COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANASTASIS S. MICHAEL, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1533-96-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JANUARY 7, 1997 

GEORGE KEENER MASONRY AND 

 UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Daniel E. Lynch (Vasiliki Moudilos; Williams 

& Pierce, on brief), for appellant. 

 Christopher D. Eib, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior 

Assistant Attorney General; John J. Beall, 

Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee Uninsured Employer's 

Fund. 

 No brief or argument for appellee George 

Keener Masonry. 

 Anastasis S. Michael, Jr., appeals the ruling of the 

Workers' Compensation Commission denying him benefits on the 

grounds that he unjustifiably refused medical treatment. Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record to this 

case, and a recitation of the facts is unnecessary to this 

memorandum opinion. 

 Guided by well established principles, we construe the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below. See Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. 

App. 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986). "If there is 

evidence, or reasonable inferences can be drawn from the 

evidence, to support the Commission's findings, they will not be 

disturbed on review, even though there is evidence in the record 

to support a contrary finding." Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie 

Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1986); see

Code § 65.2-706. "In determining whether credible evidence 

exists," this Court will not "retry the facts, reweigh the 

preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of 

the credibility of the witnesses." Wagner Enters., Inc. v. 

Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991) (citation 

omitted). 

 Code § 65.2-603(B) aims to "place the cost of medical care 

on the employer and to restore the employee's good health" so 

that he may return to work. Richmond Memorial Hosp. v. Allen, 3 

Va. App. 314, 318, 349 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1986) (interpreting 

former Code § 65.1-88(B)). "It penalizes an employee 'who 

unjustifiably refuse[s] reasonable and necessary medical 

treatment.'" Holland v. Virginia Bridge & Structures, 10 Va. 

App. 660, 663, 394 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1990) (quoting Davis v. Brown 

& Williamson Tobacco Co., 3 Va. App. 123, 127, 348 S.E.2d 420, 

421 (1986)). When determining whether a refusal of medical 

treatment was justified, we look not at whether the recommended 
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procedure was medically justified, but rather whether the 

patient's refusal to submit to it was justified. See Holland, 10 

Va. App. at 662, 394 S.E.2d at 868. "The matter of justification 

must be considered from the viewpoint of the patient and in the 

light of the information which was available to him." Id.

 We do not have before us a case where the employee lacked 

complete medical consultation and assurance. See, e.g., Holland, 

10 Va. App. at 663, 394 S.E.2d at 868. Instead, Michael saw 

several doctors, all of whom assured him of the low chance of 

complications and the high probability of success. Furthermore, 

Michael's reasons for his fear of surgery changed from time to 

time without any apparent logic. Indeed, the commission noted 

that Michael "testified that he would have accepted the surgery 

if it had been prescribed closer in time to the work accident." 

Considering this with all the other facts before the commission, 

we cannot say that the commission erred in finding that Michael's 

claim of fear constituted an unreasonable refusal of medical 

treatment. 

 Affirmed.