political level.

The viability of enforcing the no-fly zone was in qu

and NATO political authorities in Brussels tasked the

tary staff to come up with options for the future conti

of the flight ban over Bosnia. The military com

responded by presenting six options ranging from doin

ing, that is, abandoning the no-fly zone, to attacks tha

229
neutralize the Bosnian Serb air defenses.214 Furtherm

military authorities in Brussels supported Admiral S

his decision to control the risks to alliance aircrews b

ing the no-fly zone patrols to the airspace over the Adr

Back in the United States, the undersecretary of defe

policy, in a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Com

said of the NATO commanders: ‘‘If they at any point 

determination that they think the risk to American o

NATO flyers is unacceptable, we will fully back them in 

standing down the operation or modifying it to a level th

find is acceptable.’’216 Though some NATO officials w

pleased about the disruption of the no-fly zone, appare

one was willing to accept the responsibility for ove

Admiral Smith. Until the end of August when Op

Deliberate Force began, NATO air operations over 

remained severely curtailed because of the SAM th

However, the downing of O’Grady’s jet and Admiral 

restrictions moved NATO political authorities to accep

liberal ROE for SEAD, including preemptive attacks 

early warning radar in the event future air strikes were 

to defend the safe areas.218

Conclusion

During the first half of 1995, theater-level comman

the UN and NATO laid the groundwork for more eff

using airpower in Bosnia. However, the strongest advoc

enforcement were not at the top of the theater chains 

mand for either the UN or NATO. They were one level d

the level of their principal subordinate comman

Generals Rupert Smith and Mike Ryan. This represen

real shift in General Ryan’s attitude, but it was a 

change for the UN command in Bosnia. Absent clear 

direction, the commanders at the top of each chain, G

Janvier and Admiral Smith, refused to take greater r

accomplish the enforcement elements of their respecti

sions. General Janvier consistently acted so as to m

short-term risks to UN forces and to move the mis

Bosnia toward peacekeeping. He did this through 

restricting Gen Rupert Smith’s initiative on the ground 

230
refusing to turn the UN key for air strikes, whether th

urged by NATO or by General Smith.

Likewise, Admiral Smith refused to accept greate

without clearer political direction. However, unlike J

Admiral Smith’s mission was primarily one of enforc

and his efforts to minimize the short-term risks to his 

pushed NATO toward forceful action. Admiral Smith’s 

to expose NATO aircrews to the SAM threat in Bosnia 

important factor in forcing political authorities in NATO 

squarely the dilemma posed by the dual-key contro

SEAD strikes. If the Bosnian Serbs were attempting to 

an American pilot, then the AFSOUTH commander’s co

tion may have been more important than previously 

nized. However, Admiral Smith did not seem to have th

cific possibility in mind. He was, instead, trying to b

force protection and mission accomplishment, and he 

to put NATO airmen at an increased risk just to k

appearances in the no-fly zone. This eventually helped 

the dual key problem back upstairs where it could get re

By his own account, Admiral Smith felt that his expert

responsibility demand that he take a strong stand and 

the consequences of displeasing his superiors.

One level below the theater commanders, the princip

ordinate commanders, Generals Rupert Smith and Mik

were stronger advocates of enforcement. To push enforc

Mike Ryan and Rupert Smith were willing to take 

risks—especially General Smith—and in so doing they 

to shape events as they unfolded. General Ryan was 

tent in pressing for enforcement action in the no-fly zo

Bosnia. His initiative to use American officers assig

NATO for air campaign planning, rather than officers fr

US Sixteenth Air Force, might have raised the ire o

NATO nations. Though he might have been told to stop

was little serious risk associated with the pla

Conversely, sending no-fly zone patrols over northern 

without SEAD escort right after the bombing of Pale wa

This may have been intended to draw ineffective fir

older, long-range SA-2s and SA-3s operating from well

fixed sites. NATO fighters could more easily defeat thos

231
SAM systems. General Ryan would then have had grou

press the UN for SEAD strikes. There is, however, no e

for or against that hypothesis. If O’Grady had been ca

or killed, or if another airplane had been shot down, it 

possible that Admiral Smith would have asked for a 

component commander. Though the shooting down of C

O’Grady had a significant impact on the future use of a

in Bosnia, it is difficult to credit that to General Ryan

there is no evidence he intentionally exposed O’Grady 

threat. Indeed, it was Ryan’s effort to make Deny Flig

for his pilots and to make it succeed rather than lett

mission fail, that inadvertently led to the downing. G

Ryan’s main influence during this period, then, was t

the air campaign planning that became an important e

in the US government’s policy for Bosnia.

Gen Rupert Smith did the most to clear the way 

effective use of force in Bosnia, including airpow

UNPROFOR commander took a big risk in order to e

facade that the UN and NATO were okay just m

through in Bosnia. The UN hostage crisis after the P

strikes proved what others had argued about the no

nature of UNPROFOR’s bifurcated mandate for enfor

and peacekeeping. Though he raised the short-term r

his forces by precipitating the hostage crisis, he undo

lowered the longer-term risks of perpetuating UNPR

untenable peacekeeping mission in a land where there 

peace. The UNPROFOR commander was also taking ris

his own career, for if the Bosnian Serbs had killed 

hostages, General Smith very well might have been re

Janvier and Akashi would have been vindicated in 

against the use of force and would have been in a s

position to push for the UN’s preferred option of peacek

without enforcement. General Smith did not succeed 

in removing the Bosnian Serbs’ primary counterc

weapon: hostages. However, he prepared the ground so 

could succeed later. The Bosnian Serbs would get to p

hostage card one more time, at Srebrenica in early Jul

that, the importance of General Ryan’s air campaign p

would come into play. With the exception of General J

232
the theater-level commanders in NATO and the UN we

ing actors in the move toward effective employment 

power in Bosnia.

Notes

1. For evidence of General Smith’s role in precipitating the host

in order to reinforce UNPROFOR and move the UN mission in Bosn

enforcement action, see James Gow, Triumph of the Lack 

International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: C

University Press, 1997), 267–70; and Jan Willem Honig and Norb

Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 

2. Brig Gen Victor E. Renuart, USAF, interviewed by author, 

1998, Spangdahlem, Germany, transcript of taped interview, auth

sonal collection; and Brig Gen Charles F. Wald, USAF, chief of pla

(June–November 1994), commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano 

(AB), Italy (May 1995–June 1997), interviewed by author, 7 M

Aviano AB, Italy, tape recording, author’s personal collection.

3. Renuart interview; and Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF, in

by Maj Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, 16 October 1995, 

Italy, transcript of tape recording, Balkans Air Campaign Stud

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell 

Base (AFB), Alabama.

4. Renuart interview; and ‘‘B-H SEAD Campaign,’’ NATO CAOC 

of B-H Enemy Air Defenses, c. mid-December 1994, File B3d-

Collection.

5. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF, interviewed by author, 

1998, tape recording of telephone interview, author’s personal c

Renuart interview; and Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny 

Operations Center, Naples, Italy, January 1994–May 1996, interv

author, 27 May 1998, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, author’s notes, 

personal collection.

6. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, commander, Allied Air Forces S

Europe and commander, US Sixteenth Air Force, September 19

1996, interviewed by author, 6 June 1997, Ramstein AB, Germa

script of taped interview, author’s personal collection; Col Daniel 

interviewed by author, 30 April 1997, Spangdahlem AB, Germa

script of tape recording, author’s personal collection; Hornburg int

Reagan and Thompson; Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., USAF, AFSOUTH 

cer, February 1993–1996, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, 6 D

1995, Naples, Italy, transcript of taped interview, BACS Collect

Renuart. The targeting scheme for Colonel Zoerb’s air campaign 

married to a planning document called Deliberate Force some tim

May or early June of 1995.

7. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny Flight Air O

Center, Naples, Italy, January 1994–May 1996, interviewed by au

233
April 1997, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, transcript of tape recording

personal collection.

8. Ibid.; and Ryan interview.

9. Ryan interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

10. Ryan interview.

11. Ibid.; Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; and Military Official Y

12. Ryan interview.

13. Ibid.; Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, “NATO Air Operations in 

Herzegovina: ‘Deliberate Force,’” 29 August–14 September 1995. T

of briefing to Air Power Conference, London, 13 September 19

Renuart interview.

14. Ibid.; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

15. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan interv

Hornburg interview by Reagan and Thompson.

16. Ryan interview.

17. Ibid.

18. Military Official Y; and Renuart interview.

19. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan interview; a

interview, 29 April 1997.

20. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Wald interview; 

interview; Col Robert C. Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Eff

Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 2

98, and 101–2.

21. Renuart interview; Hornburg interview by Reagan and Th

Owen, Deliberate Force, 101.

22. Renuart interview; Wald interview; and Owen, Deliberate Force

23. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interviewed by Lt Col Robert O

April 1996, Washington. Unclassified version of General Ashy’s Ora

Interview, (66 pp.) redacted by the AFHRA, October 1997. Office o

Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

24. Lowell Boyd interview.

25. Gen George A. Joulwan, USA, supreme allied commander Eu

October 1993–11 July 1997, interviewed by author, 11 February 199

Boyd interview; and Senate, Current Operations Abroad–Bosnia, 12 

1995, 11–13.

26. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and MOD Official D.

27. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Gen Vincent Lanata

staff of the French air force, 1991–1994, interviewed by author, 8 S

1998, Paris, tape recording, author’s personal collection; and MOD 

D; and Senate, Current Operations Abroad–Bosnia, 12 January 199

28. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998.

29. Lowell Boyd interview.

30. Honig and Both, 158–59 n. 4.

31. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; and Renuart interview.

32. This statement refers to the reinforcement of UNPROFOR 

Rapid Reaction Force after the Pale air strike and the expansion an

234
mentation of plans for a SEAD campaign and a wider air campaign 

O’Grady shootdown and the Srebrenica crisis respectively. 

33. Before leaving Bosnia, Rose’s promotion to four-star gen

already been announced. Some observers viewed the promotion as 

from the British government for a job well done. See Joel Bran

Considered Showing Airstrike Plans to Serbs,’’ Times (London), 

1995, 12; and Jane M. O. Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albio

Policy in Former Yugoslavia (London: Institute for Public Policy R

1997), 46.

34. Nine British soldiers under General Smith’s command were 

‘‘friendly fire’’ from American A-10 aircraft. See Rick Atkinson, Crus

Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Miffli

464; and House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fifth 

Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby [Granby 

British name for Desert Storm], session 1993–1994, 25 May 1994, 

to the Gulf War, General Smith had also been briefed about the pla

campaign by Gen Buster Glosson, USAF, who directed air operat

ran the ‘‘Black Hole’’ planning group. MOD Official G.

35. Robert Fox, ‘‘Gulf Commander Named to Take Over from Ros

Telegraph (London), 10 December 1994, 17.

36. As noted earlier, General Rose’s primary avenue of influe

through the British army, specifically through General Wilsey at W

37. Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, interviewed by author, 12 Janua

Paris, author’s notes, author’s personal collection.

38. Janvier interview.

39. “Three Separate Operations Created on 31 March,’’ UN Chro

no. 2 (June 1995): 23–24.

40. Ibid., 23.

41. Gow, 270–71 n. 9.

42. UN, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolu

(1994)(S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994).

43. Ibid., par. 42.

44. Ibid., pars. 57 and 58.

45. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Orga

‘‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the S

General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 

(A/50/60, S/1995/1, 3 January 1995), pars. 77–79.

46. Ibid., par. 79.

47. Janvier interview; and Honig and Both, 152–53.

48. Honig and Both, 153.

49. UN, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolu

(1995) (S/1995/444, 30 May 1995), pars. 72 and 78–82 (hereafter 

S/1995/444).

50. UN, Letter from the Secretary-General to the Presiden

Security Council, 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94, 28 January 1994

235
51. 

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, pars. 35 and 

S/1995/444, par. 62. The foregoing discussion should not be ta

criticism of the UN secretariat. As others have noted, the Security 

members, especially the permanent members, failed to resolve their 

differences and bequeathed an impossible task to the UN secretari

UNPROFOR (i.e., implementing Resolution 836 to the satisfactio

Security Council members who could not agree on it themselves

instance, Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in 

Yugoslavia, 1991–1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (The Ha

Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1996), 35–37; Richard Capl

Mortem on UNPROFOR, London Defence Studies, no. 33 (London: B

for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1996), 7–9; Honig and Both, 

152–53; and Gow, 136–37.

52. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, interviewed by author, 10 

1998, Arlington, Va., transcript of tape recording, author’s personal c

53. Ibid.

54. ‘‘Three Separate Operations Created on 31 March,’’ UN Chro

no. 2 (June 1995): 25–27.

55. Ibid.; and Facts On File Yearbook 1995 (USA: Facts On F

1995), 36.

56. The United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United 

Peace-keeping, 3d ed. (New York: United Nations Reproduction 

1996), 556; Facts On File 1995, 221; and Honig and Both, 143.

57. This was the first shelling of Gorazde since NATO establ

exclusion zone around the safe area on 23 April 1994. Gorazde wa

again on 11 April 1995. For more on the deteriorating conditions at 

see Royal Welch Fusiliers (RWF), 1st Battalion, White Dragon: T

Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia (Wrexham, UK: RWF Regimental Head

1995), 44–45 and 110.

58. Facts On File 1995, 221.

59. Ibid., 288.

60. Blue Helmets, 549–50; Facts On File 1995, 362–63.

61. Facts On File 1995, 325.

62. Ibid., 362; and Honig and Both, 150–51.

63. Senate, Impact of the Unilateral United States Lifting of t

Embargo, 23 June 1994, 20–21.

64. Ibid., 20.

65. Ibid., 20–22.

66. Ibid., 81.

67. Fox, 17.

68. Lowell Boyd interview; and Joulwan interview, 11 February 1

see Hans-Christian Hagman, “UN-NATO Operational Co-oper

Peacekeeping 1992–1995” (PhD diss., King’s College, University of 

1997), 264 n. 130.

69. Lowell Boyd interview.

236
70. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998. Also see Senate

Operations Abroad–Bosnia, 12 January 1995, 11–13.

71. “UN Stages Bosnia Pullout Drill,” Times (London), 20 Februa

12; Leurdijk, 66; and Facts On File 1995, 131.

72. Shortly before taking up his post in Bosnia, General Smith w

in Washington, apparently meeting with members of the US JCS

Current Operations Abroad–Bosnia, 12 January 1995, 21.

73. For a fuller discussion of General Smith and the events lead

the Pale air strikes in May 1995, see Honig and Both, 141–59; a

265–70.

74. Gow, 267–68.

75. Honig and Both, 141–42.

76. Ibid., 141–57.

77. Gow, 267–68.

78. Honig and Both, 150; and Facts On File 1995, 362.

79. Honig and Both, 151.

80. Ibid., 151–52.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., 152; and Janvier interview.

85. Janvier interview; and S/1995/444, par. 9.

86. ‘‘Fighting Escalates, UN Role in Question,” UN Chronicles 

(September 1995): 31.

87. Ibid.

88. S/1995/444, par. 11; and Janvier interview.

89. Ryan interview; and Renuart interview. Also see Honig a

153–54.

90. Renuart interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

91. Ryan interview.

92. Janvier interview.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Gow, 267–68; and Honig and Both, 149.

96. Ryan interview; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; a

interview, 29 April 1997.

97. ‘‘Fighting Escalates,’’ 31; and Honig and Both, 154.

98. ‘‘Fighting Escalates,’’ 31.

99. Gow, 268.

100. Military Official U; and UN Official A.

101. Indeed, as Gow, Honig and Both, and General Ryan have s

demonstrating the vulnerability of UNPROFOR was General Smith’s i

102. Gow, 267–68; and Gow, ‘‘Coercive Cadences: The Yugosla

Dissolution,’’ in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. L

Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 293.

103. Honig and Both, 155.

237
104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Gow, Triumph, 269–70. Also see Sharp, 51–52.

107. Admiral Smith interview.

108. Blue Helmets, 557.

109. Gow, ‘‘Coercive Cadences,’’ 293; Gow, Triumph, 268; and R

script of Air Power Conference.

110. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Gow, Triumph, 

Gow, ‘‘Coercive Cadences,’’ 293; and Honig and Both, 153–54.

111. Janvier interview.

112. Blue Helmets, 557; ‘‘Fighting Escalates,’’ 31; and Janvier 

David Rohde claimed it was Smith who urged the French comm

Sarajevo to take the action. David Rohde, A Safe Area, Srebrenica: 

Worst Massacre Since the Second World War (London: Pocket Books, 1

113. Janvier interview; and Blue Helmets, 557.

114. Janvier interview.

115. General Janvier, UNPROFOR directive 2/95, 29 May 1995

Honig and Both, 156.

116. Honig and Both, 156.

117. For an abridged account of the meeting based on an int

document, see Rohde, 419–22.

118. Ibid., 420–21.

119. Ibid., 420.

120. Ibid., 420–22.

121. Ibid. On the proposed mission of the RRF, see Leurdijk, 7

122. S/1995/470, 9 June 1995, cited in Leurdijk, 71.

123. Gow, ‘‘Coercive Cadences,’’ 290; and Triumph, 267–69.

124. Michael Lindemann, Bruce Clark, and Laura Silber, ‘‘W

Russia in Bosnia Pact,” Financial Times (London), 30 May 1995, 

O’Grady with Jeff Coplon, Return With Honor (London: Doubleda

13; and Tim Ripley, “NATO Strikes Back,’’ World Airpower Jo

(autumn/winter 1995): 25.

125. O’Grady and Coplon, 10–20.

126. Senate, Briefing on the F-16 Shootdown in Bosnia and 

Operations: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 104

1st Sess., 13 July 1995, 52 (hereafter cited as Senate, Br

Shootdown).

127. Admiral Smith interview; Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 2 

Brig Gen David A. Sawyer, USAF, deputy director, Combined Air O

Center, Vicenza, Italy, interviewed by Maj Tim Reagan and D

Thompson, 11 October 1995, Vicenza, Italy, transcript of tape r

BACS Collection; and Barbara Starr, “Deny Flight Shootdown May P

on the Offensive,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 June 1995, 24.

128. Admiral Smith interview.

129. Sawyer interview; and Zoerb interview, 27 May 1998.

130. Sawyer interview.

238
131. O

Grady and Coplon, 24; and Senate, Briefing on Shootdow

132. Wald interview; and Maj Michael O. Beale, Bombs over Bo

Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air U

Press, 1997), 33.

133. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 54; O’Grady and Coplon, 

Wald interview.

134. Ryan interview; Admiral Smith interview; Wald interv

Military Official U.

135. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 36; and O’Grady and Copl

136. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 36, 45, and 52.

137. Bruce Clark and Laura Silber, ‘‘Bosnian Serbs Release 

Hostages: US Jet Downed as West Looks to Reconsider Military 

Former Yugoslavia,” Financial Times (London), 3 June 1995, 1.

138. Ibid.; and Facts On File 1995, 405.

139. Gow, Triumph, 267. Excerpts from the logbook of the UK’s 

commander in Gorazde could be interpreted as an indication tha

correct. Royal Welch Fusiliers, 50. According to a news report 

Martin, US secretary of defense Perry defended the Pale air strike

‘‘the risks to UN personnel had been taken account of in advance’’ 

words, not Perry’s]. Jurek Martin, ‘‘Clinton Pledge on Role of T

Bosnia,’’ Financial Times (London), 1 June 1995, 2.

140. Bruce Clark, Laura Silber, and Jurek Martin, ‘‘US Jet Sh

over Serb-held Part of Bosnia,” Financial Times (London), 3 June 

George Parker and Bruce Clark, ‘‘Serbs Free 108 UN Hostages,” 

Times (London), 7 June 1995, 1; Barry James, ‘‘U.S. and Allie

Collision Course Over Bosnia Policy,” International Herald Tribun

1995, 5; and Starr, 24.

141. Gen George A. Joulwan, USA, supreme allied commander, E

October 1993–11 July 1997, interviewed by author, 11 Februa

Washington, D.C., transcript of tape recording, author’s personal c

General Joulwan went on to point out that he and Admiral Smith m

as intense an effort to find the two French pilots who were shot do

on 30 August 1995, the first day of Operation Deliberate Force.

142. George Parker and Bruce Clark, ‘‘Hurd Warns over Bosnia 

Financial Times (London), 5 June 1995, 1.

143. Ibid.

144. Parker and Clark, ‘‘Serbs Free 108,’’ 1.

145. Laura Silber, ‘‘Serbs Claim Deal With West over Re

Hostages,’’ Financial Times (London), 14 June 1995, 24.

146. Laura Silber, Harriet Martin, and Bruce Clark, ‘‘Diploma

Stepped Up in Bosnia,” Financial Times (London), 20 June 1995, 2

5; and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), International Securit

1996 (London: RUSI, 1996), 63.

147. For a well-reasoned analysis of Janvier’s role that concl

delays were probably not the result of an explicit deal, see Rohde, 

239
148. Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UNPROFOR force commander, 

1994–28 February 1995, interviewed by author, 13 January 199

transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Janvier interview.

153. Jane Sharp, citing a report based on a 19 June cable from 

to Annan, says the guarantee was made over the course of three ph

between the two presidents on 3, 9, and 11 June 1995. Citing 

sources, David Rohde offers corroborating evidence of the Chirac-

phone calls about the hostages. Sharp, 53; and Rohde, 359–64.

154. Rohde, 364.

155. Facts On File 1995, 405.

156. Maj Paul C. Strickland, USAF, “Trouble In Trieste,” Daeda

winter 1996, 9.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid., 9–10. The pilot, Maj Paul Strickland, was sent to he

mine whether or not the Bosnian Serbs in fact had O’Grady.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid., 12.

161. Senate, Situation in Bosnia: Hearings before the Committee o

Services, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 December 1994, 18.

162. Gen Charles G. Boyd, USAF, ‘‘Making Peace with the Guilty

Affairs 74, no. 5 (September/October 1995): 30–31; and Military Offi

163. General Boyd, 30–31; and Military Official Y.

164. General Boyd, 30–31.

165. Bob Woodward, The Choice: How Clinton Won (New York: 

Schuster, 1996), 263–65.

166. A Pentagon official briefing the Senate Armed Services C

said the Department of Defense study of the shootdown concluded 

act of retaliation for the Pale air strikes. Senate, Briefing on Shootd

167. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 44 and 52.

168. Public opinion polls showed that American public interest i

was never very high. Typically the number of survey respondents 

lowed the war in Bosnia ‘‘very closely’’ hovered around the 10 to 15 

level. American interest peaked at the time of Capt Scott O’Grady

down and rescue, with 24 percent of Americans—about double 

age—claiming to follow events in Bosnia ‘‘very closely.’’ The Pew 

Center for the People & the Press, ‘‘Support for Independent Can

’96 Up Again,’’ transcript of media survey, 24 August 1995. Despit

numbers of Americans claiming to follow the war closely, a Harris 

ducted in June of 1995 found that more than 85 percent of Ameri

‘‘seen, heard, or read’’ something ‘‘about the recent fighting in Bo

the former Yugoslavia.’’ Louis Harris and Associates, ‘‘Public 

Survey, Study no. 951103,’’ June 1995.

240
169. Jurek Martin, 

Protests Force Clinton to Retreat on 

Financial Times (London), 5 June 1995, 2; and Facts On File 1995

170. Woodward, 255–57; and Richard Holbrooke, To End A W

York: Random House, 1998), 65–67.

171. Thomas W. Lippman and Ann Devroy, ‘‘Clinton’s Policy E

June Decision Led to Diplomatic Gamble,” Washington Post, 11 S

1995, A16; and Woodward, 254–55. Note: Woodward’s version con

timing of the increased policy attention but credits the UN hostage 

the catalyst for it.

172. Lord (Field Marshal) Richard Vincent, chairman of NATO’s 

Committee, interviewed by author, 22 September 1998, London, 

notes, author’s personal collection; Senate, Briefing on Shootdown

42–43, and 51–54; and Michael Evans, ‘‘Serb Radar Link-u

Challenge to NATO Pilots,” Times (London), 29 June 1995, 15.

173. Ryan interview.

174. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 42.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., 43.

177. Ryan interview; and Hornburg interview by Reagan and Th

178. Maj Jim Riggins, USAF, chief, Force Application, HQ USA

(CHECKMATE), “Five at ATAF Combined Air Operations Center: 

Organization, and Function, From April 1993,” Draft Edition 2, D

1995 (Vicenza, Italy: History Office, NATO CAOC), 9; Ryan i

Hornburg interview by Reagan and Thompson; Sawyer interv

Renuart interview.

179. Ryan interview.

180. Hornburg interview by Reagan and Thompson.

181. Ibid.

182. Col Robert Owen, USAF, ‘‘The Balkans Air Campaign Study

Airpower Journal 11, no. 2 (summer 1997): 21.

183. Ibid.; Owen, Deliberate Force, 55–56, 97, and 482; and 

9–11 and 41.

184. Brig Gen Walter E. Buchanan, USAF, chief, Joint O

Division, US EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Sta

viewed by author, 26 May 1998, Kalkar, Germany, tape recording, 

personal collection; and Wald interview.

185. Dr. Thomas S. Snyder and Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, USA

of History, USAFE Historical Highlights, 1942–1997: Fifty-fifth An

Edition (Ramstein AB, Germany: Headquarters USAFE, 1997), 182

186. ‘‘USAF Fact Sheet: 4190th Provisional Wing.’’ On 1 Janua

the 7490th Provisional Wing became the 4190th Provisional Wing.

187. Owen, Deliberate Force, 55, 98, and 127 n. 13; and Zoerb i

27 May 1998.

188. Deliberate Force was originally the name of a planning d

that was used in conjunction with a targeting scheme built by Colon

The targeting scheme had previously been simply called ‘‘Air Oper

241
Bosnia

Herzegovina. For the remainder of this study, Colonel Zo

geting scheme is referred to as the Deliberate Force plan, but it wa

official NATO plan akin to OPLAN 40101, ‘‘Deny Flight.’’ To the 

knowledge, there was never an official US plan called Deliberate For

According to the Balkans Air Campaign Study, Colonel Zoerb’s 

‘‘existed in the form of briefing slides and memos only, and was the 

ate precursor to DELIBERATE FORCE.’’ Owen, Deliberate Force, 98

189. Ryan interview; and Admiral Smith interview.

190. Ryan interview.

191. Air Campaign Targeting Briefing, AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy

1995, cited in Owen, Deliberate Force, 285. 

192. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997.

193. Owen, Deliberate Force, 103–5, 285–88.

194. Hornburg interview by Reagan and Thompson; and 

Deliberate Force, 98.

195. The concept of operations for what later became Delibera

had been briefed to General Joulwan during the winter of 19

However, the plan itself was still being refined when O’Grady was sh

Since Deliberate Force seems to have been the basis of 

Shalikashvili’s proposal when he met in London with the British an

chiefs of defense staff on 16 July, the author concludes that Gene

most likely briefed the plan to the US national security advisor in 

early July at the latest.

196. Col David V. Nicholls, Royal Marines, ‘‘Bosnia: UN and NAT

Journal 141, no. 1 (February 1996): 34; and idem, interviewed by 

January 1998, Exmouth, England, tape recording, author’s personal c

197. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 37–38.

198. Ibid.; Hagman, 156–57; Beale, 33–34; and Steve Watkin

Deny Flight Still Work?” Air Force Times, 24 July 1995, 3.

199. Blue Helmets, 557.

200. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 48–49; Hagman, 156–57; 

and Tim Ripley, ‘‘Silence of the SAMS,” Aircraft Illustrated 2

(November 1995): 38.

201. Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten, RAF, commander R

Command, September 1994–July 1997, telephone interview by au

May 1998, London, author’s notes, author’s personal collection.

202. Stacy Sullivan, Michael Evans, and Eve-Ann Prentice, ‘‘NAT

Down ‘No-Fly’ Operation Despite Serb Threat,” Times (London), 

1995, 13.

203. Rick Atkinson, ‘‘Germans Vote to Send Planes and 

International Herald Tribune, 1 July 1995, 1.

204. Admiral Smith interview; and Tim Butcher, ‘‘NATO Req

Bosnia Air Strike,” Daily Telegraph (London), 22 June 1995, 11.

205. Admiral Smith interview.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid.

242
208. Janvier interview; Admiral Smith interview; and Butche

Request,’’ 11.

209. Rohde, 419–21 n. 8; Honig and Both, 155–57; Senate, B

Shootdown, 42–43; Admiral Smith interview; and Janvier interview

210. MCM-KAA-050-95, ‘‘Operation Deny Flight — Viability o

Zone Enforcement,’’ 13 July 1995, File B4-2, BACS Collection; an

‘‘Serb Radar Link-up,’’ 15.

211. Admiral Smith interview.

212. Ibid.

213. Ibid.; and de Lapresle interview, 13 January 1998.

214. MCM-KAA-050-95.

215. Ibid.

216. Walter B. Slocombe, undersecretary of defense for policy

Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 44.

217. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 37; Watkins; Mate Granic, 

minister of foreign affairs, TLS (photocopy), to Yasushi Akashi, Z

August 1995, BACS collection (The letter complains about Serb je

off from Banja Luka to bomb a factory in Croatia); and Boutros 

Ghali, TLS (photocopy), to Willy Claes, Brussels, 15 August 199

Collection (The letter turns down NATO requests to take preempti

against portions of the Serb integrated air defense network in Croa

218. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 58–59.

243
Chapter 8

Srebrenica and the Decisions

to Use Airpower: July–August 199

The problem is not only that the boundaries between pol

strategy, and tactics are rarely clear but that civilian le

ers may insist on the right to control operations because 

their political implications.

—Richard K. Betts—

Soldiers, Statesme

and Cold War Cris

The fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 had a major im

Western governments’ policies toward Bosnia. In add

the Pale hostage crisis and the downing of O’Grady’s F-

loss of the safe area and reports of atrocities afterwards 

UN and NATO to endorse US proposals to use airpo

Bosnia. Srebrenica also reinforced Western concerns 

impotence and the problems inherent in the dual-key c

over NATO airpower. However, as the first section of thi

ter argues, the notion that airpower could have de

Srebrenica was unrealistic, and the blame heaped 

General Janvier for delaying the use of airpower wa

indicative of the hazards of command than of any mis

his part.

After the fall of Srebrenica, the United States faced a d

in pushing to use airpower more forcefully in Bosnia. Act

laterally would have been easier but potentially devast

NATO, the UN, and many bilateral foreign relationship

ever, acting within the existing UN-NATO framework prom

emasculate or even paralyze attempts to use airpower. T

ond part of this chapter shows how theater military com

ers remained caught up in the political struggles over us

power in Bosnia. American commanders in NATO a

UNPROFOR commander, General Smith, willingly pushe

boundaries constraining airpower while General Janvier 

245
be put under political pressure before he veered from tra

UN reluctance to endorse air strikes.

Srebrenica: 6–11 July 1995

The difficulties encountered by the UN and NATO in 

to use airpower effectively at Srebrenica typified man

lems with Deny Flight. First, there was a mismatch b

the capabilities of airpower and the expectations for a

on the part of some of the people involved in the decisio

whether and how to use it. Second, concern for the s

UN soldiers led national political authorities to get 

involved in decisions about using airpower. Third, the

confusion over close air support (CAS) and air strik

fourth, negotiations on other important issues helped t

lyze the UN chain of command. Fifth, the Serbs were 

monitor NATO air operations and apparently time

ground activities so as to avoid air attacks. Lastly, the 

inations after the fall of Srebrenica highlighted the acc

bility inherent in command, even when a commande

the means and authority to fulfill his responsibilities.1

When the Bosnian Serb assault against Srebrenica b

the dark, early hours of 6 July, it followed a familiar pa

Serb ethnic cleansing.2 The apparent random and s

nature of the initial assault made it difficult for the b

of 450 Dutch peacekeepers and the remaining Muslim 

ers to predict the scale of the operation and its ultima

pose.3 Though it would be several days before the Dutc

mander in Srebrenica, Lt Col Ton Karremans, conclud

the Serbs were determined to take the entire safe a

phoned the UNPROFOR chief of staff in Sarajevo, Dut

Gen Cees Nicolais, to discuss the option of calling in NA

power.4 With the attackers’ objectives still unclear and e

UN policy against any action that might lead to an esc

of violence, the two Dutch officers elected to forego a 

for air support.5

At first the UN was self-deterred from calling on ai

both by its policy of avoiding the use of airpower to 

retaliation and by its concerns about disrupting tal

were going on between Carl Bildt and Serbian pr

246
Milosevic over Serb recognition of Bosnia.6 By Saturday e

8 July, the Bosnian Serbs had taken their first Dutch s

as prisoners, and, by the next afternoon, they held 20 

keepers hostage.7 On 9 July, American demands within 

for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs were overrid

the Dutch because, as Honig and Both have reveal

Dutch considered air strikes ‘‘dangerous’’ and ‘‘coun

ductive.’’8

The Fall of Srebrenica: July 1995 

Repeated Serb assaults on Srebrenica led the Dutch 

keepers to finally ask for air support on the mornin

July, but the request was turned down within the UN c

command.9 Despite the UN’s reluctance to call on N

swarm of combat aircraft gathered over the Adriatic.1

another Serb attack developed that evening, the peace

in Srebrenica issued a second request for air support, 

UN battalion submitted a list of approximately 40 

around Srebrenica.11 This time the request made it qu

247

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 

JULY 2 3 4 5 6 7 

BSA assault

begins at

0315 hrs;

Dutch

officers

decide

against air 

request

9 10 11 12 13 14 

Peace- First CAS

keepers request to UN authorizes

ordered reach Zagreb CAS 1210 hrs

into 1930 hrs;

blocking Conditions CAS at 1430

positions, set

2200 hrs for next Dutch MOD

day’s calls

BSA warned approval halt

Figure 2. Six-Day Outline of Attack on Srebrenica. The shad

shows the days Srebrenica was under attack.

6

BSA assault

begins at

0315 hrs;

Dutch

officers

decide

against air 

request

7 

9

Peacekeepers

ordered

into

blocking

positions,

2200 hrs 

BSA warned 

10

First CAS

request to

reach Zagreb

1930 hrs;

Conditions

set for next 

day’s approval

11

UN authorizes

CAS 1210 hrs

CAS at 1430

Dutch MOD

calls halt 
General Janvier, but by the time he consulted his st

Akashi, the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch government, and 

it was after 9:00 P.M., the fighting had died down, and a

port no longer seemed like a useful option.12 Janvier 

that a strong NATO air force be available for the next m

but he stipulated it would be used only for CAS and on

BSA used heavy weapons in their attack.13 Somehow th

sage was misconstrued or misinterpreted, so that th

mander of the besieged peacekeepers expected mas

strikes against the BSA forces surrounding the enclave 

morning of 11 July.14

The next morning, NATO put up a package of approx

60 aircraft, including a dozen attack jets for the forw

controllers in the enclave.15 Below the orbiting air a

General Ryan and Admiral Smith monitored the si

from a specially equipped command and control ship, t

Lassalle.

16 At 10:00 A.M., with clear skies over Srebren

Dutch requested air support, but the anticipated Serb 

had yet to materialize.17 Although the request was for

to General Janvier and Mr. Akashi shortly before 11:0

the situation did not meet the criteria for air support s

by Janvier the night before.18 By 11:00 A.M. the packa

been holding in its orbit over the Adriatic for approx

four hours and had reached the limit of its endurance.

after the package of NATO aircraft began returning to It

final Serb ground assault on Srebrenica began.20 The B

Serbs had evidently been tipped off through their air 

network that the NATO planes were departing and wo

be available to provide air support.21 About an hour a

final assault began and while NATO aircraft were bein

iced in preparation for an afternoon package, General 

signed a ‘‘Blue Sword’’ order authorizing CAS.22

The Serbs moved quickly to take the city, and as the e

Muslim defenders made for the hills in an effort to esc

hopeless situation, the Dutch peacekeepers found the

surrounded, outgunned, and swamped by refugees.23 

peacekeepers had been taken hostage by the BSA in t

days of the assault, but from the outset, every

Srebrenica was a virtual hostage. At around 2:30 P.

248
Dutch F-16s, guided by a Dutch forward air controll

cuted attacks against two tanks just south of the town

next flight into the area was a pair of USAF F-16s, 

pilots failed to find their target—an artillery piece in a 

wooded area.25 Following the attacks on the tanks, th

threatened to kill the peacekeepers they were holding 

and to shell the civilians and soldiers in the enclave un

air attacks ceased.26 With another batch of fighters sch

into the Srebrenica area, the news raced up the 

national chain of command; Defense Minister Vo

phoned directly from The Hague to a Dutch officer at 

air operations center in Vicenza and ordered an imm

end to air operations.27 Left out of the decision-makin

the NATO commanders aboard the Lassalle were cau

surprise.28 General Ryan insisted on going ahead w

attacks, but the forward air controller on the ground h

the demands of the Dutch government and ordered th

aircraft away.29

Within days, Srebrenica was ‘‘ethnically cleansed

Muslim population, and 23,000 more women and c

became refugees of the war. Herded, with methodic

assistance, to the town of Potocari just north of Sreb

the women and children then moved westward, out of B

Serb-held territory, to Kladanj.30 Thousands of me

missing during the cleansing and were presumably k

When the Bosnian Serbs finished with Srebrenica, they 

on to the safe area of Zepa, 12 miles to the southeast.

Expectations and Blame

The fall of Srebrenica demonstrated the unrealistic e

tions of airpower that some people held—participan

observers. On the night before Srebrenica fell, the Dut

talion commander thought massive air strikes woul

Mladic to back off, or make the BSA suffer grave conseq

with ‘‘bombing everywhere.’’32 David Rohde later claimed 

NATO close air support had been used earlier, . . . th

missing might still be alive today.’’33 Neither air strik

close air support would have made that much differ

Srebrenica. Airpower alone could not defend the safe ar

249
senior NATO and UN commanders had been warning si

spring of 1993.34 First, the number of Bosnian Serb s

attacking Srebrenica was at most a few thousand, an

heavy weapons—hidden around the enclave—made 

targets for air strikes.35 Even when they were massed 

attack, the Bosnian Serb forces were hard to find and h

the air, as the problems with CAS on 11 July demons

Second, the BSA had an SA-6 surface-to-air missile ba

eastern Bosnia, so NATO aircrews could safely 

Srebrenica only with SEAD escort.36 That translated in

ited periods of air support by large packages of aircraf

the Bosnian Serbs were able to monitor NATO air ope

they could adjust the timing of their ground operations 

essary and take cover whenever NATO aircraft appro

Third, Dutch peacekeepers and citizens of Srebrenica w

tual hostages from the outset. By the afternoon of 

hours before the first request for airpower reached UN 

in Zagreb, the Bosnian Serbs held 20 Dutch soldiers 

they later threatened to kill when NATO started d

bombs. In summary, there was not much for NATO to 

the conditions for bombing were poor, and the Serbs co

did turn off the bombing by threatening to make things 

Though airpower could have been used sooner and p

more effectively at Srebrenica, it would have been most u

to stop the Bosnian Serbs from taking the enclave. Pr

with airpower and the fall of Srebrenica lay not with th

ness of decisions or any failure in the execution of air s

but in the unrealistic expectation that airpower could 

the enclave.

The attention and blame General Janvier has receive

the fall of Srebrenica highlight the accountability that 

panies command. Honig and Both noted that Janvier w

no-win situation, recognized it, and tried to raise the a

So Janvier was not guilty of failing to see the da

Srebrenica. But rather than credit Janvier with fo

David Rohde concluded,

Whether Janvier was cynical or misguided, he is more respo

than any other individual for the fall of Srebrenica. The restrictio

the use of airpower that he actively endorsed and his decision 

250
approve close air support on Monday, July 10, had disa

results.38

As Honig and Both have pointed out, ‘‘General Janvier, 

ticular, has unjustly been much maligned. He is often 

for losing Srebrenica because he did not authorize mas

strikes.’’39 Though they disagreed about whether t

Janvier, neither Rohde nor Honig and Both made men

any civilian policy maker singled out in the manner in 

Janvier was. General Smith was away on leave during 

of Srebrenica, so he largely escaped any blame.40 G

Janvier inherited the problems associated with Sreb

Like his predecessors, he lacked control over the forces 

his command; he could neither remove the Dutch pea

ers nor reinforce them. Nor could he order air strikes w

higher UN approval, and, in this case, without Dutch n

approval. An alternative evaluation of Janvier’s role, o

to the one offered by Rohde, is that Janvier believed h

not stop the fall of Srebrenica, and he saw no point in 

endangering the Dutch peacekeepers or the peo

Srebrenica by authorizing air attacks against the B

Serbs. General Briquemont had previously quit as 

commander in Bosnia rather than persist in a situation 

he lacked the means and authority to fulfill the respo

ties for accomplishing his mission and protecting his f

And as Briquemont had noted, the clear accountabil

goes with command explains to a large extent why g

and not policy makers have been called to The Ha

answer questions about war crimes. The focus on Janvi

Srebrenica has illustrated one of Briquemont’s princip

cerns during his tenure in Bosnia: Commanders are l

be held accountable even when they are not given the 

fulfill their responsibilities.

The London Conference

and the Decisions to Use Airpower

Stung by the debacle at Srebrenica and their own i

to take effective action in the face of Serb audacity, W

governments decided to meet at a conference in Londo

251
July to consider future options for Bosnia. From Sreb

Mladic’s forces moved on to take the safe area of Zepa

was smaller and less well defended than Srebrenica

would make Gorazde, with its battalion of British soldi

last of the safe areas in eastern Bosnia and the next lik

get for ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serbs.43 In adv

the London Conference, the uniformed chiefs of defen

the United States, the United Kingdom, and France me

British capital to discuss military options for halting M

forces.44 At the meeting, General Shalikashvili reitera

calls for air strikes and briefed a three-phased air ca

plan.45 France’s Adm Jacques Lanxade put forward 

options for reinforcing Gorazde with some or all of th

new RRF.46 The British did not have a plan of their o

tentatively backed the American option for air strikes w

stipulation that strikes take place only after British 

were mostly out of harm’s way—British soldiers in G

were scheduled to leave at the end of August.47

The London Conference was partially successful as 

sensus-building exercise, and it demonstrated con

attempts by the United States, Britain, and France t

influence through their military commanders. When t

ferees met in London, at least one of them—Field Mars

Richard Vincent, chairman of NATO’s Military Comm

could perceive no overall purpose for the gathering; h

he noted that there were numerous bilateral meeting

on behind the scenes.48 At the end of the London Conf

Britain and the United States agreed, in general, to u

power to prevent the fall of Gorazde.49 France was skep

the plan, and the Russian delegate refused to sanct

option for a stronger use of NATO airpower.50 Even the 

US agreement was an uneasy compromise. The 

insisted on retaining the dual-key arrangement that g

UN veto power over any air strikes proposed by the Am

dominated NATO chain of command.51 General Shalikash

US secretary of defense Perry reportedly urged eliminat

dual-key controls on airpower altogether.52 Throug

compromise in London, the British and Americans ten

agreed to remove UN civilians from the air strike de

252
making process by delegating the UN key to Gen 

Smith. This, however, bypassed the senior French 

General Janvier.53 On the NATO side, General Ryan 

hold the key for air strikes. As General Ryan later recal

first they wanted to push it down to Rupert and me, b

they wanted to cut Janvier out of it. But then that didn

any sense.’’54 It did not make sense because Fran

nation with the most soldiers on the ground in Bosnia

not have had a role in decisions to use airpower.

Decision to Use Airpower to Protect Gorazde

In late July, decisions made in Brussels and New Yor

ified the agreement reached between the US and Brita

the dual key and further demonstrated the influence of 

commanders in shaping the use of airpower in Bosni

25 July, the NAC met for almost 12 hours before 

authorizing more robust air strikes in response to any B

Serb attacks on Gorazde.56 Significantly, General J

urged NATO political authorities to consider wider z

action rather than limiting air operations to the vic

Gorazde, and NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes inclu

suggestion in a letter to his UN counterpart outlining 

plans for air strikes.57 The next day, Boutros-Ghali wro

to Claes agreeing that the new NATO initiative for air 

could be authorized within the bounds of existing UN S

Council resolutions and that he had ‘‘instructed 

Nations military commanders in the former Yugoslavia 

mence preparations for defining . . . the ‘zones of 

referred to in your letter.’’58 Boutros-Ghali also acknow

that ‘‘the question of Option 3 remains to be decide

within the North Atlantic Council and in the United 

Security Council.’’59 Significantly, the UN secretary-

agreed to delegate the UN’s key for NATO airpower to t

itary commanders beneath Mr. Akashi.60 However, ins

delegating it to General Smith, authority to request NA

strikes was passed to General Janvier.61 Janvier wou

have to coordinate air strikes with Adm Leighton Smith 

than with General Ryan.62 For CAS, Janvier was autho

further delegate the UN key to General Smith.63 

253
Boutros-Ghali told the NATO secretary-general he had 

instructions to Mr. Akashi ‘‘to take all measures neces

protect the United Nations personnel in the theatre 

reduce their vulnerability to retaliation and hostage ta

By stymieing the attempt to push control over air strike

to Generals Smith and Ryan, the UN secretary-general 

NAC signaled the lingering reluctance at the political 

fully endorse NATO air strikes. However, there was a 

shift away from NATO’s being a supporter of UNP

toward the Alliance’s becoming more of an independen

in Bosnia.

Events on the ground in Bosnia during late July led 

ambassadors to expand their threats to use airpower 

Serb military advances. On the first day of the 

Conference, the remaining Dutch peacekeepers taken 

at Srebrenica were freed, thus removing one of the 

inhibiting NATO air attacks.65 Four days later, on 2

General Smith negotiated with General Mladic for the e

tion of Zepa’s 17,000 Muslims, leaving just four of the 

six safe areas remaining.66 Rather than attacking Gor

anticipated, the Bosnian Serbs joined the Croatian Ser

rebel Muslim forces to launch a three-pronged ass

Bihac.67 The Bosnian government forces around Biha

no match for the three factions arrayed against them, 

the prospects of losing another safe area loomed, NAT

sidered extending the threat of air strikes to protect all 

the remaining safe areas.68 Of all the Bosnian enclaves

was the most difficult to support with airpower; th

between the warring factions were less clearly draw

than at the other safe areas, and the peacekeepers in 

had no forward air controllers.69 Moreover, Bihac lay n

Bosnian Serb air defense stronghold in northw

Bosnia.70 On 27 July NATO concerns for Bihac eased 

what as thousands of Croatian troops joined the 

against the Serbs.71 The Croatian assault quickly cu

lines of communications south of Bihac and relieved th

sure on the beleaguered government forces in the encl

254
Decision to Use Airpower in Defense of

Other ‘‘Safe Areas’’

Not to be outflanked, NATO announced a decisio

August to extend the threat of air strikes against any 

threatening any of the remaining safe areas.73 The NA

sion authorized NATO military authorities to conduct 

ated air operations up to Option 2—a reference 

‘‘Operational Options for Air Strikes,’’ developed two yea

lier.74 In a statement to the press, Secretary-Genera

claimed that: ‘‘These decisions are intended to protect t

areas and not to help any party fight against the o

Allied officers at the CAOC, not just Americans, buil

lists, so that by early August there were individual ‘‘pla

Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, and Gorazde.76 However, senior 

in AFSOUTH believed it was impossible to defend t

areas with airpower alone.77 At the suggestion of us

power to defend the safe areas, General Ryan later exc

Not defend the ‘‘safe areas’’! I FOUGHT that language—that lan

was going around, and I said: “There’s no way we can defend 

‘safe areas.’ You cannot defend the ‘safe areas’ with air . . . you 

defend the ‘safe areas’ without a competent ground force.”78

In General Ryan’s view the best way to relieve the threa

safe areas was to compel the Bosnian Serbs to stop at

them by using airpower to attrit Bosnian Serb militar

bilities.79 While this approach may have been the best 

use airpower to stop attacks on the safe areas, it co

help but upset the balance of military power among th

ring factions.80 Throughout August, planners at the CA

in Naples continued to refine plans for the safe are

Dead Eye plan, and plans for a wider air campaign.81

NATO ministers helped to open the door for General 

air campaign plan by agreeing to “authorize operati

support the defense of the Safe Areas within a wider 

action’ (ZOA) than had previously been considered

authorizing wider ZOAs, NATO ministers freed their m

commanders from restrictions limiting air strikes to onl

targets in the vicinity of a particular safe area. This, i

helped to push NATO thinking on airpower toward G

255
Ryan

s plan for a wider air campaign. After General J

proposed the ZOAs, planners in AFSOUTH were tasked 

define them. One NATO officer suggested dividing all of 

into two zones, using a line taken from a map used fo

ning Dead Eye operations.83 The line had originall

drawn on the map as a ‘‘do not cross line’’ for separat

craft that would be simultaneously attacking the no

and southeast segments of the Bosnian Serb air defen

tem.84 It had been nothing more than a tactical exped

avoiding midair collisions. When the UNPROFOR comm

Gen Rupert Smith, saw the proposed zones, he su

modifying them by making the area around Tuzla part 

zones; thus the Posavina corridor—a key route for Serb 

to western Bosnia—was in both zones (see fig. 3).85

256

Figure 3. Zones of Action and Target Distribution for O

Deliberate Force. The southeastern zone included all targets s

east of the line defined by points A-B-C.The northwestern zone incl

gets north and west of the line defined by points A-B-D. Areas w

wedge near Tuzla, defined by line C-B-D, were part of both zones.

Source: General Ryan, briefing to Air Power Conference, slide no. 8.





















































INCLU

IN BO

ZOA

SOUT

Z

OF A

NORTHWEST

ZONE

OF ACTION

BIHAC BANJA

LUKA

MOSTAR

SARAJEVO

BRCK

TUZLA

PALE

ZEPA

GORAZDE GORAZDE

OPTION 1&2

SEAD

C

A

D

B 
No matter where a triggering event might occur, NATO 

be able to strike targets in the area where the zone

lapped.86 Smith’s modifications also meant that a prov

in Tuzla could trigger air strikes in the zone of the com

ers’ choosing. General Joulwan, who was intent on bei

to limit the maneuverability of Mladic’s forces, appro

zones.87 However, General Janvier initially balked at th

zones, telling Admiral Smith he had been contemplatin

25 to 30 kilometers around the safe areas—slightly larg

the heavy weapons exclusion zones at Sarajevo and Gor

Though the military commanders in AFSOUTH 

political guidance and needed political approval fo

actions, they also controlled access to their plans s

maintain operational security and their own aut

Commenting on briefings of Deliberate Force given in th

mer of 1995, Admiral Smith recalled, ‘‘We wanted very 

to not let the Military Committee and the NAC get i

details of those targets.’’89 General Ryan was given a 

mission statement by the NAC, which had the ‘‘aim o

ring attacks on safe areas and responding, if nec

through the timely and effective use of airpower . . 

attacks on or threats to the safe areas have ceased.’

broad guidance suited General Joulwan, who believe

involvement in operational decisions would be politica

sive, hurting both alliance cohesion and military ef

ness.91 Though Admiral Smith did not want any ‘‘h

operational matters, he would have preferred to have p

authorities in the UN and NATO come to an agreeme

common approach for the operation rather than leavi

him and General Janvier to sort out matters.92 Genera

appreciated and would soon make good use of the 

given him by the NAC mission statement. At an airpow

ference on the anniversary of Operation Deliberate 

Ryan observed,

The biggest lesson I think we learned is that if we have a chance 

military side to be influential in writing the mission statement

better have our best people standing there doing it, because 

what you’re going to get graded on.93

257
The NATO commanders were not without political ov

though. On 3 August, in Italy, General Ryan and A

Smith briefed NATO Secretary-General Claes and G

Joulwan on the Dead Eye plan, the Deliberate Force pl

the target sets for the individual safe area defense plan

his part, Secretary-General Claes attempted to reass

commanders about the depth of political backing for a 

air campaign.95 While the commanders wanted oper

autonomy, it appears they also wanted, or needed, som

of political blessing from Brussels.

Changing Landscape and US Political Leadership

Croatian ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ of Serbs from UN pr

areas marked the further decline of UN influence in the 

Yugoslavia and set the stage for American leadership 

NATO. On 4 August, the Croatian army launched an o

to retake the Serb-controlled Krajina region of Croatia

not help UN-NATO relations, when, on the first day 

Croatian offensive, US aircraft providing air prese

Canadian peacekeepers in Croatia fired two antiradiati

siles in self-defense against a Krajina Serb SAM si

Knin.96 To make matters worse, a Croatian air force M

craft attacked a UN observation post, killing a Danish 

keeper; yet, NATO was not empowered to conduct cou

operations against Croatia.97 In four days, the fighti

mostly over, and Croatian forces sent 150,000 Serb r

fleeing into Serbia and Bosnia.98 The operation highligh

UN’s impotence. Even worse, from a UN standpoi

Croatian move appeared to have US support, or at leas

escence.99

Neither the BSA nor the Yugoslav army rendered ass

to their Krajina kinsmen, fueling speculation that Pre

Tudjman and Milosevic had made an agreement to let 

take control of the Serb-occupied lands within Croati

Bosnia, Karadzic was publicly critical of Milosevic, a

Bosnian Serb leader reportedly attempted to dismiss h

commander, General Mladic. Mladic had supposedl

meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade just prior to the C

assault.101 On the first day of the Croatian offensive, K

258
ordered Mladic to step down. The general refused, a

days later 18 Bosnian Serb generals signaled their sup

Mladic.102 As one news reporter put it: ‘‘Mr. Radovan Ka

leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has lost control of his 

forces, whose commanders now clearly take their orde

Belgrade.’’103 For NATO planners, knowing whether this 

squabble amongst the Serbs was genuine or merely a

was important; if General Mladic really was more res

to Milosevic than to Karadzic, then a NATO strategy ba

coercing the Bosnian Serbs would have to focus on Be

not just Pale. After the late July NATO decision for a gra

air campaign, a trio of NATO generals—one Britis

American, and one French—was dispatched to Belg

give General Mladic a final warning, but Mladic was 

pressed by the threat of NATO bombing.104

In August of 1995, the Clinton administration com

itself to taking the lead in the West’s approach to Bosni

the political risks attending this new assertiveness, 

wanted as much control as possible over the various 

nents in its strategy for the Balkans. By 1 August, US n

security advisor Anthony Lake had worked out a new U

egy for Bosnia.105 A week later, after several meetin

President Clinton and his top national security adviso

Lake traveled to the capitals of the other Contact G

countries—France, Germany, Russia, and Britain—to 

the administration’s latest plan for a comprehensive 

ment in the former Yugoslavia.107 In contrast to earlier 

istration efforts to win allied acceptance for its polici

reporter noted, ‘‘this time Lake was given permission t

ent the US plan as something Clinton was determined 

sue with or without the allies’ support.’’108 In another a

President Clinton acknowledged that by taking the l

Bosnia: ‘‘I’m risking my presidency.’’109 On 11 Aug

Congress left Washington for its summer recess, Pr

Clinton vetoed a bill lifting the arms embargo 

Muslims—temporarily making it easier for the Europ

follow America’s lead in the Balkans.110 Meanwhile, As

Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke visited leaders in 

Yugoslavia to push the administration’s new plan.111 

259
the details of the plan remained secret, Bosnian foreig

ister Muhamed Sacirbey revealed to the press th

Bosnian government will play a role in compelling the S

accept the plan, and our military is an integral part 

process.’’112 Such candidness about a secret plan was 

tive of the limits of US influence over Bosnian Croat a

ernment Federation forces. On 17 August in a note 

Croatian military forces passed from Robert Frasure, th

US negotiator for the Balkans, to Richard Holbrooke, F

wrote: ‘‘Dick: We ‘hired’ these guys to be our junkyar

because we were desperate. We need to try to ‘contro

But this is no time to get squeamish about things.’’11

Frasure was killed in a road accident on Mount Igm

days later, Holbrooke took over as the lead US negotia

quickly moved to sideline the Contact Group, while s

serving it, so that it could later ‘‘endorse and legitim

agreement’’ he might achieve.114 With the high political 

the US administration was facing, it needed as much co

possible over the disparate components of its Balkan str

The extent of US control over NATO airpower r

unclear. Senior US officials were aware of General 

Deliberate Force plan, and robust air strikes had long 

part of the administration’s policy toward Bosnia.115 H

Richard Holbrooke, a long-time supporter of bomb

Bosnian Serbs, has claimed that there was no con

between the US diplomatic initiative and NATO bombin

Almost everyone came to believe that the bombing had been pa

master plan. But in fact in none of our discussions prior to our 

August diplomatic] mission had we considered bombing as pa

negotiating strategy.116

A different account, supposedly based on interview

Anthony Lake, apparently contradicted Holbrooke’s as

The Europeans loved the diplomatic effort with Clinton putting th

utation of the United States on the line, but they hated the i

bombing. But Lake insisted that the two were bound together an

the president had already decided on US policy.117

Holbrooke was doubtful of European support for an a

paign, and, in all likelihood, he had no choice but to 

on America’s theater commanders working within the 

260
to do as much as they could to support the administ

strategy.118

AFSOUTH and UNPF Subject to Close Coordinatio

Though NATO—with the United States in the for

moving toward more forceful action in Bosnia, General 

was slow to accept plans for NATO bombing. After the 

and 1 August NAC decisions, NATO’s military comm

were left to work out the details for implementing the de

with their counterparts in UNPF and UNPROFOR, and 

nearly two weeks before a basic procedural agreeme

reached.119 During that time, General Janvier made h

against using NATO airpower, but was overruled by p

authorities within the UN.120 On 10 August, General 

and Admiral Smith signed a memorandum of unders

(MOU), which formalized and added some of the ne

details to the military arrangements for implement

NATO decisions.121 For instance, Willy Claes had anno

‘‘There is a strong feeling among Allies that such [bo

operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be 

tinued.’’122 In working out the new dual-key arrange

this meant once bombing commenced, it would not sto

the commanders agreed that the conditions precipitat

bombing had been alleviated.123 A dual-key decis

General Janvier and Admiral Smith would be needed 

bombing, as well as to start it; according to the MOU, 

would not stop it on his own. The commanders also a

the triggers for air strikes set by NATO: (1) by ‘‘any con

tion of forces and/or heavy weapons, and the conduct 

military preparations which, in the common judgmen

NATO and UN military commanders, presents a direct 

to the safe areas;” or (2) by ‘‘direct attacks (e.g., g

shelling, or aircraft) on the safe areas.”124 To the NAT

tary commanders, it seemed that these conditions for 

ing bombing operations already existed at the time th

sion was made establishing the triggers.125 All it wou

was some event to precipitate a recommendation fr

commanders to commence air strikes.

261
General Janvier also agreed to NATO control over air 

for suppressing Bosnian Serb air defenses, but he remain

picious of SEAD operations. Admiral Smith and Genera

insisted that once a dual-key decision was made to init

attacks, then the NATO commanders would be free to exe

or part of the Dead Eye plan without requesting further a

from General Janvier. As Admiral Smith recalled: ‘‘When 

together the MOU, we included that in writing—that the 

of the key would authorize me to strike, at will, those 

which I thought were necessary to neutralize the integr

defense sites.’’126 It was a matter of force protection, and 

understood it and agreed to it in principle.127 However, 

wary that Ryan and Admiral Smith might use Dead Eye 

duct air strikes unrelated to the Bosnian Serb air defense

cumvention of the target approval procedures go

Deliberate Force; therefore, Janvier insisted he be kept in

of all Dead Eye operations.128

On 14 August, General Ryan presented a detailed 

on his concept of operations for Deliberate Force to G

Janvier and Admiral Smith.129 The meeting also serv

joint targeting board, whereby the commanders vetted 

tial targets to ensure they were valid military targe

could be linked to desired military and political object

this case the objective was to make the BSA stop attac

threatening a safe area.130 As General Ryan’s chief p

Colonel Zoerb, later noted, this objective was easy to st

it did not do much to define the shape the air operation

eventually take.131 The military objective of Deliberat

was to destroy the things that gave the BSA superior

their adversaries.132 This meant attacking BSA comma

control facilities as well as certain supply and infrast

targets that Mladic needed in order to maneuver hi

capable, but less numerous, forces.133 Of approximat

potential targets General Ryan put before the boar

under 90 were approved as viable Option 1 and 2 can

for NATO air strikes.134 While General Janvier agree

were valid air strike targets, he was very careful to en

was not giving his advanced approval for hitting the en

of targets should he decide to turn the UN key in th

262
ahead.135 By this point, General Janvier had come to 

the two wider zones of action, each covering over 

Bosnia. The target sets for the safe area defense plans 

ing Sarajevo and Gorazde contained many of the same 

so with the wider ZOAs approved, planners at the CAO

bined the two into one overall plan called Operation Vu

The targets approved by Janvier on 14 August also b

to the Vulcan target set and served as the initial menu 

gets for Operation Deliberate Force two weeks later.137

Additional procedural arrangements between UNP

and AIRSOUTH were ironed out on Thursday, 17 A

when General Ryan, General Smith, and Maj Gen 

Pennefather, who headed the operations staff of the RR

to discuss a draft Air-Land Coordination Document.1

no doctrine to guide them, the UN and NATO comm

invented the air-land document to coordinate and dec

among other things, targets and use of the airspa

Bosnia.139 If air operations commenced, Generals Ry

Smith would nominate targets to Admiral Smith and G

Janvier, who would decide whether to approve the att

In agreeing on procedures for nominating targets, G

Ryan proposed that General Smith pick all CAS targ

that the two commanders share responsibility for nom

interdiction targets near the RRF.141 General Ryan w

responsible for picking air strike targets farther afield 

deciding which air defense targets to strike.142 This div

responsibilities reflected the needs of the comman

ensure force protection and mission accomplishme

General Smith to be able to use airpower to protect his 

he needed control over CAS. Likewise, Ryan needed to 

free hand in selecting air defense targets. Since part of G

Smith’s mission was to forestall a BSA attack on Saraj

needed to be able to nominate the close-in interdicti

gets.143 For Ryan, interdiction targets were important t

ing BSA mobility and attriting its military capability.

Conclusion

In the judgment of the UN and NATO theater comm

it was not possible to defend the safe areas with a

263
alone. The fall of Srebrenica might have served to ma

point had airpower been used earlier and with greate

mitment. However, as political factors aligned behind U

ership for a more robust use of airpower, heralding its 

tions would not have served the interests of America, 

commanders in NATO, or, arguably, the Alliance. As W

impatience with the UN’s approach in Bosnia opened t

for forceful air operations, NATO theater-level comm

and Gen Rupert Smith actively pushed back the bou

constraining the use of airpower.

This set the stage so that when airpower was calle

could be used in a way the commanders believed wa

effective. Moreover, senior airmen insisted upon prea

for a SEAD campaign in the event of NATO air operati

building a plan around real tactical limitations, and se

as a precondition for air strikes, the NATO comm

ensured General Janvier would not falter in decis

authorize SEAD during Deliberate Force. Amongst the t

level commanders, General Janvier harbored the g

misgivings about the utility of a NATO bombing campai

he resisted the shift from UN to NATO primacy. Ulti

however, Janvier took his political orders and went alo

the NATO plans, even though he remained uneasy abou

icy that publicly implied the continuation of the UN’s p

and its impartial role in Bosnia but in reality was head

more belligerent direction. However, Janvier’s missi

waning, and his forces were growing increasingly less 

able even as the importance of NATO’s mission and th

hood that NATO airmen would be put in harm’s wa

growing.

Notes

1. As the footnotes show, the next six paragraphs are mainly a 

tion of research done by others, especially Honig and Both, but wit

on NATO airpower. The author would be remiss not to acknowled

to them at the outset.

2. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a W

(London: Penguin Books, 1996), 4.

3. Ibid., 4–7; and David Rohde, A Safe Area, Srebrenica: Europ

Massacre Since the Second World War (London: Pocket Books, 199

264
4. Honig and Both, 4

17.

5. Ibid., 8.

6. Ibid.; and Rohde, 23 and 81–82. Bildt replaced Lord David 

the EU cochairman to the Geneva peace conference when Owen re

June of 1995.

7. Honig and Both, 10; and Rohde, 41 and 79.

8. Honig and Both, 13.

9. Ibid., 16.

10. Rohde, 99.

11. Honig and Both, 18.

12. Ibid., 19–20; and Rohde, 118–24.

13. Honig and Both, 20; and Rohde, 133.

14. Honig and Both, 21–22; and Rohde, 132–33.

15. Honig and Both, 22; and Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, ‘‘NA

Air Support-Srebrenica-11 July 95,’’ transcript of news conference

Italy, 12 July 1995, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/archive

16. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, commander, Allied Air Forces 

Europe and commander US Sixteenth Air Force, September 19

1996, interviewed by author, 6 June 1997, Ramstein Air Ba

Germany, transcript of taped interview, author’s personal collect

Admiral Smith transcript.

17. Honig and Both, 23.

18. Ibid., 20; and Rohde, 133.

19. Honig and Both, 22; and Rohde, 144.

20. Honig and Both, 23–25.

21. Ibid. The ability of the Bosnian Serbs to monitor NATO flyi

ties closely, and the networking of the Serbian air defense system 

of the Bosnian Serbs, was well known at the time. See Senate, B

the F-16 Shootdown in Bosnia and Current Operations: Hearings b

Committee on Armed Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1995, 36, 

51–52; and Tim Ripley, ‘‘Silence of the SAMS,’’ Aircraft Illustrated 

(November 1995): 36–37.

22. Honig and Both, 24. A ‘‘Blue Sword’’ order was used for CAS

strikes.

23. Ibid., 23–24.

24. Ibid., 25; and Admiral Smith transcript.

25. Honig and Both, 25; and Rohde, 162.

26. Honig and Both, 25; and Rohde, 162.

27. Honig and Both, 25–26; Joris Voorhoeve, ‘‘Protect

Peacekeepers on the Day Srebrenica Fell,’’ Washington Post, 20 N

1995, A20. Note: In the Washington Post article, Voorhoeve says: ‘‘I c

headquarters in Zagreb at 4 P.M. and asked to call off a new round o

port.’’ Other sources indicate that Honig and Both’s version is acc

that even if Voorhoeve phoned Zagreb at 4:00 P.M., he apparently ph

CAOC first.

28. Ryan interview.

265
29. Ibid.

30. Honig and Both, 19, and 45–66.

31. Rohde, 343–49. Rohde uses the Red Cross figure of 7,079.

32. Honig and Both, 21.

33. Rohde, 354.

34. For examples, see comments by General Briquemont in cha

paragraph of section entitled ‘‘Airpower and coercion at Moun

August 1993”; by General de Lapresle in chap. 5, section entitled 

Point: Gorazde, April 1994”; and by Generals Ryan and Rupert Smi

7, section entitled “The Beginning of the End.” Also see comm

General Ryan from April 1993 in, Elaine Sciolino, ‘‘U.S. Military 

Using Air Power against the Serbs,” New York Times, 29 April 1993

35. Facts On File Yearbook 1995 (USA: Facts on File, Inc., 19

and Military Official Y.

36. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 33 and 45; and Honig and 

The SA-6 in eastern Bosnia was one of the first targets hit at th

Operation Deliberate Force. On 30 August 1995, it was located 

town of Sokolac between Pale and Srebrenica.

37. Honig and Both, 151–53 and 182–83.

38. Rohde, 368.

39. Honig and Both, 182.

40. Rohde, 366.

41. See chap. 4, section entitled “Command without 

September–December 1993.”

42. Facts On File 1995, 513.

43. Ibid.

44. Bruce Clark, Bernard Gray, and Lionel Barber, “Doubts G

UN Bosnia Role,” Financial Times (London), 17 July 1995, 1; a

Officials F and J.

45. MOD Official J.

46. Bruce Clark, John Kampfner, and Anthony Robinson, “S

Bosnia Air Strike Threat: Meeting Fails to Back US Calls for Toug

Against Serbs,” Financial Times (London), 22 July 1995, 1; Fact

1995, 513; and MOD Officials F and J.

47. MOD Officials F and J.

48. Lord (Field Marshal) Richard Vincent, chairman of NATO’s 

Committee, interviewed by author, 22 September 1998, London, 

notes, author’s personal collection.

49. Clark, Kampfner, and Robinson.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.; Bernard Gray, ‘‘Clinton Fights Uphill Battle with Cong

Bosnia Crisis - Europe and the US Struggle to Agree on What to D

Financial Times (London), 20 July 1995, 2; and Anthony Robin

Bernard Gray, ‘‘Taking of Hostages Will Not Deter Attacks, Serbs 

Financial Times (London), 22 July 1995, 2.

52. Gray; and Robinson and Gray.

266
53. Ryan interview; and Robinson and Gray.

54. Ryan interview.

55. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), ‘‘Operation D

Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 5 October 1995, 2. Col Robert C. Owen’s D

Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, 

University Press, 2000) covers the evolution of NATO and US tar

ning. However, different aspects of the planning are captured with 

degrees of fidelity in three chapters of the book. The following d

draws from Col Owen’s book and other sources. See Col Owen D

Force, 54–57, 98–103, and 285–91.

56. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yu

1991–1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (The Hague: The Net

Atlantic Commission, 1996), 76; and NATO, ‘‘Press statement on Go

Secretary-General Willy Claes, following North Atlantic Council m

25 July 1995.’’

57. Gen George A. Joulwan, USA, Supreme Allied Commander 

22 October 1993–11 July 1997, interviewed by author, 11 Februa

Washington, D.C., transcript of tape recording, author’s personal c

Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny Flight Air Operations 

Naples, Italy, January 1994–May 1996, interviewed by author, 

1997, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, transcript of tape recording, 

personal collection.

58. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, TLS (photo

Willy Claes, NATO secretary-general, Brussels, 26 July 199

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Facts On File 1995, 530.

63. Boutros-Ghali, TLS, to Willy Claes, 26 July 1995.

64. Ibid.

65. Facts On File 1995, 529.

66. Paul Adams and Laura Silber, “UN in Talks with Serbs as Z

Haven’ Falls: International Tribunal Charges Karadzic and Mladic 

Crimes,” Financial Times (London), 26 July 1995, 1; and Facts On F

529. On the day Smith and Mladic met, the Yugoslav War Crimes 

announced charges against Mladic and Bosnian Serb President 

Karadzic for ‘‘genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.’

67. Facts On File 1995, 530 and 549; and Laura Silber and 

Robinson, “Fear of Wider Conflict as Croatians Attack Serbs: UN a

Finalise Procedure for Air Strikes,” Financial Times (London), 29 July 

68. Facts On File 1995, 549.

69. NATO, ‘‘Press Statement on Gorazde;’’ and Col Daniel R

USAF, interviewed by author, 30 April 1997, Spangdahlem AB, G

transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

70. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 33.

267
71. Facts On File 1995, 549 and 565.

72. Silber and Robinson, 20; and Laura Silber, Judy Demp

Anthony Robinson, “ ‘Underdog’ Croatia Learns How to Bite: Za

Made Good Use of the Backing it Receives from the US, Germ

Austria,” Financial Times (London), 2 August 1995, 2.

73. NATO, ‘‘Press Statement on Other Safe Areas by the S

General Following North Atlantic Council Meeting on 1 August 199

74. MCM-KAD-057-95, ‘‘NATO Air Operations to Stabilize 

Hercegovina Beyond Gorazde,’’ Memorandum to the Secretary

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 July 1995, cited in Owen, D

Force, 105 and 128 n. 19; ‘‘Operational Options’’ is discussed in 

section entitled NATO Air-to-Ground Missions: June–August 1993

75. Leurdijk, 76; and NATO, ‘‘Press Statement . . . 1 August 19

76. Owen, Deliberate Force, 105; and Col Steven Teske, USA

viewed by author, 6 May 1997, Aviano AB, Italy, tape recording, 

personal collection. As Colonel Owen’s study pointed out, these ‘‘p

the individual safe areas were little more than target lists and 

briefing slides. As of May 1997, the individual safe area plans w

being held in a historical file in a safe in the Guidance Apportionm

Targeting Cell at the CAOC in Vicenza.

77. Admiral Smith transcript; Ryan interview; and Zoerb, 29 Ap

78. Ryan interview. This was consistent with General Ryan’s t

to Congress in April 1993; see Elaine Sciolino, A1 and A6.

79. Ryan interview.

80. Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, ‘‘The Balkans Air Campaign St

2,’’ Airpower Journal 11, no. 3 (autumn 1997): 14.

81. Owen, Deliberate Force, 105–110.

82. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), ‘‘Operation D

Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 5 October 1995, 3. The NAC decision for the wid

of action reflected acceptance of a memorandum from the 

Committee to the secretary-general supporting ‘‘the wider applic

airpower in a wider context.’’ MCM-KAD-057-95, ‘‘NATO Air Oper

Stabilize Bosnia-Hercegovina Beyond Gorazde,’’ cited in Owen, D

Force, 105 and 128 n. 19.

83. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 19.

84. Ibid.; and Zoerb, 30 April 1997.

85. Gen Michael E. Ryan, “NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Her

‘Deliberate Force,’ 29 August–14 September 1995,” transcript of A

Conference, London, 13 September 1996; and Zoerb, 30 Ap

Generals Smith and Ryan were meeting in Kiseljak on 29 July 1995 

the process of coordinating NATO air operations with ground oper

the RRF. They had their key planners with them, including Colon

USAF, and Col David Nicholls, Royal Marines. General Smith m

made his input for the wider zones at this meeting. Col David V. 

Royal Marines, ‘‘Bosnia: UN and NATO,’’ RUSI Journal 141, no. 1 (

268
1996): 34

35; and Col Daniel R. Zoerb, Notes From Kiseljak Mee

July 1995, File B4-3, BACS Collection.

86. Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference.

87. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Ryan transcript of A

Conference; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

88. Admiral Smith transcript; and Nicholls, 34–35.

89. Admiral Smith transcript.

90. Gen Michael E. Ryan, ‘‘NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herz

slides from a briefing to Air Power Conference, London, 13 Septemb

slide no. 6.

91. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998.

92. Admiral Smith transcript.

93. Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference.

94. AFSOUTH, ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 3

Deliberate Force, 481; Ryan interview; and Zoerb interview, 30 Apr

95. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997.

96. Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, French army, commander of United 

Protection Force, Zagreb, Croatia, March 1995–December 1995, int

by author, 12 January 1998, Paris, author’s notes, author’s person

tion; The United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United 

Peace-keeping, 3d ed. (New York: United Nations Reproduction 

1996), 552; and Laura Silber and Anthony Robinson, ‘‘Croats 

Attack on Krajina,’’ Financial Times (London), 5 August 1995, 1.

97. Silber and Robinson, ‘‘Croats Unleash;’’ UN Security 

Resolution 1009 (1995) (S/RES/1009, 10 August 1995); and Fact

1995, 565.

98. Blue Helmets, 552.

99. Facts On File 1995, 565–66.

100. Ibid.; ‘‘Turn of the Tide?” The Economist, 5 August 1995, 

Patrick Moore, ‘‘An End Game in Croatia and Bosnia?’’ Tran

November 1995, 10.

101. Facts On File 1995, 566.

102. Ibid.; and ‘‘Croatia’s Blitzkrieg,’’ The Economist, 12 August 19

103. Edward Mortimer, ‘‘Slicing Up the Bosnian Cake: Brute 

Triumphing over Diplomacy in the Balkans,” Financial Times (Lo

August 1995, 13.

104. The officers were Gen James Jamerson, USAF, Air Chief 

Sir William Wratten, RAF, and a French army major general servi

operations directorate of the French joint staff. After the meeting, 

Marshal Wratten reported to the British Secretary of State for 

Michael Portillo, that the message had been delivered and tha

showed no signs of taking it seriously. Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Wratten, telephone interview by author, 18 May 1997, London, 

notes, author’s personal collection. Also see Jane M. O. Sharp

Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia 

269
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), 57; and Owen, Delibera

480 and 519 n. 46.

105. Thomas W. Lippman and Ann Devroy, “Clinton’s Policy E

June Decision Led to Diplomatic Gambles,” Washington Post, 11 S

1995, A1 and A16.

106. The Contact Group was an outgrowth of the internation

conference in Geneva. Established in April 1994, the Contact Gro

up with a ‘‘take it or leave it’’ plan, which the Bosnian Serbs rejecte

1994. The group was hamstrung by pretty much the same dispara

ment of allegiances that prevented effective action from the UN 

Council. By 1995, the Contact Group had become just another f

disagreement between Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the 

107. Lippman and Devroy, A16; Bob Woodward, The Choice: How 

Won (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 267–68.

108. James Carney, ‘‘Finally, The Leader of NATO Leads,’’ 

September 1995, 54. President Clinton’s determination to go it alo

essary is also discussed in Woodward, 267–68.

109. Woodward, 265.

110. Facts On File 1995, 590–91.

111. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random Hous

3–4 and 74–75; Facts On File 1995, 590; and ‘‘US Peace Plan fo

Attacked,’’ Financial Times, 16 August 1995, 2.

112. Harriet Martin, Bruce Clark, and John Ridding, ‘‘Bosnia Ha

Element in US Plan,’’ Financial Times (London), 17 August 1995, 2

113. Holbrooke, 73.

114. Ibid., 84.

115. Ibid., 102; Woodward; and Ryan interview.

116. Holbrooke, 104.

117. Woodward, 268.

118. Holbrooke, 103–4.

119. Admiral Smith transcript; and Ryan interview.

120. NATO Official D; Military Official Q; Admiral Smith transc

Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

121. Dr. Thomas S. Snyder and Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, USA

of History, USAFE Historical Highlights, 1942–1947: Fifty-fifth An

Edition (Ramstein AB, Germany: Headquarters USAFE, 199

AFSOUTH, ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 3; and Leurd

122. NATO, ‘‘Press Statement on Gorazde,’’ 25 July 1995.

123. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997; and Military Official Q.

124. Owen, Deliberate Force, 406–7; and AFSOUTH, “O

Deliberate Force,” Fact Sheet, 2–3.

125. Ryan interview; and Ryan transcript of Air Power Conferen

126. Admiral Smith transcript.

127. Janvier; and Military Official Q.

128. Janvier; and Military Official Q.

129. Owen, Deliberate Force, 57, 107–8, and 282.

270
130. Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997.

131. Ibid.

132. Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference.

133. Ibid.

134. Owen, Deliberate Force, 107–8 and 281–85.

135. Military Official Q.

136. Owen, Deliberate Force, 105; Zoerb interview, 29 April 199

137. Owen, Deliberate Force, 111 and 483; and Col Daniel R

director, Deny Flight Air Operations Center, Naples, Italy, 

1994–May 1996, ‘‘AU’s Deliberate Force Report, Remarks on an Ea

of the Balkans Air Campaign Study, 20 November 1996 for Genera

138. AFSOUTH, ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 3; Ry

script of Air Power Conference; and Owen, Deliberate Force, 106.

139. Nicholls, 35; Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference; a

interview.

140. Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan interview; a

interview, 30 April 1997.

141. Owen, Deliberate Force, 106; Ryan transcript of A

Conference; and Ryan interview. See also Nicholls, 35.

142. Ryan transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan interv

143. Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff, ‘‘HQ 1 (UK) AR

RRFOS Brief,’’ 17 November 1995, slide no. 18; and Nicholls, 35.

271
Chapter 9

Deliberate Force:

August–September 1995

“The General who values his good name,” wrote Marmo

“must see to it that he has a completely free hand. Either 

must not be interfered with, or he must be removed from 

command.” But he must have a sufficiently clear-cut plan 

his own on which to base his firmness. Nothing tends m

surely to provoke interference from above than a lack 

assurance below.

—Charles de Gaulle—

The Edge of the Sw

Well, everybody had an opinion, but nobody [else] had 

plan. So, we were the only ones that had a plan; so we 

to execute.

—Gen Michael Rya

Interview by auth

6 June 1997 -----

Operation Deliberate Force highlighted the political-m

dimension of the struggle by theater-level comman

influence the use of airpower in Bosnia. The ascend

Richard Holbrooke in negotiations for a settlement of th

Yugoslav conflict led him to seek some control over NA

power. In his attempt to influence the campaign, Ho

clashed with Admiral Smith, the commander respons

NATO forces and the success of Deliberate Force. The fi

tion of this chapter shows that Admiral Smith invok

command responsibilities to maintain control over ope

first with General Janvier to win UN approval for propo

gets and later with Holbrooke during a pause in the bo

The need to balance risks to one’s forces and mission 

plishment is a serious responsibility borne by comm

and because of their military expertise, commanders 

the best judges of risks. The second section of this 

273
demonstrates how a commander may set limits on risk

attempting to accomplish a given mission.

Responsibility also gives commanders leverage for s

operations, and that influence is fortified when it is co

with expertise and control over information. Because a

egy revolves around targeting decisions, a command

controls information about targets has a good chance 

serving operational autonomy while influencing air ca

strategy. During Operation Deliberate Force, Genera

and Admiral Smith maintained a close hold on infor

about the campaign to keep control of it and ensure 

cess. However, this tight military governing of air ope

led to friction between NATO’s theater-level comma

especially Admiral Smith—and some US and European 

cal authorities.

Defense of Sarajevo

As August drew to a close, Serb shelling of Goraz

Sarajevo prompted Bosnian government calls for NATO 

The UN announced on 18 August that no new peace

would replace British forces set to leave Gorazde at m

end—a move which the Bosnian government feared mi

nal the international community’s abandonment of Go

60,000 Muslims.1 Four days later, a Bosnian Serb shel

Sarajevo, killing six people and wounding nearly 40 o

The government in Sarajevo demanded the Serbs be pu

but the UN refused to act because the Serb shelling w

voked by Bosnian army attacks on the Serb sub

Vogosca.3 A similar transaction near Gorazde also fa

elicit air strikes.4 While the Bosnian government 

intent on creating a cause for Western intervention, B

Serb leaders reportedly gathered in Belgrade and conse

make Serbia’s President Milosevic their lead negotiator 

six-member team that would represent breakaway S

upcoming US-led peace talks.5 Richard Holbrooke, sp

on a US television news show on 27 August, warned S

Western intervention should the upcoming round o

talks fail.6 However, intervention was triggered befor

even began.

274
The Trigger

Shortly after 10:00 on Monday morning, 28 Augus

Serb shells began falling again on Sarajevo. Over the 

minutes, five rounds hit the capital, with the fourth 

landing in the crowded Markale market, killing at least 

ple and wounding more than 80.7 The Bosnian gove

threatened to boycott the upcoming peace talks unles

and the UN carried out air strikes against the Serbs.

Admiral Smith learned of the blast, he phoned Za

inform the UN of his intent to turn the NATO key if, 

the Serbs were the guilty party.9 General Janvier was 

ing his son’s wedding in France when the blast occurre

Gen Rupert Smith held the UN key for NATO air strik

UN investigators sought to discover the origins of the bl

last of the British forces in Gorazde withdrew eastwa

Serbia. They reached Serbia around 8:30 P.M. on 28 A

arriving safely in Belgrade early the next morning—a li

than 24 hours before the first bombs of Deliberate 

slammed into targets in southeastern Bosnia.11 UN inv

tors proved to General Smith’s satisfaction that the Ser

shelled the market, and on the night of 28 August, 

Admiral Smith decided to order air strikes against the S

However, General Smith asked for a one-day delay 

commencing the air campaign so that he could sec

forces.13 In the final hours leading up to Operation De

Force, French soldiers withdrew from two observatio

near Sarajevo, leaving no UN peacekeepers for the B

Serbs to take hostage.14

When the market blast occurred, General Ryan was 

at the CAOC for an exercise—turned execution—of the 

plan.15 By the next morning he was joined by a small 

planners led by Colonel Zoerb.16 Admiral Smith sent 

sage through NATO’s military headquarters in Mons, B

recalling aircraft tasked to support Deny Flight.17 Likew

ordered the US aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt to 

into the Adriatic within easy striking distance of tar

Bosnia.18 On 29 August, CAOC leaders received officia

to go ahead with the air campaign, but they elected to p

275
with a scaled-down schedule of sorties that day in o

mask preparations for the next day’s attacks.19

The Targets

Aware of impending air strikes, General Janvier 

returned to his compound in Zagreb, arriving Tuesday 

ing, 29 August. At 9:30 A.M., his staff updated him on 

uation; at the end of the meeting Janvier announced 

of that moment he once again held the UN key.20 Tho

did not overrule General Smith’s decision to turn the k

evening Janvier demurred when it came time to appr

first batch of air strike targets.21 Inexplicably, General 

had not been shown the proposed list of 13 targets un

in the afternoon.22 With the first wave of attacks jus

hours away, Admiral Smith phoned for word of J

approval. Janvier asked for more time to consider the 

but the AFSOUTH commander pressed him for a deci

doing so, Admiral Smith later claimed he told Janvi

pilots are showing up in the ready rooms, and they don

which targets to go hit, so I’ve got to have your answ

because you’re endangering the lives of my pilots and 

put up with that.’’23 Under pressure from Admiral 

General Janvier agreed to hit five of the 13 targets nom

by General Ryan.24 It was the only time Admiral Smith 

could recall losing his temper in his dealings with G

Janvier.25 Smith later said he told Janvier: ‘‘This is craz

start the bombing operations, but I must tell you t

going to write a letter up my chain of command tellin

that you’ve abrogated your side of the agreement, an

this is a failed campaign at the very outset.’’26 After qui

sultations with his advisors in Zagreb, Janvier conse

authorize 10 of the 13 targets, but he refused to approv

targets that had the word barracks in their title.27 A

Smith gave General Ryan the go-ahead to hit the 10 

and told him to change the names of the three barr

more accurately reflect the nature of the objects NATO 

to bomb at those sites.28

Admiral Smith’s frustration with General Janvier r

the shift for AFSOUTH from being the supporting to th

276
ported element of the UN-NATO team. For Deliberat

bombing operations, Smith’s forces were at risk, not Ja

Furthermore, Admiral Smith, not the UN command

responsible for mission accomplishment. In pres

Janvier, Admiral Smith invoked these two principal co

responsibilities—force protection and mission acco

ment. As the commander accountable for the forces 

and the outcome of the operation, Admiral Smith expec

even demanded support from Janvier—much as previ

commanders had demanded support from Admiral Sm

General Janvier’s reluctance to authorize strikes 

targets labeled as barracks was emblematic of a lack of 

standing about airpower and targets that persisted w

Deliberate Force.29 The concept denoted by the term tar

changed with the advent of precision-guided munitions 

but the military vernacular had failed to keep up w

technological change. Poor bombing accuracies in the 

World War drove allied air forces to conduct area bom

even when theory and doctrine called for precision bom

By Desert Storm, some NATO air forces had the capab

strike precisely at individual targets, such as building

munications towers, and aircraft shelters. A large num

such targets might be concentrated at one site, an air

example; yet target libraries continued to refer to thes

or target complexes, as single targets.31 Planners at an 

tional headquarters were apt to use the term target to 

the entire site, while a pilot flying a mission might u

word target to describe the individual object to hit at t

With PGMs it became increasingly important to dist

between the two types of targets, but there was no offi

minology for doing so.32 For those whose business it 

plan and execute air attacks, the term aim point o

(desired mean point of impact—pronounced dimp-e

used to differentiate the individual target from the lar

get complex. As an air campaign, Deliberate Force was 

in that the majority of bombs dropped were PGMs.33 A

Pale air strikes and the many briefings General Janv

received on NATO air plans, Admiral Smith inco

assumed the UN commander understood the dist

277
between larger target complexes and individual targ

DMPIs, that were going to be bombed.34

In Bosnia, targets such as the Hadzici and Pale amm

storage sites contained up to 20 bunkers or buildings, 

separate target with a specific aim point.35 NATO p

analyzed each of these individual targets with its res

aim point in terms of the utility for hitting it and its p

for collateral damage.36 Moreover, in Bosnia, several la

get complexes were concentrated in certain areas. In th

ity of Hadzici, there were at least three target sites: a m

vehicle repair facility, a military equipment storage si

an ammunition storage site.37 The number of individual 

at these three target sites ranged from 10 to more than 

was two days after Deliberate Force began that Admira

finally realized General Janvier had not distinguished b

larger target sites and individual DMPIs.39 Furthermore

targets or target complexes in Bosnia still bore their o

War labels that by 1995 no longer reflected the true na

the sites.40 A target labeled a barracks might no long

served primarily for housing troops. Target sites actua

taining barracks often held other buildings or objec

NATO wished to bomb. For example, the Sarajevo arm

racks contained BSA air defense assets and military 

facilities.41 As directed by Admiral Smith, AFSOUTH p

changed the names of the three barracks, later resub

them for General Janvier’s approval, and NATO a

bombed them without hitting any buildings housing M

soldiers.42

General Janvier’s reluctance to approve air strike 

was not due solely to inadequate time for considering 

get list or concerns about what NATO was going to bom

after he was delegated the UN key, Janvier continued 

cuss all bombing decisions with Mr. Akashi, and 

remained philosophically opposed to NATO bombing 

tions.43 In addition, General Janvier remained uncom

participating in the charade of UN impartiality while 

conducted a campaign aimed solely at the Bosnian S

Richard Holbrooke has claimed that direct pressure fr

Annan, who was then serving as UN undersecretary-

278
for peacekeeping, was necessary in order for Janvi

Akashi to give in to NATO demands for bombing 

August.45 Describing the target approval process with 

after the first stormy experience, Admiral Smith later s

was pretty pro forma after that.’’46 Overall, Janvier’s 

tance to initiate Deliberate Force stemmed to some 

from his lack of expertise and confidence in airpow

more importantly, Janvier’s hesitation derived from h

for political direction—despite public pronouncements 

his authority over decisions for air strikes.

The Execution

Once Admiral Smith and General Janvier approved t

posed targets, General Ryan was responsible for ex

Deliberate Force. Speaking at a press conference on t

ond day of Deliberate Force, Admiral Smith said: 

General Janvier and I decided it was time to execute a

ations, we turned the air operations over to General Ry

he is responsible for execution.’’47 General Ryan’s m

control over the air operation were many. Within p

meteorological, and logistical constraints, Ryan could 

which of the approved targets to hit, the sequence for 

ing, and how rapidly to strike.48 He determined how fa

in attacking the Bosnian Serb air defense system befor

after other BSA targets.49 The theater air commander w

free to choose which aim points to strike within a given 

complex, what time of day to attack, and which aircr

ordnance to employ.50 Finally, General Ryan determine

restrictions or special instructions to issue to aircrew

were attacking the targets.51 The latitude given to R

Admiral Smith and the broad mission statement from t

allowed General Ryan to use airpower in a manner he t

most effective.

From the outset of Deliberate Force, General Ryan’s de

reflected the way in which a commander must use ind

expertise to balance force protection against mission 

plishment. Given time, General Ryan would have prefe

destroy the entire Bosnian Serb integrated air defense 

(IADS) before hitting any other BSA targets.52 However

279
compelled, initially, to confine attacks against air defe

southeastern Bosnia and to forego the heart of the IADS 

northwest.53 Eliminating the entire IADS would have 

attacks Ryan believed were needed to diminish Bosnia

military capability.54 Despite tough talk from some W

political leaders after the London Conference, experien

gested permission to continue bombing might not las

Therefore, General Ryan opted to begin strikes again

targets after just one wave of attacks aimed at degradin

air defenses in the southeast zone of action.55 Added 

NATO aircrews caused by a delay in fully prosecutin

Eye was small so long as aircraft stayed clear of northw

Bosnia.56 By putting off attacks against the northw

component of the air defense system, Ryan applied his 

ise to fulfill his principal responsibilities as a comma

achieving his assigned mission with the least unne

risks and costs to his forces.

Though air operations between 30 August and 14 Sep

1995 have become known as Operation Deliberate Forc

were not simply an execution of the Deliberate For

crafted by Col Doc Zoerb earlier that year.57 Operation De

Force, as it unfolded, embodied elements of three distin

of plans built during the nine months before the Saraje

ket blast. First, in late 1994, planners at the CAOC de

a plan called Dead Eye, which was designed solely for 

ing Bosnian Serb air defenses. The second relevant pl

shape in early 1995 when General Ryan instructed hi

ners to develop a campaign plan for degrading the BSA

ing potential. The plan built by Colonel Zoerb—refe

herein as the Deliberate Force plan—contained 

throughout Bosnia and was not linked to the defense 

particular safe area. Third, after Srebrenica and Ze

Western leaders vowed to prevent loss of the remaini

safe areas, and planners at the CAOC created target 

the defense of each remaining enclave. In August, the p

defending Gorazde and Sarajevo were combined into o

plan called Vulcan, which Ryan went to the CAOC to e

on the morning of 28 August.58 When General Ryan ex

Deliberate Force, the operation contained elements of a

280
sets of plans. Air strike targets were initially chosen fr

Vulcan plan.59 Air defense targets came from a portion 

Dead Eye plan.60 The heart of the operation—the logic 

the prosecution of the campaign—derived from the De

Force plan.61

Ryan’s execution of Operation Deliberate Force su

an observation made a century earlier by Moltke the E

Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent 

tion of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pu

consistently to the end. Certainly the commander in chief (Fe

will keep his great objective (Zweck) continuously in mind, undist

by the vicissitudes of events. But the path on which he hopes to 

it can never be firmly established in advance.62

Moltke’s comment fits the case of Deliberate Force, bec

prosecuting the campaign General Ryan was guided 

view of the objective more than by details of existing p

Ryan was bent on undermining the BSA’s military 

tage.64 In his view that was the surest way to end the th

safe areas and to get Mladic to comply with UN reso

and NATO ultimatums.65 Mladic would determine w

bombing would lead to a quick cease-fire or whether air 

would continue until BSA fighting potential was draw

to a level on a par with Bosnian government forces. Th

with which General Ryan prosecuted Deliberate Force 

demonstrated his desire to level the playing field as m

possible before Mladic gave in or international politi

gave out.66

Collateral Damage and Other Priorities

By doing his utmost to limit collateral damage, G

Ryan again faced the potential need to make a tr

between force protection and mission accomplis

though, as with the decision to delay prosecuting the 

west part of Dead Eye, added risks were minimal. Co

damage concerns factor into targeting decisions wh

Western nations consider employing airpower.67 In ope

other than war, such as Deliberate Force, it is probably 

say that avoiding collateral damage will usually ran

behind protection of friendly forces as a commander’s 

281
orities. Although Deliberate Force seemed like c

General Ryan was acutely aware NATO was not at w

total war, an air component commander’s priorities ar

to be (1) mission accomplishment; (2) force protection; 

collateral damage—in that order. In operations other th

the priorities are more likely to be (1) force protection; 

lateral damage; and (3) mission accomplishment.69 As 

Ronald M. Reed, a contributor to the Balkans Air Ca

Study averred, this was definitely the case in De

Force.70 And, as the surface-to-air threat declined in 

General Ryan’s concern for collateral damage motivat

to issue instructions that appeared to place collateral d

on a near equal footing with force protection.71 Severa

contributors described a policy during the last two 

Deliberate Force restricting tactics during bombing att

as to further reduce chances for collateral damage

examples clearly highlight how a commander mus

expertise to make judicious trade-offs between force pro

and mission accomplishment.72

Col Robert Owen, head of the US Air Force’s Balk

Campaign Study, has shown that commanders in AF

were more sensitive to collateral damage than the Am

diplomats involved in Deliberate Force.73 However, G

Ryan and Admiral Smith believed European and UN p

sensibilities mattered as much as American tolera

unintended damage.74 At a briefing to the US Air For

War College a few weeks after the campaign, Admira

highlighted this point when he explained that had G

Ryan been less diligent in planning air strikes, or NA

crews less careful when executing them, then

I believe that we would have lost the political and the public su

to continue these operations. They would have ceased. And I 

think we would have people in Dayton today talking about 

That’s a firm conviction of mine, and believe me, I’m probably a

as anybody in terms of experience and knowledge to make that 

ment, because I was there watching it day by day.75

One high-ranking NATO official later put it in more p

terms, describing General Ryan’s painstaking efforts t

collateral damage as ‘‘very wise because, if somethi

282
gone wrong, he would have been on the next plane 

Moreover, General Ryan personally accepted responsib

collateral damage, later telling an audience in London,

If you’re the commander of an air operation [collateral damage is

business, nobody else’s business. . . . Don’t let it get down to th

vidual aircrew or unit. If they screw it up, it’s normally your scre

not theirs.77

The lack of tolerance for collateral damage amongst 

political authorities was consistent with the concept 

portionality from the laws of armed conflict.78 Accor

official NATO statements, there was no military objectiv

than to defend the remaining safe areas.79 UN political 

ities reportedly directed the RRF to halt offensive ope

after the second day of Deliberate Force, demonstrat

absence of official support within the UN for any posit

itary objective.80 With no enemy, ostensibly, and no ove

ical backing for leveling the playing field, it would hav

difficult for NATO commanders to make the case th

appreciable collateral damage was proportional to the 

objective of the operation.81 By minimizing collateral d

General Ryan and Admiral Smith were working wit

confines of the laws of armed conflict and the narrow o

for bombing established by the UN.

AFSOUTH commanders’ concerns for collateral d

were apparently driven mainly by their desire to m

political cohesion within the alliance and with the UN.

the outset of Deliberate Force, NATO officers in Napl

ducted a precision-attack marketing pitch. As with pre

ferences during the Gulf War, AFSOUTH displayed 

videos of precision munitions slamming into military ta

In addition to these public presentations, Admiral Sm

sented General Janvier a photograph to impress upon 

commander NATO’s sensitivity toward collateral dama

the alliance’s ability to limit it.84

Contained in the photo was a large building with a re

ringed by other buildings. The picture, taken by 

reconnaissance aircraft, clearly showed the outermos

ings flattened, inner buildings left standing as a buff

the large building bearing the red cross untouched.85

283
Minimizing the number of BSA soldiers killed by De

Force air operations was also important for keeping the 

board with NATO, and it was something General Ryan 

to make a priority based on the peace-support natur

mission. General Ryan’s chief planner, Colonel Zoerb, 

fied certain elite BSA troops as desirable targets, believ

best way to stop Mladic was to attack his most effectiv

ing forces.86 Two years after the campaign, when asked 

the myriad political constraints bounding the air op

General Ryan added,

There was one that was unsaid . . . no one ever told me to do thi

limit carnage—limit loss of life. So, we didn’t hit buildings tha

apparent administrative functions. . . . So we limited by time of d

function, by location, loss of life on the Bosnian Serb Army side

As his chief of staff noted, ‘‘Anytime there was doubt, 

n’t bomb. . . . When we went after targets where ther

be people around, we went at two o’clock in the morni

clear attempt on Mike’s part to minimize loss of life.’’88 G

Ryan’s efforts not only helped to keep the UN from b

ranks, they also apparently facilitated the peace nego

later at Dayton. At the Dayton peace talks, one membe

Bosnian Serb negotiating team alleged large numbers of 

ties and collateral damage in an apparent attempt to stre

the Serb bargaining position, but President Milosev

missed the ruse, claiming “that there were only 25 fata

the whole air campaign.’’89

General Ryan had good political and practical reas

limiting BSA casualties. Political consent for the cam

especially from the UN, dictated that NATO bombing 

so far in attacking the Serbs.90 Avoiding BSA casua

much as possible kept NATO from crossing a fuz

between coercive diplomacy and war. The UN could n

openly endorsed a campaign against the BSA without 

Security Council resolution, and Russia would certain

vetoed that. Without the UN’s legitimizing acquiescence 

campaign, NATO would probably have called for an 

Deliberate Force, leaving the US to decide whether to 

continue with an ad hoc coalition. Moreover, had G

Ryan purposely targeted BSA troops in their barracks o

284
field, he would have initiated a dynamic that would ha

difficult to control. As one senior NATO staff officer put i

knows that once you kill somebody over there, it bec

family . . . vendetta, or religious thing, or whatever; 

hard to stop the cycle.’’91 AFSOUTH commanders knew 

Deliberate Force succeeded and a peace agreement fo

then NATO forces would be put on the ground in Bo

implement the agreement—and they would be respons

commanding that force. In all likelihood, the command

not want to poison the post-Deliberate Force environm

giving the Bosnian Serbs cause for revenge. Thus, politi

practical reasons militated against targeting BSA soldi

The Bombing Pause

Negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in the 

Yugoslavia were ostensibly separate from the air 

which were conducted for the much narrower purpose 

viating the Bosnian Serb threat to safe areas. Al

General Ryan and Richard Holbrooke maintained an 

length relationship and denied any connection betwe

negotiations and Deliberate Force, the two processes 

linked on the second day of the campaign.92 At Mil

instigation, through Paris and the UN—and with Holb

support through Washington—General Janvier was in

meet with General Mladic to discuss a halt to the bom

Janvier asked for a 24-hour hold on air strikes, and A

Smith consented.94 Late evening on 31 August, the CAO

was notified to withhold all attacks after 4:00 A.M. the 

ing morning—about 50 hours after the campaign had 

On 1 September, Generals Janvier and Mladic met 

border town of Zvornik,95 and Janvier sought to gain M

signature on a document pledging compliance with U

NATO demands.96 The initial 24-hour pause was overc

events as the meeting between the two commanders st

toward the 14-hour mark. At the end of the meeting, 

brought Janvier a letter promising a Bosnian Serb ce

and a withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone so 

NATO and Bosnian government forces fulfilled certa

conditions.97 Janvier refused to sign Mladic’s letter but 

285
Zagreb confident the BSA commander would soon a

Western demands.98 Admiral Smith and a small en

from Naples flew to Zagreb to meet Janvier at his com

on the airport at Camp Pleso.99 Janvier convinced A

Smith he had made significant progress toward getting 

to agree to halt BSA attacks on safe areas and to w

heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.100 Without 

political approval, Smith agreed to Janvier’s prop

extend the pause to 96 hours in order to give Mladic 

comply.101 General Ryan’s chief of staff, who was at th

ing between Janvier and Smith, notified the AIRSOUT

mander that it looked as though Deliberate Force m

over, but General Ryan ‘‘just postured the forces, gettin

to go again.’’102

The reactions of Holbrooke and Willy Claes to news 

longer pause demonstrated the political-military tensio

cive diplomacy can engender over who gets to control 

of force. Upon learning of the elongated pause, the two 

cal officials began pressing Admiral Smith and G

Janvier to resume bombing. Richard Holbrooke sp

Admiral Smith by phone, pushing him to restart th

paign.103 Smith rebuffed pressures from outside the c

command104 and, in Holbrooke’s opinion, the admir

edging into an area of political judgments that shou

been reserved for civilian leaders.’’105 As Holbrooke 

‘‘Smith saw it differently: He told me that he was 

responsible’ for the safety and well-being of his forces, 

would make his decision, under authority delegated to 

the NATO Council, based on his own judgment.’’106 H

Admiral Smith could not easily dismiss General Jo

complaints.107 Although Admiral Smith had been giv

NATO key for bombing, General Joulwan believed once 

tions commenced, he and the secretary-general were 

sible for ensuring proper execution.108 Meanwhile, the 

secretary-general phoned Zagreb and asked Mr. Akash

Janvier on the phone. Even though Janvier was not 

NATO chain of command, Claes raged at the UN gen

agreeing to the longer pause.109 Given that NATO’s cre

was at stake and given the importance of Holbrooke’s 

286
macy, Holbrooke and Claes apparently could not tolera

ing the bombing decisions entirely to the discretion of t

ater commanders.

The matter was finally settled by an ultimatum fr

NAC. On the evening of 2 September, NATO ambassad

to take up the issue of resuming Deliberate Force. Sec

General Claes, ‘‘ruling on his own authority,’’ told th

ambassadors they were assembled to reaffirm an earli

mitment to back the military commanders in their de

they were not gathered to decide themselves whe

resume bombing.110 The meeting lasted into Sunday m

3 September, and ended with an ultimatum threate

resume air strikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not (1) rem

heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer exclusion zone 

Sarajevo; (2) cease all attacks on the remaining fo

areas; and (3) lift the siege of Sarajevo by allowing unh

access by road and air to the Bosnian capital.111 Accor

the ultimatum, the military commanders were free to 

mence bombing operations ‘‘at any moment.’’112

The extended pause brought Admiral Smith and R

Holbrooke, the two officials responsible for the d

aspects of Western policy toward Bosnia, into conflict ov

would control NATO airpower. According to Hol

Admiral Smith used the risk to his forces and the au

granted him by NATO as a shield to block Holbrooke’s a

to influence bombing decisions. Holbrooke was leading 

ations on behalf of the West and was responsible for t

come of what seemed to be the last, best chance to get 

deal not only in Bosnia but in all of the former Yugosl

Though he had a hand in stopping the bombing, 

blocked by Admiral Smith and General Janvier from res

it. Moreover, according to Holbrooke, Admiral Smith 

General Ryan from having any contact with Holb

team.114 Holbrooke could not invoke civilian control o

military himself to restart the bombing, so he pres

views through those in Washington and Brussels wh

exert pressure on Admiral Smith through US and 

chains of command.115 From a negotiator’s perspec

would have been helpful to have the legitimacy of allian

287
port and military responsiveness without the compli

associated with getting 16 nations to agree on a commo

tion and without having to act through military comm

whose allegiances were to their forces and to diverse i

tional political authorities. As Holbrooke later wrote: ‘

deal of any good negotiation is improvisation within the 

work of a general goal.’’116 Improvisation would not be 

ble without some control over the ‘‘sticks’’ used in c

diplomacy. From the standpoint of a military comma

would have been desirable to get clear objectives and p

cover for operations without interference or remote s

from outside the chain of command. In addition to p

conflicts between military objectives of an operation a

shifting aims inherent in improvised negotiations, peop

side the chain of command are unlikely to be held acco

for problems resulting from their interference in oper

matters. Thus, with coercive diplomacy, political-milita

sion over who gets to control the use of force is p

inevitable.

The NATO ultimatum authorized General Janvi

Admiral Smith to resume bombing at their discretion, 

two commanders elected to give Mladic time to comp

the ultimatum.117 On the night of 4 September, poor w

over Bosnia hindered NATO’s attempts to verify signs 

compliance.118 The weather cleared the next morning, 

and NATO commanders were soon convinced that t

majority of Serb heavy weapons remained inside Sa

exclusion zone; by mid-morning they decided to go ahe

more air strikes.119 At 1:05 P.M. on 5 September, NA

power once again began paring away at the BSA’s war-

potential.120

Leveling the Playing

Field and Coercing the Serbs

As discussed in chapter 2, air strategy is mainly a m

targeting decisions intended to lead to the accomplish

some objective. By keeping a tight hold on information 

targets and battle damage assessment (BDA), Genera

and Admiral Smith controlled bombing strategy.

288
In doing so, the two sought to minimize risks to thei

while maximizing their chances of achieving the objec

Deliberate Force. In the process though, Admiral Sm

ther alienated himself from Richard Holbrooke and 

some NATO political authorities who believed bombing 

tions were going too far.

New Objectives

During the bombing pause, NATO clarified the officia

tive of Deliberate Force, giving General Ryan a better 

to level the playing field and allowing Richard Holbrook

scope to use the campaign as part of his coercive dip

As Admiral Smith later put it, ‘‘The goalposts got move

day prior to the pause, the AFSOUTH commander t

press, ‘‘Our operation has one objective. It was stated 

by Secretary-General Claes at NATO and that objecti

reduce the threat to the Sarajevo safe area and to deter 

attacks there or on any other safe area.’’121 However

first press conference after the pause, Smith stated,

Now there are three conditions and you know that they are

• no attacks on safe areas,

• begin immediately a withdrawal of all heavy weapons from t

kilometer exclusion zone and complete that withdrawal witho

halts or delays, and

289

SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 

AUGUST 27 28 29 30 SEPTEMBER 1 

Trigger Pause 

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

Pause Pause Bombing Fis

resumed; Ey

1305 CET N-

10 11 12 13 14 15 

Cruise Cease-fire

missile

strike

Figure 4. Time Line of Operation Deliberate Force. (The sha

shows days on which NATO conducted bombing operations. Al

September is not shaded, NATO did drop bombs that day before t

went into effect at 4:00 A.M. Central European Time.)

30 31

5 6 78 

Bombing 

resumed; 

1305 CET 

10 11 12 13

Cruise 

missile

strike
complete freedom of movement for the UN forces and reco

humanitarian aid distribution assets, as well as free acc

Sarajevo airport.122

CINCSOUTH stressed, ‘‘Those objectives remain, they 

negotiable.’’123 This suggested these three conditions for 

Deliberate Force had existed from the beginning of the cam

but no such terms had been publicly articulated prior to t

ultimatum issued on 3 September.124 More revealingly, A

Smith concluded the press conference by saying,

Let me just tell you that we have a pretty good idea of what we w

accomplish in these operations. And whether it’s visible to us o

at this point I think we’re making progress towards achieving th

that we desired. So I’m satisfied that we know enough about ex

targets to affect the military capability if we continue this proce

These remarks suggested the objective of Deliberate Fo

to achieve a certain level of destruction against the B

Serb military; that is, to level the playing field betwe

and Federation forces. Admiral Smith later conceded t

never said what our objective was publicly,’’ and th

objective was, in fact, to draw down the BSA’s militar

bility in order to put them on a more even level wit

adversaries.126

As a result of Admiral Smith’s press conference 

September, General Joulwan issued a ‘‘Media Pol

Operation Deliberate Force.’’127 The new policy directed 

dinate commanders to ‘‘above all, keep NATO political 

ities properly informed.’’128 Aimed at preventing the fir

about operations from reaching NATO ambassadors v

televisions, the new policy required all NATO officers 

clearance from Brussels before making any statem

Admiral Smith subsequently left it to one of his seni

officers, Group Capt Trevor Murray, to conduct press 

ences for the remainder of Deliberate Force.130 G

Joulwan later explained that ‘‘a very important part 

strategic commander is to acquire the political conse

give the operational commander flexibility, and to insu

hold 16 nations together.’’131 In General Joulwan’s view

the NATO nations got together in the council and fo

position, then that one position set the objectives for t

290
tary even though the common position was unlikely t

pletely satisfy each individual nation—including the 

States.132 Satisfied that NATO had established conditi

success in Bosnia, General Joulwan did not want his s

nates upsetting the fragile political consensus arran

Brussels.133

Battle Damage Assessment and Target Selection

Commanders in AFSOUTH were tight-lipped abo

results of the bombing as Deliberate Force progresse

that helped them to preserve their autonomy.134 At the 

of Deliberate Force, General Ryan saw to it that a m

went out directing all agencies involved in the opera

refrain from issuing estimates of BDA.135 As Genera

later explained, previous air operations stretching b

Vietnam taught him that tight controls were necessary

So that we didn’t have nations, or particular intelligence agencies 

ing BDA that was not corroborated and coming up with concl

from that. None of the nations knew what targets were approve

If you don’t know what the target set is, you can’t measure how 

doing, because you don’t know what your objective is. And the

none of the other agencies were empowered in any way to sa

whether we were accomplishing what we thought we needed to a

plish.136

General Ryan tracked the BDA very closely and provide

the information to Admiral Smith, who then decided w

release.137 Even General Janvier complained that he ha

culty getting BDA and never did get all of the damage 

ments.138 By controlling the BDA closely, AFSOUTH 

manders prevented people on the fringes of policy mak

people in the press from grading their performance.139 

kept NATO political authorities from ‘‘helping’’ the com

ers with operational decisions. Finally, tight controls o

kept the Serbs in the dark about NATO operations and 

tions. Speaking about BDA, General Ryan said,

We didn’t let Washington control it, or any of the other nations

tals control it, because you didn’t want to have people second-gu

what you were doing. The people you wanted second-guessing 

you were doing were the Serbs, not the capitals.140

291
Thus, maintaining operational autonomy was one of th

cipal purposes for the tight controls over BDA.

In addition to restricting the release of BDA infor

General Ryan exercised personal control in selecting e

strike target during Deliberate Force, further enhanc

autonomy.141 Mike Ryan and Rupert Smith nominated 

for approval by Admiral Smith and General Janvier

those targets or target complexes were approved, G

Ryan decided what to hit. In explaining his extrao

degree of control over targeting, General Ryan told a 

Force team studying the campaign that he was mo

mainly by his concern for collateral damage, saying:

You cannot delegate selection . . . There will be no time in the 

when [the air commander] will have the option to say, I delegat

responsibility. The commander must be accountable for all a

taken by his forces.142

A year after the Deliberate Force campaign, Genera

expanded on that point at an airpower conference in L

noting: ‘‘Your targeting is always going to be joint, it’s 

going to be political, and I guarantee it’s going to be o

so you’d better get it right.’’143 As the commander w

clearly responsible and accountable for the campaign

demanded control. Close control of target selection an

importantly, the secrecy surrounding the target lists m

well with controls on BDA to help General Ryan ens

maintained autonomy in executing the campaign. Thro

chain of command, General Ryan kept the NATO sec

general informed of the campaign and its progress.144 A

above, Ryan did not want people outside the chain o

mand second-guessing his decisions, and keeping a tig

trol over targeting supported his freedom to operate w

interference.

By controlling access to information about targets an

General Ryan made it extremely difficult for outsiders to 

his performance. Undoubtedly it also helped maintain 

cohesion and UN cooperation, at least for the duration 

campaign. Keeping quiet about the objective of leveling th

ing field prevented nations in the UN or NATO that mig

opposed weakening the BSA from breaking ranks. Gover

292
that were sympathetic to the Bosnian Serb side, but h

patience with the leaders in Pale, could go along with the 

ing while genuinely claiming (naively perhaps) not to 

measures that favored the Federation forces. Thus, the 

with which commanders in AFSOUTH guarded their ob

the targets they were hitting, and the progress of the ca

served to enhance the commanders’ operational aut

alliance solidarity, and UN acquiescence while the bom

falling. As the Balkans Air Campaign Study noted, secr

also necessary for operational security, enhancing bot

protection and mission accomplishment.145 Finally, it ga

manders and their political masters flexibility in deciding 

to go in prosecuting the campaign, making it difficult 

siders to challenge claims that the operation succee

achieving the planned objectives. From the perspective 

manders responsible for the outcome of the campaign, th

no immediate downside to controlling information about 

ing, BDA, or the campaign objective.

SEAD, Option 21⁄2, and Coercion

When NATO commanders finally got around to attack

heart of the Bosnian Serb air defense system in northw

Bosnia, the attacks served several different objective

demonstrating the potential leverage that force pro

gives commanders for influencing the use of airpower. 

after bombing resumed on 5 September, Admiral Sm

General Ryan sought to eliminate the heart of the B

defense network in northwestern Bosnia. Admiral Smi

stated he had received intelligence reports that the B

moved SAM batteries south from Banja Luka to positio

which they could threaten NATO aircraft traveling to an

their targets.146 Individual missile batteries were diff

track; however, the threat they posed to NATO aircraf

be greatly reduced by destroying about a dozen com

control, and communications facilities located in nor

ern Bosnia.147 In that way, missile batteries would be fo

work in an autonomous mode without the benefit of in

tion provided by the larger integrated air defense 

Operating autonomously, missile batteries would need 

293
their own radar, giving allied aircrews more warnin

simultaneously making SAM operators more suscep

attack from NATO SEAD aircraft. By deciding to exec

remainder of the Dead Eye plan, Admiral Smith and G

Ryan made Deliberate Force operations safer for NA

crews.148

The response from Brussels over a cruise missile 

during the execution of Dead Eye-northwest demonstra

accountability thrust upon commanders, even for pr

they had not caused. To reduce risks to allied airmen, A

Smith requested permission from Washington to use 

missiles against air defenses, and President Clinton rep

authorized the attacks on 7 September.149 However, t

sile attacks, scheduled for the night of 8–9 Septembe

delayed for approximately 36 hours by General Joulwa

could give NATO political authorities advance notice.

AFSOUTH commanders elected to go ahead with th

strikes into northwestern Bosnia early on 9 Septembe

stand-off munitions from NATO aircraft. Hurried

together and marred by technical glitches, the raid a

disappointing results.151 When cruise missile strikes 

did go ahead on 10 September, they caused an up

Brussels, particularly from the French who complained 

military authorities had overstepped their bounds by 

cruise missiles.152 For the military planners in AFSOU

cruise missile was just another weapon, and it had the 

tage of accuracy without risk to the lives of NATO air

The missile attack was coordinated through NATO hea

ters, but notification to NAC ambassadors went o

Sunday afternoon, 10 September, and the attack wa

that evening.154 Although the delays in notification ori

in Brussels,155 and even though AFSOUTH had approv

NATO Headquarters and Washington before the 

Admiral Smith was made to bear the brunt of the politi

icism for the cruise missile attack.156 This indicate

would be no political shielding from Brussels if militar

ations went awry.157

The political consternation over the cruise missile 

probably had more to do with political sensitivities ov

294
far NATO should go with its graduated air campaign th

the use of the missiles, per se. The French had lost a 

2000 on the first day of Deliberate Force, and its tw

crew was still missing, so it would have been illogical 

French to be upset about sending American missiles 

of French airmen against the Serb air defenses. 

September when the missile attack was made, AFSOUT

manders were running low on worthwhile Option 1 an

gets in southeastern Bosnia and wanted to ratchet 

pressure on the Serbs to get them to comply with the 

ultimatum from the previous week.158 Hitting Dead Eye 

in northwestern Bosnia not only gave commanders th

awaited opportunity to eliminate threats to NATO aircre

also gave them more targets to bomb. General Janvier 

nized the larger military significance of the Bosnian Ser

mand and control facilities and other targets on the De

list.159 The Bosnian Serbs were facing a ground offensi

Federation forces in western Bosnia, and Janvier viewe

Dead Eye northwest strikes as equivalent to Option 

strikes.160 Admiral Smith recalled discussing the issu

Janvier when General Ryan proposed hitting a large 

complex called the ‘‘Banja Luka SAM Repair Facility;’

later said he told Janvier,

I could defend it as an Option 2 target because that’s where the 

ties are, and we know that damned well they’ve got some SA

there. Or, I can say it’s a 21

⁄2, to 3, and take it off [the list for now

let’s try to get it later. I was frankly afraid, at this point, that if w

stepped at all, the NAC would say: Stop. Or the UN would say

The UN had already told the RRF to cease and desist. They 

“You’re not an offensive force. Stop.”161

Thus, the French reaction to the cruise missile stri

probably a signal of growing discomfort over the 

Deliberate Force was taking, rather than a sign of disp

about the choice of weapons being used in the campai

Having nearly run out of Option 1 and 2 targets, A

Smith refused to risk the lives of NATO airmen by s

them to revisit targets that had been destroyed on 

attacks. However, the lack of targets created a prob

295
Richard Holbrooke because NATO bombing was a use

for his negotiations with Milosevic.163 As General Ryan r

Holbrooke did some coordination, in telephone calls with [Ad

Snuffy [Smith], and with Joulwan, and through the State Depar

But, his biggest thing was: “Keep it up.” That was his advice. . . 

hitting them. Because it’s giving me great leverage, particularly o

Serbia.164

But the AFSOUTH commanders needed something to b

order to continue the campaign.165 Admiral Smith lat

fessed he was willing to get fired over certain issues, an

of them was going back after targets that didn’t make 

ference, and bombing holes in the ground.’’166 

September, there were few targets and DMPIs left to 

and poor weather continued to interfere with Deliberat

operations. Though they could scrape together enough 

for about another two days’ worth of bombing, the com

ers in AFSOUTH believed they were reaching the p

diminishing returns with Option 1 and 2 tar

Furthermore, the UN secretary-general appeared to be 

to find a way to end the bombing,168 and on 12 Sep

Russia introduced a draft resolution in the Security C

calling for an end to Deliberate Force.169 As Admira

later recalled,

When we started getting down to the bottom of that funnel, and w

running out of targets, I was encouraged by at least one individual 

chain of command to go back and hit targets a second time. And 

“No. I’ve been down that road, too. And I ain’t going to send these 

in there hitting holes in the ground because we don’t have the p

stomach to ratchet up the price. And we’re not going to do that.”17

According to Richard Holbrooke, some people in Washing

not believe the NATO commanders were running out of t

[US Secretary of State Warren] Christopher told me he doubte

the military had really exhausted all its authorized Option Two ta

But there was no way to question the military within its own a

responsibility—the military controlled the information and inde

ent verification was virtually impossible.171

Holbrooke was forced to make an unplanned ret

Belgrade on 13 September to try to get a cease-fire 

NATO commanders ran out of targets.172

296
As Deliberate Force air operations were coming to 

commanders in AFSOUTH turned up the psychologica

sure on the Serbs, including President Milosevic. At 

conference in Naples on 12 September, a member 

AFSOUTH staff handed out fact sheets on the F-117 

aircraft to journalists as they entered the room.173 Wh

NATO spokesman, RAF Group Capt Trevor Murray, beg

ing questions, reporters asked about the F-117, a topic t

not been featured in Murray’s briefing.174 Apparently ta

surprise, Group Capt Murray denied plans to bring 

into theater, much to the bemusement of the journalis

were left wondering why they had been given th

sheets.175 F-117s had originally been a serious consid

for attacks against Bosnian Serb air defenses, and s

equipment and personnel for the stealthy planes were 

in Italy.176 By 12 September, F-117s were no longer nee

Bosnia, and the apparent press conference snafu was a 

lated attempt to make Serbia’s president wonder wha

be coming next.177 Around the same time, offic

AFSOUTH began admitting to the press that NATO w

ning out of Option 1 and 2 targets, and it was time to c

Option 3.178 Admiral Smith and General Ryan believe

psychological pressures might intimidate not only G

Mladic, but also Milosevic, who would have been con

already over the influx of refugees poised to enter 

because of the Federation ground offensive in Bosnia.

weather over Bosnia led NATO to cancel nearly half of 

ties on 13 September as Richard Holbrooke held a 

arranged meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade.180 Ho

later wrote that this was his ‘‘moment of maximum le

and NATO bombing his ‘‘best bargaining chip.’’181 After 

hours of talks, Milosevic produced President Karadz

General Mladic, and that night the Serbs agreed to th

of the 3 September NATO ultimatum.182 The bombing w

pended for 72 hours to give the Serbs a chance to comp

the agreement they had signed. After another 72 h

allow the BSA to complete its withdrawal of heavy w

from around Sarajevo, Deliberate Force officially ended

297
Aftermath: More of the Same

Though Deliberate Force helped end the war in Bo

did nothing to resolve two of the principal tensions und

the contest to control airpower during Deny Flight: 

political-military tension over who controls the use o

and (2) the soldier-airman controversy over the efficacy 

power. As NATO planners made preparations for the 

implementation force (IFOR), they sought to ‘‘NAC pro

aerial rules of engagement to make sure NATO airmen 

not again be hobbled in using force for self-def

Meanwhile, to make sure Admiral Smith was respon

political direction from Brussels, someone at NATO hea

ters proposed sending to Naples a special representativ

NATO secretary-general.184 This political overseer woul

ate much the same as Mr. Akashi had for the UN sec

general.185 Admiral Smith balked at the suggestion

claiming,

I got a call one time from Mons saying that the NAC was going t

a Secretary-General’s Special Rep to whom I would be responsib

And I said: “Well when you send him, send another CINC, becau

going to be gone.” They didn’t send him.186

When Smith later came under fire for not using the au

granted to him in the Dayton accords to apprehend su

war criminals, he claimed,

I told [NATO political authorities] time and again: “You want me 

after the [war] criminals, fine. You give me the orders, get . . . out 

way, but understand there’s a price. There are going to be a lot o

ple killed. Probably going to set this peace process back a lon

But you give me the order, we’ll go get them. We may not be su

ful, but we’ll give it a . . . good try.” They didn’t like that.187

Admiral Smith apparently believed that whatever author

given to him under the Dayton agreement, he still need

cific political orders from Brussels before using alliance f

dangerous circumstances. And once given those ord

wanted the alliance’s political authorities to stay out of th

ational details. At his change of command and prematur

ment in July 1996,188 Admiral Smith cautioned his succ

298
The further away people are from the problems, the more apt th

to have a solution for them. And . . . those who shout loudest f

or that action, are the ones who bear absolutely no responsibi

the consequences of those actions.189

Political authorities are unlikely to be comfortable 

the sort of explicit commitments Admiral Smith desi

Richard Betts argued, diplomats and politicians value 

ity just as military officers value commitment to policy 

tives.190 Moreover, using force creates a dynamic all of i

and there is little incentive for a politician to commit 

porting a course of action that might lead to unintend

undesired consequences. It is far safer, politically, t

one’s choices open and to keep an arms-length relat

with policy implementation when it has the potential t

fire. This calculus can lead to political pressure for 

without guarantees of political support for a com

should things go wrong. The riskier the venture, the 

disincentive a political official would have for making 

accountable for the consequences. However, when an 

tion poses high risks, military commanders will want t

their political masters aware of potential dangers a

want assurances that a proposed course of action i

what is desired. Guarantees from special represen

secretary-generals, and assistant secretaries of executive 

ments are unlikely to suffice. Their authority is derivati

they may have agendas not fully supported by the 

political leaders at the top of the chain of com

Furthermore, because of the clear accountability th

with a military chain of command, commanders 

depend on these second- and third-tier officials for top 

Though the need to use airpower diminished greatly w

end of Deliberate Force, the political-military tension ov

trolling the use of force in Bosnia continued.

Assessments of Deliberate Force have confirmed R

Betts’s conclusion that beliefs for and against airpower 

become articles of faith and that people on both sides 

airpower debate often draw opposite conclusions fr

same evidence.191 General Cot saw the Deliberate Fo

strikes as long-range air support, and he judged that t

299
was a more important factor in the campaign

s succ

least around Sarajevo, especially because, unlike airpo

did not depend on the weather of the moment.’’192 G

Briquemont believed what really mattered in 1995 w

change in the balance of power on the ground agai

Serbs.193 Finally, General Rose did not give the air ca

much credit for bringing the war to an end, noting,

The NATO air campaign in Bosnia in August and September 

formed part of a series of strategic actions taking place at that 

These included the use of artillery and mortar by the UN 

Reaction Force to neutralise [sic] the Bosnian Serb heavy we

around Sarajevo, the Croat-Muslim Federation ground offensive 

west of Bosnia, and most important of all, the emergence of a p

settlement acceptable to all sides. The NATO air campaign w

more than a useful signal to the Serbs that the peacekeeping 

had been suspended and that the West was now prepared to 

greater level of enforcement than before.194

Such judgments were consistent with the thinking o

generals during their tenures in command with th

reflecting the traditional soldiers’ views of airpower as 

porting arm for the land forces.

The views of NATO officers also changed little, and 

placed greater weight than did nonairmen on airpowe

tribution to ending the war. General Ashy viewed th

paign as a success, seeing it as an execution of the p

he had done as far back as 1993.195 General Ryan a

‘‘There were lots of other things going on; there was a 

operation going on in the west, there was diplomatic eff

There was a lot going on, but Air Power is a decisive fo

The Balkans Air Campaign Study team reached the sam

clusion.197 Presumably, being a decisive force means 

was a necessary but perhaps not a sufficient element a

the factors leading the Bosnian Serbs to comply with 

September NATO ultimatum. General Ryan’s chief p

Colonel Zoerb, considered the NATO airpower contribu

more important than that of the RRF.198 Admiral Smit

had been less enthusiastic about using airpower than 

component commanders, believed there was ‘‘a conflu

events that occurred in the June, July, August, Sep

time frame that all came together very, very nicely to m

300
power look a lot better, perhaps, than airpower was.

point here is not to decide which judgment on the a

paign best captures its significance in the confluence o

during the summer of 1995, but to note that the partic

views on airpower changed little as a result of the ca

and that airmen placed a higher value on the airpower 

bution than did soldiers.

Conclusion

During Deliberate Force, the soldier-airman dimensio

struggle for control over NATO airpower was less significa

the political-military dimension. Once General Janvier ap

the first list of targets at the start of the campaign, 

between Janvier and Admiral Smith diminished great

reflected the alignment of expertise and command respon

airmen controlled airpower in pursuit of a mission for wh

were responsible. As the responsible air commander, 

Ryan was given the freedom to use his expertise to man

campaign and the risks to his forces. Thanks largely to 

Smith, UN ground forces were able to defend themselves a

little need to call for air support.200 Because General Sm

delegated UN control for CAS, and Ryan had agreed tha

would nominate CAS targets, General Smith possessed v

complete control over the CAS mission. Therefore, as the 

sible ground commander, Smith controlled resources co

surate with his responsibilities. These arrangements work

not because of any formal doctrine (there was none) but b

they reflected the advantages, from a military perspec

marrying expertise, responsibility, and autonomy.201

The political-military aspect of the contest to contro

airpower was less harmonious. Because the bombin

Holbrooke leverage in his negotiations, he wanted som

trol over airpower—more than Admiral Smith was wi

concede. Holbrooke’s negotiations were part of a large

that Deliberate Force supported. Therefore, it was onl

ral for Holbrooke to want to control NATO airpower, es

in light of his limited ability to influence other elemen

porting his coercive diplomacy, such as the Federation 

offensive. However, Admiral Smith’s superior expertise 

301
itary matters and his responsibility for the lives o

forces—not just US forces—led him to resist pressures 

from outside the chain of command. Expertise, con

information, and responsibility for NATO forces also 

for theater-level commanders as powerful tools for k

control over Operation Deliberate Force. This strong m

influence in such a highly politicized operation did not 

with some of the political authorities concerned.

Notes

1. Facts On File Yearbook 1995 (USA: Facts On File, Inc., 1996)

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 629.

4. David Binder, ‘‘Bosnia’s Bombers,’’ The Nation, 2 October 19

and Joris Janssen Lok, ‘‘Deny Flight Turns to Affirmative Action

Defence Weekly, 9 September 1995, 57.

5. Kevin Fedarko, ‘‘Louder Than Words,’’ Time, 11 September 1

and John Ridding, Harriet Martin, and Laura Silber, ‘‘Bosnian Threa

Talks Unless NATO Punishes Serbs,’’ Financial Times (London), 3

1995, 1.

6. Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, “US Warns Serbs as Bosn

Resume,” Financial Times (London), 28 August 1995, 2.

7. Rick Atkinson, ‘‘The Anatomy of NATO’s Decision to Bomb 

International Herald Tribune, 17 November 1995, 2; Binder, 336

Bruce W. Nelan, ‘‘The Balkans: More Talking, More Bombing,’’ 

September 1995, 76.

8. Nelan, 76; and Harriet Martin, ‘‘UN Threatens Raids as Mort

Kills 37 in Sarajevo,” Financial Times (London), 29 August 1995, 1

9. Maj Gen Michael C. Short, USAF, chief of staff, Allied A

Southern Europe, July 1995–May 1996, Naples, interviewed by a

May 1997, Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany, tape recording, auth

sonal collection; Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, director, Deny F

Operations Center, Naples, Italy, January 1994–May 1996, interv

author, 25 May 1997; Col Steven Teske, USAF, CAOC director 

May–November 1995, interviewed by author, 6 May 1997, Aviano 

tape recording, author’s personal collection; and Atkinson, 2.

10. Military Official Q.

11. Royal Welch Fusiliers (RWF), 1st Battalion, White Dragon: T

Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia (Wrexham, UK: RWF Regimental Head

1995), 69–70.

12. Atkinson, 2; Col Robert C. Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case 

Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air U

Press, 2000), 135; and Military Official Q.

13. Owen, 131.

302
14. Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, French army, commander of United 

Protection Force, Zagreb, Croatia, March 1995–December 1995, int

by author, 12 January 1998, Paris, author’s notes, author’s person

tion; and Maj Michael O. Beale, Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Air

Bosnia-Herzegovina (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press), 36. 

citing a US admiral said that by the end of August the UN had red

number of peacekeepers in Bosnia from a peak of ‘‘22,000 to fe

3,600.’’ Steve Komarow, ‘‘U.N. Pullback Gives NATO Jets Breathin

USA Today, 13 September 1995, 1. There were some Russian sold

Bosnian Serb-held area near Sarajevo but, because of the traditio

relationship between the Serbs and Russians, they were not expec

in any danger of being taken hostage. Facts On File Yearbook 1995

15. Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, ‘‘The Balkans Air Campaign St

2,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 3 (autumn 1997): 7, (hereafter cited 

“Balkans: Part 2”).

16. Owen, Deliberate Force, 110.

17. Ibid., 131–32; Col Steve Teske, USAF, interviewed by 

Christopher Campbell, et al., 14 February 1996, Ramstein AB, G

transcripts of taped interview, Balkans Air Campaign Study 

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Daniel R. Zoerb, interviewed by author, 29 April 1997, Spangdah

Germany, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection

18. United States Department of Defense (DOD), ‘‘DOD News 

Pentagon, 29 August 1995 (1:30 P.M.), transcript of press co

http://www.dtic.mil:80//defenselink/news.

19. Owen, Deliberate Force, 135; and Teske, 14 February 1996

20. Military Official Q.

21. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, interviewed by author, 10 

1998, Arlington, Virginia, transcript of tape recording, author’s pers

lection; Short interview; and Atkinson.

22. Janvier interview; and Smith interview.

23. Smith interview. Admiral Smith admitted he was exagger

urgency slightly because the first round of strikes were going 

defense targets and did not require Janvier’s approval. However, th

batch of strikes, which Janvier did need to approve, was schedule

two hours of the first.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.; Janvier interview; Military Official Q; and Owen, D

Force, 410.

28. Smith interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

29. During and after Deliberate Force, some observers interp

repeated bombing of certain targets as wasted attacks against hol

ground. See Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), “NATO O

Deliberate Force,” transcript of press briefing, Naples, 9 Septem

303
(5:00 P.M.), http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/archives.htm; 

September 1995; and Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Sr

Record of a War Crime (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 186 n.11.

30. Col W. Hays Parks, “ ‘Precision’ Bombing and ‘Area’ Bomb

Did Which, and When?” Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 1 (Mar

145–74.

31. Target Descriptions: Pale Ammo Depot South and Hadzi

Storage Depot, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.

32. The DOD Dictionary of Military Terms contains four US defin

the word target and five NATO definitions. The first definition offered 

United States and NATO usage is: ‘‘a geographical area, complex, 

lation planned for capture or destruction by military forces.’’ The d

does not include a listing for either aim point or desired mean point o

or DMPI, which air planners, targeteers, and aircrews use to denot

targets within a larger target complex. Joint Chiefs of Staff, US De

of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms (London: Greenhill Books, 19

33. Owen, Deliberate Force, 199; and Gen Michael E. Ryan, US

mander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe and commander US Sixt

Force, September 1994–April 1996, slides from a briefing to A

Conference, London, 13 September 1996, slide nos. 43 and 44. Of 

1,026 bombs dropped, 738 were PGMs.

34. Adm Leighton W. Smith, commander in chief NATO Allie

Southern Europe, briefing to the US Air Force Air War College, Maxw

Ala., 9 November 1995, videocassette of briefing, File MISC-19, fo

BACS Collection.

35. Target Descriptions: Pale Ammo Depot South and Hadzi

Storage Depot, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.

36. Owen, Deliberate Force, 410–11; and Gen Joseph W. Ash

interviewed by Lt Col Robert Owen, 29 April 1996, Washington, un

version of “General Ashy’s Oral History Interview,” (66 pp.) redacte

Air Force Historical Research Agency, October 1997, Office of His

Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. MCM-KAD-084-93, ‘‘Op

Options for Airstrikes,’’ from August of 1993 contained an explicit s

directing NATO commanders to try to minimize collateral damage.

37. Target Descriptions: Hadzici Ammo Storage Depot, Militar

Depot, and Storage Facility, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.

38. Ibid.

39. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

40. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

41. Target Description: Sarajevo Army Barracks and Ordnanc

File C2a(2), BACS Collection.

42. Smith, briefing Air War College; and Col Daniel R. Zoerb, USA

viewed by author, 30 April 1997, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, tran

tape recording, author’s personal collection.

43. Smith interview; and Military Official Q.

44. Janvier interview; and Military Official Q.

304
45. Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Random House, 

and 103. According to Holbrooke: ‘‘Annan’s gutsy performance in thos

four hours was to play a central role in Washington’s strong support 

year later as the successor to Boutros Boutros-Ghali as secretary-gene

United Nations. Indeed, in a sense, Annan won the job on that day.’’

46. Smith interview.

47. Adm Leighton W. Smith, USN, ‘‘NATO Air Strike Agains

Serbs,’’ transcript of news conference, 31 August 1995 (10

http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/archives.htm.

48. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 9.

49. Ryan interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

50. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 9; Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF

commander Sixteenth Air Force and CAOC director, N

1994–September 1996, interviewed by Maj Tim Reagan and D

Thompson, 16 October 1995, Vicenza, Italy, transcript of tape r

BACS Collection; Zoerb interview, 30 April 1997; and Short intervi

51. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 9; and Owen, Deliberate Force, 15

410–11.

52. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, “NATO Air Operations in 

Herzegovina: Deliberate Force, 29 August–14 September 1995,” tran

briefing to Air Power Conference, London, 13 September 1996; a

interview, 29 April 1997.

53. Ryan, transcript of briefing to Air Power Conference; and Zo

view, 29 April 1997.

54. Ryan, transcript of briefing to Air Power Conference; and Zo

view, 29 April 1997.

55. Owen, Deliberate Force, 111 and 136–37.

56. The French Mirage 2000 shot down on the first day of D

Force was hit by a shoulder-fired, infrared-guided SAM near 

Attacking the Bosnian Serb IADS could do little to neutralize such 

and the best defense against them was to stay above their reach.

57. See chap. 7 of this publication.

58. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 7.

59. Owen, Deliberate Force, 111 and 136.

60. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997; and Owen, Deliberate Force, 

136.

61. Ryan interview; and Zoerb interview, 30 April 1998.

62. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of War (Novat

Presidio Press, 1993), 45.

63. To differentiate between the types of targets that were bomb

refer to targets hit in order to degrade the BSA’s war-fighting pot

‘‘Deliberate Force targets,’’ using that term interchangeably with ‘‘

targets.’’ The other category of targets hit during Operation Deliber

will be referred to as ‘‘Dead Eye targets,’’ a term I will alternate 

defense targets’’ or ‘‘IADS targets.’’

64. Ryan interview.

305
65. Ibid.; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

66. General Ryan and a handful of other CAOC leaders and US 

hardly slept from the outset of Deliberate Force until the pause 

later. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 10; Owen, Deliberate Force, 113, 

487; Teske interview by author; and Ryan interview.

67. See, for example, United States Department of Defense, Co

the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (n.p.: Government 

Office, April 1992), appendix O, ‘‘The Role of the Law of War,’’ esp

and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), The Democratic Manag

Defence, Whitehall Paper 16 (London: RUSI, 1992), 48–52.

68. Ryan interview; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conferen

69. The reason why the priorities ought to align this way fo

same logic as in the discussion of ROE, weakness errors, and e

errors covered in chap. 2, section entitled “Rules of Enga

Circumstances for Force.”

70. Owen, Deliberate Force, 383 and 416–21. Admiral Smith m

point repeatedly in his press conferences during Deliberate Force a

briefing to the Air War College.

71. Owen, Deliberate Force, 150 and 411–12.

72. Ibid.

73. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 17–18.

74. Smith, briefing to Air War College; and Ryan, transcript of A

Conference.

75. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

76. NATO Official C.

77. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

78. As discussed in chap. 6. For a discussion of collateral dam

portionality, and future implications regarding PGMs, see Owen, D

Force, 410–12 and 416–21.

79. NATO, Press Release (95) 73, 30 August 1995; and Smith, t

of news conference, 31 August 1995.

80. Smith interview; Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 14. A key plan

Chief G2/G3 on the RRF Operations Staff (RRFOS), Col D. V. Nicho

no mention in his article for RUSI Journal of UN orders to halt offens

ations. However, RUSI’s annual International Security Review 

reported the RRF fired 1,000 shells before the pause on 1 Septem

an RRFOS briefing showed 1,381 total rounds fired when the c

ended on 14 September. Col David V. Nicholls, Royal Marines, ‘‘Bo

and NATO,’’ RUSI Journal 141, no. 1 (February 1996): 35–36; Roy

Services Institute, International Security Review 1996 (London: RUS

69; Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff, ‘‘HQ 1 (UK) ARMD DIV 

Brief, 17 November 95,’’ slide no. 25.

81. For a discussion of collateral damage, proportionality, an

implications regarding PGMs, see Owen, Deliberate Force, chap. 14 

Ronald M. Reed.

82. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

306
83. Smith, 

NATO Air Strikes, press conference, 31 August 19

Atkinson, ‘‘NATO Tailors Bombing Information,” Washington 

September 1995, A20; and William Matthews, ‘‘Accuracy is Phen

Air Force Times, 2 October 1995, 10.

84. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

85. When the author interviewed General Janvier in 1998 an

about the photo, the general had his military aid fetch the frame

graph from his office.

86. Zoerb interview, 29 April 1997.

87. Ryan interview.

88. Short interview.

89. Amb. Christopher Hill, US State Department, interviewed 

Robert Owen, 27 February 1996, transcript of tape recording, 

BACS Collection. Also see Beale, 37. Note: The figure of 25 killed is 

taken as an official or reliable estimate of the number of casual

Deliberate Force.

90. Janvier interview.

91. Lt Gen Patrick K. Gamble, USAF, assistant chief of staff, O

and Logistics, SHAPE, interviewed by author, 2 July 1998, Washing

recording, author’s personal collection.

92. The connections between the two appear to have been indir

Holbrooke working through the State Department or NATO Head

only once calling Admiral Smith directly.

93. Janvier interview; Holbrooke, 107–14; and Atkinson, ‘‘An

NATO’s Decision.’’

94. AFSOUTH, ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force” Fact Sheet, 5 October 

95. Janvier interview; Facts On File Yearbook 1995, 645.

96. Military Official Q.

97. Ibid.

98. Short interview; Rick Atkinson, ‘‘Put to the Test, NATO S

Mettle,” International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1995, 2; and 

Official Q.

99. Smith interview; Short interview; and Military Official Q.

100. Ibid.

101. Smith interview; and Military Official Q.

102. Short interview; and Atkinson, ‘‘Put to the Test.’’

103. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Smith intervi

Holbrooke, 118.

104. Smith interview; Holbrooke, 118.

105. Holbrooke, 118.

106. Ibid.

107. Smith interview; Joulwan interview, 11 February 19

Holbrooke, 118–19.

108. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998. In my interview with 

Joulwan, he said he cited the terms of reference set up by the first S

307
General Eisenhower, to support his case for taking the role as chi

tor for Operation Deliberate Force.

109. Janvier interview; and Atkinson, ‘‘Put to the Test.’’

110. Holbrooke, 120; NATO Officials C and D.

111. DOD News Briefing, Pentagon, 5 September 1995.

112. NATO, ‘‘Statement by the Secretary-General Following 

Meeting-2 September 1995,’’ Press Release, 3 September 1995.

113. Holbrooke, 119.

114. Ibid., 145 and 362.

115. Holbrooke, 118–20.

116. Ibid., 111.

117. NATO, ‘‘Statement Following Council Meeting,’’ 3 Septemb

118. Admiral Smith, ‘‘NATO Recommences Air Strikes Against 

Serbs,’’ transcript of press conference, 6 September 1995.

119. Smith, ‘‘NATO Recommences;’’ and Military Official Q.

120. Smith, ‘‘NATO Recommences;’’ and John Thornhill, John 

and Bruce Clark, “Hardline Serbs Solve West’s Dilemma,” Financ

(London), 6 September 1995, 2.

121. Admiral Smith, “NATO Air Strike Against Bosnian Serbs,” t

of news conference, Naples, 31 August 1995.

122. Smith, “NATO Recommences.’’

123. Ibid.

124. Smith interview.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and Atkinson

Tailors.’’

128. Gen George Joulwan, cited in Atkinson, ‘‘NATO Tailors.’’

129. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and Atkinson

Tailors.’’

130. Admiral Smith next appeared at a press conference 

September, a day after suspending Deliberate Force bombing op

Group Captain Murray ran the meetings with the media on 9, 11

September. Group Captain Murray’s press conferences were all hel

P.M. Central European Time (CET), in keeping with General Joulwa

ance. See transcripts of AFSOUTH press conferences 6, 9, 11, 12

September 1995; and Atkinson, ‘‘NATO Tailors.’’

131. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. For a discussion of the other reasons for controlling BD

Deliberate Force, see the chapter by Maj Mark McLaughlin entitled, 

Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility,’’ in Owen, Deliberate F

135. Ryan interview. See also Owen, Deliberate Force, 183–

Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 13.

136. Ryan interview.

308
137. Ibid.; and Smith interview.

138. Janvier interview.

139. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 13; and Owen, Deliberate Force, 

140. Ryan interview.

141. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 9.

142. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, interviewed by Balkans Air C

Study team, 7 February 1996, Maxwell AFB, Ala., cited in Owen, D

Force, 57–58.

143. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

144. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Smith interview; a

interview.

145. Owen, Deliberate Force, 185.

146. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

147. 7490 Composite Wing (P), memorandum for CAOC, 7 S

1995, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.

148. Smith, briefing to Air War College.

149. Smith interview; and Bradley Graham, ‘‘U.S. Fires Cruise 

at Bosnia Serb Sites,” Washington Post, 11 September 1995, A18.

150. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Smith interview; a

Official D.

151. Lt Col Joseph Wood, USAF, commander 492d Fighter Squ

15Es, interviewed by author, 5 March 1997, London, transcrip

recording, author’s personal collection.

152. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 12; Smith interview; NATO Offici

Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force (Lancaster, UK: Centre for 

and International Security Studies, University of Lancaster, 1999).

153. Smith interview; and Zoerb interview, 29 April 1998.

154. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; and NATO Official D

155. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Smith interview; 

interview; and NATO Official D.

156. Smith interview.

157. NATO Official D.

158. Short interview; Ryan interview; and Smith interview.

159. Janvier interview; and Military Official Q.

160. Janvier interview.

161. Smith interview.

162. The nature of Deliberate Force and the coincidental F

ground offensive have made it difficult to determine whether the co

between the two campaigns was preplanned or opportunistic. Res

this study has not uncovered any evidence to contradict official cla

it was not preplanned, but that is hardly surprising or definitive.

163. Holbrooke, 145–51.

164. Ryan interview.

165. The officer running the BDA cell for General Ryan was R

Comdr Andy Bachelor. He told BACS researchers that during the c

there was no intentional bombing of targets that had alrea

309
destroyed. Due to the shortage of targets with a higher payoff, some 

destroyed targets were reattacked late in the campaign. Wing Com

Bachelor, RAF, head of Battle Damage Assessment Cell during O

Deliberate Force, interviewed by Maj John C. Orndorff, USAF, 14 

1996, Ramstein AB, Germany, tape recording, BACS Collection. R

bombs dropped compared to targets, or DMPIs, attacked s

Bachelor’s assertion: 2.8 PGMs and 6.6 general-purpose bombs p

PGMs are usually dropped in pairs, and general-purpose bombs (

PGMs) are usually dropped in multiples of two, with six per pass be

mon. General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference. Also see R

Hallion, ‘‘Precision Guided Munitions,’’ Air Power History 43, n

1996): 13.

166. Smith interview.

167. Ibid.; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan i

168. Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, ‘‘UN in Split with NATO o

Bombing Campaign,” Financial Times (London), 13 September 199

169. Facts On File 1995, 662.

170. Smith interview.

171. Holbrooke, 146.

172. Ibid.

173. Military Official X.

174. AFSOUTH, transcript of press briefing, Naples, 12 Septemb

175. Military Official X.

176. General Ryan requested six F-117s on 8 September. T

approved by the US secretary of defense on 9 September. Perso

equipment needed to support F-117 operations were deployed to 

on 11 September the Italian government turned down the American 

to bring the planes into Italy. Owen, Deliberate Force, 243–45; an

transcript of Air Power Conference.

177. Ryan interview; and Smith interview.

178. Daniel Williams and Rick Atkinson, “Limits on Targets 

NATO, U.N. Officers Say,” Washington Post, 13 September 1995

A14; Eric Schmitt, ‘‘NATO Commanders Face Grim Choices,” N

Times, 14 September 1995, 1; Bruce Clark, ‘‘Bombing Raids 

Diplomatic Bridges,’’ Financial Times (London), 14 September 1995

179. Smith interview; and Ryan interview.

180. AFSOUTH, ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force,’’ Fact Sheet, 

Holbrooke, 146–48.

181. Holbrooke, 151.

182. Ibid., 148–52.

183. Private discussion with US Air Force officer responsible 

planning.

184. Smith interview; and Zoerb interview, 27 May 1998.

185. Joulwan interview, 11 February 1998; Smith interview; a

interview, 27 May 1998.

186. Smith interview.

310
187. Ibid.

188. Admiral Smith received his fourth star in conjunction 

assignment as commander in chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. 

retired two years later, he still had not reached the 35-year m

retirement point.

189. Remarks of Admiral Smith in, AFSOUTH, ‘‘AFSOUTH C

Command,’’ transcripts from change of command ceremony, 31 Ju

Admiral Smith was later given an honorary knighthood by Britai

some observers viewed as a gesture of appreciation for Smith’s resi

using force more often in Bosnia.

190. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprint with n

ace and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 36 

191. Betts, 203.

192. Gen Jean Cot, French army, ‘‘Dayton ou la Porte Etroite: G

Avenir d’un Désastre,” in Dernière Guerre Balkanique? 2d ed., ed. 

(France: Editions L’Harmattan, 1996), 123.

193. Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Do Something, General!: Chro

Bosnie-Herzégovine 12 juillet 1993–24 janvier 1994 (Bruxelles: 

Labor, 1997), 133.

194. Gen Sir Michael Rose, British army, retired, Fighting f

Bosnia 1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), 238. General R

neously claimed that ‘‘nearly 100 cruise missiles’’ were fired 

Deliberate Force. The actual number of cruise missiles fired was 1

10 September.

195. Ashy interview by Owen. The targets struck during O

Deliberate Force had their roots in the planning begun under Gene

Like Deliberate Force, General Ashy’s plans would have degraded t

military capability. However, research done for this study suggests 

behind Deliberate Force was based on studies of the BSA underta

ing General Ryan’s tenure. The center of gravity analysis, determi

an end state, and heavy reliance on PGMs were the product of plan

ducted under General Ryan. Moreover, Dead Eye was also produce

General Ryan’s time in Naples.

196. Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

197. Owen, ‘‘Balkans: Part 2,’’ 24.

198. Zoerb interview, 27 May 1998.

199. Smith interview.

200. Ten CAS missions were executed the first day of Delibera

all against preplanned heavy weapons sites. As the CAOC plans dir

Steve Teske, describes these missions, they were really battlefield 

diction with forward air controllers, rather than what would nor

considered close air support. Despite the large number of CAS sort

just in case they might be needed, few expended ordnance because 

did not attack UN forces. One exception to this occurred around Tu

September.

311
201. On the absence of doctrine, see Owen, 

Balkans: Part 1

and Col Maris McCrabb’s “US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign P

chap. 3 in Owen, Deliberate Force.

312
Chapter 10

Conclusions: Military Influence o

Airpower in Bosnia

When the external threat is low, policy decisions app

less consequential and so policy costs are lower—what d

it matter if civilian interference has disastrous side effe

when there is no Soviet menace to capitalize on the erro

—Peter D. Feaver————————

“Crisis as Shirking: An Agency—

Theory Explanation of the Sour

of Civil-Military Relations”———

Theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO se

more than mere executors of policy, and, in so doing, th

nificantly influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia b

the summers of 1993 and 1995. Of the various reason

manders chose to play the roles that they did, their ex

and responsibilities as commanders were important 

However, expertise and responsibility for mission acco

ment and force protection often reinforced other force

vating theater-level commanders, such as national p

pressures and UN and NATO organizational preferences

examines the actions of commanders across the entire 

of Deny Flight, certain patterns emerge indicating the 

expertise and command responsibility. During Deny 

theater-level commanders demonstrated an apprecia

their responsibility for and to people under their com

not just responsibility upward to the state or to multin

political authorities. Unlike tactical determinism, whic

on limitations in the capabilities of military means (i.e

feasibly can be done?), responsibility sets limits based o

ought to be done and who will be held accountable (i.

worth it?). Without clear, authoritative guidance abou

tives, theater-level commanders in NATO and the UN 

to their own internal compasses for direction in de

313
about how much risk to take in order to use airpo

Bosnia. Commanders also demonstrated that respon

for people’s lives served as more than just a basis fo

sions; it also worked as a tool for gaining autonomy an

ence in operational matters.

How UN Commanders Influenced Airpow

The UN’s theater-level commanders significantly infl

the use of airpower in Bosnia. They all wanted close a

port, and, with the exception of Gen Rupert Smith, all o

air strikes. Generals Briquemont and Cot were the fir

last) UN commanders to attempt to reconcile the amb

inherent in the safe areas policy. Both left their tours 

early because of clashes with civilian political authorit

acquiring and controlling the means for fulfilling co

responsibilities of mission accomplishment and force 

tion. Unlike Briquemont and Cot, who sought clearer p

direction for their mission, General Rose offered his ow

pretation via his campaign plan. By winning approva

UK and the UN for a campaign plan focused on the h

tarian and peacekeeping elements of UNPROFOR’s m

General Rose reduced UNPROFOR’s needs for NATO ai

Later, General Rose not only shaped the terms of the S

ultimatum to mirror the impartiality needed for peacek

he also used UN forces to help Bosnian Serbs meet t

matum deadline. In addition, he controlled information 

the degree of Bosnian Serb compliance with the ulti

and later lapses in Serb compliance with the exclusio

around Sarajevo in order to head off NATO air stri

Gorazde, General Rose held tight control over NATO ai

and he attempted to conduct limited air strikes in the g

close air support for his special forces. However, after G

he used the dual key to delay air strikes so he coul

warnings to the Bosnian Serbs and control targeting de

for air strikes. General Rose was a central figure in in

ing NATO’s first-ever uses of airpower for bombing ope

and the course he chose minimized the need to make tr

between the lives of his soldiers and his interpreta

UNPROFOR’s mission.

314
General Rose

s immediate superior in the UN chain 

mand, General de Lapresle, initially played a less direct 

influencing the use of NATO airpower. De Lapresle 

solidify the UN’s stance against the use of airpower to 

the safe areas policy. He did this by educating Mr. Ak

the ways of using airpower and by adding military leg

to the UN Secretariat’s position that UNPROFOR’s job 

deter through its presence and that it could not be expe

act more forcefully without the necessary ground for

doing so. Later in 1994, General de Lapresle took a mor

role in shaping the employment of airpower by using t

key to limit NATO air strikes at Udbina and to block 

operations after the first air defense suppression miss

23 November 1994. De Lapresle’s successor, General J

was equally opposed to robust air action and tried to r

his more activist subordinate, Gen Rupert Smith. 

influential in advising against air strikes in early May 

and in delaying close air support at Srebrenica, Janv

ultimately outmaneuvered by other theater-level comm

and overruled by political authorities. Rather than d

the enforcement elements of UNPROFOR’s mand

Janvier and the UN Secretariat preferred, General 

cleared the way for forceful action, including NATO air 

He did so by precipitating a hostage crisis. He also 

commanders in NATO broaden the allowable zone 

strikes by proposing that the area around Tuzla be co

in both zones of action for Deliberate Force.

Generals Briquemont, Cot, de Lapresle, and Janvie

fairly conventional means to try to influence the use 

power in Bosnia. Except for Briquemont’s public criti

air strikes in August 1993 and Cot’s complaints to th

about not having approval authority for close air suppo

sions, these commanders generally worked within 

chain of command or their own national chains of com

The other UN commanders, Michael Rose and Rupert 

took unusual measures to influence the use of airpowe

by issuing warnings to the Serbs; Smith, by caus

hostage crisis. Even when working within the UN c

command, certain commanders took active roles in s

315
policy. General Rose demonstrated the enduring tr

Betts’s finding: ‘‘Advocates of an existing plan have an 

tage over opponents who do not have one of their ow

introducing his own campaign plan, Rose moved the U

sion away from enforcement. UN Security Council am

dors such as Madeleine Albright, who favored a more 

approach in Bosnia, had no military advocate in the 

counter General Rose’s plan. Likewise, General de La

endorsement of the interpretation of UNPROFOR’s miss

forward by Mr. Akashi effectively altered UN policy, an

sions within the Security Council prevented it from ove

UNPROFOR’s interpretation. Even after the UN agree

along with NATO demands for multiple targets, Gen

Lapresle remained master of the decision-making proc

air strikes.

Why UN Commanders Influenced Airpow

Answering the question of why commanders chose t

ence the use of airpower in the ways they did is more c

than seeing how they exercised their influence. As 

throughout this study, the factors impelling theater-lev

manders to try to win control over airpower were often 

ally reinforcing rather than in tension with one anoth

UN Secretariat’s organizational bias for peacekeeping m

well with the British government’s reluctance to see 

conduct air strikes. British army doctrine for peacek

added to the list of reasons that might explain w

instance, General Rose resisted applying all but m

doses of airpower in Bosnia. French political pressur

also consistent with British and UN desires to avoid the 

robust air attacks that American commanders in 

believed were needed to coerce the Serbs. Although arm

manders were skeptical about using airpower while a

generals advocated its use, the unusual alignment o

manders (i.e., European US soldiers commanding UN 

and US airmen commanding in NATO) makes it difficul

the theoretical proposition that army and air force 

took their respective positions because of their service 

tions. The challenge, then, is to determine when, how, 

316
what degree expertise and command responsibility mo

commanders. UN commanders provided plenty of test

evidence that their actions were guided by their conce

the safety of their forces and the need to sustain the U

sion in Bosnia. While that is a strong indicator in and o

it cannot be counted as sufficient evidence.2 To bette

their motivations, it is necessary to look at their action

cially when expertise and responsibility pushed comm

in directions that cannot be explained well by other fa

General Briquemont warrants special attention b

national political pressures were not a strong factor f

Furthermore, political instigation from the EC d

Briquemont toward more aggressive measures, wh

resisted. Briquemont took command shortly after crea

the safe areas when UN leaders still expected to get th

reinforcements promised under the light option. Moreo

was not of the UN peacekeeping culture, and he w

imbued with doctrinal ideas about peacekeeping. His fa

see the coercive value in the threat of NATO air strik

consistent with a soldier’s view of airpower. Intere

Briquemont sought more infantry from the Danish min

defense instead of tanks the Danes were planning to 

Bosnia. This suggests that aside from differences betwe

diers and airmen, soldiers from different army branch

fer different weapon systems according to the soldiers

grounds. General Briquemont threatened to quit o

strikes, but not because they were inconsistent with 

836; he accepted that the ambiguities in the res

allowed for such action. He threatened to quit because 

sidered himself the commander in Bosnia, and he dem

control over operations in his area of responsibility—es

when they might put his forces at risk. When G

Briquemont ultimately did quit, it was because he was 

to take greater risks and responsibilities by unacco

officials without being given the resources to fulfill ad

tasks being thrust upon him. Thus, for General Briqu

expertise as a soldier and the responsibility inherent i

mand weighed heavily in his decisions and actions.

317
General Cot left Bosnia because he clashed with the 

hierarchy in the UN over control of close air support. Th

trations that precipitated his departure came at a tim

fighting in Bosnia was escalating and UN forces were i

ingly endangered. He was already on his way out wh

Sarajevo ultimatum nearly led to NATO air strikes, a

responsibilities were lightened by the open accountab

elected political leaders (especially President Mitterra

the pending strikes. However, three weeks later, when 

soldiers came under fire at Bihac, he demanded air s

and threatened to make Mr. Akashi bear the blame 

consequences of inaction. Thus, Cot’s behavior also in

the importance of responsibility and accountability for 

lives as a factor motivating his behavior.

General Rose’s repeated attempts to employ Special 

in Bosnia, first at Gorazde, later as part of Operation An

and again at Bihac, indicated the influence of his past 

expertise as a former commander of Special Forces. Ro

cause to be embittered toward the Bosnian governme

its forces apparently created the situation leading to th

of the Special Forces soldier Rose had sent to Gorazde

the risk he took with his Special Forces in sending t

Gorazde to help protect the safe areas and the urgen

which he pleaded to Mr. Akashi for CAS, it seems reas

to argue that Rose was motivated by his sense of resp

ity to his forces to block later uses of airpower, to select 

ingless targets, and to issue warnings to the Serbs

actions lowered the risks to his forces and increas

chances of succeeding in the UN’s humanitarian miss

not in its mission to protect the safe areas. However, G

Rose’s case is complicated because, presumably, the 

government would have put extra pressure on Rose to 

aggressive after a British soldier was killed in Gorazd

British Sea Harrier was shot down the next day. Furthe

the British government sent hundreds of peacekee

Gorazde in the spring of 1994, giving leaders in London 

reasons for wanting to avoid confrontation with the 

Thus, national political pressures, doctrinal beliefs, ex

and responsibility all pointed in the same direction, 

318
played a role in shaping Rose

s influence on the use 

power.

General de Lapresle did not share General Rose’s ex

in peacekeeping and seems to have been driven away fr

ing to protect safe areas by the inadequacy of the mean

disposal for executing tasks relating to safe 

Furthermore, de Lapresle, an armored officer, felt the n

forces that could fill the gap between light infantry and 

fighter aircraft—unlike General Briquemont, who 

more ground forces, but not tanks. Again, evidence s

theater-level commanders were most comfortable em

and advocating the need for forces with which they we

familiar. That rule seemed to apply not just between s

(e.g., soldiers and airmen) but also to officers from d

backgrounds or branches within the same type of serv

Except for Rupert Smith, European army office

served as theater-level commanders with the UN exhib

sort of risk-averse behavior ascribed to the Vietnam 

tion of professional military officers in the United 

General Briquemont, during the Mount Igman cris

General Rose, during the assault on Gorazde, took ris

their forces. However, the generals resisted political pr

to do more when risks outweighed the value of taking t

action later in their tours. The same could be said of G

de Lapresle; he authorized General Rose’s plan to send 

Forces to Gorazde, but after that he became reluctan

using airpower to uphold the UN safe areas policy. G

Rose, de Lapresle, and later, Janvier helped steer the U

sion away from enforcement of the UN’s safe areas 

which held the greatest potential to endanger lives 

forces. What set General Smith apart from other UN t

level commanders was not a predilection for taking un

sary risks with his troops. What set him apart was his 

a worthwhile objective for taking short-term risks in o

lower costs to his forces over the long term. Only wh

commanders had a clear, attainable, positive objec

using force were they willing to take risks with their 

Thus, responsibility for people’s lives inherent in co

was a factor motivating senior UN commanders to resis

319
ical pressures to 

do something until that somethi

defined and weighed against the risks of attempting t

While the Vietnam War undoubtedly sensitized a gener

American officers to the imperative of avoiding risks 

absence of worthwhile and achievable objectives, th

aversion was not a uniquely American phenomenon. N

it confined to one generation. Risk aversion is a natura

uct of the special expertise and responsibility of profe

military officers, and theater-level commanders are l

possess an uncommonly high degree of both expert

responsibility.

How NATO Commanders Influenced Airpo

American commanders in NATO also influenced the 

airpower beyond being mere executors of policy. G

Joulwan helped define heavy weapons to include elem

the BSA that were only indirectly related to the s

Sarajevo, and his inputs were incorporated in the term

Gorazde ultimatum as well. He called for zones of acti

helped move NATO political thinking beyond the of

weapons surrounding each individual safe area, thus o

the door for General Ryan’s air campaign. Finally, G

Joulwan pushed his subordinate commanders, es

Admiral Smith, to resume bombing during the pa

Deliberate Force and to avoid saying anything to th

about broader implications of the campaign that might 

alliance cohesion.

General Ashy’s early planning and his apparent suc

winning General Briquemont’s approval for NATO’s ta

helped move NATO toward the sort of robust air action 

by the US government. In addition, Ashy’s efforts with A

Boorda to limit details of target information presented t

ambassadors, while convincing them that AFSOUTH 

manders had done everything necessary to limit co

damage, was intended to prevent micromanagemen

Brussels. General Chambers’s main contribution was 

up an efficient system for enforcing the no-fly zone 

providing close air support to the UN. There was 

unusual about how he did this, but his expertise was 

320
in the successful working of each system. In additi

efforts to make Deny Flight bombing operations overtly 

national boosted the apparent legitimacy of the operat

General Ryan demonstrated the value of having 

ready in advance of political orders for such planning. 

Admiral Smith greatly increased the impact of De

Force by making Dead Eye an automatic component o

air operations. Admiral Smith’s earlier refusal to patrol 

fly zone more aggressively without first suppressing B

Serb air defenses was a helpful precursor for Dead Eye 

tions, heightening political awareness within NATO 

threat to allied airmen. Together General Ryan and A

Smith controlled information about targets, BDA, and t

itary objective of Deliberate Force to maintain oper

autonomy during the campaign. Efforts by NATO theat

commanders to influence the use of airpower were fair

ventional and confined to the NATO chain of comman

they all moved NATO toward a forceful air campaign.3

Why NATO Commanders Influenced Airpo

The factors motivating NATO commanders tended 

mutually reinforcing. Thus, explaining why they ch

influence airpower as they did raises the same diff

encountered in trying to explain the actions of UN com

ers. For the most part, the capabilities and limitations 

power, the commanders’ expertise, the imperative for p

ing their forces, and US political pressure all worked t

to push commanders toward robust air operations. H

Admiral Smith demonstrated a willingness to upset so

and NATO superiors in order to meet his responsibility 

people under his command. Admiral Smith’s behavior 

scored the dilemma a commander might face in trying 

fill responsibilities up and down the chain of command

At the risk of stating the obvious, negative objectives 

substitute for positive objectives when a commander 

the responsibility for forces against the objectives fo

force. Yet, for much of 1994 the absence of an overridi

itive objective for using force meant that negative ob

defined how and when airpower was used in Bosnia. T

321
true at Gorazde in April, for the air strikes around Sar

August and September, and for the attack against Ud

November. In each case, there was a positive objective 

operations, but it was not sufficiently important to ov

the negative objectives, or objections, for using airpo

the end of 1994, Admiral Smith had seen enough to kn

NATO was not politically united behind a positive objec

its air operations. After that he twice restricted no-f

activities over Bosnia to avoid unnecessary risks to NA

men: first at the end of November 1994 and again a

downing of O’Grady. As Deliberate Force wound down

again resisted air operations that might have needles

NATO airmen in harm’s way when he refused to stre

the bombing campaign to hit previously destroyed targ

Smith’s actions suggest that when a commande

decide how much risk to take with forces, there is nee

positive objective (one not overshadowed by negative 

Without a positive objective, commanders cannot 

whether they are taking excessive risk. A policy of 

tough or being more forceful is unlikely to suffice. O

expertise and command responsibility were strong mo

shaping the actions of NATO theater-level comman

their attempts to influence the use of airpower over B

even if the importance of responsibility was most clea

cernible on the rare occasions when it ran counter t

factors motivating commanders.

Objectives, Authority, and Responsibili

The absence of a palpable threat to national in

robbed those who chose to intervene in Bosnia’s w

rationale for accepting costs and risks. As leading na

principally the US, the UK, and France—tried to resol

differences, they did so in a cost-intolerant enviro

Theater-level commanders who served in the UN and 

were enlisted in the battle to hold down costs (a n

objective) aside from whatever positive objectives the

supposed to pursue. In addition to pressures from 

political and military leaders from nations contributing 

to UNPROFOR constantly reminded UN command

322
Zagreb that the contributing countries were unwilling 

their soldiers put at risk. These external political press

guard the lives of forces entrusted to UN commande

forced the internal pressures or responsibilities borne b

manders to balance mission accomplishment agains

protection. The need to contemplate trade-offs betwee

sion and lives emerged for NATO commanders when t

face-to-air threat increased dramatically during the 

half of 1994.

The sum of external and internal pressures for min

costs to friendly forces repeatedly worked to convince 

NATO theater-level commanders to avoid the dangerou

dle ground between peacekeeping and enforcement a

The measure of a ‘‘good’’ commander is probably best 

strated by how well that commander balances respon

for accomplishing a mission with the responsibility t

unnecessary costs to the lives of people in the comm

Bosnia, theater-level commanders sought to affect the 

of their missions, their forces, and their rules of enga

in a way that would avoid trade-offs between their m

and their people’s lives. When trade-offs had to be mad

manders often shouldered the responsibility. They 

decide how much risk to accept. They were usually th

held accountable, or they expected to be held to a

When objectives for a military operation were uncl

patently beyond the capabilities of the available forces, 

became impossible for commanders to strike a balance b

mission and men. Under such circumstances, theat

commanders leaned toward force protection. They to

however unhappily, restrictions that kept them from 

plishing their missions, provided those restrictions 

also unnecessarily jeopardize the lives of their peopl

briefly flirting with efforts to combine consent-based 

keeping and enforcement actions in early 1994, theat

commanders eschewed the middle ground and accep

incompatibility of the two approaches.

As with tactical determinism, the responsibility for t

of people under one’s command can serve as a tool fo

ing policy. Commanders in Bosnia used force protecti

323
powerful device for persuading their counterparts 

military-to-military dialogue over using airpower, as was 

at Udbina. Both sets of commanders in UNPROFOR 

AFSOUTH could—and to some extent did—take advan

their expertise and the threat to their forces to furth

respective missions. The argument was one-side

UNPROFOR holding the floor until the summer of 199

the Serb SAM threat began to mount. After that, NAT

manders were able to take a firmer stand in dictating h

power would be used. An example of the leverage comm

gain by the need to protect their forces occurred 

Deliberate Force. AFSOUTH commanders expanded a

longed bombing in Bosnia by prosecuting attacks 

Dead Eye targets in the northwestern part of the c

General Janvier (and almost certainly the French gover

saw this as a circumvention of controls on the NATO b

campaign. Ironically, policy makers in Washington su

AFSOUTH commanders were not doing enough to k

bombing campaign going. Despite suspicions and gru

on both sides—against and for continuation of the bom

AFSOUTH commanders were not overruled. Thus, th

manders’ prerogative to ensure force protection undo

strengthened their demands for control over operation

ters and allowed them to shape the use of airpow

Bosnia.

Political controls on military commanders can at bes

fer, but not eliminate, the responsibility that goes wit

mand. Some observers have advocated that NATO ad

UN practice of assigning a special representative of the 

tary-general to work alongside theater commanders

might be desirable for political leaders who wish to e

tighter control over their theater commanders. The 

representative could detect and curb unwanted indepe

on the part of commanders, while also providing a sing

of contact for political inputs to commanders. Howev

experience from Deny Flight indicates that to be effe

special representative would need real decision-

authority and, more importantly, would have to have a

ability within the chain of command. Without author

324
special representative would likely hinder timely d

making. Without accountability, the special represe

would probably find commanders unwilling to recogn

representative’s authority to make decisions affecti

safety of friendly forces.

Perhaps the most important lesson of Deny Flight 

need for political and military leaders to explicitly re

and agree upon the political objectives for using for

their shared responsibility for determining the acc

costs for doing so. The dictate to Do Something, Genera

substitute for a clear objective. However, it may well be 

tive of the guidance military commanders are likely to 

fewer and fewer elected officials in Western states ha

personal experience serving in the military. The challe

theater commanders will be to marry the means avai

the desired political objectives and to do so within the 

of acceptable costs. In Western democracies where the m

is subordinate to civilian control, presidents and prime 

ters sit atop the military chains of command. Therefor

ical leaders at the highest level cannot entirely esca

responsibilities and accountability that go with comm

military operations. They are forced to share the conc

theater commanders, who must strike a proper b

between force protection and mission accomplis

Political leaders can best help to strike the right bala

establishing a positive objective for which force is to b

and a sense for the acceptable level of costs, including 

losses, collateral damage, time, and material costs. H

these are variables that cannot be spelled out in precise 

and they are likely to change over time. Therefore, 

commanders may not be able to wait for an objectiv

assigned; they may have to become partners in estab

objectives and willingly embrace the responsibility for t

sequences of their plans. The theater-level command

can gauge the political currents and come up with a 

connect the means available to the desired ends while 

within the bounds of acceptable costs will be well pos

to win political support. Thus, theater-level command

need to anticipate, plan, and expect to be held accoun

325
they wish to maintain operational autonomy and avoid 

to just ‘‘do something.’’ If political leaders want actio

commanders, they should recognize the limits to whic

tary commanders can resolve unsettled political issu

understand that commanders will want clear positive 

tives and explicit authority to act so that they can best b

the responsibilities for mission success and the l

friendly forces. Striking the right balance will continue 

the interest of both political authorities and their theat

manders, and it will continue to motivate commanders 

seek to influence the use of airpower in future interve

While political leaders have the right to be wrong in o

military operations, it will be in their interest and 

national interest that they get things right whenever m

forces are put in harm’s way, because disastrous side 

so blithely dismissed in the opening epigraph, are just 

disastrous.

Notes

1. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wa

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprint with n

ace and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 15

2. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in Internationa

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 382–87. In Jer

cussion of cognitive dissonance, he explains that decision makers 

committed to their decisions, and they will seek justifications 

actions or decisions after the fact, which might not reveal their tru

ing at the time of the decision.

3. This conclusion would be challenged if later evidence reve

commanders were intentionally baiting the Bosnian Serb SAM o

and knowingly exposing NATO aircrews to added risks to create a 

eliminating the SAMs.

4. This was a consideration as NATO readied to deploy IFOR 

1995. Also see Michael C. Williams, Civil-Military Relatio

Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321 (London: International Inst

Strategic Studies, 1998), 17 and 30.

326
UN Documents. The endnotes used the UN system o

encing UN documents. They are listed here chronolo

under ‘‘United Nations.’’

BACS Collection. The Balkans Air Campaign Stu

commissioned by Air University and headed by Col Ro

Owen, USAF. In addition to producing its own study, th

of researchers was chartered to collect documentary infor

on the background, planning, and execution of Op

Deliberate Force. The archival material from that study 

at the US Air Force Historical Research Agency at Max

Force Base (AFB) in Montgomery, Alabama. In this biblio

the shortened form ‘‘BACS Collection’’ is used to refer 

archival material, in lieu of ‘‘Balkans Air Campaign 

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, M

AFB, Alabama.’’

Military Rank. For published works, or contempor

documents, the rank cited is that held by an individua

time the cited item was produced. Interviews reflect th

at the time of the interview; however, the position(s) lis

those held during the period of interest. For instan

entry for Lt Gen Régnault includes posts he held as a b

general and as a major general.

Multiple works by same author. For news articles, 

and so forth, the order is alphabetical. For Congre

reports it is chronological. For transcripts of news conf

or press releases, the order is chronological.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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385
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386
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397
16th Air Force, 116, 150, 192–93, 231,

233, 265, 304–5

7th Air Force commander during

Vietnam. See Lavelle, Gen John

A-10, 167, 193, 235

Abdic, Fikret, 174

AC-130 gunship, 131–32, 154, 162

AFSOUTH chief of staff. See Short, Maj

Gen Mike

AFSOUTH commander, 134, 203, 209,

228–29, 231, 276, 289. See also

Smith, Adm Leighton

aim point, 277–78, 304. See also desired

mean point of impact.

air strike, 13, 78, 84–86, 94, 109,

111–12, 119, 160, 162–68, 170, 172,

177, 181–82, 185, 191, 193–94, 197,

213, 215, 228, 235, 242, 252,

262–63, 266, 276, 278, 281, 292,

305, 308

air support, 9, 13, 47–48, 73–75, 77–79,

81–85, 87–91, 93–97, 99, 101–3,

105, 107, 109, 111–13, 119–21, 130,

132–33, 135–38, 141–42, 145, 147,

154, 159, 162, 180, 183, 187–90,

208, 220, 227, 246–51, 265, 299,

301, 311, 314–15, 318, 320. See also

close air support.

Airborne Warning and Control System,

129–30

airdrop, 63, 173

airlift, 173

airpower, 1–10, 12–17, 20, 23–24,

27–29, 31–33, 35, 37, 39–41, 43,

45–51, 53, 55–59, 61, 63–67, 69, 71,

73–83, 87–91, 96–98, 102–4, 106,

115–25, 127–29, 131, 133–35,

137–47, 149, 151–53, 155–57, 159,

161–62, 165, 169, 171, 184–85, 187,

189–90, 195–96, 203, 206–8,

211–13, 215, 219, 224, 226, 229–30,

232–33, 238–39, 241, 245–47,

249–55, 257, 259–61, 263–69, 271,

273, 277, 279, 281, 287–88, 292–93,

298–301, 303, 313–22, 324, 326

AIRSOUTH Commander. See Ashy, Lt

Gen Joseph; Ryan, Gen John

Akashi, Yasushi, 4, 102, 120

131–35, 137–38, 140–43, 

157, 163, 170, 176, 185

208, 210, 213, 215–17, 

232, 240, 243, 248, 253–54

286, 298, 315–16, 318

Albright, Madeleine, 64–65, 75

209, 316

Allison, Graham, 35, 52

ammunition bunkers, 146, 16

ammunition storage site, 169, 

Annan, Kofi, 79, 89, 106, 113, 

240, 278, 305

Antelope, 161–62, 318

arms embargo, 65, 236, 259

Ashy, Lt Gen Joseph, 5, 18

61–63, 68–70, 73, 84, 88–8

104, 108–9, 111, 116, 119

125, 127, 131, 145, 150–58

192–95, 234, 300, 304, 311

Atkinson, Rick, 54, 235, 242, 

310

Aviano, 62–63, 127, 154, 

221–22, 226, 233, 268, 30

AWACS. See Airborne War

Control System

Baker, James, 58, 67

Banja Luca, 130, 153, 183, 

243, 293, 295

barracks, 276–78, 284, 304

Basher, 51, 52, or Basher F

O’Grady, Capt Scott

battle damage assessment, 28

308–10, 321

Beale, Michael, 13, 23, 153, 2

Belgium, 10, 17, 25, 81, 84, 

105, 108, 152, 206, 275

Belgrade, 58–59, 119, 140, 

222, 258–59, 274–75, 296–

Betts, Richard, 1, 21, 28, 30, 4

57, 110, 148, 245, 299, 31

Bihac, 65, 82, 86, 100, 128–2

134, 154, 173–76, 178–79

196, 198, 205, 210–11, 254

Bildt, Carl, 22, 246

bombing pause, 285, 289

399

Index
Boorda, Adm Mike, 61, 63, 74, 80, 82, 84,

87, 93–96, 104, 110–11, 121–22,

127–28, 131, 134, 152, 320

Bosnia commander. See Briquemont, Lt

Gen Francis; Rose, Lt Gen Sir Michael;

Smith, Lt Gen Rupert

Bosnian capital. See Sarajevo

Bosnian Muslim capital. See Sarajevo

Bosnian Serb Army, 83–84, 90, 97, 119,

121, 125–26, 128, 136–38, 140, 142,

162, 164–65, 168–69, 174, 178,

204–6, 212, 217, 219, 222, 225–26,

247–50, 258, 262–63, 278–81,

284–86, 288, 290, 292–93, 297, 305,

311, 320

Bosnian Serb Assembly, 163

Bosnian Serb capital. See Pale

Bosnian Serb president. See Karadzic,

Radovan

Both, Norbert, 10, 23, 69, 106, 151,

233, 264, 304

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 4, 77, 85, 95,

100, 103, 120, 142–43, 208, 243,

267, 305

Briquemont, Lt Gen Francis, 10–11,

23, 25, 73, 81, 83, 87–96, 98–105,

107–14, 116–17, 143, 251, 266, 300,

311, 314–15, 317, 319–20

British Army doctrine. See Wider

Peacekeeping

British chief of defense staff. See

Vincent, Field Marshal Sir Richard

British foreign minister. See Hurd,

Douglas

British prime minister. See Major, John

Brodie, Bernard, 29, 39, 47, 51–52

Brussels, 17, 61, 79, 84, 88–89, 100,

107–8, 120, 123–24, 127, 146, 149,

152, 170, 174, 177–78, 181, 183–84,

198–99, 228–30, 243, 253, 258, 267,

287, 290–91, 294, 298, 320

BSA commander. See Mladic, Gen Ratko

BSA. See Bosnian Serb Army

Bush, President George, 58–59, 64

C-130, 162, 173

C-141, 173

C-160, 173

CAOC director (after October 1994). See

Hornburg, Lt Gen Hal

CAOC director (until October 1994). See

Chambers, Lt Gen James “Bear”

CAOC. See Combined Air O

Center

CAS. See close air support

casualty avoidance, 40

chairman of the Joint Chief

during the Vietnam War. Se

Gen Earl

chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

October 1993–October 1

Shalikashvili, Gen John

Chambers, Lt Gen James “Bea

21, 60–64, 68–70, 82, 84, 8

104, 108, 111, 121–22, 130

150, 153–54, 156–57, 163

194, 196, 198–99, 320

Chapter VII of the UN Charte

75, 96, 117, 121, 209

Checkmate, 226, 241

Cheney, Vice President Dick, 5

chief, Balkans Air Campaign S

Owen, Col Robert, USAF

Christopher, Warren, 65, 79, 2

Churkin, Vitaly, 138, 220

CINCSOUTH. See Smith, Adm 

Claes, Willy, 101, 105, 210, 

243, 253, 261, 267, 286

Clausewitz, Carl von, 34, 39, 

Clinton, President William,1

69–70, 75, 79, 105, 120, 13

239–41, 259–60, 266, 270, 

Clodfelter, Mark, 32, 40, 51, 1

close air support, 9, 13, 48

81–82, 84, 88, 94–96, 

119–21, 130, 132–33, 135

145, 147, 154, 162, 187

220, 246, 249, 251, 311

318, 320. See also air supp

co-chairman of ICFY. See O

David; Stoltenberg, Thorva

coerce, coercion, 13, 23, 28, 40

149, 169, 217, 237, 266, 2

collateral damage, 40, 42, 46

164–65, 177–78, 182, 1

281–84, 292, 304, 306, 32

Combined Air Operations Cent

19, 21, 63, 69, 82, 94, 108, 

130, 150, 161–62, 166, 181

194, 196, 198, 204, 206, 

233, 238, 241, 255, 263, 

275, 280, 285, 302, 305–6, 

See also Vicenza, Italy

400
commander of NATO

s Southern Region.

See Smith, Adm Leighton

Congress, 149, 222, 259, 266, 268, 306

Contact Group, 210, 212, 260, 270

Cot, Gen Jean M., 4, 8, 10, 12, 23, 68,

80–82, 87, 89–90, 93–96, 98–105,

107, 109–14, 120, 128–33, 143,

152–54, 299, 311, 314–15, 318

Croatian capital. See Zagreb

Croatian president. See Tudjman,

Franjo

Croat-Muslim Federation. See Federation

Crowe, Adm William, 42, 54

cruise missile, 289, 294–95

Dayton Peace Talks, 14, 284

Dead Eye, 203–4, 223, 226, 255–56,

258, 262, 280–81, 289, 294–95, 305,

311, 321, 324

Deliberate Force, 6, 14, 24, 69, 87, 109,

111, 192, 196, 201, 203–4, 216, 223,

226–27, 230, 233–34, 239, 241–42,

256–58, 260, 262–64, 266–71,

273–75, 277–87, 289–99, 301–12,

315, 320–22, 324

Denmark, 108

Deny Flight, 1, 3, 8, 13–14, 16–17,

20–21, 24, 49, 57, 63, 69–70, 82,

85, 87, 94, 111, 125, 138, 150, 154,

156, 160–61, 165, 167–68, 181, 192,

198, 204, 212, 219, 223, 226–29,

232–33, 238, 242–43, 246, 267, 271,

275, 298, 302, 313, 321, 324–25

Desert Storm, 33, 53–54, 60, 207–8,

227, 235, 277

desired mean point of impact (DMPI),

277, 304, 310

Donegan, Cmdr Kevin, USN, 156–58

downing, 23, 63–64, 129–30, 146, 153,

203, 217–25, 227, 230, 232, 245,

322. See also shoot down

dual-key, 130, 159–60, 172, 187–88,

190–91, 219, 229, 231, 245, 252,

261–62

Dutch defense minister. See Voorhoeve,

Joris

Dutch, 113, 163, 177, 216, 220, 227,

246–51, 254

EC. See European Community

Edmonds, Martin, 37, 53

enclave, 134, 13840, 151, 

248–50, 254, 280

ethnic cleansing, 246, 252, 

also Srebrenica

EU. See European Union

European Community (EC), 2

105, 317

European Union (EU), 3, 22

99–101, 265

exclusion zones, 144, 146, 

171, 173, 183, 185, 192, 

227, 257. See also heavy 

exclusion zones

F-117, stealth fighter, 297, 31

F-16, 130, 135, 153, 196, 

203, 217–19, 221, 223–24, 

245, 265

F-18, F/A-18, 136

Falklands, 118, 126

Feaver, Peter, 21, 313

Federation, 260, 290, 293, 

300–301, 309

Federation, Croat-Muslim. See 

Finer, Samuel, 29

force protection, 4, 37, 46, 5

73, 92, 98, 105, 115–16, 

147, 159–61, 163–65, 167

175, 177–81, 183–85, 187, 

193, 195, 197, 199, 2

262–63, 269, 277, 279, 28

303, 313–14, 323–25

Fornesiero, Lt Gen, 111

France, 8–10, 17, 20, 23, 5

65–68, 74, 78, 81, 85, 10

123, 126, 129, 149–50, 

208, 223, 252–53, 259, 

311, 322

Frasure, Robert, 260

Freedman, Lawrence, 67, 237

French chief of defense s

Lanaxde, Jacques

French president. See Mitterand

friendly fire, 199, 235

Gacek, Christopher, 39, 53

Galeb, 129–30

George, Alexander, 43, 55

German cargo aircraft. See C-

Germany, 17, 60, 69, 81, 132, 

192, 196, 212, 227, 233–34

265, 267–68, 270, 302–4, 3

401
Gorazde, 8, 65, 90, 116, 125, 129,

133–35, 137–42, 144–45, 147,

157–59, 183, 192, 210, 215, 236,

239, 252–55, 257, 263, 266–68, 270,

274–75, 280, 314, 318–20, 322. See

also safe area

Gow, James, 6, 22, 70–71, 106, 149,

213, 233

Gulf War, 39, 48, 54, 57, 59, 62, 66, 81,

90, 118–19, 149, 195, 207, 235, 283,

306

Haass, Richard, 30, 51–52, 54

Hadzici, 278, 304

Hagman, Hans-Christian, 12–13, 23,

106, 109, 154–55, 191, 194–95, 198,

200, 236, 242

Harding, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter, 126

Harrier, 138, 145–46, 158, 318. See also

Sea Harrier

Hayes, Brigadier Vere, 89, 98

heavy weapons exclusion zones, 185, 210,

223, 257. See also exclusion zones

heavy weapons, 71, 116, 123–26,

139–40, 144–45, 151, 161–63, 183,

185, 192, 210–11, 214, 216, 223,

248, 250, 257, 261, 286–89, 297,

300, 311, 320

helicopters, 63–64, 70, 133, 162

Holbrooke, Richard, 1, 6, 22, 50, 198,

241, 259–60, 270, 273–74, 278,

285–87, 289, 295–97, 305

Honig, Jan Willem, 10, 23, 69, 71, 78,

106, 113, 151, 213, 215–17, 233–38,

243, 247, 250–51, 264–66, 304

Hornburg, Lt Gen Hal, 111, 198, 200,

204, 225–26, 233–34, 241–42, 305

hostages, 64, 97, 112, 137–38, 142, 146,

169–70, 176–77, 184–85, 213–16,

219–23, 232, 239–40, 250, 266

hostile intent, 174, 184, 186, 189

Hunt, Peter, 23

Huntington, Samuel, 29–30, 34, 36,

51–52

Hurd, Douglas, 123, 213

ICFY. See International Conference on

the Former Yugoslavia

Ilidza, 163

intercepts, 63

International Conference on the Former

Yugoslavia (ICFY), 3, 22, 71, 149

Jaguar, 195

Jamerson, Gen James, USAF, 

Janowitz, Morris, 29, 34, 51

Janvier, Lt Gen Bernard, 10, 1

107, 208–9, 213–17, 

228–32, 235, 237–40, 243, 

250–51, 253, 257, 261–64

273, 275–79, 283, 285–88

295, 301, 303, 305, 30

315, 319, 324

JFACC. See Joint Forces Air C

Commander

Johnson, President Lyndon, 4

54, 56

Joint Forces Air Component C

(JFACC), 48, 63

joint targeting board, 109, 16

Juppe, Alain, 113

Karadzic, Radovan, 90, 1

137–38, 185, 201, 258–59, 

Karremans, Lt Col Ton, 246

Kiseljak, 268–69

Kissinger, Henry, 43, 55

Kohn, Richard, 21

Krajina, 258, 269

Krajisnik, Momcilo, 163

Kramlinger, George, 13, 23

Lake, Anthony, 259–60

Lambert, Andrew, 24, 53, 112

Lanata, Gen Vincent, 58, 68, 

Lanxade, Jacques, 59, 100, 25

Lapresle, Lt Gen Bertrand

132–35, 140–43, 154–57, 

169–73, 176–80, 183, 

193–201, 208, 220, 240, 

315–16, 319

Lassalle, 248–49

Lavelle, Gen John, 45–46, 56,

law of war, 55, 306. See als

armed conflict

laws of armed conflict, 168, 2

Leurdijk, Dick A., 5–6, 22

90–91, 106, 108, 110, 112, 

156, 236–38, 267–68, 270

lift and strike, 64–65, 67, 75

205

light option, 78, 96–97, 99, 13

208, 317

402
London Conference, 22, 113, 195

96,

234, 251–52, 254, 268–69, 280, 292,

304–5

Lushbaugh, Col Robert, 60–62, 68–69,

82, 107, 111, 150

Luttwak, Edward N., 21, 38, 50, 53,

56, 67

MacKenzie, Gen Lewis, 9, 22, 99, 114

Major, John, 117, 119

MANPAD. See surface-to-air missile

Mason, Air Vice-Marshal Tony, 14, 24,

53, 67, 153

massacre, 23, 238, 264. See also

Srebrenica

McMaster, H. R., 51, 54–55

MCM-KAD-084-93, 108–9, 194–95, 304.

See also operational options for air

strikes

McNamara, Steve, 48, 50–51, 56

McPeak, Gen Merrill M., 68

media, 65, 67, 123, 240, 290, 308

Meilinger, Phil, 41, 50, 54, 56

Messervy-Whiting, Brigadier Graham, 8,

22, 106

Mirage, 166–167, 295, 305

Mirage 2000, 295, 305

Mitterand, Francois, 58

Mladic, Gen Ratko, 91, 134–37, 151,

173, 196, 205, 220–21, 249, 252,

254, 257–59, 262, 267, 269, 278,

281, 284–86, 288, 297

Mogadishu, 193

Montgomery, Field Marshal, 117, 148

Morillon, Lt Gen Philippe, 9–10, 22–23,

78–79, 81, 106–7, 114, 124

Mount Igman, 74, 83, 87, 90–92, 98,

192, 260, 266, 319

NAC. See North Atlantic Council

Nambiar, Gen Satish, 9, 22–23, 114

Naples, 17, 61, 70, 80, 84, 90, 107, 131,

145, 150, 161, 175, 192, 197, 200,

204, 206, 215, 233, 242, 255, 265,

267, 271, 283, 286, 297–98, 302–3,

308, 310–11

National Security Council, 64

NATO headquarters, 17, 122, 125, 149,

181, 294, 298, 307. See also Brussels

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

negotiations, 6, 42, 81, 9093

110, 112–13, 135, 137–

220–21, 246, 273, 284–85

296, 301

Netherlands, 22, 71, 106, 126, 

267. See also Dutch

NFZ. See no-fly zone

Nicholls, Col David V., Roya

242, 268–69, 271, 306

Nixon, President Richard, 41, 

no-fly zone (NFZ), 13–14, 59, 

82, 94, 129–30, 132, 

178–80, 182–88, 190–91, 

210, 218, 223, 227–31, 243

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 

85, 90, 97, 108–9, 121

138–40, 147, 149, 152, 

176, 181–83, 185–86, 190, 

205, 227, 253–55, 257, 

279, 287, 290, 294–95, 29

North Atlantic Treaty Org

(NATO), 1–2, 4–8, 10, 12–1

39, 49, 56–57, 59–63, 65–7

79–91, 93–99, 101–13, 116

149–201, 203–10, 212–16

222–34, 236, 238, 241–43

252–70, 273–98, 300–310

326

Northern Ireland, 118, 126

O’Grady, Capt Scott, 218–25, 

232, 235, 238–40, 242, 24

Operation Antelope. See Antel

Operation Rolling Thunder. S

Thunder

Operation Vulcan. See Vulcan

operational options for air 

84–85, 91, 108, 146, 194, 

Option 1, 86, 141, 262, 295–9

operational options for air 

Option 2, 86–87, 141, 146, 

295. See also operational o

air strikes

Option 3, 109, 158, 253, 297

operational options for air 

Osgood, Robert, 39, 53

Osirak, 40

Otoka, Bosnia, 180–82

Owen, Col Robert, 14, 24, 6

111, 150–53, 192, 201, 

267–68, 282, 302–4, 307

403
Owen, Lord David, 3

6, 8, 17, 22, 68,

71, 113, 184, 265

Pale, 15, 112, 123, 137, 166, 169, 201,

213–16, 218–20, 222, 226, 231–32,

235, 237, 239–40, 245, 259, 266,

277–78, 293, 304

peacekeepers, 8–9, 17, 57–58, 67–68, 93,

98–99, 113, 137, 141–42, 145, 147,

164, 166, 171, 177–78, 183–84, 190,

207, 211, 215, 219–20, 222, 246–51,

254, 258, 265, 274–75, 303, 318

peacekeeping, 9–10, 12–13, 17, 22–23,

65, 68, 77, 79, 81, 93, 99, 104, 106–7,

112, 115, 117–18, 124–25, 127, 143,

146–50, 154, 160–61, 163–65,

169–72, 178–79, 183, 189, 191,

193–94, 201, 207, 209–10, 213–17,

228, 230, 232, 236, 279, 300, 314,

316–17, 319, 323, 326

Peck, Brig Gen William, 111

Pennefather, Maj Gen David, 263

Pentagon, 17, 45, 54, 175, 224–26, 240,

303, 308

Perry, William, 127, 170–71, 239, 252

Petraeus, David, 1–2, 20–22, 27, 30–32,

36, 51–52, 66

PGM, 277

Portillo, Michael, 269

Posavina, 205, 256

Powell, Gen Colin, 2, 21, 33, 58, 64,

66, 70

precision-guided munitions (PGM), 57,

169, 277

press conference, 155, 178, 194, 197,

279, 289–90, 297, 303, 307–8

proportionality, 3, 14, 159, 167–69, 172,

186–87, 190, 214, 283, 306

proportionate, 62, 167–70

Quiggin, Thomas, 156

Ramstein, 60, 69, 150, 192, 196, 212,

233, 241, 265, 270, 302–3, 310

Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), 216–17,

227, 235, 238, 252, 263, 268, 271,

283, 295, 299–300, 306

Rapid Reaction Force operations staff,

271, 306

reconnaissance, 137, 180, 184, 186, 283

Reed, Ronald, 201, 282, 306

Regnault, Lt Gen Francois, 68

responsibility, 24, 6, 8, 10, 

18, 20, 22, 24, 28, 30–34, 

42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52–54, 5

62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 73–76, 7

84, 86–90, 92, 94, 96, 

102–4, 106, 108, 110, 112, 

118, 120–22, 124, 126, 128

134, 136, 138, 140, 1

146–48, 150, 152–54, 156, 

162, 164, 166, 168, 1

174–76, 178, 180, 182, 184

190–92, 194, 196, 198, 20

208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 

222, 224, 226, 228–32, 

238, 240, 242, 246, 248, 

254, 256, 258, 260, 262

268, 270, 273–74, 276, 

282–84, 286, 288, 290, 

296, 298–302, 304, 306, 

312–14, 316–26

responsible, 2, 8, 31, 36–37, 6

84, 92, 96–97, 100, 102, 

163, 188, 212, 215, 250, 

277, 279, 285–87, 292–93, 

310

retrospective SEAD, 180–81

188–91. See also suppr

enemy air defenses

Ripley, Tim, 5, 7, 11–12, 1

155–56, 195–96, 200, 238, 

309

risk, 2, 37–38, 101, 104–5, 12

143–44, 146–48, 164–66, 

207, 213, 215, 217, 224–2

277, 280, 287, 294–95, 314

320–23

Rohde, David, 12, 23, 221, 23

249–51, 264, 266

Rolling Thunder, 43

Rose, Lt Gen Sir Michael, 4–5

23, 67, 113, 115–121, 123

134–38, 140–49, 151–59

169–71, 173, 177, 182–84, 

203, 207, 235, 300, 311

318–19

Rosen, Stephen Peter, 51

Rossetti, Lt Gen, 63, 69, 111, 

Royal Welch Fusiliers, 236, 23

RRF. See Rapid Reaction Forc

rules of engagement, 27, 39, 

55, 93–94, 122, 160, 1

404
185

86, 195, 198, 201, 21718, 298,

306, 323

Russia, 74, 78, 238, 259, 270, 284, 296

Ryan, Gen John, 45, 175

Ryan, Lt Gen Michael, 5, 167, 175, 177,

181, 183–84, 186, 190–93, 203–6,

211–12, 214–15, 219, 223–27,

230–34, 248–49, 253–58, 260,

262–63, 273–76, 279–89, 291–97,

300–301, 320–21

SA-2, 180, 189, 198. See also surfaceto-air missile

SA-3, 198. See also surface-to-air missile

SA-6, 180, 218–19, 250, 266. See also

surface-to-air missile

Sabin, Prof. Phil., 54, 112, 179, 198, 200

Sacirbey, Muhamed, 260

safe area, 5, 23, 65, 86, 97, 100, 102, 134,

161, 174, 191, 236, 238, 245–46, 249,

252, 254–55, 258, 262–64, 268, 280,

289, 320. See also Bihac, Gorazde,

Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa

Sagan, Scott, 44, 55

SAM. See surface-to-air missile

sanctuaries, 53

sanctuary, 174

Sarajevo, 14, 22, 64–65, 71, 74, 81–84,

86, 90–91, 100, 102, 106, 110, 116,

120, 122–26, 128–29, 137, 139, 144,

146, 152–53, 157–60, 163, 166, 169,

173, 187, 192, 196, 200, 207–8,

210–11, 213–14, 216–17, 238, 246,

255, 257, 263, 274–75, 278, 280,

285–90, 297, 300, 302–5, 314, 318,

320, 322

SAS. See Special Air Service

Schulte, Greg, 22, 125, 151, 158, 195

Sea Harrier, 138, 145–46, 158, 318. See

also Harrier

SEAD. See suppression of enemy air

defenses

Secretary General’s special representative. See Akashi, Yasushi

Security Council. See UN Security

Council

self-defense, 45–46, 75–77, 97, 105,

108, 119, 160, 169, 171, 181,

184–88, 191, 209, 258, 298

Serb aircraft, 129, 174–75. See also

Galeb

Serbian capital. See Belgrade

Seville, Spain, 17071, 173, 1

Shalikashvili, Gen John, 67, 

152, 242, 252

Sharp, 8, 22, 43, 54–55, 148

235, 238, 240, 269

Sharp, Adm U.S. Grant, 54

Sharp, Jane, 8, 148, 200, 240

Sheehan, Gen Jack, 136

shoot down, 63, 137, 165–66

also downing

Short, Maj Gen Mike, 302–3, 

309

Smith, Adm Leighton, 6, 134

145–46, 161, 163–64, 172

183–85, 190–91, 193–2

209–10, 216, 218–19, 223

238–39, 242–43, 248, 

261–63, 265, 268–70, 

282–83, 285–301, 303, 30

320–22

Smith, Lt Gen Rupert, 7, 8, 18

145, 164, 190–91, 203

211–17, 219, 228, 231–33, 

245, 251, 253–54, 262–

275–77, 279, 283, 286–87

297, 301, 315, 319

Sokolac, 266

Solli, Per Erik, 13, 23, 109, 15

Soubirou, Andre, 165–66, 194

Special Air Service (SAS), 155

special forces, 118, 134, 137

318–19

Split, Croatia, 170

Srebrenica, 10, 12, 23, 65, 69

102, 106, 121, 124, 151, 

232–33, 235, 238, 245–55, 

261, 263–67, 269, 271, 280

stealth fighter. See F-117

Stewart, Col Bob, 23, 108

Stoltenberg, Thorvald, 22, 7

91–92, 98–101, 120

suppression of enemy air 

(SEAD), 177, 180–82, 184

204, 215, 218, 223, 227

235, 250, 262, 264, 293–9

Supreme Allied Commander 

(SACEUR), 21, 67, 84, 

239, 267

surface-to-air missile, 4, 41, 4

173, 175, 180, 181–84

405
198

200, 21819, 22732, 218, 250,

258, 293–95, 305, 324, 326

T-55, 166. See also tank

tactical determinism, 35–36, 46, 115–16,

147–48, 151, 313, 323

tank, 95, 115, 135, 138, 144, 154,

162–63, 166–67, 194–95

target, 31, 41–42, 83, 85–86, 93, 96, 109,

121, 127, 130, 132, 135–36, 138, 140,

161, 163, 165–67, 169–70, 172, 174,

180–82, 184, 192–93, 197, 199–200,

204, 206, 210, 249, 252, 255–56, 258,

262–63, 267–68, 277–80, 291–92,

295, 304, 320

TEZ. See Total Exclusion Zone

Tilford, Earl, 51, 54

Tomahawk. See cruise missile

Toner, James, 36, 53

Tornado, 183, 227

Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), 126

Tudjman, Franjo, 258

Tuzla, 65, 99, 102, 121, 210, 215,

255–57, 311, 315

Udbina, 129, 160, 173–80, 182, 185,

197–98, 206, 218, 228, 315, 322,

324

UK chief of defense staff. See Harding,

Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter

UK. See United Kingdom

ultimatum, 58, 116, 122–26, 128–29,

138–39, 146, 151–53, 158, 183, 196,

287–88, 290, 295, 297, 300, 314,

318, 320

UN commander in Bosnia, 4, 7, 9, 18,

92–93, 95, 101, 112, 251. See also

Morillon, Lt Gen Philippe

UN Peace Force. See United Nations

Protection Force

UN safe areas policy, 102, 319. See also

UN Security Council Resolution 836

UN secretary general. See Boutros-Ghali,

Boutros

UN Security Council Resolution 816, 69

UN Security Council Resolution 824, 71

UN Security Council Resolution 836, 71,

74, 105, 317

UN Security Council Resolution 844,

77, 106

UN Security Council, 17, 24, 62, 64–66,

69, 74–78, 82, 85, 90–93, 96, 98, 103,

1056, 11213, 118, 120

142–43, 148–51, 154, 

160–61, 171, 176, 185, 18

208–10, 214, 216–17, 2

269–70, 284, 296, 316

UN spokesman. See Williams, 

UN undersecretary general f

keeping. See Annan, Kofi

unauthorized bombing, 54–55

Lavelle, Gen John

United Kingdom, 8, 17, 20–21, 

66–67, 74, 75, 78, 82, 

117–18, 126, 149, 166, 207

252, 271, 302, 306, 309, 31

United Nations Peace Forc

208–9, 223, 261

United Nations Protectio

(UNPROFOR), 4, 8–9, 12–1

62, 66, 73–108, 114–18

133–34, 136–37, 139–45

151–54, 156–57, 159–62

176–80, 182–87, 189–91, 

204, 206–9, 211–17, 219, 

227, 232–33, 235–38, 240

254, 256, 261, 263, 269, 30

322, 324

United States Air Forces 

(USAFE), 59–61, 68–69, 

212, 226, 241, 270

UNPF commander. See Janvi

Bernard; Lapresle, Lt Gen 

UNPF. See United Nations Pea

UNPROFOR commander, 12, 7

101, 106–7, 114, 121, 141, 

160, 176–77, 179–80, 183, 

232, 240, 245, 256. See als

Gen Satish; Cot, Gen Jean M

UNPROFOR. See United 

Protection Force 

US ambassador to UN. See 

Madeleine

US assistant secretary of s

Holbrooke, Richard

US defense secretary. See Perr

US national security advisor, 

See also Lake, Anthony

US secretary of state, 58, 65

See also Christopher, Warr

USAFE. See United States A

Europe

406
Vance, Cyrus, 22, 71, 79

Vicenza, Italy, 63, 69, 87–90, 94, 108–9,

111, 150, 154, 166, 194, 196, 204,

206, 227, 233, 238, 241, 249, 268,

305. See also Combined Air

Operations Center

Vietnam, 2, 21, 29–33, 39, 41, 43–47,

50–52, 54–55, 60–61, 64–65, 87,

106, 135, 175, 190, 228, 291,

319–20

Vincent, Field Marshal Sir Richard, 49,

58, 68, 234, 241, 252, 266

Voorhoeve, Joris, 249, 265

Vrbanja Bridge, 217

Vulcan, 263, 275, 280–81

Wahlgren, General, 78–80, 99, 106, 114,

124, 133

Wald, Brig Gen Chuck, 154, 157–58, 162,

192–96, 198, 221, 226, 233–34, 239,

241

Walzer, Michael, 53

war crimes, 251, 267

warning, 45, 63, 68–69, 84, 129–30,

132, 159–60, 163–66, 170–73, 188,

191, 194, 199, 214–15, 219, 230,

250, 259, 294, 314–15, 318

Washington, 1, 20–21, 24, 41–43, 45,

51–56, 62, 67, 70, 108, 136, 150,

152, 175, 177, 192, 197, 200–201,

225, 234, 237, 239, 241, 

267, 270, 285, 287, 291, 

304–5, 307, 309–10, 324

Waxman, Matthew, 24

Wheeler, Gen Earl, 41

Wider Peacekeeping, 23, 118, 

Williams, Michael, 8, 22, 78, 1

Wilsey, Gen John (UK), 126, 1

Winton, Hal, 47, 50, 56

Wörner, Manfred, 122, 138

Wratten, 242, 269

Wratten, Air Chief Marshal Si

RAF, 242, 269

Zagreb, 21, 79–82, 93, 95, 101–

132, 144, 156–57, 172–

200–201, 208, 211, 214–15, 

247, 250, 258, 265, 268–6

286, 303, 323

Zepa, 65, 102, 121, 161, 215, 

254, 267, 280

ZOA. See Zones of Action

Zoerb, Col “Doc,” 154–58, 

198–200, 204, 212, 226

237–38, 241–242, 262, 267

280, 284, 300, 302–5, 307

Zones of Action (ZOA), 87, 253

263, 268, 315, 320

407
Responsibility of Command

How UN and NATO Commanders

Influenced Airpower over Bosnia

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