If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

VB,

Petitioner-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

May 23, 2024

v No. 364255

Kent Circuit Court 

KA, LC No. 22-001524-PP

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: YATES, P.J., and CAVANAGH and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, KA, appeals as of right the trial court’s order affirming the referee’s decision 

to deny respondent’s motion to terminate an ex parte personal protection order (PPO) following 

de novo review. The PPO was obtained by respondent’s ex-wife, petitioner, VB, after respondent 

attended petitioner’s minor son’s high school hockey game. On appeal, respondent argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion by upholding the PPO because it was issued on the basis of conduct 

that was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, US Const, Am I. Moreover, 

respondent asserts that the court erred by upholding the PPO considering that there was no credible 

evidence that respondent may commit one of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1). Finally, 

respondent argues that the court erred by upholding the PPO, as petitioner’s actions demonstrate 

her desire to wrongfully use the PPO statute as a sword against respondent rather than a shield. 

We conclude that respondent’s arguments are without merit and affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises out of an ex parte PPO that was granted to petitioner against respondent. 

Petitioner and respondent were married for two years. The divorce was final in June 2021. 

Petitioner had two children from a previous relationship, ES and NS. At the time the PPO in this 

case was filed, ES was 20 years old and NS was 17 years old. NS played high school hockey. His 

“senior night” game, which was the final game of the regular season of his senior year, was held 

on February 16, 2022. Respondent attended that game with his fiancée, BB. Petitioner asked the 

athletic director to request that respondent and BB leave the game but respondent refused.
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Petitioner then sought a PPO against respondent. In the petition, petitioner alleged that she 

filed for divorce from respondent because of verbal and emotional abuse that was escalating to 

physical and sexual abuse against her. She further alleged that respondent was aggressive and 

attempted to physically assault her sons. Moreover, petitioner alleged in the petition that 

respondent had to be told repeatedly throughout the divorce proceedings not to contact petitioner 

directly, but to contact her through her attorney. However, petitioner asserted, respondent 

continued to harass her through e-mails and refused to contact her through her attorney. According 

to petitioner, respondent attempted to contact NS using social media. She explained that this 

contact was unwanted. In addition, she stated that respondent attended NS’s most recent hockey 

game. She alleged that “security” asked respondent and his girlfriend to leave but he refused. 

Respondent stated that it was a public place and that he did not have to leave because there was no 

PPO. Petitioner stated that she “was visibly shaking the whole time due to fear of what he had 

planned.” She explained that she had someone escort her and both of her sons outside “because 

we were so scared to leave.” Petitioner stated that she knew that respondent was drinking because 

he received a drunk-driving conviction in November 2021, and he was violent and unpredictable 

while he was drinking.

The trial court issued an ex parte PPO. Respondent then moved to terminate the PPO. He 

denied petitioner’s claims that he ever threatened petitioner or either of her children. He admitted 

to sending e-mails to petitioner during the divorce, but he asserted that the e-mails were 

professional and cordial. He further admitted to attending the hockey game but argued that he 

purposefully took actions—such as arriving and leaving early—to avoid any confrontation with 

petitioner.

After holding a two-day evidentiary hearing, the referee denied respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the PPO. Respondent then sought de novo review of the referee’s decision from the trial 

court. The trial court affirmed the referee’s decision denying the motion to dismiss. The PPO 

remained in place until it expired. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The granting and continuation of a PPO is within the sound discretion of the trial court 

and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 

176; 981 NW2d 500 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the decision resulted in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court’s findings of fact underlying a PPO ruling 

are reviewed for clear error. The clear-error standard requires us to give deference to the lower 

court and find clear error only if we are nevertheless left with the definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, this Court must 

give regard “to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

who appeared before it.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also MCR 2.613(C). 

“Issues of constitutional law, including the application of the First Amendment, are reviewed 

de novo.” Buchanan v Crisler, 323 Mich App 163, 175; 922 NW2d 886 (2018).
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B. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONDUCT

First, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rescind the 

PPO because respondent’s presence at the hockey game was constitutionally protected by the First

Amendment. We disagree.

This appeal concerns a PPO issued pursuant to MCL 600.2950, which concerns orders 

issued in domestic situations involving former spouses. According to MCL 600.2950(4), in 

pertinent part, “[t]he court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the court 

determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined 

may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1).” MCL 600.2950(1) prohibits the 

following actions:

(a) Entering onto premises.

(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named 

individual.

(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual.

(d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of 

the children, except as otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting time order 

issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.

(f) Interfering with petitioner’s efforts to remove petitioner’s children or 

personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the individual 

to be restrained or enjoined.

(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or 

education or engaging in conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or 

educational relationship or environment.

(h) If the petitioner is a minor who has been the victim of sexual assault, as 

that term is defined in section 2950a, by the respondent and if the petitioner is 

enrolled in a public or nonpublic school that operates any of grades K to 12, 

attending school in the same building as the petitioner.

(i) Having access to information in records concerning a minor child of both 

petitioner and respondent that will inform respondent about the address or 

telephone number of petitioner and petitioner’s minor child or about petitioner’s 

employment address.

(j) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section [MCL 750.411h and 

MCL 750.411i].

(k) Any of the following with the intent to cause the petitioner mental 

distress or to exert control over the petitioner with respect to an animal in which 

the petitioner has an ownership interest:

(i) Injuring, killing, torturing, neglecting, or threatening to injure, kill, 

torture, or neglect the animal. A restraining order that enjoins conduct under this 
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subparagraph does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of the animal as 

described in section [MCL 750.50(11)].

(ii) Removing the animal from the petitioner’s possession.

(iii) Retaining or obtaining possession of the animal.

(l) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with 

personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.

“MCL 600.2950(1)(j) allows a court to restrain individuals from engaging in conduct that is 

prohibited under MCL 750.411h,” which is also known as Michigan’s “stalking statute.” SP, 339 

Mich App at 181. According to MCL 750.411h(1)(e), “stalking” is defined as

a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another 

individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, 

intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim 

to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.

“Harassment” is defined as

conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or 

continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer 

emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress. 

Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that 

serves a legitimate purpose. [MCL 750.411h(1)(d).]

“Course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or more separate 

noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(a).

“The petitioner bears the burden of establishing reasonable cause for issuance of a PPO 

and of establishing a justification for the continuance of a PPO at a hearing on the respondent’s 

motion to terminate the PPO.” SP, 339 Mich App at 181 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The trial court must consider the testimony, documents, and other evidence proffered and whether 

the respondent had previously engaged in the listed acts.” Id. (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The court shall issue an ex parte PPO

if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written 

motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself 

precipitate adverse action before a personal protection order can be issued. 

[MCL 600.2950(12).]

“[T]he court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing 

a PPO.” SP, 339 Mich App at 181 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, respondent asserts that the PPO was invalid because it was issued on the basis 

of him participating in a constitutionally protected activity—attending the hockey game. 

Respondent frames his claim as a free-speech issue under the First Amendment. “The First 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no 

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” Buchanan, 323 Mich App at 181 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). See also US Const, Am I. “The Michigan Constitution provides the same 

protection under Const 1963, art 1, § 5 . . . .” Buchanan, 323 Mich App at 181.

However, respondent’s attendance at the hockey game does not involve speech. “The First 

Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.” 

Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 358; 123 S Ct 1536; 155 L Ed 2d 535 (2003). The PPO was not 

issued on the basis of something that respondent said at the hockey game. Indeed, the referee 

concluded that the evidence concerning whether respondent “booed” NS was unclear. Moreover, 

it does not appear that respondent’s attendance was meant to communicate some sort of message, 

such as burning the flag. To any extent that he argues he attended the game to show support for 

NS, NS did not even know respondent was in attendance until after the game, and he testified that 

he did not invite respondent or want respondent to attend.

In any event, even if respondent has raised a valid First Amendment claim, “the freedom 

of speech is not absolute.” Buchanan, 323 Mich App at 181. “[A] person’s right to free speech 

must be understood in light of another person’s interest in being left alone.” ARM v KJL, 342 

Mich App 283, 299; 995 NW2d 361 (2002). As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Hill 

v Colorado, 530 US 703; 120 S Ct 2480; 147 L Ed 2d 597 (2000):

None of our decisions has minimized the enduring importance of a right to be free 

from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to communicate 

has been declined. While the freedom to communicate is substantial, the right of 

every person to be let alone must be placed in the scales with the right of others to 

communicate. [Id. at 718 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

In this case, respondent admitted that he did not have a relationship with NS following the 

divorce. He had not attended any of NS’s hockey games in two years. NS had previously blocked 

respondent’s phone number on his phone, and he blocked respondent from following him on social 

media. He did not invite respondent to attend any of his games. The evidence showed that 

respondent contemplated that his attendance at the game would cause issues. He arrived early, 

attempted to sit away from the crowd, sent his fiancée to purchase the tickets and snacks, and he 

left early. Moreover, the athletic director asked respondent to leave, citing petitioner’s concerns 

that respondent may become violent. However, respondent declined to leave. Respondent had a 

problematic history with ES and petitioner, which included an incident that resulted in damage to 

ES’s bedroom door. In addition, during the divorce proceedings, petitioner asked respondent not 

to contact her directly. Rather, respondent was directed to send his communications to petitioner’s 

attorney. It would be reasonable to believe that petitioner and ES would attend NS’s senior night 

game and that they would be sitting in the stands. Petitioner testified that she believed that 

respondent would attend more games and events because he stated that he could and that there was 

nothing that petitioner could do to stop him.

Accordingly, because petitioner and NS had previously taken steps to avoid contact with 

respondent, the trial court’s decision to issue and uphold the PPO, at least in part, on the basis of 

respondent’s attendance at the hockey game did not violate respondent’s First Amendment rights. 

See ARM, 342 Mich App at 299 (concluding that the trial court did not violate the respondent’s 
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right to free speech by finding the respondent in contempt for contacting the petitioner, rather than 

for the content of his speech that he used to make the contact).

Similarly, respondent’s claim that his attendance at the hockey game served a legitimate 

purpose is without merit for many of the same reasons. The phrase “conduct that serves a 

legitimate purpose” has been interpreted to mean “conduct that contributes to a valid purpose that 

would otherwise be within the law irrespective of the criminal stalking statute.” Hayford v 

Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 332-333; 760 NW 2d 503 (2008) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

In this case, respondent did not have a relationship with NS, and he had not been invited to 

attend the game. In fact, NS had blocked respondent from sending him text messages and 

following him on social media. Petitioner had also previously asked respondent not to contact her 

directly. In addition, respondent’s own actions at the game show that he knew that his presence 

would cause a problem. As a result, respondent’s attendance at the hockey game was not for a 

legitimate purpose. See id. (explaining that there was evidence that the respondent continued to 

contact the petitioner even after the petitioner asked the respondent to stop contacting him and 

refrain from attending his school functions, so even if the respondent had a partially legitimate 

reason for the contact, the court was entitled to conclude that he was not acting for a legitimate 

purpose).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to 

terminate the PPO because the PPO did not violate respondent’s First Amendment rights. See SP, 

339 Mich App at 176.

C. REASONABLE CAUSE

Next, respondent asserts that the trial court erred by upholding the PPO because there was 

no credible evidence to support the finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that 

respondent may commit one of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1). We disagree.

As previously explained, MCL 600.2950(4) requires a court “to issue a PPO if it determines 

that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 

1 or more of the acts listed in [MCL 600.2950(1)].” Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 

701; 659 NW2d 649 (2002). MCL 600.2950(1)(b) includes “[a]ssaulting, attacking, beating, 

molesting, or wounding a named individual.” MCL 600.2950(1)(c) encompasses “[t]hreatening 

to kill or physically injure a named individual.” Moreover, MCL 600.2950(1)(l) includes “[a]ny 

other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a 

reasonable apprehension of violence.” “In determining whether good cause exists, the trial court 

is required to consider testimony, documents, or other evidence and whether the individual to be 

restrained . . . has previously committed or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in 

[MCL 600.2950(1)].” Pickering, 253 Mich App at 701, quoting MCL 600.2950(4)(a) and (b) 

(quotation marks omitted). MCL 600.2950(12) provides:

A court shall issue an ex parte personal protection order without written or 

oral notice to the individual restrained or enjoined or his or her attorney if it clearly 

appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or 

affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the 
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delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate adverse 

action before a personal protection order can be issued.

Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court erred by upholding the ex parte PPO 

because it was not supported by credible evidence. At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified 

that respondent had made threats against her and ES. She also claimed that respondent sexually 

assaulted her during the marriage. She specifically described an incident in which respondent 

punched a hole in ES’s bedroom door during an argument, and she called the police. The parties 

separated shortly after this incident. Moreover, petitioner testified that she knew that respondent 

had a domestic-violence conviction from an incident involving his brother. She also knew that 

respondent had been charged with drunk driving in November 2021. She testified that respondent 

was “unpredictable and violent” when he was drinking alcohol. She further testified that 

respondent repeatedly came to her house and sent her threatening or harassing e-mails during the 

divorce proceedings.

Petitioner acknowledged that respondent’s presence at the hockey game was what caused 

her to request the PPO. She attempted to stay on the other side of the rink to take pictures. She 

was “shaking so bad” that she did not get many pictures of the game. She explained that 

respondent being at the hockey game made her feel scared. NS and ES’s father testified that ES

appeared to be “extremely uncomfortable” and “frightened” at the hockey game. He also said that 

petitioner was “pretty upset.” In addition, NS testified that petitioner looked worried after the 

hockey game.

As a result, contrary to respondent’s assertion, there was testimony provided at the 

evidentiary hearing establishing reasonable cause to believe that respondent may commit one or 

more of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1), such as causing a reasonable apprehension of violence. 

See MCL 600.2950(4); MCL 600.2950(1)(l). Respondent argues that petitioner’s allegations were 

not credible and were uncorroborated. Although the referee stated that petitioner’s failure to 

introduce the threatening e-mails weakened her credibility and that petitioner’s behavior toward 

BB at the hockey game raised a question whether she was fearful of respondent being there, overall 

the referee found petitioner’s testimony to be credible. The trial court accepted the referee’s 

findings, except for the allegation that petitioner sent Facebook messages to BB’s ex-husband

under a fake name. This Court must defer to the trial court concerning credibility determinations. 

See SP, 339 Mich App at 176.

Respondent further argues that the PPO was improperly issued on the basis of his 

attendance at the hockey game. However, respondent had not had any in-person contact with NS

since the parties separated in July 2020. Respondent had not been invited to the game. NS testified 

that he did not want respondent to attend. Respondent knew that his presence would possibly

cause a confrontation with petitioner. There was also testimony that petitioner and ES exhibited 

emotional distress after discovering that respondent was in attendance. See id. at 187 (concluding 

that the respondent’s presence at the children’s basketball games was meant to frighten and harass 

them considering the history of sexual-abuse allegations and the termination of the respondent’s 

parental rights).
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Respondent further argues that the trial court relied on uncorroborated allegations that were 

improperly admitted into evidence without following the safeguards of MRE 404(b).1 However, 

respondent never objected to the presentation of any evidence on the ground that it violated 

MRE 404(b). See MRE 103(a)(1). Therefore, this issue was never ruled on by the trial court. “If 

a litigant does not raise an issue in the trial court, this Court has no obligation to consider the 

issue.” Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW3d ____ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 3. In any event, MCL 600.2950(4)(b) directs 

a trial court to consider whether the respondent “has previously committed or threatened to 

commit” one or more acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1). As a result, we do not agree that petitioner’s 

allegations concerning respondent’s past actions were admitted in violation of MRE 404(b).

Accordingly, considering the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the PPO. See SP, 339 Mich 

App at 176.

D. IMPROPER PURPOSE

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred by upholding the PPO because 

petitioner obtained the PPO for an improper purpose. We disagree.

First, as previously discussed, there was sufficient evidence supporting the issuance and 

continuance of the PPO. Second, petitioner sought the PPO after respondent attended her son’s 

hockey game uninvited after not having contact with petitioner or her son for several months. 

Petitioner last had contact with respondent during the divorce proceedings, and she asked 

respondent not to contact her directly and to send all communications through her attorney. She 

testified that respondent continued to send her e-mails and show up at her house. At the evidentiary 

hearing, petitioner testified that she wanted respondent to leave her and her children alone, and 

that she did not believe that respondent would leave her alone without a PPO. She believed that

he would attend more of her son’s games and activities because there was nothing stopping him 

from attending.

Respondent admitted that he attended the hockey game. He knew that petitioner and ES

were also at the game. His actions—such as arriving and leaving early—showed that he was aware 

that his presence would cause a possible confrontation with petitioner. When the athletic director 

asked respondent to leave, he refused.

The testimony showed that respondent continuously contacted petitioner even after she 

asked him to stop and that respondent continued contact after the divorce was finalized. Moreover, 

because respondent refused to leave the game at petitioner’s request, the evidence indicated that 

respondent would continue to contact petitioner and her sons unless a PPO was issued. Therefore, 

petitioner sought and obtained the PPO for the proper purpose of protecting herself from 

respondent’s unwanted contact. See MCL 600.2950(1). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 

 

1 The Michigan Rules of Evidence were substantially amended on September 20, 2023, effective 

January 1, 2024. See ADM File No. 2021-10, 512 Mich lxiii (2023). This opinion relies on the 

version of MRE 404(b) in effect at the time of the evidentiary hearing.
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its discretion by denying the motion to terminate the PPO on the basis of respondent’s claim that 

petitioner sought the PPO for an improper purpose. See SP, 339 Mich App at 176.

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher P. Yates

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra