Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

August 1979

NTIS order #PB-301397
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79-600145

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
FOREWORD

In June 1978, the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the House of Representatives Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee requested the Office of Technology Assessment to

conduct “a detailed comparison between conditions prevailing in

railway safety in the United States and a review of safety operations

in Canada. ”

Responding to this request, this OTA report identifies the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Canadian railroad systems

and Government/rail relationships. It establishes a base from which

the overall comparability of safety between the two systems is made.

The report surveys the safety activities of Canadian railroads,

Government, labor, and other organizations and compares those efforts with counterpart safety activities in the United States.

This report represents a significant cooperative effort on the part

of Canadian and U.S. Government agencies, railroads, and labor

groups in creating mutual understanding of railroad safety policy and

programs.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director
Canadian Review Group

Mr. E. W. Eastman

Acting Director

Railway Transport Committee

Mr. J. H. Johri

Bureau of Management Consulting

Mr. Charles Pike

Chief Mechanical Officer

Canadian Pacific Rail

Mr. E. J. Bradley

Director of Rules, Accident, and Damage

Prevention

Canadian Pacific Rail

Mr. R. G. Messenger

Assistant Vice President for operations

Canadian National Rail

Mr. W. T, Mathers

Director of Accident Prevention and

Safety

Canadian National Rail

Mr. Ed Abbot

Executive Secretary

Canadian Railway Labour Association

OTA Railroad Safety

Comparison Advisory Panel

Joe Adams Robert Parsons

Assistant General Attorney, Law Department Associate Administrator for R&D

Union Pacific Railroad Company Federal Railroad Administrate on

Lawrence M. Mann

Attorney for Railway Labor Executives

Association

William Harris

Vice President, Research and Test

Department

Association of American Railroads

James P. Romauldi

Director of the Transportation Research

Institute

Carnegie-Mellon University
OTA Railroad Safety

Comparison Project Staff

Eric H. Willis, Assistant Director

Science, Information, and Transportation Division

Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Group Manager

Lucia Turnbull, Project Leader

Jim Leach Joel Miller Paula Walden

Debi Chertok Linda McCray

Contractors

Newman and Hermanson Company

Judith A. Hermanson Constance B. Newman Lawrence McCaffrey, Jr.

Editor and Production

Ralph Hoar, Editor Marese A. Miles, Typist

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report, “Rail Safety: A U.S.-Canadian Comparison, ” was undertaken by

the Office of Technology Assessment at the request of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the

House of Representatives.

In conducting the analysis, OTA utilized information and data generated in the

previous OTA Evaluation of Railroad Safety published in May 1978, and additional

information on U.S. rail safety provided by Government, industry, and labor

sources. Data, information, and assistance regarding Canadian railroad safety was

provided by the Canadian Transport Commission, Labour Canada, the Canadian

Pacific (CP) Railway, the Canadian National Railway (CN), and the Canadian

Railway Labour Association.

The study was conducted by OTA staff with the contractual assistance of the

Newman and Hermanson Company, Mr. Ralph Hoar as editor, and his. Marese

Miles as typist. Special assistance was provided by Jim Leach and Joel Miller within

OTA. Advice and assistance was provided by a U.S. advisory panel comprised of

representatives from the Federal Railroad Administration, the Association of

American Railroads, the Railway Labor Executives Association, the Union Pacific

Railroad, and Carnegie Mellon University. In addition, numerous other persons

provided valuable insight and information regarding safety for the study effort. A

detailed list of the persons interviewed is included in appendix A.

This study sought to give a general overview of the similarities and differences

between the U.S. and Canadian rail systems, Government structures, accident and

casualty pictures, and rail safety policies and programs. Time and data limitations

did not permit detailed comparisons of such items as operational data and codes,

specific accident comparisons, Government economic policies, and rail resource

allocations.

Special thanks are extended to the Canadian Transport Commission and the

Railway Transport Committee, Labour Canada, CN Rail, CP Rail, the Canadian

Railway Labour Association, and to the numerous persons who assisted in the study

effort. Appreciation is also extended to the U.S. advisory panel, the Newman and

Hermanson Company, Ralph Hoar, and Teri Miles for their excellent support.

vi
SUMMARY

The major findings of a comparative analysis

of U.S. and Canadian rail systems and safety

practices are:

1.

2.

3.

The Canadian and U.S. rail systems differ

substantially in size and structure. The

Canadian system is comprised of two primary railroads, the Canadian National

(CN) and the Canadian Pacific (CP). CN

has been Government-owned since 1923

and CP is privately owned. Both lines are

transcontinental. In contrast, the United

States has approximately 56 majo r

railroads, none of which are transcontinental or Government-owned. The Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) is the

only U.S. freight carrier that has recently

received sizable Government subsidies or

investments. In general, the U.S. rail

system and related Government structure

is considerably more complex than the

Canadian. The extent to which that difference in complexity may account for the

relative effectiveness of safety measures in

the two countries could not be determined

for this report.

The U.S. rail fatality rate, on a train-mile

basis, was an average of 47.6 percent

higher than the Canadian for the Ii-year

period 1966-76. This higher U.S. fatality

rate, especially in grade-crossing and trespasser fatalities, seems to reflect the fact

that, since the U.S. population and rail

system are considerably larger than the

Canadian, the level of exposure to rail

hazards is much higher in the United

States.

On the whole, the U.S. derailment rate is

much higher than the Canadian. However, derailment rates vary widely among

U.S. carriers. The average derailment

rates of the nine largest (in ton-miles) U.S.

carriers were similar to those of the Canadian railroads for 1976 and 1977. However, the average derailment rates for the

second 10 U.S. railroads are significantly

higher than the rates for the Canadian

railroads for those same years. Derailments in the United States are continuing

4.

5.

6.

to increase, while derailments in Canada

have stabilized.

The continued rise in U.S. derailment

rates seems to be a result of deferred maintenance and increased axle loadings on

freight equipment. U.S. derailment rates

will probably continue to climb until the

economic condition of some U.S. rail carriers improves. The stabilization of Canadian derailment rates seems to stem from a

combination of factors, which include the

priority railroad management gives to

track maintenance, the economic health of

the industry and the availability of capital

for it, and favorable Canadian tax structures.

In Canada, the National Transportation

Act of 1967 changed Government economic policy to encourage greater balance

among transportation modes. Under the

new policy, railroads gained greater control over their rate structure. Although no

direct correlation can be made between

this change in policy and rail safety records, the change does appear to have

strengthened the economic position of the

rail industry in Canada and may be one of

the underlying causes of improved rail

safety.

Several Canadian approaches to rail safety appear to work well and may be worth

considering for the United States. They include:

Emphasis by railroad management on

safety accountability and adoption by

management of a systematic approach

to safety that includes training, the

development and use of accident data,

and a high priority placed on track

maintenance.

Creation of a no-fault system of insurance compensation for work-related injuries.

Government use of risk analysis to

guide railroad inspection.

Government use of risk analysis in the

allocation of funds for grade crossings.

vii
● Government use of stop orders rather

than penalties as a means of enforcing

safety standards.

● Mandatory use of the Hazardous In- ●

formation Emergency Response form,

which outlines the basic information

needed for immediately responding to

accidents, in all shipments of dangerous

commodities.

Participation and cooperation between

labor and management in a Government-sponsored forum.

Viii
CONTENTS

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

IV.

v.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. . .

Rail Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident Picture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Government Structures and Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Government, Industry, and Labor Approaches to Safety . . . . . . . . . . .

CANADIAN RAILROAD SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Rail System Physical Plant and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad Financial Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S.-Canadian Rail System Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND RAIL SAFETY . . . . . . . . . .

Government Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Laws Directly Affecting Rail Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE ACCIDENT PICTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RTC Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparisons with the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Labour Canada Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad Accident Data and Reporting Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE RAIL SAFETY INQUIRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Events Leading to Safety Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety Inquiry: Process, Findings, and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . .

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Transport Commission Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Labour Canada’s Occupational Safety and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railway Safety Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supervisor Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Preventive Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Participation in Regulatory Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RAILROAD LABOUR AND SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Labour/Railroad Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

Labour/Government Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIXES

Appendix A: Persons Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

3

3

4

8

12

19

19

19

21

24

27

31

31

33

41

45

45

50

56

58

65

65

66

71

71

85

86

89

89

89

90

95

99

99

100

103

.107

Appendix B: Canadian Accident Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......108

Appendix C: Hazard Information Emergency Response Form. . ...............109

ix
LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

Selected Comparative Characteristics

United States—Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fatalities in the United States and Canada,

1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Trespasser Fatalities in the United States

and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Grade-Crossing Fatalities in the United

States and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . .

Employee Fatalities in the United States

and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Collisions/Derailments in the United

States and Canada, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . .

Derailments in the United States and

Canada, 1975-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Derailments by Cause . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mainline/Branchlike—Derailments by

Year and Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Derailments by Cause . . . . . . . .

U.S. and Canadian Safety Regulations . . .

Railway Trackage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Locomotive Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freight Rolling Stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Intercity Freight by Mode of Transportation in Canada (excluding pipelines),

1944-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commodities Accounting for More Than 2

Percent of Rail Ton-Miles in 1969 and 1974

in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Pacific Rail Financial Fact Sheet.

Maintenance Expenditures for the

Canadian Pacific Railroad, 1973-77. . . . . .

Capital Expenditures for the Canadian

Pacific Railway, 1973-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Capital Expenditures—U.S. Class I

Carriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Casualties by Type of

Accident, 1966-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Casualties, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canadian Accidents by Type, 1966-77. . . .

Statement of Canadian Derailments

According to Major Causes, 1966-76 . . . . .

Canadian Incidents Involving

Dangerous Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Casualties, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fatalities in Canada and the United States,

1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

4

5

5

6

6

6

6

7

8

10

21

23

24

25

25

26

26

26

26

47

48

48

48

49

52

53

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

Employee Fatalities in Canada and

the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Grade-Crossing Fatalities in Canada and

the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Trespasser Fatalities in Canada and

the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Statement of Derailments According

to Major Causes in Canada, 1966-76 . . . . . 54

U.S. Train Accidents by Class, 1966-74 . . . 55

U.S. Train Accidents by Class, 1975-77 . . . 55

Mainline/Branchlike—Derailments

by Year and Railroad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

U.S. Derailments by Contributing Cause,

1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

U.S. Derailments by Contributing Cause,

1975-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Labour Canada Work Injury Experience

for Industries Under Federal Jurisdiction,

5-Year Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Accidents Resulting From Transportation

Problems or RuleViolations . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Engineering (Track) Responsibility . . . . . . .59

Equipment Responsibility Accidents

for CN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Entrain and Yard Accidents by Cause,

1972-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

CN5-Year Disabling Injury Ratio . . . . . . . 61

FRA Comparative Statistics--Train

Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

FRA Comparative Statistics--Employee

Disabling Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

CPT rain Accidents on FRA Basis . . . . . . . 62

U.S. and Canadian Railroad Safety

Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Canadian Incidents Involving Dangerous

Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

1. Transport Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2. Relationship of Ministry "Family" to

Transportation Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3. Rate of Disabling Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chapter I

U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY:

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Chapter I

U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY:

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Rail safety problems and policies in Canada

and the United States have been shaped by a

number of factors including: Government structure and policy, geography and national resources, economic systems, technologies, and

the role various transportation modes played in

each country’s history. Differences in several of

these factors between the United States and

Canada have produced some differences in each

country’s rail system and rail safety.

This chapter provides a comparative analysis

between the U.S. and Canadian rail systems,

rail accident pictures, and major rail safety

policies and programs.

The primary sources of information for this

report include the Office of Technology Assessment’s Evaluation of Rail Safety and interviews

and documents provided by the Canadian Government, railroads, and labor organizations.

RAIL SYSTEM

The U.S. and Canadian rail systems differ

significantly in size and in structure. The

U.S. rail system is considerably larger and

has many more individual railroads than

the Canadian.

Two transcontinental railroads, the Canadian

National (CN) and the Canadian Pacific (CP)

dominate the Canadian rail system. CN is a

Government-owned crown corporation and CP

is a privately owned railroad. By contrast, the

U.S. rail system is comprised of approximately

56 major railroads, none of which are transcontinental. No U.S. carrier is entirely Government

owned, although the Government does have a

very sizable ownership interest in the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), as a result of

its recent investments.

The United States has over nine times the

population of Canada. Although the two countries are similar in land mass, the great portion

of Canada’s land mass lies in arctic and subarctic regions and only one-third is populated.

Selected characteristics of the two countries’

rail systems are shown in table 1. The rail

technology employed by the two countries is

Table 1 .—Selected Comparative Characteristics

United States—Canada

Year Characteristic United States

1976

1976

1976

1975

1975

976

976

976

975

976

976

976

Population (million) .,

Land mass (sq. miles)

Number of railways (major)

Mainline/branchlike

(miles) ... . .

Yard/sidings (miles )

Total freight fleet (cars)

Total locomotives (number

Average capacity per

freight car ., ., .,

Total passenger fleet (car)

Freight train miles (million

Gross ton miles (billion)

Passenger miles (billion)

1976/ 77 Average number of

employee s

1976 Operating revenues

(billion). . . . . .

1976 Operating expenses

(billion) *

Percent expenses to

revenue s

1976 Net income (ordinary)

(million) . ,

‘1 5,000,00(

3,615,100

56

199,400

124,800

1,699,000

27,600

73.8 tons

6,471

424.5

1,996

1 0 3

496,500

1 8 5

1 5 0

80%

358

Canada

3,000,000

1,851,800

2

43,900

16,100

193,400

4,008

64.6

1,855

6 8 6

273

1.8

107,000

3.1

2 9

91%

36.9

United

States/

Canada

(ratio)

9.3

.

—

4.5

7.8

8.8

6.9

1 2

3 5

6.2

7,3

5 7

4.6

5.8

5 1

9.7

“The differences between Canada and the United States (n the percentage of expenses 10 reve

nues may be explalned In part by the capital Investment that IS nol Included as an expense Item

In the Umted States

3
4 . Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

similar. However, the United States carries a

slightly higher weight per train as evidenced by

a larger freight car capacity. The freight car

capacity for both countries has increased in the

last two decades. The United States has over

four times as much mainline/branchlike trackage as Canada and over eight times the equipment fleet. The U.S. system travels six times the

amount of freight train miles and seven times

Fatality rates

countries for

ACCIDENT

(based on train miles) in both

the 1966-76 period declined.

However, the United States had a 47.6 percent higher fatality rate (or 1.5 times

higher) than Canada. Grade-crossing and

trespasser fatality rates are considerably

higher in the United States than in Canada,

whereas employee fatality rates are similar.

These data probably reflect the fact that,

since both the U.S. population and rail

system are much larger than the Canadian,

the U.S. general public has a higher level of

exposure to rail hazards.

For the 1966-76 period, the U.S. rail fatality

rate was an average of 47.6 percent higher than

that of Canada. Total U.S. rail fatalities declined by 37 percent between 1966 and 1976

(table 2). The U.S. fatalities per train mile

declined by 27 percent. In Canada, the total

fatalities declined by 54 percent for the same

period, and the rate per train mile declined by

50 percent.

A proportionately larger number of trespasser fatalities occur in the United States than

in Canada (table 3). On the average, over the

1966-76 period, the trespasser fatality rate for

the United States was 67 percent higher than for

Canada. The reasons for the differences in trespasser fatality rates between the two countries

could not be specifically ascertained. However,

factors such as location of trespasser death (urban or rural), population densities, and rail traffic exposure could influence the number and rate

the gross-ton mileage of the Canadian rail

system. In the United States, passenger miles

were 5.7 times higher than that of Canada, and

the United States hired an average of 4.6 times

more railroad employees than Canada. In light

of the differing sizes of the two countries and the

nature of their economies, the differences in the

sizes of the rail systems are to be expected.

PICTURE

Table 2.—Fatalities in the United States and Canada,

1966-76

Canada United States

Per million* Per million**

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

1966 . . . . 318 3.31 2684 4.18

1967 . . . . 297 3.15 2483 4.08

1968 ., ., . 230 2.64 2359 4,04

1969 .. . 218 2.53 2299 4,03

1970 . . . . 195 2.24 2225 3.04

1971 ., ., , 208 2.39 1010 3.09

1972 . . . 253 2.81 1,945 3.73

1973 ... . 228 2.57 1,916 3.38

1974 ... 201 2.07 1,908 3.27

197 5 187 2.11 1,560 2.92

1976 . . . . . 145 1.66 1,684 3.02

2,50 average 3.69 average

rate rate

“U S tram miles used for Ihls table were derwed from comb rung Iocomotwe males (whtch In

eludes freight and passenger males, and motor Iraln miles)

● *Canadian tram males for 1972-76 used m this table included Ilolor tram miles, and freight and

passenger miles

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulhng, Sfa(/sf/cd/Arra/ ys/s of Ra/lway AccdeMs, /956-73,

p 12, Railway Transport, pt 1, Comparahve Summar I, 1972-76, table 9 U S Federal

Ratlroad Admlmsfratlon Accldenf Bullehn, no 14 and 45, p 1

of deaths. This data was not available for this

report. *

Between 1966 and 1976, both countries

showed a decline in the number and rate of

deaths resulting from grade-crossing accidents

(table 4). The decline in the United States was

more consistent over the period than in Canada.

On a per million train-mile basis, the Ii-year

average grade-crossing fatality rate in the

United States is 62 percent higher than that of

*The Railway Transport Committee (RTC), the Canadian Government agency responsible for accident data collection and analysis, gathers data on mainline and branchline accidents that result

in $750 or more in damage to rail property, equipment, and

lading.

(continued)
Ch. 1 U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis ● 5

Table 3.—Trespasser Fatalities in the United States

and Canada, 1966-76

Canada United States

Table 4.—Grade”Crossing Fatalities in

the United States and Canada, 1966=76

Canada United States

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

1966 ., . . 74 .77 678 1.06

1967 ., ., 57 .60 646 1.06

1968 53 .61 628 1,08

1969 53 .61 627 1,10

1970 . . . 50 .57 593 1.08

1971 56 .64 551 1.07

1972 . . 66 ,73 537 1,03

1973 48 .54 578 1.02

1974 55 .57 565 .91

1975 59 .67 524 .98

1976 ...,. 32 .37 458 .82

.61 average 1.02 average

rate rate

SOURCE Bureau of Marragement Consulfmg, SfaMocd&ra/ys(s o/ Radway Acc/derr(s, f956-73

Radway Transpofl, pt 1, Comparative Summary, 1972-76 U S Federal Radroad Admmtstrahon Accident Bulletins

1966 ., . . . 186 1,94 1,780 2.77

1967 . . . 197 2.09 1,632 2.68

1968 ., . . . 121 1.39 1,546 2.65

1969 ., ., 120 1,39 1,490 2.61

1970 . . . . . 116 1,33 1,440 2.61

1971 . . . . . 121 1.39 1,356 2.63

1972 . . . . 150 1,65 1,260 2.41

1973 ... . 150 1.69 1,185 2.09

1974 . . . 109 1.12 1,220 2.09

1975 ..,.. 99 1,12 978 1.83

1976 ... , 108 1.24 1,168 2.10

1.49 average 2.41 average

rate rate

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulting, .Slaflsflca/ Ana/ysis of r?a{/way Accderm, 1956-73,

Radway Transport, pt I Comparatwe Summary 1972-76, U S Federal Railroad Ad.

mmlstratlon Accident BulletIns

Canada. This rate difference appears to reflect a

higher level of exposure of the U.S. population

to such hazards than in Canada. For example,

Canada has 34,000 public crossing sites compared to 219,000 in the United States. For the

1966-72 period, the United States had an average of 105,288,000 motor vehicle registrations

compared to 8,238,000 in Canada. However, in

order to determine accurately the exposure

levels, more detailed data is needed.

The employee fatality rates for the United

States and Canada are quite similar (table 5).

Both countries have shown a relatively stable

rate, with the exception of a dramatic decline in

employee deaths for Canada in 1976.

In both the United States and Canada, rail

grade-crossing fatalities represent the most

significant rail-related safety problem.

Grade-crossing fatalities are the largest

category of rail-related deaths in Canada and in

the United States. In both countries, these

deaths account for between 60 to 65 percent of

all rail-related fatalities. In both countries,

trespasser fatalities accounted for the second

largest safety problem in number of deaths.

*(continued)

The U.S. Federal Railroad Administration currently collects accident information on mainline, branchlike, and yard accidents

that result in $2,300 or more in damage costs. In the United States,

prior to 1975, the threshold value for reporting accidents was

$750. It was raised to $1,750 to account for inflation in 1975, and

to $2,300 in 1977. Mainline and branchlike accidents for the

United States could only be separated from yard data for the years

1975, 1976, and 1977. Hence, qualitative comparisons with RTC

data could only be made for those years. Although the reporting

threshold for derailments is lower in Canada for the 1975-77

period, this should not preclude comparison of derailments between the United States and Canada for that period for mainline

and branchlike derailments.

RTC collects data on injuries for operating employees, however,

data on injury causes were not available. The United States did not

begin collecting injury data for injuries resulting in “one or more”

days off or requiring medical attention until 1975. Prior to 1975,

injury data were collected for only those injuries resulting in “more

than one” day off. The primary difference in accident data collection systems between the two countries is the fact the United States

collects yard accident data whereas Canada does not, and the def -

initions and procedures used to collect injury data have differed.

Canadian railroads with gross ton miles

similar to the top-nine ton-mile carriers in

the United States have derailment rates

similar to those of the U.S. carriers. However, the averages of accident rates for the

next 10 (ton mile) U.S. railroads as a group

in 1976 and in 1977 are significantly higher

than the Canadian railroads. In the aggregate, the U.S. derailment rate is significantly higher than that of Canada. In both

countries, derailments are more significant

for the property losses and service dislocation than for the fatalities they cause.

Derailments measured on a gross ton-mile

basis increased for both countries over the

1966-74 period, as shown in table 6. After 1974,

derailments stabilized for Canada, whereas they
6 ● Railroad safety—U.S. -Canadian Comparison

Table 5.—Employee Fatalities in the United States

and Canada, 1966-76

Canada United States

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

1966 ., ., 26 .27 168 .26

1967 ., 29 .31 176 .29

1968 ., 28 .32 150 .26

1969 26 .30 190 .33

1970 21 ,24 172 .31

1971 ., 18 .21 123 .24

1972 32 .35 133 .25

1973 ... 21 .24 161 .28

1974 . . ., 24 .25 144 .25

1975 . . . 23 ,26 113 .21

1976 8 .09 109 .20

.26 average .26 average

rate rate

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulting SfafNlcaJ Analysts of Ratlway Accjdenk, 1956-73,

Railway Transport, pt 1, Comparatwe Summary, 1972-76, U S Federal Railroad Admlmstratlon Accident Bulletins

Table 6.—Collisions/Derailments in the

United States and Canada, 1966-74

Canada United States

Year Collisions Derailments* Collisions Derailments**

1966 55 230 1,552 4,447

1967 ., 39 209 1,522 4,960

1968 ., ., 49 228 1,727 5,487

1969 . . . . 41 246 1,810 5,960

1970 . . 46 276 1,756 5,620

1971 ., ., 45 265 1,529 5,131

1972 . . 44 323 1,348 5,509

1973 56 299 1,657 7,389

1974 . . ., 46 420 1,551 8,513

‘Mamllne only

● *Mamlme and yard combmed

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulting, .SfatNica/ Analysls of RahayAccdertk,

1956-73, Radway Transport pl 1, Comparatwe Summary 1972-76, U S Federal

Ratlroad Admlmmstratlon Accident Bulletins

have continued to increase in the United States

(tables 7 and 8).

While the total derailment picture for the

United States appears less favorable than that of

Canada, derailment rates among U.S. carriers

range from 0.28 to 12.50 on a billion gross-tonmile basis for the 1976-77 period. Table 9 lists

U.S. and major Canadian carriers by their gross

ton miles and by their derailment rates. As evidenced from this table, derailment problems

vary among individual carriers. From the information provided by table 9, the average accident rates for the nine largest (ton mile) U.S.

railroads in 1976 and in 1977 are not significantly different from the values for either CN or CP

in those years. However, the averages of the acTable 7.—Derailments in the United States

and Canada, 1975.77*

Year Canada United States

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 3,600

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 4,123

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 4,010

“ Malnllne/branchlike only for both countries.

SOURCE Railway Transport Committee, Summary Accident Data, Federal Rail.

road Administration, Accident Bullet Ins,

Table 8.—U.S. Derailments by Cause

Year Track

1966* . . 1,388

1967. . . . . 1,800

1968. , ., 2,062

1969, ., ., 2,400

1970, . . . . 2,393

1971 . . . . . 2,194

1972. ., . . 2,481

1973. ..., 3,477

1974. . . . . 3,196

Percent of

total . . (40%)

1975** 1,63 3

1976. , ., 1,921

1977. . . . . 1,844

(46%)

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

.88

.96

.92

Equipment

1,550

1,611

1,745

1,863

1,602

1,389

1,344

1,755

1,967

[30%)

1,242

1,405

1,324

(34%)

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

.67

.71

.66

Misc.

and

—

1,501

1 ,549

1 ,681)

1,697

1,607

1,5411

1 ,684

2,157

2,350

(30%)

725

797

842

(20% )

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

.39

.40

.42

Total

4,447

4,960

5,487

5,960

5,602

5,131

5,509

7,389

8,513

3,600

4,123

4,010

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

1.84

2.07

1.99

I

“1966-74 for mamllne/branchlme and yard derailments

“” 1975-77 for mamllne/branchllne only (prior to 1975 deradmerts could not be Isolated by locatlon otmamllnev yard)

SOURCE Federal Ratlroad Admmlstratlon Acc!dent Bulletln am Assoclatlon of American Ratlroads, Economics and Finance Department

cident rates of the next 10 U.S. railroads in 1976

and in 1977 statistically are significantly higher

than the values of either CN or CP in those

years. The differences in the accident rates between the years 1976 and 1977 for the individual

carriers are not statistically significant. The

variation among the carriers is highly significant, but the variation from year to year is not

significant.

In the United States, track-caused derailments

represent a slightly higher portion of total

mainline/branchlike derailments than they do

in Canada. Between 1966 and 1977, trackcaused derailments accounted for roughly 40 to
Ch. I U.S. -Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis ● 7

46 percent of all U.S derailments (table 8). * In

Canada, during the same period, equipmentcaused accidents represented the largest number

of derailments between 1966 and 1970 whereas

track-caused accidents represented the greatest

portion of accidents between 1970 and 1975

(table 10). The slower introduction of roller

bearings in the Canadian freight car fleet may

account for the slightly larger portion of equipment-caused accidents. By 1976, track and

equipment causes together accounted for roughly 74 percent of all Canadian derailments with

the split between track and equipment causes

being almost equal or approximately 37 percent

each by 1977.

In the United States, 1.7 percent of rail-related fatalities for 1966-76 occurred in derailments. In Canada, 1 percent of fatalities for

1966-76 occurred in derailments. Derailments

appear more significant for their resulting property losses and service dislocations.

As suggested in the previous OTA Evaluation

of Railroad Safety, the reasons for the increases

in track-caused train accidents may result from

a combination of factors including increased

axle loading on freight equipment, deferred

maintenance, and the unstable economic condition of some U.S. carriers. Data was not available to correlate directly the financial viability

of the individual rail carriers with their derailment picture.

Around 1974, Canadian Government and

railroad officials showed a growing concern

about increased axle loading on freight equipment. Railroad management states that, as a result of this concern, CN conducted research on

the problems, Both railroads decided to increase

track expenditures. Although sufficient data

● Prior to 1975, in the United States, derailments occurring in the

yards could not be separated from mainline and branchlike derailments. Therefore in the range of 40 to 46 percent of derailments

caused by track for the 1966-77 period, 40 percent represents

track-caused derailments for mainline) branchlike only, and 46

percent represents track-caused derailments occurring on mainlines/branchlines and in the yards from 1966-74.

Table 9.—Mainline/Branchline — Derailments by Year

and Railroad (in billions of gross ton miles)

Railroad

Conrail. . .

Burlington Northern:

Southern Pacifi c

Union Pacific .

Santa F e

Souther n

Norfolk &Western.

Chessie ... .,

Missouri Pacifi c

Louisville & Nashville. .,

Seaboard Coast Line

Illinois Central Gulf

Chicago & Northwestern

Milwaukee ,

St, Louis-San Francisco.

Rock Island .

St.Louis-Southwestern.

Denver Rio Grande.

SooLine, .,

Kansas City Southern .,

Western Pacific . ,

Missouri-Kansas-Texas .,

Grand Trunk Western

Delaware & Hudson.

Boston & Maine ., .,

Clinchfield . . . .

Colorado & Southern .

Ft. Worth & Denve r

Florida East Coast

Long Island .

Bessemer & Lake Erie

Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton

Duluth & Missabe Iron

Range . ,

Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potoma c

Pittsburgh & Lake Erie,

Duluth, Winnepeg, &

Pacific ., . ., .,

Maine Centra l

Elgin, Joilet, & Eastern

Toledo, Peoria, & Western

CP-U.S. Lines .,

Georgia . ,

Northwestern Pacific .,

Illinois Terminal Co.

Bangor & Aroostock.

Chicago & Illinois Midland

Central Vermont .,

Detroit Toledo Shoreline,

Gross ton

miles 1976

204.6

170,3

160.1

144.7

(CN 139.4)

1130

114,9

1149

108,2

(CP 101.0)

8 1 2

7 9 9

6 2 6

57,1

5 0 4

38.3

3 4 7

26.2

20.7

18.4

147

13,4

11.6

9.1

8.3

6,2

5 9

4,7

4.8

4 2

3 8

3.8

3 2

3.6

2.7

2.5

2,4

2 0

1,8

1,5

1.4

1,4

1.2

1 2

1.2

9

.7

5

Derailment

rate, 197E

1,44

1,09

.97

(1.36)

1.03

.86

3 8 0

1.02

( 97)

3.03

1.55

3 3 7

5.90

6.45

1 9 8

6.97

,72

3 1 5

3.40

2 0 9

4 4 0

3.96

4.94

3.23

3.39

4,26

3.54

48

1.05

1.58

5.63

.28

1.48

8..80

2.08

950

1.11

3.33

214

2.14

4.17

750

12,50

5.56

714

12.00

Gross ton

miles 197i

2392

221 7

173.3

169.1

159.8

(141 7)

121 3

108,0

110.8

111 8

(106.2)

8 4 3

84.5

601

58.8

48.8

38.8

35.1

26.7

21.2

20.5

16.2

13.8

12.3

9.5

8.9

6.1

6.7

6.6

6.8

5.0

3.8

3.7

3 4

2.3

2,6

2,5

2.6

2.0

1 7

1,4

1.5

1.4

1.2

1,2

1.2

7

.7

.5

SOURCE Federal Railroad Administration Accident Bulletin and Association of

roads

Derailment

rate, 1977

2.47

1,16

1 25

.86

.73

(1 .34)

.92

.71

330

.98

(1 02)

339

1.77

386

510

7.33

1 52

8.06

.61

2,59

1 79

1.59

4.15

2.21

472

3.28

358

2.73

2.21

.80

1.05

.81

2.94

222

9.20

500

1,76

5.00

.67

714

12,50

6.67

429

1,43

800

American Railwas not available to document fully the trends

in allocation for track maintenance, the Canadian accident data tends to support statements

made by the railroads.

50-171 0 - 79 - 2
8 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 10.—Canadian Derailments by Cause

I

Year Track

1966 . . . . . 70

1967 ..., . 53

1968, .. . 50

1969. , . . . 73

1970 . . . . . 119

1971 .. . 107

1972 . . . . . 134

1973 . . . . . 115

1974, . . . . 157

1975 . . . . . 136

1976 ...,. 106

1977, ..., 120

36%

Gross

ton

miles

000)

.32

.25

.24

.34

.51

.44

.53

.45

.56

.53

.41

.43

Equipment

125

82

100

128

108

89

103

104

130

103

107

111

38%

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

.57

.38

.47

.60

.46

.36

.40

.41

.46

.40

.42

.39

Misc.

and

other

35

74

78

45

49

69

86

80

133

91

88

81

26%

Gross

ton

miles

(000)

.32

.31

.29

SOURCE Railway Transport Committee, Summary Accident Report, 1977

Total

230

209

228

246

276

265

323

299

420

330

301

312

Gross

ton

miles

000)

1.17

1.08

1.10

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND STATUTES

In the history of both Canadian and U.S.

railroads, there has been Government involvement in the railroads, but that involvement—in terms of both economic and

safety regulations and economic subsidies

for the railroads—has differed in several

ways.

Canada’s early rail system was tied directly to

the political union and economy of the country.

The first transcontinental railroad, the Canadian Pacific, was stipulated by the British North

America Act of 1867. This Act formed the

Canadian confederation by joining British Columbia to the other provinces, particularly to

Montreal. CP received substantial initial

Government subsidies, land grants, and tax

credits. However, it has always been maintained as a private enterprise system.

The Canadian Government has been involved

in rail economic regulation since the late-1800’s.

In 1897, the Canadian Government entered into

the Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement with CP. The

agreement established rates for hauling grain for

specified routes in exchange for subsidies needed

by CP to build additional lines. The Crow’s

Nest Pass Agreement was later extended to include all grain-hauling routes for CP, and those

for other rail lines as well.

In 1903, the Canadian Government enacted

the Railway Act, which consolidated a number

of existing rail policies and added economic and

safety regulatory measures.

The U.S. Government has been involved with

economic, safety, and other aspects of its rail

system since the late-1800’s. The United States

provided substantial land grants for building the

rail system to foster growth in the West. The

Federal Government became involved in the

economic regulation of the railroads when it

created the Interstate Commerce Commission in

1887. The Government also became active in

railroad safety with the creation of a number of

specific safety laws between 1900 and 1920.

In Canada, CN was established as a Government owned and operated crown corporation in

1923 following the financial collapse of several

major private railroads. These were consolidated with previously owned Government

lines.

As in Canada, the U.S. railroads experienced

financial difficulties in the early 1900’s. During

World War I, the U.S. Government operated

the rail system. However, after the war, the railroads returned to private ownership with Government regulation. The U.S. railroads later

received substantial loans from the Reconstruc-
Ch. I U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis • 9

tion Finance Corporation during the Depression. Most of these loans were paid back by the

end of World War II. Conrail is the only major

carrier that has received sizable Government

subsidies in recent rail history.

Today in Canada, CN represents one of several divisions included in the Canadian National

Crown Corporation. Its other divisions include

trucking, shipping, U.S. rail lines, and hotels.

However, CN accounts for the largest source of

revenues to the corporation. Although publicly

owned, CN’s financial position was greatly improved by the Capital Revision Act of 1977-78

which removed substantial CN debts (approximately $2 billion). The remaining CN debt after

this Act is approximately $250 million.

Canadian Pacific is also part of a larger conglomerate, CP Limited, which has assets of $5

billion. CP Limited enterprises include air,

trucking, shipping, mining, forestry, real estate,

telecommunications, and other investments.

Rail accounts for 22 percent of the annual

revenues of CP Limited.

The structures of the two Governments and

their current rail policies differ in several

substantial ways.

Canada has a parliamentary form of government that combines legislative and executive

functions. The Minister of Transport, a member

of Parliament, serves as the chief executive for

the Department of Transport (Transport Canada), the governmental agency with umbrella

transportation authority.

In Canada, there are two primary Government entities with rail safety responsibilities;

Transport Canada (Department of Transport)

and Labour Canada (Department of Labour).

Labour Canada is the equivalent of the executive branch Labor Department in the United

States. In Canada, the central Government has

exclusive jurisdiction over the interprovincial

rail carriers, whereas, in the United States,

Federal Government jurisdiction preempts but

does not exclude State jurisdiction over rail carriers.

Canadian authority for economic and safety

regulation of all interprovincial railroads, as

well as for economic regulation of other modes,

is vested in one primary agency, the Canadian

Transport Commission (CTC). CTC reports to

Transport Canada. Within CTC, the Railway

Transport Committee (RTC) has direct responsibility for rail regulatory activity. CTC was

created by the National Transportation Act of

1967 (NTA), which sought to establish a balanced transportation policy. NTA established a

national transport policy for the purpose of

achieving maximum efficiency from all available modes at lowest cost. With the 1967 Act,

Canada removed a number of Government rail

economic policies in an effort to allow rail to

compete more effectively with other modes.

NTA established an appeals process to resolve

potential rate disputes in captive markets and to

safeguard the public interest. NTA also established the framework for Federal regulation of

trucks, historically a function of the provinces.

This section, although passed by Parliament,

has never been activated. Hence the provinces

still exercise regulatory authority over trucking. 1

Within CTC, the Railway Transport Committee is responsible for implementing Federal

rail policies. Its functions are several: administration of rail economic policy, administration

of rail subsidies, and administration of rail safety policies involving train operations. RTC rail

safety functions include: regulation, inspection,

accident reporting and investigation, and gradecrossing and dangerous commodities safety-related activities.

‘A major study in 1977 of the impacts of rail economic and pricing changes resulting from NTA was undertaken by the Centre for

Transportation Studies at the University of British Columbia, a research organization sponsored by the Canadian Ministry of

Transport. The study is entitled Railway Pricing Under Commercial Freedom: The Canadian Experience by T. D. Heaver and J. C.

Nelson, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada,

1977.

While this OTA report does not seek to examine the impacts of

Canadian rail economic policies, the previous source gives information regarding the implications of rail economic deregulation in

Canada resulting from policies established by NTA.

The study concludes that:

The dynamic compet]t}on provided by the 1967 NTA has proved

workable in promoting efficient transport, sophisticated and efficient

prlcmg of railway services, adequate service for the most part, competitive rate levels, and some lessened discrimination in pricing as well

as ma]ntalning the commer]cal and financial viability of the Canadian

railways. Further the competition spawned by the Act has stimulated

shippers and ra]lways to make needed institutional changes.
10 ● Railroad Safety— U.S.-Canadian Comparison

In the United States, authority for development and implementation of rail economic policies, including regulatory functions, and rail

safety policies and programs is vested in several

different Federal agencies. The Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA) within the Department of

Transportation has responsibility for administering rail subsidies, and developing safety regulations and other programs including research.

In addition, FRA shares jurisdictional responsibility with the Federal Highway Administration

for grade-crossing safety, and with the Materials Transportation Bureau for hazardous

materials safety. The Interstate Commerce

Commission (ICC) has economic regulatory responsibilities for rail. Unlike Canada, the

United States has continued to maintain substantial Federal regulation of rail economic policies. Trucking regulation is maintained at the

Federal and State levels in the United States,

unlike Canada where Federal jurisdiction has

not been exercised.

The objectives and responsibilities of CTC

appear comprehensive and substantially stronger and wider in scope than those vested in ICC

and FRA. In particular, CTC can establish rules

and seek penalties for violation of its laws and

rules from both rail companies and rail employees. It has jurisdiction over construction and

operation of railroads. Its inspectors can issue

orders to stop train operations or remove a car

from a train. CTC decisions are binding within

its jurisdiction and may be reviewed only on apTable 11 .—U.S. and Canadian Safety Regulations

Subject

Hazardous materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ambient noise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Procedural rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State/Province participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Track safety standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freight car safety standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special notice, emergency orders . . . . . . . . . . .

Operating rules—general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operating rules— specific (blueflag, etc.) . . . . .

Two-way radios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rear-end marking devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hours of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Locomotive design, performance

and inspection standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety appliances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Power brakes and drawbars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signals and related devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Occupational Safety and Health. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mixed passenger/freight equipment —

vestibule doors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Testing employees—sight, hearing. . . . . . . . . .

Loading open top cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special equipment regulations (mailcars, snow

plows, grain cars). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air pollution and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fire extinguishers and emergency tools in

passenger cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fire prevention from railroad causes. . . . . . . . .

Grade crossings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad design (plans, profiles, etc.). . . . . . . . .

Utilities on or near rail line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. provision

49 CFR 172-174, 178-179,209

40 CFR 20 (EPA); 49 CFR 210;

49 CFR 171,211

49 CFR 171,211

49 CFR 212

49 CFR 213

49 CFR 215

49 CFR 216

49 CFR 217

49 CFR 218

49 CFR 220

49 CFR 221

49 CFR 225

49 CFR 228

49 CFR 230

49 CFR 231

49 CFR 232

49 CFR 233-236

29 CFR 1910

Non e

Non e

None

Non e

None applicable exclusively to

railroads

None

Non e

Non e

Non e

Non e

Non e

Canadian provision

Gen. Order no. 0-29 to O-34

N/A

Gen. Order. no. M-2

None

None

None

None

Gen. Order no. 0-8

Gen. Order no. 0-8

None

None

Gen. Order no. 0-

None

Gen. Order no. 0--

1 to 0-14,0-16 to

0-19,0-21

Gen. Order. no. 0-10

Gen. Order no. 0-20 (air brake only)

Gen. Order no. E-12 and E-13

SOR 71-30,71-480 ,71-481,71-584,

71-605,71-616,72663, 72-13,72-23,

72-66,72-666,72-171, 72-288,

73-679, and 78-559

Gen. Order no. 0-6

Gen. Order no. 0-9

Gen. Order no. 0-15

Gen. Order no. 0-22-0-24

Gen. Order no. O-26

Gen. Order no. O-27

Gen Order no. 0-28, E-16

Gen. Order no. E-3 and E-9

Gen. Order no. E-1 and E-2

Gen. Order no. E-10 and E-12

Gen. Order no. E-17
Ch. I U.S. -Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis ● 1 1

peal to the Supreme Court of Canada or the

Governor-in-Council.

The Canadian railroads and the U.S. railroads have been subject to similar statutory

safety requirements since the early 1900’s.

The regulations of similar areas or categories of safety by the two countries contain comparable provisions. However,

each country regulates categories not covered by the other.

The 1903 Railway Act established a broad

range of requirements and restrictions on the

formation, construction, operation, and safety

of Canadian railroads. As in comparable U.S.

laws, a number of the provisions contained in

the 1903 Act are specific in content and are

designed to address specific problems. A number of the regulations resulting from the statutes

in both Canada and the United States are similar. For example, the safety appliances, hazardous materials, and locomotive inspection regulations are similar. However, Canada has

adopted a Uniform Code of Operating Rules, a

subject left to the U.S. railroads for the most

part, although the Association of American

Railroads has a suggested code. By contrast, the

United States has track and freight car standards, a subject for which there are no Government standards in Canada. Canada does not

consider hours of service as a safety regulatory

matter. Table 11 indicates the rail safety regulations adopted by each country.

As in the United States, responsibility in

Canada for the safety and health of railroad employees is divided between transportation and labor agencies.

In Canada, the safety of some railway employees, primarily those in operating positions,

is within the jurisdiction of CTC; other railway

employees are within the jurisdiction of Labour

Canada. In the United States, the safety of railroad operations employees is under FRA, while

the occupational safety and health of employees

rests with the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) within the Department

of Labor. However, unlike CTC in Canada,

FRA collects all accident and casualty statistics

for both OSHA and FRA.

Labour Canada has developed regulations to

cover employees working in industries under

their jurisdiction, including those working for

the railroads. Labour Canada has not promulgated occupational safety and health regulations

for hazards specific only to railroads. CTC, to

date, has not promulgated occupational safety

and health regulations covering employees

under its jurisdiction. In the United States, there

is no gap in the statutory authority to deal with

occupational safety and health hazards since

OSHA can exercise it to the extent that FRA

does not. However, FRA has not exercised any

substantive jurisdiction in this area for a variety

of reasons, and has basically left the matter to

OSHA for functions not involving rail operations. To date, OSHA has not issued any regulations exclusively applicable to railroads.

Canadian compensation laws are established by the provinces, rather than by the

central Government. Compensation for

work-related injuries is no-fault in concept.

These plans are viewed by both management and labor as providing fair treatment

and compensation. In contrast, in the

United States, compensation for workrelated railroad disabilities or injuries is

under the authority of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). The employee

must sue the railroad and prove negligence

in order to receive disability compensation.

These compensation suits are handled in

the Federal court system. Results from

these suits may differ according to the court

in which the case is tried.

There are 10 separate compensation and rehabilitation plans in Canada—one for each province. In general these plans provide full medical

treatment, and disability benefits for unlimited

time periods. * Rehabilitation boards at the provincial level make determinations regarding

needed medical treatment and rehabilitation

programs. The railroads pay into no-fault insurance funds maintained by the provinces, or

*For examp]t?, one plan providm tor a maximum di~ability cc)mpensatiOn at $20,000 annually. Widow\ may recci~e $250 p e r

month unt i] cleat h or remarriage J nd $5-I per dependent up t c) age

18.
12 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

pay the employees directly according to

vincial plans.

In the United States, compensation

the profor disability or injury incurred by railroad employees

in the line of work is under Federal jurisdiction

by the authority of FELA. In order to receive

disability compensation, the U.S. rail employee

must sue the railroad and prove railroad negligence. Thus, the U.S. system is a legal one that

adjudicates responsibility for the injury. FELA

proceedings are handled in the Federal court

system. Results from lawsuits may differ according to the court in which the case is tried, or

according to the railroad’s history of case settlements.

The Canadian system, unlike that in the

United States, does not attempt to adjudicate responsibility for the injury. Decisions on whether

and how much disability compensation should

be awarded are made without involvement in

the legal system or in an adversary environment. Injured employees are assured of compensation and rehabilitation payments. Canadian

injury compensation and rehabilitation programs are reported as acceptable to both labor

and management and are not an area of dispute

in Canada. However, in the United States, FELA

has long been a

ment and labor.

divisive force between manageU.S.-CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND

LABOR APPROACHES TO SAFETY

In both countries, Government concern for

safety was heightened in the early 1970’s by

a series of accidents and by increases in

dangerous commodities.

In the United States, the Government’s response to the increases in accidents was a series

of hearings and the enactment of the Railroad

Safety Act of 1970 and the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act. The 1970 Safety Act gave

the Department of Transportation regulatory

and administrative powers to deal with safety

and hazardous materials transportation problems. Prior to the enactment of the Railroad

Safety Act of 1970, track-caused train accidents

were increasing. After the passage of the Safety

Act, a series of regulations have been promulgated by FRA and new inspection programs to

ensure compliance with those regulations have

been introduced. The primary regulations dealing with substantive, rather than procedural,

safety concerns that have resulted from the 1970

Safety Act and from the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act include: track standards,

equipment standards, and standards for component designs and performance of tank cars.

The Canadian rail safety inquiry, begun in

the early 1970’s, was a Government effort that

investigated several major accidents and was

later expanded to investigate the effectiveness of

Government and industry rail safety policies

and programs. The inquiry included testimony

of the railroads and labor regarding safety issues

and problems. The inquiry lasted over 3 years.

It was followed by an in-depth analysis of safety

problems and Government programs. The resulting reports were intended to establish and

quantify the need, if there was a need, for increased Government safety activity and programs to reduce accidents and injuries.

One of the results of the Canadian inquiry

was that the railroads increased their own safety

efforts. They expanded their data collection and

analysis procedures for safety, ir creased communication with employees by utilizing safety

committees more effectively, established rehabilitation programs, and began to explore trackrelated problems in greater detail. Today accident and casualty data are used by the railroads

to establish safety targets, to identify areas in

which safety problems exist, and to examine

and apply possible corrective actions to such

problems.

Both U.S. and Canadian Governments use

inspections as a part of their railroad safety

programs. However, the two Governments
Ch. I U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis ● 1 3

differ somewhat in their approaches to inspection and allocation of inspection

resources.

The Canadian RTC combines safety inspections with other routine responsibilities of its

field personnel. Canadian inspection practices

are based on the premise that safety is an integral part of efficient rail operation and should

be viewed as such. Responsibilities of the Rail

Services Branch of RTC are divided among safety inspection programs, branchlike rehabilitation, evaluation of passenger services, and station retirements. RTC officials estimate that

about 35 percent of the professional staff time

spent in the field involves safety matters. The

Rail Services Headquarters Branch has about 29

staff members to carry out its responsibilities,

Estimates of the extent to which safety is a part

of headquarters work of the Rail Services

Branch were not available. Allocation of inspection resources to a particular type of inspection

results primarily from priorities established by

RTC officials and the requirements of statistically based sampling. The inspection programs

conducted by RTC include: track, car, locomotive, operations, dangerous commodities, fire

prevention, stationary mechanical equipment,

and structures and signals including grade crossings. Highest Government priority for inspections are on: developing an improved accident

investigation procedure, grade-crossing inspections, and safety inspections administered by

the Rail Services Branch, particularly equipment inspection. RTC with the assistance of the

Bureau of Management Consulting developed

an approach to equipment inspections that

utilizes risk factor analysis and inspection

sampling as the primary method for equipment

inspections. This system was recently employed. Its effectiveness has not yet been determined. RTC views the Government’s role as one

of monitoring railroad activities. As in the

United States, Canadian Government inspection programs do not appear to have measures

by which the effectiveness of inspection programs can be ascertained.

In the United States, a significant portion of

the FRA safety resources is dedicated solely to

safety inspections. FRA conducts inspections in

five major areas: track, operating practices,

motive power and equipment, signals and train

control, and hazardous materials. The basis

FRA has used in establishing and assigning

levels of effort to the five inspection programs is

not apparent. As of 1977, inspection resource

allocation did not coincide with the accident

patterns in the United States. FRA has recently

reviewed existing regulations and is currently

proposing changes. The extent to which these

regulatory changes will alter the inspection

process in the United States is not yet known. In

the United States, the Government has a shared

Federal/State inspection program. This contrasts with Canada where interprovincial

railroads are under the sole jurisdiction of the

central Government.

In both countries, transportation of dangerous commodities by rail has become an

increased concern for the Governments and

the railroads. The approaches taken in each

country to dangerous commodity transportation is largely the same, with the exception of the use of emergency information

forms in Canada.

In the early 1970’s, dangerous commodity

shipments became a heightened concern in the

United States and Canada. In both countries,

the increased concern was prompted by several

major accidents and increases in hazardous

materials shipments. Risks brought about by

dangerous commodity transportation in Canada have been addressed by: a) adoption of U.S.

tank car standards, b) development of a Hazardous Information Emergency Response

(HIER) form that accompanies each shipment of

dangerous commodities, and c) voluntary industry actions. These same types of programs

have been undertaken in the United States with

the single exception of the use of the HIER

forms. In addition, both countries have almost

identical hazardous materials regulations. The

Canadians adopted the recent U.S. tank car

standards requiring head shields and shelf

couplers although the timetable for implementing the standards will be slower and retrofitting

will be voluntary in Canada.

Canada requires the HIER forms to accompany all tank car shipments carrying dangerous

commodities from origin to destination. The
14 ● Railroad Safety— U.S.-Canadian Comparison

form contains the name of the commodity, the

danger classification of the commodity (i.e., explosive, gas, etc.), potential hazards, and immediate action information. The purpose of the

form is to aid people in response procedures in

case of an accident. Use of the form was made

mandatory by RTC.

In the United States, there is no specific

equivalent to the Canadian HIER form, although some information is required on the

waybill. Some U.S. railroads have more extensive response procedures for dangerous commodities than others. A committee of the Association of American Railroads is currently

studying the Canadian system, although no

conclusions have been reached regarding its

adoption. The major objection voiced by some

U.S. railroads to the form is that it increases the

paperwork carried for freight shipments at a

time when the railroads themselves are trying to

move to more automated systems.

Grade-crossing safety is the most serious

rail-related safety problem in both Canada

and the United States. While primary authority for grade-crossing improvements

rests with the central Governments in both

countries, the Canadian Government appears to have broader powers and more detailed controls over grade crossings than in

the United States. In contrast, in the United

States, major funding authority for grade

crossings, though vested at the Federal

level, is split administratively among a

number of different entities and basically

administered by the States.

The Railway Transport Committee within

CTC has jurisdiction for grade-crossing safety

improvement programs. In contrast, the U.S.

Federal Highway Administration has primary

jurisdiction at the Federal level for gradecrossing improvement programs.

Today, Canada has detailed information on

over 34,000 public crossing sites. The Canadian

Government attempts to match the grade crossing with the most appropriate and cost-effective

warning device. Onsite investigations of the

crossing are one method used by RTC to determine the relative risks of the site. Further, RTC

is developing a model they hope to use to set

priorities among crossing sites requested by the

road authorities (Federal, provincial, and municipal) to receive funding. The Canadian

Government has broader powers and exercises

more detailed controls than the United States

over grade crossings. Canada and the United

States both have problems with grade-crossing

program administration.

There are fewer public crossing sites in

Canada than in the United States. Canada has

34,000 and the United States had 219,000 public

sites. Predominant jurisdiction for funding of

crossing projects falls under Federal Government jurisdiction in both countries. The U.S.

Federal Highway Administration has major

funding authority for grade-crowing improvement. It allocates funds to the States on a formula basis. The States subsequently distribute

crossing projects funds among localities. As a

result, in the United States, priority determination, and the matching of crossing sites with the

appropriate warning device, occurs at the local

level, which does not, in turn, control the formula allocations of funds. Hence the complexity of the U.S. system and the divided jurisdictions have so far worked against a more systematic approach for addressing the most serious

safety problems.

While in Canada the RTC provides funds for

grade-crossing protection, it usually relies on

the road authority or local municipalities to apply for funding. When this system does not

work, RTC can order protection to be provided.

A growing problem in Canada is that maintenance costs for crossing protection are escalating so rapidly that road authorities who are

responsible for maintenance are becoming less

inclined to pursue protection funding.

Canadian railroads maintain a philosophy

that ties safety closely to economic and

operational efficiency. Canadian railroads

place a high priority on maintaining and

upgrading track.

Both Canadian railroads consider safety an

integral part of all their operations. This consideration is also voiced by the I-J. S. railroads.

The increased concern for safety among the Ca-
Photo CP Rail

Photo CN Rail

School Days— Both Canadian National and Canadian

Pacific conduct regular training and refresher

courses for employees utilizing the latest teaching

techniques. CN operates their training center at

Gimli, Manitoba; CP operates their training centers

across their rail system.

nadian railroads dates to about 1974 after the

Government safety inquiry. Since that time

both CP and CN have increased existing safety

activities and initiated a number of new programs. Among these activities are: the emphasis

on supervisor accountability for safety, yearly

safety targets, and increased and improved

training. Progress is discussed at the board of

directors meeting for both railroads. In addition, the railroads serve on the RTC Railway

Safety Advisory Committee. The reasons for

the railroads’ safety philosophy include: the desire to protect human and physical resources,

the economic costs of accidents and casualties,

and the wish to forestall any greater Government involvement in their activities.

The Canadian railroads consider the conditions of the track, particularly the mainline, of

paramount importance to their efficient operation. The Canadian railroads recognized the implications of increased maintenance costs resulting from increased weight of freight equipment.

CN conducted research to determine rail replacement costs and maintenance costs resulting

from increased axle loadings. The results of that

research were a significant factor in the decision

to use concrete ties, heavier rail, and deeper

ballast. Similarly, the CP management increased capital spending for track upgrading

and replacement when it recognized the effects

Photo CN Rail

CN utilizes concrete ties as shown in this photo

based on research on increased axle loadings.
16 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

of 100-ton freight cars and the six-axle diesel

electric locomotive on the roadbed. Canadian

management indicates that track maintenance is

a high priority in terms of allocations of resources. However, sufficient data was not available to adequately determine the extent to which

this priority is supported by financial commitments. While rail officials in Canada indicate

that track should be maintained to the highest

level, the line profitability, traffic density, and

other factors are among the considerations

given to assigning limited financial resources to

track maintenance and replacement programs.

In both the United States and Canada, track

standards and safety, line profitability, deferred

maintenance, and common carrier obligations

of the railroads are issues of concern and discussion among the railroads, labor, and Government.

In the United States, track deterioration,

resulting from deferred maintenance and heavier axle loading on freight equipment, has

caused increased Government concern. The extent to which track conditions cause significant

safety problems among U.S. railroads appears

to be related to the financial health of a given

carrier, management philosophy toward track

maintenance, track lifecycle, and available

capital.

I

I

I

In both countries, rail labor representatives

participate in the safety regulatory process.

As a matter of policy, Labour Canada consults widely with labor representatives as it formulates workplace safety regulations. CTC,

after the safety inquiry of 1971, included labor

representatives in the tripartite forum of the

Railway Safety Advisory Committee. Although

CTC has not promulgated safety regulations for

. working conditions of the railroad employees

under its jurisdiction, it formally consults with

labor representatives on any matter that relates

to safety regulation.

In the United States, railroad labor participates in a number of executive and legislative

branch hearings and deliberation. Though no

formal safety advisory committee exists in the

U.S. structure, safety advisory committees are

appointed for a number of functions undertaken

by executive branch agencies. Generally both

labor and management participate in the functions. Cooperation between labor, management, and Government entities in the United

States for improving safety is increasing.

However, additional cooperation is needed if

further inroads into safety problems are to be

achieved.
Chapter II

CANADIAN RAILROAD SYSTEM
Chapter II

CANADIAN RAILROAD SYSTEM

A common assumption about the railroad

systems in the United States and Canada is that

they are directly comparable. Similarities in

operational purpose, close geographic proximity, and commonality of technological systems

imply that comparability. This chapter explores

the validity of this assumption. It establishes a

framework for the Canadian railroad system

from which specific Canadian safety policies

and programs are examined for their application

to the United States.

The following sections describe: Canadian

resources and demography; an outline history

of the railroad system; and specific physical,

operational, and economic characteristics of the

system. The final section of this chapter summarizes the major relevant similarities and differences between the Canadian and U.S. rail

systems.

BACKGROUND

Canada’s population, geography, climate,

and resources have played a significant role in

the evolution of its transportation system.

These characteristics, Government policies, and

other transportation technologies continue to

heavily influence the rail system.

Canada’s land mass covers approximately

3,851,809 square miles.1 Its varied terrain includes vast prairies, agricultural and forest

lands, the rugged areas of the Laurentian Shield,

the mountainous regions of the West, and the

subarctic and arctic regions in the North. Its

winter climate is more severe than many regions

of the United States.

Canada’s population is approximately 23 million, of which the majority (58 percent) live between the U.S. border and a 650-mile east-west

line from Sault Ste. Marie to Quebec City. Only

one-third of Canada’s land mass is developed.

One-third of Canada’s population lives in its

eight largest cities, with Montreal and Toronto

being the two largest metropolitan areas.2

Canada’s railroads have been linked historically with the population settlement patterns

and development of natural resources. The following briefly describes the history of the Canadian rail system.

‘Ibid. p. ~.

HISTORY

Canada’s railroad system began in the 1830’s Construction of the railroads connecting

when the lines established served primarily as British Columbia and the Maritime Provinces to

portage roads. Substantial railroad construction Montreal, was essential to the political union of

did not begin until the 1850’s with the develop- Canada in the British North America Act of

ment of the Grand Trunk. 1867. The Intercolonial Railway was completed

19
20 . Railroad Safety U.S.-Canadian Comparison

in 1876 and the first transcontinental railway,

the Canadian Pacific (CP), was completed in

1885. 3

The first transcontinental railroad, although

perceived as a public enterprise, was initiated

and built by private enterprise with substantial

Government assistance. Its development was

significant to the confederation, in part because

of the potential expansionist policies of the

United States at the time.’ An agreement between the Canadian Government with CP for

the construction and operation of the system included: a cash subsidy of $25 million, a land

grant of 25 million acres, and valuable tax and

customs concessions.5

The railroads were perceived as tools of

Canada’s development. Early Government initiatives as well as the British North America Act

established the central Government’s jurisdiction, rather than provincial jurisdiction, for rail

and water transportation services. In addition

to being significant to the political union of

Canada, the railroads were essential to its economic development. CP was a primary instrument of Government policy in settling the West

and developing Canada’s agricultural resources.

Similarly the railroads were critical to the

development of ports in the Maritime Provinces.

In 1897 the Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement (sec.

271, Railway Act) was signed. It established

rates for shipment of grain moved by CP to certain ports. This rate stipulation was later expanded and applied to other rail operations including those of Canadian National. The

Crow’s Nest Pass requirements remain in effect

today. Grain shipment rates are the only area in

which Canadian rail rates have not been deregulated.

In addition to the transcontinental CP, two

other lines connecting the western with eastern

mainlines were established by 1915, the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific.

The addition of these two lines resulted in signif-

‘“An Interim Report ~~n Freight Transportation in Canada”

(Transport Canada, June 1975), p, 1.

“W. K. Lamb, Hisforv of tl)c CaIIUdILJt~ Paci/ic Railuw~ (Ne w

York, N. Y.: McMillian Publishing Co., Inc., ]977), pp. 73-74.

‘Ibid., pp. 73-74.

icant financial overinvestment in terms of

physical plant necessary for a country of 8

million people. b Too much line had been built

for the amount of rail traffic available at the

time.

As a result of the overinvestment in rail plant,

the railroads, with the exception of CP, faced

serious problems. In 1917, the Canadian Government appointed a royal commission to investigate the problems. By 1923, a number of

railroads were consolidated to form the Canadian National (CN) Railways, a crown corporation with a Government-appointed board. The

consolidation into a Government entity represented the integration of three private bankrupt

railroads, four Government-owned systems, or

149 separate companies with 251 different

security issues. 7

At the outset, CN confronted significant, if

not overwhelming, problems. Included among

its problems were:

●

●

●

●

●

●

an inherited debt of $1,3 [1,448,713 ( in

1922 its operating expenses were $231.2

million and its gross revenues were $234.1

million);

an unnecessary duplication of line;

deferred maintenance;

nonstandard gauge track in areas of the

system;

fierce competition with CP which had initially offered to run the system; and

political interference.8

Subsequent to the initial incorporation of

CN, debts amounting to over $3 billion were

backed or removed by the Canadian Government in 1936-37, 1951-52, and in 1977. In addition a balance of other ongoing subsidies have

been met by the Government at various intervals. The 1977 Capital Revision Act removed

substantial accumulated debts (approximately

$2 billion) of CN. This Act placed CN in a

““An Interim Report on Freight Transp{~rtat on in Canada, ” op.

cit., p. 2.

‘Robert F. Leggett, Rai/roads of CatIadU (New York, N. Y.:

Drake Publishers, 1973), p. 134.

“Leggett, op. cit., pp. 134-13s; and C. R. Stevens, History o}t)~c

Cat~adian Natiot~a/ Railway (New York, N. Y.: McMillian

Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 313-3]5.
Ch. II Canadian Railroad System ● 2 1

significantly more favorable financial position. g

In 1978, CN achieved $168 million in profits.

Between its genesis and the present, CN as a

crown corporation diversified its operations. It

controls several U.S. rail lines (Central Vermont; Grand Trunk Western; Duluth, Winnepeg, and Pacific), trucking lines, hotels, and

other enterprises. Its air carrier operation

became a separate crown corporation in the

1960’s.

The Canadian Pacific Railroad, as a result of

its vast landholdings and financial management,

expanded and evolved into a highly diversified

corporation known today as Canadian Pacific

Limited. In the mid-1960’s, the Canadian Pacific

Railroad changed its name to Canadian Pacific

Limited because the previous name did not reflect its many interests. Today CP Rail is one

enterprise within CP Limited. As a conglomerate its current assets are approximately $5 billion. 10 Its enterprises include rail operations, air

carriers, trucking, shipping, hotels, mining, real

estate, forestry, telecommunications, and other

investment holdings. CP Rail operations represented 22 percent of CP Limited’s revenues in

1977.11

The transportation services of both CN and

CP are not restricted to rail mode. They are

multimodal transportation companies. The fact

that rail companies operate trucking enterprises,

however, has not prevented some erosion of

rail’s share of freight. Further, passenger rail

service has eroded with competition provided

by automobile technologies. Multimodal ownership does appear to influence the management

structure and operation by providing the companies increased system flexibility to respond to

new or available markets. The extent to which

the companies use their flexibility is unknown.

Current managements claim to maintain a competitive philosophy between the modes.

‘Ctt}lUL~U Guzettc vol. 3, no. 6, pt. III, 26-27, Elizabeth 11, ch.

34, Canadian National Railways Capital Revision Act.

IoCanadian pacific publication supplied by E. Bradley, Director

of Rules, Accidents, and Prevention, Canadian Pacific Railroad.

I 1A ~l)ll~a~ R@p(3rt, 1977 (Canadian Pacific Limited).

CANADIAN RAIL SYSTEM PHYSICAL PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

The Canadian National and the Canadian Pacific Railroads comprise the majority of the

Canadian rail system. In 1975, these railroads

controlled approximately 94 percent of the

43,000 miles of mainline track.12 As indicated in

table 12, most mainline track was in place by

the late-1920’s.13 In 1976, CP operated about

16,400 miles14 of mainline and branchlike track

and accounted for 38 percent of the total Canadian trackage. CN has approximately 25,000

miles of mainline and branchlike track and represents 56 percent of Canada’s system.

Several other Canadian railroads operate as

regional systems. These companies control the

remaining 6 percent of Canada’s rail trackage.

Included among these companies are: the British

Columbia Railway, which operates from North

“~[l?~[~cf(? Yearbook. 1976-77, op. ~it., p. 760.

‘ ‘Ibid, p. 760.

14Data furnished by Canadian Pacific Rail, Sept. 29, 1978.

Table 12.—Railway Trackage*

Year Total miles in operation*

1900 ... . . . ., 17,657

1910 . . . . . . . . . . 24,731

1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,805

1925 ., ., 40,350

1930 ... ., . . . . : : : : : : : 42,047

1935 . . . . ... . . . . . ., 42,916

1940 . ... . . . . . . . . . ., 42,565

1945 . . ... . . . ... 42,352

1950 ., ., . . . . . ... ., 43,979

1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... 44,444

1960 ., . . ., . . . . . ., ., 43,029

1965 ., ... ., ., ... ., 45,157

1970 ., . . . ., 44,983

1971 . . . . . ... . . . 44,153

1972 ., ., ... . . . ... . . . . . 44,025

1973 ., . . . . . . . ... 44,232

1974 . . . . . . . ., . . . . . ., 44,260

1975 . . . . ... ., ., . . . . . . . . . 43,941

“Malnllne track–defined as s!ngle track extending the ermre d!stance between terminals on

which the length of road IS based

NOTE From 1971101975 Canada averaged 16000 miles of frack of her than malnhne

SOURCE Canada Yearbook, 197677
22 ● Railroad Safety-U.S. -Canadian Comparison
Photo CP Rail

Sorting —CP Rail’s Alyth Yard in Calgary, Alta., is one of the most modern in Canada. Located on the

railway’s mainline, the yard contains sorting and hump yards, maintenance facilities for cars and

locomotives, and repair facilities.

Table 13.—Locomotive Equipment creased from 5,000 in 1960 to 14,700 in 1975, an

increase of 194 percent. This increase is one

Year ‘Stea m Diesel-electrlc Electric Total clear indicator of an increase in the amount of

1960 403- – 3,308 41 3,752 hazardous commodities shipped by rail i n

1970 3,399 18 3,417

1971 3,449 14 3,463 Canada, although not all tank cars are used t o

972 3,598 14 3,612 ship dangerous commodities.

1973 3748 14 3,762

1974 3870 16 3,884 Canadian rail officials indicated that the

1975 3963 16 3.877 Canadian fleet evolved to heavier axle loadings ———.———

SOURCE Canada Yearbooks. on freight equipment (100-ton cars) by the late1960’s.-’” Today the average freight car capacity ownership. The number of Canadian rail- in Canada is 64.6 tons.

owned freight equipment remained a relatively

constant size between 1960 and 1975. As the ‘f lntc’rll(>~t \ ~i I t h (’.~n,]({i.]n h’,] t I(Jn.) I .ln~i C ,] n.ldl,]n J“lc it [C I<<i 11 -

table also indicates, the number of tank cars in- r(~,l[]~ (1 t 10-1 1 1 ’178
24 ● Railroad Safety—U. S. -Canadian Comparison

In addition to the evolution of the freight roads in 1977 was over 107,000. As in the

equipment fleet, the decline in number of pas- United States, employment has dropped over

senger service cars indicated in table 14, demon- the last two decades .17

strates the declining rail passenger market.

The average employment for Canadian rail- ‘ ‘Letter, Canadian Railway Lab{~ur Ass[}c atic~n.

Table 14.—Freight Rolling Stock

Type 1960 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Auto ., . ., 7,249 2,178 2,280 2,607 2,579 2,617 2,776

Ballast . ... ., 3,128 2,639 2,408 2,383 2,363 2,296 2,199

Box. ... ., 111,217 101,746 99,904 97,162 95,239 95.538 92,669

Flat. .. . 12,645 18,043 19,738 20,414 22,010 24,898 25,733

Gondola. : : : : : : : : 20,310 20,975 20,354 20,450 20,464 20,414 21,370

Hopper ... . . . . . 15,578 24,496 25,175 25,539 26,464 27,398 29,287

Ore. . . . . . . . 5,930 6,735 6,819 7,241 7,371 7,151 7,731

Refrigerator, ., ., ., 10,076 6,673 5,403 5,292 4,955 4,772 5,016

Stoc k 4,917 2,827 2,687 2,583 2,503 2,463 2,359

Tank, ., ., ... 472 487 468 474 484 494 379

Other . . 31 1,938 2,080 2,320 2,320 2,851 3,689

Total . . . 191,553 188,737 187,316 186,465 186,752 190,892 193,208

Tank, ., ., . . 4,999 14,957 14,207 14,296 14,324 14,426 14,699

Other . . . . 32 1,254 1,353 3,778 3,384 4,504 7,301

Total . . . . . . . 5,031 16,211 15,560 18,074 17,705 18,930 22,000

Passenger car s 5,119 2,801 2,516 2,383 2,175 2,056 1,936

SOURCE Canada Yearbooks, /970-75

RAILROAD FINANCIAL PICTURE

Agricultural, forestry, and mineral resources

are among the most important natural resources

in Canada and represent a significant part of rail

freight tonnage. Historically rail, as a shipper of

bulk commodities, has been important to the

political and economic well-being of Canada.

While rail was once the only freight transporta- ‘

tion mode, trucking became a dominant transportation growth area and carrier of nonbulk

commodities. However, in ton miles in Canada,

rail has remained the dominant carrier with 55

percent of all intercity freight. Table 15 shows

the modal split of the freight transport market

between 1944 and 1968. Table 16 shows the split

among commodities carried in 1969 and 1974.

As indicated by the first table, though still

dominant, rail’s share of the freight market declined from 1944 to 1968 by 20 percent. Truck

and water transportation increased by 10 percent during that time period. As shown by the

types of commodities in the second table, a large

percentage of current rail freight is bulk commodities. 18

Of 397.4 million tons of freight carried by rail

and truck in 1972, rail accounted for 57 percent

of the tons shipped. However, of the $4.26 billion in gross revenues earned by the two modes,

truck claimed 52 percent of the revenues or

$2.23 billion. ” This combination of factors indicates the growth of trucking (competition for

higher valued nonbulk freight in Canada. Rail

depends heavily on bulk raw materials transport. However, it faces great competition

from trucking for the transport of manufactured

goods. 20 As Canada increases production of

‘ST. D. Heaver and ]. C. Nel\t~n, R(?//i~~[7i/ Prlci)t,q UII(I(JI C“(II)I-

)tIct cIt// Frmf(>ItI: T/IP C’(JtIL7t/If?II E.1) wrict~rc Un iversi t}’ (~t 13ritlsh

Ct~lumbia, 1977), p. 24.

1“Ibid., p. 23.

“’ibid,, p, 23.
Table 15.—lntercity Freight by Mode of

Transportation in Canada (excluding pipelines),

1944-68

(billions of ton miles and percent of total by each mode)

Year

1944 .

194 8

1952

1956

1960

1961

1962

196 3

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Rail

“on-miles

‘

-

65 93-’

5908

6843

7883

6545

6583

6794

7580

8503

871 9

9510

9410

9686

Percen t

7 4

6 8

63

61

56

54

53

53

52

53

53

55

55

. . —

Road I Water

[on-males

2 6 7

5 1 9

8 9 0

1061

1384

1610

1658

1670

1747

1820

1895

1954

21 13

Percent

3

5

8

8

12

13

13

12

11

11

11

11

12

Ton-miles

2031

2320

308 7

3941

3687

3938

4295

5012

5919

5782

6441

5715

5811

Percent

23

27

29

31

32

33

34

35

37

36

36

34

33

SOURCE Calculated from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics Special Release April 1969

Table 16.—Commodities Accounting for

More Than 2 Percent of Rail Ton-Miles

in 1969 and 1974 in Canada

1974 ton-miles 1969 ton-miles

Rank in

Commodity 1974 Millions Percent Millions Percent

Wheat 1 1245 1 3 6 9 2 6 144

Bituminous coal 2 9 7 8 1 0 7 425 66

Potash 3 572 63 361 56

Sulfur 4 5 1 9 5.7 14.8 23

Barley 5 344 38 2 6 7 4.2

TOFC 6 33.3 36 247 38

Lumber 7 247 27 19.2 30

Freight forwarder and

shipper associations 8 21 2 23 123 19

COFC 9 186 20 02 ––

Total of commodities above 4636 507 269 1 41 8

Total of all rail traffic 9155 1 0 0 6436 10 0

SOURCE Canadian Transport Commission Waybill And/y s/s 1974 and 1969

.

manufactured goods and nonbulk freight, his -

torical trends indicate that truck competition

with rail will also increase. Trucking regulation

has historically been the jurisdiction of the

provinces. Although the 1967 National Transportation Act gave some power to the central

Government, the power has never been implemented so that jurisdiction is still exercised at

the provincial level.

The declining number of passenger cars (cited

in table 14) in the Canadian rail equipment fleet

indicates a decline in rail passenger traffic. As in

the United States, the rapid growth of the automobile and air passenger services were two

dominant factors leading to the decline of rail

passenger service. In October 1978, Transport

Canada officially assumed full control and management of rail passenger services in Canada. A

crown corporation called VIA Rail Canada Limited, purportedly similar to AMTRAK in the

United States, has been established to provide

rail passenger services. VIA Rail is responsible

for the operation of all long-distance and intercity passenger services in Canada. It owns all

passenger equipment and is completely responsible for the management and marketing of rail

passenger services. VIA Rail trains run on CN

and CP track on a leased basis.

From the annual reports and other available

financial data, CP has shown steady growth in

net income for the .5-year period 1973-77, with

the exception of 1975, a recession year. Table 17

displays CP financial data. In 1975, CP Rail had

a rate of return on net investment of 4.9 percent,

compared to 6.3 percent in 1976 and 6.7 percent

in 1977. Of total CP Rail revenues for 1977,

Government subsidies for unprofitable branchlines and passenger services represented 8 percent. 2

1

In 1977, 15.7 percent or $193 million of CP

Rail’s operating expenses was spent on track and

facilities maintenance compared to $108. 6

million or 14.4 percent for 1973 as shown in

table 18. For CP, expenditures for track maintenance adjusted for inflation* increased approximately 25 percent over the 1973-77 time

period. CP spent approximately $259 million on

equipment maintenance in 1977 compared to

$158.2 in 1973, an increase of 15 percent in

operating expenses. When viewed in constant

dollars, total maintenance expenditures increased by 19 percent between 1973 and 1977

for CP. The ratio of track maintenance expenditures v. equipment maintenance expenditures

remained constant over the time period.

Capital expenditures of CP for- roadway increased steadily from 1973 to 1977, with the exception of 1975. Table 19 shows the CP capital

expenditures for the 1973-77 period. By 1977,

: ‘,,1 }7/1~((// I{(TIJ(lI ~ ((’clnclcilcln I’.]( ]1 ic [{<111 puhllcc]tlt~n> %p( 2Q,

1 o~~ )

‘ C ,ln.lcilanC(ln\umt’r I’rlc t 1 n(lc,x
Table 17.—Canadian Pacific Rail Financial Fact Sheet

CPR net income Total CP Iimited

Year (in millions) net income Percent rail Year Rate of return CPR

1973 “35 2 –

125 28 1975 , 4.9

1974 4 4 6 194 23 1976 , 6 3

197 5 31 7 175 18 1977 . 6 7

1976 51 1 190 27

197 7 548 247 22

CPR operating Revenue distribution

expenses including CPR operating

Year tax revenues 1975 1976 1977

1975 990,26 2 1,021,953 Freigh t 887,666 1,006,624 1,112,094

1976 1,111,849 1,162,946 Passenger. ., 21,497 21,708 21,541

1977 1,231,600 1,286,392 Other railway 26,188 29,862 35,878

Coastal steamships 16,486 16,690 14,763

Gov’t. subsidy 70,116 88.062 102,111

1,021,953 1.162,946 1,286,387

SOURCE Canadian Pacific annual reports.

Table 18.— Maintenance Expenditures for the Canadian Pacific Railroad, 1973.77

(dollars in thousands)

Percent of total Percent of total

Year Road operating expense Equipment operating expense Total

197 3 $108,600 14.4 $158,200 21.0 $266,800

197 4 130,100 141 188,500 20.5 318,600

(in 1973 constant $). (117,300) (170,000) (287,300)

1975 141.700 1 4 3 195,300 19.5 337,000

(in 1973 constant $) (1 15,300) (158,900) (274,200)

1976 167,600 15.3 216,800 19.5 386.400

(in 1973 constant’ $). (1 26,900) (164.100) (292,500)

197 7 1 5 7 258,900 2 1 0 452,000

(in 1973 constant $) : (135,300) (181 ,400) (316,700)

Percent increase in 1973

constant $ from 1973-77 + 24.6 + 147 + 18.7

Percent of total

operating expense

3 5 4

34.6

34.0

3 4 8

36.7

SOURCE Canadian Pacific Rail general publication

Table 19.–Capital Expenditures for the Canadian Pacific Railway, 1973-77

(dollars in thousands)

Rolling Percent Diesel Percent Percent Maintenance Percent

Year stock of total units of total Road* of total shops of total Total

197 3 $7,97 3

197 4 17,592

(1973 $) (15,900)

197 5 30,441

(1973 $) (24,700)

197 6 31,199

(1973 $) (23,600)

197 7 13,130

(1973 $). ( 9,200)

Percent Increase

( + ) or decrease

( - ) in 1973 $

from 1973 -77 + 15

13 $23,476

24 19,139

(1 7,200)

32 24,509

(19,900)

32 12.145

( 9,200)

13 16,134

(11,300)

- 5 2

39 $25,362

26 34,457

(31,100)

26 36,184

(29,400)

13 48,450

(36,700)

16 61,406

(43,000)

+ 70.0

43 $2,68 2

47 2,204

( )

39 2,556

( 2,100)

50 4,955

( 3,800)

61 10,771

( 7,500)

+ 180

5 $59$793

3 73,392

(66, 179)

3 93,690

(76,233)

5 96,749

(73,239)

10 101,441

(71 ,087)

+ 18.9

“Includes rail hes ballast and road maintenance machines

SOURCE Canadian Pacdlc Rallgeneral publlcaflon
CP’s capital expenditures for track accounted

for roughly 60 percent of its total capital

expenditures budget. Rolling stock accounted

for 30 percent (rolling stock and diesel units

combined). According to CP officials, the shift

in capital expenditures for track “was a conscious management decision in response to a

perceived need. The introduction of the 100-ton

nominal capacity freight car and the six-axle

diesel electric locomotive led to the realization

that the existing track structure was simply not

strong enough. "

22 The capital expenditures budget for CP from 1973 to 1977 increased by 18.9

percent when measured in constant dollars .23

In the aggregate, the U.S. railroads ratio of

capital expenditures for track v. equipment for

the 1973-77 period was roughly 30 percent for

track and 70 percent for equipment as shown in

table 20. In comparing the U.S. aggregate with

the CP data, the difference in ratios of capital

expenditures for track v. equipment may have

several possible explanations: a difference in the

‘l<t~’)(~~ c ~~nln~tn ts lc>t tt>r {~n prt’l]nl]n,]rt’tlr,]t t (~t (IT A: RI/~)-

) , ){ ?C / sL/ f[, / u ,4 L] s ( ‘[1 )j[l[ /1[/ )1 (-, ))) I ~ ~~1 I I ● , I I I r[~c (,I I,(K] t rorn ( h,l r-1(+

J’IA(’, C’hIt’l >1(’< h,]nl( J] Otttc(r ( ,ln.~{11.in J’J{ itlc I-?a Il, J,]n. 2.3,

] c)~cl

‘‘I)dt<) turn] ~hcxl III [’<]nclcl]c~n1’.1( lt]c 1<<]11, St’pt 2Q 1 Q78

Table 20.—Capital Expenditures— U.S.

Class I Carriers

(dollars in thousands)

Year

1973

1974

(1973 $)

1975

(1973 $ )

197 6

(1973 $)

1977

(1973 $)

Percent Increase

in 1973 $ from

1973-77

Equipment

$ 892,700

1,038,100

(935.200

1,303300

( 1,076,200

1,174,800

(917, 100

1,540300

(1, 128,400

+ 26

Percent

of total

67 

66

73

68

67

I I

+ 22 + 25 1

availability of capital for railroads in the two

countries, differences in management philosophy, a difference in industry accounting mechanisms, and Government tax structures. According to rail officials “Canadian corporate income tax laws tend to lead to economic evaluation which, as a whole, strongly favors rebuild (maintenance) as opposed to renewal

(capital ) particular] y for equipment. “24

‘”1 (t tt’r t r(~nl C’ll<l 1-1(’< I’lkt’ (~[~ L It I.in 23 I Q7Q

COMPARISON BETWEEN U. S.= CANADIAN RAIL SYSTEMS

Several comparisons can be made between

U.S. and Canadian railroad systems. These

comparisons may influence safety directly or indirectly.

a. As a result of the severe Canadian winter,

Canadian rails may require somewhat different

maintenance procedures and practices than required by many U.S. carriers. It appears that

Canadian climate does influence the number of

accidents and may also adversely affect employees working in this environment.

b. Due to the considerably smaller Canadian

population, and fewer miles of rail, there is

statistically less exposure of the Canadian

population to rail safety hazards (dangerous

commodities, hazards, etc. ). In size, the Canadian mainline rail trackage is 43,000 miles compared to 200,000 in the United States. Canada’s

population is 23 million whereas the U.S. population is 220 million people. The general ratio of

population to rail trackage is 535 people to 1

mile of track in Canada, compared to 1,075 people to 1 mile of track in the United States. This

comparison should be considered only in a

general context as population density and traffic

volume are two variables necessary to determine specific exposure rates.

c. Because of the smaller population base, and

the fewer and smaller urban areas, Canada may

be expected to have a less severe “trespassing”

safety problem than that potentially associated

with congested urban areas in the United States.

One-third of Canada’s population is located in

eight large cities. Of these cities Montreal and
28 . Railroad Safety— U. S.- Canadian Comparison

Toronto are the largest, with populations of

1,214,352 and 712,786 respectively as of 1971. It

is assumed that a majority of trespasser fatalities occur near populated areas. No data or correlations have been made to determine this

assumption.

d. The existence of only two major rail carriers in Canada may have facilitated Government and railroad formulation of operational and other policies. A specific example of

this is the Uniform Code of Operating Rules,

which has been a Government standard for all

railroads in Canada since 1958.

e. In 1976, the United States had approximately 56 class I carriers that accounted for 99

percent of the revenue traffic and 96 percent of

rail mileage. Of the 56 carriers, approximately

10 accounted for 80 percent of the operating revenues. 25 In contrast, Canada has only two major

rail carriers, CN and CP. These railroads account for 94 percent of Canada’s rail trackage

and 90 percent of its revenue traffic.

f. The transcontinental nature of the Canadian system may allow its rail managements

greater flexibility in freight traffic control and

also in scheduled maintenance and repair of

freight equipment.

g. Canada, like the United States, introduced

diesel locomotives which subsequently allowed

for increases in the size and capacity of freight

cars. Increased productivity resulted, However,

these factors appear to also increase track wear

““A Prospectus for Change in the Freight Railroad Industry, ”

October 1978, A Preliminary Report, U.S. Department of Transportation.

and may influence safety. Railroad maintenance

procedures could offset the impact of increased

track wear.

h. From limited data, CP appears to be increasing capital expenditures in track and facilities more significantly than increases in its expenditures for equipment. In contrast, while aggregate U.S. expenditures (in constant dollars)

for track have increased 22 percent, the percentage ratio of total capital expenditures for track

v. equipment is remaining the same. These

ratio’s appear to have occurred for several reasons: 1) the Canadian railroad may have available more cash for track investment; 2) in Canada, though the average capacity per freight car

has not increased as much as in the United

States, the effect of changes in technology were

recognized and the pace of mainline plant replacement and upkeep was considered significant to the overall operation; 3) Canadian plant

lifecycle was such that replacements may have

been needed; and 4) tax structures and other

financial incentives were different in Canada

than in the United States.

i. As in the United States, the introduction of

the automobile and increase in its usage brought

greater exposure to rail-highway grade-crossing

risks. Similarly the rise in auto and air transportation led to the decline in rail passenger traffic,

a factor that naturally reduced the number of

people exposed to rail-related hazards.

j. Both countries are experiencing increases in

rail transportation of dangerous commodities.

This results in an increased exposure level of

both populations to the potential hazards of

these commodities.
Chapter Ill

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND

RAIL SAFETY
Chapter Ill

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND RAIL SAFETY

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

Comparison between the U.S. and Canada’s

rail safety legal and regulatory provisions can

only be made with some recognition of the major differences between the two countries’

Government institutions. Primary among these

differences is that Canada has a parliamentary

system of government in which the legislative

and executive functions overlap. The United

States has complete separation of the executive

and legislative branches. Canada’s form of

government has evolved over many years from

the English constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system. Canada, however, has also

drawn from the American system as a separate

government model. While Canada does not

have a formal “constitution,” it does have a

series of laws and customs that make up the

Canadian “constitution,” which is primarily embodied in the British North America Act of

1867.

The executive branch of the Canadian Government has “formal” and “political” institutions. The former is composed of the Crown,

the Governor General (formerly the Crown’s

representative in Canada), and the Governor

General presiding over his advisors in the Privy

Council. The latter is the Cabinet, being the

heads of Canadian ministries or departments

and certain other senior advisors to the Prime

Minister. It is headed by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister, the political head of the

Government, is the chosen leader of the majority political party and is always a member of the

House of Commons, one of Canada’s two legislative bodies. He selects each of his Cabinet

members or ministers from members of the majority party in the House of Commons. Cabinet

ministers retain their elected posts in the House

of Commons. The functions of the Cabinet are

to: 1) establish Government policy and influence Parliament to legislate that policy, 2) coordinate the various Government departments,

and 3) supervise the administration of policy as

legislated by the Parliament. It is this merging of

legislative and executive functions in the Cabinet that is one of the major differences between

Canadian and U.S. Government structures.

The ministries of Canada are much like the

executive departments of the United States.

They are headed by a Minister (in the United

States, by a Secretary) and are staffed primarily

by civil servants who are not part of the political system. In addition to the Canadian Federal

agencies, there are “crown corporations” which

are organizationally independent, though generally subject to the policy guidance of a ministry.

Canada’s first crown corporation was the Canadian National Railway.

As in the United States, the legislative branch

of the Canadian Government is bicameral. The

Senate is composed of 102 members on a regional basis appointed by the Governor General on

the advice of the Prime Minister. The House of

Commons is composed of 263 members divided

among the provinces primarily on a population

basis (with one each from the Yukon and Northwest Territories). The House is by far the more

powerful of these two bodies because its members are elected and are considered to represent

the body politic. The House, which originates

all public bills, carries on its business in much

the same manner as our Congress. The Senate’s

function is to review House-enacted legislation,

handle private bills, and oversee the executive

agencies. Once a bill passes both bodies, it is

presented to the Governor General for royal assent in the Queen’s name.

The judicial branch of the Canadian Government is quite similar to the U.S. court system.

There are separate and multitiered provincial

and Federal systems, each of which has trial and

appellate divisions. However, the Province of

Quebec differs from the other provinces in that

31
32 ● Railroad Safety —U.S.-Canadian Comparison

it follows Roman or civil law concepts rather

than English common law. (The State of Louisiana in the United States is similar to Quebec in

this regard. )

The Supreme Court of Canada has nine

judges, selected on geographical and minority

group representation principles. The court hears

most cases in small panels (three members),

rather than en bane, as in the United States. At

the request of the Governor-in-Council, the Supreme Court is required to render advisory

opinions on matters of law. This procedure is

not followed in the United States.

Transportation Agencies

Canadian agencies responsible for transportation matters and railroads in particular are more”

closely allied to each other than in the United

States. The major Canadian agency is the

Transportation Ministry, called the Department

of Transport (also called Transport Canada),

whose head is a member of the Cabinet. The

Ministry is responsible for development of policy and Government programs ‘or all modes of

transportation. It provides the central link

among all of the transport agencies. Figures 1

and 2 show the relationships of Government

transport entities.

One of the agencies under the Transport

Canada umbrella is the Canadian Transport

Commission (CTC), established by the National

Transportation Act of 1967. 1 It has responsibility for economic regulation of all modes of transportation subject to Federal jurisdiction (i.e., excludes intraprovince transportation). Railroads

are the only mode for which CTC regulates both

economic and safety matters.

CTC has 17 Commissioners, including a president and two vice-presidents, who are appointed for 10-year terms. CTC is divided into

seven committees, each with specific regulatory

responsibilities. One of these committees, the

ICh. N-17, R.S. C. , 1970. .

Figure 1 .—Transport Canada

Minister f 1

Bureau of Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Telecommunications

Coordination Deputy Minister Deputy Minister and Electronics

Canadian Transport

Commission I

I I I

Strategic Systems Current Policy Programming

Planning Development and Liaison and Evaluation Air Marine* Surface Arctic

I

Personnel Finance Public Affairs Legal

“Includes St Lawrence Seaway Authority, Nahonal Harbours Board, Atlantlc Pdotage Authority, Great Lakes Pdotage Authortty, and Paclftc Pllotage Authority

SOURCE Transpofl Canada
Ch. III Government Institutions and Rail Safety • 33

Figure 2.— Relationship of Ministry “Family” to Transportation Regulation

Government

Public

Canadian Transport Ministry Central Ministry (overall coordination

Commission Executive Staff and investment)

(economic regulation,

railway safety)

Crown Corporations

(investment on vehicles,

Administrations

(safety regulation, coordination,

investment on railway terminal infrastructure)

and way)

I

Air Canada Marine

Canadian National Railways

Northern Transportation Company Ltd.

Air

SOURCE Transtport Canada

Railway Transport Committee (RTC) handles

all railroad matters. The railroad responsibilities of CTC have been exercised by similar nonpartisan commissions since the enactment of the

Railway Act in 1903.

The third Canadian entity with railroad responsibility is the Canadian National Railway

regulation,

Administrations (operational

coordination, investment Agency

(research) in ferries)

Arctic Transportation

Surface Development Agency

(CN), a crown corporation. CN is a result of the

Government takeover of certain rail operations

in 1923. Since it is owned by the Government, it

is subject to the policy guidance established for

it by the Transport Ministry. It is also subject to

the rail regulation of CTC in the same manner

as the Canadian Pacific Railway (CP).

LAWS DIRECTLY AFFECTING RAIL SAFETY

Four basic statutes affect Canadian rail safe- U.S. statute is the Occupational Safety and

ty. The oldest is the Railway Act,2 originally Health Act of 1970.

5

enacted in 1903. It prescribes most of the eco- The third law is the National Transportation nomic, safety, and other operational require- Act (NTA), enacted in 1967. It established CTC, ments. Its U.S. analog would be a combination

of part I of the Interstate Commerce Act3 and all and transferred to CTC the functions previously

of the rail safety statutes. assigned to a number of modal regulatory

boards. It also proclaims a new national transThe second of these laws is part IV of the portation policy. The law details the functions,

Canada Labour Code.’ Part IV ‘establishes the powers, duties, and procedures of CTC.

authority for workplace safety

interprovincial rail operations.

regulations for

Its counterpart The fourth law is the Railway Relocation and

Crossing Act,6 enacted in 1974. This Act goes

2Ch. R-2, R. S. C., 197o.

3

49 U.S. C. 1 et seq.

‘Ch. L-1, R. S. C., 197o.

’29 U. S .C. 651 et seq.

bCh. 12, 23 Elizabeth II.
34 . Railroad Safety—U. S.-Canadian Comparison

well beyond existing U.S. legislation on this

subject by providing: 1) financial assistance for

preparation and implementation of “urban

development and transportation plans, ” with

respect to railway relocation in urban areas, 2)

special grants for grade separations, and 3) a

continuing fund for grade-crossing safety improvement projects.

Canadian railroad casualty compensation

laws are established at the provincial level,

rather than at the Federal level. These laws are

no-fault in concept, and generally allow for full

medical treatment without time limits and major tax-free disability compensation. Provincial

compensation boards oversee payments and ensure treatment and rehabilitation adequate for

the injured employee. These provincial laws are

in significant contrast to the U.S. statute. The

Federal Employer’s Liability Act’ depends on

legal determination of negligence to establish

compensation. The Canadian compensation

plans are discussed further in chapter VIII.

The National Transportation Act

As in the United States, railroads in Canada

were initially viewed as monopolies because of

the absence of competition. They were regulated

as such. In the middle of this century, railroads

met increased competition from other modes,

which eliminated their dominant position. In

1959, a royal commission studied this change

and recommended that the Government’s regulatory approach be changed to encourage competition among and between modes. The result

was the 1967 enactment of NTA.

This law placed the regulation of all transportation modes in one entity —CTC. One of its

primary purposes is to coordinate the regulation

of all of the modes under a policy that will allow

competition to be the primary regulating force.

While the 1967 Act curbed numerous economic regulatory restrictions, some still remain.

One example is the limitation on grain tariffs

established by the Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement.

This agreement between the Government and

CP subsidized the extension of CP lines into the

interior of British Columbia in return for a fixed

rate for transportation of grain in certain areas.

In 1925, these rates became statutory and were

extended to additional parts of Canada and to

CN.

8

CTC has authority to prescribe rates in monopolistic situations (the “captive” shipper) and

to intercede when rates are prejudicial or not in

the public interest if satisfactory rates cannot be

negotiated between the railroads and shippers.

CTC has jurisdiction to hear complaints from

any interested party or to act on its own motion,

and to hear and determine all matters of law or

fact consistent with its jurisdiction. CTC can act

as a superior court by taking evidence. Having

heard or considered a matter, it can issue a final

order mandating or restricting particular action.

If a regulation, order, or decision is published in

the Canada Gazette (the Canadian equivalent to

the U.S. Federal Register) for 3 weeks, the order

has the effect of a statute. However, the Governor-in-Council may at any time vary or rescind any order, rule, or decision of CTC. The

rescinding order is binding on CTC. This power

is rarely exercised.

Within the scope of its statutory authority,

CTC can adopt regulations or orders on any

matter. It can establish penalties for violation of

any order or regulation to the extent that those

penalties are not otherwise established by statute. Moreover, CTC has jurisdiction to hear

and resolve disputes between parties concerning

any aspect of a railroad line, whether construction, maintenance, or operation, or concerning

any structure, appliance, or equipment used in

connection with a railroad. CTC can request

that the Ministry of Justice provide counsel in

matters for which it feels the public interest

needs specific representation.

NTA has two special limitations with respect

to safety matters. First, if a law requires approval of CTC before particular work can be

conducted and if the work affects the safety of

employees or the public, that approval cannot

be given without “due notice and hearing.”9

7

45 U.S. C. 51 et seq.

‘Sec. 271, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.

‘Sec. 52, ch. N-17, R. S. C., 1970.
Ch. III Government Institutions and Rail Safety ● 35

Similarly, where any work that affects the safety of the public or employees is required by

regulation, order, or decision of CTC within a

specified time, that time limit cannot be extended by CTC without “hearing or notice. ”l0

NTA grants CTC and the Ministry broad investigatory powers, It can request that any person make a report or inquiry on any matter

within its jurisdiction. Its agents may enter on

any property the agent thinks necessary for the

purpose of investigation. The agent or committee may inspect any rolling stock, or summon

witnesses, or require submission of documents,

or take oaths or otherwise act as a court in a

civil case.

The importance of this Act in the context of

rail operations is twofold. First, it substantially

revised the approach to economic regulation,

which had a particularly significant impact on

the economic condition of the railroads. By providing the railroads a greater opportunity to

compete freely, the Act may have provided

them more resources to carry out maintenance

and make improvements consistent with safe

and efficient operations. Second, it brought

together in one body a number of agencies with

transportation powers. In theory, at least, this

should enable a more coordinated approach to

the entire range of problems facing Government

and transportation industries.

In comparison to U.S. laws, NTA provides

substantially greater powers to CTC than those

provided to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) or the Interstate Commerce Commission. NTA is generally more flexible concerning the manner in which powers are exercised. For example, outside the labor law context, U.S. law does not generally provide parties

involved in a dispute on a railroad matter (e. g.,

a loss and damage claim or an interline settlement claim), a forum other than a court for resolution of such a dispute, whereas in Canada,

CTC can resolve such a dispute. Moreover,

there appear to be fewer procedural constraints

on the CTC’s ability to exercise its power such

as are provided in the United States by the Administrative Procedures Act and related laws.

l~~S~C 53, ch IN-l 7, R S C ., 1970.

As the final arbiter of facts in matters under its

jurisdiction, and having the power to determine

matters of law under the Railway Act, CTC’s

orders and regulations appear less likely to be

the subject of litigation than those of a U.S.

agency.

The Railway Act

The Railway Act, originally adopted in 1903,

is the seminal law for the information, construction, operation, and safety of Canadian railroads. It covers the CP and CN railroads with

respect to their Canadian operations and all

other railroads that cross provincial or international boundaries. Its provisions and the regulations and orders issued under them apply specifically to: 1) internal corporate matters of any

railroad incorporated under a special act of the

Parliament; 2) engineering and location of railroad lines; 3) operation of railroad equipment,

including safety matters; 4) treatment of uneconomic branch lines; 5) requirements for accommodating shipper demand for service; 6) investigation of accidents, penalties, and treatment of

damages caused by breach of the Act or rules or

orders under it; and 7) railroad accounting.

The comprehensiveness and detailed treatment of many of its subjects distinguishes the

Canadian Railway Act from any single rail

statute in the United States. Much of what appears to be treated in the Canadian Railway Act

is not the subject of Federal statute in the United

States, but rather is covered by internal railroad

rules or by interrailroad agreement such as the

rules for interchange of traffic between carriers.

The following discussion describes the contents

of designated sections of the Railway Act that

relate directly to rail safety.

Safety and Care of the Roadway ll—Some of

the provisions under this subpart of the law

reflect the early origins of the Act and the essentially rural nature of the then rail environment.

It prohibits animals from running-at-large near

a grade crossing, requires weeds to be removed,

and requires certain safeguards against roadway

fires. Violation of those provisions subjects the

1 ls~C~, 21s_z24, Ch. R-2, R. S c., 1970.
36 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

violator to relatively insignificant monetary

penalties. In the United States, these matters are

essentially left to State law.

In a broadly drawn provision (sec. 223), CTC

may direct an “inspecting engineer” to inspect

railway (the Canadian term for right-of-way)

that may be “dangerous to the public using the

railway” and can order any repairs, reconstruction, etc., that appear to CTC to be necessary or

proper. ’2 CTC can limit or prohibit the use of

railway that is subject to such an order, pending

execution of the order’s requirements. CTC can

also forbid use of rolling stock that it considers

unfit for either use or repair. An inspecting CTC

engineer may also limit or prohibit the use of

track or equipment if he finds its use would be

“dangerous.” Notice must be given to the railroad and to CTC of this action and the reasons

for it must be stated. CTC may modify or override the action of the engineer. Violation of

these orders or the notice of the inspection engineer subjects the company to a penalty of up to

$2,000 and subjects any person willfully and

knowingly aiding or abetting the violation to a

penalty of $20 or $200.

There are two provisions in U.S. law that can

be used to stop operations or equipment use.

Both are contained in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA). 13 One provision permits

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to

issue an order directing compliance with particular safety requirements established under

FRSA. Such an order can include a direction to

stop operations or equipment use until compliance is achieved. In addition, there is the power

to order track or equipment out of service upon

a determination that there is “an emergency

situation involving a hazard of death or injury

to persons affected by it. ” In the United States,

neither of these powers has been delegated to the

inspector discovering the violation. The maximum penalty for each violation of an emergency order in the United States is $2,500, but no

penalty can be assessed against an individual as

in Canada.

The Canadian statutes do not set forth specific safety requirements with respect to the

roadway, which is also the case in the United

States. As discussed in chapter VI, the United

States does have extensive regulatory requirements for track safety. Canada requires that

plans for construction, diversion, or modification of track be submitted in advance to CTC

for its review and approval, a power not established under U.S. law. Thus, CTC has far

greater control than its U.S. counterpart of the

original safety of rail lines and, one might suppose, greater knowledge of the condition of the

system’s track.

Accidents 14 —The Railway Act requires that a

railroad, immediatel y after informing its officers, give notice of any accident in which an

injury occurs to a person using the railroad or to

any railroad employee, or of any occurrence

whereby a bridge, culvert, viaduct, or tunnel is

impassable or unfit for use. Employees in charge

of a train also have the duty to notify CTC of an

accident. CTC has the power to: 1) regulate the

manner and form of accident notices and the information required, 2) conduct inquiries into

the cause of the accidents or accident situations

in general, and 3) investigate the means of

preventing accidents. Failure to give notice of an

accident may result in a penalty of $200 per day

for the. railroad, and up to $100 for a willful or

negligent failure of an employee to so report.

In the United States, the Accident Reports

Ac t

15 requires monthly (although the regulations prescribed under other authority require

immediate notification for most types of accidents) reports to DOT of accidents resulting

from rail operations that cause death or injury

to any person or damage to equipment or roadbed. The carrier is subject to a fine of up to $100

per day for failure to so report.

Operation and Equipment 16–The Act gives

CTC very broad rulemaking authority covering

among other things:

● speed of trains in populated areas,

● coupling of cars,

‘

z

Sec. 223, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.

1345 u. S.c. 421 et seq.

IdSecs. 225-226, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.

“45 U.S.C. 38.

“Sees. 227-251, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.
Ch. III Government Institutions and Rail Safety ● 3 7

●

●

●

●

●

provision of shelter to employees on duty,

length of track sections required to be kept

in repair by employees and the number of

employees per section “so as to ensure safety to the public and its employees, ”

the number of “men” employed on trains

“with a view to the safety of the public and

of employees, ”

hours of service of employees, and

other matters affecting safety in the operation of trains or their speed and use of

engines. 17

While CTC has adopted regulations on some of

these subjects, such as speed limits in populated

areas, coupling of cars, and other matters affecting operational safety, it has not adopted regulations concerning employee shelter, hours of

service, or the number of men employed on a

train, which are presumably left to collective

bargaining.

CTC is also directed to “endeavor to provide

for” uniformity of construction of equipment

used on the roadway. 18 Railroads are granted

authority to adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations concerning many operational matters but

these must be sanctioned by the Governor-inCouncil acting on the advice of CTC.

With respect to safety appliances, the Railway Act directs that railroads have “modern

and efficient apparatus, appliances, and means”

for: 1) communication among employees, 2)

checking speed of the train, 3) coupling devices

that couple upon impact and do not require employees to go between the cars to uncouple, and

4) power or train brakes that do not require use

of handbrakes to stop the train. The brake

system is required to be continuous throughout

the train. Ladders and handholds are required

for box cars. Draw bars must be of a standard

height fixed by CTC, and locomotives are forbidden to have valves that require oiling from

outside the cab while in motion. CTC is given

power to determine what constitutes compliance

with this legislative direction through regulation

of general applicability or by order applicable to

a particular case. An improved method of brake

‘“Sec. 227, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.

‘“Sec. 228, ch. R-2, R. S. C., 1970.

l~sec, 238, ch R-2, R.S C ., 1970.

testing is at an advanced stage toward promulgation.

The Act also specifies a variety of rather

detailed requirements in connection with operation of the trains, e.g., regular schedules printed

on timetables in English and French, stopping of

trains before entering onto a swing- or drawbridge, stopping at railroad switches for signal

to proceed unless there is a switch-signal interlocking device or similar device, and using

the train whistle continuously from 80 rods

before a grade crossing until the engine has

passed the crossing. A train cannot exceed 10

miles per hour in a “thickly populated area”

unless the track is fenced or otherwise protected

or unless CTC otherwise approves a greater

speed. Trains must observe that speed limit at a

grade crossing in such an area unless, in the

view of CTC, the crossing is adequately protected. In the event of a crossing accident involving death or injury, a train cannot exceed

25 miles per hour unless the speed restriction is

removed by RTC. If a train is traveling in

reverse, except in a switching or yard movement, and is traveling along or across a highway, someone must be stationed in the lead car

or other piece of equipment to warn persons in

the train’s path. Finally, a train may not block a

highway by standing still or shunting cars for

more than 5 minutes.

Penalties of up to $200 a day are provided

under Canadian law for failure to equip a train

properly. Failure to stop at a draw- or swingbridge can produce a penalty of up to $400.

Employees who do not observe company rules

are liable for a penalty of up to $400 or 6

months in jail or both. Failure to observe the

grade-crossing requirements (except the whistle

requirement) can result in a penalty of $100.

The penalty for blocking a highway is $50 for

the engineer and $50 for the company. However, employees can be exempted if they can

show they were following company rules.

It can be seen that both Canada and the

United States recognize the same subjects as

worthy of consideration from a safety point of

view, though the approach is often quite different. For example, whereas the Railway Act

authorizes CTC to establish regulations for
38 ● Railroad Safety —U. S. -Canadian comparison

employee hours of service it has not established

any particular requirements in this regard. In

the United States, very specific requirements are

established by statute and little regulatory

power is granted to FRA.20 The Canadians also

impose by statute a variety of limitations on the

manner in which a train is operated, whereas in

the United States this subject is not covered by

statute but rather by agency (FRA) regulation

and in the absence of such regulation (which is

generally the case) the railroads are free to

adopt through their own operating rules. On the

other hand, many of the safety appliance requirements are treated in a similar manner by

both countries, e.g., automatic couplers, driving wheel brakes, and draw bars.

Another area of comparison is the treatment

of power or train brakes. In Canada, the statute

mandates that “such a number of cars in each

train be equipped with such brakes as to permit

the engineer to control its speed or bring it to a

stop in the quickest and best possible manner”

without requiring use of the common hand

brake. 21 In addition, on passenger trains such a

brake system must be continuous and self-applying in the event of any failure in their continuity of action. Inspection requirements are

not specified. In the United States, the law originally required one-half of all cars to be so

equipped with power or train brakes22 but this

percentage has been increased administratively

to include all cars in a train .23 No distinction is

made between passenger and freight trains.

Finally, U.S. law mandated the adoption of the

Association of American Railroads (AAR)

power brake maintenance and inspection standards.

Dangerous Commodities—The Railway Act

contains two short provisions concerning transportation of dangerous commodities .24 The first

prohibits passengers from carrying such goods

except in conformity with CTC rules. It also requires a shipper to mark clearly the nature of

such goods on the outside of the packing and

z~45 U .S. C. 64 et seq.

2 Isec, 238(s), ch. R-2, R. S. C. , 1970.

2245 U. S.C. 65 et Seq.

2349 CFR.

24secs, 295.296, ch. R-2, R. S.C. , ‘970.

give identical notice to the station agent or

whoever receives them for shipment. The second provision prohibits a railroad from carrying such goods except in conformity with CTC

rules and permits it either to refuse to handle,

except in accordance with CTC rules, a parcel

containing goods it suspects to be dangerous or

to require that the parcel be opened. Violation

of the first provision carries a fine of up to

$2,000 or 2 years in jail or both; violation of the

second provision can result in a maximum

penalty of $500.

There is considerable difference in the statutory approach to regulation of the transportation of these commodities in Canada and the

United States. The United States has both criminal and civil penalties of substantial dimensions

for violations of hazardous cargo regulations,

whereas Canada has relatively mild penalties,

particularly for the railroad. Moreover, the

U.S. statute seems to envision regulation of a

broad scope of activity concerning such materials from labeling, packaging, and handling

through transportation. The Canadian statute

dealing with hazardous materials seems to envision regulation of a more limited scope of activity with those materials, although CTC may be

able to take the same steps as the comparable

U.S. agency due to the broad powers otherwise

available to it.

Offenses, Penalties, and Other Liabilities25—

In addition to the penalties for violation of particular statutory or regulatory requirements, the

Railway Act also specified a penalty of $20 to

$5,000 for any company that does not obey a

CTC order. Moreover, if the company is proven

to have so disobeyed CTC rules, the president,

each vice-president, and each director and

managing director of the company is subject to

a penalty of the same range an ~/or up to 12

months in prison unless they can prove that they

did everything in their power to see that the

order was carried out, and they were not at fault

for the violation. Canadian Government officials indicated that these penalties are levied

infrequently, if at all. U.S. law does not impose

such personal penalties on officers of railroads.

25secs 343_399, ch. R-2, R. S.c. , 1970.
Ch.III Government Institutions and Rail Safety ● 39

The Railway Act provides for a summary procedure before a justice of the peace, if a penalty

is less than $100. If the penalty is between $100

and $500, the summary procedure must be

before two such justices or other officials with

equivalent power. CTC can also seek enforcement through the offices of the Attorney General or in his name.

The Canada Labour Code—Part IV

The Canada Labour Code establishes the

framework for Federal regulation of workplace

safety. It applies to interprovincial railroads

rather than intraprovincial companies. However, the Labour Code does not apply to employment “upon or in connection with the

operation of . . . trains . . . .“26 CTC has jurisdiction for the safety of train operations.

The Labour Code places a general duty upon

employers to conduct business in a manner that

will not endanger the health or safety of their

employees, and to adopt and carry out reasonable procedures and techniques designed to

reduce the risk of workplace injury. The employee likewise has a duty to take reasonable

measures and precautions to protect his own

safety and to use protective devices provided by

the employer. The Code provides a specific procedure through which employees can refuse to

work when they believe to continue to work

would constitute an “imminent danger” to

themselves or other employees. The Code also

grants broad regulatory authority to the Governor-in-Council. This authority is exercised by

the Minister of Labour.

The Code’s mechanism used to oversee safety

in the workplace is to require or authorize industries or companies to establish safety and

health committees, with at least half of committee membership comprised of employees. These

committees handle all health and safety matters

between the employers and employees. Included

among committee responsibilities are handling

complaints, conducting inquiries, developing

safety programs, recordkeeping, and cooperation with appropriate Government agencies.

“SC>C, 80(2), ch. L-1, R. S. C., 1970.

The Code provides for appointment of “safety

officers” to enforce its provisions. These officials have authority to enter the premises of an

employer “at any reasonable time” to conduct

inspections, inquiries, and tests. If something

constitutes a “source of imminent danger to the

safety or health” of employees or is contrary to

the Code or regulations, the “safety officer”

may direct an employer or person in charge, in

writing, to take certain safeguarding actions or

direct that the place, matter, or thing not be

used until directions are complied with .27 A procedure for industry appeal of such a direction is

provided. The employer is subject to a penalty

of up to $5,000 or 1 year in prison or both for

the following: 1) a violation of the Code, or

regulations issued under the Code; 2) violation

of the direction of a safety officer; 3) industry

discrimination against employees who participate in or provide information for a safety inquiry; 4) adverse action from industry against

employees who stop work because they believe

they are in imminent danger; or 5) failure to

provide requested information to a safety committee. Employees and managers can also be

punished personally.

The approach of the United States and

Canada to occupational safety and health appears to be generally similar. With respect to

railroads in particular, FRA has accepted

responsibility for safety of railroad operations

(meaning the safe movement of equipment over

rails) including health matters related to such

operations, and ceded the balance to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) of the Department of Labor. While the

area covered by FRA appears to be somewhat

broader than the safety and health matters

under CTC jurisdiction, both countries divide

safety and health regulation, especially in the

case of railroads, between two agencies and

generally along the same lines. Both countries

establish general responsibilities for employers

and employees, and have broad regulatory

power to establish minimum safety and health

requirements. In addition, they have a similar

enforcement structure of inspections coupled

with a power to order abatement of the hazard

‘“%’C. 94, ch. L-1, R,S. C. , 1970.
40 . Railroad Safety U.S.-Canadian Comparison

or levy of a monetary penalty. Both countries

have procedures for administrative review of

the order. However, when the Canadian and

U.S. occupational safety and health provisions

are examined in detail, many differences appear. These differences do not relate to the treatment of railroads per se, and therefore are not

examined in detail here.

In sum, it can be said Canada’s statutory approach is one that appears to be based both on

inspection and intracompany safety awareness

through safety and health committees, whereas

the U.S. approach is based more on inspection

and enforcement. The difference in these two

approaches is that the Canadian system is

directed more at resolution of the safety problems at the company level through joint and

equal participation of labor and management

but with a strong residual enforcement power

granted to the Government. The U.S. system is

more adversarial in nature pitting employer

against the Government and the employee.

However, the enforcement powers for OSHA

violations in the United States are not as comprehensive as those in Canada.

Railway Relocation and Crossing Act

Since 1955 Canada has recognized the special

safety problems of rail-highway grade crossings. The Railway Act established a railway

grade-crossing fund to provide financial assistance for the improvement of grade crossings.28

In 1974, this provision was replaced by the

Railway Relocation and Crossing Act. A more

comprehensive approach was taken to the physical relationship between railroads and highways. The new Act retained the original railway

grade-crossing fund administered by CTC. This

fund is used on a cost-sharing basis for: 1) work

done for public protection, safety, and convenience on grade crossings existing for at least 3

years; 2) work done to reconstruct or improve a

grade separation in existence for at least 15

years; 3) placing reflective markings on the sides

of rail cars; and 4) placing revolving lights on

locomotives. The Federal share of the cost of

such work varies from sO to 80 percent.

2n~> ~ 202, ch . R-2, R.S. C. , 1970.

The Railway Relocation and Crossing Act

provided two types of assistance. The first is

financial assistance provided by the Minister of

Transport and the Minister of State for Urban

Affairs for up to one-half of the cost of transportation plans and urban development plans respectively. The former is a plan for control of

transportation of all types and modes within a

defined area and the latter is a plan for land use

and development within or adjacent to an urban

area. Where such plans have been developed

and agreed to by provincial and municipal authorities, they can apply to CTC for a special

order that will permit abandonment of lines,

removal of structures, sharing of trackage

rights, relocation of railway lines, building of

new lines, elimination of grade crossings, and

limitations on rail traffic. The plans, including

the related financial plans, showing that no affected railroad will receive burdens or benefits

greater than the corresponding receipts or costs,

must be acceptable to CTC before it can issue

such a special order. In addition, CTC can

recommend that the Minister of transport provide a “relocation grant” to meet up to one-half

of the net costs of railway relocation.

The other new form of assistance is provision

for special grants for construction or reconstruction of a grade separation that costs more than

$1,250,000. The total amount obtainable for

such a grant ranges from $1,150,000 to

$3,250,000 plus 40 percent of the costs in excess

of $5 million for new construct on, with substantially lesser amounts for reconstruction

projects. This latter provision s intended to

meet the many situations needing assistance that

were not eligible under the earlier railway

grade-crossing fund.

It should also be noted that the Railway Act,

gave CTC authority to control the protections

at grade crossings and order any necessary

changes including grade separation.

The United States has generally financed

grade-crossing improvements from the Highway Trust Fund and on a cost-sharing basis with

State highway authorities.29 It has also provided

substantial sums under the Federal Aid High292? 1) ,S. c. 130.
Ch. III Government Institutions and Rail Safety ● 42

way Act for a series of demonstration projects provided any generally available funding for the

which have included relocation of some urban marking of rail cars or lights on locomotives

rail lines. 30 However, the United States has not although it is currently conducting a demonstration project with four railroads providing for

“’rl], il. Laws 93-87, 93-643, 94-280, and 94-387. use of strobe lights on locomotives.

SUMMARY

The laws affecting railway safety in Canada

are comprehensive in scope, touching at least

generally all of the same subjects as U.S. laws.

However, a comparison of the statutory framework of these laws for each country indicates

several differences in emphasis and detail. First,

the Canadian laws are considerably more restrictive concerning the design and engineering

of a railroad when first constructed but Canada

does not regulate its subsequent maintenance. In

the United States, the law does not cover design

and engineering but subsequent maintenance is

regulated. Second, the Canadians have numerous detailed statutory requirements for operating the railroad of which the United States has

very few. Third, the Canadians have more comprehensive penalty provisions for violation of

its legal requirements that are applicable to officers and employees as well as companies.

However, the penalties are apparently not generally invoked and do not seem to be a major

part of the enforcement structure. In the United

States, the penalties appear to be somewhat

higher, and do provide an integral part of the

enforcement scheme, but are not applicable to

railroad officers and employees. Fourth, the

Canadians do not appear to have mandated by

law or regulation particular requirements for

hours of service or employee quarters or other

such subjects that are considered part of what

should be left to collective bargaining. In the

United States, specific legislative requirements

have been established on such subjects. Finally,

the Canadians have been considerably more

comprehensive in their legislative approach to

the grade-crossing problem both in terms of

establishing requirements for train operations

and installation of protections at crossings as

well as providing funding mechanisms.
Chapter IV

THE ACCIDENT PICTURE
Chapter IV

THE ACCIDENT PICTURE

This chapter describes Canadian accident and Since each data system differs, the findings from

casualty trends from data provided by: each source are discussed separately. In all

• the Railway Transport Committee (RTC),

● Labour Canada’s Occupational Safety and

Health Division, and

● the Canadian National (CN) and Canadian

Pacific (CP) Railroads.

cases, differences in the data collection criteria

limit the extent to which comparisons can be

made with U.S. data. Nevertheless, some comparative findings are included in each section of

this chapter.

R T C

Under authority established by the Railway

Act and the National Transportation Act, RTC

is responsible for collecting data on railroad accidents and casualties resulting from the movement or operation of trains. A later section of

this chapter describes the Canadian Occupational Safety and Health Division’s data and

reporting systems for railroad workers other

than those associated with the movement of

trains.

As a result of the 1971 RTC safety inquiry,

the Bureau of Management Consulting (BMC),

a consulting organization within the Canadian

Government, conducted a comprehensive analysis of rail safety problems and policies in

Canada. Among the studies prepared by BMC

was a report entitled, Statistical Analysis of

Railway Accidents Reported to the Canadian

Transport Commission, 1956-1973. The BMC

Analysis is the primary Government report of

railroad safety trends in Canada between 1956

and 1973. However, summary data have been

published for subsequent years. * Information

contained in the BMC Analysis and subsequent

summary data are the basic sources of Government information used in this report.

DATA

Although the Canadian

lyzed accident and casualty

Government anadata for the period

1956-73, and summarized data from 1974-to the

present, for purposes of this report Canadian

data and trends are being used from 1966 to the

present. Canadian reporting requirements for

accidents prior to 1966 were different, therefore

making 1956-64 data not comparable with data

collected from 1965 to the present.

Authority for Accident Reporting

in Canada

In March 1922, the Board of Railway

missioners required that Canadian rail

9

Comroads

report all railroad accidents that involved the

movement of trains, casualties to employees or

users, and damage to bridges, viaducts, and

tunnels, which would make such structures impassable. ’ This was the first Government initiative for monitoring railroad accident data. In

1955, the Railway Commissioners extended the

reporting requirements to include all accidents

involving train operations irrespective of casualties. 2 However, in 1956 it restricted reporting

requirements to accidents involving train operations at rail/highway crossings, and to accidents

on the main track involving damage to rolling
46 ● Railroad Safety—U. S.-Canadian Comparison

stock in excess of $1,000, 3 This was the first initiative to place a dollar threshold on reportable

accidents. In 1965, accident reporting was further refined by requirements involving:4 death

or personal injury; damage to bridge, culvert,

viaduct, or tunnel; public rail grade crossings;

collisions and derailments on main track;

obstructions; and destruction of stations by fire.

In addition, railroads were required to report

derailments or collisions with damage to railroad property in excess of $750. This changed

the 1956 circular by reducing the reporting

threshold from $1,000 to $750 and by including

in the threshold, damage to rail property, not

just damage to rolling stock. ’

RTC has seven accident classifications: collisions, derailments, crossing, track car, trespassing, dangerous commodities, and “other. ” The

general classifications and definitions used by

RTC are:

●

●

●

●

●

Collision: an accident on the main track

wherein a moving train, engine, car, or

work equipment comes in contact with

another train, engine, car, or work equipment, standing or moving and results in excess of $750 damage to rail property.

Derailment: an accident wherein any moving train, engine, or car becomes derailed

on the main track resulting in excess of

$750 in damage to rail property.

Crossing Accident: an accident in which

any unit of rolling stock on the rails strikes,

or is struck by, a user of a public, private,

or farm crossing, at a crossing, and damage

or injury results.

Track Car Accident: an accident in which a

track car strikes, or is struck by, a train or

another track car or becomes derailed. This

excludes accidents resulting from a track

car striking or being struck by a motor vehicle at a crossing.

Dangerous Commodities: accidents or incidents involving commodities that are defined as being dangerous according to the

General Order of the Commission: “Regulations for the Transportation of Dangerous Commodities by Rail .“

● Trespassers and Suicides: an accident resulting in the death or injury of a person or

persons using railroad pro property not designated for public use, including off-duty employees.

• Other: all accidents or incidents not otherwise classified, including a large number of

incidents, many of which are personal injuries such as slipping and falling that are

not directly related to train operations.6

Canadian Casualty and Accident

Trends

Crossing accidents are the largest source of

rail-related fatalities in Canada. Between 1966

and 1977, 1,564 or 61 percent of the total railrelated deaths in Canada resulted from gradecrossing accidents. Trespassing fatalities ranked

second with 25 percent; derailments accounted

for only 1 percent; and 10 percert of fatalities in

the rail operating environment were classified

“other.” The remaining 3 percent of total fatalities was split between collision; and track car

accidents.

Data on casualties resulting from the movement or operations of trains, indicated by the

aggregate number of persons killed or injured in

the various accident classifications, is shown in

table 21.

The category “other” represents the largest

number of injuries, 33,156 or 73 percent in Canada’s railroad statistics. A large number of these

incidents are employee injuries that did not occur in train accidents. Crossing injuries rank

second in number, 6,950 or 15 percent of total

injuries. Derailments accounted 1 or 4 percent of

total injuries, collisions 4 percent, track car 3

percent, and trespassing accounted for the least

number of injuries or 1 percent of the total. No

trends for injuries by type of accident can be

ascertained.

‘Ibid., pp. 1 I, 22, 34, 51, 61, 74, 75, 84.
Ch. IV The Accident Picture . 47

Year

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

Total (12 yr)

Percent of 1 2-year total

Table 21 .—Canadian Casualties by Type of Accident, 1966-77

Collision

(Killed

8

8 I

4

4

2

5

3

2

8

0

1

1

46

2 %

Injured

104

5 16

189

139

74

60

62

85

343

42

30

62

706

4%

Derailment

Killed

2

0

8

1

5

5

4

2

3

3

2

1

36

1°/r

injured

65

56

141

92

230

134

187

180

166

132

186

51

620

40%

—

Killed

186

197

121

120

116

121

150

150

109

99

108

87

,564

61 %

Injured

62?

584

479

519

587

644

675

647

651

566

524

453

9 5 0

15%

.

Track car

Killed

5

5

8

8

3

7

2

2

3

2

1

0

45

2%

Injured

1 1 5

145

1 0 6

113

8 7

102

132

112

104

8 7

7 7

126

3 0 6

3 %

Trespas

Killed

74

57

53

53

50

56

66

48

55

59

32

44

647

25%

sing

Injured

60

66

59

60

55

43

80

58

48

65

49

38

681

1%

Other

Killed Injured

33 2910

30 3068

36 7753

35 250 6

19 2517

14 2556

2 8 2543

24 2517

23 2900

24 2983

1 3110

– * 2,713

268 33156

1 o% 73 %

.

Total

Killed

308

297

230

221

195

208

253

228

201

187

145

133’

2,570

—.

Injured

3875

4435

3727

3429

3550

3539

3679

3599

4292

3875

3976

3443

45,419

— — -.

Although grade-crossing fatalities show a

downward trend, fatality trends for all other accident categories cannot be ascertained. In the

aggregate, fatalities appear to have declined

steadily since 1972. The BMC Analysis stated

that crossing accidents for the period studied

(1956-73) represented “the single most important cause of fatalities on the railways, though

the fatalities are not railway employees or railway users, but mostly others (98 percent).” 7 The

Analysis looked at crossing accidents by the

type of protection afforded at the intersection

and found that the greatest number of accidents

occurred at unprotected sites for the 1956-73

time period. The second greatest number of

casualties, occurred at crossing sites protected

by flashing lights and bells. ’

Casualties among employees, passengers,

trespassers, and others are shown in table 22.

The category “other” is comprised predominantly of casualties occurring as a result of

crossing accidents. Deaths in this category accounted for the largest, or 63 percent* of all rail

deaths. Employee fatalities accounted for 9 percent of reported deaths or the third largest

group of rail-related fatalities.

Itll(l [1[1 00-01.

“1[31(1 , [~ 58

‘Th(> c ~)nlpll.~t Ion t ~lr t ht’ c<~tc>~(~r~ ‘‘L~t h~,r ‘ t t) r t .Ihlt,22 c (~nl hl n(’~

~ratl~, c r(lssl nx LIc>,] t h+ ,1 n(l t ho r~’n~,~ I n i n~ cIc,l t h \ not ,IC c tJLI n tc’ci

t t~r tn~ t }It’ t~t ht’r t hrcc c dtc~tlrlt’<ll~tt’ci

As expected, railroad employees experienced

the greatest number of injuries in the rail environment. Trends in employee casualties are

not discernible. However in 1976, there was a

dramatic decrease in the number of employee

fatalities. There was no concurrent decrease in

the number of injuries reported, rather a slight

increase. According to the BMC Analysis, “The

reporting of injuries is very inadequate. No attempt is made to attach any severity to the injury; thus the most minor injury, such as a small

bruise or some foreign matter in the eye, is

lumped in with the most major incapacitation,

such as the loss of a limb or an eye. A very large

number of injuries are reported, but the data is

of doubtful value.”9

The causes of injuries were

not reported in available Canadian data.

With the exception of derailments, the aggregate number of accidents in other classifications (collisions, crossing, track car, trespassing, and “other”) has remained relatively constant or declined slightly from 1966 through

1977. Table 23 shows the aggregate number of

accidents by classification. Derailments increased gradually from 1969 to a high in 1974

and appear to be declining since 1974. Table 24

shows the various causes of derailments between 1966 and 1977. During this time, the total

number of derailments due to track conditions

“Ihlcl , p 11.
48 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian comparison

Table 22.—Casualties, 1966-76

Employe e

Year Kille d ‘Injured -

1966 .. . . . . . . 26 2,27 0

196 7 29 2,499

1968 . . . . 28 2,093

1969 . . . . . 26 2,072

1970 ., . . . . 21 2,248

1971 . . . . . 18 2,280

1972 . . . . . . 32 2,436

1973 . . . . . 21 2,421

1974 . . . . . . 24 2,839

1975 . . . . 23 2,764

1976 . . . . . . 8 2,940

Total . . . . 256 “-- 26862 ‘-

Percent . 1 0 % 6 4 %

‘-Passenger ‘

- -- Trespasse r Other*

Killed ‘

- - Injured Kille d

-

Injure d Killed –Injure d — —. —. —-. —. —. -——

3 - - ‘

- “905 - - 7-4 - 60 -

205 640

3 1,294 57 66 208 576

6 982 53 59 143 586

4 731 53 60 148 566

4 704 50 55 120 543

3 560 56 43 131 656

6 565 66 80 149 598

2 575 48 58 157 545

1 813 55 48 121 592

— 484 5 9 6 5 105 457

1 523 32 49 104 464

33 8,136 603 643- 1,591 6,223

10/0 1 9 % 240/o 1.5 % 6 4 % 14.8%

“Com-prised p;edornlnantly of crossing casualt Ies

- . —

SOURCES Bureau of Management Consulting, Stat/st/ca/ Ana/ys/s, 1956-73, RTC Safety and Standards Branch, Summary Analysis, 1978, 1977 Railway

Accident Summary

Table 23.–Canadian Accidents by Type, 1966-77

Year -” - - Collision Derailment Crossing Track car Trespassing Other Total

1966 . . . . . . . . . . ’55 -

230 1,133 92 127 2,805 4,442

1967, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 209 1,183 101 115 3,025 4,672

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 228 1,139 83 108 2,578 4,185

1969 ......., . . . . . . . . . 41 246 1,032 73 104 2,402 3,898

1970 ......, . . . . . . . . . 46 276 977 53 102 3,168 4,622

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 265 1,088 66 97 3,210 4,721

1972 ......., . . . . . . . . . 44 323 1,175 76 135 3,065 4,818

1973, ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 299 1,030 72 101 3,130 4,688

1974, ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 420 1,074 72 87 3,118 4,817

1975 ...., . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 330 982 52 112 3,050 4,574

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 301 923 41 84 3,238 4,619

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 316 877 51 82 2,920 4,285

SOURCE {ureau o;Managem;ntCons-ult;ng,Stat;sf;alAna/ys)s, 1956.73, and Summary of Accident Data 1977

Table 24.—Statement of Canadian Derailments According to Major Causes, 1966-76

Due to track Rate per billion Due to equipment Rate per billion Rate per billion Total

Year conditions gross ton miles defects gross ton miles car miles Other derailments

1966 , 70 0322 125 0.574 29,07 35 230

196 7 53 0.245 82 0.379 19.52 74 209

1968 50 023 7 100 0.474 24.39 78 228

1969 , 73 0.344 128 0.603 31.22 45 246

197 0 119 0.511 108 0.464 24.53 49 276

197 1 107 0.436 89 0.363 19,35 69 265

197 2 134 0525 103 0.403 21.46 86 323

197 3 115 0.447 104 0.405 22.61 80 299

197 4 157 0.557 130 0.461 26,53 133 420

197 5 136 0.527 103 0399 21.91 91 330

1976 106 0.411 107 0.415 23,26 88 301

1977 . 120 042 6 111 0.394 24,13 81 312

Tota l 1,240 1,290 909 3,439

36% 38 ”/o 26%

SOURCE Analysts of Railway Accldenf Stattshcs 1977 RTC
Ch. IV The Accident Picture ● 4 9

accounted for approximately 36 percent of all

derailments. Derailments due to defective

equipment accounted for approximately 38 percent, and the miscellaneous category (“other”

causes) accounted for the remaining 26 percent

of the derailments. For the 1966-70 period, both

in total numbers and on a ton-mile basis, defective equipment represented the most significant

cause of derailments. From 1970 through 1975,

track conditions caused an increasing number of

derailments while defective equipment remained

fairly constant. In 1976 and 1977, track and

equipment accounted for approximately equal

numbers and rates of derailments. 10 Information

is not available to factor out derailments reported as a result of inflationary factors, or to

explain the unusually high number of derailments in 1974. Although data on accident severity is limited and imprecise, the BMC report indicates that the majority of derailments appear

to be low-cost, that is under $5,000 for a

1965-73 sample. 11

Railroad and Government officials indicated

that they believed heavier axle loading in freight

equipment had influenced derailments.12 Both

CN and CP indicated that they believed heavier

axle loading on freight equipment has caused increased wear on the roadbed. CN conducted research on the problem and published several reports. These include: Rail Replacement Costs on

the B.C. South Line; Effects of 100-Ton Carloadings on Tie Replacement Costs, B.C. South

Line; Track Maintenance Cost, B.C. South Line

1964-74, Summary Report; and Effect of 100-

Ton Carloadings on Train Accident Costs, B.C.

South Line. The latter study compared train accident costs prior to the introduction of the 100-

ton capacity equipment and after for the period

1960-74. That study factored out inflation and

increases in traffic. The study conclusions indicated that train accident costs, particularly

those accidents resulting from track and employee responsibility, had increased as a result

of the heavier 100-ton cars. The increases in

“employee responsibility caused” accidents cited

by the study may be related to the differences in

train-handling techniques necessary to operate

the heavier trains.

Costs estimates for equipment and property

damage in accidents are not fully reported to the

Canadian Government.

Of the dangerous commodity incidents between 1970 and 1973, flammable liquids were

involved in 37 percent of the incidents involving

dangerous commodities for the 3-year time period. During that period, 2 fatalities and 34 injuries were attributed to dangerous commodities

incidents. Table 25 shows the dangerous commodities most commonly involved in incidents

in Canada. Since 1973, no fatalities and only

seven injuries have resulted from accidents involving dangerous commodities.13

As indicated by the BMC study on railroad

safety, a number of factors may have influenced

Canada’s accident picture. Cited among these

factors were changes in technology and the use

of technology, increases in traffic, changes in

maintenance practices in the industry and labor

force size and/or assignments, and changes in

the amount of financial resources necessary to

maintain the rail physical plant .14 While all of

these factors were briefly discussed in the Canadian study, no correlations between specific

data and possible industry factors were drawn.

As in the United States, a concern exists at the

Federal level regarding deferred maintenance,

particularly for branchlines in Canada, and its

implications for safety.

Table 25.—Canadian Incidents Involving

Dangerous Commodities

Total Incidents for Average number of

Type of commodity 1970-73 incidents per year ——.

Flammable solid s 14 35 –

‘ -

Flammable Iiquids 53 1325

Oxidizing organic 22 5 5

Poiso n 18 4 5

Corrosiv e 27 6 7 5

Explosive 0 0 0

Radioactiv e 2 0 5

Compound ga s 8 2 0

Total 144 3 6 0

————— ——————————..—— —

SOURCCE Statistical Analysis 1956-73 p 75

1‘SI/))/tt/{~),V (>~ Ac,-rtitt1t5 Itr(-t,i,?)tts ~(’~mrt,ui t,l t)r(’ CTC 1W7

prepared by RTC, p. 13.

“Stuti<t/c(/l A)lLll,w\Is t~p, cit., ch. 5, ~p. I 17-152.
50 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

RTC Data Collection System

The Railway Transport Committee of the

Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) is responsible for gathering accident information

and data from the railroads and investigating

accidents as necessary. Accidents are initially

reported by telex to CTC headquarters. A subsequent detailed report is sent by the railroad to

CTC. The initial report is entered into a computer system. The information contained in the

accident report is included in appendix B.

Prior to 1977, accident information was processed manually. Monthly accident summary reports were prepared. Currently changes in accident reporting systems and data bases are being

discussed by RTC and the railrcads.

COMPARISONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Significant differences exist between the U.S.

and Canadian Government classifications and

the criteria for obtaining and using accident and

casualty information. This section describes

those differences and compares data when possible.

Data Differences

In Canada, collisions and derailments occurring on the mainline and branchlike are reported

when damage to railroad property exceeds

$750. In the United States, until 1975 all ac-

cidents involving the movement or operation of

a train were reported regardless of the location

of their occurrence if damage exceeded $750.1

5

Therefore, the U.S. railroads report collisions,

derailments, and other train accidents in the

yards, whereas Canadian railroads only report

mainline accidents. In addition, the U.S. groups

collisions, derailments, and other accidents

under the heading train accident. There is no

such equivalent in the Canadian system.

In Canada, all deaths and injuries to employees under CTC jurisdiction and to other persons

are reported. However, in the United States prior to 1975 only those injuries that resulted in

more than 24 hours lost time were reported.

Since 1975, all U.S. injuries requiring medical

attention are reported as well as injuries requiring “one or more days” off rather than “more

than one” day off as previously reported. The

“ Alter 1Q75, tht’ [Jnitcd States c hangtd it% rc>pt~rtinx i’<llut>

t hrt~~h~}ld tt~ !31, 750 ‘~nd $2,300 t r(>nl 1477 to JC ( t}unttt}r Intl+

t It)n,]rv im p.lc t~ on ,1( c idt’n t>

U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

collects all casualty data; whereas in Canada

both RTC and the Occupational Safety and

Health Division at Labour Canada collect data

separately. The differences in reporting requirements precludes meaningful comparison of the

two systems.

Other reporting differences between the

United States and Canada incluce:

. in the United States, accidents involving

suicides or attempted suicides are not reported;

● bridges, viaducts, and tunnels unfit for

passing are not reported in the United

States; and

● prior to 1975, grade-crossing accidents that

did not result in casualties and involved

damages less than $750 were not reported

in the United States. 16

Canadian-U. S. Casualty Comparison

Although the differences in reporting requirements between the United States and Canada are substantial, some comparisons of

fatalities are possible.

In the two countries when “like” categories of

fatalities are compared, similar fatality patterns

emerge. As reported in the OTA Evaluation of

Railroad Safety, crossing fatalities accounted

for the largest portion, approximately 65 percent of the fatalities in the U.S. rail environ-

“In 1 Q75 an(i I Q77, the [! S. thrt’~hold \T.du,+ c h,]nxt’(1
ment.

1 7 This same pattern emerges in Canada

with 61 percent of Canada’s railroad-related fatalities occurring in grade-crossing accidents. In

both countries, trespassers accounted for the

second largest group of fatalities, representing

27.3 percent of rail-related deaths in the United

States, and 24 percent in Canada. Table 26 displays the similarity of fatality patterns. Only a

small percentage of total fatalities occur in collisions and derailments for both the United States

and Canada.

U.S. and Canadian fatalities in aggregate

numbers and when measured on a train-mile

basis, declined steadily 

from 1966 to 1976 (table

27), When measured by million train miles, the

average rate for 1966-76 of Canadian fatalities

was 2.50 and in the United States it was 3.69 indicating that the United States had approximately 1.19 more deaths than Canada. Population size, density, exposure levels, and other

variables may be the influencing factors in the

differing ratios. For example, the United States

has 5 times the amount of mainline track as

Canada and 10 times the population.

When examining employee fatality rates for

the United States and Canada, the average rates

for employee fatalities, measured by train miles,

for the years 1966-76 were approximately the

same (table 28). Data to measure employee fatalities by man-hours worked was not available.

The train-mile measurement of employee fatalities, therefore is assumed to be a fairly accurate

reflection of the exposure rates of employees to

the rail environment, because the number of

train miles is an indicator of the amount of rail

traffic.

The fatal it y rate resulting from grade-crossing

accidents is the largest category of rail-related

fatalities in both Canada and the United States.

Grade-crossing deaths account for 60 to 65 percent of all rail fatalities in each country. When

comparing the grade-crossing fatality rates,

several factors should be considered in order to

determine the level of exposure. These include:

number of crossing sites, amount of rail and

motor vehicle exposure, number of protected

crossings, and other factors. The data necessary

‘ Sf[lf 1+ t /( L?/ ,.1 )l[//l/. / + (lp c I t , pp s-b,

for a comprehensive, detailed comparison were

not available for this study. However, crossing

fatalities measured by train miles shows the

United States with a rate rate 60 percent higher

than Canada (table 29). Motor vehicle data,

i.e. , number of registrations, suggests that the’

United States has a higher exposure rate of

motor vehicles to crossings. The average number of motor vehicle registrations for the

1966-72 period was 8,238,000 for Canada and

105,288,000 for the United States. * The large

difference in motor vehicle registrations indicates differing levels of the exposure of the

public between the United States and Canada.

The comparison of motor vehicle registrations

does not take into account many of the factors

necessary for a thorough examination of exposure rates and grade-crossing fatalities.

Nevertheless, the comparison does suggest that

the crossing fatality rates in Canada and the

United States are a function of the population

size and exposure at rail crossing sites.

Several conclusions can be drawn from examining grade-crossing data for the United States

and – -‘

-

●

●

•

●

●

Canada. These are:

Between 1966 and 1976, both countries

have shown a decline in the total number as

well as a decline in the fatality rates resulting from grade-crossing accidents.

The decline has been more consistent in the

United States over the 1966-76 period than

in Canada. There was a dramatic decrease

in grade-crossing fatalities between 1967

and 1968, but there was an increase as well

for the years 1972 and 1973.

Grade-crossing fatalities represent the

largest rail-related fatality problem for

both countries.

On a per million train-mile basis, the 11-

year average U.S. rate is 62 percent higher

than Canada’s.

Factors affecting the differences in fatality

rates could not specifically be determined.

However, it appears that the larger U.S.

population and greater exposure of that
52 . Railroad Safety—U, S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 26.—Casualties, 1966-76

Employe e

a- – – - ‘- – – Passenge r Trespasser Other b

Year Killed

—

Injure d ‘Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured — -. — — — . — — — — — — — —

Canada – –

—

1966 26 2,270 3 905 74 60 205 640

1967 29 2,499 3 1,294 57 66 208 576

1968 28 2,093 6 982 53 59 143 586

1969 26 2,072 4 731 , 53 60 148 566

1970 21 2,248 4 704 50 55 120 543

1971 18 2,280 3 560 56 43 131 656

1972 32 2,436 6 565 66 80 149 598

1973 21 2,421 2 575 48 58 157 545

1974 24 2,839 1 813 55 48 121 592

1975 23 2,764 484 59 65 105 457

1976 8 2,940 1 523 32 49 104 464

Total 256 26,862 – - - 33 8,136 603 643 - ‘

- 1,591 6,223

Percent 10% 64% 1 % - -- - – – - —– – – –-– 19% 64% 14 8% — — — —

— . — — —. —

United States

1966 168 18,651 23 1,244 678 702 1,815 4,955

1967 176 18,055 12 1,054 646 696 1.649 4.71 8

1968 150 18,116 11 1,329 628 663 1,570 4,500

1969 190 17.255 6 862 627 674 1,476 4,565

1970 172 16,285 8 489 593 646 1,452 3,907

1971 123 14,191 16 536 551 607 1,320 3,638

1972 133 12,973 47 680 537 586 1,228 3.691

197 3 161 13,511 6 503 578 614 1,171 3,577

1974 144 16,002 7 574 565 674 1,192 3,568

1975C

113 47,855 8 1,307 524 703 915 4,441

1976 109 58,477 5 999 458 768 1,112 5,143

Total 1,63 9 251,411 -

149 – - 9,57 7

-

6.385 - 7,333 -<4,900 46,703 -

Percent 7% 79 8% .06% 3% 27.6% 2.3% 64.5% 14 8%

-.

aEm@oyees Inlurles reporfed 10 RTC hsted above do not lake Into account occupational safety and health Injuries reported 10 La bour Canada

— — — — — ——— — — . — —

U S emp~oy;e In

lur!es represent OSHA type Injuries

bcomprlsed predomlnan[[y 01 crossing casualties

cAcc[den[ reporllng requirements charged making 1975 data Incomparable w(fh that of Prevlolls Years

SOURCES Bureau of Management Consulllng Sr~r/sI/c~l Arrdjys(s 195673 RTC Safely and Sfandards Branch Summary Analysls 1978 1977 Railway Accldenl: ummary

population to rail hazards could be significant factors in the differing rates between

the two countries.

Comparisons of trespasser fatalities (table 30)

shows that the United States had approximately

11 deaths to every 1 in Canada when the data is

viewed in the aggregate. When measured by

train miles, the average rate for the United

States in 1966-76 is approximately 70 percent

higher than that of Canada, or 1.02 to 0.61 in

Canada. The reasons for the trespasser fatality

rate differences between the two countries could

not be ascertained for this report. To understand the differences in rates, factors such as the

locations of trespasser deaths, i.e., rural or urban areas, the population densities, and rail

traffic exposure should be correlated with the

number of deaths. These types of data from

both countries were not available for this

report. The Canadian Ministry of Transport is

currently issuing a policy to deal with the

trespasser problem. This policy, entitled

“Pedestrian Safety at the Railroad Right of

Way” will become public in 1979.

Overall findings on the fatality rate comparisons between the two countries indicated

that:

●

●

●

●

Fatalities and fatality rates in both countries declined between 1966 and 1976.

U.S. fatality rates were higher than

Canada’s primarily due to grade-crossing

and trespasser fatality rates.

The higher grade-crossing and trespasser

fatality rates in the United States appear to

be a function of population size and level of

exposure to rail hazards.

Employee fatality rates in the two countries

were similar.
Ch. IV The Accident Picture ● 5 3

Table 27. —Fatalities in Canada and the

United States, 1966-76

Canada United States ——— —

Per milliona

Per millionb

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

19~6 – 318 – 3.31 2,684 4 1 8

1967 297 3 1 5 2,483 4 0 8

1968 230 2 6 4 2,359 4 0 4

1969 218 2 5 3 2,299 4 0 3

1970 195 2 2 4 2,225 3 0 4

1971 208 2 3 9 1,010 3 0 9

1972 253 281 1,945 3 7 3

1973 228 2 5 7 1,916 3 3 8

1974 201 2 0 7 1,908 3 2 7

1975 187 211 1,560 2 9 2

1976 145 1.66 1,684 3 0 2

2 5 0 3 6 9

average rate average rate

— — — .

aU S !ri[n m!les used for lhls table were der!ved !rom combmmq Iocomolwe m!les Iwhlch tn

eludes tre(qhl and passenqer Ira(n miles and molor Iraln miles I

bcanad(do lraln ~lle$ for 197276 used In this table Included motor fraln miles and frelghl and

passenqer miles

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consult!nq Statlsllcal Analysls of Railway Accidents 195673

0 12 Railway Transport PI I Comparaflve Summary 197276 Iable 9 U S FRA

Acrlr3Enf E?,,jllelln ‘ 14 and 145 p 1

Table 28.—Employee Fatalities in Canada and the

United States, 1966-76

Canada United States — — —

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

1966- 26 27 168 26

1967 29 .31 176 29

1968 28 32 150 26

1969 26 .30 190 33

1970 21 24 172 31

1971 18 21 123 24

1972 32 35 133 25

1973 21 24 161 28

1974 . 24 25 144 25

1975 23 26 113 21

1976 8 09 109 20

Average 26 26

S~U~C;B;re;u~ ~an;q=e;~n;l~g=l=s;cafifla/ys/sO( Radway Acc(decrls 195673

RTC Summary Acc)denl Analyses and Federal Railroad Admlmslratlon Accident

Bulle!lns

Accident Comparisons

Direct comparisons of accident trends, i. e.,

collisions, derailments, etc., are complicated by

significant differences in Government reporting

requirements in the United States and Canada.

The Canadians do not report yard accidents.

Their dollar-loss threshold value for reporting

accidents is $750. U.S. carriers report both yard

and mainline/branchline accidents. The United

States adjusted the threshold reporting value to

Table 29.—Grade.Crossing Fatalities in Canada and

the United States, 1966-76

Canada United States — .

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

196 6 186 1 94 1,780 2.77

1967 197 2 0 9 1,632 2 6 8

196 8 121 1.39 1,546 2 6 5

196 9 120 1 39 1,490 261

1970 116 1.33 1,440 261

1971 121 1 39 1,356 2 6 3

197 2 150 1 65 1,260 241

1973 150 1 69 1,185 2 0 9

1974 109 1 12 1,220 2 0 9

197 5 99 1 12 978 183

1976 108 1 24 1,168 2 1 0

Total average 1.49 241

62%

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulbng SIallsflcal ~nalysls d Radway Accldenls 195673

RTC Summary Accldenl Analyses and Federal Railroad Admlmslrabon Accldenl

BulletIns

Table 30.—Trespasser Fatalities in Canada and the

United States, 1966-76

Canada United States

Per million Per million

Year Fatals train miles Fatals train miles

1966 74 77 678 1.06

1967 57 60 646 1. 06

1968 53 61 628 1.08

1969 53 61 627 1.10

1970 50 .57 593 1. 08

1971 56 64 551 1 07

1972 66 73 537 1 03

1973 48 54 578 102

1974 55 57 565 91

1975 59 67 524 98

1976 32 37 458 82

Average rate 61 1 02

SOURCE Bureau of Management Consullmg StalMca/ ~flalysls Of ~a~lway Acclderrk /956-73

RTC Summary Accident Analyses and Federal Ratlroad Admtmstrabon Accident

Bullelms

$1,750 in 1975 and $2,300 in 1977 to account for

inflation. Only U.S. accident data for 1975-77

can be broken out to isolate mainline and

branchlike data from yard data. However, due

to the differences in reporting thresholds, Canada could be reporting proportionately more of

their nonyard collisions and derailments.

As previously indicated, the Canadian aggregate data shows that with the exception of

derailments, all other accidents have remained

relatively constant or declined slightly (see table

23). In Canada, derailments increased through

1974 and then stabilized in the following 2 years
54 . Railroad Safety—U.S. -Canadian Comparison

(table 3 1). In the United States, collisions and

“other” mainline and yard accidents remained

relatively constant from 1966 to ‘1974. However, mainline and yard derailments nearly doubled in that same time in the United States (table

32). Between 1975 and 1977, U.S. collisions, derailments, and other train accidents on the

mainline/branchline also increased (table 33).

While the total for U.S. derailments increased

over the period studied, there is a wide range of

derailment rates among U.S. carriers. As indicated by table 34, the derailment rates on a

billion gross-ton-mile basis for 1976 and 1977

among U.S. carriers ranged from a low of 0.28

to a high of 12.50. From the information provided, the averages of the accident rates for the

eight or nine largest (ton mile) U.S. railroads in

1976 or in 1977 are not significantly different

from the values for either CN or CP recorded in

the respective year. However, the averages of

the accident rates for the next 10 U.S. railroads

in 1976 and in 1977 are significantly higher than

the values of either CN or CP recorded in the

respective year. The differences in the accident

rates among the 20 largest (ton miles) U.S. railroads are statistically significant t. The differences in the accident rates on a carrier-specific

basis between the years 1976 and 1977 are not

statistical] y significant. The variation among

the carriers is highly significant, but the variation from year to year is not significant.

Between 1966 and 1974, U.S. track-caused derailments for mainline /branchlike and yard represented approximately 40 percent of all derailments (table 35). Between 1975 and 1977, trackcaused derailments represented 46 percent of all

derailments on the mainline and branchline

only.

When examining the causes of derailments in

Canada for- the 1966-76 period, both defective

equipment and track conditions combined, account for 74 percent of the derailments. The

split between equipment and rack causes was

almost equal by 1977 as shown in table 31. In

contrast, the chief cause of U.S. derailments between 1966 and 1974 was defective track as

shown by table 35.18 In 1975-77, track-caused

mainline and branchlike derailments continued

to be the chief cause for derailments as shown

by table 36.

As indicated in the previous OTA Evaluation

of Railroad Safety, the reasons for- the increase

in train accidents, particularly track-caused accidents, appear to relate to a combination of

factors. Included among these are: the increased

axle loading on freight equipment, deferred

maintenance, lack of capital among some U.S.

carriers to invest in maintenance and plant improvements, and the management philosophy of

some U.S. carriers toward maintenance. A

downturn in the trend toward increased derailments does not appear likely in the United

States unless there are positive industry

economic changes, particular] v among some

U.S. carriers. Direct correlation between the

financial condition of some U S. carriers and

Table 31 .—Statement of Derailments According to Major Causes in Canada, 1966-77

Due to track – Rate per billion - Due to equipment Rate per billion

Year conditions gross ton miles defects gross ton miles — —

1966 70 -0.322 125 - ‘

- – – 0.574 

1967 53 0245 82 0379

1968 50 0237 100 0474

1969 73 0344 128 0603

1970 119 0511 108 0464

1971 107 0436 89 0363

1972 134 0525 103 0403

1973 115 0447 104 0405

1974 157 0557 130 0461

1975 136 0527 103 039 9

1976 106 0411 107 0415

1977 120 042 6 111 0394

SOU;C~ ~ld~sl;ol Rdl~d~ Accld;n;Slatls;s” 1977 RTC – ‘

— — —

Other

35 -

74

78

45

49

69

86

80

133

91

88

81

Total

derailments

.

230

209

228

246

276

265

323

299

420

330

301

312
Ch. IV The Accident Picture • 55

Table 32.— U.S. Train Accidents by Class, 1966-74

— — — —

Total train

Year Derailments Collisions Other accidents

1966 - ‘

-

4,447 1,552 794-

6,79 3

1967 4,960 1 522 812 7,294

1968 548 7 1 727 814 8,028

1969 5960 1 810 773 8,543

1970 5,602 1,756 737 8.095

1971 5131 1,529 644 7,304

1972 5,509 1,348 675 7532

1973 7,389 1,657 652 9,696

1974 8,513 1 551 630 10,694

— — . —

SOURCE Feder,~l R,~!lmad Adnllnlslratlon

—

Table 33.— U.S. Train Accidents by Class, * 1975-77

Year Derailments Collisions - Other Total

1 975’ 360 0 174- –

266 ‘-4,040-

1976 4 123 258 356 4,737

1977b 4010 256 329 4,595

+ 11 -percent Increase

. M]lnll;ebranchlne acclde-nts-only Th!s table exclude~y~d ~crfients -

‘A( cioents r?ported ~Ifh es!lmated dam,?qe m excess of $1 750

bArcldents reported WIln estimated damaqe In excess of $? 3°0

SOURCE FedPril R.llroxl Admln, strat!o~ Acc!denl DafA

their derailment ratios could not be undertaken

for purposes of this report.

In both Canada and the United States, only a

small percentage of rail-related fatalities and injuries occurred in derailments compared to

other types of accidents in which casualties occur. In Canada, only 1 percent of all rail-related

fatalities occurred in derailments for 1966

through 1977. In the United States, 1.7 percent

of all rail-related fatalities occurred in derailments for the same period. It appears that derailments are more significant for their resulting

property losses than for casualties.

● Examination of the U, S. derailment data on

a railroad-by-railroad basis shows a wide

range of derailment rates among U.S. carriers. Examination of the averages of accident rates for the eight or nine largest (ton

mile) U.S. railroads in 1976 or in 1977

shows that the values for either CN or CP

in the respective year are not significantly

different from the top (ton mile) carriers in

the United States. However, the averages

Table 34. —Mainline/Branchlike— Derailments

by Year and Railroad

(miles in billions of gross tons)

Railroad

Conrail - -

Burlington Northern

Southern Pacific

Union Pacific

Santa Fe

Southern

Norfolk & Western

Chessie

Missouri Pacific

Louisville & Nashville

Seaboard Coast Line

Illinois Central Gulf

Chicago & Northwestern

Milwaukee

St Louis-San Francisco

Rock Island

Denver RIO Grande

Soo Line

Kansas City Southern

Western Pacific

Missouri-Kansas -Texas

Grand Trunk Western

Delaware & Hudson

Boston & Maine

Clinchfield

Colorado & Southern

Ft Worth & Denver

Florida East Coast

Long Island

Bessemer & Lake Erie

Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton

Duluth & Missabe Iron

Range

Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac

Pittsburgh & Lake Erie

Duluth Winnepeg, &

Pacific

Maine Central

Elgin Joilet, & Eastern

Toledo, Peoria & Western

CP-U.S. Lines

Georgia

Northwestern Pacific

Illinois Terminal Co

Bangor & Aroostock

Chicago & Illinois Midland

Central Vermont

Detroit Toledo Shoreline

—

976 mile: —

2046

1703

160 1

1447

(CN 139.4)

1130

1149

1149

1082

(CP 101.0)

81 2

7 9 9

6 2 6

571

5 0 4

3 8 3

3 4 7

2 0 7

184

1 4 7

134

11. 6

9 1

8 3

6 2

5 9

4 7

4 8

4 2

3 8

3 8

3 2

3 6

2 7

2 5

2 4

2 0

1 8

1 5

1.4

1 4

1 2

1 2

1 2

9

7

5

977 mile

2392

221 7

1733

1691

1598

(141. 7)

121 3

1080

1108

111 8

(106 2)

843

845

601

588

488

388

351

21 2

205

162

138

123

9 5

8 9

61

6 7

6 6

6 8

5 0

3 8

3 7

3 4

2 3

2 6

2 5

2 6

2 0

1 7

14

15

14

1 2

1 2

1 2

7

7

5

Derailment

ate, 197f

.

1 44

1 09

97

63

(1.36)

103

86

3 8 0

102

( 97)

3 0 3

1 55

3 3 7

5 9 0

6 4 5

1 98

6 9 7

72

3 1 5

3 4 0

2 0 9

4 4 0

3 9 6

4 9 4

3 2 3

3 3 9

4 2 6

3 5 4

48

1 05

1. 58

5 6 3

28

1 48

8 8 0

2 0 8

9 5 0

1.1 1

3 3 3

2 1 4

2 14

4 .17

7 5 0

1250

5 5 6

7 1 4

1200

Derailment

ate, 1977

2 4 7

1 16

1 25

86

(1.34)

92

71

3 3 0

98

(1. 02)

3 3 9

1 77

3 8 6

5 1 0

7 3 3

1 52

8 0 6

61

2 5 9

1 79

1 59

4 15

221

4 7 2

3 2 8

3 5 8

2 7 3

221

80

1 05

81

2.94

2 2 2

9 2 0

5 0 0

1. 76

5 0 0

67

7 14

1250

6 6 7

4 2 9

1 43

8 0 0

SOURCE Fe(ierdl Rdllroad Aclmlntstr,]t(orl 4[ c!dent I (lforn) IIIOP Jnd A, ~r,c l,mnr o! Anwr I( ,trR,, II

road~
56 . Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 35.—U.S. Derailments by Contributing ●

Cause, 1966.74*

Human

Year Track Equipment factors Miscellaneous Total

1966 , 1,388 1,550 647 862 4,447

1967 , 1,800 1,611 668 881

●

4,960

1968, 2,062 1.745 743 937 5,487

196 9 2,400 1,863 816 881 5,960

1970 2,393 1,602 765 842 5,602

197 1 2,194 1,389 721 827 5,131

197 2 2,481 1,344 792 892 5,509

1973 3,477 1,755 1,017 1,140 7,389

1974. : : 4,196 1,967 1,043 1,307 8,513

“Includes malnllne branchl!ne and yard acctdents

SOURCE Federal Railroad Admlnls!rallon ●

of the accident rates for the next 10 railroads in 1976 and in 1977 are significantly

higher than the values of the Canadian railroads in either year.

Canada has a stable or declining derailment

picture whereas U.S. derailments appear to

be increasing.

The U.S. problem attributable to track is

nearly twice that of Canada for the 1975-77

period. The United States has a higher derailment rate due to equipment and “other”

causes although the difference is not as

great as track causes for derailments.

In both Canada and the United States, only

a small percent of rail-related fatalities occurred in derailments. It appears that derailments are more significant for their resulting property losses than for casualties.

Table 36.—U.S. Derailments by Contributing Cause, * 1975.77

Per billion gross Per billion gross Per billion gross

Year Track ton miles Equipment ton miles Other ton miles Total

197 5

a

1,633 88 1,242 67 725 1 94 3.600 –

197 6 1,921 96 1,405 71 797 2 0 7 4,123

1977 b 

., 1,844 92 1,324 66 842 199 4,010

Tota l 5,398 3,971 2,364

Percen t 34% 20%

“Malnhnelbranchhne only

a A bove $1 75o estimated loss

bAb ove $2 3(IO estimated 10SS

LABOUR CANADA DATA

Labour Canada’s Accident Prevention Division is responsible for receiving reports and investigating accidents.l9 Additionally, its Division of Occupational Safety and Health is responsible for rail employees not involved with

train operations. This includes maintenance-ofway employees as well as employees working in

repair shops, on tunnels and viaducts, and other

employees normally subject to the Division’s

jurisdiction.

and Health Division as well as the Accident

Prevention Division within Labour Canada are

responsible for administering programs to all

Canadian industries. For example, the accident

reporting regulations, described below, apply to

all industries, not just the rail industry.

Labour Canada’s Accident Reporting

Regulations20

This section briefly describes Labour Can- The accident investigation and reporting regada’s accident data collection system and trends ulation for Labour Canada contains several main the rail industry. The Occupational Safety jor features. First, it places responsibility on the

I *pt .IV,cd na~ian Labou r Code. 1“Lab{~ur Canada, Accident Rep{~rtinX Regl Iatif}n.
Ch. IV The Accident Picture ● 5 7

employer for investigation and reporting accidents resulting in: disabling injury or death of

an employee, a shock or contaminated atmosphere causing an employee’s loss of consciousness, implementation of rescue or revival procedures, or explosions. Second, the regulation

requires that in an employer investigation of the

accident, the steps necessary to prevent its recurrence be enumerated. These reports are sent

to regional safety officers within 10 days of the

accident. In addition to the written reports, employers are responsible for notifying by telephone the regional safety officer of a disabling

injury to two or more employees, a fatality, or

an explosion. A telephone report is required

within 24 hours of an accident’s occurence.

The Labour Canada regulation defines a “disabling injury” as any work injury that:

● prevents an employee from reporting for

work or effectively performing all of the

duties connected with his regular work on

any day subsequent to the day on which the

injury occurred, whether or not that day

was a holiday or other nonworking day; or

● results in the loss by an employee of a body

member or part thereof or in a complete

loss of its usefulness or in the permanent

impairment of a body function whether or

not the employee is prevented from reporting for work or effectively performing his

regular work as described above.

It identifies disabling injury frequency rate by

dividing the number of disabling injuries incurred in a specific period of time by the number

of man-hours worked during the period and

multiplying by 1 million.

The accident reporting regulation also requires that every employer with workplaces of

15 or more employees keep a record of all minor

injuries for that location. * Minor injuries where

there are fewer than 15 employees at a given

location are also reported, but with fewer items

of information necessary for the report.

Each March, all employers are required to

report their accident history for the preceding

year for each workplace.

Accident Data Reported by

Labour Canada

Injuries (normalized by man-hours worked)

for non-operating rail employees, according to

Labour Canada data, appear to have remained

constant in the 1972-76 time period. Although

the rate of disabling injuries to man-hours

worked was 18.3 in 1976, the highest recorded

for a 5-year period, a long-term trend of increases in disabling injuries cannot be established. See table 37 for injury data reported to

Labour Canada. (Figure 3 shows the injuries

plotted by year. )

‘The items to be includ[,d in the, rec(~r[] .]rL,. th[, (jatt,~n~ tjnlt,~,f

the accident; the name of the in]urcd emplo>rw; the m’ork~ite or locat ion m’here the acc idcn t OCCU rrd; the principal ca LIW or causes

ot the accident; the name (>I the dcpa rt men t or u n i t t C) which the

employee reports for work; a brief description of the Injury and I t~

direct cause; the date, time, and type of treatment provided; the

initials or name of the person who provided the treatment; and the

na t u rt> .a nd mt i ma ted c(~st clf a n y propert~r da mdgt’ (Jr ma ter]a I l(~ss

re~u I t i n~ t rom t h(~ accident.

Table 37.—Labour Canada Work Injury Experience for Industries Under Federal Jurisdiction,

5-Year Comparison

Number of disabling

Injuries

. —

1972-

2’86 7

– ‘-

1973 2,287

1974 2,578

1975 2236

1976 2420

5-year average 2478

Disabling Injuries per —

Number of Man-hours worked million man-hours Injuries per 100 Ratio of nondisabling

nondisabling Injuries (000,000’s) worked workers to disabling injuries

22,493 1780 161 278 —

7 8

20,093 1469 1 5 6 2 9 7 8 8

19,954 1479 174 2 9 7 7 7

16643 1390 160 2 6 5 7 4

16,301 1326 183 2 7 5 6 7

19,097 1489 166 2 8 3 7 7
58 Ž Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Figure 3.— Rate of Disabling Injuries

Injuries per

20 100 workers

10 Disabling injuries

per million manhours

worke d

01 1 1 1 1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

year

Differences Between U.S. and Canadian

Occupational Safety and Health

Prior to 1975, FRA collected injury data on

railroad employees involved in train operations

as well as those not involved in train operations.

The injuries reported to FRA, were only reported if they involved more than 1 day of lost

worktime. Beginning in 1975, all injuries requiring medical attention were reported as well as

those injuries resulting in 1 or more days of lost

worktime.

When comparing the United States and Canada, several differences in the reporting criteria

and

●

●

●

procedures become apparent.

Labour Canada collects occupational safety

and health data whereas the U.S. FRA collects this data as well as operations employees injury data.

Labour Canada defines “disabling injury”

and minor injury and includes fatality

under the term “disabling .“ The United

States does not have this distinction, however, it does report disabilities and subsequent fatalities. Canada does not break out

subsequent fatalities.

Until 1975, the U.S. railroads did not have

to report minor injuries or all incidents requiring medical attention whereas Canadian railroads have reported such accidents

since 1971.

Given the differences in reporting requirements, and collection procedures, the occupational safety and health trends, particularly injury data, of the two countries cannot be usefully compared.

RAILROAD ACCIDENT DATA AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

Both major Canadian railroads are required

to report accidents and casualties to CTC and

Labour Canada under their respective accident

reporting regulations. In addition to these reports and agency accident investigations, the

railroads have their own extensive accident reporting and investigation systems. This section

describes those reporting systems, their uses,

and the trends evident from available railroad

data.

Each railroad compiles complete accident and

injury data and reports such information to

chief operating officers on a monthly basis. In

addition, CP reports accidents trends to its corporate board on a quarterly basis. CN reports

accidents trends to its board on an annual basis.

Information obtained from one railroad (CN)

showed that a wide variety of accident data are

compiled on a monthly basis for use by the company. Included in the information are: accident

performance and disabling injury rates and

graphs, monthly claims and accident estimates,

expenses due to train accidents and employee injuries, comparisons between performance and

projected safety targets, regional safety performance (actual and projected goals), and

departmental totals by region. CN’s yearly

reports include, among other things, data on the

number of accidents, costs, and causes. The CN

data include all train accidents (yard and

mainline) for the year reported, not just those

reported to RTC over $750 and occurring on the

mainline. Accidents reported to the Govern-
Ch. IV Tile Accident Picture ● 5 9

ment in 1977, acccording to the $750 threshold

reporting figure, represented 17 percent of the

total accidents for CN that year.

Accident data and information were available

from both railroads. The information provided

by CN shores several patterns for 1977.

CN Data

• While the number of accidents involving

train movement occurring in the yards and

on the mainline was roughly the same, for

CN in 1977, those accidents occurring on

the mainline accounted for 91 percent of accident costs excluding lading claims.

● Of the total CN mainline accidents only 10

percent cost over $50,000 in 1977. This

percentage of severe train accidents is

similar to that of the United States. Between 1966 and 1974, less than 10 percent

of U.S. train accidents were over $50,000.2

1

● Of the total number of yard and train accidents for CN in 1977, 52 percent were

caused by operating rules violations, 16

percent by track failure, 12 percent by

equipment failure, 8 percent by noncompany fault, 5 percent by combination, and

7 percent by miscellaneous causes. In terms

of costs, track failure accounted for 53 percent, equipment—l 7 percent, human failure—l 5 percent, combination —5 percent,

noncompany —2 percent, and miscellaneous- 7 percent.

● While operating rules violations accounted

for the largest number of accidents, track

responsibility or track-related failures were

the most costly of accidents, for the single

year studied. (Tables 38 and 39 display specific human failure and track-related causes

respective] y.)

● In terms of equipment responsibility or

failure for CN, journal and wheel failures

accounted for the largest number of accidents respectively. Journals and track

failures accounted for the largest costs.

(Table 40 gives a breakdown of leading

‘ IA. E. Shulmananci C E Ta}rlor, A tI A )1[//vsI\ tlf Ni)~(’ Y~TL~r+ CIf

/<L/Ilr tJflL/ A(-I-I[{L1)It Dut[i 1 W-74 ( Rc+carch & Tc+t Department ,

A\w~clati(~n (~t Arncr]can Rallr(,ad+, 1 Q76), pp. 10-1 I

Table 38.—Accidents Resulting From

Transportation Problems or Rule Violations

(1977–CN data)

Cause Number of accidents

Rule 112: Handbrake and Coupling Rule 210

Rule 104 Hand-Operated Switches 202

Othe r 100

Special Instructions 67

Rule 103 Switching Signals 52

Rule 105 Restricted Speeds on Other Than

Main Track 22

Costs of Accidents by Cause

Percent of total cost for

Cause [ran sport problems

Rule 105 36%

Other 21

Rule 112 18

Rule 104 15

Special instructions 6

Rule 103 4

$3.075M

Table 39.—Engineering (Track) Responsibility*

(1977–CN data)

Cause

Sno–wind ice- ‘

- - -

Broken rail

Subgrade

Tie and fittings

Other

Switches

Line and gauge

Employee failure

Rockslides, etc..

Total

Number of accidents

37 -

32

30

30

30

29

16

14

12

“230–

Cause

Tie and fittings -

Broken rail

Employee failure

Subgrade

Slides, rocks

Switches and points

Snow and Ice**..

Other

Line and gauge

“Thts dafa repre~en~ all ac;ldenf~ occurring on—C~ In;l just I hose reoorled (n excess 01$75010

RTC

Cost percent

41%

24

9

7

6

4

3

3

2

“ “This caleqory appears 10 not be reflecfec in Canad!an Government data due 10 IIS low cost The

same slfuallon nkiy be true for the Unl!ed Stales on some ra(l carriers

SOURCE CN Rail
60 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 40.—Equipment Responsibility Accidents

for CN

(1977 only)

Cause Number of accidents

Journal s

Wheel s

Couple r

Employee failure

Truc k

Brake .

Body fram e

Othe r

Axle s

33

28

17

15

15

14

14

13

3

Total 152

Percent of total cost for

Cause equipment responsibility

Journal s 460/o

Truck s 17

Wheel s 12

Couplers 11

Body fram e 9

Brak e 4

Othe r 3

Axles 8

Employee failure 6

Tota l $3.5M

“This data represents all acctdents occurrlnq on~N–not lust those reported In excess of $750 to

RTC

SOURCE CN Rad

equipment-caused problems and their

costs. )

Track-related failures accounted for only

16 percent of CN’s accidents but 53 percent

of accident costs for 1977. The leading

causes of track accidents were snow and

ice, broken rail, subgrade, tie and fittings,

and switches and switch points. The leading causes in terms of costs were tie and fittings, broken rail, and employee failure.

Employee failure is defined as an accident

cause when the employee fails to perform a

prescribed task, for example, if an inspector failed to detect defective equipment that

resulted in an accident.

For the 5-year period 1972-77, CN’s accidents associated with track, equipment,

and operating rule violations appear to be

declining except for 1974. In constant

dollars, accident costs declined by 24.6 percent from 1972-76, as indicated on table 41.

However, over the 5 years, costs increases

●

in 1974 reflect the rise in accidents for that

year.

In analyzing available injury information,

the chief causes contributing to employee

injury were getting on and off trains; material handling and improper lifting procedures resulting in back, hand, foot injuries

(need for hand protection); and servicing

equipment. These injury causes are similar

to those in the United States. The leading

causes of employee injuries in the United

States for 1966-74 were: getting on and off

trains; construction and maintenance of

equipment; track maintenance; stumbling,

slipping, and falling; coupling and uncoupling; and flying object:.

CN’s injury data was not modified to show

severity until 1978. Table 42 shows CN’s 5-year

injury profile.

CN prepares comparative analyses of train

accidents and disabling injury ratios for internal

review. These analyses take CN accident and injury data and that of CP, selected U.S. railroads, and U.S. railroads in the aggregate. As

indicated on tables 43 and 44, CP showed the

lowest train accident ratio compared to that of

any of the railroads and to the [J. S. railroads in

the aggregate. CN showed the lowest injury

ratio from 1975 to the present. Prior to 1975 injuries reported by U.S. and Canadian railroads

could not be compared. From the CN analyses,

overall the Canadian railroads appear to have a

better accident and injury ratio than the U.S.

railroads in the aggregate.

CP Data

CP supplied its train accident data on an FRA

basis for this study. As indicated by their

1974-77 accident data and rates, equipment,

track, and “other” train accidents constitute the

greatest losses in terms of costs, while employee

negligence appears to be the category in which

the greatest number of train accidents occur.

(See table 45. ) When adjusted for inflation,

dollar losses resulting from train accidents for

CP appeared to have declined. In addition the

overall accident rate for CP has alSO declined in

terms of aggregate numbers and by accident

rates.
Ch. IV The Accident Picture ● 6 1

Table 41 .—CN Train and Yard Accidents by Cause, 1972-76

Employee (Track)

Year transportation Equipment engineering Noncompany Combination Miscellaneous Total

197 2 1.321

—

252 623 158 65 236 2,655

197 3 1,202 202 436 220 69 168 2,297

197 4 1,607 296 556 187 77 198 2.921

197 5 1,081 199 351 162 49 147 1,989

1976 ., 783 163 316 104 43 98 1,507

Cost of All Train and Yard Accidents (Excluding Merchandise Claims) in Dollars

Employee (Track) 1972 constant

Year transportation Equipment engineering Noncompany Combination Miscellaneous Total dollars

1972 $3,170513 $2,273,813 $5,557,182 $543,041 $569,052 $1,568.836 $13682.437 $13,682,437

1973 2,383,354 1,671,933 4,394,653 627,590 448,986 2,131,610 11,638,126 10,298,698

1974 : :.... . 4,537,636 4,136,867 4,788,853 872,295 472,085 2,213.649 17,021,385 13,266,863

197 5 3,880,695 3,203,970 6,772,869 600,289 827,064 3,123,655 18.408,542 12,256,020

1976 .: ’., 4.072,015 2,250,241 7,146,065 536,204 295,225 2,498,009 16,797,759 10,311,700

SOURCE CNRall

Table 42.—CN 5-Year Disabling Injury Ratio

(per million man-hours worked)

Transportation

Year – T.E.Y. Others Equipment Engineering

197 2 3660 4 8 0 1880 1640

197 3 3455 441 2152 1570

197 4 3488 5 9 5 2044 1942

1975. 3391 3 7 2 2034 1733

1976 2729 3 8 8 1844 1667

1977

(Jan -

Sept. ) 2413 2 9 8 1921 1452

Variance– 1972

base better

(worse) % 341 3 7 9 (2 2) 11. 5

TEY = (Transporfatlon equipment and yard)

SOURCE CNRall

Table 43.— FRA Comparative Statistics—Train Accidents

1972 1973 1974 1975a 1976a 1977b (Jan -Aug. )

Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio

CN Rail . 604 861 661 991 880 1184 524 7 7 8 518 7 9 7 305 7 2 7

CP Rail 218 531 214 5 3 4 285 6.69 220 5 6 3 247 6 5 7 124 4 8 6

U S. railroad 521 8 3 8 586 9 2 4 641 9 9 0 504 8 7 9 735 11 73 480 11 33

U.S. railroad 236 1043 257 1088 287 1216 296 9 4 0 441 1266 278 11 11

U. S. Class I

railroads 7,012 9.65 8,648 11 10 9,913 1263 8,041 1065 N/A N/A

Raflo = Number of accldenls mulflphed by 1 mllllon dwlded by Iocomotwe miles

—

apropefly damage Increased to $1 750

bprope~y damage Increased TO $2300

SOURCE CN Rail
62 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 44.— FRA Comparative Statistics— Employee Disabling Injuries

CN Rai l

CP Rai l

U S railroad

U S railroad

U.S. Class I railroads

1975* 1976 1977

Killed Injured Ratio Killed Injured Ratio Killed Injured Ratio

12 2,092 17,84 8 1,827 15.45 4 1,186 16.44

10 1,621 24,5 7 1,586 24,29 8 812 18,59

6 3,939 48,87 1 3,368 394 7 2 2,416 40.83

2 734 19.66 4 774 19,92 2 501 18,91

102 22,338 22.87 94 27,040 27,61 80 20,203 30.69

“Elfeclwe Jan 1 1975 FRA Regulallon changed all Iosl lime cases are changed which resulted In U S road increases

SOURCE CN Rail

Table 45.—CP Train Accidents on FRA Basis

Year Responsibility Number Rate per MLM* Total damage

1974

1975

1976

1977

Employee negligence . . . 70 1.64 $ 771,74 1

Detective equipment. ., . , 60 1.41 5,157,417

Defective track and structure. ., ., : : : : : : 44 1.03 4,591,223

Others . 63 1.48 3,452,609

Crossings : . . 54 1.27 1,628,999

Total . . . 291 6,83 $15,602,089

Employee negligence ., 63 1,61 $ 1,017,217

Defective equipment . ., ., . 51 1,30 2,635,172

Defective track and structure. . . . ... 30 .77 2,660,846

Others ... . . . 40 1,02 3,104,999

Crossings . ., ., ., 34 .87 2,258,731

Total 218 5.58 $11,676,965

Employee negligence ., . 83 2.21 $ 1,384,396

Defective equipment . . 37 .99 2,865,553

Defective track and structure ., ., 36 .96 5,692,913

Others . 56 1,49 2,054,498

Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 1.01 413,995

Total ., ., ., . ., ., ... . . 250 6.66 $12,411,355

Employee negligence . . . 51 1.33 $6,500,547

Defective equipment . 46 1.20 3,755,786

Defective track and structur e 36 .94 2,863,512

Others . . . 38 .99 3,133,552

Crossings . . 19 .49 296,405

Total . 190 4.94 $16,549,802

“MLM –Million Iocomollve miles

SOURCE CP Rad
Chapter V

THE RAILROAD SAFETY INQUIRY
Chapter V

THE RAILROAD SAFETY INQUIRY

Railroad officials, labor representatives, and

officials of the Canadian Transport Commission

(CTC)/Railway Transport Committee (RTC)

generally agree that a major step towards improving Canadian railroad safety was the railway safety inquiry conducted by RTC. This

chapter covers that inquiry, the events leading

to it, and some activities that were a direct result

of the inquiry.

Critical dates and activities leading to the inquiry and inquiry milestones were as follows:

1904

1967

1970

(summer)

Sept. 1,

1970

Sept. 24,

1970

Jan. 18,

1971

Jurisdiction for safe operation of Canadian

trains came under Federal jurisdiction through

the Board of Transport Commissioners

Authority for regulating the safety of the railroads transferred to the Canadian Transport

Commission/Railway Transport Committee

Series of accidents, including derailments in

Cobourg and Port Hope and a collision in

Brockville

RTC issued a formal notice that a public inquiry would be held regarding three accidents

lnquiry on three accidents began

Second phase of the inquiry on Midland Structural Company —safety of a subway structure

EVENTS LEADING TO

The Railway Transport Committee and its

predecessor, the Board of Transport Commissioners, had jurisdiction over the safe operation

of the railroads from the early 1900’s.1 As a result of its authority and growing concern at

CTC about the safe operation of Canadian railroads, RTC began an inquiry on railway safety

in 1970. The inquiry was prompted by an increase in the number of accidents involving

Jan./March Series of accidents involving dangerous com1971

Jan. 18,

1972

April 19,

1972

July 17,

1972

Dec. 28,

1973

1973

1974

modities (sulfuric acid, propane gas, liquid

sulfur, fuel, etc. ) and a derailment in the

Fraser River Canyon

Resumption of the satety inquiry to include

investigation of a CN derailment near

Dun robin, Ontario

Filing of the initial report of the railway

safety inquiry

Filing of the second report of the railway

safety inquiry

Filing of the third report of the railway

safety inquiry

CTC approached the Treasury Board requesting additional staff resources to be used to ensure railroad satety — request denied

Beginning of the Bureau of Management

Consulting study of railway safety

As indicated in this chronology, the inquiry

was divided into three phases during the September 1970 through December 1973 period.

This chapter describes: the events leading to the

safety inquiry; the inquiry process, findings,

and recommendations; and, the steps following

the inquiry including the Bureau of Management Consulting study and the creation of the

Railway Safety Advisory Committee.

THE SAFETY INQUIRY

heavier tonnage trains and an increase in accidents involving dangerous commodities. 2 A

series of accidents occurred during the summer

of 1970 including two derailments and a collision. These three accidents were the subject of

the initial inquiry.
SAFETY INQUIRY: PROCESS, FINDINGS,

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Railway Transport Committee conducted the inquiry by the authority contained in

section 226 of the Railway Act and sections 45

and 46 of the National Transportation Act. On

September 1, 1970, RTC issued a formal notice

that a public inquiry would be held regarding

the three accidents. In addition, evidence was

requested concerning maintenance and operating practices, and other matters related to derailments and collisions.

The inquiry took several forms including

public hearings and field investigations. The

Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific

(CP) Railroads, and the Canadian Railway Labour Association participated in the inquiry.

RTC received evidence about three specific

accidents (Cobourg, Port Hope, and Brockville). However, during the hearings, the panel

decided to observe operating procedures firsthand. The panel conducted onsite investigations

of the yards of both CP and CN.3

RTC attributed the Cobourg and Port Hope

accidents to journal failures that resulted in the

derailments (the Port Hope accident also involved postcrash leakage of toxic and flammable weedkiller). It attributed the Brockville

accident, a collision between a train and a track

motor car, to human error on the part of the

track car operator who apparently misjudged

the closing speed of the train.

The investigation of the three accidents convinced RTC that an expanded investigation was

necessary to determine: whether the railroads

were implementing CTC rules and regulations,

the adequacy of the railroad’s maintenance procedures, and the adequacy of its own review

procedures.4

 The expanded inquiry specifically

explored:

● a CN derailment near Dunrobin, Ontario,

where 39 passengers reported minor injuries;

. a derailment in the Fraser River Canyon involving a rockslide that killed three crew

members; and

● a number of accidents involving dangerous

commodities.

After hearings, investigations and analyses,

RTC issued its report. Among the major findings

●

●

●

●

●

of the general inquiry were:

the need for more active research into possible improvements for the design of railroad signaling devices and equipment;

derailments caused by journal failures required better evaluation;

reporting requirements for accidents at rail

grade crossings should be improved;

systems to detect rockslides were often inadequate and should be improved; and

deteriorating track conditions were increasing the potential for derailments.

Based on its findings, RTC recommended several research projects on specific safet y problems identified during the inquiry. It also recommended that the Government’s regulatory and

oversight functions be strengthened. For example, it called for increases in RTC staffing. Most

significant, it created a Railway Safety Advisory Committee. The committee consists of

railroad company representatives, CTC members, one of which chairs the committee, and

representatives from the railroad unions. Its

purpose is to explore solutions to safety problems and make recommendations to CTC.5 (Advisory committee activities are discussed in

chapter VI. )

In 1973, CTC requested that the Treasury

Board grant it 55 additional staff to conduct a

number of rail safety programs. The Treasury

Board initially denied the request on the basis

that the need for the programs was insufficiently

documented. ’ The Board requested justification

of the programs by careful analysis and demon-

‘Ibid, p Q.

JIbld , p 10
stration of their potential effectiveness. CTC

then requested that the Bureau of Management

Consulting (BMC) conduct an independent

study of rail safety problems. Specifically, CTC

requested comments on the functions of a regulatory agency and proposals for a rail safety

program. The resulting study, which required 4

man- years, produced a 13-volume report consisting of:

●

●

●

●

●

●

an evaluation of current CTC programs,

a study of the railroad environment,

an analysis of railroad accident statistics,

a compilation of the views of railroad and

union officials,

research on the economics of safety regulations, and

policy alternatives.

BMC concluded that:

Much of the increase in derailments could

be attributed to increased traffic and larger

heavier trains.

Rail grade-crossing accidents declined between 1956 and 1973.

The number of collisions during that period

had not changed substantially.

The economic input into maintenance of

rails and associated structures had progressively decreased over a period of 2 0

years. (It recommended that the issue of

deferred maintenance be studied by Government in cooperation with the railroads

and if a problem was found to exist, it

should be addressed by a combination of

fiscal and regulatory policies. )

I{[{lli[(l \/ $(/f(’( lj >11(1{1/ ( I;l] rt,<lu {~t hlc~ncl~c>mt,n t (’t}n~l]lt in~,

C dn<]~ld, 1~75 )

●

●

●

The accident data was not fully reliable.

Differences existed in the data collected by

the Government and that collected by the

railroads.

Problems existed in implementing programs to deal with the highway/railcrossing problem. (Highway/rail-crossing

findings are discussed in chapter VI. )

Problems existed in the handling and shipment of dangerous commodities. (See chapter VI. )

The safety programs of RTC were evaluated

and a number of further improvements were

suggested by BMC. These included the redesign

of inspection programs, accident investigation,

data reporting and analysis, and the introduction of some new standards. 8

BMC made the following policy observation:

In order to set a level of collective risk, the

Government must consider the societal costs of

damage and societal benefits from transportation, as against the railway cost and railway

benefits. The difference between the societal

costs and railway costs from accidental damage

arises due to the fact that the railways do not

suffer the total economic loss from accidents.

The societal costs of accidents are greater than

that considered by the railways. To induce a

higher level of safety, society can use the following three policy instruments: subsidy, taxation,

and regulatory measures.9
Chapter Vl

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
Chapter VI

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

Two Federal organizations have responsibility for Canadian railroad safety: the Canadian

Transport Commission’s (CTC) Railway Transport Committee (RTC), and the Department of

Labour’s Occupational Safety and Health Division.

CTC was established in 1967 by the National

Transportation Act. CTC is the Federal Government’s regulatory body responsible for all transportation modes. RTC is responsible for limited

economic regulatory activity, safety regulatory

activity, and financial assistance programs for

Canada’s railroads. RTC has six commissioners,

some of whom have responsibility for the

regulation of other transportation modes. RTC

is organized around the following activities: rail

systems engineering, rail safety and standards,

rail services, rail economic analysis, and tariff

and traffic. The CTC/RTC regulates all railroads except those that are intraprovincial. Provincial jurisdiction does not extend to railroads

under CTC jurisdiction.

The Department of Labour’s Occupational

Safety and Health Division is a regulatory body

similar to the U.S. Occupational Safety and

Health Administration within the Department

of Labor.

This chapter is organized as follows:

Canadian Transport Commission Activities

Regulation

Inspection

Dangerous Commodities/Explosives Safety

Highway/Railroad Crossing Safety

Labour Canada’s Occupational Safety and

Health

Regulations

Activities

Railway Safety

CANADIAN TRANSPORT COMMISSION

Advisory Committee

ACTIVITIES

Regulations

A range of subjects directly

significant to railroad safety

or tangentially

is covered by

regulations in Canada and in the United States.

The regulations in the United States applicable

to rail safety are primarily developed and administered by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Promulgation of the Canadian rail

safety regulations is one of the functions of

CTC. Other important regulations are those for

occupational safety and health, which in the

United States are issued by the Department of

Labor and in Canada by Labour Canada. In

both countries there are not any workplace safety and health rules applicable exclusively to the

railroads. Table

safety regulatory

try.

46 indicates the range of rail

subjects covered by each counThe Canadian body of law that is comparable

to title 49 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, with respect to railroads, is the Revision

and Consolidation of General Orders of the

Board of Transport Commissioners of Canada

(now CTC). This is, as the name suggests, a

compilation and revision of all orders establishing regulations of general applicability issued by CTC and its predecessors since 1906. It

has four parts of which two—Operating and Engineering—have safety implications. These

orders, generally, were effective as of February

1965, when the consolidation occurred.

Accident Reporting

The regulatory requirements for accident reporting are substantially more broad than the

statutory requirements for accident reporting.

71
72 . Railroad/ Safety—U. S.-Canadian Comparison

Table 46.—U.S. and Canadian Railroad Safety Regulations

Subject U.S. provision Canadian provision

Hazardous materials ,

Ambient noise . : ., : : : : : : : :

Procedural rules ., ., ., . . . .

State/Province participation . . . . .

Track safety standards ., .,

Freight car safety standards ., : : : : : : : :

Special notice, emergency orders

Operating rules–general. . : : : : : : : : :

Operating rules–specific (blueflag, etc. )

Two-way radios ., . .

Rear-end marking devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident reports. ., . . . . . .

Hours of service ., ., ., . ., ., ., .,

Locomotive design, performance . . .

Safety appliances. . .

Power brakes and drawbars. ., .

Signals and related devices ., ., ., .,

Occupational Safety and Healt h

Mixed passenger/freight equipment–

vestibule doors .

Testing employees–sight, hearing

Loading open top cars. . . . . . . . .

Special equipment regulations (mailcars, snow

plows, grain cars). ., . . . .,

Air pollution and control . ., . . ., ., . . .,

Fire extinguishers and emergency tools in

passenger cars . . . . . . .

Fire prevention from railroad causes . . . .,

Grade crossings. ., . . . . . . . . . . .,

Railroad design (plans, profiles, etc. ) ., . . .

Utilities on or near rail line ., .,

Fencing ., ., ., . . . .

49 CFR 172-174, 178-179, 209

40 CFR 20 (EPA), 49 CFR 210;

49 CFR 171, 211

49 CFR 171, 211

49 CFR 212

49 CFR 213

49 CFR 215

49 CFR 216

49 CFR 217

49 CFR 218

49 CFR 220

49 CFR 221

49 CFR 225

49 CFR 228

49 CFR 230

49 CFR 231

49 CFR 232

49 CFR 233-236

29 CFR 1910

None

None

None

None

None applicable exclusively to

railroads

None

None

None

None

None

None

Gen. Order no. 0-29 to O-34

N/A

Gen. Order no. M-2

None

None

None

None

Gen. Order no. 0-8

Gen. Order no. 0-8

None

None

Gen. Order no. 0-

None

Gen. Order no. 0- 1 to 0-14,0-16 to

0-19,0-21

Gen. Order. no. 0-10

Gen. Order no. 0-20 (air brake only)

Gen. Order no. E-12 and E-13

SOR 71-30, 71-483, 71-481, 71-584,

71-605, 71-616, 72-663, 72-13, 72-23,

72-66, 72-666, 72-171, 72-288,

73-679, and 78-559

Gen. Order no. O-6

Gen. Order no. O-9

Gen. Order no. O-15

Gen. Order no. 0-22-0-24

Gen. Order no 0-26

Gen. Order no. 0-27

Gen. Order no. 0-28, E-16

Gen. Order no. E-3 and E-9

Gen. Order no. E-1 and E-2

Gen. Order no. E-lo and E-12

Gen. Order no. E-17

The regulations require reports on five types of

accidents to CTC:

1. accidents attended by death or personal

injury or whereby any bridge, culvert,

viaduct, or tunnel has been damaged;

2. accidents not attended by death or personal injury

—at public highway crossings, or

—collisions and derailments on main track

where damage to railway property is in

excess of $750;

3. obstructions on railway causing delay in

operations of more than 24 hours,

4. employees suddenly stricken while on

duty and death ensues, and

5. accidents involving handling of dangerous

commodities. 1

Only the first is required by statute. The information required in the report and the speed

of its delivery vary depending on the nature and

severity of the accident. Reports are not required for accidents that occur for reasons other

than “as a result of transportation, that is to say

where trains, engines, cars, or other rolling

stock either while in motion or stationary are involved . . . .“2 Accidents occurring in shops or

other facilities are specifically excluded unless

‘General Order O-1.

‘Ibid.
Ch. VI Government Programs ž 73

they occur directly or indirectly or a result of

transportation as so defined.

By comparison, the FRA accident report regulations are substantially more comprehensive

with respect to casualties. They require reporting of all types of accidents involving rail operations, not just derailments and collisions, if

damage to railroad property is in excess of

$2,300. It also appears that the amount of detail

required by FRA concerning a reported accident

or casualty is substantially greater than that required in Canada. On the other hand, Canada

requires accidents resulting in damage to a

bridge, culvert, viaduct, or tunnel or where

there is an obstruction on the track causing a

delay of 24 hours or more, regardless of whether

there is significant damage or casualty. This

presumably is intended to give CTC notice of

conditions that may impair subsequent safe

transportation. Canada is considering a complete revision of its accident-reporting requirements.

Operating Rules

CTC established by general order a uniform

code of operating rules for use by all railroads

subject to its jurisdiction. These are the rules

that govern the continuing activities of rail

employees in the conduct of rail operations. The

current version of these was adopted in 1976. 3

All employees involved in rail operations must

initially pass a written examination administered by the railroads and, every 3 years thereafter, must pass an oral examination on the

operating rules.

This regulation also sets forth seven additional rules that modify or extend earlier rules

contained in Canada’s Uniform Code. First, it

states the manner and type of blue-signal display necessary to meet the requirements of Rule

26 of the Uniform Code. The blue-signal display

is intended to alert railroad crews that

employees are working under or between certain rail equipment and thus that equipment

should not be disturbed. The special Canadian

rules also require locking with special locks for

all switches leading to repair track with the keys

‘ General Order O-8.

carried by the foreman or other person in

charge.

The Canadian rule differs from the U.S. blueflag rule as recently amended in a number of

substantive respects. First, the Canadians require the signal to be mounted on a steel frame

at a height of 5 feet. The frame is attached to the

track between the switch and the first piece of

rolling stock (presumably at both ends of the

track if both are open to a switch). The United

States has a variety of requirements as to the

location of the blue signal depending on the

nature and location of the equipment involved.

Second, the Canadian rule does not distinguish

in its requirements between main and other

track, or between manually operated and remotely controlled switches as does the U.S.

rule. Third, the Canadian rule does not contain

most of the operational detail and alternative

forms of providing protection that are contained in the proposed U.S. rule. For this reason

the Canadian rule is probably one-tenth as long

as the U.S. rule.4

The remaining special Canadian operating

rules, which have no similar U.S. Government

requirement, are on the following subjects and

generally relate to or modify the requirements

of the Uniform Code: protection of impassable

or slow track, speed limits and operating procedures at crossings of one rail line by another

at grades and drawbridges, speed of trains at

highway-level crossings, flagging equipment on

engines, signals at public crossings, and a ppointment of conductor to protect light engine

movements on main track.

Finally, in a separate order,5 CTC requires the

testing by the company of the visual acuity, color perception, and hearing of railway employees. The tests are specified in the rule. Periodic

re-examination is also required. In the United

States, virtually all aspects of operating rules,

including the testing of employees, are left to the

separate determination of each company.

4

44 F.R. 2174, Jan. 10, 1979.

‘General Order o-9.
74 ● Railroad Safety —U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Safety Appliances and

Locomotive Inspection

For the most part the safety appliance regulations, which establish requirements for certain

“appliances” to be used on rail equipment for

safety purposes, are virtually identical in

Canada and the United States to the extent they

address the same subject. Only three provisions

appear in the Canadian orders that do not appear in the comparable section of the U.S. regulation.’ They address safety appliances for

“boarding cars” and appliances for locomotives

of special construction. The United States, on

the other hand, has provisions for safety appliances not covered by Canadian rules. They pertain to certain kinds of unidirectional passenger

cars, box and other house cars with high roofs,

self-propelled track motorcars, road locomotives with corner stairways, and locomotives

used in switching.

Canadian and U.S. requirements for locomotives, including their inspection, appear to be

similar in that they address the same areas.

However, design specifications, for example,

cab interiors, which do not seem to receive

treatment in Canada, do receive detailed treatment by the United States. In some instances

many of the U.S. and Canadian regulations for

identical subjects may be similar but the United

States, by comparison, regulates in far greater

detail than does Canada’ (compare U.S. requirements for multiple-operated electric units

in 49 CFR 230 D with Canadian requirements in

General Order 0-21 adopted in 1970 for inspection and maintenance for motive power equipment).

Dangerous Commodities

Dangerous commodities regulations of CTC

are substantially similar to the U.S. regulations. 8 However, Canadian dangerous commodities regulations cover some areas that are

not subject to Federal regulation in the United

States. First, CTC established rules governing

’49 CFR 231.

‘Compare 49 CFR 230D with General Order 0-21 re~ardin~ inspection and maintenance of motive power equipment.

‘General Order O-29 thru O-36.

transportation of dangerous commodities i n

piggyback service, adopting the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) tariff ‘requirements for

the cargo tank unit. Second, the CTC rules

cover the design, location, construction, operation, and maintenance of stationary bulk storage facilities for liquefied petroleum gases, flammable liquids, and anhydrous ammonia; unloading facilities for chlorine tank cars; and

storage of ammonium nitrate and ammonium

nitrate mixed fertilizers. CTC requires the railroad to submit the plans and specifications for

each of these for approval. The U.S. Department of Transportation does not have similar

specifications for such facilities. Canada also

regulates design, location, construction, and

operation of gas fuel systems c n railway cars.

The United States does not.

Rail/Highway Crossings

CTC has regulations governing four aspects

of rail/highway crossings—grade crossings, 9

grade separations, 10 protective devices,11 and requirements for financial accounting for gradecrossing projects. 12 In the United States, these

subjects are not covered even in part by Federal

regulation, but rather are administered by the

States using Federal funds. CTC approves the

plans of a railway line before it is constructed as

well as those of any modification to the line.

Thus, review of the plans of all aspects of

rail/highway crossings is consistent with this

regulatory scheme.

In seeking approval for new grade crossings,

the crossing party must submit a detailed application to CTC. CTC regulations establish specific requirements for the incline of approach of

the highway, length and width of crossing surface, fencing, and signboards. The party constructing the crossing must pay the cost of construction and maintenance unless it has senior

title to the property.

Canadian grade-separation regulations

(which have not been revised to account for the

changes made by the 1974 Railway Relocation

‘General Order E-4.

l~Genera] Order E-5.

1‘General Order E-6.

IZGenera] Order E-7 thru E-9.
Ch. VI Government Programs ● 7 5

and Crossing Act concerning financial assistance) also require submission of detailed plans

and specifications to CTC for approval. The applicant must also submit certain financial data

when funds are requested. The regulations outline cost-sharing formulas of the Government,

the highway authority, and the railroads for

each project and for its future maintenance.

Allocations vary depending on the type and size

of the project.

Protective device regulations are essentially

design and installation specifications for particular types of grade-crossing warning devices.

They are guidelines for the railroads to follow

when they install and maintain protective devices at crossings. The regulations concerning

treatment of accounts in joint rail/highway

crossing projects are used in those projects

undertaken pursuant to CTC order. They provide detailed treatment of the subject matter,

such as rental rates of 254 different types of

equipment.

Signals and Related Systems

CTC retains complete control over all aspects

of the design, construction, location, and use of

interlocking and signal systems. 13 Plans for the

construction and modification of such systems

must be submitted to CTC for review and approval. The regulations establish detailed requirements for these systems and provide, in effect, for uniformity of such systems on all railroads subject to the jurisdiction of CTC. However, the regulations do not establish requirements for inspection, maintenance, or repair of

these systems. In the United States, a different

approach is used. Plans and specifications for

new systems are not approved although any applicable requirements for systems once installed

must be observed. Discontinuance or modification of the signal system requires FRA approval.

In addition, the carrier must observe certain

periodic inspection requirements and report signal failures and accidents resulting therefrom.

The U.S. requirements appear to be at least as

detailed as those in Canada, if not more so.

Summary

In the long established areas of railroad safety

regulation, such as those for safety appliances

and locomotives, there appears to be little significant difference between the requirements of

the two countries, although U.S. regulations, in

some respects are considerably more detailed. In

matters dealing with the fixed plant of the railroads, the approach is quite different. Canada

requires review and approval of initial plans

and specifications and of subsequent modifications. It also establishes many design requirements. However, it does not establish maintenance standards or minimum inspection requirements. The United States, on the other

hand, prescribes maintenance and inspection

practices but does not require pre-installation

review.

The United States and Canada also take an

entirely different approach to operating rules.

The United States has traditionally left operating rules to the railroads’ discretion. The

Association of American Railroads has produced a set of operating rules as a guide to their

members. However, in recent years the United

States has begun to consider piecemeal adoption

of a Federal operating rule on certain matters

believed to need nationwide uniformity. An example is the blue-flag rule. Canada, on the other

hand, owing probably to the fact that there are

only two major carriers, has established a Federal Code of Uniform Operating Rules. These

rules appear to generally follow a relatively simple format and style similar to that used by

many U.S. carriers. This simplicity contrasts

greatly with the comparatively detailed and

lengthy style used by FRA in the few rules it has

established. 14

While much of the focus of U.S. regulatory

activity in the past 7 years has been on track and

freight car standards, Canada does not have any

rules in those areas. Moreover, it has not

adopted any regulations concerning hours of

service despite a statute specifically authorizing

it to do so. This subject is left to collective bargaining between labor and management. On the

other hand, Canada has been very active in de-

) ‘General Order E-12 and E-13. “4Q CFR 218,
76 . Railroad Safety —- U.S.-Canadian Comparison

signing new programs for rail/highway crossings, whereas in the United States this has essentially been left to the States with matching-share

Federal funding, with the addition of some federally funded studies and demonstration projects.

Finally, the Canadians use a somewhat different approach for reporting accidents. They do

not report yard accidents unless they result in

injury or death. They also do not collect data on

occupational safety and health hazards as distinguished from operational safety. However,

they do require reports of incidents that cause

train delays or obstructions regardless of

whether any injury or damage is incurred.

Overall, Canadian regulations suggest a

closer working relationship between the railroads and CTC than exists between U.S. regulatory agencies and the railroads in this country.

This is supported by the fact that CTC does not

rely on collection of fines as its major enforcement tool. Also the fact that CTC has not

sought to revise its regulations continually to

meet changing needs seems to indicate, among

other things, that it is not relying heavily on a

regulatory structure to accomplish its safety objectives.

Inspections

The Government safety inspection programs

are carried out by the Rail Services Branch of

RTC. The safety inspection programs implemented and planned by the Branch include

track, car, locomotive, operations, dangerous

commodities, fire prevention, stationary mechanical equipment, structures (including highway grade crossings), and signals. In addition,

the Rail Services Branch has responsibilities that

are not directly associated with railroad safety.

These responsibilities include such diverse areas

as monitoring the rehabilitation of grain-hauling branchlines, administering the branchlike

abandonment program (including the capital expenditure fund for lines eligible for subsidies in

connection with abandonment), evaluating

passenger service, and monitoring station retire:

ment and agency centralization activity.

Thus, RTC’s organizational structure by combining inspections with other activities reflects

the philosophy that railway safety is an integral

part of all aspects of rail service delivery. Nonetheless, safety is considered an essential aspect

of rail service delivery and specific attention is

paid to it in the particular inspection programs,

listed above, that are carried OUt by the Railway

Services Branch. The Branch itself is organized

into two divisions: the Infrastructure and Equipment Assessment Division and the Rail Systems

Performance Evaluation Division, both of

which have some responsibility for safety inspection. The Infrastructure and Equipment Assessment Division is responsible for monitoring

compliance with track (including all aspects of

the right-of-way), fixed structures, and equipment standards and regulations. The Rail Systems Performance Evaluation Branch is responsible for monitoring compliance with service,

dangerous commodities, and the Uniform Code

of Operating Rules.

The Rail Services Branch is authorized 2 9

staff in headquarters to carry out all of its responsibilities; these persons are divided approximately equally between the two Divisions. The

Branch believes that almost all of the activities

of the Infrastructure and Equipment Assessment

Division and about half of the Rail Systems Performance Evaluation Division activities are directly linked to railroad safety. In addition to

the headquarters activities associated with safety, RTC has field offices in six different locations throughout Canada .15 The field offices

work in the general areas of accident investigations, quality control inspection programs, applications processing (for example, applications

for abandonments), and investigation of complaints. In a field force of 84, approximately 59

persons spend some time on safety-related inspections. CTC estimates that about 35 percent

of the professional person-hours available in the

field are spent on safety matters. Although the

headquarters Rail Services Branch does not

have direct authority over the regions, it establishes the programs of work and the standards of performance for the field safety inspections.

‘lsMonOtOn, MOntrea], Toron”to, Winnipeg Ca]gary, and Vancouver.
Ch. VI Government Programs • 7 7

The top management of CTC views the inspection priorities as follows:

● accident investigation,

● grade-crossings inspection (including an informal supplement to ongoing programs

administered by the Rail Services Branch),

and

● safety inspection programs administered by

the Rail Services Branch (of which car

equipment inspection has received highest

priority).

These priorities were arrived at by an informal

consensus process as well as by management decisions made as a result of top management’s

perception of the existing problems. Some feeling was expressed by top management that the

Rail Services Branch should give greater priority

to the track inspection and operations (human

error) problems. At this time, CTC acknowledges that the Rail Services Branch has been

unable to match the priorities of the inspection

program against accident data, because of inadequacies in the data collection system. With

regard to the bulk of the safety inspection programs, the Rail Services Branch recognizes that

with limited personnel it cannot inspect 100 percent of the railroad’s plant and operations. It

sees the Government’s role in the inspection program as monitoring what the railroads are

themselves doing. In this monitoring, Government inspectors note conditions and defects that

require correction and, in this way, the Rail

Services Branch sees its activities as directly

related to the prevention of and the reduction of

accidents. In addition, from its perspective the

Rail Services Branch believes that there may be

two other principal benefits stemming from the

inspection activity. These are:

The fact that Government is concerned

about railroad safety and is monitoring the

railroads’ safety performance by means of

inspection in itself tends to raise the general

level of compliance.

The fact that Government is concerned

about railroad safety and is monitoring the

railroads safety performance by means of

inspection helps the various operating

levels in the railroads’ own organizations

justify and receive more funds for maintenance than they might have otherwise received. The Rail Services Branch, however,

acknowledges that it has no absolute measures of effectiveness for the inspection programs, although such indices are currently

being developed. ”

The Rail Services Branch believes that the effectiveness of an inspection effort that is based

on the concept of periodic monitoring must be

based also on the credibility of the inspections

with the railroads—both with management and

with the individual supervisor or employee at

the working level. The Rail Services Branch has,

therefore, followed a policy of hiring personnel

who have had considerable experience in the

railroad industry itself and who have achieved a

certain stature within the organization of the

railroad. Thus, it is not uncommon for RTC inspectors to be people who have reached the

assistant superintendent level after 10 years with

the railroad. In the opinion of the Rail Services

Branch, however, such a policy is increasingly

difficult to implement given the hiring constraints placed on RTC and the railroads’ ability

to compete successfully with the Government in

terms of benefits.

CTC attempts to make the inspection efforts

both systematic and representative. However,

the individual inspectors are given latitude in

devising their own inspection strategy. A description of the major inspection activities

directly related to safety follows.

Track Inspection

The goal of the track inspection program is to

monitor, evaluate, and regulate the quality of

track and right-of-way .17 Since there are no

Government-mandated track standards, RTC

inspectors check against the railroads’ own

standards, which approximate the American

16The Bureau ~lf Management Consulting is conducting a study

to devel{~p measures of effectiveness for the inspection program as

a whole. In the Rail Services Branch, Activity Resource Allocation

forms, which describe specific program components of the

Branch’s work, set forth “criteria to asses effectiveness and efficiency. ” These criteria do not measure the degree of impact of any

given program, but rather indicate what areas should be affected if

the program is having an impact.

17CTC Activity Resource Association, “Track and Right-of-Way

Quality Control.”
7g ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Railway Engineering Association (AREA) recommended standards and which RTC representatives feel are adequate. At the present time,

track inspection is conducted generally in the

course of other engineering inspection duties,

such as inspecting drainage, fencing, or crossing

problems, However, the Rail Services Branch

stated that it tries to make the inspections as systematic as possible.

Recently RTC began two additional efforts

that can serve as tools of the inspection program. A description of each undertaking follows:

Comprehensive Track Inspection Effort: RTC

assigned an engineer with substantial railroad

experience to inspect the entire mainlines of

both CN and CP. The inspector went over both

systems in a high rail car (stopping along the

way to make spot checks), passenger train, and

freight train. In addition, RTC obtained information from the railroads about the type of rails

and ties installed during the past 5 years, the

ballasting and surfacing programs undertaken,

the number of inspectors and track forces (mobile and fixed) assigned, and the tonnage moved

over various subdivisions. RTC also gathered

information on the branchlines and conducted

some inspections but it did not conduct a complete field inspection.

From the analysis of information obtained

from all these activities, the Rail Services

Branch’s opinion was that, in general, the mainlines of both railroads are in good condition.

However, the branchlines are not in as good

condition as they were in the early 1950’s when

short section forces were responsible for manually inspecting and maintaining the road.

Nonetheless, the Rail Services Branch’s opinion

indicated that the branchlines are not in an unsafe condition. Representatives of the Rail Services Branch indicated their belief that the condition of the lines represented policy decisions by

the railroads to place primary emphasis on the

mainlines.

l~on ~i5cu55i{)n5 with CTC representatives, there seemed to be

some difference of opinion as to the condition of the track. Some

high-ranking members of CTC believe that the track may not be in

as good condition as the inspection reports might indicate.

Photographing of Mainlines: Based on a pilot

study, the Rail Services Branch has proposed to

photograph the mainlines at prescribed intervals

(of approximately 300 feet). The photographs

would be made by a camera mounted on a high

rail car. The camera would take a picture with a

wide area of vision (two frames sideways would

constitute one picture) and would code the section of the track photographed. RTC believes

that a photographic record of the track would

aid in accident investigation as well as in headquarter’s analysis of any particularly difficult

inspection issue that might arise. RTC proposes

to update the photographic library whenever a

major change in the configuration of the track

might occur (e.g., installation of a new grade

crossing). 19

Car Inspection

The goal of the car inspection program is to

monitor, evaluate, and regulate the quality of

railroad cars. CTC gives this program highest

priority of all inspection activities. As in the

track inspections, the principal activities are to:

develop and update information concerning the

condition of railroad cars in Canada by a systematic cyclical inspection program; to effect

improvements in related railroad maintenance

practices where deficiencies are identified; and

to investigate complaints and ensure that necessary remedial action is taken ,

20

The inspection program is based on a risk factor analysis developed by RTC. In this context,

the term “risk” is defined as “expected severity

within the system .”21 The concept combines

probability of defect occurrence with the potential severity of occurrence. RTC developed the

risk factor by rating 125 typical defects on a

severity scale of 1 to 20. The defects were rated

in terms of potential for personal injury and

property damage. The ranking was performed

by various people knowledgeable in railroad

l*The Rai] Services Branch representatives indicated that the

Canadian highway department has made a I imilar photographic

record of highways; however, the purpose or the record was not

safety inspection, but rather to judge efficacy of signing.

z~CTC Activity Resource Allocation, “car (~uality Control. ”

“’’Analysis of Defect Severity and Risk for Railway Car Equipmerit, ” working paper completed for RTC, project no. 3-1265,

August 1977 (draft), p. 1.
Ch. VI Government Programs ● 7 9

operations. The severity number finally assigned to each defect resulted from averaging

the severity numbers assigned to it in the categories of personal injury and property damage.

When an inspection is carried out and a defect

is discovered, the inspector enters the defect

code on their inspection report. The information

is computerized. By the time that the end of a

quarter is reached, a “scientific random sampling” of cars has been made. RTC is then in a

position to describe what the condition of the

fleet is, based on the established measures. The

inspectors examined a total of 11,000 cars in a

representative quarter; however, the risk factor

for that quarter does not mean anything in isolation. RTC believes that the significance of the

risk factor lies in the comparisons that it will

enable RTC to make over different time periods.

The risk factor inspection of car equipment is a

new program of RTC.

RTC inspectors are instructed to inspect cars

at the large centers through which cars pass, and

at points where there might be captive cars (cars

that run only between certain points and do not

go through one of the large interchange centers).

Inspectors are also to inspect cars in receiving

yards, on repair tracks, and in leaving yards. Inspectors inspect one side of a train only and

check the brakes on every 10 cars that they inspect. They are assisted in making their inspection reports by recording equipment, from

which they transcribe their findings onto a

standardized form. The forms are in triplicate:

one copy for the railroad supervisor, one filed

with headquarters, and one retained by the inspector. The Rail Services Branch estimates that

between 30,000 and 40,000 units are inspected

annually.

Motive Power Inspection

The goal of the motive power inspection program is to monitor, evaluate, and regulate the

quality of motive power units. As in the car and

track programs, the principal activities are: to

develop and update information concerning the

condition of railroad motive power units by a

systematic cyclical inspection program, to effect

improvements in related railroad maintenance

practices where deficiencies are identified, and

to investigate complaints and ensure that

necessary remedial action is taken .22

The motive power inspection program is carried out in a similar way to the car inspection

program. Inspectors check a sample of motive

power units at various points in service, such as

in the receiving yards, and the leaving yards.

RTC is developing a risk factor for motive

power units that will be similar in concept to

that developed for cars.

Dangerous Commodities Inspection

The goals of the dangerous commodities inspection program are twofold: to ensure the safe

storage, handling, and transportation of dangerous commodities on the railroad system in

Canada; and to monitor, evaluate, observe, and

regulate railroad and shipper compliance with

CTC regulations for the transportation, storage,

and handling of dangerous commodities. The

major activities of personnel in this program are

the systematic inspection of various railroad facilities, the ongoing inspection of shipper and

carrier facilities, and the conduct of training sessions to ensure understanding of the regulations. 23 The inspectors look primarily at the

adequacy of the storage and handling of the

dangerous commodities being shipped .2’

RTC has one full-time dangerous commodities officer in Vancouver. Otherwise, the dangerous commodities inspections are conducted

by the car inspectors, the transportation officers, and the operations inspectors. CTC estimates that any given inspector can inspect from

40 to 80 tank cars a day. The inspector must

break the seal on each car, check empty cars,

and verify that the Hazardous Information

Emergency Response form (HIER), giving information about action to take in the event of an

accident, is present for shipments of dangerous

commodities.

‘2CTC Activity Resource Allocation, “Motive Power Quality

Control. ”

“CTC Activity Resource Allocation, “Dangerous Commodities

Regulations Compliance”.

‘“The Canadian Government’s Bureau of Expl(~sive\ has resp(~n -

sibi lit ~ to protect carriers from committing infractions but is not a

regulatory agency.
80 ● Railroad Safety —U.S.-Canadian Comparison

Every 30 days, the inspectors concentrate on

a specific dangerous commodity activity, paying particular attention to what defects are present in the aggregate, RTC uses this information

to determine whether trends might be developing. Inspectors are authorized to stop a train if a

specific defect found during the course of any inspection is sufficiently serious, in the judgment

of the inspector.

In addition to the inspection activities, RTC

staff hold regional seminars to develop awareness among both RTC staff and railroad employees about the requirements for handling

dangerous commodities. These seminars are oriented to the practicalities of handling commodities—i.e., setting up trains, re-railing cars,

handling leakage, and the like—as well as to the

overall requirements and enforcement policies

of RTC. RTC is also beginning to conduct seminars for the shippers of dangerous commodities. Dangerous commodities are discussed

in greater detail in the following section.

Operations Inspection

The goal of the operations inspection program is to monitor, evaluate, and regulate the

quality of railroad operations of trains on mainline and yard operations. The operations inspectors systematically monitor railroad operating

procedures to determine the quality of railroad

operations as they relate to safety and, in particular, to the Government-mandated Uniform

Code of Operating Rules and other related instructions and regulations .25

All written complaints by operating crews

concerning operating conditions are investigated. Two inspectors, one in headquarters

and one in Calgary, concern themselves almost

exclusively with operating practices, including

in-cab observation of engineers. Inspectors in

each of the regions conduct operations inspections in addition to their other responsibilities.

The two inspectors who are concerned almost

exclusively with operations inspection devote

most of their time to engine handling. Other operations inspectors are concerned with the obZ5CTC Ac

tivity ReSC}Urce Allocation, “Train Operations Quality

Control. ”

servance of the operating rules generally—both

by labor and by management.

When an employee has violated an operating

rule, the RTC inspector reports the violation to

the employee. Depending on the nature of the

violation, it may be reported also to the railroad. However, representatives of the Rail Services Branch stated that the violations do not

usually warrant discipline by the railroad. Instead, the violations are usually of such a type

that they relate to the system of operations.

Other Inspection Programs26

Other RTC inspection programs are designed

to ensure that measures taken by the railroads

are adequate to prevent, detect, and suppress

fires on and near the railroad right-of-way; to

monitor, evaluate, and regulate the quality of

railroad stationary mechanical equipment; to

monitor, evaluate, and regulate the quality of

maintenance of railroad structures; to ensure

that the protection, safety, and convenience of

the public is provided for by an adequate level

of maintenance of highway/railroad crossings

and ancillary installations; 27 and, to monitor,

evaluate, and regulate the quality of railroad

signal installations.

The inspection programs for stationary mechanical equipment, railroad structures, highway grade crossings, and signal installations are

based primarily on a systematic approach to inspection and secondarily on response to complaints. However, the fire prevention inspection

program, is directed by a greater responsiveness

to incidence of complaints. The five inspection

programs mentioned here are similar to each

other and the others discussed above in that

they operate from a regional base. Taken together, these five programs are intended to provide assurance that the rail operating environment does not in itself pose hazards.

z~CTC Activity Resource Allocation, “F re prevention, Stationary Mechanical Equipment Quality Cent-ol, Structures Quality Control, Signal Quality Control, Crossinl; Safety, and Protection Evaluation. ”

Zzsee a subsequent section of this chapter fc r a ful] discussion of

the highway grade-crossing program.
Ch. VI Government Programs ● 8 1

A detailed quality control program is being

developed for signal and crossing inspections.28

This program will entail compiling an inventory

of signal equipment by subdivision and inspecting crossing warning devices and various signal

systems in a comprehensive way. This effort is

planned to take place in cooperation with the

railroads. However, staff limitations have impeded the implementation of a planned structures comprehensive review similar in concept

to the signal and crossing review.29 RTC is currently reviewing the procedures and effectiveness of the fire prevention inspection programs.

In the view of the Rail Services Branch, a meeting arranged by RTC between railroad officials

and forestry representatives in British Columbia

and Ontario resulted in greater cooperation and

fewer railroad-associated fires .30

Dangerous Commodities

The Railway Transport Committee, in its initial report of the railway safety inquiry, noted a

“factor of grave concern was the rapidly increasing involvement in railroad accidents of

cars carrying a wide variety of dangerous commodities whose cargo, if accidentally released,

could pose a serious hazard not only to railroad

employees but also to the lives and property of

the public. ”31 During the inquiry, derailments

occurred involving dangerous commodities that

increased the inquiry panel’s interest in that type

of accident .32 The inquiry panel concluded that

shipment of dangerous commodities confronted

Canada’s regulatory authority with a new dimension in destructiveness and danger of life

and limb. 33

frequent, presented the potential for major

catastrophes. Available data for the years

1970-73, showed 2 fatalities and 34 injuries

resulting from accidents involving dangerous

commodities. Table 47 provides the information

of the Bureau.

Dangerous Commodities Safety

Responses

Transportation of dangerous commodities

comes under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Canada’s Railway Act specifies that:

• No passenger shall carry, except in conformity with a CTC order, gunpowder,

dynamite, nitroglycerine, or any other

goods of a dangerous or explosive nature.

. Every person sending dangerous commodities shall indicate the nature of the shipment on the outside of the package and give

written notice of the commodity to the employee of the company receiving the goods.

• The railway shall not carry goods of an explosive or dangerous nature except in conformity with CTC regulations. s

’

Dangerous Commodities Task Force

During the general inquiry, RTC explored

problems associated with the shipment of dangerous commodities. It examined, for example,

whether new railroad technology was increasing

the hazards; whether railroad practices and

rules for dangerous commodities were adequate

to meet the increased hazards; and whether exTable 47.—Canadian Incidents Involving

Dangerous Commodities

In 1974, the Bureau of Management Consulting (BMC) concluded that very little data was

available on incidents involving dangerous

commodities. BMC contended that dangerous

commodities incidents, although relatively inZ~Raj ] Servjces Branch, “Status of Program s,” June 30, 1978, PP.

5-6.

‘

9

1 bid., p. 7.

‘“Ibid., p. 15.

~l~nitia~ ~eportof the Railway Safety Inquiry (Canadia n

Transport Commission, 1972) p. 1.

321 bid., p. 1.

331 bid., p. 19,

Total incidents for Average number of

Type of commodity 1970-73 incidents per year

Flammable solids. ., ., 14 3.5

Flammable liquids . . . 53 13,25

Oxidizing organic. . . 22 5.5

Poison ... ., . . . . ., 18 4.5

Corrosive . . . . . . . . 27 6.75

Explosive ... ... 0 0.0

Radioactive. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0.5

Compound gas . . . . . . . 8 2.0

Total. ... ... ., ., . . . . 144 36,0

SOURCE Slat! stlcal Analysls 1956-73 p 75

JdRai]Way Act, Ch. ‘-2.
82 . Railroad Safety U.S.-Canadian Comparison

isting rules were being properly applied and

monitored. RTC felt these issues about the adequacy of the research effort were not satisfactorily answered during its inquiry .35 RTC therefore proposed that CTC create a task force to

examine rail transportation of dangerous commodities. In 1971, CTC created a task force with

representatives from CP, CN, and the Canadian

Railway Labour Association. This group was to

review the hazards associated with the transportation of dangerous commodities by rail. T h e

task force was to recommend measures to ensure the highest level of safety compatible with

the economy of operation and expeditious

movement of goods. The task force had available to it some of the best expertise in industry

(chemical, gas and oil industries, and tank car

lessors); other Government agencies (such as

those dealing with the military, atomic energy,

explosives, and natural hazards); other carriers

(such as motor vehicle, aviation, and water);

certain shippers of dangerous commodities; and

health, firer environmental, and safety specialists.

Reporting Requirements

Canadian regulations require certain reports

whenever trains, engines, cars, or other rolling

stock are involved in an accident that results in

the release of a pollutant or a dangerous commodity. 36

In addition, RTC requires that each dangerous commodity shipment be accompanied by a

HIER form, which is completed by the shipper

of explosives or other dangerous commodities.

The form, included in appendix C, contains the

following information.

●

●

●

●

designation of the commodity/explosive,

commodity/explosive classification (e. g.,

flammable compressed gas),

potential hazards (fire, explosion, and

health), and

immediate action information (general,

fire, spill or leak, first aid, and emergency

phone).

‘

5 Raih(w.v SUfety Study (Bureau of Management Consulting)

lbRevisicln and Consc}]idation of General Orders, General Order

0-1.

Dangerous Commodity Program

Implementation

CTC specifications for the design and/or performance of tank cars are similar to those issued

by the U.S. Department of Transportation

(DOT). The most recent DOT tank car standards have been adopted by CTC almost completely. However, the compliance schedule differs.

The present plan for the assurance of safety of

the tank cars does not provide for retrofitting.

Nor does CTC have the authority to require retrofitting. RTC officials note, however, that

many of the tank car manufacturers are cooperating without regulation.

Highway Crossings

There are about 34,210 public highway/

railroad crossings in Canada. Approximately 8

percent of the public crossings are grade separated; 21 percent have some form of automatic

protection, such as flashing lights or automatic

gates; and the remaining have crossing signs .37

Between 1956 and 1973, the average number

of crossing accidents was 1,156, There were on

the average, 160 fatalities and 618 injuries annually. Crossing accidents are the largest cause

of railroad-related fatalities.38 The Rail Systems

Development Branch of RTC roted in a 1978

report that:

At the crossings that are not grade separated

there is an inherent danger to road and rail users

of colliding with each other at the crossing; however, the extent of hazard is a site-specific condition and depends on the features of the crossing;

one is more or less hazardous than another because the features of all crossing differ. For example, over the period 1970-75 there have been

no accidents at 90.6 percent of all crossings, one

accident at 7 percent of all crossings, two accidents at 1.5 percent of all crossings, three accidents at 0.5 percent of all crossings, four accidents at 0.2 percent of all crossings, five accidents at 0.1 percent of all crossings; none had

more than six accidents. 39

‘

7 Raiklay Safety Stzidy, op. cit., 1974,

‘“Ibid.

“Rail Systems Dezwlopn?e~lt Brauch Report (Railwa y Transport

Committee, 1978).
Ch. VI Government Programs ● 8 3

RTC representatives note a steady decrease in

the number of crossing collisions over the past 5

years. Automobile mileage has increased.

The objectives of CTC regarding crossing

safety are to: 1) establish the characteristics of a

crossing in accordance with the regulations and

standards developed by the Commission for the

safety of the users of the crossing; 2) authorize

or encourage road authorities or railroad companies to carry out works improving physical

features or to install warning devices with or

without grants in order to reduce hazard to the

users of the crossing. 40

Legislative History

The Canadian Government first addressed

the highway-crossing problem in 1909 with

amendments to the Railway Act. These amendments established the railway grade-crossing

fund. The prior 1888 Railway Act led to interest

in the crossing problem by raising the general

level of consciousness of the public and the railroad industry on the issue of crossing safety.

Following that 1888 Act were the beginning installations of passive protections, such as crossbucks and signs. Legislative provisions are discussed in chapter 111. The following summary

includes the basic provisions of the 1909 amendments, the 1958 Act, and the 1974 Railway Relocation and Crossing Act. The basic provisions

in chapter R-2 of the Act are as follows :41

● Railroads shall submit to CTC a plan and

profile showing the portion of the railroad

and highway to be affected by proposed

rail construction. CTC may withhold approval of an application pending adequate

railroad steps to ensure the safety.

● Where a railroad is already constructed,

CTC may on its own motion or upon complaint, order the railroad to provide additional safety at a crossing.

● A railway grade-crossing fund exists to aid

construction work for the protection, safety, and convenience of the public at crossings. Amounts from the fund are available

only to crossings 3 years old or older.

Under the Railway Relocation and Crossing

Act, up to 80 percent of the project installation

cost can be funded by the Federal Government.

The remaining 20 percent of the installation cost

is divided between the road authorities and the

railroads. The Act does not provide for Federal

funding of the maintenance of the protection.

Usually 50 percent of the maintenance cost is

borne by the road authority and 50 percent by

the railroad.

Program Implementation

Past Evaluation of CTC Program Effectiveness. One of the most comprehensive reviews of

CTC’s grade-crossing program was conducted

by BMC in 1974. The Bureau found relative to

highway crossings that:42

●

●

●

●

RTC has not initiated much of the activity

in bringing about crossing safety, but rather is in a reactive posture. Over 90 percent

of the projects originate from art external

application or complaint. RTC places reliance almost entirely on the railroads and

the highway authorities to identify those

crossings that present the greatest hazard.

Since there is a shared funding responsibility for the installation of crossing protection

and since the responsibility for the maintenance of automatic devices is with the railroads and the highway authorities, RTC

initiatives in reducing risks at hazardous

crossings are sometimes difficult to

achieve.

Insufficient attempts are made to establish

priorities based on risk in decisions to approve a grant.

The criteria for fund dispersals did not appear to include an analysis of the relationship between the crossing problem and the

most cost-effective protection.

PRESENT PROGRAM STRATEGY

Survey and Data Collection: Data on approximately 30 typical attributes of grade crossings

have been collected for a number of crossings

‘“Interviews with representatives of CTC, 1978.

JIRai]way Act, ch. R-2. 41Rajlu)ay Safety Study, Op. Cik. , 1%’4.
84 . Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

and placed in a computerized file. The data can

be grouped into the following six categories:

● location and jurisdiction,

● accident history,

● protection at the crossing,

● track and train characteristics,

● road and road vehicle characteristics, and

● year of last inspection.

During 1978, RTC conducted onsite surveys of

some 12,000 of the likely most dangerous crossings. Specific attention was paid to: the annual

traffic (based on the daily traffic rate), the

nature of crossing physical characteristics (e.g.,

description of the sight lines), and the type of existing protective devices. These data supplemented other information already computerized. Following the survey, CTC officials met

with many of the road authorities with jurisdiction over surveyed grade crossings. The purpose

of those meetings was to come to some agreement on the most cost-effective approach to

dealing with the problems on a crossing-bycrossing basis.

Federal Government Funding of

Crossing Projects

The Canadian Federal Government provides

financial assistance for crossing improvement

under the authority of the Railway Relocation

and Crossing Act. Each application is reviewed

against criteria developed by RTC. The criteria

are based on protection, safety, and convenience to the public.

Six months is usually required between the

time of receipt of a crossing improvement assistance application and a grant approval. Another

3 years is generally needed for funds disbursement and project implementation .43 A large majority of the projects begin with an application

from a local jurisdiction or a complaint. For

those applications under serious consideration,

RTC sends an engineer to make an onsite inspection to validate or alter the proposal, as

necessary, from the jurisdiction applying for the

grant. In 1977, 1,519 applications were received

aJReview Committee of Railway Transport Committee, Sept.

22-23, 1975, Bureau of Management Consulting presentation, slide

6-12, CXtawa.

for crossing improvement work. Funding was

provided for 399 of those projects, totaling over

$17 million. The projects qualifying for assistance included 29 grade separations, 166 installations of new or improved automatic protection

devices, and 36 improvements in approach

and/or visibility at grades .44

Present Problems With the

Grade-Crossing Program

According to RTC officials, some problems of

the grade-crossing program identified by BMC

in 1974 still exist today. Following is a discussion of some of the grade-crossing program

problems and the present efforts to deal with

those problems.

RTC uses inadequate methodology to set

correction priorities by degree of hazard, or

to determine the most cost-effective method

of reducing existing hazards.

The Rail Systems Development Branch of

RTC is attempting to develop an objective evaluation method to determine the most cost-effective crossing improvements. A statistical analysis of crossing accident data, including physical and warning characteristics of the crossings,

is being developed. The resulting mathematical

model, called a hazard index, would represent

in the aggregate, the average number of accidents that a typical crossing with a given set of

charactistics could be expected to have. The

next step in the analysis will be to determine

what the effect of altering certain characteristics

will be on the number of accidents. The methodology is expected to provide a means for: 1)

ranking crossings by hazard, and 2) determining

the relative effectiveness of one type of improvement over another.

While the research is being conducted, RTC is

funding projects based on a subjective evaluation of the physical characteristics of a crossing,

and the road and rail traffic.

ddReport of the Canadian Transport COmIT ission, 1977.
Ch. VI Government Programs ● 85

Intermediate protection devices (between

passive protection and automatic devices)

are currently ineligible for funding.

Some argue that no intermediate technology

exists; others argue that such technology exists,

but is not accepted for funding. RTC is exploring options, given the fact that many municipalities cannot afford the automatic devices and

believe that they do not need such level of protection. The “ditch lights” now being used by

CP serve as an intermediate option that some

argue should be considered. Statistics (which

have yet to be analyzed by RTC) show a reduction in accidents at crossings when railroads

have been using ditch lights.

An increase in the number of illegal (de

facto) crossings presents a hazard to the

general public.

Agreements between the railroads and a number of private landowners have produced crossings that the landowners can use when the rail

track crosses their land. Increasingly those

crossings are being opened to a larger public

with the acquiescence of the railroads. These

crossings are not under the jurisdiction of the

Federal Government, hence the public is not

adequately protected.

The fact that maintenance is not funded

by the Federal Government results in inadequate protection for many of the smaller,

poorer municipalities.

Efforts are underway to amend the law to

provide some level of Federal support for maintenance of automatic devices.

It is possible that grade crossings will no

longer receive the necessary attention or resources because of changes in the allocation

of funds.

Under the urban transportation assistance

program, provinces can use funds formerly authorized solely for grade-crossing protection, to

finance grade separations, equipment, and other

highway programs. The railroads fear that

broadening the discretion of the provinces will

decrease the amount of money spent on grade

crossings and possibly increase the number of

grade-crossing accidents.

LABOUR CANADA’S OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

The Department of Labour (Labour Canada)

has responsibility for safety of some railroad

employees; CTC has responsibility for others.

Employees under the jurisdiction of Labour include: employees involved in maintenance-ofway activities, repair shop employees, freight

handlers, and porters and dining car employees.

Protections Provided

The Department of Labour has issued rules

that protect employees under its jurisdiction.

The rules are applicable to employees, irrespective of the industry. In other words, the Department of Labour attempts to provide the same

level safety to railroad employees as it provides

to employees of a steel mill. The only Canadian

industry that has specific standards is the coal

industry. In addition to the protections cited

above according to Department officials, employees can refuse to work if the work environment presents an imminent danger.

Labour Canada requires investigation of

every injury if the employee loses 1 or more

day’s work. In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Division, or its agent, investigates

all fatal accidents and “significant” disabling accidents. Accident investigators are used for encouraging compliance and for the training of

employees.

In addition to accident investigation, the

Federal Government is involved in inspection.

Representatives of the provincial governments

have performed the investigations under contract with the Federal Government. However,

the arrangements with the provincial govern-
86 . Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

ments did not extend beyond February 1979.

After that time the Department of Labour will

conduct its own investigations relying on information from local safety committees composed of railroad and union representatives.

The sanctions that can be imposed for violations

of Department rules can be up to $10,000 or incarceration. The Department of Labour also has

authority to close operations until there has

been compliance with the rules.

Problems Associated With Providing

Occupational Safety

According to Department of Labour officials,

problems in providing the necessary level of

safety to railroad employees are both jurisdictional and substantive. The jurisdictional problem arises from the division of responsibility between Labour and CTC. The fact that CTC has

not issued occupational safety rules appears to

compound the jurisdictional problem.

The environmental hazards for railroad employees have been identified as follows:

● the potential for harm to those involved in

welding because of the nitrogen dioxide

fumes,

● the potential for harm from nitrogen dioxide to those employees spending long periods of time in the tunnels, and

● noise level in shops.

(The Department of Labour is, however, working with one of the railway companies to develop a pilot program of audio-metric examinations. This project may be a joint railroad/Occupational Safety and Health Division

noise evaluation system. )

One other problem relates to the effectiveness

of the regulations. The Department is required

to conduct socioeconomic analyses when the

cost of implementing a regulation has the potential of exceeding $10 million. The Department

has the difficulty of obtaining the resources to

conduct meaningful analyses.

RAILWAY SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

One major initiative of RTC prompted by the

safety inquiry was the establishment of the

Railway Safety Advisory Committee in 1973.

That committee is a tripartite committee with

representation from the railroads, the unions,

and RTC. Initially the committee was organized

into working groups for addressing such matters

as public disclosure of accident information,

track inspection requirements, maintenance of

signal devices and equipment, detection of rockfalls, and the development of standards for

track right-of-way.

Since 1973, the committee has established

four technical committees and one administrative committee: The administrative and technical committees that form part of the Safety

Advisory Committee are:

● Order s and Regulations—Administrative/Legal Committee,

● Dangerous Commodities Technical Commit tee,

●

●

●

Track and Structures Technical Committee,

Crossings and Signals Technical Committee, and

Rolling Stock and Operations Technical

Committee.

Each of the technical committees has representation from the railroads, the unions, specialists as required, and RTC staff officers. The

administrative committee consists of RTC staff

members only since its responsibility is to

translate the standards/criteria into orders and

regulations. Working groups may be organized

within each technical committee in order to explore specific issues in greater detail.

The technical committees operate under the

principle that although they should attempt to

integrate divergent points of view, they will not

seek consensus.
Chapter Vll

RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS

50-171 0 - 79 - 7
Chapter Vll

RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS

The management

railroads in Canada,

INTRODUCTION

philosophy of both major Individual responsibility for safety into indialthough different in many vidual accountability is done in various ways by

other respects, appears to be characterized to a

considerable extent by an active concern for

safety. Managements of both railroads perceive

operational safety as directly related to productivity and efficiency. Thus, in both cases, an effort has been made to extend a concern for safety throughout the organizations. Each railroad

places emphasis on supervisor accountability

for safety as well as on conveying to the individual employees that they have a responsibility

for ensuring safety. The Government-mandated

Uniform Code of Operating Rules says, in its

first point, “Safety is of first importance in the

discharge of duty.’”

the two railroads. However, in both case, the

significance attached to safety is indicated by

the fact that the most senior operating official,

the vice president for operations, is responsible

to the board of directors for the safety record of

the railroad. The Canadian Pacific (CP) requires

the vice president for operations to report to its

board of directors specifically on the subject of

safety four times every year. The Canadian National (CN) requires the vice president for operations to report to its board once a year. In each

case, the significant point is that safety is a subject of explicit concern and accountability at the

highest corporate levels.

‘ (-f)lifort)] Codr of 0/Jrrutitl,y /?11/(75 Revision of 1962, approved and prescribed by the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada by

General Order N{). 873, dated the 1.5th day of November 1961. Effective Oct. 28, 1962, p. 2.

SUPERVISOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Since the highest ranking officials of CN and

CP must answer for the safety records of their

companies and since both managements appear

to be convinced that safety and productivity go

hand in hand, they have both implemented systems for monitoring the safety performance of

their various divisions. Both managements trace

their increased concern for safety in the workplace to about 1974. A representative of CP said

that he saw personal injuries in the workplace as

an “attitude problem, ” and in assigning management priority to safety believes that attitudes

have changed.

Each railroad is able to get a complete picture

of its safety record –both train accidents and

personal injuries—for any particular month as

early as 10 days into the following month. Management discussions and decisions flow from

this information. A headquarters office in each

railroad is charged with accident prevention and

so with managing this data system. In CP, when

an accident occurs—whether it involves personal injury or property damage—the costs for

that accident are charged directly to the budget

of the division responsible. CN’s system consists

of safety performance goals against which

supervisors are judged. Goals are set by the

joint headquarter/field process. Individual performance of each division is discussed by conference call with headquarters every month. CP

has a similar safety performance goal system.

89
90 ● Railroad Safety - U.S.-Canadian Comparison

PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS

In addition to their accident and casualty

reporting systems, the data analyses they conduct, and their systematic program of supervisor accountability, the two railroads approach the problem of promoting and maintaining safety in a variety of ways. Generally, the

programs implemented by the two railroads are

preventive in nature and attempt to integrate

safety concerns with other functions. The major

programs are:

● inspection and maintenance,

● training,

● research ,

● safety committees and other activities, and

. rehabilitation.

Each of these programs is undertaken to some

extent by both railroads. However, the emphasis placed on one program over another may

differ between the railroads.

Inspection and Maintenance

Track

The railroads inspect the roadbed for a number of reasons. In most cases the inspections

have some implications for safety. Neither of

the railroads differentiates between safety inspections and maintenance inspections. However, in the track and roadbed area, both railroads agree that safety standards are “minimal”

standards. Both claim to maintain their track at

a level higher than the standards prescribed by

the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration

(FRA). 2 A representative of one of the railroads

said that if the track gets to the point of being

maintained to a level of safety rather than above

the minimum safety standard, “then, you have a

real problem, ” in terms of the economic wellbeing of the railroad. Both railroads apparently

recognized that track-related accidents were beginning to be very costly at about the time of the

1971 safety inquiry. Since that time both railroads claim to have expended significant sums

to upgrade their track system.

‘There are no Government-mandated track standards in

Canada.

There are specific examples of continuing

track improvement programs undertaken by the

railroads. For instance, CN has recently instituted a program of installing concrete ties in certain areas where track curvature exceeds two

degrees and where there is significant traffic

with heavy axle loadings. As another example,

CP recently overhauled a difficult section of

track along which several derailments took

place. Both railroads agree that well-maintained

track is the backbone of a productive railroad.

However, they acknowledge that the problem of

maintaining the roadbed is complicated by increased traffic with heavier axle loadings.

There appears to be a consensus of the two

railroads that deferred track maintenance has

not been a problem in the same sense that it has

in some places in the United States. Canadian

railroads recognized in the early 1970’s that

maintenance of the roadbed had to be a priority

item if they were to remain v able. Although

track conditions may not have been ideal at that

time, the railroads believe that maintenance had

not been deferred to the point of causing irreversible problems. However, they acknowledge

that this is more true for the mainlines than it is

for the branchlines. Many of the branchlines are

principally used for hauling grain and are not

revenue producing, For that reason, the railroads have consciously limited maintenance on

these lines, However, they emphasize that the

branchlines are still maintained above a minimum level of safety.

Both railroads are organized by regions.

Their inspection force operates four of the

regions; however, the headquarters Office of

Engineering serves a quality control function,

providing the regions with the standards of inspection and performing spot checks to see how

the inspection function is being carried out.

Track inspections are carried out on a schedule

determined by the frequency of track use. One

railroad representative stated that although precise inspection requirements exist for different

sections of track, it is possible to generalize that

the mainline track is inspected at least once

every two calendar days. Foremen, supple-
Ch. VII Railroad Safety Programs ● 9 1

Photo CP Rail

Upgrading —CP Rail spends millions of dollars each year

upgrading its track

mented by roadmasters, inspect the track by

high rail car, by track motor car or, sometimes,

by train looking for specific aberrations.

The inspections reports are used to allocate

immediately available resources. The reports

also provide some input to decisions about how

the projected resources available to the railroad

as a whole should be allocated in the long term.

However, the two railroads appear to rely on

different systems for general allocation of resources. CN relies, to a considerable extent, on

a sophisticated data bank that provides information on the condition of the railroad plant,

specifically to assist in such decisionmaking. Input to this data bank with regard to track is provided by an inspection report issued after track

inspection has been made by track recorder car,

which looks at rail surface, gauge, and cross

alinement.

Locomotive and Car Equipment

Canadian railroads are subject to Government-imposed locomotive and car equipment

standards. The standards are similar to those

promulgated by the U.S. FRA.

One railroad official indicated that a critical

difference between the approach of the Canadian railroads to equipment maintenance and

that of the U.S. railroads in general is a greater

Photo CN Rail

Upgrading —CN concrete tie and rail installation machine

husbanding of capital. In other words, freight

cars are not maintained to standard unless they

are called into use or unless there is an influx of

money that has not been earmarked for other

purposes. Generally, motive power units are inspected every 45 days, with a major overhaul

every 4 years. Freight car equipment is inspected

every 500 miles, with a major repair every 10 to

12 years.

CN instituted a program in the last 4 to 5

years to analyze a 10-percent sample of the rolling stock twice a year. The analysis includes

looking at the equipment both by type and by

series. The railroad has found that, by constructing a profile of freight equipment characteristics, sufficient leadtime is given to correct

problems before they become severe. The railroad believes that the program prevents accidents. In addition to the safety implications of

such an inventory, the program provides a data

base to the railroad that helps it in allocating its

resources.

Generally, the equipment used by the Canadian railroads is very similar to that used by

U.S. railroads. However, the locomotives have

certain safety features such as a collision post,

expanded area of vision, and personal facilities

in the cab that are Canadian-designed. Many

Canadian freight cars still have plain bearings
92 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

(the failure of which has been related to accidents), but hot box detectors are becoming increasingly common.

As in the case of track, the railroads do not

consider it profitable to invest in new equipment

for hauling grain. Thus, the Government of

Canada itself bought grain hoppers, which the

railroads are now using to transport grain. The

railroads are responsible for maintaining these

cars and replacing them if they are damaged

beyond repair.

Training

Both railroads have instituted several different types of training programs for their

employees. The training may be skill-oriented

with a specific focus on safety aspects or it may

be directed toward safety in a more general

way. An example of skill-oriented training that

has a specific ‘safety focus is the engineering

training school that CN operates at Gimli. This

school attempts to replace informal, on-the-job

training that locomotive engineers received in

the past with a structured program. The engineers receive a 2-month course of which 1

month is concerned almost exclusively with

safety. To aid in making the training realistic

and transferable, CN built locomotive simulators that it uses during the training. (CP also

has two locomotive simulators, which it uses as

training aids for locomotive engineers. The

simulators are used also as research tools to

determine causes of derailments ) After the engineers have completed the training program at

Gimli, they must go through a period of on-thejob training and other qualification procedures

before they can become engineers. Representatives of CN state that locomotive engineers

trained at the school have considerably better

safety records with regard to human failure accidents than do engineers not trained at the

school .

v

motion system equipment

.

simulateur

Locomotive and Train Simulator Simulateur
Ch. VII Railroad Safety Programs ● 9 3

The school is located at the site of a former air

force base. It has a permanent staff of 28. A n

estimated 1,500 employees attend the school

each year. In addition to locomotive engineers,

training programs are also conducted for telegraphers, train dispatchers, and railroad officers. 3 The school is beginning retraining activities to reinforce and refresh knowledge

gained previously by employees. CN estimates

that it spends about 1 percent of its transportation budget on its training activities.

An important aspect of training for both railroads is the promotion of safety consciousness

among employees. Both railroads give supervisor training courses in safety in order to inform

employees about the safety implications of

various aspects of employee management and

railroad operations. This training emphasizes

the responsibility that the railroads assign to

supervisors for the safety records of their units.

The training efforts result in a greater level of

safety consciousness in both general and specific

terms. For instance, in its operations and maintenance supervisory safety training program,

CN instructs its supervisors in such diverse

areas as accident problems, human relations,

maintaining interest in safety, industrial hygiene, material handling and storage, and fire

protection. ’ The supervisors are told, “Accident

prevention and efficient production go together

.,, Implementing the company program, making sure his work area is safe, and that his people work safely, is an integral part of the supervisor’s responsibility.”5 CP emphasizes training

for first- and second-line supervisors, dispatchers, yardmen, trainmen, and enginemen in order to prevent accidents and promote safety.

Research

Both railroads are engaged to some degree in

research activities. The most extensive rail re-

‘The U)~ifor-t~~ Code of Operating Rules requires that railroad officers be re-examined for proficiency in the rules at periods of 2

(for operating officers) or 3 years. This requirement extends

through the hierarchy to the vice presidents for operations.

40ther items covered in the course are: instructing safety, personal protective equipment, industrial housekeeping, machine

guarding, hand tools, and power tools,

‘Canadia)l Naflo)zal Railumys Operatio)ls and Maintenance ,

Superz~isory Safety Traini)lg Progra)?l, pp. 1-2.

search carried out by any entity—Government

or private—in Canada, is conducted by CN. A

description of the research activities of the two

major railways follows.

CP’s research is directed primarily toward the

application of new technology to continuing

problems, such as research on traction motor

performance. It is also reviewing technology for

application in the Canadian environment, such

as the field trials being carried out on self-

-steering freight car trucks. In addition, CP has

also had some research projects with outside

groups such as the National Research Council

and various universities.

CN’s research program began in 1945 when

the railroad established the first rail research in

Canada. In 1965, CN built an integrated research facility in Montreal. The bulk of CN’s research work now is conducted for the rail division, emphasizing track/train dynamics. In addition, the CN research centre is responsible for

quality control of materials. Under this program, 18 inspectors are employed by CN to inspect those materials critical to the operation of

the railroad; these materials are inspected in the

plant, prior to their delivery to the railroad.

(CN also requires that suppliers themselves

maintain adequate in-plant inspection a n d

monitors this activity. ) The inspection reports

are sent to the research centre for analysis to

detect any trends that might be developing.

Another major activity of the research centre is

to conduct failure analysis on all components of

the railroad that fail and are involved in an accident. The centre looks for trends as well as for

specific aberrations.

At the present time, in addition to the ongoing activities mentioned above, CN is conducting research in the following areas that

relate specifically to safety:

●

●

●

●

●

fatigue life of track structures,

fatigue life of bridges,

hunting of vehicles,

radially articulated trucks,

accident investigation—conducted by hybrid computer to simulate the accident and
94 ● Railroad Safety— U. S.-Canadian Comparison

determine what might have occurred under

a variety of conditions, and

● alerter for train crew.

Further, in response to specific problems that

have arisen, CN research has been conducted to

modify six-axle trucks and to address “rock and

roll” problems on the track.

Safety Committees and Other Activities

Both railroads have a system of safety committees 6 established in the field by supervisors in

the different departments, such as the car department or the motive power department, at

the operating level. These committees have been

a cooperative effort between labor and management and have been used to promote and to

monitor safety practices. In general, the committees do a certain amount of accident investigation, observe jobs performed, and make

safety recommendations to management. In addition, for instance, CN encourages its safety

committees to conduct safety audits, for which

it provides forms. CN uses the audits to monitor

the safety programs of the various supervisors.

CP has a similar safety audit program.

Both railroads indicated that employee involvement in activities that give them responsibility for their own safety has paid off in terms

of fewer accidents. Peer pressure and better

communication between labor and management

about the potential for accidents are seen as the

primary contributing factors to the success of

the safety committees.

The railroads have detailed requirements for

situations in which protective clothing—such as

goggles, protective footwear, hard hats, and

gloves—must be worn. The railroads generally

either provide the protective equipment for their

employees or they contribute to its purchase. In

addition, CN maintains a list of suppliers, approved for the safety performance of their products, from which all CN purchases are made.

Award programs (e.g., the annual certificate

program in which CP recognizes groups of embThe 13cpartment of Lab(>ur require~ the e~tahlishment c~f satety

commit tees i f the Department find~ them necessary, However, the

ra ilrc>ads safety committees ~reciate this legislation.

ployees who have had no lost-time injuries and

the Golden Shoe Club of CN for employees who

avoided injury because they were wearing protective footwear) are used to some extent to encourage the use of protective equipment and

general safety practices. The railroads also use a

variety of safety films, posters, pamphlets, and

information sheets to direct the employees’ attention toward safety matters in general as well

as the importance of wearing appropriate garb

for different work situations.

When an employee is involved in an accident,

an attempt is made to analyze the reasons for

the accident. In some cases, an employee judged

to have been negligent, is rebuked or disciplined

for having been involved in the accident. However, the approach of the railroads is not merely

disciplinary. Its emphasis is to determine ways

of preventing accidents in the future.

In addition to the employee-focused safety

programs, CP has a program that is aimed at the

public. CP rail police visit schools located near

railroads to instruct on the dangers of trespassing on railroad property. CP a so has a snowmobile safety program to help reduce snowmobile/train accidents.

Rehabilitation Programs

The Uniform Code of Operating Rules states,

“The use of intoxicants or narcotics by employees subject to duty, or possession or use while

on duty is prohibited. ”7 The railroads indicated

that until recently anyone caught “drinking on

the job, ” for instance, was summarily dismissed. Today, this is still true for anyone involved in train operations who is found to be

under the influence of alcohol or narcotics while

on the job. However, several years ago, both

railroads recognized that employees with alcohol or drug problems should be assisted with

these problems, As a consequence, both railroads have rehabilitation programs in which the

troubled employees can get professional help.

The railroads are working with the local union

representatives to encourage employees with

alcohol or drug problems to seek the help that is

‘U)liform Code of Operati)]g Rules, op. cit p. 3.
Ch. VII Railroad Safety Programs ● 9 5

available. Although the programs have been in that alcohol and other drug-related accidents

effect for several years, a representative of one have been statistically reduced since the proof the railroads stated that it does not appear gram’s inception.

PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY EFFORTS

Both CN and CP believe that one of the significant outcomes of the RTC safety inquiry of

1971 was the formation of the tripartite Railway

Safety Advisory Committee. This committee

provides a forum for management, labor, and

Government to discuss mutual problems and to

put forward their varying points of view in a

nonadversarial situation. One of the major

tasks of the Railway Safety Advisory Committee (see chapter V for discussion of committee

organization) is to “integrate divergent viewpoints and provide the Railway Transport Committee with a consentaneous exposition of

specific actions required for purposes of improving levels of rail safety. ”8 This purpose is

carried out to a large extent by a series of

technical committees, which report to the Railway Safety Advisory Committee. The Railway

Safety Advisory Committee reviews suggested

changes in the rules and regulations that come

from the committees, in addition to advising

generally on railway safety policy.

Both railroads and labor have representatives

on each of the technical committees as well as

on the advisory committee itself. The railroads

recognize that the tripartite forum is one way

for the day-to-day concerns of the railroads to

be integrated into regulatory policy consideration and so to help ensure that the resulting

policies are realistic from a railroad operations

point of view.

Nonetheless, while both railroads indicate

their support for the committee, they also both

indicate that the accomplishments, amount of

cooperation, and consensus achieved to date

vary with the subject matter. For instance, a

proposed revision to the power brake regulation

was developed in a technical committee with

representatives from labor, railroads, and

Government participating. From the railroads’

“’Railway Safety Advisory Committee Organizational Structure, ” October 1978.

point of view, however, the product was not

adequate, and CN and CP, working together,

drafted a different proposal that they then submitted to RTC for consideration.9 In the area of

dangerous commodities, however, both railroads believe that significant progress has been

made using the technical committee structure

and the advisory committee forum. There has

been agreement, for instance, about the usefulness of the Hazardous Information Emergency

Response (HEIR) form, which suppliers are required to furnish railroads with each shipment

of dangerous commodities and which railroads

are required to carry. This form gives the railroad employees information about what steps

to take if the shipment of dangerous commodities is involved in an accident. The initiative for

the HIER form came from a technical committee

of the Railway Safety Committee, with the active support of the railroads.

Both railroads seem to view the regulatory

process with regard to safety as nonthreatening.

Neither railroad expressed the view that it is not

adequately consulted or that it does not have

adequate opportunity to participate in the formulation of regulatory safety policy. They view

their relationship with the Government as largely nonadversarial and view compliance with

Government-imposed safety requirements as a

serious responsibility. The incentive to comply

with various safety requirements is not the

avoidance of penalties, since the Government

has not and is not viewed as likely to assess major penalties against the railroads; rather, the incentive seems to come from a combination of

the knowledge that operations may be shut

down if a violation is considered serious

enough, and of the respect for what one railroad

official referred to as “the law of the land. ”

‘The outcome of the revision to the power brake regulation is

still pending. The railroads proposed revision was submitted in the

first part of October 1978.
Chapter Vlll

RAILROAD LABOR AND SAFETY
Chapter Vlll

RAILROAD LABOR AND SAFETY

INTRODUCTION

The majority of Canadian rail labor organizations are represented by a bargaining group

called the “Associated Railway Unions. ” This

organization brings together 18 unions under its

umbrella. It represents the largest single bargaining unit in Canada. ] The Canadian Railway

Labour Association represents the same unions

for all purposes (including safety) other than

collective bargaining, The Association consists

of five major groups. They are:

● nonoperating employees . . . . . . . . . 55,800

• shopcraft employees . . . . . , . . . . . . 18,800

• United Transportation Union

—trainmen . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .14,500

—enginemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,646

● Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .4,6002

The United Transportation Union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the shopcraft unions are associated with the unions of

these names in the United States.

Collective bargaining has existed within the

Canadian railroad industry almost since its beginning. Railroad employees were organized

along craft lines. For many years they negotiated with railroad management as individual

entities. Before 1947’, an Act of Parliament compelled labor and management to negotiate periodically. 3 As a result of a series of disputes, centering largely on the subject of wages, and a

strike in the 1950’s, significant changes in labormanagement relations began to occur. A movement toward joint negotiations gained momentum.

The safety of operating employees, locomotive engineers, conductors, and trainmen while

operating trains is regulated by the Canadian

Transport Commission (CTC). The safety of the

rest of the rail employees is under the jurisdiction of Labour Canada. However, the jurisdictional clarity is somewhat clouded by the fact

that Labour Canada has jurisdiction over the

safety conditions of the operating employees’

workplace environment during their off-hours

(e.g., while they are laying over on a long trip).

Labour Canada also has jurisdiction over the

workplace of such employees as dining car employees even when the train is operating.

Labour Canada approaches its responsibilities

for developing safety standards as much as it

can from a generic point of view by considering

problems common to all industries rather than

considering problems on an industry-by-industry basis. The Department of Labour is currently in the process of developing a set of regulations that will standardize a minimum level of

safety to be applied across all industries under

its authority, CTC has not promulgated safety

regulations related to the conditions of work for

the operating employees under its jurisdiction.4

‘The lack (~t regulati[~n (~t the satety (It th(we ra[lwa} c,nlpl(]leei

u rider the ju riscl]cti(~n (~t CTC is a current w~u r-c-e of dlsa~reemc’n t

between the Department (>f Tran\p(~rtatl(~n and the Department (~t

l.ab(~ur. The Department [~f I.ab[lur teel~ that regulati(~rl~ are nect’>+] r-y and that i t sh(~u ]d a ssu rne th(, j u ris(j iction, or a ] terncl ( i \,(. I ~,

that the Department of Tran\p(~rta t i(>n should ad(>pt it+ re~ula -

t I(}ns. The uni(~n~ are \LIPPort in~ the Department (>t [.ab(}ur’> p(wi -

tion.

99
100 ● Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison

LABOR/RAILROAD RELATIONS

The railroad industry has experienced generally good relations between management and

labor at the working level.5 Testifying to this

fact is the long-standing existence of a plethora

of committees at the local level—including those

that deal with safety matters—that have, i n

many instances, evolved into consultative bodies that negotiate particular local matters with

management. Despite the history of cooperation, the unions on the national level believe

that the effectiveness of the labor/management

committees that have been established to deal

with safety problems at the local level would be

enhanced by the participation of a Government

body with the authority to regulate matters of

safety. The Canadian Railway Labour Association believes that a cooperative arrangement in

this regard between the Railroad Transport

Committee (RTC) and Labour Canada would be

beneficial and made the suggestion to RTC.6 At

the present time, according to a national

representative of the Canadian Railway Labour

Association, a major priority of the unions with

regard to railroad operational safety is the

upgrading of track.

From a national perspective, it appears that in

addition to the historical relationships, two

other principal factors affect the way in which

the unions and the railroads relate to each other

with regard to safety. These factors are described below.

Canadian Injury/Disability

Compensation System

The Canadian injury compensation system is

a provincial responsibility and each of the provinces has its own compensation law. Thus,

there is variety in the way in which the Canadian worker’s compensation for injury and illness incurred on-the-job takes place. However,

the approach to compensation in each of the

provinces is similar. It is premised on a no-fault

‘1’eitchini\, t~p. cit., p. 317 .

“Letter from J. F. Walter, Vice Chairman, Canadian Railroad

Labour Association, to G. H. Cooper, Executive Director, Railway Transport Committee, Canadian Transport Commission,

Jan. 26, 1978.

concept in which the injured employee is entitled to compensation—which is paid for either

directly or indirectly by the employer-and in

which the injured employee is not permitted to

sue the employer with regard to the injury or illness incurred.

The Province of Quebec, for instance, has implemented the no-fault concept to workmen’s

compensation through assigning wide-ranging

responsibility to the Quebec Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the five members of

which are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and serve on a full-time basis administering the claims of injured employees in

Quebec. ’ The Act provides for certain cooperative arrangements with other provinces when

an employee also works in provinces other than

Quebec.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

(continued)
Ch. VIII Railroad Labor and Safety ● 101

The claims for compensation benefits are calculated on the basis of the employee’s average

earnings for a 12-month period preceding the

7(continued )

aC [ <lrd I ng t t> equ it}’ and on the rc>a I meri t > ~ nd just ice (~t

the c aw, not heinx bt~unci to it~llotfi the (~rdl nary rules of

L’vidcnre lnstitutln~ a mecha n i+m t or homolga” t ion of

c(lm m is~l cln dw isl (~ns by the supc’r i~~r c-ou rt and e~ta bl]~h]nx >uch jud~ment~ h(~m[)lxating dec l>i(~ns as t inal an~i

LN.I t h (lu t app(>a I C, II’ I ng t t) the c[tnl m ls>i(~n br<~ad re~u la -

tory p(~wer> \\ri t h in I t~ area 01 ILI ri+dict ion.

~. Contribution by the province prt~vlding for as~i+tancc

by the pr(~tlncial ~(}\’crnment in dctraying c(~mmissi(}n

expenws an ann Llal \Llm not exceeding $100,000.

h Accident fund e+tahli\hinX an accident fL1nd t(> be

funded b?” c (lntributi(ln> h}’ emplo}’er-s ]n th(m indu~tries

iden t If id u rider the fl rst ma I(I r ~r(~ LI p (T1 i ndLIst rim wt

I(lrth in thi> law. ~’(~ntr}bLlt i~~n~ are made based on a perccn t agc ()[ a n nLla I pa~r r[~] I; t he~ ma~ n{~t be LI n II (~rm f (}r

a ] ] i ndu~t rle< i n the ma l(~r gr( }LI ~ or a ntr ot her \LJ bgrou p,

but arc’, instead, determln(’d b} t ho conl”ml+~lon.

1 . Statements to be furnished b} employers req Ljiring rt>-

p[~rt~ of ac tLlal and antic lpated pa}rr(~]]~ for the prweding

and u pc(lm in~ }’ea r< to be made to the c(}mnl is+t(~n by a 11

emp]t)ycrsIn in(]L~>tries I n th(~ } ]r\t maj(>r’ ~r(>LIP.

j. Assessments—requiring the commission to assess a contribution to cover the compensation for injured employees in the appropriate category of industry, to maintain a

reserve fund, t~> meet commission administrative expenses, and for other purposes.

k. Industrial di~ease+ est abll<h i ng that a n employee i~ t’! i -

~ible l[)r compc’nsat lon when a d iwaw dLIe to the nature

of any em pl t~ym~’n t I n wh I( h ht’ ;~ra< ~,n~a~ed a t a n y t i me

u’ i t h ] n 12 n~(~n t h~ pre~” i (}us t (~ the date (~t hi< d i~ablemcn t;

estabt ish I n~ t h[, c [~nd i t I (~n~ LI rider w h ich t ho c (~mpensa t i on

WI I I be rnad(’.

I, Preventiv e association+ e~tabl ishing the right of

em pl (~yc’r> I n i ndLl+t ries I n the t ] r>t gr(~Llp t (~ t (~rnl themWI ve~ i n t (~ a ~r(~u p t ~lr pLI rp(wc> t)t accident pre~rrn t i(ln

a r-d may, Ii’ I t h certain c(~nd I t it>n~, pre~cribe rLl Im that \\. i II

be binding on all ernpl(~yer< In the particular cla+s in indLl+t rv

m. C{~ntributi(~n by empl{~>’er~ in indListrie\ in Schedule 11

reel L] i ri ng the c(~m m is~i on t t) a~w~s pa~~men t \ t (~ meet i t \

c[~~ts t r(~m the emp l(~}~ers i n the w’c[>nd major ~r(~Llp i n a

manner \i m ila r to f ha t i n ti’h]( h f Llnd\ are (~htalned t(~r the

accident t LI n(i.

n. Genera] provisions – [’xc] LId i n~ the ] nd u~t rie>()} farming

(}r domest IC wrk’ Ice I r(~m c(~\rera~e LI rider the AC t; \et t i ng

dowrn certain req Ll i remcn t~ as to +LI i ts f(~r the rec(~ver}r (~1

tines provided I(}r b} the Act: and establtshirlg that l“incs

rec ei Y’ecl belong [’n t i re] ~’ t () t h~> commission and a r-c t (>

t(~rm part (~t the acciden’t fund.

(), Compensation to blind workmen- defining blinclnes+ and

wttin~ l(~rth { (~ndi t](lns t(~r retmbLlrwment by th e

h! In i~t r}’ (~t Flna nc t>, LI rider cert.a i n c(~nd i t l(~ns, for c(~mpenwti(ln pa>rable by rc’a~(>n an accident to a blin d

work men

In addition t(} these ma j(~r secti(ln~, there arc three schcdLl]e\ appended to the law. The t ir-~t \ched L1 It, set> f(>rth th(m> industries in

which empl(~yer> nlLlst con tribLl te t (~ the accident }Llnd. The second

sched Llle \etstort h t how i nd List rim I n w’h ich the enlpl(~yer~ a r-e ind i~’ idLlal 1 y resp(~n~lblc [or pa yI ng c[~nlpen>a t ion The t h i r-d sched -

u Ie wt~ t (~rt h a des( ri pt ion of va riou~ d iwasw and the processe>

leading to them.

accident; provisions are also made for dependent and survivor claims. In certain cases, t he

commission may authorize lump-sum payments

or may advance a 1 u m p sum of compensation

that will be due. Generally, however, the compensation is paid on a weekly basis.

For purposes of compensation payment, employers in Quebec are divided into two major

groups by the statute. The first major group

must contribute, based on a percentage of its annual payroll determined by the commission, to

an accident fund. This accident fund is administered by the commission, and when an employee in an industry falling into this first major

category is injured, compensation is made from

this fund. The second major group is composed

of industries in which employers are individually responsible for compensation of injured employees, Although the commission administers

the compensation of employees in an industry

failing into the second major category, the funds

to pay for the compensation are not drawn from

the accident fund. Employers in the second major category are also responsible for paying for a

portion of the commission’s administrative

costs. Railroads fall into the second major group

of employers and so are individually liable for

payment of compensation to injured employees

in Quebec.

As a general rule, as is the case in Quebec, the

provincial acts cover employees in all industries—that is, there is not a specific compensation system solely for employees of a railroad

industry. The laws establish provincial workmen’s compensation commissions to administer

the compensation laws and to decide, within the

parameters of the law, how to compensate individual employees. The approach to workmen’s

compensation that the provincial laws take has

been described as constituting an “inquiry system” rather that an “adversary system.”8 In this

system, the provincial commissions are given a

fairly wide area of latitude with regard to the

various benefits that can be made available to

the injured employee. Although the degree of
102 ● Railroad Safety —U.S.-Canadian Comparison

latitude provided varies from province to province, generally speaking, there is a provision

made for the costs of all medical treatment and

rehabilitation services, with no arbitrary financial or time limits placed on benefits. Total permanent disabilities are paid for life; there are

provisions for survivor benefits; partial and/or

temporary disabilities are monitored on a continuing basis by the workmen’s compensation

commission. In many cases, there are no waiting periods for the benefits to start. 9

Once a compensation commission has taken

over a case, it is responsible for assuring treatment, considering rehabilitation possibilities,

providing reemployment counseling, as well as

for defining the disability and making decisions

concerning income continuation. The degree of

disability is generally a medical judgment and

since the commission has continuing jurisdiction

and since temporary benefits have no time limit,

the actual condition of the injured employee can

be assessed with a minimum of external factors

playing into the judgment. Benefits can be adjusted upward or downward by the commission

as the situation warrants. In many provinces,

the commissions place a great deal of emphasis

on rehabilitation. 10

Since the employee is guaranteed compensation for work-related injury and illness and

since the employer is protected by law from

suit, the issue of safety in the workplace is not a

contentious issue between railroad employees

and the railroads. Further, since the railroads

are responsible for providing for the compensation of the injured employee, it is in their interest to hear and to respond to concerns about

safety and to ensure that safety practices are put

into place and observed.

Hours of Service

An employee’s hours of service has not been

regulated as a safety issue nor has it been dealt

with legislatively. Rather it is a matter for negotiation between the labor unions and the railroads. At the present time, the hours-of-service

“Ibid , p. 31,

“’ibid., p 31 t}.

requirements for operating employees, engineers, conductors, and trainmen* in Canada

allow employees discretion after 11 hours of

service, as to whether they should continue to

work without a break. This provision places the

responsibility for the safety of employees as it

relates to fatigue on their own shoulders.

In negotiating with the railroads, the Associated Railway Unions does not bargain separately with CP and CN; instead, the unions bargain

with representatives of both railroads at the

same time. In the early 1970’s. there were a

series of disputes between labor and the railroads, some of which went to arbitration. It was

during this period that the unions organized

themselves into a single powerful bargaining

group. However, the principal concern of the

unions has been job security. Safety conditions

have not been the subject of a railroad labor dispute per se, although safety was brought out as

an issue in a case concerning crew size during

this period. 11

At the present time, the union; participate in

many of the railroads safety efforts at the working level. The three major areas in which labor/

management cooperation in safe y-related matters has taken place are:

Safety Committees—Unions urge their members to participate and use this forum to understand the nature of the workplace and to pass on

the worker’s point of view to the management.

However, national union representatives have

expressed doubts as to whether these committees are optimally effective.

Rehabilitation Programs—The railroads and

the unions are working out a relationship

whereby the unions at the local level can encourage its members with drug or alcohol abuse

problems to seek professional help in one of the

rehabilitation programs that the railroads made

available.
Ch. VIII Railroad Labor and Safety • 103

Training Programs—Where training pro- ification to take on another job. National union

grams have been developed, the unions have representatives would like a greater emphasis on

supported them even where they have replaced training (see next section).

the informal apprenticeship programs for qualLABOR/GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

The unions played a major role in the safety

inquiry of 1971. Since that time, they have been

active participants in the tripartite forum, the

Railway Safety Advisory Committee, established by CTC to promote railway safety in

Canada. The Canadian Railway Labour Association has membership on the Railway Safety

Advisory Committee and member unions have

representation on the various technical committees that consider possible amendments to existing standards or possible new standards. By this

participation, the unions are able to participate

fully in the safety regulation of railroads.

In addition, however, the unions have identified areas that affect the safety of railroad

employees and have brought these areas to the

attention of CTC. The unions raised many issues at the safety inquiry and have continued to

follow and to participate in their resolution. For

instance, in January 1978, the vice chairman of

the Canadian Railway Labour Association outlined the current safety-related concerns of his

Association in a letter to the executive director

of the Railway Transport Committee of CTC.12

Many of the concerns expressed were similar to

those expressed during the safety inquiry; other

concerns grew from more recent incidents. The

listing of the Canadian Railway Labour

Association’s concerns with regard to the safety

of railroad employees included all aspects of

railroad safety—the immediate work environment, the operating environment of the trains,

and the long-term health of the employees—

without attempting to place these concerns in

“The points raised were made in a letter from J. F. Walter, Vice

Chairman, Canadian Railway La~c~ur Association, to Mr. G. H.

Cooper, Executive Director, Railway Tran~port Committee of the

Canadian Transport c(~mmission, dated Jan. 2,6, 1Q78. The letter

was written >ubsequent to a meeting between Messrs. Walter and

Cooper to discuss Lab(~ur’s safety concerns and at the invitation of

Mr. Cooper.

any order of priority. The listing of concerns includes:

1.

2.

Uniform Code of Operating Rules—The

association’s concerns centered on protecting the integrity of the concept of uniformity and on the adequacy of the rules

to address all the safety problems encountered. Specifically, the Canadian Railway

Labour Association believed that a revision of the Uniform Code was necessary

because of the authority of railroads to

issue special instructions that tend to destroy the uniformity of practice intended

by the Uniform Code. The association

also believed that additional rules might

be needed, such as rules to govern movement of insulated track units other than

conventional rolling stock. RTC apparently agreed with these concerns and has

instituted a review of the Uniform Code.

This review is currently taking place under the auspices of the Safety Advisory

Committee, with representatives of the

three major interest groups participating.

In addition to believing that the Uniform Code was in need of revision, the

association also suggested that certain

rules in the Uniform Code—notably rules

40-44, which govern requirements for

lights in situations involving unattended

flagging of trains–were being disregarded

by the railroads. Although the association

believed that the rules might be appropriately revised, they also believed that they

should be adhered to until the revision

had taken place.

Dangerous Commodities—The Canadian

Railway Labour Association has suggested that a central computer bank be set

up to store coded information about how

to handle all existing dangerous commodi-
104 ● Railroad Safety —U.S.-Canadian Comparison

ties. The association has requested that

this suggestion be considered by a technical committee of the Railway Safety Advisory Committee.

3. Environmental Safety, On-Train Employees—The association believes that the

“on-train” employees should be provided

regulations governing heating, lighting,

ventilation, and noise control in locomotive cabs and cabooses. They believe further that the adequacy of the working conditions of the “on-train” employees will be

guaranteed only after the promulgation of

such regulations. In addition, the Association recommended that CTC ensure that

the regulations, once developed, be adequately monitored, by augmenting their

staff capabilities with the services of the

safety and health inspectors available to

Labour Canada.

4. Ditch Lights—The association supported

a requirement that certain railroads under

CTC’s jurisdiction operating on mainline

in mountain territory be equipped with

ditch lights. Further, the association believes that ditch lights might be safer at

level grade crossings than the revolving

lights currently required. ’3 The association is undertaking a study of this matter.

5. Hearing and Sight Restrictions—The association suggested that technology has sufficiently improved today to allow the safe

use of hearing aids and contact lenses by

employees involved in train operations.

These devices are not currently allowed to

be worn. ” In addition, the association

suggested to CTC that the railroads be required to maintain career records of visual

acuity and audiogram tests so that any

loss of hearing or vision might be detected

at an early date and protective measures

taken.

6. Tunnel Ventilation—Labour Canada

issued a report in October 1976 in which it

‘ ‘At the’ pre~ent time, Order R-22009 requires CP Rail tt~ Install

ditch 1 ights c~n all lc>c(~m{>tives used in mainline (]peratl{~n in mountain tcrrit(~ry. CN Ra i] has v[l]untarily used ditch I i~h ts in certain

a rea~ and CP Rail intends to install ditch lights vt~lun tarilv on ~11

lt}c~~motives by the end of 1978.

I ~Tht> requ irements gc~vern ing use <~1 hearing a Ids d ncf C~~n tact

Icnww by emplt~yee~ inv(~lved in train (}perati(~ns are c[~ntdined in

General Order O-Q.

stated that tests conducted in tunnels have

revealed concentrations of nitrogen dioxide that exceed certain standards of safety.

The association has urged that CTC issue

regulations that would change the existing

requirements.

7. Minimum Track and Operating Right-ofWay Standards—The association believes

that the development of such minimal

standards should have high priority by

CTC.

8. Training Standards, Railroad Employees—The association has taken the position that training programs for employees

involved with the movement of trains as

well as employees involved with the inspection and maintenance of rolling stock,

track, and signals are safety programs. As

such, the association believes, the training

programs should meet minimum standards set by RTC. Some steps along these

lines have been taken; however, the

association suggests that RTC should

develop a program of apprenticeship

training standards for selected railroad

crafts. The association also believes that

the program should provide a skill certification for the employees.

The unions are also involved in the standards

development process for railroad employees

under the jurisdiction of the Labour Canada.

Labour Canada’s policy is to solicit wide participation in the development of standards.

Thus, in the past, the unions have had the opportunity to review drafts of standards and to

give their comments to the Department of Labour, along with other interested parties.

A relatively new amendment to the Canadian

Labour Code has implications for the relationship between the railroad unions and the Government with regard to safety. This provision is

administered by Labour Canada for rail employees under its jurisdiction. The provision affirms the right of any worker to refuse to continue to work in an “imminently dangerous

situation. ”

1’The a~s(~ciati(~n cited appr(~vingly stan(idrds drattuf by a

W(>rking ~r(>up ~>f the AdvisL>r~ Committee c i!!m] “~uide]ines for’

a S ignd I Training Prc~~ra m ft~r S ignd 1 C(~nst ru c t ion, Main tena rice,

and In\pecti(~n Per\[~nnel. ” Thew >tandarcis were dppr<~vcci by t h e

Satety Adviw~ry C(~mmittc’c’ and RTC in ] Q76.
Appendixes
Appendix A

Persons Interviewed During Project Research

CANADA

CN Rail

J. L. Cann

Vice President, Operations

R. A. Walker

Chief of Transportation

G. A. Van de Water

Chief Engineer

R. G. Messenger

Assistant Vice President

Operations

W. T. Mathers

Director

Accident Prevention and Safety

R. P. Rennie

Chief of Technical Research

H. J. G. Pye, Q. C.

General Solicitor

CP Rail

E. J. Bradley

Director of Rules, Accident,

and Damage Prevention

Charles Pike

Chief Mechanical Officer

William Stinson

Vice President of Operations

Labour Canada

Roy Elfstrom

Director, Occupational Safety

and Health Branch

Railway Transport Committee/

Canadian Transport Commission

The Honorable D. H. Jones, Q.C.

Chairman

G. H. Cooper

Executive Director

J. H. Green

Assistant Director, Rail Services

E. W. Eastman

Director, Rail Systems

S. K. Rawat

Services Planning and

Regulations Advisor

Rail Systems

G. Gazon

Orders and Regulations

Committee Officer

Safety and Standards

R. Konchak

Analyst, Rail Economic Analysis

R. L. Gray

Director, Task Force

Safety and Standards

E. J. Hase

Director, Safety and Standards

J. E. Reynolds

Assistant Director

Safety and Standards

A. G. Hibbard

Director, Rail Services

L. Stanford

New Accident Investigation

Committee

Konrad Studnizki-Gizbert

Bureau of Management Consulting

J. H. Johri

Assistant Director and Leader for

Rail Safety Study

Canadian Railway Labour

Association

Ed Abbot

Executive Secretary

J. L. Walters

Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers

UNITED STATES

John Fowler

Committee on Transportation

National Academy of

Engineering

Fred Yocum

Vice President for Operations

United States Railway

Association

107
Appendix B

Accident Information Requested by

the Railway Transport Committee

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Year, month, and date of the accident;

The day of the week, time, and the

weather conditions;

The railroad, region, area, or division;

The location—subdivision, mileage,

town, and province;

The classification of the accident according to the type of accident, i.e., collision, derailment, etc.;

The primary possible contributory accident causes;

7. Associated factors such as speed of train,

whether dangerous commodities were involved;

8. The type of train involved, and for crossing accidents, the type of motor vehicle;

9. The estimated cost of damage to railroad

property for collisions and derailments;

10. The number of casualties classified as

passengers, employees, and others; and

11. The Commission file number, if one was

created.

108
Appendix C

Hazardous Information Emergency Response Form

HAZARD INFORMATION

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FORM

(Not to be used for waybilling purposes)

PLACARD ENDORSEMENT:

DANGEROUS

DATE:

SHIPPER: (preprinted)

ORIGIN : (preprinted

CAR NO.

If compartmentized check one: WEIGHT or VOLUME:

ccl (Approximate)

CONSIGNEE:

DESTINATION:

ROUTING:

COMMODITY:

CLASSIFICATION: Flammable Solid

PLACARD NOTATION:

This is to certify that the above named article is properly classified, described, packaged, marked and labelled, and is in proper

condition for transportation according to

the applicable regulations of the Canadian

Transport Commission.

Shipper’s signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Fire Burns very rapidly and intensely, sometimes with flare-burning effect.

May be ignited by heat, sparks or open flame.

Explosion Hazard minimal unless material is finely divided.

Health Contact with material may cause severe burns to skin and eyes.

IMMEDIATE ACTION INFORMATION

General Keep upwind.

No unnecessary personnel.

Identify and isolate hazard area.

Wear firefighters full protective clothing.

Fire Move exposed containers from fire area, if without risk.

On small fires, use dry chemical.

On large fires, use standard firefighting agents.

Cool containers with water from maximum distance.

If fire is massive or advanced, withdraw from hazard area and use unmanned hoseholder or monitor nozzle.

Spill or Stop leak if without risk.

Leak Within hazard area: Eliminate ignition source.

No flares, no smoking, no open flames.

Collect into clean dry metal container and keep tightly covered.

Flush small spill area with water spray.

First Aid Call doctor.

Use standard first aid procedures.

In case of contact with material or water solution, immediately flush skin or eyes

with running water for at least 15 minutes.

Emergency (Shipper’s number or his designate for further emergency assistance. )

Phone:

109

u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING O OFFICE : 1979 0 - 50-171