IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-01641-COA IN RE ESTATE OF HARRY J. GREEN, DECEASED: ELIDE CRISTINA GARRIDO GREEN APPELLANT

v. SHIRLEY COOLEY AND WILFORD GREEN APPELLEES DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/11/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C. MICHAEL MALSKI COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARK NOLAN HALBERT CYNTHIA TRANELL LEE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: CHRISTOPHER G. EVANS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/10/2019; CORRECTED 09/26/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ. LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Cristina Green appeals t he decision of the Lee County Chancery Court to award eight of h er late husband’s p r operties to his sister, S hirley Cooley

. The chancery court f ound that Harry G reen delivered t he Decem ber 31, 2003 deeds to Shirley , and that Harry intended that Shirley own the properties in question. W e af f irm

. FACTS ¶2. During his lif

e tim e, Harry am assed a l arge e state consisting of various properties. On
Decem ber 31, 2 003, Harry h ad his attorney draf t eight d eeds that convey ed t he f ollowingproperties to his sister Shirley :

1. 1201 Nixon Drive, Tupelo, MS
2. The “Main Street W arehouse,” Shannon, MS
3. The Monroe County Land, Nettleton, MS
4. The “Shannon Lot”
5. Tem

ple Circle, Shannon, MS
6. The “W hite Lane Property ,” Nettleton, MS
7. The “Two Houses and Green Valley Lab,” Shannon, MS
8. The Sum m it 1 Shirley was not present w hen these deeds were signed. In f a c t, both p arties agree that she was at her hom e in Texas a t that tim e. Further, there is no indication in the record that she

ever knew the t ransaction o ccurred in Decem ber 2003. A f

ter the deeds were properly acknowledged bef

ore a notary public, Harry took the deeds with him f o r saf e keeping. Harry did not deliver the d e eds to Shirley at that tim e, n or d id he f ile them in t h e c o u n ty clerk’s

1 T h e S u m m it p ro p e rty is n o t co n sid ered in th is ap p eal. A t trial, S h irley testif ied t h at sh e sig n ed a d eed th at tran sf erred th e S u m m it p ro p erty b ack to H arry tw ice. S h e f irst sig n ed a d eed o n Jan u ary 1 5 , 2 0 0 4

. Y e ars later, in 2 0 0 9 , h o w e v er, H arry cam e b ack t o S h irley an d to ld h er sh e n eed ed to r e-co n v ey th e p ro p erty b ecau se h e w an t ed t o g e t a “h o m estead ex em p tio n ,” an d b u ild a h o m e f o r h im an d C r istin a. B ecau s e th e S u m m i t p ro p erty w as in H a rry ’s n am e at th e tim e o f h is d eath , it p assed to C ristin a an d w as n o t at issu e at th e trial lev el. T h e ch a n cello r, h o w ev er, to o k t h is as a sig n o f H arry ’s in t en t. M ain l y , th e ch an cello r co n clu d ed th at if H arry w an t ed th e o th er p ro p erties in h is n am e, h e w o u ld h av e ask ed S h irley to sig n th e d eed s an d reco rd th em lik e h e d id w ith th e S u m m it p ro p erty

. 2of

f ice. 2 ¶3. Later, o n January 1 5, 2004, Shirley was visiting Harry and their m o ther in M ississippi. Harry asked Shirley to go with him to his attorney ’s of f i ce i n H ouston, Mississippi to sign

som e papers. Shirley t estif ied that she signed “ e v e ry thing that w as put in f

ront of [ her].” The record indicates that Shirley s igned the f o llowing w a r

ranty deeds on January 15, 2004: (1) 1201 Nixon Drive; ( 2) t he Main Street W a rehouse; ( 3) the Monroe County Land; (4) the Shannon Lot; (5) T e mp l e Circle; and (6) the Beauty Shop and House in Monroe County

. Shirley told the chancellor that Harry did not t ell her any

thing about why h e wanted her to sign the deeds, b ut that s he just trusted Harry

. The warranty deeds signed on January 15 were

never properly acknowledged or f i led. Harry took the deeds with him when he lef t, and those deeds were never f

o und. 3 ¶4. Harry m et C r i s t i n a i n 2 0 0 3

. On January 31, 2004, Harry m arried C ristina in Las Vegas. Cristina testif

ied at trial that Harry “never told [ her]” that Shirley owned a ny of his properties, including the hom e on Nixon D rive that the n ewly weds were living in. Likewise, Cristina t estif

i ed that her husband kept his business af f a irs secret. However, Lisa Diallo, a deputy clerk f

o r Lee County , testif

ied t hat Har r y t o l d her his properties w ere in Shirley ’s

nam e because he trusted her and his “wif e [ was] f rom across the water,” and he did not want

2 T h e D ecem

b er 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 d eed s s ig n ed b y H arry to S h irley w ere later f iled i n th e L ee C o u n ty C h an cery C lerk ’s o f f ice o n D ecem

b er 4 , 2 0 0 4 , an d w ere d eliv e r e d to S h irley b y H a rry th at sam e m o n t h

. 3 C o p ies o f th e sig n ed , n o n -ack n o w led g ed , u n f iled d eed s w ere later f

o u n d in th e atto rn ey ’s o f

f ice, b u t th e o rig in al d eed s H arry

to o k w i th h im

w e r e n ev er f

o u n d

. 3her to take the property . The chancellor specif i cally cited this f

act in his opinion. ¶5. O n N o v e mb e r 2 6 , 2004, Harry convey ed by quitclaim deed the ninth property , th e Plantersville property , to Shirley

. Like the deeds s igned on Decem ber 31, 2003, Shirley was
not p resent and the deed w as pr o p e r l y a c k nowledged. A f

ew day s later, on Decem

ber 3, 2004, Harry traveled to Texas a nd delivered all of the Decem ber 3 1 , 2003 warranty deeds

an d t h e N o v e mb er 26, 2004 quitclaim deed t o Shirley

. Shirley testif i ed t hat she “put the deeds away ,” and that Harry told her that if som ething happened to him , she would “know what to d o.” T he Decem

ber 31, 2003 deeds w ere recorded on Decem ber 4, 2004, except f

or the Monroe County properties (the W hite Lane property and the Monroe Co u n t y l and). Shirley actually f

iled the W hite Lane property and the M onroe County land warranty deeds af ter Harry ’s death in 2010. ¶6. Harry c ontinued to pay taxes on the properties, do r o utine m aintenance, and collect

rent. W hen H arry went to borrow m oney against t he Plantersville property in 2 010, however, he asked Shirley to sign the papers required to d o s o. Shirley testif ied t h a t H a r r y h a d also borrowed agains t t h e hom e at 1201 Nixon Drive twice bef o re. These transactions also required her signature f

o r a pproval. The chanc e l l o r ’ s o pinion noted these f a c ts to support his f actual determ ination that Harry inte n d e d t o t ransf er the properties to his sister instead of Cristina. ¶7. Harry

died on July

6, 2010. In 2007, Harry had updated his will t o devise all of his property to h is wif

e Cristina and h is grandchildren. The property listed in t he will included

4the properties Harry deeded t o Shirley on Decem ber 31, 2003. Because Shirley t ook control of the p roperties af

ter Harry ’s d eath, Cristina f iled a c om plaint f or an accounting of the estate and a declaratory judgm ent as to the owner of the property at issue. Cristina argued that the deeds signed on January 15, 2 004, were properly accepted by Harry , and the properties were
to pass a s dictated b y

Harry ’s will. The estate was never able to f i nd the unacknowledged original deeds s igned o n January 15, 2004, a nd those deeds w e r e n e v e r f i led i n the land records or the clerk’s of

f i ce. Copies of the deeds s i gned t hat day were retrieved f rom Harry ’s attorney , but there is no record of Shirley ever signing a deed to convey the “ Two Houses and Green Valley

Lab” back to Harry

. ¶8. T h e c h a n c e l l o r f

ound that, af

ter reviewing all of Harry ’s actions, he intended f o r Shirley t o p o s sess t he properties. As a result, the court f ound t hat Shirley was the rightf ul

owner of t he eight properties in dispute. 4 Cristina tim ely appealed t he chancellor’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. Our review of the chancellor’s decision is lim ited. T he f indings o f a chancery court will not be disturbed “unless [ it] abused its discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard,

4 In th e ch an cello r’s o r ig in a l m em o ran d u m o p in i o n an d j u d g m en t f iled o n N o v em

b er 7 , 2 0 1 7 , h e f

o u n d th at S h irley w as th e rig h tf u l o w n er o f s i x p r o p e rties c o n v ey ed o n D e cem b er 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 (1 2 0 1 N ix o n A v en u e, th e Wh ite L an e p ro p e r ty in M o n ro e C o u n ty , th e M ain S treet Wareh o u se in S h an n o n , t h e M o n ro e C o u n t y l an d , T e m p le C i rcle, an d th e S h an n o n L o t). L ater, o n F eb r u ary 2 1 , 2 0 1 8 , th e ch a n cello r en tered a n o rd er clarif y in g h is m em o ran d u m o p in io n an d j u d g m en t. In h is clarif y in g o rd er, th e ch an cello r f o u n d th at th e G r een V a lley L ab p ro p erty b elo n g ed to S h irley

. A d d itio n ally , h e f o u n d th at S h i rley o w n ed th e h o u s e an d 9 .5 acres i n P lan tersv ille. A t th e tim e o f t h i s ap p e al, S h irley w as a d j u d g ed to b e th e rig h tf

u l o w n er o f

all eig h t p ro p erties.

5or its f

indings are m anif

estly wrong or clearly erroneous . ” Matter of E s tate of Smith v. Boolos , 204 So. 3d 291, 305 (¶22) (Miss. 2016) (citing In re Estate of B aumgardner , 82 So. 3d 5 9 2, 598 (¶15) (Miss. 2 012)). Q u e stions of law, and i ssues of constructive t rusts, we review de novo. Id.
ANALYSIS ¶10. C r i stina argues three issues on appeal. Because her f i r s t t w o i s s u e s d e a l w i t h acceptance and d elivery of t he deeds signed on January 15, 2004, we consider them as one issue. First, Cristina c laim s that the chancellor erred in awarding t he s ix properties to Shirley b e c a u s e Harry had properly accepted the deeds s i gned on January 15, 2004. Second , s h e
argues a constructive trust was c reated when Shirley took possession of the properties, and the properties should have been distributed as dictated in Harry ’ s will. ¶11. The laws of t his state concerning the validity of deeds and the transf er of real property

are well settled. For there to be a valid convey ance o f real property , there m ust be delivery

a n d a c c eptance of a valid deed. I n re Estate of Hardy , 910 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (¶7) (Miss. 2005). Delivery constitutes a “ transf er of a deed f

rom the grantor to the grantee or his agent

or t o som e third person f

or the grantee’s use, in such m anner as to deprive the grantor of the right to recall it at his option, and with intent to convey title.” Id

. at 1054-55 (¶8) (quoting
23 Am

. Jur. 2d Deeds §120, at 1 56 (1983)). Bef o re delivery i s com

plete, “a deed is without
f orce o r ef f ect and i s me r e l y a ‘scroll under control of the grantor who is f ree t o withdraw it, destroy it, or com

plete its execution by delivery .’” Morrow v. Morrow , 129 So. 3d 142,

6146 (¶13) (Miss. 2013). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has f ound t hat a deed that was signed and acknowledged, but n ever delivered, w as void f or lack of delivery

. In re Estate of H ardy , 910 So. 2d a t 1055 ( ¶8) (citing Grubbs v. Everett , 236 Miss. 698, 7 01, 111 So. 2d 923, 924 (1959)). ¶12. Cri s t i n a c l a i ms t h a t the chancellor erred in awarding the six properties t o Shirley because Harry had properly a ccepted the deeds s igned on January 15, 2004. She argues that
H a r r y ’ s a ctions leading up to the convey ance on January 15, 2004 showed his intent was alway s f or the properties to return to him

. Harry had the deeds that c o nvey ed the properties
f rom him to Shirley (signed on D ecem ber 31, 2003) and the d eeds that transf erred them back (signed o n January 1 5, 2004) draf ted at the sam e tim e. Additionally , the short p eriod of t im e between the convey ances, Cristina argues, m akes it clear that Shirley was not the intended

owner. The chancellor d isagreed, and f ound that Harry ’s actions i ndicated he wanted Shirley to own the properties at issue. ¶13. The chancellor f

actually f ound, af ter considering the evidence presented a t trial, that Harry intended t he p r operties in question to be transf erred to Shirley and t hat Harry did not accept the January 2004 deeds. W e are bound to af f irm t hat f actual f inding unless it was

m anif estly in error or clearly erroneous. Here, am ple evid ence supports the chancellor’s
f inding. The chancellor’s decision was b ased on “Harry ’ s words, acts[ ,] and the circum stances surroundi n g t h e t r a n s a c t ion.” F rom t hat, the chancellor determ ined Harry “did

not intend to, and thus did not accept, the con v e y a n c e ” o f t he properties i n January 2004,

7when Shirley executed t he deeds. W e agree. Cristina testif i ed at trial that she overheard her husband discuss that he was renting their hom e at 1201 Nixon Drive with his secretary : Q. -- y ’all were renting the Nixon hom e A. Yeah . . . . That was during t he tim e that Sh i r l e y w as the owner o f record o f t he 1201 Nixon Drive property

. Further, testim o ny proved that Shirley signed f o r deeds of t rust a s the o wner of the properties, and S hirley re-signed the deed to the Sum m i t property af t er she had s igned it previously on January 15. In addition, the chancellor heard testim ony t hat the deeds Harry ultim ately delivered t o Shirley were the warr a n t y d e e d s he signed on Decem ber 3 1, 2003. The January 15, 2004 d eeds w ere n ever f iled and were, in f

act, never f

ound. The chancellor recognized “one of several possibili t i e s f or the disappearance o f the deeds i s t hat Harry destroy ed them , ” and took that f act to signif

y that he never accepted the deeds. W e agree. ¶14. Further, Harry ’s knowledge and a c t i o n s evidence h is n on-acceptance of the deeds signed in January 2004. H arry k new what he was doing. It is hard to com prehend that Harry would d eliver and record t he Decem ber 2003 deeds in Decem

ber 2004 if his intended result was to vest title back to him self because of the January 2 004 deeds that w ere never f ound.
In f a c t , i t i s i mpossible to im a gine that Harry was not a ware of each s tep in these transactions, w hen h e o r c h e s t r a ted and caused every m ove. At the t im e, Harry was acting

as b oth grantor and grantee over the course of these transactions and had f ull knowledge of the a c t u a l o w n e r s hip interest of all parties. The chancellor even n oted in his opinion that

8“despite his ex p e r i e nce in m atters of real estate a nd his p rior c o nduct,” Harry chose not to

have the January 2004 deeds notarized, f iled, o r f ound. This indicated that Harry ’s intent was f or Shirley to rem a in t he owner of the properties and Harry ’s non-acceptance of the January 2004 deeds. ¶15. The chancellor’s f indings of f

act as to Harry ’s intent are supported by the e vidence. The law requiring delivery and a cceptance b ef ore a convey a nce is legally ef f e c tive supports the chancellor’s conclusions. All of these f acts, c oupled with t he additional testim ony and evidence a t trial, s upport the chancellor’s f actual f indings and conclusion o f law and do not rise to the level o f clear or m anif est error. W e af

f irm the chancellor’s f

inding t hat Harry did not accept the deeds in January 2004. ¶16. Cristina’s second issue a rgues that the properties were held in a constructive trust. “A constructive trust is a j udicially im posed rem edy used t o p revent unjust enrichm ent w hen one party wrongf

ully retains title t o property .” Presb y t e r y of St. Andrew v. First Presbyterian Church PCUSA of Starkville , 2 4 0 So. 3d 3 9 9 , 405 (¶27) ( Miss. 2018). If Shirley had wrongf ully retained title to the properties, th e n a c o n structive trust m ay be n ecessary . However, as t he chancellor f ound in his opinion, S hirley is the rightf ul owner of all eight of the properties. This Courts af f irm s the chancellor’s f

inding that the deeds signed in
D e c e m ber 2003 and again i n January 2004 (1201 Nixon Drive, the “ Main Street W a rehouse,” the “ Sh a n n o n Lot,” “Tem ple Circle,” the “Monroe County Land,” and the beauty shop, house, and acreage in Nettleton) were all rightf u lly Shirley ’s. As such, a constructive trust

9is not proper because Shirley did not “wrongf ully retain[ ] title to [ the] propert[ ies].” As to the Green Valley L a

b and P lantersville properties, we f ind the sam e . Nothing in the record indicates that a s igned deed convey ing the G reen Valley Lab f rom Shirley to H arry was ever f ound. There was a unsigned copy , but neither Cristina n or Harry ’s a ttorney c ould produce

a s igned copy . A dditionally , there is no evidence that a deed was ever f ound that would have
convey ed the Plantersville p r operty back to Harry

. So, again, these two properties would not require a constructive trust. W e f ind that the c hancellor did not err by f inding Cristina f

ailed to prove her claim

of a constructive trust.

CONCLUSION ¶17. This Court af

f irm s t he c hancellor’s f

inding that Shirley C ooley is the rightf ul owner of the f ollowing properties:
1. 1201 Nixon Drive, Tupelo, MS
2. The “Main Street W arehouse,” Shannon, MS
3. The Monroe County Land, Nettleton, MS
4. The “Shannon Lot”
5. Tem

ple Circle, Shannon, MS
6. The “W hite Lane Property ,” Nettleton, MS
7. The “Two Houses and Green Valley Lab,” Shannon, MS
8. The Plantersville Property The record supports the chancellor’s conclusi o n t h a t H a r r y ’ s a c t i o n s b e t

w e e n Decem

ber 2003

1 0and Decem

ber 2004 show his intent that Shirley rem ain the owner of these p roperties. W hile this Court cannot speak t o Harry ’s reasons f or m asterm inding t hese transf ers like a gam e of Monopoly , Harry ’s actions in t his case speak louder than his words. Harry f ailed to properly accept the deeds signed by Shirley on January 16, 2004, because he never f iled the deeds and the signed originals w ere never f ound a f t e r h i s death, even though the deeds were in his exclusive control. Accordingly , we f ind no m anif

e st error in the c h ancellor’s decision and af f irm the decision that the properties belong to Shirley

. Furtherm ore, because Shirley does

n o t w r o n g f

u l l y possess title to the properties, a constructive trust as to any of the eight properties is unnecessary and the chancellor was correct in deny ing her request. ¶18. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P . J . , G R E E N L E E , W ESTBROOKS, M cDONALD, McCARTY AND C. W I L SON, JJ., CONCUR. J. WIL S O N , P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY TINDELL, J. J. WILSON, P.J., DISSENTING: ¶19. T h is dissent prim arily a ddresses six of the eight properties that are at i s s u e i n t h i s appeal. 5 There is no dispute that Shirley signed warranty deeds recon v e y ing those six properties to Harry

. T here is also no dispute that S hirley signed th o s e deeds at Harry ’s lawy er’s of

f ice at Harry ’s specif

ic request

. A n d t h e r e is no d ispute that Harry took

5 T h e o th er tw o p ro p erties— (1 ) th e “ T w o H o u ses an d G r een V alley L ab ” in S h an n o n an d (2 ) a h o u se an d n in e a n d a h alf acres in P l an t ersv ille— raise d if f e ren t issu es b ecau se th ere is n o ev id en ce th at S h irley sig n e d d eed s reco n v ey i n g th em to H arry . I ad d ress th o se tw o p ro p erties in P a rt II. 1 1possession of the deeds, continued to pay insurance and taxes on the properties f or the rest of his lif e, and continued t o m a ke im provem ents a n d r e p airs and collect rents on the properties. The chancellor nonetheless f ound that Harry d id not “accept” the d eeds to these properties. I respectf

ully disagree with the chancellor’s conclusion. I would reverse and render judgm e nt in f

avor of Cristina as to these six properties.
I. The January 15, 2004 Warranty Deeds ¶20. W i th respect t o s ix o f the properties at issue i n this appeal, there is no dispute (a) that Harry signed deeds convey ing the properties to Shirley on Decem ber 31, 2003, and (b) that Shirley then signed warranty deeds reconvey ing the properties to Harry on January 15, 2004. These include f

our properties in Lee County and two in Monroe County : 1. 1201 Nixon Drive in the Lee Acres s u bdivision in Tupelo (Lee County ) (Exhibits 1-A and 1-B);
2. the “ Main Street W arehouse” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 2-A and 2-B);
3. the “Shannon Lot” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 4-A and 4-B);
4. “Tem

ple Circle” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 5-A and 5-B);
5. “Monroe C o u nty Land” in or a round Nettleton (Monroe County ) (Exhibits 3-A and 3-B); and
6. a beauty shop, house, and acreage at 30023 W hit e L a n e in Nettleton (Monroe County ) (Exhibits 6-A and 6-B). Shirley signed the six deeds reconvey ing the properties t o Harry at Harry ’s specif ic request at the of f ice of Harry ’s lawy er, John Fox.

1 2¶21. The Decem ber 31, 2003 deeds f

o r the f our Lee County properties were not recorded

u n t i l Decem

ber 4, 2004. The Decem b er 31, 2003 deeds f

or the t wo Monroe Count y properties were not recorded until af ter H arry ’ s death. On J uly 2 9, 2010, about three weeks af ter Harry died, Shirley r ecorded those two deeds in Monroe County

. T he January 15, 2004 deeds reconvey ing the six properties f rom Shirley to Harry were never recorded. ¶22. Although the deeds r eco n v e y i n g t he properties f rom Shirley to Harry w ere neither acknowledged nor r ecorded, that does not af f ect their validity as between Shirley and Harry or their heirs. Miss. Code Ann. § 89-5-3 (Supp. 2018) (providing that a deed “shall . . . be valid and binding” “ as between the parties and their heirs” even if it is n ot acknowledged or recorded); Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Miss. v. Bennett , 611 So. 2d 973, 976 (Miss. 1992);
Cotton v. McConnell , 435 So. 2d 683, 687 (Miss. 1983); M etro. Nat’l Bank v. United States , 901 F.2d 1297, 1302 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990). The c hancellor recognized this point in his order deny ing s u m ma r y judgm ent, and Shirley does not dispute it on a ppeal. The chancellor correctly s tated that the “one central qu e s t i o n r e maining in this cause” is “whether Harry accepted the six deeds on January 15, 2004.” ¶23. “[ A]cceptance by the grantee [ is] essential t o the validity o f a deed.” Odom v. Forbes , 500 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Miss. 1987). The grantee’s intent to accept the deed is “m anif ested by his words, acts and the circum stances surrounding the transaction.” Id. The chancellor
in this c ase noted that Mississippi case law addressing the grantee’s intent to accept a deed is “sparse.”

1 3¶24. In Martin v. Adams , 216 M i s s . 2 7 0 , 62 So. 2d 328 (1953), the C ourt held that the

grantee, Mrs. Adam s, did not accept a deed f rom the grantor, her husband. W hen M r. Adam s told his wif

e t hat he h ad executed a d eed convey ing certain land to her, she “im m ediately declined to accept the deed, and rem o nstrated with him f o r what he had done.” Id. at 277,
62 So. 2 d at 329. She “took the deed to an a ttorney f or h is interpretation of it,” b ut the deed

wa s t h e n “returned to [ Mr. Adam s] and rem ained in his control.” Id. at 277-78, 62 So. 2d

at 329. The Court held that the deed was void d ue to Mrs. Adam s’s express ref usal to accept it. I d. ¶25. The C ourt also h eld that deeds were not accepted in In re Estate o f Hardy , 910 So. 2d 1052, 1054-55 (¶¶7-10) (Miss. 2005). In that case, Hardy e x e cuted deeds convey ing property
t o h e r t h r e e d a ughters, but she died bef ore s he delivered t he deeds. Id. at 1055 (¶9). Th e deeds were f

ound in her purse af

ter h er d e a t h , and “each o f [ her daughters] testif ied unequivocally

that she never accepted the deed.” Id. Thus, the problem in H ardy was not just that the deeds were not “accepted” but that they were not even delivered. Id. at (¶10). ¶26. In S

almon v. Thompson , 3 91 S o. 2d 984 (Miss. 1980), t he Court held that a deed was not accepted because the of f eree f ailed to pay

the purchase price f

or the property

. Salm on orally agreed to buy 55 acres f rom Thom

pson f or a specif

ied price. I

d. at 985. S ix m onths later, Thom

p son wrote to Salm on. Id. He enclosed an executed deed and instructed Salm on
to return a copy of the deed w ith a check f or the purchase p rice if he still w anted to buy the property

. Id. For m ore than two y ears t hereaf t e r , S a l mon did not pay f or the property or

1 4record the deed, and Thom p so n f i n a l l y i n f orm ed Salm on that he was selling the land to another party

. Id. at 9 85-86. Salm on then a ttem p ted t o record t he d eed a nd p ay f or the property

. Id. However, the C ourt held that Thom pson h ad withdrawn the of f er to sell bef

ore Salm on accepted the deed. Id. at 987. The Court held that Thom pson’s initial “letter with instructions

. . . constituted a qualif ied delivery o f t he deed,” but Salm on f ailed to accept the deed when he f

ailed to com

ply with those instructions f

or m ore than two y e ars. Id. ¶27. In each of

the f oregoing c ases, the evidence t hat t he grantee did not accept the deed

was clear. There is no s im ilarly clear evidence of non-acceptance in this case. In f act, there is am pl e e v i dence that Harry did accept the deeds. There is no dispute that Harry asked Shirley to go to the F ox law of f ice and sign th e d e e ds reconvey ing the properties to him

. There is also no dispute t hat Harry took possession of the deeds and l ef t the Fox law of

f ice with them

. Harry then continued to pay the taxes and insurance on the properties, continued

to m ake repairs and im

provem ents o n the properties, and continu e d t o c o llect r ent on the properties. In addition, m o re t han three y ears later, Harry had a new will prepared in which he specif ically devised at least som e of

the properties at issue. He specif ically devised the
“W hite L ane” property in Nettleton to his g randchildren, and he devise d “ [ t ] h e Green real

estate apartm ents and houses” t o C r istina. 6 In a r esidual clause, Harry devised all of his

6 T h e p recise n atu re o f all s ix o f th e p ro p erties is n o t clear f ro m th e reco rd ; h o w e v er, at least so m e o f th e m a r e r e n tal p ro p erties th at ap p e a r to f all w ith in th is d ev ise. S h irley ack n o w led g ed a t t rial th at s h e ch an g ed th e l o ck s o n th e p ro p erties an d b eg an co llectin g ren t o n th e p ro p erties af

ter H arry ’s d eath

. 1 5rem aining real property to Cristina. Harry a lso borrowed m oney a gainst t he Nixon Dri ve

property and used the f

unds to build a new m ar i t a l h om e on a nother of his properties. In short, with respect to these six properties, Harry e x ercised the ordinary rights and f ulf illed the ordinary obligations of property ownership. As the chancellor put it, “Harry ’s d ay -to-day behavior with regard to the property was consistent with ownership.” ¶28. The eviden c e t h a t S h i r ley cites does n ot dem onstrate a l ack of acceptance. Shirley

em phasizes that Harry never had the deeds n otarized and f iled. However, as discussed above, that does not render the deeds invalid as between t he parties or their heirs. 7 Shirley also notes that Harry asked her to sign deeds o f trust f or the Nixon Drive property

. However, i t i s h a r dly surprising that the bank wanted Shirley —the r ecord o wner of the property —t o sign the deed of trust. Shirley next points o ut that H arry f r equently reviewed the properties under her nam e a t the Lee C ounty chancery c lerk’s of f ice. H owever, that sim

ply shows that Harry knew that the L ee County land records showed that Shirley was t he owner of record, which is not in dispute. ¶29. Shirley also relies o n Cristina’s inabilit y t o p roduce t he original signed deeds that Harry took with him f

rom the Fox law of

f ice. Shirley speculates that Harry m ay have lost

7 M o reo v e r , a s n o t e d a

b o v e, w ith resp e ct to th e tw o M o n ro e C o u n ty p r o p erties, n eith er th e D ecem

b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 d e ed s f

r o m H arry to S h irley n o r th e Jan u ary 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 d eed s f ro m S h irley to H a rry w ere reco rd ed p rio r to H arry ’s d eath

. It w as o n l y af ter H arry d ied t h at S h irley reco rd ed h er d eed s. It is u n clear w h y S h irley ’s u n ilateral actio n af ter H a rry ’s d eath sh o u ld m a k e th o se d eed s m o re v alid th an th e d e ed s th at S h irley sig n ed to reco n v ey th e sam e p ro p erties to H arry . 1 6or destroy ed the originals. However, even if that is what happened, the subsequent loss or destruction of

the originals would not render Harry ’s acceptance o f the deeds i nvalid. See
W ood v. Johnson , 234 Miss. 874, 880, 108 So. 2d 202, 204 (1959) (“The rule has generally been a dhered to in t his jurisdiction that where a deed has once been signed a nd delivered, a subsequent surrender and destruction of it does not divest the grantee of title t o the land.”); Lisloff v
. H

art , 25 M iss. 245, 2 5 0 ( 1 8 52) (“The d eed m ade to the son by Hanah vested the title to the land in h im , a nd the subsequent dest r u c t i on of it did not divest it. The second deed, m a de by Hanah to Charles Lislof f , Sen., is inoperative, and cannot def eat the right of the son t o the prem ises.”). The relevant issue is whether Harry accepted the deeds when they

were executed and delivered to him in January 2004—not what he m ay have done with t hem

som etim e later. ¶30. Shirley also cites vague testim ony of h e r b r o t h e r , Wi lf ord Green, that Harry

and
C r istina wrote a num

ber of “rent” checks t o L arry W illiam s f or “around $ 500 ” w h i l e t h e couple resided on Nixon Drive. W ilf ord said t hat W illiam s was a “f r iend” of theirs. Shirley suggests that Harry would n ot have paid “rent” to a “ third party ” if he r eally owned t he Nixon Drive p roperty

. The suggestion m a kes no sense. To begin w ith, W i lf ord had little
k n o w l e d g e o f the checks a nd did not clearly testif y t hat they were rental pay m ents f or th e Nixon Drive hom e. Bey ond that, there is no evidence t hat Larry W illiam s owned the property or that he w as collecting rent on behalf Shirley

. It i s S hirley ’s position in this litigation that she owned the Nixon Drive p roperty at that t im e. Yet S hirley f ails to explain

1 7why Harry would have been pay ing rent to Larry W illiam s or how that would tend to prove

that she own e d t h e property

. Is Shirley suggesting that Harry m istakenly believed that his
f riend Larry

W illiam s owned the property ? And, if so, what would that prove? 8 ¶31. Finally , the chancellor f ound it signif

icant that Harry had Shirley execute two deeds
reconvey ing the m arital hom e in “The Sum m it” s u bdivision i n Tupelo. The Sum m it property is n ot at issue in this appeal b ecause Shirley does not dispute that Cri s t i n a i s i t s rightf ul

owner. Like the s ix properties discussed a bove, H arry signed a deed convey ing the Sum m it
p r operty to Shirley on Decem ber 31, 2003, and Shirley then signed a deed c onvey ing th e property back to Harry on January 15, 2004, although the latter d eed w as never r ecorded. In 2009, Harry asked Shirley to e xecute a second d eed c onvey ing the Sum m it property to h im

so t hat he could f

ile f or a hom e stead exem

ption on t he property

. Shirley com plied, and that deed was both acknowledged and recorded

. The chancellor suggested that t he 2009 deed
“m ay have been unnecessary if Harry had t ruly accepted the 2004 convey a nce.” However, the m u ch sim pler e xp l a n a t i o n f

or Harry ’s r equest f

or a second deed is j ust what he told

8 T h e m aj o rity o p in io n q u o tes a s n ip p et o f C ristin a’s testim o n y t o m ak e it ap p ear t h at C r istin a ad m itted th at sh e a n d h e r h u sb an d w e re ren tin g th e N ix o n D riv e h o m e. A n te at ¶1 3

. C r istin a, w h o is f

ro m V en ezu ela, ap o lo g ized d u rin g h er testim o n y t h at h er “E n g lish is so b ad .” S h e also testif

ied th at sh e an d H arry d id n o t p ay r en t f o r th e p ro p e rty an d th a t th ey d id n o t h av e a lan d lo r d

. A l l t h at sh e clearly articu lated w as th at sh e o n ce o v erh e ard H arry m ak e s o me u n s p ecif

ied co m m en t to h is secretary ab o u t ren t in g th e p r o p erty

. F u rth erm o re, th e m aj o r ity also f

ails to ex p lain w h y

H arry o r C ristin a w o u l d h av e b een p ay in g ren t to L a rry Willia m s i f

, as th e m a

j o rity co n ten d s, S

h i rley o w n ed th e p ro p erty

. 1 8Shirley : he needed an a cknowledged, recorded deed to f i le f or his hom estead exem

ption. 9 Harry ’s r equest regarding t he S um m it property should not be interpreted as e v idence of what he did or did not believe about the six other properties. ¶32. I n s um m ary , the c hancellor was entirely correct in f i nding t hat “Harry ’ s day -to

- d a y behavior with regard to the property was consistent with ownership.” Harry asked Shirley

to sign deeds reconvey ing the properties to him , a nd he took possession of those deeds. He also paid the taxes a nd insurance on the properties, he m a d e im provem e nts and repairs, he collected r ent, and he even devised the properties i n his w i l l

. The various other pieces of evidenc e c i t e d b y Shirley do not prove a lack of a cceptance. Because H arry accepted the deeds, I would reverse and render judgm ent in f avor of Cristina.
II. Constructive Trust ¶33. Cristina’s com

plaint sought a c o n s t r

u ctive trust as to all eight p roperties t hat are in dispute i n this appeal. As to the six properties discussed above i n Part I, Cristina m akes an in-the-alternative argum e nt t hat, “[ t]o the e xtent there is a n y question concerning [ Harry ’s] acceptanc e o f t h e six s igned deeds, [ the] evidence is suf f icient to establish a constructive

trust as t o the properties.” Cristina also argues that a c onstructive trust should b e im posed

9 S e e M iss. C o d e A n n . § 2 7 -3 3 -1 7 (f ) (R ev . 2 0 1 7 ) (“If title is h eld b y d eed

. . . , su ch in stru me n t s h a l l b e d ated an d ack n o w led g ed o n o r b ef o re Jan u a ry 1 o f t h e y ear f o r w h ich h o m estead ex em

p tio n is ap p lied an d sh all b e f iled f o r reco rd w ith th e ch an cery clerk o n o r b ef o r e J an u ary 7 o f th e y ear f o r w h ich h o m estead ex em p tio n i s ap p lied

. . . .”); M iss. C o d e A n n . § 8 9 -3 -1 (S u p p . 2 0 1 8 ) (“U n less [ a d eed ] is [ p ro p erly ] ack n o w led g ed

. . . , t h e [ ch an cery clerk ] m ay

ref u s e to [ reco rd th e d e ed ] .”).

1 9on two additional properties: (1) the “Two Houses and Green Valley Lab” in Shannon and (2) a house and nine and a half acres in Plantersville. T here are n o d eeds to show that Shirley

ever convey ed these p roperties back to Harry ; however, Cristina argues that S hirley held the properties “solely

f o r the benef

it of Harry .” ¶34. A constructive trust is an equit a b l e c l a i m a g a i n st a party who holds legal title to a property

. Joel v. Joel , 43 S o. 3d 424, 431 ( ¶23) (Miss. 2 010); McNeil v. Hester , 753 So. 2d 1057, 1 064 (¶24) (Miss. 2000). T heref ore, the m ajority ’s determ ination that Shirley has title

t o t he six p roperties discussed above in Part I does not def eat Cristina’s claim f

or a

con s t r u c t i v e t r ust. Nor is Cristina’s lack of deeds f or t he other two properties dispositive with respect to those two properties. ¶35. I w ould not address Cristina’s claim f or a constructive trust as to the six pro p e r t i e s discussed above in Part I only b ecause I would hold t hat the January 15, 2004 w arranty deeds
f rom Shirley to Harry were valid a nd ef f ectively convey ed title to the properties. Theref ore, a constructive trust should be unnecessary as to those properties. ¶36. As to the rem aining two properties—the Two Houses and Green Valley Lab and the Plantersville property

—I w ould af

f i rm t h e c h ancellor’s denial of a constructive trust. 10
Unlike the six properties discussed above, there i s no evidence that Shirley signed a warranty deed convey ing either of

those properties back to Harry

. Although there is som e evidence

10 T h e S u p rem e C o u rt’s d e cisio n in Jo e l , 4 3 S o . 3 d a t 4 3 0 -3 1 (¶¶2 2

- 2 4 ), su m m arizes th e b asics o f

th e law o n co n stru ctiv e tru sts. 2 0to support Cris t ina’s claim that Shirley held the p roperties solely f or Harry ’s benef

it, the evidence is also open t o other interpretations. I cannot say that t he chancellor clearly erred by f i nding that Cristina f

aile d to m eet h er burden of p roving this claim by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSION ¶37. I w o u l d a f

f irm the denial of Cristina’s c laim f o r a constructive t rust with respect to the Two Houses and Green Valley Lab and the Plantersville property

. However, with respect
to the six properties discussed in P art I, I would hold that t he evidence i s open to only one interpretation: H arry accepted the signed warranty deeds r econvey ing the properties to him

. Theref ore, those d eeds were valid and ef f ective, a nd I would reverse and render as to those six properties. I respectf

ully dissent. TINDELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

2 1