alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
** **

**Exhibit31(b)**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, William R. Talley, Jr., certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this quarterly report onForm 10-Q of Frederick County Bancorp, Inc.;

2.             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.             The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)        Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)       Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

(c)          Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

5.             The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

(a)        All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

(b)       Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| Date: July 23, 2007 |   | William R.  Talley, Jr.   |
|---------------------|--------|---------------------------|
|                |   | William R.  Talley, Jr.   |
|                |   | Executive Vice  President |
|                |   | Chief Financial  Officer  |

 

----
May 2, 1961

No. 65588.

Suit 5046.

#### United States *v.*National Carloading Corp. and James S. Baker Import Co.

Abstract 64233 affirmed March 15, 1961. C.A.D. 767.
#### KEVIN CONMY, Boilerman Third Class, U. S. Navy, Petitioner v UNITED STATES; J. W. WILLIAMS, Jr., Rear Admiral, Commanding Officer, Eleventh Naval District, San Diego, California; JOSEPH McDEVITT, Rear Admiral, Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy; C. E. STASNY, Captain, Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Station, Long Beach, California; and ROYCE BERG, Lieutenant (jg), USNR, Disciplinary Officer, U. S. Naval Station, Long Beach, California, Respondents

20 USCMA 282, 43 CMR 122

Miscellaneous Docket No. 71-1

January 19, 1971

*John Vaisey, Esquire,*Counsel for Petitioner.

Memorandum Opinion of the Court

This Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is submitted by Attorney John Vaisey, on behalf of Boilerman Third Class Kevin Conmy, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner.

The petition avers that two days prior to Conmy’s scheduled trial by special court-martial, he retained individual counsel. When the court-martial convened on January 8, 1971, as scheduled, the regularly appointed defense counsel moved for a continuance, setting forth as his reason individual counsel’s need for additional time. The military judge, however, denied the motion. Trial proceeded and resulted in a conviction and sentence to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for six months, and reduction to grade E-3. The convening authority immediately deferred service of the confinement portion of the sentence. (See Article 57 (d), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 857 (d).) Conmy is presently performing “custodial work supervising Brig prisoners on work details.” The *283nature of the restraint imposed upon his liberty is not disclosed by the petition.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is alleged that the ruling on the motion for a continuance denied Conmy’s right to counsel as well as his right to a fair trial. Consequently, he should be released from “unlawful custody, detention, and restraint of his liberty.”

Article 51(b), Uniform Code, supra, 10 USC § 851 (b), provides that the military judge shall rule upon all interlocutory questions arising during the proceedings. See, United States v Knudson, 4 USCMA 587, 16 CMR 161 (1954). His decision upon a motion for continuance rests within his sound discretion, but is subject to review for abuse of that discretion. United States v James, 14 USCMA 247, 34 CMR 27 (1963). The question presented by the petition in the instant case is reviewable in the normal course of review provided for in the Uniform Code, and there appear to be no such extraordinary circumstances as are contemplated by the All Writs Act (28 USC § 1651 (a)) tending to deny or defeat the jurisdiction of this Court or otherwise to require intervention by the Court at this stage of the proceedings. Gale v United States, 17 USCMA 40, 37 CMR 304 (1967).

The petition is denied without prejudice to the right of petitioner to assert the matters herein presented in the normal course of appellate review.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

PEDRO JUNIOR RODRIGUEZ, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 332 MAL 2016 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 11th day of August, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
*

Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not

participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a quorum of

the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7531

DAVID LUCAS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CRIME RECORDS CENTER, Director; DEPARTMENT OF

THE ARMY; NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE

SERVICES; DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (CA-05-562)

Submitted: April 26, 2006 Decided: June 1, 2006

Before LUTTIG,* TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Lucas, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

David Lucas appeals from the district court’s orders

denying his “Petition for Pre-Action Discovery” pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 27 and motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning that the pre-action

discovery request, a precursor to filing a motion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (2000), must be filed in the court that imposed sentence.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410

U.S. 484, 497 (1973). We also grant Lucas’ motion to proceed in

forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

 AFFIRMED
#### Willie Gleaton, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 399]

—In an action to recover damages for wrongful death, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vacarro, J.), dated September 28,1994, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

In 1989, Theresa Clayton was murdered in a building owned and maintained by the defendant New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter the NYCHA). There were no arrests made and there is no evidence in the record indicating who the assailant was or how he or she gained access to the building.

Thereafter, Ms. Clayton’s mother commenced this action against the NYCHA, alleging that the murder was caused by, among other things, the failure of the NYCHA to provide and maintain locks and other security measures in the building. In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the NYCHA argued that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the perpetrator gained access to the building by virtue of the absence of security measures and devices. The Supreme Court denied the motion without opinion. We reverse.

On the record before us, the plaintiff has adduced no factual support for her contention that the assailant was an intruder who gained entry to the building by virtue of the allegedly lax security measures. Under the circumstances, there exist no material questions of fact with respect to the plaintiff’s allegations that the conduct of the NYCHA constituted a proximate cause of the occurrence *(see, Scheer v City of New York,*211 AD2d 778; *Harris v New York City Hous. Auth.,*211 AD2d 616; *Wright v New York City Hous. Auth.,*208 AD2d 327; *Dawson v New York City Hous. Auth.,*203 AD2d 55; *see also, Oginski v Rosenberg,*115 AD2d 463). Accordingly, the motion of the NYCHA for summary judgment should have been granted. Sullivan, J. P., Thompson, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
(V. D. 93)

#### Manca, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 765413.

(Decided December 23, 1958)

*Eugene R. Pickrell*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

This matter is before me on remand from classification proceedings decided by the first division of this court in *Manca, Inc.*v. *United States,*41 Cust. Ct. 339, Abstract 62226, and it has been submitted for decision on a written stipulation, reading as follows:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the perties [sic] hereto that the merchandise covered by the above remand of protest consists of Enlargers and Accessory lenses, which were the subject of a judgment and decision by the First Division of this Court, in the case of *Manca, Inc.*vs *The United States,*Abstract 62226, on August 7, 1958, wherein it is stated “* * * and remand the matters pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U. S. C. § 2636 (d), for further proceedings before a single judge sitting in reappraisement for determination of the value of the imported merchandise in the manner provided for by law”.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that at the time of the exportation of such merchandise to the United States, the prices at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for exportation to the United States were as follows:

> Entry No. Merchandise Invoice price ea. Less discount U. S. dollars per each

> 765413 2 Enlargers Focomat* Ila. $214. 80 48% $111. 70

> Accessory lens_ 26.40 48% 13. 73

> *418IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar merchandise.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above remand of protest may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question, and I hold such dutiable value for each of the articles to be as hereinabove set forth in the stipulation of submission. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.

*

Lens included is not component in chief value.
# jf**ourtlj Court** **of March** **30, 2015** **No. 04-14-00741-CV** **Deidre Elane** **Sehamp, Appellant** **v. Edward** **Mitchell, Appellee** **Trial Court** **Case No.** **2013-CI-205S3**

### ORDER**The Court** **has reviewed** **the record** **and briefs** **in this** **appeal and** **has determined** **that oral**

### argument**will not** **significantly aid** **it in** **determining the** **legal and** **factual issues** **presented in** **the appeal.** **See Tex.** **R. Al'l'.** **P. 39.8.** **Therefore, all** **requests for** **oral argument** **are denied,** **and the** **cause is** **advanced for** **ON BRIEFS** **submission on** **May 12,** **2015, to** **the following** **panel: Justice** **Marialyn Barnard,** **Justice Patricia** **O. Alvarez,** **and Justice** **Jason Pulliam.** **All parties** **will be** **notified of** **the Court's** **decision in** **this appeal** **in accordance** **with Tex.** **R. App.** **P. 48.** **Either party** **may file** **motion requesting** **the Court** **to reconsider** **its determination** **that oral** **argument will** **not significantly** **aid the** **Court in** **determining the** **legal and** **factual issues** **presented in** **the appeal.** **See Tex.** **R. API'.** **P. 39.8.** **Such motion** **should be filed** **within ten** **(10) days** **from the** **date of** **this order.** **It is** **so ORDERED** **on March** **30, 2015.** 

## '44+**Maralyn Barnanfi** **Justice**

## IN**WITNESS WHEREOF,** **have hereunto** **set my** **hand and** **a/fixed the** **seal of** **the court** **on this** **March 30,** **2015. e,** **Clerk'**
No. 45051.

#### Protests 42595-K, etc., of Wm. Shaland (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel the opera glasses in question were held dutiable at 35 percent under paragraph 228 (b) and the French Trade Agreement (T. D. 48316), *Woolworth*v. *United States*(2 Cust. Ct. 1, C. D. 74) followed, and trick wood jumping sticks similar to those the subject of Abstract 44028 were held dutiable at 33J4 percent under paragraph 412 as claimed.
Opinion issued February 7 , 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 1 7 - 00 334 - CV

——————————— NEAT HOME INVESTORS, LLC, IGNACIO FLORES , AND LETICIA RAMIREZ , Appellant s

V. FRANK GRANDE AND SUZ AN GRANDE D/B/A CJ P ROPERTIES , Appellee s

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 and Probate Court

Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. CI 5 5015

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant s, Neat Home Investors, LLC, Ignacio Flores, and Leticia Ramirez, representing that “all matters presently pending before the Court have been resolved , ” ha ve filed a notice of dismiss al, which we construe as a motion to dismiss2

the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P

. 42

. 1 (a) ( 1)

. No other party has filed a notice of appeal, and no opinion has issued. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 42. 1 ( a ) (1) , (c)

. Further, although the motion does not include a certificate of conference, more than ten days have passed and no party has responded to the motion. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a). We reinstate the appeal, grant appellant’s motion , and dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.1(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Countiss

.
EX-32.1

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

INFe- Human Resources, Inc. CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the amended quarterly report of INFe-Human Resources, Inc.
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending August 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Arthur
Viola, Chief Executive Officer of INFe- Human Resources, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of INFe-Human
Resources, Inc.

/s/    ARTHUR VIOLA
---------------------
       Arthur Viola

       Chief Executive Officer
       Sole Director
       and Chief Financial Officer

       October 14, 2005
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JIAN YUAN ZHEN,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-72906

Agency No. A044-195-740

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 19, 2010** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Jian Yuan Zhen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of

FILED

OCT 26 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-72906

a motion to reopen. Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003). We

deny the petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhen’s third motion to

reopen because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s March 12,

2003, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed

within 90 days of the final order), and Zhen failed to establish that he acted with

the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 894

(deadline can be equitable tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing

because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due

diligence”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### STATE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. MORRIS RUDNER, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

Argued November 27, 1918

Decided March 3, 1919.

On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported m 92 *N. J. L.*20.

For the plaintiff in error, *A. Dayton Oliphant*and *Martin P. Devlin.*

For the defendant in error, *Harry Heher, Aaron V. Dawes*and *John A. Montgomery.*

Per Curiam.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The supplement thereto by our opinion just filed in *State v. Levin (ante p.*553) is applicable also to the present case.

(For dissenting opinion by the Chancellor, see *ante p.*555.)

*For affirmance*— Swayze, Trenchard, Bergen, Minturn, Black, Heppenheimer, Taylor, Gardner, JJ. 8.

*For reversal*— The Chancellor, White, Williams, JJ. 3.
#### THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES J. PATTON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued March 17, 1964

Decided May 18, 1964.

*Mr. Norman Heine*argued the cause for the appellant *{Mr. Stephen M. Oretzkowski, Jr.,*on the brief).

*Mr. James J. Casby, Jr.,*argued the cause for the respondent.

Pee Cubiam.

The judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed by Judge Eoley in the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Wbintbaub, and Justices Jacobs, Eeancis, Peoctoe, Hall, Schettino and HaneMAN-7.

*For reversal*— None.
#### Midland Township v State Boundary Commission, Midland Township v Midland County Board of Commissioners, Novi Township v State Boundary Commission, and Brighton Township v State Boundary Commission.

(Docket Nos. 57720, 57732, 58223, 58236, 58242-58245.)

*Downs & Pirich*and *Bauckham, Reed, Lang, Schaefer & Travis*for plaintiffs-appellees. *Frank J. Kelley,*Attorney General, *Robert A. Derengoski,*Solicitor General, and *Milton I. Firestone*and *Craig Atchinson,*Assistants Attorney General, for defendant-appellant State Boundary Commission. *John J. Rae,*City Attorney, for intervening defendant-appellee City of Midland. *Louis C. Andrews*and *John R. Brennan,*City Attorney, for intervening defendant-appellant City of Brighton. *Lampert, Fried & Levitt, P. C.,*for intervening defendant-appellant-cross-appellee City of Novi.

Rehearing and motion for stay order denied.

Reported at 401 Mich 641.
No. 51019.

#### Protests 79161-K, etc., of Guerlain, Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank Rivera, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 217]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Egitto, J.), rendered July 7, 1986, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s murder conviction stems from the shooting death of Solomon Lewis. During his investigation into the crime, a detective learned that Lewis worked as a “lookout” for a drug distribution ring, known as the “Brown Bag”, which operated out of an abandoned building in Brooklyn. The detective interviewed two identified “Brown Bag” employees, who stated that Lewis had been killed by the defendant and a man named Rodriguez, both of whom were managers of the “Brown Bag” operation. These identified employees also indicated that they were present at the “Brown Bag” on the night Lewis was killed, and that they were ordered to dispose of the body, which they did. The detective then “let the word out” that he was looking for the defendant and Rodriguez in order to talk to them.

The defendant was arrested when he voluntarily came to the police station to be interviewed about the incident. Approximately eight hours after his arrest, the defendant made *668two statements in which he admitted to the killing. He contends, *inter alia,*that the branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements should have been granted because there was no probable cause for his arrest. We disagree.

The information provided by the identified employees, based upon their presence and personal observations at the time of the commission of the crime, gave the detective probable cause to arrest the defendant even if the witnesses could be considered accomplices *(see, People v Michalek,*194 AD2d 568, *mod on other grounds*82 NY2d 906; *People v Herrin,*187 AD2d 670).

The defendant’s contention that the police intentionally delayed his arraignment is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Jehle,*181 AD2d 792).

Finally, the defendant’s sentence was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Altman, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
No. 49267.

#### Protests 884647-G, etc., of Chong Lung et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Cole, J.

The merchandise was assessed and claimed dutiable at the same rates' and under the same paragraphs as similar merchandise covered by the decision in *Quong Yuen Shing Co.*v. *United States*(31 C. C. P. A. 43, C. A. D. 247). In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of said cited case the merchandise at bar was found to contain salt and was therefore excluded from paragraph 5 (chemical compounds). The protests were sustained to this extent.