No. 88-125 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

LOWELL JEAN WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsRONALD RIGLER, KARI RIGLER, 

and THELMA GRAY, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Park, 

The Honorable Byron L. Robb, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

K. Robert Foster, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gene I. Brown; Landoe, Brown, Planalp & Kommers, 

Bozeman, Montana 

Arnold Huppert; Huppert & Swindlehurst, Livingston, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 18, 1988 

Decided: September 27, 1988 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Mr. Williams brought an action for libel and slander 

against Park County and the Park County Sheriff, Robert 

Oakland. He also brought an action for libel and slander 

against Ronald Rigler, Kari Rigler, and Thelma Gray. Since 

both actions sought damages arising out of related incidents, 

they were consolidated for trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants in the District Court for the 

Sixth Judicial District, Park County. Mr. Williams appeals 

the judgment entered in favor of the Riglers and Thelma Gray 

only. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Should this appeal be dismissed based on the lack of 

a full transcript submitted by plaintiff for our review? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 

refusing challenges to the jury for cause? 

3. Did the District Court err in allowing the defendants eight peremptory challenges? 

4. Were statements made during defense counsel's closing argument an improper appeal to local prejudice? 

Plaintiff submitted only a partial transcript essentially covering the pretrial rulings, voir dire, and opening 

and closing arguments. The transcript does not include any 

of the testimony submitted in the course of the jury trial. 

In his brief plaintiff refers to various interrogatories and 

admissions, apparently contending these establish the facts 

of the case. The record does not warrant that conclusion. 

As a result, we actually have no record from which we may 

summarize the pertinent facts. For the assistance of parties 

reading the case, we will briefly summarize the contentions 

on the part of the plaintiff as set forth in his brief. 
Plaintiff contends that Mr. and Mrs. Rigler filed 

criminal trespass charges against him after he was discovered 

on their ranch, owned by Telma Gray, near Emigrant, Montana. 

Plaintiff also contends that various anonymous threatening 

phone calls were made to the Riglers. Plaintiff further 

contends that the Livingston Enterprise printed various 

statements connecting the anonymous calls and the criminal 

trespass charges, with reference being made to "horn hunters" 

in the area. From his brief it does not appear that plaintiff contends his name even appeared in the newspaper articles. Plaintiff contends that it subsequently appeared that 

the Riglers had staged the various anonymous phone calls. 

Plaintiff then filed libel and slander actions against the 

Riglers, Thelma Gray, Park County and the Park County Sheriff, as well as the Livingston Enterprise. The Livingston 

Enterprise was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals 

the jury verdict in favor of the Riglers and Thelma Gray. 

I 

Should this appeal be dismissed based on the lack of a 

full transcript submitted by plaintiff for our review? 

Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised by 

plaintiff, we address the defendants' motion to dismiss this 

appeal based on a failure to comply with the Montana Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Rule 9 (b) , M.R.App.P., allows a party 

to submit a partial transcript for appeal, but requires a 

description of the included parts and a statement of the 

prospective issues to be served on the respondent. The 

plaintiff submitted a partial transcript to this Court but 

failed to comply with the above requirements to allow the 

respondent to reply to the adequacy of the transcript prior 

to this appeal. It would be appropriate to dismiss the 

appeal as a result of plaintiff's disregarding the rules. 
However, this Court has concluded that an appeal need 

not be automatically dismissed in every instance where the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure have not strictly been followed. 

Garza v. Peppard (Mont. 1984), 689 P.2d 279, 280, 41 St.Rep. 

1922, 1923. Because the record does contain sufficient 

information to consider the significant issues on challenges 

to the jury, we will consider those aspects of the appeal. 

I1 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing 

challenges to the jury for cause? 

The plaintiff argues that two jurors who considered 

themselves to he defense counsel's current clients should 

have been excused when challenged for cause. Montana's 

statute listing the grounds for challenges to jurors for 

cause does not address past or present business relations 

between a juror and an attorney involved in the case. Section 25-7-223, MCA. In absence of specific statutory authority rendering a juror client incompetent, we will defer to 

the discretion of the District Court, whose judgment will not 

be set aside unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. 

Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Services (1982), 200 Mont. 205, 

214, 650 P.2d 772, 777. 

The transcript reveals that although both jurors considered defense counsel to be their attorney, neither had any 

business pending with him at the time of trial. When asked 

by the judge, one of the jurors answered that her past relationship with counsel would not reflect on her ability to act 

as a juror. Because the District Court confirmed that no 

present business was pending between either of the jurors and 

defense counsel, we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court in refusing Williams' challenges for cause. 
LII 

Did the District Court err in allowing the defendants 

eight peremptory challenges? 

The plaintiff claims that the District Court should not 

have allowed a total of eight peremptory challenges to the 

defense. Four were awarded to Park County and the Park 

County Sheriff, and four to the Riglers and Thelma Gray. 

Each party is entitled to four peremptory challenges 

under S 25-7-224(1), MCA. "Each party" has been interpreted 

to mean "each side," unless the position of the codefendants 

is shown to be "hostile." Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess 

Foundation (1978), 179 Mont. 305, 313, 588 P.2d 493, 499. 

For this Court to uphold an uneven grant of peremptory challenges, we must be convinced that the District Court concluded from the pleadings, representations, or evidence that 

hostility existed and that the court set forth the reasons 

for its ruling. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 501. 

The issue of peremptory challenges was first raised in 

this case at the pretrial level. The court heard argument 

from all parties and invited briefs on the matter prior to 

its ruling that each defendant would be allowed four peremptory challenges. The District Court reasoned that because 

the suits against the defendants were consolidated involuntarily, hostility was present. The defendants in the present 

action contend that they did not make any statements to the 

media so that if they had been found responsible in any 

manner to the plaintiff, they would have sought indemnity 

from the Park County Sheriff who actually made the statements 

to the newspaper. The District Court concluded that the 

interests of the parties were adverse on the claim of indemnity theory. We affirm the holding of the District Court in 

granting four peremptory challenges to each set of 

defendants. 
IV 

Were statements made during defense counsel's closing 

argument an improper appeal to local prejudice? 

In the absence of a transcript of the evidence submitted 

to the jury, we are not able to consider plaintiff's contention that defense counsel made improper appeal to local 

prejudice. We note this was a libel and slander action which 

in itself apparently raised questions with regard to the 

plaintiff's reputation. In the absence of a transcript we 

are not able to evaluate the accuracy or necessity of closing 

argument. 

We decline to address the plaintiff's closing argument 

issue. We affirm.