F-35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER

Restructuring Has Improved 

the Program, but 

Affordability Challenges 

and Other Risks Remain

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

GAO-13-690T

United States Government Accountability Office

On December 2, 2013, this testimony document was revised to 

correct the page numbering. The content was not revised.
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-690T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

June 19, 2013

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Restructuring Has Improved the Program, but

Affordability Challenges and Other Risks Remain

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike 

Fighter, is DOD’s most costly and 

ambitious aircraft acquisition. The 

program is developing and fielding

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is 

critical to long-term recapitalization 

plans as it is intended to replace 

hundreds of existing aircraft. This will 

require a long-term sustained funding 

commitment. Total U.S. investment is 

nearing $400 billion to develop and 

procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. 

Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered 

through 2012. The F-35 program has 

been extensively restructured over the 

last 3 years to address prior cost,

schedule, and performance problems.

DOD approved a new acquisition 

program baseline in March 2012. 

This testimony is largely based on 

GAO’s recently released report, GAO13-309. This testimony discusses (1) 

progress the F-35 program made in 

2012, and (2) major risks that program 

faces going forward. GAO’s work 

included analyses of a wide range of 

program documents and interviews 

with defense and contractor officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO’s prior reviews of the F-35 made 

numerous recommendations to help 

reduce risk and improve outcomes. 

DOD has implemented those 

recommendations to varying degrees.

What GAO Found

The new F-35 acquisition baseline reflects positive restructuring actions taken by

the Department of Defense (DOD) since 2010, including more time and funding 

for development and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future 

years. Overall, the program progressed on several fronts during 2012 to further 

improve the current outlook. The program achieved 7 of 10 key management 

objectives and made substantial progress on one other. Objectives on aircraft 

deliveries and a corrective management plan were not met. The F-35 

development test program substantially met expectations with some revisions to 

flight test plans and made considerable progress addressing key technical risks.

Software management practices and some output measures improved, although

deliveries to test continued to lag behind plans. Manufacturing and supply 

processes also improved—indicators such as factory throughput, labor efficiency, 

and quality measures were positive. While initial F-35 production overran target 

costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data shows labor hours decreasing 

and deliveries accelerating.

Going forward, the F-35 program still faces considerable challenges and risks. 

Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities and time 

required by the warfighter will be a paramount concern to the Congress, DOD,

and international partners. With more austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition 

funding requirements average $12.6 billion annually through 2037 (see below). 

Once fielded, the projected costs of sustaining the F-35 fleet have been deemed 

unaffordable by DOD officials; efforts to reduce these costs are underway. 

Software integration and test will be challenging as many complex tasks remain 

to enable full warfighting capability. The program is also incurring substantial 

costs for rework–currently projected at $1.7 billion over 10 years of production–to 

fix problems discovered during testing. With about two-thirds of development 

testing still to go, additional changes to design and manufacturing are likely. As a 

result, the program continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 

aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing development flight testing.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Funding Requirements 

View GAO-13-690T. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page 1 GAO-13-690T 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cochran, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35 Lightning II, 

also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). At a cost approaching $400 

billion, the F-35 is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and 

ambitious acquisition program. The program is developing and fielding 

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is the linchpin of U.S. and partner plans 

to replace existing fighters and support future combat operations. In a 

time of austere federal budgets, DOD continues to project significant 

long-term sustained funding requirements for the F-35 while, at the same 

time, pursuing several other expensive systems. Over the past 3 years, 

DOD has extensively restructured the F-35 program to address poor cost, 

schedule, and performance outcomes. Most recently, in March 2012, 

DOD established a new, more realistic, F-35 acquisition program baseline 

that reflects increased costs, longer schedule times, and deferred

procurement of 410 aircraft to the future. Appendix I tracks program 

baseline changes since the start of system development in 2001.

We have reported annually on F-35 issues since 2005.

1 My testimony

today is largely based on the results of our latest review,

2 and addresses 

(1) the progress the F-35 program made in 2012 and (2) the major risks

that the program faces going forward. To conduct our work, we reviewed 

program status reports and briefings, management objectives, test plans 

and results, and internal DOD analyses with a focus on accomplishments 

in calendar year 2012 compared to original plans for that year. We 

obtained manufacturing data and cumulative outputs from the start of 

production in 2007 through the end of 2012, and discussed development 

and production issues and results to date, future expansion plans, and 

improvement efforts with DOD, F-35 program, and contractor officials. We 

toured the aircraft manufacturing plant, obtained production and supply 

performance indicators, identified cumulative and projected engineering 

changes, and discussed factory improvements and management controls 

with members of the contractor’s work force and DOD plant

 1

See related GAO products at the end of this statement.

2

GAO- F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability 

Is a Major Concern, GAO-13-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2013).

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-13-690T 

representatives. We evaluated DOD’s restructuring actions and impacts 

on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes from program start to 

the March 2012 baseline, and determined factors driving the changes.

We obtained current projections of acquisition funding needs through 

2037 and estimated life cycle sustainment funding requirements. We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts. The program 

met or substantially met most of its key management and development 

testing objectives for the year. We also found that the program made 

progress in addressing key technical risks, as well as improving software 

management, manufacturing, and supply processes. 

The F-35 program met or substantially met most of its key management 

objectives established for calendar year 2012. The program office 

annually establishes major management objectives that it wants to 

achieve in the upcoming year. The F-35 program achieved 7 of its 10 

primary objectives in 2012. Those included, among other things, the 

completion of development testing on early increments of software, the 

beginning of lab testing for both variations of the helmet mounted display, 

the beginning of pilot training for two aircraft variants, and the completion 

of negotiations on the restructured development contract. Although the 

program did not complete its software block 31 critical design review as 

planned in 2012, it did successfully complete its block 3 preliminary 

design review in November 2012 and the critical design review in late 

January 2013. The program did not meet its objectives to (1) deliver 40

production aircraft in 2012 and (2) receive approval from the Defense 

Contract Management Agency of the contractor’s plan for correcting 

deficiencies in its system for tracking and reporting cost and schedule 

progress.

2

 1 Software capabilities are developed, tested, and delivered in three major blocks. Block 3 

is to provide the F-35 its full warfighting capability.

2

This specifically refers to the contractor’s Earned Value Management System, which has 

been found to be deficient. Earned value management is a disciplined process for 

tracking, controlling, and reporting contract costs and schedule. DOD requires its use by 

major defense suppliers to facilitate good insight and oversight of the expenditure of 

government dollars. 

F-35 Program

Performance

Improved in 2012

Most Management and 

Development Testing

Objectives Were Achieved
Page 3 GAO-13-690T 

The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 

expectations with some revisions to original plans. The program 

exceeded its planned number of flights by 18 percent, although it fell short 

of its plan in terms of test points3

• Conventional takeoff and landing variant (F-35A)—accomplished high 

angle of attack testing, initial weapons separation, engine air start, 

expansion of the airspeed and altitude envelopes, and evaluated 

flying qualities with internal and external weapons.

flown by about 3 percent, suggesting 

that the flights flown were not as productive as expected. Test officials 

had to make several adjustments to plans during the year due to 

operating and performance limitations with aircraft and late releases of 

software to test. As a result, none of the three variants completed all of 

their planned 2012 baseline points, but the test team was able to add and 

complete some test points that had been planned for future years. Testing 

accomplished on each of the aircraft variants in 2012 included:

4

• Short takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)—accomplished the 

first weapons release, engine air start tests, fuel dump operations, 

flight envelope expansion with weapons loaded, radar signature 

testing, and tested re-design air inlet doors for vertical lift operations.

• Carrier suitable variant (F-35C)—conducted speed and altitude range 

verification and flights with external weapons, prepared for simulated 

carrier landings, and conducted shore-based tests of a redesigned 

arresting hook.

In 2012, the F-35 program also made considerable progress in 

addressing four areas of technical risk that if left unaddressed could 

substantially degrade the F-35’s capabilities and mission effectiveness. 

However, additional work remains to fully address those risks. These risk

areas and the actions taken in 2012 are discussed below:

1. Helmet mounted display (HMD)—DOD continued to address technical 

issues with the HMD system. The original helmet mounted display, 

integral to mission systems, encountered significant technical 

 3

Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight plans that are needed to 

verify aircraft design and performance.

4

Due primarily to operating restrictions and deficiencies in the air refueling system, the F35A did not accomplish as many flights as planned and fell short of planned test points by 

about 15 percent.

Progress Made in 

Addressing Key Technical 

Risks 
Page 4 GAO-13-690T 

deficiencies and did not meet warfighter requirements. The program is 

pursuing a dual path by developing a second, less capable helmet 

while working to fix the first helmet design. In 2012, DOD began 

dedicated ground and flight testing to address these issues. Both

variations of the helmet mounted display are being evaluated and 

program and contractor officials told us that they have increased 

confidence that the helmet deficiencies will be fixed. DOD may make 

a decision in 2013 as to which helmet to procure.

2. Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)—ALIS is an important 

tool to predict and diagnose aircraft maintenance and supply issues.

ALIS systems with limited capability are in use at training and testing 

locations. More capable versions of ALIS are being developed and 

program and contractor officials believe that the program is on track to 

fix previously identified shortcomings and field the fully capable 

system in 2015. Limited progress was made in 2012 on developing a 

smaller, transportable version needed to support unit level 

deployments to operating locations.

3. Arresting hook system—The carrier variant arresting hook system

was redesigned after the original hook was found to be deficient, 

which prevented active carrier trials. The program accomplished risk 

reduction testing of a redesigned hook point to inform this new design. 

The preliminary design review was conducted in August 2012 and the 

critical design review in February 2013. Flight testing of the 

redesigned system is slated for late 2013.

4. Structural durability—Over time, testing has discovered bulkhead and 

rib cracks on the aircraft. Structural and durability testing to verify that 

all three variants can achieve their expected life and identify lifelimited parts was completed in 2012. The program is testing some 

redesigned structures and planning other modifications. Officials plan 

to retrofit and test a production aircraft already built and make 

changes to the production line for subsequent aircraft. Current 

projections show the aircraft and modifications remain within weight 

targets.

In 2012, the F-35 aircraft contractor and program office took steps to 

improve the program’s software management and output. The program 

began the process of establishing a second system integration laboratory,

adding substantial testing and development capacity. The program also 

began prioritizing and focusing its resources on incremental software

development as opposed to the much riskier concurrent development

approach. In addition, the program began implementing improvement 

initiatives recommended by an independent software review, and

Software Management and 

Output Improved
Page 5 GAO-13-690T 

evaluated the possible deferral of some of the aircraft’s capabilities to 

later blocks or moving them outside of the current F-35 program

altogether. At the same time, program data regarding software output 

showed improvement. For example, program officials reported that the 

time it took to fix software defects decreased from180 days to 55 days, 

and the time it took to build and release software for testing decreased 

from 187 hours to 30 hours. 

Key manufacturing metrics and discussions with defense and contracting 

officials indicate that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes improved

during 2012. While initial F-35 production overran target costs and 

delivered aircraft late, the latest data through the end of 2012 shows labor 

hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating. The aircraft contractor’s

work force has gained important experience and processes have matured

as more aircraft are built. We found that the labor hours needed to 

complete aircraft at the prime contractor’s plant decreased, labor 

efficiency since the first production aircraft improved, time to manufacture 

aircraft in the final assembly area declined, factory throughput increased, 

and the amount of traveled work declined. In addition, program data 

showed that the reliability and predictability of the manufacturing 

processes increased while at the same time aircraft delivery rates 

improved considerably. Figure 1 illustrates the improvement in production 

aircraft delivery time frames by comparing actual delivery dates against 

the dates specified in the contracts.

Manufacturing Process

Metrics Improved
Page 6 GAO-13-690T 

Figure 1: F-35 Production Aircraft Deliveries Compared to Contract Dates

Note: The numbered aircraft are in order of delivery. AF= U.S. Air Force F-35A, BF = U.S. Marine 

Corps F-35B, CF = U.S. Department of the Navy F-35C; and BK = United Kingdom F-35B.

Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities 

and time frames required by the warfighter will be of paramount concern 

to the Congress, U.S. military and international partners. As we recently 

reported, the acquisition funding requirements for the United States alone 

are currently expected to average $12.6 billion per year through 2037, 

and the projected costs of operating and sustaining the F-35 fleet, once 

fielded, have been deemed unaffordable by DOD officials. In addition, the 

program faces challenges with software development and continues to 

incur substantial costs for rework to fix deficiencies discovered during

testing. As testing continues additional changes to design and 

manufacturing processes will likely be required, while production rates 

continue to increase.

F-35 Program Still 

Faces Risks
Page 7 GAO-13-690T 

We recently concluded that while the March 2012 acquisition program 

baseline places the F-35 program on firmer footing, the aircraft are 

expected to cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take longer than 

previously projected. The new baseline projects the need for a total of 

$316 billion in development and procurement funding from 2013 through 

2037, or an average of $12.6 billion annually over that period (see figure

2). Maintaining this level of sustained funding will be difficult in a period of 

declining or flat defense budgets and competition with other “big ticket 

items” such as the KC-46 tanker and a new bomber program. In addition, 

the funding projections assume the financial benefits of the international 

partners purchasing at least 697 aircraft. If fewer aircraft are procured in 

total or in smaller annual quantities—by the international partners or the 

United States—unit costs will likely rise according to analysis done by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) office.

Figure 2: F-35 Program Budgeted Development and Procurement Funding Requirements, Fiscal Years 2013-2037

Note: Development and procurement of the Marine Corps variant is included in the Department of the 

Navy budget accounts.

Long-Term Affordability 

Remains a Concern
Page 8 GAO-13-690T 

In addition to the costs for acquiring aircraft, we found that significant

concerns and questions persist regarding the cost to operate and sustain

the F-35 fleet over the coming decades. The current sustainment cost 

projection by CAPE for all U.S. aircraft, based on an estimated 30-year 

service life, exceeds $1 trillion. Using current program assumptions of 

aircraft inventory and flight hours, CAPE recently estimated annual 

operating and support costs of $18.2 billion for all F-35 variants compared 

to $11.1 billion spent on legacy aircraft in 2010. DOD officials have 

declared that operating and support costs of this magnitude are 

unaffordable and the department is actively engaged in evaluating 

opportunities to reduce those costs, such as basing and infrastructure 

reductions, competitive sourcing, and reliability improvements.

Because of F-35 delays and uncertainties, the military services have 

made investments to extend the service lives of legacy F-16 and F-18 

aircraft at a cost of $5 billion (in 2013 dollars). The Navy is also buying 

new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets at a cost of $3.1 billion (in then-year 

dollars) to bridge the gap in F-35 deliveries and mitigate projected 

shortfalls in fighter aircraft force requirements. As a result, the services 

will incur additional future sustainment costs to support these new and 

extended-life aircraft, and will have a difficult time establishing and 

implementing retirement schedules for existing fleets.

Our report found that over time, F-35 software requirements have grown 

in size and complexity and the contractor has taken more time and effort 

than expected to write computer code, integrate it on aircraft and 

subsystems, conduct lab and flight tests to verify it works, and to correct 

defects found in testing. Although recent management actions to refocus 

software development activities and implement improvement initiatives 

appeared to be yielding benefits, software continued to be a very

challenging and high-risk undertaking, especially for mission systems.5

 5

Mission systems are critical enablers of F-35’s combat effectiveness, employing next 

generation sensors with fused information from on-board and off-board systems (i.e.,

electronic warfare, communication navigation identification, electro-optical target system, 

electro-optical distributed aperture system, radar, and data links).

While most of the aircraft’s software code has been developed, a 

substantial amount of integration and test work remain before the 

program can demonstrate full warfighting capability. About 12 percent of 

mission systems capabilities have now been validated, up from 4 percent 

Software Development 

Challenges Remain
Page 9 GAO-13-690T 

about a year ago. However, progress on mission systems was limited in 

2012 by contractor delays in software delivery, limited capability in the 

software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple 

software versions. Further development and integration of the most 

complex elements—sensor fusion and helmet mounted display—lie 

ahead.

F-35 software capabilities are being developed, tested and delivered in 

three major blocks and two increments—initial and final—within each 

block. The testing and delivery status of the three blocks is described 

below:

• Block 1.0, providing initial training capability, was largely completed in

2012, although some final development and testing will continue. 

Also, the capability delivered did not fully meet expected requirements 

relating to the helmet, ALIS, and instrument landing capabilities.

• Block 2.0, providing initial warfighting capabilities and limited 

weapons, fell behind due to integration challenges and the 

reallocation of resources to fix block 1.0 defects. The initial increment, 

block 2A, delivered late and was incomplete. Full release of the final 

increment, block 2B, has been delayed until November 2013 and will 

not be complete until late 2015.

• Block 3.0 providing full warfighting capability, to include sensor fusion 

and additional weapons, is the capability required by the Navy and Air 

Force for declaring their respective initial operational capability dates. 

Thus far, the program has made little progress on block 3.0 software. 

The program intends initial block 3.0 to enter flight test in 2013. This is 

rated as one of the program’s highest risks because of its complexity.

Although our recent review found that F-35 manufacturing, cost, and 

schedule metrics have shown improvement, the aircraft contractor 

continues to make major design and tooling changes and alter 

manufacturing processes while development testing continues.

Engineering design changes from discoveries in manufacturing and 

testing are declining in number, but are still substantial and higher than 

expected from a program this far along in production. Further, the critical 

work to test and verify aircraft design and operational performance is far 

from complete. Cumulatively, since the start of developmental flight 

testing, the program has accomplished 34 percent of its planned flights

and test points. For development testing as a whole, the program verified 

11.3 percent of the development contract specifications through 

November 2012. As indicated in table 1, DOD continues to incur financial 

Design Changes and 

Rework Continue to Add 

Cost and Risk
Page 10 GAO-13-690T 

risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing 

development flight testing. 

Table 1: F-35 Procurement Investments and Flight Test Progress

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Cumulative procurement (thenyear dollars in billions)$0.8 $3.5 $7.1 $14.3 $21.3 $27.6 $33.8 $40.1 $47.9 $57.8 $69.0 

Cumulative aircraft procured 2 14 28 58 90 121 150 179 223 289 365

Percent total flight test points 

completed 

- <1% <1% 2% 9% 22% 34% 54% 74% 91% 100%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: Years listed denote fiscal years. Flight test data reflects the percentage of total flight test 

points completed in time to inform the next year’s procurement decision. For example above, the F-35 

program accomplished about 22 percent of total planned flight test points through the end of calendar 

year 2011 that could help inform the fiscal year 2012 procurement decision. The program intends to 

complete developmental flight test points in 2016 and would be in a position to fully support the 2017 

procurement buy.

This highly concurrent approach to procurement and testing increases the 

risk that the government will incur substantial costs to retrofit (rework) 

already produced aircraft to fix deficiencies discovered in testing. In fact, 

the F-35 program office projects rework costs of about $900 million to fix 

the aircraft procured on the first four annual procurement contracts. 

Substantial rework costs are also forecasted to continue through the 10th 

annual contract (fiscal year 2016 procurement), but at decreasing 

amounts annually and on each aircraft. The program office projects about 

$827 million more to rework aircraft procured under the next 6 annual 

contracts. 
Page 11 GAO-13-690T 

We have reported on F-35 issues for over a decade and have found that 

the magnitude and persistence of the program’s cost and schedule 

problems can be largely traced to (1) decisions at key junctures made 

without adequate product knowledge; and (2) a highly concurrent 

acquisition strategy that significantly overlapped development, testing, 

and manufacturing activities.6 Over that time, our reports included

numerous recommendations aimed at reducing risk in these areas and 

improving the chances for successful outcomes.7

DOD has implemented our recommendations to varying degrees. For 

example, in 2001 we recommended that DOD delay the start of system 

development until the F-35’s critical technologies were fully mature. DOD 

disagreed with that recommendation and chose to begin the program with 

limited knowledge about critical technologies. Several years later, we 

recommended that DOD delay the production decision until flight testing 

had shown that the F-35 would perform as expected, and although DOD 

partially concurred with our recommendation, it chose to initiate 

production before sufficient flight testing had been done. Citing concerns 

about the overlap—or concurrency—among development, testing, and 

production, we have recommended that DOD limit annual production 

quantities until F-35 flying qualities could be demonstrated. Although 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation at the time, it has since

restructured the F-35 program and, among other things, deferred the 

production of hundreds of aircraft into the future, thus addressing the 

intent of our recommendation and reducing program risk. Appendix ll lists 

these and other key recommendations we have made over time, and 

identifies the actions DOD has taken in response.

In conclusion, while the recent restructuring of the F-35 program placed it 

on a firmer footing, tremendous challenges still remain. The program 

must fully validate the F-35’s design and operational performance against

warfighter requirements, while at the same time make the system 

 6 We have an extensive body of work looking at knowledge-based best practices in 

successful private and public acquisitions of new technology. Defense policy and the 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 incorporate elements of the knowledgebased approach. For an overview of the best practices criteria and methodologies, and 

how current defense programs including the F-35 fared, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12-400SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

29, 2012). 

7 See related GAO products for a list of previous F-35 reports.

DOD Actions On GAO 

Recommendations 

Have Varied, but F-35 

Restructuring Was A 

Positive Step
Page 12 GAO-13-690T 

affordable so that the United States and partners can acquire new 

capabilities in the quantity needed and can then sustain the force over its 

life cycle. Ensuring overall affordability will be a challenge as more 

austere budgets are looming.

Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cochran and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions you may have. 

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan 

at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

are Bruce Fairbairn, Travis Masters, Marvin Bonner, W. Kendal Roberts, 

Megan Porter, Erin Stockdale, and Abby Volk.

GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments
Page 13 GAO-13-690T 

October 2001 

(system

development start)

December 2003 

(approved 

baseline) 

March 2007

(approved 

baseline)

June 2010 

(NunnMcCurdy)

March 2012

(approved 

baseline)

Expected quantities

Development quantities 14 14 15 14 14

Procurement quantities (U.S. only) 2,852 2,443 2,443 2,443 2,443

Total quantities 2,866 2,457 2,458 2,457 2,457

Cost estimates (then-year dollars in 

billions)

Development $34.4 $44.8 $44.8 $51.8 $55.2

Procurement 196.6 199.8 231.7 325.1 335.7

Military construction 2.0 0.2 2.0 5.6 4.8

Total program acquisition $233.0 $244.8 $278.5 $382.5 $395.7

Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars 

in millions)

Program acquisition $81 $100 $113 $156 $161

Average procurement 69 82 95 133 137

Estimated delivery and production 

dates

First production aircraft delivery 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011

Initial operational capability 2010-2012 2012-2013 2012-2015 TBD TBD

Full-rate production 2012 2013 2013 2016 2019

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: TBD means to be determined.

Appendix I: Changes in Reported F-35 

Program Quantity, Cost, and Deliveries, 2001-

2012 
Page 14 GAO-13-690T 

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2001

GAO-02-39

$34.4 Billion

10 years

$69 Million

Start of system development 

and demonstration approved.

Critical technologies needed for 

key aircraft performance 

elements not mature. Program 

should delay start of system 

development until critical 

technologies mature to 

acceptable levels.

DOD did not delay start of 

system development and 

demonstration stating 

technologies were at acceptable 

maturity levels and will manage 

risks in development.

2005

GAO-05-271

$44.8 Billion

12 years

$82 Million

The program undergoes replan to address higher than 

expected design weight, 

which added $7 billion and 18 

months to development 

schedule.

We recommended that the 

program reduce risks and 

establish executable business 

case that is knowledge-based 

with an evolutionary acquisition 

strategy.

DOD partially concurred but did 

not adjust strategy, believing 

that its approach is balanced 

between cost, schedule and 

technical risk.

2006

GAO-06-356

$45.7 Billion

12 years

$86 Million

Program sets in motion plan 

to enter production in 2007 

shortly after first flight of the 

non-production representative 

aircraft.

The program planned to enter 

production with less than 1 

percent of testing complete. We 

recommended program delay 

investing in production until 

flight testing shows that JSF 

performs as expected.

DOD partially concurred but did 

not delay start of production 

because it believed the risk 

level was appropriate.

2007

GAO-07-360

$44.5 Billion

12 years

$104 Million

Congress reduced funding for 

first two low-rate production 

buys thereby slowing the 

ramp up of production.

Progress was being made but 

concerns remained about 

undue overlap in testing and 

production. We recommended 

limits to annual production 

quantities to 24 a year until 

flying quantities are 

demonstrated.

DOD non-concurred and felt 

that the program had an 

acceptable level of concurrency 

and an appropriate acquisition 

strategy.

2008

GAO-08-388

$44.2 Billion

12 years

$104 Million

DOD implemented a MidCourse Risk Reduction Plan 

to replenish management 

reserves from about $400 

million to about $1 billion by 

reducing test resources.

We believed new plan 

increased risks and DOD 

should revise it to address 

testing, management reserves, 

and manufacturing concerns. 

We determined that the cost 

estimate was not reliable and 

that a new cost estimate and 

schedule risk assessment is 

needed.

DOD did not revise risk plan or 

restore testing resources, 

stating that it will monitor the 

new plan and adjust it if 

necessary. Consistent with a 

report recommendation, a new 

cost estimate was eventually 

prepared, but DOD refused to 

do a risk and uncertainty 

analysis.

Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports and DOD 

Responses
Page 15 GAO-13-690T 

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2009

GAO-09-303

$44.4 Billion

13 years

$104 Million

The program increased the 

cost estimate and adds a year 

to development but 

accelerated the production 

ramp up. Independent DOD 

cost estimate (JET I) projects 

even higher costs and further 

delays.

Moving forward with an 

accelerated procurement plan 

and use of cost reimbursement 

contracts is very risky. We 

recommended the program 

report on the risks and 

mitigation strategy for this 

approach.

DOD agreed to report its 

contracting strategy and plans 

to Congress and conduct a 

schedule risk analysis. The 

program completed the first 

schedule risk assessment with 

plans to update semi-annually. 

The Department announced a 

major restructuring reducing 

procurement and moving to 

fixed-price contracts.

2010

GAO-10-382

$49.3 Billion

15 years

$112 Million

The program was restructured 

to reflect findings of recent 

independent cost team (JET 

II) and independent 

manufacturing review team. 

As a result, development 

funds increased, test aircraft 

were added, the schedule 

was extended, and the early 

production rate decreased.

Costs and schedule delays 

inhibit the program’s ability to 

meet needs on time. We 

recommended the program 

complete a full comprehensive 

cost estimate and assess 

warfighter and IOC 

requirements. We suggest that 

Congress require DOD to tie 

annual procurement requests to 

demonstrated progress.

DOD continued restructuring, 

increasing test resources and 

lowering the production rate. 

Independent review teams 

evaluated aircraft and engine 

manufacturing processes. Cost 

increases later resulted in a 

Nunn-McCurdy breach. Military 

services are currently reviewing 

capability requirements as we 

recommended.

2011

GAO-11-325

$51.8 Billion

16 years

$133 Million

Restructuring continued with 

additional development cost 

increases; schedule growth; 

further reduction in near-term 

procurement quantities; and 

decreased the rate of 

increase for future production. 

The Secretary of Defense 

placed the STOVL variant on 

a 2 year probation; decoupled 

STOVL from the other 

variants; and reduced STOVL 

production plans for fiscal 

years 2011 to 2013.

The restructuring actions are 

positive and if implemented 

properly, should lead to more 

achievable and predictable 

outcomes. Concurrency of 

development, test, and 

production is substantial and 

provides risk to the program. 

We recommended the program 

maintain funding levels as 

budgeted; establish criteria for 

STOVL probation; and conduct 

an independent review of 

software development, 

integration, and test processes.

DOD concurred with all three of 

the recommendations. DOD 

lifted STOVL probation, citing 

improved performance. 

Subsequently, DOD further 

reduced procurement 

quantities, decreasing funding 

requirements through 2016. The 

initial independent software 

assessment began in and 

ongoing reviews are planned 

through 2012.
Page 16 GAO-13-690T 

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2012

GAO-12-437

$55.2 Billion

18 years

$137 Million

The program established a 

new acquisition program 

baseline and approved the 

continuation of system 

development, increasing costs 

for development and 

procurements and extending 

the period of planned 

procurements by 2 years.

Extensive restructuring places 

the program on a more 

achievable course. Most of the 

program’s instability continues 

to be concurrency of 

development, test, and 

production. We recommend the 

Cost Assessment Program 

Evaluation office conduct an 

analysis on the impact of lower 

annual funding levels; JSF 

program office conducts an 

assessment of the supply chain 

and transportation network.

DOD partially concurred with 

conducting an analysis on the 

impact of lower annual funding 

levels and concurred with 

assessing the supply chain and 

transportation network.

Source: DOD data and GAO analysis in prior reports cited above.

Note: Est. dev. is abbreviation of estimated development.

.
Related GAO Products

Page 17 GAO-13-690T 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term 

Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Washington, D.C.: March 

11, 2013.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance 

Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks. GAO-12-437. 

Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, 

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 20, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Implications of Program Restructuring and Other 

Recent Developments on Key Aspects of DOD’s Prior Alternate Engine 

Analyses. GAO-11-903R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting 

Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.: 

March 19, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk. GAO-09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009.

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. 

GAO-07-360. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006.

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005.

Related GAO Products

(121156)
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