Th e oth e r s e ve n n ame d d e fe nd ants are B ASF Ak tie ng e se lls c ha ft , Sa

no fi Av e nti s, 1 Take da Pharma ceutica l Co., L td., Eisai Co., L td., Eisai Corp. of North Amer ica, Da iichi Pha rm a c e uti c a ls C o. L td. , a

nd JohnDo e s. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

JIM HOOD, P la in t if f,
v. F . HOFF MAN- LAROCHE, LT D., etal., De fend ant s. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 06 -0 14 84 (T F H)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Pending be fore the Court is a Motion to R emand f iled by Mississ ippi Attorney

Gene ral Jim Ho od , who se e ks to h ave thi s la ws uit re mand e d b a c k to the Cha nc e ry Court of Rank in County , M iss iss ipp i, whe re it o ri g ina lly wa s f ile d. Th e Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l’ s mo tio n is opposed by

three of the ten na

med def endants in this lawsuit – F. Hoff man-L a Roche L td., Hoffma n-L a Roche Inc., and A ventis Pharmace uticals, Inc. – which jointly asser t that they are the only defe ndants the Mississippi Attorney Gene ral prope rly

serve d with a copy

of the Complaint. (De fs.’ Opp’ n Br . 4 n.2.) F or the re asons set for th below, the Court will gr ant the 1 Mississ ippi Attorney

Gene ral’s Motion to Remand.I t is no ex ag g eration to st ate that the Complaint is so superficia lly and vaguely

draf ted 2 that it is nearly

impossibl e to deter

mine what is alleg ed. Althoug h the Complaint asserts that the de fe nd ants vio late d “ the pr ov isi on s o f M iss iss ipp i la w g ov e rn ing‘T ru sts and

Com bin e s in Restraint or Hindra

nce of Trade ,’” ( Compl. ¶ 5), and “e ng ag ed in a c onspiracy ,” (Compl. ¶ 1), the document other

wise is completely

devoid of so much a s a hint about what the c onspiracy entailed. It appea

rs that the first time the nature of the conspirac y was fully disclosed was in the A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ’ s l e g a l b r i e f

s u p p o rt i n gth e r e m an d

m o t i o n , w h i c hs t at e s th at“ [ t ] h e c o n s p i r a c y . . . consisted of a

continuing a g ree ment, understanding , and conc ert of a ction amongthe conspirator s to fix price s and allocate marke ts of vitamins, vit amin premixes, bulk vit amins, and other vitamin products in Mississippi .” (Pl.’s B r. 2.) Th e Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l e xpla ine d in

his Mo tio n to Re mand

that: 3 Due to the c omple x i t i es of the De fenda nts’ illega l monopoly , the M i s s issippi Att orney

Gene ral de cided he would prosec ute the Def endants in sepa

rate actions. T h e M ississi ppi Attorney Gene ral first sued B ASF Corporation in the Hinds County Chance ry Court on August 31, 2004. [BASF] did not remove the first a ction, but moved the Court to transfe r it to t h e C hance ry Court of Rankin County on November

29, 2004. The Hinds County Chance ry Court gr anted the mot i o n t o t ransf

er on F ebrua

ry 17, 2005. . . . On J anuar y 24, 2005, the Attorney

Gene ral sued th e Defendants in this action in the C h an c e r y C o urto f

R an k i nC o un ty. (Pl.’s Br . 3-4.) 2

BACK GR OUND AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY On J anuar

y 24, 2006, Mississ ippi Attorney Gene ral Jim Hood filed a Complaint i n the Chance ry Court of Rankin County , Mississ ippi, that purported to alleg e an a ntitrust conspiracy amongthe named de fenda nts. Wit h the conse nt of all defe ndants, Hoff man-L a Roche Inc. 2
re mov e d th e c a se to t

he Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Mis sis sip pi, Jac ks on Di vis ion . T he Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l imme diate ly

mov e d to re mand

the c a se back to the Cha

ncer y Court of Rankin County

wher e a se parate, but rela ted, ca se wa s pending ag ainst BASF Corporation. Be fore the Mississi ppi Attorney Gene ral’s motion was r esolved, 33

howeve r, the Judicial Panel on Multi district L itigation orde red the case transfe rre d to this C ourt for inclusion in the coor dinated and c onsolidated pretr ial proce eding s for a ctions that involve alleg ed antitrust violations related to vitamins and vitamin products. Conseque ntly , the Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l’ s mo tio n s e e kin gre mand is n ow pe nd ingbe fo re thi s Co ur t. AN AL YSI S 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) pe rmits defenda nts to remove civil ac tions from a state c ourt to a fede ral district cour

t if the fede ral district cour t otherwise would have orig inal jurisdiction. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. , 5 46 U. S. 1 32 , 1 34 (2 00 5) (“ A c ivi l c a se c omm e nc e d in state
c ourt may , a s a g e ne ra l matte r, be re mov e d b y the de fe nd ant t o f

e de ra l di str ic t c ourt , if

the c a se could have been br oug ht there or igina lly .”). When c onsideringwhether remova l was prope r, courts must construe the remova l statute narr owly to avoid fede ralism conce rns. Sh am ro c k Oi l & Ga s Co rp . v . S

he e ts , 313 U.S. 100 (1941). More over, a ny doubts about the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction will be resolve d in favor of rema nd. Gasch v . Hartford Accident &Indem

. Co. , 491 F.3d 278, 281- 82 (5th Cir. 2007). Ultimately , it is t he def endant who be ars the bur den of provingthat remova l was soundly taken a nd, if the def

endant f ails to do so, the case must be
rema nded. W ilson v. Republic Iron &Steel Co. , 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The jurisdictional statute the de fenda nts invoked to remove this ca se provides that fede ral courts have orig inal jurisdiction over “a ll civil actions where the matter in c ontroversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive of interests and c osts, and is betwee n . . . citizens of differ ent States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Acc ording ly , if this case involves c itiz ens of diff ere nt states and a

n amount in controver sy

exceeding$75,000, then the Court may exercise subjec t4

matter jurisdiction over it and r emoval will be dee med prope r. I f, howe ver, “ at any time before final judg ment it appear s that the district court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction, the c ase sha ll be
rema nded.” 28 U .S.C. § 1447(c). The Mississippi Att orney Gene ral a sserts that re mand is warr anted be cause this Court la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he c a se . A lth ou g h th e pa rt ie s a g re e that th e amou

nt i n controve rsy

meets the re quirement imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Missi ssippi Attorney Gene ral c ontends that this lawsuit was filed as a parens patriae action on beha lf the State of Mis sis sip pi, wh ic h is no t a c iti zen fo r t he purp os e of

e sta bli sh ingthe div e rs ity

of c iti zen sh ip
nece ssary to exercise subjec t matter jurisdiction. Consequently , so the Mississi ppi Attorney Gene ral a rgues, re moval was improper notwithstanding that the de fenda nts are c itiz ens of other states. The Mississippi Attorney Gene ral a lso asserts that the Eleve nth Amendment to the Con sti tut ion

ba rs re mov a l be c a

us e a state c ann ot b e su e d in

a fe de ra l c ourt
. The de fenda

nts oppose rema

nd on the g round that the State of Mississippi is not the re al party in interest for the claims that seek c ompensatory damag es on beha lf of Mississippi
c or po ratio ns and

c iti zen s ( re fe rr e d to c oll e c tiv e ly a s “ Mis sis sip pi c iti zen s” ). Th e de fe nd ants
a sse rt that Mi ssi ssi pp i c iti zen s are the re a l pa rt ie s in int e re st f or tho se c la ims . T hu s, a c c or din gto the de fe nd ants , th e re a l pa rt ie s in int e re st t o th e laws uit

are (1 ) M iss iss ipp i c iti zen s, (2 ) t he State of Mississippi , and (3) the def endants. The defe ndants argue that, bec ause Mississippi citiz ens also are rea l parties in intere st and complete dive rsity exis ts betwee n Mississ ippi citiz ens and the defe ndants, the Court proper ly may exercise subjec t matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 33 2. Th e de fe nd ants fu rt he r a rgue that, r e g ard le ss, the El e ve nth Am e ndme nt i s n o b ar t o5

jurisdiction because it does not affor d immunit y from lawsuits commenc ed by states, ver sus laws uit s c omm e nc e d a g a ins t th e m. Be cause there is no dispute that the amount in controversy is met for the purpose of
e xer c isi ngfe de ra l di ve rs ity jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 32 , th e Court wi ll f oc us its attention on deter

mining whe ther this lawsuit involves citiz ens of diff ere nt states. In rec og nition of the de fenda

nts’ burden to prove that rema nd was a ppropriate , the Court will turn to the contentions raise d by

them first. To assess the me rits of the def endants’ c ontentions, the Court wi ll c on sid e r ( 1) the ide nti ty of the re a l pa

rt ie s to the c on tr ov e rs y , ( 2) wh e the r c omp le te div e rs ity exis ts among the re al par

ties to the controver sy , and (3) if so, whether the Eleve nth Amendment ba rs the Court ’s e xer c ise of su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n in any e ve nt. I. The Re al P ar ti e s In Int e r e st The Supreme Court has made c lear that “the ‘ citizens’ upon whose diversity a plaintiff g rounds jurisdiction must be real a nd substantial parties to the contr oversy .” Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee , 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980). Ac cording ly , this Court “must di sreg ard nominal or f ormal parties a nd rest jurisdiction only

upon the citizenship of rea l parties to the contr oversy .” Id. The crux of the def

endants’ a

rgument is that some of the plaintiff’s c laims involve compensatory dama g e s a sse rt e d o n b e ha lf of Mis sis sip pi c iti zen s w ho are the re a l pa rt ie s in int e re st f or tho se claims. The de fenda

nts point t o the Mississi ppi statutes cited in the plaintiff’s Complaint and argue that only

individual citiz ens and c orporations are a uthorized to recove r compe nsatory damag es under

the statutes. The de fenda nts also argue that the parens patriae authority cannot be used to vindicate injuries suffe red by individuals.The Court re cog nizes that, at least with respec t to issues of fede ral law – such as the 4 question of fe dera l jurisdiction – it should give “close consideration” to the law of the transfe ror fo rum, a lth ou g h s uc h la

w “ do e s n ot h ave sta

re de c isi s e ff

e c t in a tr ans fe re e fo rum si tuate d in another circ uit.” In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983 , 8 29 F .2 d 1 17 1, 11 76 (D .C. Cir. 1987). 6 L a st ye ar, the Un ite d St ate s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F if th C ir c uit de c ide d a

c a se that th is Court vie ws a s in str

uc tiv e wi th r e sp e c t to de te rm ini ngthe ide nti ty of the re a l pa

rt ie s in int e re st for this lawsuit. In Louisi ana ex re l. Caldw ell v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 536 F.3d 418 ( 5th Cir. 2008), 4 the L ouisiana Attorney

Gene ral “ filed a la

wsuit which it sty led as a parens patriae action” ag ainst multi ple cor

porations for a lleg ed violations of L ouisiana’s a ntitrust st atute. 536 F .3d at 42 1- 22 . T he L ou isi ana

Attor ne y Ge ne ra l a lle g e d th at th e de fe nd ants c omb ine d to su pp re ss competition in the insurance industry by fix ing the value of

insurance policy

holders’ c laims and raisinginsurance premiums to cover their losses. Id. at 422. The la wsuit was filed in a L ouisiana state cour t but the defe nding insura nce c ompanies re moved the ca se to the fe dera l district court pursuant to the Class Action F airne ss Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) , which provide s fede ral district courts with orig inal jurisdiction over qualify ing c lass action lawsuits. In response to the
remova l, the L ouisiana Attorney Gene ral moved to re mand the ca se bac k to the state cour t where it origina lly

was filed. Id. at 42 2- 42 3. Af te r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

de te rm ine d th at “ the re a l pa rt ie s in int e re st w e re the c iti zen

po lic y ho lde rs ” and

de nie d th e L ou isi ana

Attor ne y Ge ne ra l’ s mo tio n to
rema nd, the L ouisiana Attorney Gene ral a

ppeale d to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 423. On re view, the F ifth Circuit first considere d the Supreme Court’s de cisions in Hawaii v. Sta nd ar d O il Co . o

f Ca l. , 405 U.S. 251 (1972), and Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v . Puerto Rico , 458 U.S. 592 (1982), which it viewe d as “use ful in illust ratingboth the limit ations and re ach of7

parens patriae actions.” Id. at 42 6. Th e F if th C ir c uit ob se rv e d th at “ ba se d o n th e se tw o c a se s it is clear that while parens patriae actions ar e not re stricted to their c ommon law roots, there are
so me lim itatio ns , p art ic ula rl y wh e n a state is s e e kin gto r e c ov e r d ama g e s f or a lle g e d in

jur ie s to its economy .” Id. at 427. Althoug h the Fif th Circuit ag ree d that L ouisiana’s Attorne y Gene ral h adth e “ s t atu t o ry

an d co n s t i tu t i o n al au th o ri ty

t o b ri n g parens patriae antitrust actions,” the c ourt distinguished the que stion of authority to bring such ac tions from the ultimate issue of whethe r the L ouisiana Attorney

Gene ral wa s the rea l party in interest, stating that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that the Attorney Gene ral ha s standing to br ing suc h a re prese ntative ac tion, the narrow issue befor e this court is who ar e the r eal pa rties in interest: the individual policy holders or the State.” Id. at 429. To deter mine the re al par

ties in interest, the F ifth Circuit procee ded to ana ly ze the statutes that g overne d the re medies the L ouisiana Attorney Gene ral wa s seekingin the complaint that trig g ere d the lawsuit, which c onsisted of “for feiture of illeg al profits, treble damag es, and injunctive relief

.” Id. at 42 3. Withre sp e c t to the re me dy of tr e ble dama g e s, the F if

th C ir c uit deter mined that individual policy holders we re the rea l parties in intere st beca use they wer e the pa rt ie s inte nd e d to e nf

or c e the pr ov isi on

of the statut e a

uth or izin gsu c h d ama g e s: Th e t e xt o f § 1 3 7 o f th e M o n o p o l i e s A c t , w h i c ha u th o r i z e s th e r e c o v e r

y o f tre ble d am a g e s , p l a i n l y s t at e s th at ‘ an y p e r s o n w h o i s i n j ur e d i nh i s b u s i n e s s o r

p r o p e rty’ under the Monopolies Act ‘shall rec over[] [t reble ] damag es.’ The plain languag e of that provision ma

kes clea r that individuals have the right to enforc e this provision. Acc ordin g ly , w e a g r e e w it hth e d is tr ic t c o urt a

n d h o ld th at u n d e r § 1 3 7 the po lic y ho lde rs , a nd no t th e State , a

re the re a l pa

rt ie s in int e re st. Id. at 42 9. Ind e e d, the F if th C ir c uit re je c te d th e L ou isi ana

Attor ne y Ge ne ra l’ s c on te nti on

that,
e ve n w ithre sp e c t to the c la im f or tr e ble dama g e s, L ou isi ana wa s th e re a l pa

rt y in i nte re st b e c a

us e8

another section of the Monopolies Ac t authorized the Attorney Gene ral to enf

orce ever y provision of the Ac t. Id. As the F ifth Circuit ex plained: On ce aga i n , ev en as s u m i n g a r gu e ndo that su c h a

n inte rp re tatio n o f s tate law i s corr ect, it does not re solve the ce ntral issue i n this appea l: whether the ‘pe rson who [was] injured in his business or proper ty ’ – in this case t h e poli cy holders – ar e the re a l part ies in int e re st. We h ave no re a so n to be lie ve that th e y are no t, e sp e c ia lly g ive n th at th e purp os e of

anti tr us t tr e ble dama g e s p ro vis ion s are to e nc oura g e pr ivate l aw s u i t s b y a g g r i e v e d

i n d i v i d u a l s f o r i n j ur i e s t o th e i r

b u s i n e s s o r

p r o p e rty. Id. at4 2 9 -3 0 (c i t i n g Ha wai i , 4 05 U. S. at 26 2) . M or e ov e r, a c kn ow le dg ing that th e laws uit

a lso involved a cla im for injunctive re lief, the F ifth Circuit further c ommented that “[i] f L ouisiana
wer e only seekingthat reme dy , which is clea rly on behalf of the State, its argument that it is t he only rea l party

in interest would be much mor e compe lling.” Id. at 43 0. Ac c or din g ly , b e c a us e the Fif th Circuit concluded that the individual policy holders we re the rea l party in interest for the claims seekingtreble da

mag es, the c ourt held that those cla ims were pr operly remove d to the fede ral district cour

t pursuant to the Class Action Fa irness Ac t, but indicated that the district
c ourt might e le c t to se ve r t

he c la im f

or inj un c tiv e re lie f a

nd re mand that c la im b a c k to the state court. Id. Turningto the case at hand, this Court also will consider the statutes that g overn the
reme dies the Mississippi Attorney Gene ral is see king in the Complaint to determine whether the State of Mis sis sip pi i s th e on ly

re a l pa rt y in i nte re st o r whe the r t

he re is a no the r r e a l pa

rt y in interest, as the defe ndants maintain. The last pa ragraph of

the Mississi ppi Attorney Gene ral’s Complaint st ates that he is seekingcompensatory damag es, statutory

damag es, and punitive damag es, in addition to interest, costs and attorney ’s fe es. (Complaint 3.) The MississippiMiss. Code § 75-21-1 throug h § 75-21-39. 5 After this lawsuit was filed, the title was amended to state “ Penalty for Violation of 6 Chapter” ; however , the substantive text of the statute remains uncha ng ed. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-7 ( 2008). L ike the pr ior

tit le , th is t itl e wa s ame nd e d to state “ Re c ov e ry of Da ma g e s b y Pr ivate 7 Persons,” but no cha

ng e wa s made to the substantive text of the statute. Miss. Code Ann. § 75- 21-9 (2008)
. 9 Antitrust Act, which is the statute the de fenda nts are a lleg ed to have violated, contains seve ral 5 sections that addr ess damag es. The f irst section, Miss. Code § 75-21-1, mandates fines in the
e ve nt o f a c ri min a l c onvic tio n, but th at se c tio n d oe s n ot a pp ly to t his c ivi l c a se . A t th e tim e thi s lawsuit was filed, the second se ction, Miss. Code § 75-21-7, was titled “Pena lty for Violation of Antitrust L aws” and mandated a f orfe iture pena lty

in an amount from $100 to $2,000 for ever y 6 vio latio n o f t

he Mis sis sip pi Anti tr

us t A c t. T hat se c tio n o f t he statut e a lso state d th at: Ea c h mo nth

in whic h s uc h p e rs on , c or po ratio n or a sso c iatio n s ha ll v iol ate thi s chapte r shall be a

separ ate violation, the for feiture and pena lty in such case to be rec overe d alone by

suit in t he name of t he st ate on the relation of t he attorney g ener al and by the conse nt of the attorne y gen er al s uits may

be brought by

any district attorney , such suits to be broug ht in any court of c ompetent jurisdiction. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-7 (2007) . As the statute made clea r, the re al par

ty in interest for a

ny fo rf e iture pe na lty

so ug ht p ur su ant t o M iss . Co de § 7 5- 21 -7 wa s th e State of Mis sis sip pi. Th e on ly oth e r d ama g e s p ro vis ion ide nti fi e d in

the Mis sis sip pi Anti tr

us t A c t is Mis s. Code § 75-21-9, which pre viously was titled “Private Per sons and Corporations May Sue” and 7 state d th at: Any pe rs on , n atur a l or

art if ic ia l, i nju re d o r d ama g e d b y a

tr us t and c omb ine a s h e re in define d, or by

its effe cts dire ct o r i n direc t, may rec over a ll damag es of e very kind sustained by

him or it and in addition a penalty of five hundr ed dollars ( $500.00), by suit in any

court of competent jurisdiction. Said suit may be brought ag ainst one orThis also is the only basis on which the de fenda nts challeng e the Mississippi Att orney 8 Gene ral’s status a s a re al par ty in interest. (De fs.’ Opp’ n Br . 6-8.) At thi s junc tur e , th e Court

mus t r e ma

rk that th e Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a

pp e ars to 9 overlook the distinction betwee n the parens patriae do c tr ine and the c on c e pt o f t

he re a l pa rt y in interest. As the F ifth Circuit indicated in Allstate Ins. Co. , whether a state’ s attorney

g ener al has sta nd ingto p ur su e an a c tio n in a re pr e se ntativ e c a

pa c ity a s parens patriae is an independe nt inq uir y fr om t he qu e sti on

of wh e the r t hat sa me atto rn e y

g e ne ra l, o r a

nyon e e lse fo r t

hat matte r, is the re a l pa

rt y in i nte re st f

or a pa rt ic ula r c la im. 53 6 F .3 d at 42 9. In c on te mpo ra ry le g a l ana ly se s, the parens patriae doctrine is re cog nized as a conc ept of standing
. See , e.g. , Alfred L. Snapp & Son , 4 58 U. S. a

t 60 1 ( de sc ri bin gthe do c tr ine a s o ne of sta nd ing ); Oregon v . Legal Svs. Corp. , 552 F.3d 965, 970 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (“Ge nera lly , a state ha s been grante d standing under the parens patriae doctrine in situations involving the a batement of

public nuisance s, such as g lobal wa rm ing , f loo din g , o r n oxiou s g a se s. ” ); New Mex ico v. Ge neral Elec. Co. , 467 F.3d 1223, 1243 n.30 (10th Cir. 2006) (“ The doc trine of parens patriae is a standingconce pt rather than one of 10 more o f t h e p ar t i es to the trust or combine a nd one or more of the off icer s and repr esenta

tives of any corpor ation a party to the same, or one or more of either . Such penalty may be re cover ed in ea ch ins tance of i njury
. All rec overie s here in provided fo r m ay be su e d f or in o ne su it. Mis s. Cod e Ann. § 7 5- 21 -9 (2 00 7) . A s f ar a s th is C ourt

c an d isc e rn , th is i s th e on ly
c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s p ro vis ion

c on ta ine d in

the Mis sis sip pi Anti tr

us t A c t. L ike the statut e in

8 Allstate Ins. Co. , this provision of the Missi ssippi Antit rust Act cle arly is intended to be enf

orce d by a private “pe rson or c orporation,” i.e. , an individual (whe ther natural or c orporate), see king
c omp e ns atio n f

or inj ur ie s su sta ine d a s th e re su lt o f v iol atio ns of the Ac t. T hu s, the de fe nd ants
are corr ect that Mississippi citi zens, whether natural per sons or corpor ations, are the re al par ties in interest for a

ny compensatory

damag es soug ht pursuant to this provision of the Missi ssippi Antitru st A c t. T he Court , th e re fo re , is inc lin e d to a g re e wi th t he de fe nd ants that, at le a st w ith
re sp e c t to c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s, the “ pe rs on s” wh o s uf fe re d in jur ie s a re the re a l pa

rt ie s in interest for

such cla ims, not t he Mississippi Attorney Gene ral, re g ardle ss of whethe r the Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l is a c tin gin a

re pr e se ntativ e c a

pa c ity on be ha lf of its c iti zen s. See

9su

bs tanti ve re c ov e ry .” ); N.E. v. Hedge s , 391 F.3d 832, 836 n.3 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (“Use d in the modern sense , parens patriae is ‘[a] doctrine by which a g overnme nt has standingto prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of

a citizen . . . .’” ( quoting B L ACK’S L AW DI CTI ONARY 1137 (7th e d. 19 99 )) ; Connecticut v. H

ealth Net, Inc. , 383 F.3d 1258, 1261 ( 11th Cir. 2004) (assessingwhether a state ha d s tand ingto s ue a s parens patriae ); City of Olmstead Falls, OH v. FAA , 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (a cknowledg ing that the doctrine of parens patriae is a “theor y of sta nd ing ” ). Th e c on c e pt o f a re a l pa rt y in i nte re st f

or the purp os e of

te sti nga c ourt ’s div e rs ity jur isd ic tio n, ho we ve r, inv olv e s a de te rm inatio n a

bo ut whe the r a

name d p art

y “ ha s a ‘r e a l inte re st’ in the suit or, in other words, is a ‘ rea l party ’ to the controve rsy .” Car de n v . A rk

om a A sso cs. , 49 4 U .S. 18 5, 20 0 ( 19 90 ). As de fi ne d in B la c k’ s L aw D ic tio na

ry , a re a l pa rt y in i nte re st i s a “ [p]e rs on wh o w ill be e nti tle d to be ne fi ts o f a c tio n if su c c e ssf ul, that is , th e on e wh o is a c tua lly and su bs tanti a lly

int e re ste d in

su bje c t matte r a s d ist inguis he d f ro m on e wh o h a s o nly

a no min a l, formal, or technica l interest in or conne ction with it.” BLACK’S L AW DI CTI ONARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990). Se e als o U nite d S tates v . 9 36.7 1 A c re

s o f La nd In Br e v ar

d Co un ty , 418 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1969) (“ Whether a pe rson is a re al par ty in interest depe nds upon his substantive rig hts, which, in diversity case s and ca ses like the pre sent one, a re de termined by

state law.” ). Th e fa c t th at an atto rn e y

g e ne ra l ha s th e a

uth or ity to p ro c e e d a s parens patriae does not, ips o fac to , me an th at he or

sh e ne c e ssa

ri ly is the on ly

re a l pa rt y in i nte re st. 11 Allstate Ins. Co. , 5 36 F .3 d at 42 9; see also In reBaldwin-United Corp. , 770 F.2d 328, 341 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (“[W] hen the state mere ly asser ts the persona l claims of its citiz ens, it is not the real pa rt y in i nte re st a

nd c ann ot c la im p are ns patr ia e sta nd ing .” ). Th e Court ’s de te rm inatio n is reinfor ced by

the fa ct that the Mississippi Attorney Gene ral a sserts that “[l] arg e quantities of vitamins are sold direc tly and indirec tly

to the citizens of Missi ssippi[ ,]” (Pl.’s Br. 2) , and “[t]he citizens of Missi ssippi have bee n illega lly overc harg ed by

purcha sing the se items containing vit amin s[,]” (P l.’ s B r. 3) . A c c or din g ly , it is c le ar t hat th e Mis sis sip pi A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l “ is seekingto rec over da

mag es suffe red by

individual” vitamins purchase rs, who ar e the r eal pa rties in interest for the compensa tory damag es cla ims. Allstate Ins. Co. , 536 F.3d at 429. II. Whe th e r Co m ple te Di ve r sity Ex ist s A m ong th e Re al P ar ti e s In Int e r e st Be cause the Court conclude s that Missis sippi citiz ens ar e the r eal pa rties in interest for any claims seekingcompensatory damag es, it theref

ore f ollows that their citizenship m ust be12

taken into ac count when de termining whether diversity of jurisdiction exi sts for the purpose of exercisingsubject matter jur isdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. According ly , at this point the Court’s diversity

calc ulation must t ake into ac count the followingparties: (1) the State of Mis sis sip pi a c tin ga s parens patriae and re prese nted by the Mississi ppi Attorney Gene ral, whic h, at a minimum, is t he re al par ty in interest for the forf

eiture a nd penalty

claims, (2) Mississippi citizens who, collectively , are the re al par ty in interest for c laims seekingcompensatory damag es under the Mississ ippi Antitrust Act and (3) the de fenda nts, who are citizens of states other than Mississ ippi. I t is established beyond pera dventure that the exercise of subject matter jur isdiction purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 32 re qu ir e s c omp le te div e rs ity be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s, “ [t]hat is , d ive rs ity jur isd ic tio n d oe s n ot e xist unle ss each de fe nd ant i s a c iti zen of a dif fe re nt S tate fr om each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. &Erection Co. v. Kroger , 4 37 U. S. 3 65 , 3 74 (1 97 8) (e mph a sis in orig inal). F urthermor e, “[t]here is no question that a State is not a ‘c itiz en’ f or purpose s of the diversity jurisdiction.” Mo or

v . A lam e da Cou nty , 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973). The question, then, is whe the r M iss iss ipp i’ s la c k o f c iti zen sh ip d e str oy s c omp le te div e rs ity and the re by wa rr ants
rema nd. “Or dinarily , ‘[i] n an ac tion where a state is a pa rty , there can be no fede ral jurisdiction on the ba sis of

div e rs ity of c iti zen sh ip b e c a

us e a state is n ot a

c iti zen fo r p ur po se s o f d ive rs ity jurisdiction.’” Lou isi an a v . U nio n O il Co . o

f Ca lif or nia , 458 F.3d 364, 366 ( 5th Cir. 2006) (qu o t i n g Texas De

p’t of Housing and Cmty. Affairs v. Verex A ssurance, Inc

. , 68 F.3d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1995)). The re is an e x ception whe n the state is mere ly a nominal par

ty , but that is not this case. Id. (“ Ho we ve r, if the State is a

no min a l pa

rt y wi th n o r e a l inte re st i n th e dis pute , it sThe de fenda nts argue that the F ifth Circuit’s decision in Hussain v. Boston Old Colony 10 Ins. Co. , 3 11 F .3 d 6 23 (5 th C ir . 2 00 2) , s tand s f or the pr op os iti on

that th e pr e se nc e of

a state a s a pa rt y may be dis re g ard e d f

or the purp os e of

de te rm ini ngwh e the r c omp le te div e rs ity e xists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Def .’s B r. 4 n.3.) This Court is disinclined, however , to adopt the ana ly sis in Hu ssa in beca use it is dicta offe red in a footnote addr essingjurisdiction over an “interple ader -like ac tion” subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (involving for eclosure actions ag ainst the United States), see311 F.3d at 635 n.46, and, more importantly , it conflicts with the more re cent and we ll-rea soned dec isions in In re Katrina Canal L itig. Breaches , 524 F.3d 700 ( 5th Cir. 2008), and Un ion Oi l Co . o f Ca lif or nia , 458 F.3d 364 ( 5th Cir. 2006), discussed su pra . Wh ile consideringthe issue of a state’s immunity

from re moval, the Fif

th Circuit noted in In re Katrina Canal L itig. Breaches that “it has bee n long se ttled that a State is not a person f or purpose s of d i v e r s i ty j ur i s d i c t i o n . T h i s , w i thth e l o n gt i m e c o mp an i o ni n s i s t e n c e u p o nc o mp l e t e d i v e r s i ty, ma de the pr e se nc e of

a dd iti on a l pa

rt ie s a ligne d w iththe State ir re le va nt t o f e de ra l di ve rs ity jurisdiction.” 524 F.3d at 706. L ikewise, a s indicated a bove, in Union Oil Co. of C aliforni a the Fifth Circuit indicate d that a state’ s prese nce a s a par ty destroy s complete diver sity unless the state is deeme d a nominal par ty , in which ca se its citiz enship may be disreg arde d. 458 F.3d at 366-67. B oth of these de cisions contradic t the notion that complete diversity can be established purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 32 if

a state is the pla int if

f a nd a re a l pa rt y in i nte re st. 13 citizenship m ay

be disreg arde d.”). As a re sult, although the Court finds that Mississippi 10 citizens are r eal pa

rties in interest with re spect to the c ompensatory damag es cla ims, the Court
ne ve rt he le ss i s c on str a ine d to ho ld t hat it la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he laws uit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 beca use complete diversity

is lackingso long a s the State of Mis sis sip pi a lso is a

re a l pa rt y in i nte re st. III . Eleventh Am endm ent Im m uni ty I t is a well-esta

blished rule of judicia l restra int that “‘prior to re achingany constitutional questions, fede ral c ourts must consider nonconstitutional gr ounds for de cision.’” Jean v . Nelson , 4 7 2 U. S
. 8 4 6 , 8 5 4 (1 9 8 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Gu lf O il Co . v . B e rn ar d , 4 52 U. S. 8 9, 99 (1 98 1) ). B e c a us e the Court c on c lud e s th at it

may no t e xer c ise su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t his c a se purs ua

nt t o 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and for that re ason re mand to the state c ourt is warr anted, the Court ne ed not addre ss the contentions raise d by the par ties about whethe r the Eleve nth Amendment bar s14

remova l in this case . CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Court wi ll gra nt t he Mo tio n to Re mand . A n a pp ro pr iate order acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Au g us t 4, 20 09 /s/ Thomas F. Hogan Thomas F. H og an Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge