United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1996 DRUG CONTROL

Counternarcotics

Efforts in Mexico

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-163

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271958 

June 12, 1996

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International

 Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr.

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

As you requested, we reviewed counternarcotics activities in Mexico. This

report discusses (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Mexico,

(2) Mexican efforts to counter drug-trafficking activities, (3) the U.S.

strategy and programs intended to stem the flow of illegal drugs through

Mexico, and (4) recent initiatives by the United States and Mexico to

increase counternarcotics activities. We did not review U.S. efforts to

interdict drugs at the border.

Background Mexico is the primary transit country for cocaine entering the United

States from South America as well as a major source country for heroin,

marijuana and, more recently, methamphetamine. U.S. law enforcement

efforts in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean during the

mid-1980s caused cocaine traffickers to expand routes to the drug markets

in the United States. The traffickers’ preferred routes were through

Mexico, a country with a 2,000-mile border with the United States, a

30-year history of heroin and marijuana smuggling, and the existence of

cross-border family ties. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

estimates that up to 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States

currently transits Mexico.

Since 1977, we have issued four reports that examined various aspects of

U.S. and Mexican efforts to control drug production and trafficking.1

 Many

of the problems discussed in those reports continue to adversely affect

1

Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico: Cautious Optimism Advised (GAO/GGD-77-6, Feb. 18, 1977);

Gains Made in Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourishes (GAO/GGD-80-4, Oct. 25, 1979);

Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication Program

(GAO/NSIAD-88-73, Jan. 11, 1988); and Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in

Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

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current drug control efforts in Mexico. In our June 1995 testimony2 on U.S.

efforts to stop the flow of drugs from cocaine producing and transit

countries, we highlighted problems in such areas as changes in the U.S.

drug interdiction strategy; competing foreign policy objectives at some

U.S. embassies; coordination of U.S. activities; management and oversight

of U.S. assets; and willingness and ability of foreign governments to

combat the drug trade. This report updates our prior work on drug control

efforts in Mexico.

Results in Brief Mexico continues to be a major transit point for cocaine, heroin,

marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States. In addition,

drug traffickers have changed their preferred mode of transportation for

moving cocaine into Mexico, decreasing the use of aircraft and increasing

the use of maritime vessels. Currently, maritime vessels are used to move

an estimated two-thirds of the cocaine entering Mexico.

Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy

crops in 1995. However, U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts have had

little, if any, impact on the overall flow of drugs through Mexico to the

United States. The amount of cocaine seized and the number of

drug-related arrests in Mexico have declined. The current government of

Mexico appears committed to fighting drug trafficking, but, according to

U.S. officials, its efforts are hampered by pervasive corruption of key

institutions, economic and political problems, and limited

counternarcotics and law enforcement capabilities.

The current U.S. strategy in Mexico, initially developed in 1991, focuses on

strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the

Mexican government, targeting major drug-trafficking organizations, and

developing operational initiatives, including the interdiction of drugs. In

late 1993, the United States revised its international cocaine strategy from

one that focused activities and resources on intercepting drugs as they

move through the transit region of Central America, Mexico, and the

Caribbean to one of stopping cocaine at its source of production in South

America.

U.S. counternarcotics activities in Mexico and the transit zone have

declined since 1992. Multiple-agency drug interdiction funding for the

transit zone, including Mexico, declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year

2

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182,

June 27, 1995).

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1992 to about $570 million in fiscal year 1995. The U.S. assistance program

in Mexico has been negligible since Mexico initiated its policy of refusing

nearly all U.S. counternarcotics assistance in early 1993. Staffing cutbacks

in the Department of State’s Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy

in Mexico City have limited U.S. capabilities to monitor previously funded

U.S. assistance, primarily helicopters and spare parts.

Since our June 1995 testimony, a number of events have occurred that

could greatly affect future drug control efforts by the United States and

Mexico. First, drug control issues have been elevated in importance at the

U.S. embassy and a drug control operating plan with measurable goals has

been developed for U.S. agencies in Mexico. Second, the government of

Mexico has recently signaled a willingness to develop a mutual

counternarcotics assistance program. Third, the Mexican government has

taken some action on important law enforcement and money laundering

legislation. Fourth, the United States and Mexico have created a

framework for increased cooperation and are currently developing a new

binational strategy. Following through on all of these efforts is critical if

the United States and Mexico are to increase their ability to combat drug

trafficking in Mexico.

The Drug Threat From

Mexico Continues to

Be a Major Problem

The importance of Mexico to U.S. drug control efforts is best described by

the Department of State, which reported in March 1996 that “. . . no

country in the world poses a more immediate narcotics threat to the

United States than Mexico.” This view was reiterated by the Administrator

of DEA, who testified in August 1995 that Mexico was “. . . pivotal to the

success of any U.S. drug strategy.” It is estimated that up to 70 percent of

the more than 300 tons of cocaine that entered the United States in 1994

transited Mexico. DEA estimates that, at any one time, from 70 to 100 tons

of cocaine are stockpiled in Mexico for movement into the United States.

In its March 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the

Department of State estimated that Mexico supplies 20 to 30 percent of the

heroin, which is the predominate form of heroin available in the western

half of the United States, and up to 80 percent of the foreign-grown

marijuana consumed in the United States. Mexican drug-trafficking

organizations also dominate the U.S. methamphetamine trade and are

major figures in the diversion of precursor chemicals necessary for the

manufacture of methamphetamine.

Narcotics traffickers use a variety of air, land, and sea conveyances and

routes to move cocaine from Colombia (the world’s largest manufacturer)

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to Mexico. Cocaine shipments are then moved overland through Mexico

and across the U.S.-Mexican border. (See fig. 1.) Since the early 1990s,

some traffickers have begun to use jet cargo aircraft that are larger and

faster than the private aircraft used in the late 1980s. As we recently

reported,3

 traffickers in the Caribbean have changed their primary means

of delivery and are increasingly using commercial and noncommercial

maritime vessels (such as go-fast boats, sailing and fishing vessels, and

containerized cargo ships) to transport drugs through the transit zone.

According to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, about two-thirds

of the cocaine currently entering Mexico is transported by maritime

means. Department of Defense (DOD) records show that the number of

known drug-trafficking events involving aircraft in the transit zone

declined by about 65 percent from 1992 to 1995 and that known maritime

drug-trafficking events increased by about 40 percent from 1993 to 1995.

The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City reported that 15 known air-trafficking

events were detected in Mexico during 1995.

3

Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 16, 1996).

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Figure 1: Primary Drug-Trafficking Routes From Colombia to Mexico

Air routes

Maritime routes

Overland routes

Legend

United States

Colombia

Mexico

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration.

Drug traffickers respond quickly to interdiction operations by adjusting

their delivery routes and means of transport. Some traffickers have begun

to use aircraft not ordinarily associated with cocaine movement, such as

commercial jets and air cargo aircraft, and maritime vessels to move drugs

into Mexico. Traditionally, traffickers have relied on twin-engine general

aviation aircraft to deliver cocaine shipments that ranged from 800 to 

1,000 kilograms. Beginning in 1994, however, some trafficking groups

began using larger Boeing 727-type jet aircraft that could fly faster than

U.S. and Mexican detection and monitoring aircraft and deliver up to

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10 metric tons of cocaine per trip. To date, there have been eight known

deliveries using this means of transport.

During the past 3 years, Mexican trafficking organizations operating on

both sides of the border have replaced U.S.-based outlaw motorcycle

gangs as the predominant methamphetamine manufacturers and

traffickers in the United States. DEA estimates that up to 80 percent of the

methamphetamine available in the United States is either produced in

Mexico and transported to the United States or manufactured in the

United States by Mexican traffickers. Methamphetamine seizures in

Mexico have grown from a negligible amount in 1992 to 495 kilograms in

1995. Also, the amount of methamphetamine seized along the border rose

from 6.5 kilograms in 1992 to 665 kilograms in 1995. Unlike cocaine,

Mexican drug-trafficking organizations control the production and

distribution of methamphetamine and, because they have complete

control, they retain 100 percent of the profits.

In recent years, drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico have become

more powerful as they have expanded their operations to include not only

the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine but also the

trafficking and distribution of cocaine in the United States. Initially,

Mexican drug-trafficking organizations acted as transportation agents for

Colombian organizations and only smuggled cocaine across the U.S.

border. As they became the key transporters for the Colombians, the

Mexicans began to demand and receive a portion of the drug shipment for

their services. According to DEA, Mexican drug-trafficking groups often

receive up to half of a cocaine shipment for their services. This has

resulted in Mexican drug-trafficking groups substantially increasing their

profits and gaining a foothold in the lucrative cocaine wholesale business

in the United States. According to DEA, Mexican drug traffickers have used

their vast wealth to corrupt police and judicial officials as well as project

their influence into the political sector. The Administrator of DEA recently

testified that some of Mexico’s major drug-trafficking organizations have

the potential of becoming as powerful as their Colombian counterparts.

Proximity to the United States, endemic corruption, and little or no

regulation have combined to make Mexico a money-laundering haven for

the initial placement of drug profits into the world’s financial system. Once

placed in the Mexican financial system, funds can be transferred by wire

to virtually anywhere in the world. Mexico is also the most important

transit point for bulk money shipments from the United States to the

drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico and Colombia. Mexican officials

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estimated that billions of dollars in drug proceeds were repatriated by

Mexican drug-trafficking organizations in 1994, and the total amount

moved into Mexico for eventual repatriation to Colombia was much

higher.

Problems in Mexico

Impede Efforts to

Curb the Flow of

Drugs

Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy

crops in 1995 but other counternarcotics activities, including cocaine

seizures and arrests of traffickers, have declined since 1992. Mexico’s

efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by numerous problems.

These problems include widespread, endemic corruption; economic and

political difficulties encountered by the government of Mexico; the

absence of some legislation necessary to provide a complete foundation

for a meaningful counternarcotics effort; and inadequate equipment and

training that limit Mexico’s capabilities to detect and interdict drugs and

arrest drug traffickers.

In January 1993, the government of Mexico initiated a policy to conduct its

own counternarcotics activities, assumed most of the costs of the

counternarcotics effort and refused most forms of U.S. drug-control

assistance. This policy, commonly known as the “Mexicanization” of the

drug effort, has resulted in major reductions in the U.S. counternarcotics

assistance program in Mexico. During this period, Mexico has seized only

about half as much cocaine and made only about a third as many

drug-related arrests.

Illegal Drugs Continue to

Enter the United States

Despite Mexican Efforts

Despite Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts, the amount of cocaine seized

and the number of drug-related arrests in Mexico have declined from 1993

to 1995 compared to those before U.S. assistance was curtailed. The

average annual amount of cocaine seized in Mexico from 1990 to 1992 was

more than 45 metric tons, including more than 50 metric tons in 1991. In

contrast, from 1993 to 1995, average cocaine seizures declined to about 

30 metric tons annually, including about 22 metric tons in both 1994 and

1995. The number of drug-related arrests in Mexico in 1992 was about

27,600 persons whereas, by 1995, the number had fallen to about 9,900—a

decline of nearly two-thirds. In commenting on this report, the Department

of State attributed the decline in the number of arrests to a change in

emphasis that focused on arresting major drug traffickers. For example, in

January 1996, Mexico arrested Juan Garcia-Abrego, reputed leader of one

of Mexico’s drug cartels, and expelled him to the United States for

prosecution.

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Mexico has made some efforts in counternarcotics. For example, Mexican

military personnel have increased their participation in combating illicit

drugs and destroying illegal airfields. The Mexican Army has traditionally

been involved in the manual eradication of illicit drug crops. During 1995,

the Mexican government reported that more than 7,000 soldiers worked

full time on drug eradication programs and, during peak growing seasons,

the number of soldiers working on these programs grew to 11,000. Army

personnel are assigned to remote growing areas for short-term (90-day)

tours during which they manually cut down, uproot, and burn opium

poppy and marijuana plants and patrol rural areas to halt the

transportation of these and other illicit drugs. According to the

Department of State, Mexican personnel effectively eradicated 29,000

acres of marijuana and almost 21,000 acres of opium poppy during 1995.

As a further indication of increasing the role of the military, President

Zedillo directed the Mexican Air Force to use its F-5 fighter aircraft to

assist the Attorney General’s Office in air interdiction efforts in 1995.

However, assigning the aircraft to an interdiction mission may not have an

immediate impact because, according to U.S. officials, deficiencies in the

capabilities and maintenance of the F-5s, as well as poorly trained pilots

and mechanics, limit the effectiveness and possibilities of success of the

Mexican Air Force in this new mission.

Corruption Continues to

Limit the Success of

Counternarcotics Efforts

The Department of State reports that pervasive corruption continues to

seriously undermine counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. In addition, the

Administrator of DEA testified in March 1996 that Mexican drug-trafficking

organizations have become so wealthy and powerful that they can rival

legitimate governments for influence and control. While drug-related

corruption exists on both sides of the border, the Department of Justice

believes that it is more prevalent in Mexico than in the United States. After

taking office in late 1994, Mexican President Zedillo directed the Mexican

military—widely perceived to be the least corrupt government

institution—to expand its involvement in attempting to stop

narcotics-related corruption. Following an investigation that revealed

extensive corruption within the Mexican federal judicial police forces in

the state of Chihuahua, a contingent of Mexican Army officers and a

number of civilian personnel employed by the Mexican military were

reassigned to replace 60 judicial police personnel in December 1995.

According to Mexican officials, the deployment of Army personnel is not a

short-term quick fix but, rather, a commitment to remain in Chihuahua

until rampant police corruption is brought under control.

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Despite the efforts that President Zedillo has undertaken since late 1994,

U.S. and Mexican officials told us that corruption in Mexico is still

widespread within the government and the private sector. They added that

corruption can be found within many government agencies, but it is

especially prevalent within law enforcement organizations, including the

Mexican federal judicial police and other police forces. Mexican federal

and state police personnel have reportedly participated in the movement

of drugs, including one instance in November 1995 in which federal and

state personnel off-loaded a cargo jet laden with from 6 to 10 metric tons

of cocaine. In another instance, 34 federal judicial police personnel were

arrested by the Mexican Army in June 1995 when they were found to be

protecting a major drug trafficker. Another example occurred in

March 1995 when 16 officers of the National Institute for Combatting

Drugs (the Mexican equivalent of DEA) were arrested for accepting cocaine

and cash to allow a 1.2-metric ton shipment of cocaine to proceed.

Drug-related corruption is not limited to federal police personnel. As we

indicated in our June 1995 testimony, many local police officers are

susceptible to corruption because they earn very low salaries. Sometimes,

their salaries are equivalent to only about $3 per day, which is not enough

to provide many of their families’ basic needs. More recent reports

indicate that the take-home pay of a foot patrolman in Mexico City is

about $6 per day—an increase since June 1995, but still much too low to

reduce susceptibility to corruption.

President Zedillo has openly acknowledged the problems created by

corruption, publicly stated his commitment to stopping it, and taken some

actions to reduce it. Within the Office of the Attorney General, these

actions include restructuring the Office to facilitate counternarcotics

efforts, increasing the amounts of staff and equipment, and undertaking

extensive training programs. Within the Ministry of Finance, a separate

Money Laundering Directorate was created to enhance the government’s

investigative capabilities and improve its auditing procedures to identify

drug-generated cash.

Despite these efforts, counternarcotics efforts continue to face major

obstacles in Mexico because, according to one U.S. law enforcement

official, corruption has been part of the social and cultural fabric of

Mexico for generations. In addition, the Department of State reported in

March 1996 that endemic corruption continued to undermine both policy

initiatives and law enforcement operations. Moreover, the Mexican

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Attorney General stated that addressing the deep-rooted problems of

corruption would take all 6 years of President Zedillo’s term in office.

Economic and Political

Problems Limit Mexico’s

Counternarcotics Efforts

Since 1992, the Mexican government has confronted several major crises

that have competed with drug control activities for government resources.

U.S. officials have stated that these crises, both economic and political,

have adversely affected the overall counternarcotics efforts. According to

one U.S. official, the Mexican government neither publicly announces nor

shares the actual funding levels for its counternarcotics programs with the

United States. However, it is evident that a substantial amount of the

Mexican government’s attention and resources have been focused on

concerns other than counternarcotics.

In December 1994, Mexico experienced a major economic crisis—a

devaluation of the peso that eventually resulted in a $20-billion U.S.

financial assistance package. Further erosion in the peso’s value resulted

in a decline to approximately one-half of its pre-crisis value. In addition,

the rate of unemployment was 17 percent in October 1995, and it is

projected to be 13 percent for 1996. Furthermore, high rates of

inflation—projected to range from 27 to 29 percent in 1996—have

continued to limit Mexico’s economic recovery.

In addition to economic concerns, Mexico had to focus funds and

resources in the southern state of Chiapas on its effort to suppress an

insurgency movement. In doing so, the government required the use of

Mexican military, police, other personnel, equipment, and resources that

might otherwise have been used for counternarcotics purposes.

Mexico Has Lacked Some

Important Legislative Tools

for Curbing Drug-Related

Activities

Mexico has lacked some of the basic legislative tools necessary to combat

drug-trafficking organizations at the law enforcement level. According to

the Department of State, the use of wiretaps, confidential informants, and

a witness protection program was included in legislation recently passed

by the Mexican Congress. These essential tools, according to DEA, have

been used by U.S. law enforcement agencies to successfully combat

organized crime within the United States. Also, until May 1996, the

laundering of drug profits was not a criminal offense in Mexico.

U.S. officials in Mexico City told us that enacting strong legislation that

criminalizes money laundering and requires the reporting of large currency

transactions will not, in and of itself, ensure success in reducing or

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eliminating money laundering. They estimated that, at best, it will take at

least 5 years before substantial reductions in money laundering can occur.

They also said that banks and other financial institutions continue to

strongly resist the reporting requirements because of the additional costs

and administrative burdens of handling and processing the reports. In

addition, according to U.S. officials, large numbers of personnel from both

the government and the private sector would have to be trained to prepare

the currency transaction reports, and the government would need to train

qualified financial investigators to monitor and enforce the transaction

requirements. Despite the additional costs, administrative burden, and

training that would be required, most U.S. and Mexican officials we

contacted believe that a reduction in money laundering cannot be

accomplished without enacting, implementing, and enforcing such

reporting requirements.

Moreover, until May 1996, Mexico’s laws lacked sufficient penalties to

effectively control precursor chemicals that are used to manufacture

methamphetamine. According to U.S. officials, the ineffective penalties

encouraged potential traffickers to use Mexico to transship ephedrine,

pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals from their manufacturers, many

located in Europe, to U.S. and Mexican methamphetamine laboratories. To

counter the growing threat posed by these chemicals, the United States

encouraged Mexico to adopt strict chemical control laws.

Equipment Shortcomings

and Inadequately Trained

Personnel Limit Mexico’s

Capabilities

The counternarcotics capabilities of the Mexican government to detect

and interdict drugs and drug traffickers, as well as to aerially eradicate

drug crops, are hampered by aircraft that are sometimes inadequately

equipped and by aircraft and equipment that are poorly maintained

because of spare parts’ shortages. The Office of the Attorney General and

the Mexican Air Force have over 150 aircraft, including F-5 fighter aircraft

and UH-1H helicopters, and a variety of equipment for interdiction and

eradication operations. According to U.S. officials, many of the F-5 jets

have only a small chance of successfully interdicting drug-trafficking

aircraft because they do not have operational radar units and are not

configured for night-vision operations. Equipment, such as global

positioning systems and radios that are used in eradication operations, is

frequently inoperable and poorly maintained.

In addition to equipment problems, some Mexican pilots, mechanics, and

technicians are not adequately trained, thus limiting Mexico’s

effectiveness in performing counternarcotics activities. Department of

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State officials view the Office of the Attorney General’s UH-1H pilots as

well-trained and disciplined. However, many F-5 pilots receive only a few

hours of proficiency training every month, which is considered not nearly

enough to maintain flying skills needed for interdiction. In addition, the

officials told us that many mechanics and technicians lack the necessary

skills to keep equipment operable because of insufficient training.

U.S. Counternarcotics

Programs in Mexico

Have Declined Since

1992

Relative to the threat posed by narcotics produced in and transported

through Mexico and the pivotal role Mexico plays in the success of any

U.S. drug control strategy, the size of the U.S. counternarcotics effort in

Mexico is extremely small. Before 1992, Mexico was the largest recipient

of U.S. counternarcotics assistance, as it received about $237 million

between fiscal years 1975 and 1992. In fiscal year 1992, the United States

provided about $45 million in assistance that included the provision of

excess helicopters, military aviation training, funding of the maintenance

of Mexico’s antinarcotics air fleet, construction of a new maintenance

facility, support for the manual and aerial eradication of marijuana and

opium poppy, demand reduction and education programs. In early 1993,

the Mexican government assumed nearly all the costs associated with the

counternarcotics effort in Mexico. Since then, U.S. assistance has sharply

declined and, in fiscal year 1995, amounted to only $2.6 million, most of

which was for spare helicopter parts.

U.S. Policy Decisions

Affect Drug Control Efforts

in the Transit Zone and

Mexico

With the November 1993 issuance of Presidential Decision Directive

Number 14, the United States changed the focus of its international drug

control strategy from interdicting cocaine as it moved through the transit

zone of Mexico and the Caribbean to stopping cocaine in the source

countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, before the drug could reach the

transit zone. To accomplish this, drug interdiction resources were to be

reduced in the transit zone while, at the same time, increased in the source

countries.

As discussed in our April 1996 report, DOD and other agencies involved in

drug interdiction activities in the transit zone began to see major

reductions in their drug interdiction resources and capabilities in fiscal

year 1993. Table 1 shows the funding levels for those agencies and the

reductions that have occurred since issuance of the presidential directive.

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Table 1: Counternarcotics Funding in

the Transit Zone (fiscal years 1992-95) Dollars in millions

Agency 1992 1993 1994 1995

DOD $504.5 $426.0 $220.4 $214.7

Coast Guard 443.9 310.5 314.4 301.2

Customs a 16.2 12.5 12.8

DEA 28.8 29.1 28.7 29.6

State 36.2 14.0 7.9 10.6

Total $1,013.4 $795.8 $583.9 $568.9

aCustoms data for 1992 was unavailable.

Source: Indicated federal agencies.

According to the Department of State, U.S. efforts in Mexico are guided by

an interagency strategy developed in 1991. The strategy focused on

strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the

Mexican government, targeting major drug-trafficking organizations, and

developing operational initiatives, including the interdiction of drugs. Key

components of the strategy were dependent upon Department of State

funding, which was reduced in January 1993 when the Mexican

government assumed most counternarcotics costs. Since then, the

Department of State’s counternarcotics programs and staff in Mexico have

experienced major reductions. For example, the Narcotics Affairs Section4

has received no new program funding since fiscal year 1992, and the size

of its staff has been reduced from 17 to 7. According to U.S. officials, the

Narcotics Affairs Section has been operating on unexpended prior-year

and pipeline funds. In contrast, U.S. Customs Service and DEA operations

in Mexico have not been reduced because their programs consist primarily

of the costs of (1) salaries for U.S. employees, (2) equipment used by U.S.

personnel, and (3) the development of drug-related information and

intelligence.

Despite the virtual absence of a U.S. counternarcotics assistance program

in Mexico during the past 3 years, the United States has provided some

limited training and equipment to the Mexican government. For example,

DOD recently provided $1.8 million in emergency spare parts to support

helicopters that had been provided previously by the United States.

4

Overall responsibility for U.S. international narcotics control efforts rests with the Secretary of State.

The Department’s responsibilities, carried out by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs, include policy development and program management, diplomatic initiatives, and

assistance for crop control, interdiction and related enforcement activities. The Bureau is represented

in Mexico City by the Narcotics Affairs Section.

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In addition to the U.S. programs discussed above, the United States

provides indirect support for counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. This

support includes sharing with Mexican officials the results of some DOD

and Customs detection and monitoring activities in South America and

Central America, and some data developed by the counternarcotics

intelligence community.

U.S. Ability to Monitor Its

Assistance Has Declined

According to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, reductions in

the size of the U.S. counternarcotics program have resulted in

corresponding decreases in the number of staff available to monitor how

U.S.-provided helicopters and other types of U.S. assistance are being

used. To ensure that U.S.-provided military assistance is properly

maintained and not misused, section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, as amended, sets forth certain assurances that recipient

governments must make before the United States can transfer

defense-related commodities and services. Among other things, these

assurances permit continued U.S. access to the asset, provide for the

security of the asset, and prevent the sale of the asset without U.S.

approval. The Mexican government, however, has objected to direct U.S.

oversight requirements. In some instances, the Mexican government has

refused to accept assistance that was contingent on its signing such an

agreement. In other instances, this position resulted in lengthy

negotiations between the two countries to develop agreements that

satisfied the requirements of section 505 and were sensitive to Mexican

concerns about national sovereignty. As we reported in 1993, these delays

resulted in Mexico receiving only about 60 percent of the $43 million in

emergency U.S. counternarcotics assistance authorized in 1990 and 1992.

Before the Mexicanization policy, the Department of State employed

several advisers who were stationed at the aviation maintenance center in

Guadalajara and the pilot training facility in Acapulco. One of their duties

was to monitor the use of the numerous U.S.-provided helicopters, which

are dispersed throughout Mexico, and the inventory of aviation spare

parts. The advisers would periodically report their end-use monitoring

observations to the Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in

Mexico City. The advisers and embassy personnel also discussed their

observations with representatives from Bell Helicopter, which the

Department of State had contracted to maintain the Mexican

counternarcotics air fleet.

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With the advent of the Mexicanization policy, the number of State

Department Foreign Service and contract personnel was greatly reduced

and the aviation maintenance contract was awarded by the Mexican

government. As a result, the State Department currently has fewer

personnel in the field to review operational records and monitor how the

30 U.S.-provided helicopters are being used. According to U.S. officials,

the embassy relies heavily on biweekly reports submitted by the Mexican

government that typically consist of a map of Mexico with the state to

which a helicopter is deployed highlighted and a listing of helicopters that

are inoperative at the time of the report. Unless they request specific

operational records, U.S. personnel have little way of knowing if the

helicopters are being properly used for counternarcotics purposes or are

being misused.5

 Embassy officials told us that helicopter operational

records have been requested and received on only one occasion in the past

8 months to provide information to visiting U.S. officials.

Limitations in U.S.

Interdiction Efforts

Drug traffickers have traditionally used aircraft to move drug shipments

from Colombia to the staging areas of Mexico. To respond to aircraft

movements, DOD has devoted extensive resources to detecting and

monitoring suspicious aircraft as they fly from South America to staging

areas outside of the United States. The 1993 change in the U.S. drug

interdiction strategy reduced the detection and monitoring assets in the

transit zone. According to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, this

reduction creates a void in the radar coverage, and some drug-trafficking

aircraft are not being detected as they move through the eastern Pacific

Ocean. As an example, the embassy cited the November 1995 flight of a

Caravelle cargo jet to Baja California. The jet reportedly contained 6 to 

10 tons of cocaine and U.S. officials did not know that it was a

drug-related flight until 2 days after it landed.

DOD officials acknowledge that radar voids have always existed throughout

the transit zone and the eastern Pacific area. These voids are attributable

to the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the limited range of ground- and

sea-based radars. As a result, DOD officials believe that existing assets must

be used in a “smarter” manner rather than flooding the area with

expensive vessels and ground-based radars, which are not currently

available.

5

In the past, the Mexican government has misused some U.S.-provided counternarcotics helicopters.

For example, during the 1994 uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas, several U.S.-provided

helicopters were used to transport Mexican military personnel to the conflict, which was a violation of

the transfer agreement.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

In Mexico, U.S. assistance and DEA activities have focused primarily on

interdicting trafficking aircraft as they deliver their drug cargoes.

However, as discussed previously, traffickers are increasingly using

commercial and noncommercial maritime conveyances to move drugs into

Mexico. Commercial maritime smuggling primarily involves moving drugs

by containerized cargo ships. Noncommercial maritime smuggling involves

either “mother ships” that depart Colombia and rendezvous with either

fishing vessels or smaller craft that, in turn, smuggle cocaine into a

Mexican port, or “go-fast” boats that depart from Colombia and make a

direct run to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. According to officials at the U.S.

Embassy in Mexico City, about two-thirds of the cocaine currently

entering Mexico is transported by maritime means.

Efforts to address the maritime movement of drugs into Mexico are

minimal, when compared to the increasing prevalence of this mode of

trafficking. According to officials at the U.S. Embassy, the Mexican

government is developing a port inspection unit and the Mexican Navy is

involved in patrolling the Mexican coast and navigable rivers, boarding

suspect vessels, and eradicating illicit crops in coastal regions. The U.S.

program for addressing this problem is also small and consists mainly of

monitoring some ship movements and providing training to Mexican naval

personnel. The U.S. program is based on prior explicit intelligence on the

movement of drug carrying vessels. DOD officials told us that without prior

intelligence, the detection and monitoring of ships is impossible since

thousands of fishing, commercial, and other vessels are found in sea lanes

between Colombia and Mexico daily.

Department of State officials believe that Mexican maritime interdiction

efforts would benefit from training offered by the Customs Service and the

Coast Guard in port inspections and vessel boarding practices. However,

according to DOD, Mexican law and custom have limited the amount of

interaction between the Mexican Navy and these two U.S. agencies in the

past. Department of State officials note that the degree to which the

Mexican Navy becomes involved in drug control efforts will be an

indicator of the political will of the country to address the drug-trafficking

problem.

Recent Efforts to

Address Bilateral

Drug Control Issues

Since our June 1995 testimony, a number of events have occurred that

could affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico.

First, the importance of drug control issues at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico

City has been elevated, and the embassy has developed a drug control plan

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

that focuses the efforts of all U.S. agencies in Mexico on specific goals and

objectives. Second, the Mexican government has enacted legislation that

strengthens fiscal regulations governing financial institutions and other

legislation aimed at reducing money laundering. Third, according to U.S.

officials, the Mexican government has signed a mutually acceptable

section 505 transfer agreement that will cover future military equipment

transfers. Fourth, the United States and Mexico have created a framework

for increased cooperation and the development of a joint counternarcotics

strategy.

The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City elevated counternarcotics from the

fourth highest priority—its 1995 ranking—in its Mission Program Plan for

Mexico to a top priority, which is shared with the promotion of U.S.

business and trade. The U.S. Ambassador to Mexico told us that, because

the immediacy of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S.

involvement in the financial support program for the Mexican economy

have subsided, he has been able to focus a substantial amount of his

attention on counternarcotics issues since mid-1995.

In July 1995, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City developed a detailed

embassywide counternarcotics plan for U.S. efforts in Mexico. The plan

involves the activities of all agencies involved in counternarcotics

activities at the embassy and focuses on (1) disrupting and dismantling

Mexican drug cartels and their political allies, (2) reducing money

laundering, (3) strengthening Mexican institutions, and (4) interdicting

drug shipments and eradicating illicit crops. The plan also identifies

several programs that the embassy believes will lead to attaining these

goals, as well as specific program milestones and measurable objectives,

and sets forth funding levels and milestones for measuring progress. The

embassy estimated that it will require $5 million in Department of State

funds to implement this plan during fiscal year 1996. However, according

to State Department officials, only $1.2 million in counternarcotics funds

will be available for efforts in Mexico during fiscal year 1996. Of this

amount, about $800,000 is expected to be used to support the Narcotics

Affairs Section and $400,000 is to fund a program to assist Mexico’s

judicial system. According to State Department officials, the fiscal year

1997 budget request includes $5 million for the Department of State’s

narcotics control efforts in Mexico.

Senior Department of State officials do not believe there is a conflict

between the policy of reducing the level of resources in the transit zone

outlined in the presidential directive and current efforts to increase drug

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

interdiction assistance and resources to Mexico. These officials told us

that the United States needs to pay special attention to drug control efforts

in Mexico because (1) Mexico is the staging area for drugs entering the

United States, (2) the influence of drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico

has increased, and (3) the borders are relatively easy to cross.

After taking office in December 1994, President Zedillo declared drug

trafficking “Mexico’s number one security threat.” As such, President

Zedillo advocated legislative changes that could improve Mexico’s ability

to combat drugs and drug-related crimes. During the session that ended on

April 30, 1996, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation that could

improve some of Mexico’s counternarcotics capabilities. Some of the

newly enacted legislation is effective immediately and includes provisions

that make money laundering a criminal offense within Mexico’s penal

code. However, other legislation to provide Mexican law enforcement

agencies with some essential tools needed to arrest and prosecute drug

traffickers and money launderers requires amending the Mexican

constitution. These tools include the use of electronic surveillance and

other modern investigative techniques that, according to U.S. officials, are

very helpful in attacking sophisticated criminal organizations. Department

of State officials told us that it appears likely that the amendments will be

ratified in the near future—maybe as soon as the end of June 1996.

To date, the Mexican Congress has not addressed several other key issues

that would support its counternarcotics efforts. These issues include a

requirement that all financial institutions report large cash transactions

through currency transaction reports. Although some U.S. officials

disagree on the value of such reports, none dispute the point that currency

transaction reports are useful tools that could deter and reduce money

laundering. According to U.S. officials, various U.S. government agencies

are working closely with Mexican officials to address the issue of currency

transaction reports. However, the officials acknowledged that, even if

legislation requiring the use of currency transaction reports is enacted, it

will take the Mexican government up to 5 years or longer before the laws

can be fully implemented because of the extensive administrative

procedures and training that would be required.

To follow up on mutual concerns discussed during the U.S. Secretary of

Defense’s October 1995 visit to Mexico, military and diplomatic

representatives of the two countries met in San Antonio, Texas, in

December 1995. According to a U.S. participant at this meeting,

representatives of the Mexican government proposed that an agreement

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

be developed for future transfers of military equipment. With such an

agreement, equipment could be quickly transferred to the Mexican

government and the lengthy delays encountered in the past avoided. U.S.

officials view this as an indication that the Mexican government and its

military components are committed to stopping the flow of drugs through

Mexico. According to U.S. officials, a formal agreement was signed in

mid-April 1996, and the United States announced shortly thereafter its

intention to transfer a number of helicopters and spare parts to the

Mexican Air Force to enhance its role in interdiction and support for law

enforcement activities. Twenty UH-1H helicopters are scheduled to be

transferred in fiscal year 1996 and up to 53 in fiscal year 1997. According

to the Department of State, details about how the pilots will be trained, as

well as how the helicopters will be operated, used, and maintained, are

being worked out.

In March 1996, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo established a high-level

contact group to better address the threat narcotics poses to both

countries. The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy

(ONDCP) co-chaired the first contact group meeting in Mexico City in late

March, which met to review drug control policies, enhance cooperation,

develop new strategies, and begin to develop a new plan of action. At the

conclusion of this meeting, the contact group issued a 10-point joint

communique that called for action, such as developing a joint

antinarcotics strategy, increasing counternarcotics cooperation, and

implementing laws to criminalize the laundering of drug profits. Binational

working groups have been formed to plan and coordinate implementation

of the contact group’s initiatives. A follow-up meeting is scheduled during

the summer of 1996 in Washington, D.C. According to ONDCP officials, the

joint antinarcotics strategy is expected to be completed in late 1996.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

ONDCP and DEA provided comments on a draft of this report (see apps. I and

II); the Departments of State and Defense provided oral comments; and

the Department of Justice provided informal comments. ONDCP and the

Departments of State and Defense generally agreed with the report’s

content and major conclusions. ONDCP, in commenting on reduction in

interdiction resources available for activities in the transit zone and source

countries, stated that these reductions were largely the result of

congressional action. DEA, however, raised concerns that the draft report

did not accurately reflect the many positive counternarcotics initiatives

undertaken by the governments of Mexico and the United States. We,

consequently, updated the report to reflect Mexican legislative initiatives

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

and bilateral efforts. We also made changes to reflect additional

information provided by the Department of Justice, as well as other

agencies.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information for this report, we spoke with appropriate officials

and reviewed planning documents, studies, cables, and correspondence at

DOD and the Department of State, the U.S. Customs Service, DEA, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and ONDCP in Washington, D.C. In

addition, at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, we interviewed the

Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission. We also interviewed

responsible officials from the Narcotics Affairs, Political, and Economic

Sections; the Defense Attaché Office; the Military Liaison Office; the

Information Analysis Center; DEA; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the

U.S. Customs Service; and the Department of the Treasury. We also

attended various drug-related meetings and reviewed documents prepared

by U.S. Embassy personnel.

To obtain the views of the Mexican government, we met with

representatives of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C. In Mexico

City, Mexico, we met with the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations; the

Deputy Foreign Minister for North American Affairs; the Coordinator for

Counternarcotics Programs (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores); the

Deputy Attorney General (Procuraduria General de la Republic

Sub-Procurador Juridico); the Deputy Finance Minister (Secretaria de

Hacienda y Credito Publico); and representatives of the Ministry of

Defense. We also visited the Mexican Attorney General’s aircraft

maintenance facility in Mexico City, Mexico, where we met with Mexican

government officials responsible for maintaining the 30 U.S.-provided

UH-1H helicopters and the Mexican air interdiction fleet. At the

maintenance facility, we also met with U.S. officials responsible for

developing a spare parts inventory system for the Office of the Attorney

General. Information on Mexican law in this report does not reflect our

independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary

sources.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
B-271958 

We conducted our review from January through June 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees;

the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Attorney General; the

Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; and the Directors of the

Office of National Drug Control Policy and Federal Bureau of

Investigation. Copies will also be made available to other interested

parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be

reached on (202) 512-4268. The major contributors to this report were

Allen Fleener and George Taylor.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Office of National

Drug Control Policy

24

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Drug Enforcement

Administration

25

Table Table 1: Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone 13

Figure Figure 1: Primary Drug-Trafficking Routes From Colombia to

Mexico

5

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix I 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix II 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix II 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

See comment 1.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 6.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix II 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 4.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 20.

See comment 5.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix II 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
Appendix II 

Comments From the Drug Enforcement

Administration

The following are GAO’s comments on the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s (DEA) memorandum dated June 3, 1996.

GAO’s Comments 1. The report text has been modified to reflect this information.

2. We believe that the report presents an accurate portrayal of actions

taken by the Mexican government.

3. This discussion has been deleted from the final report.

4. We presented information from 1992 to illustrate changes that have

taken place since the institution of Mexican efforts to implement their own

counternarcotics policy.

5. We have discussed this issue with DEA and the situation is currently

under review.

(711181) Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-163 Drug Control in Mexico
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