alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WEIKE LUO,

Petitioner,

v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 20

- 72504

Agency No. A200

- 264

- 886

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2023 * * San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Weike Luo, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of t he Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an

I mmigration J udge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application s for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 16 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” Garcia

-

Martinez v. Sessions , 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).

We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, applying the

standards governing adverse credibility determinat ions under the REAL ID Act.

Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1039

– 40 (9th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination

based on inconsistenc ies between Luo’s testimony
, in which he stated that the

Chinese government forcibly induced his pregnant wife’s early labor, and his

asylum interview, in which he stated that the Chinese government forced his wife

to have a cesarean section

. See Li v. Garland , 13 F.4th 954, 9 59 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“ [E] ven minor inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner ’ s veracity may

constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination.” (quoting Ren v.

Holder
, 648 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9t h Cir. 2011)) )

. Luo’s explanations , which

themselves contained inconsistencies, do not “ compel a contrary conclusion. ” See

id. at 96 0

– 6 1

. Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that

Luo’s corroborative evidence did not independently establish his eligibility for

relief. See Garcia v. Holder , 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Luo’s C onvention

A gainst T orture claim because it is based on the same testimony the agency found3

not credible, and Luo does not point to any other evidence in the record that

compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if

returned to China. See Shrestha
, 590 F.3d at 1048

– 49

.

PETITION DENIED

.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8359 

To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to require the Federal Crop 

Insurance Corporation to carry out research and development regarding 

a policy to insure table, wine and juice grapes against losses due to 

a freeze event, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2024 

Mr. LANGWORTHY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to require the 

Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to carry out research and development regarding a policy to insure 

table, wine and juice grapes against losses due to a 

freeze event, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Grape Research And 

5 Protection Expansion Act’’ or the ‘‘GRAPE Act’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8359 IH

1 SEC. 2. POLICY TO INSURE TABLE, WINE, AND JUICE 

2 GRAPES AGAINST LOSSES DUE TO A FREEZE 

3 EVENT. 

4 Section 522(c) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 

5 U.S.C. 1522(c)) is amended by adding at the end the fol6 lowing: 

7 ‘‘(20) TABLE, WINE, AND JUICE GRAPES.— 

8 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year 

9 after the date of the enactment of this para10 graph, the Corporation shall carry out research 

11 and development, or offer to enter into 1 or 

12 more contracts with 1 or more qualified persons 

13 to carry out research and development, regard14 ing a policy to insure table, wine and juice 

15 grapes against losses due to a freeze event. 

16 ‘‘(B) AVAILABILITY OF POLICY.—Notwith17 standing the last sentence of section 508(a)(1), 

18 and section 508(a)(2), not later than 18 

19 months after the date of the enactment of this 

20 paragraph, the Corporation shall make available 

21 a policy described in subparagraph (A) if the 

22 requirements of section 508(h) are met. 

23 ‘‘(C) REPORT.—Not later than 2 years 

24 after the date of enactment of this paragraph, 

25 the Corporation shall submit to the Committees 

26 on Appropriations and Agriculture of the House 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8359 IH

1 of Representatives and the Committees on Ap2 propriations and Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

3 Forestry of the Senate a report that includes— 

4 ‘‘(i) the results of the research con5 ducted under subparagraph (A); and 

6 ‘‘(ii) a description of the policies made 

7 available under this paragraph.’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v DONNELL WILLIAMS, Private E-2, U. S. Army, Appellant

9 USCMA 55, 25 CMR 317

*56No. 10,739

Decided March *21,*1958

*Major Edward Fenig*and *First Lieutenant Hazen V. Hatch*were on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel John G. Lee*and *First Lieutenant Jon R. Waltz*were on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

George W. LatimeR, Judge:

The accused was tried and convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child under sixteen years of age and of assault with the intent to commit sodomy upon the same child, both in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 934. Evidence at the trial substantially proved that the accused came upon a fourteen-year-old Korean boy riding to school in a box car of a moving train. The accused, along with a companion, both of whom were train guards, beat the child severely while the accused attempted to force the boy to perform an act of, fellatio. The boy courageously refused, despite the heavy beating, and attempted to preserve his decency by leaping off the moving train. Later he was discovered beaten and unconscious lying beside the railroad tracks.

With this evidence before it, the court-martial members found the accused guilty of the two crimes alleged. Before deliberating upon the sentence, they were informed by the law officer that the maximum sentence imposable included confinement for seventeen years, ten for the assault with the intent to commit sodomy, and seven for the indecent act with a minor. The accused was sentenced to ten years confinement, total forfeitures, and dishonorable discharge. The findings and sentence were affirmed in all respects except that the board of review reduced the period of confinement to seven years. We granted review to consider whether for sentencing purposes the charges are multi-plicious. Thereafter, the Government conceded error on the basis of United States v Morgan, 8 USCMA 341, 24 CMR 151, and United States v Dicario, 8 USCMA 353, 24 CMR 163. Under the holding of those cases, the concession of the Government is well taken as the law officer should have limited the maximum sentence to the most serious of these offenses. Accordingly, the decision of the board of review is reversed and the record is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Army for reference to a board of review for reassessment of the sentence in the light of the admitted error.

Chief Judge Quinn and Judge FERGUSON concur.
CERTIFICATIONS

I, BRIAN FISHER, certify,  pursuant to Rule 13a-4 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as adopted pursuant to Section 302 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
with respect to the Annual Report of 1-900  Jackpot,  Inc.  (formerly  Pultronex
Corporation) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended August 31, 2004 ("Report") that:

(1) I have reviewed this Report;

(2) based on my knowledge,  this Report does not contain any untrue statement of
a  material  fact  or omit  to  state a  material  fact  necessary  to make  the
statements made, in light of the circumstances  under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Report;

(3)  based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements  and  other  financial
information included in this Report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of 1-900 Jackpot, Inc.
(formerly  Pultronex  Corporation) as of, and for the periods  presented in this
Report;

(4) I am responsible for  establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and
procedures  (as  defined in  Exchange  Act Rules  13a-14 and  15d-14)  for 1-900
Jackpot,  Inc.  (formerly  Pultronex  Corporation) and I have: (a) designed such
disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material  information relating
to 1-900 Jackpot,  Inc. (formerly Pultronex  Corporation) is made known to me by
others,  particularly  during the period in which this Report is being prepared;
(b) evaluated the  effectiveness  of 1-900  Jackpot,  Inc.  (formerly  Pultronex
Corporation)'s  disclosure  controls and  procedures as of a date within 90 days
prior  to the  filing  date of this  Report  (the  "Evaluation  Date");  and (c)
presented  in  this  Report  my  conclusions  about  the  effectiveness  of  the
disclosure  controls and procedures  based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation
Date;

(5) I have disclosed,  based on my most recent  evaluation,  to our auditors and
the audit  committee  of our  board of  directors  (or  persons  performing  the
equivalent  function):  (a)  all  significant  deficiencies  in  the  design  or
operation  of  internal  controls  which could  adversely  affect our ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for our
auditors  any  material  weaknesses  in  internal  controls;  and (b) any fraud,
whether or not material,  that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in our internal controls; and





DATE:   NOVEMBER 22, 2005

BY:      /S/ BRIAN FISHER
      ---------------------------
             BRIAN FISHER
    PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
#### Daniel W. Arnold, *Appellant, v.*Isaac J. Oliver and others, *Respondents.*

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Opinion by Daniels, J.
No. 46212.

#### Petition 6173-R of B. Spiliadis & Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

The undervaluation in this case was apparently occasioned solely by reason of the deduction of a 2 percent discount on the consular invoice and again on entry.' An examination of the entire record satisfied the court that there was no intention to defraud the "revenue of the Uhited States, conceal or misrepresent the facts, or to deceive the appraiser as to the true value of the merchandise. The petition was therefore granted.
Exhibit 32.9

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Long/Short Commodity Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund on Form 10-Q
for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Long/Short Commodity Series.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert J. Enck                                                              
|Robert J. Enck                                                                  
|President and Chief Executive Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC,          
|the Managing Owner of Long/Short Commodity Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|                                                                                
|/s/ Brent Bales                                                                 
|Brent Bales                                                                     
|Chief Financial Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC,                        
|the Managing Owner of Long/Short Commodity Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|                                                                                
|Date: May 10, 2007
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED BY**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Rockwood Specialties Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Seifi Ghasemi,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

1.   TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.   Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: May 13, 2009               |   |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
|                                  |   |
| /s/ SEIFI GHASEMI                |   |
| Seifi Ghasemi                         |   |
| Chairman and Chief  Executive Officer |   |

 

This certificationaccompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18or any other provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 or other documentauthenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appearsin typed form within the electronic version of this written statement requiredby Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained bythe Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, February 14, 2022. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, February 14, 2022 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A22I0117. MAURICIO EMILIANI et al. v. BLUE CRYO FRANCHISE, LLC et al. .
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2021CV352947
#### Edith L. Goddard et al., Plaintiffs, v George Johnson et al., Defendants.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County,

September 11, 1978

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Martin, Wiltshire, Cambridge & Kerr*for plaintiffs. *Abraham Spector*for defendants.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Herman Cahn, J.

Defendants executed and delivered to plaintiffs a bond and mortgage on premises located at 130 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New York. Defendants defaulted in paying the mortgage debt, and plaintiffs brought the instant action on the bond.

On May 3, 1976, a default judgment was obtained by plaintiffs in the amount of $8,595.56, and execution was issued to the Sheriff. When the Sheriff attempted to sell the premises subject to the mortgage, the sale was stayed by order of this court pursuant to CPLR 5236 (subd [b]).

*231Plaintiffs now move to set aside defendants’ default and the judgment entered herein, and thereby to vacate the stay entered on Juanuary 4, 1977, or in the alternative, to modify the January 4, 1977 order. Plaintiffs had a choice of proceeding at law to bring an action on the bond or proceeding at equity by bringing an action to foreclose the mortgage *(Copp v Sands Point Marina,*17 NY2d 291), and plaintiffs were thus well within their rights when they elected to sue upon the bond. However, having made that election, plaintiffs are subject to the statutory restrictions which direct that when a judgment is recovered for all or part of the mortgage debt, the execution shall direct that no part of the mortgage property shall be levied upon or sold thereunder. (CPLR 5230, 5236.) The right to execute the judgment is limited to other real and personal property of the judgment debtors.

Defendants’ contention, that plaintiffs’ right to foreclose the mortgage is extinguished as a result of their election to proceed on the bond, is not correct. (Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, § 1301, subd 1.)

 The purpose of subdivision 1 of section 1301 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law is to avoid multiple actions to recover the same debt and to confine the proceedings to collect the mortgage debt to one court and one action. *(Brandenberg v Tirino,*66 Misc 2d 193.) Section 1301 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law bars a subsequent foreclosure action where a prior final judgment has been obtained by a plaintiff in an action to recover all or part of the mortgage debt, only until after execution "has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied.” This statute is an embodiment of the equitable principle, that once a remedy at law has been resorted to, it must be exercised in its entirety before a remedy in equity may be sought. *(White Factors v Friedman,*32 Misc 2d 978.)

The prior order of this court specifically limits the stay so that sale of the property is stayed "in execution of the judgment herein”. Thus, if plaintiffs meet the requirements of section 1301 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, they may be able to commence a foreclosure proceeding against the property. A sale in such a later proceeding is not stayed by the prior order of this court.

Motion is denied.
#### Richard W. Cunningham, *Appellant, v.*Richard M. Cunningham, *Respondent.*

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.
No. 40240.

#### Petition 5660-R of Saunders Merchandise & Novelty Co. (Cleveland).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

The petitioner failing to sustain his burden of proof the petition was denied.
#### State, *ex rel.*Rebecca Libtz, v. D. C. Coleman, as Sheriff of Dade County.

177 So. 725.

Division A.

Opinion Filed December 20, 1937.

*411
      *Daniel Sepler,*for’Plaintiff in Error;

*Cary D.*Landis, Attorney General, and *Tyrus A. Nor-*wood, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant in Error.

Buford, J.

Writ of error brings for review judgment remanding petitioner to the custody of the Sheriff in habeas corpus proceedings instituted after conviction and after time in which petitioner may have had the conviction reviewed on writ of error.

The sole question is the challenge to the sufficiency of the information to withstand attack in habeas corpus proceedings.

The information is in the following language:

“In the Name and by the Authority of the State of

Florida :

“Fred Pine, County Solicitor for the County of Dade, prosecuting for the State of Florida in the said County, under oath, information makes that Rebecca Libtz of the County of Dade and State of Florida, on the 12th day of February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, in the Uounty and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully keep and operate a house of ill-fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and/or lewdness, contrary to the form of the Statute in such case *412made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”

The statute alleged to have been violated is Section 5433 R. G. S., 7576 C. G. L., and is as follows:

“Keeping House of Ill-fame.—Whoever keeps a house of ill-fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year.”

So the charge is substantially in the language of the statute. The words “prostitution” and “lewdness” each have a meaning so well known that it is not necessary for their meaning to be stated in an information.

The information not only is sufficient to withstand the attack here made, but is entirely sufficient to charge the offense denounced by the statute and to fully advise the accused of the nature of the crime of which she stood accused and stands' convicted.

The rule applicable to the sufficiency of informations to withstand attack by habeas corpus is stated, and supported by numerous authorities there cited, in State, *ex rel.,*v. Windham, 120 Fla. 206, 162 Sou. 501.

The judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Ellis, C. J., and Terrell, J., concur.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.