No. 13694 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977

WESTERN LITHO, a Montana

corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF YELLOWSTONE COUNTY,MONTANA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Hon. LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counse of Record: For Appellant: Hibbs, Sweeney & Colberg, Billings, Montana Maurice Colberg argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana Edmund P. Sedivy argued, Bozeman, Montana C. W. Jones argued, Deputy County Attorney,

Billings, Montana

Submitted: September 23, 1977

'i,-, p Decided: .)v 1 A

## 8377 Filed: ,LI - 

### - :&Q-iT .+A%Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court, Yellowstone County, requesting a declaratoryjudgment. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground plaintiff lacked standing tobring the action and was not the real party in interest. Plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff isWestern Litho, a printing establishment located inBillings, Montana. Defendants are the Board of County Commissioners of Yellowstone County and The Artcraft Printers, Inc., another printing firm located inBozeman, Montana. The facts as alleged in the complaint are: For the two year period preceding January 

### 1, 1976, Campbell Calvert, d/b/a Laurel Outlook, a newspaper in Yellowstone County, hereinafter referred to as Calvert, had the contract for legal advertising, publications and printing for Yellowstone County, and subcontracted the printing portion of the work toplaintiff. Calvert also submitted a bid for the period commencing in 1976 and agreed again to subcontract the printing toplaintiff, ifhisbid was accepted. Plaintiff contends Calvert's bid was the only qualifiedbid on the entire contract, and therefore the Board of County Commissioners was required toaccept it under sections 16-1230 through 1233, R. C,M. 1947. The Board, however, chose to splitthe contract and awarded the printing portion toArtcraft and the remainder to Calvert.Plaintiff instfhted a declaratoryjudgment action, naming the Board and Artcraft as defendants and requesting sections 16-1230, et-seq.,be interpreted tomean: 

### "*

# ** that if there 

### is a low bid from any newspaper for allof the legal advertising, publications and printingwork of the county and if thatnewspaper owns and operates a commercial printing establishment, then allof the county legal advertising, publications and printingwork must be awarded to that particular newspaper and the contract cannot be divided into two parts, one for legal advertising and publications and the other for printing and further that the phrase Icommercial printing establishment' as used in 516-1230 does not contemplate that allof the printing work must be accomplished by the particular newspaper upon 

### its premises but may be subcontracted to other qualified firms, 'I Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to sue and was not the real party in interest. Plaintiff subsequently moved toamend itscomplaint to add Calvert as a party plaintiff and to add

a prayer for lostprof

### its. Without ruling on plaintiff'

### s motion, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The threshold question here 

### iswhether plaintiff has the requisite standing tobring an action under Montana's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947 provides, so far as 

### ispertinent here: "Any person

# **

# * whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute

# ** * may have determined any.questionof construction or validity arising under the

# * ** statute

# * ** and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. " The complaint allegesplaintiff has a contract with Calvert forprinting work conditioned upon the acceptance by the Board of County Commissioners of Calvert's entirebid. Further, it alleges Calvert's entirebid was not accepted because the Board acted in contravention of sections 16-1230, et seq., R.C.M. 1947, inacceptingArtcraft's bid for the printing work.The United States Supreme Court stated inFlast v. Cohen, 392 

### U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942,1952, 20 L ed 2d 947, 

# "*** The 'gist of the question of standing' 

### is whether the party seeking relieQhas 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 

### 7 L Ed 2d 663, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962)." Here plaintiff has alleged a substantial and personal economic injury that 

### is the direct result of what it claims tobe the unlawful action of the Board of County Commissioners. The "concrete adverseness" required by Baker and Flast 

### is assured. Defendants rely on Chovanak v. Matthews, 120Mont. 520, 188P.2d 582 (1948), for the proposition that plaintiff lacks standing to seek a declaratoryjudgment. Such reliance 

### is misplaced. The Court inChovanak denied standing toa citizen who challenged the constitutionality of a law relating to the licensing of slotmachines for certainpurposes. The Court noted plaintiff's only interestwas that of a citizen, elector, resident and taxpayer, and stated: "It 

### is held inMontana, as it isheld by the United States Supreme Court, and by courts throughout the nation, that 

### a showing only of such interest in the subject of the suit as the public generallyhas 

### is not sufficient towarrant the exercise of judicial power. 

# ***" 120Mont. 527. The instant case 

### is clearly distinguishable. Here, plaintiff asserts a right of a subcontractor under the statutes governing the letting of bids for county printingwork. Far from being shared with the public atlarge, this right 

### is shared by, at most, one other person, the contractor, Calvert. Plaintiff has standing tobring the action for 

### a declaratoryjudgment.Defendants concede Calvert 

### is the real party ininterest, but the district court dismissed the actionwithout giving plaintiff a reasonable opportunity tojoin Calvert as a party plaintiff. In view of our holding, we find it unnecessary to discuss the other questions on appeal. The order of the district court 

### is reversed. The case 

### is remanded for furtherproceedings in accordance with this opinion.

We Concur: