SALYUT: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent

Human Presence in Space

December 1983

NTIS order #PB84-181437
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600624

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

As the other major spacefaring nation, the Soviet Union is a subject of interest to

the American people and Congress in their deliberations concerning the future of U.S.

space activities. In the course of an assessment of Civilian Space Stations, the Office

of Technology Assessment (OTA) has undertaken a study of the presence of Soviets

in space and their Salyut space stations, in order to provide Congress with an informed

view of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

The major element in this technical memorandum was a workshop held at OTA

in December 1982: it was the first occasion when a significant number of experts in

this area of Soviet space activities had met for extended unclassified discussion. As a

result of the workshop, OTA prepared this technical memorandum, “Salyut: Soviet

Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. ” It has been reviewed extensively

by workshop participants and others familiar with Soviet space activities.

Also in December 1982, OTA wrote to the U. S. S. R.’s Ambassador to the United

States Anatoliy Dobrynin, requesting any information concerning present and future

Soviet space activities that the Soviet Union judged could be of value to the OTA assessment of civilian space stations. The result of this request is appendix A of this technical

memorandum: “The Soviet Salyut Space Program: Space Station, Spacecraft, Support,

and Training Facilities” is an official summary of Salyut space station activities, provided to OTA by Dr. Balayan, Vice-Chairman of the Intercosmos Council of the

U. S. S. R. ’s Academy of Sciences. OTA appreciates the cooperation of Ambassador

Dobrynin and the Soviet Academy in providing this information. This appendix is of

particular interest in that such information is seldom provided to American agencies

through official Soviet channels.

Appendix B is a paper prepared for OTA by Geoffrey E. Perry, head of the Kettering Group in England. This paper, “Soviet Space Stations: Achievements, Trends, and

Outlook, ” provides an independent view of Soviet accomplishments in this area; it is

based, in part, on the Kettering Group’s long-term monitoring of audio communications between the Salyuts and Soviet ground stations.

Those individuals acknowledged in appendix C provided information during the

course of the study and/or reviewed the draft report.

Director

. . ///
OTA Staff for Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent

Human

William

Presence in Space

John Andelin,

Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTA

and Natural Resources Division

Nancy Naismith, Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager

Mills, Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager (until Oct. 1, 1983)

Thomas F. Rogers, Project Director, Civilian Space Stations Assessment

Philip P. Chandler, II, Deputy Project Director, Civilian Space Stations Assessment

Contractors

Leonard David Courtland S. Lewis

Al Peabody Peter Ognibene

Administrative Staff

Marsha Fenn R. Bryan Harrison

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

Glenda Lawing Linda A. Leahy Cheryl J. Manning
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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EARLY SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PRE-SALYUT SOYUZ SPACE FLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SALYUT SPACE STATION CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . .

SALYUT ACI’IVITIES, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FUTURE DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POSTSCRIPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERAL REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX A: THE SOVIET SALYUT SPACE

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PROGRAM:

SPACECRAFT, SUPPORTAND TRAINING FACILITIES

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SPACE STATION,

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APPENDIX B: SOVIET SPACE STATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS, TRENDS,

AND OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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APPENDIX C: OTA WORKSHOP ON SOVIET SPACE STATION ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Photo cradit: Tass

Orbiting complex Salyut 7–Soyuz T-5 (photo taken from Soyuz T-6 on July 2, 1982, from a distance of about 120 m)
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Introduction

A number of citizens of the Soviet Union, and

their guests from other countries, have visited the

Earth’s lower space regime; the Soviet in-orbit

space infrastructure, primarily the Salyut space

stations (or, as the Soviets say, “orbital stations”),

has housed and supplied them there, more or less

continuously, for over a dozen years. During this

period the total number of hours that Soviet cosmonauts have spent in space has overtaken and

is now much greater than the corresponding total

for U.S. astronauts. By all accounts, the Soviets

are more knowledgeable than the United States

in space biology and medicine; in a number of

technical areas, notably in the use of automated

docking systems, they routinely use techniques

that the United States has never demonstrated.

It is true, on the other hand, that the Space Shuttle now gives the United States significant

capabilities that the Soviets do not have, but it

is widely believed on the basis of photographic

evidence available from unclassified sources that

the Soviet Union is developing both a small space

plane and a heavy-lift shuttle expected to be capable of propelling more massive payloads into

low-Earth orbit than can its U.S. counterpart.

The Soviet space station program is the cornerstone of an official policy which looks not only

toward a permanent Soviet human presence in

low-Earth orbit but also toward permanent Soviet

settlement of their people on the Moon and Mars.

The Soviets take quite seriously the possibility

that large numbers of their citizens will one day

live in space. Although the Soviets do not often

directly communicate detailed results of what has

been learned by and from the cosmonauts aboard

Salyuts, enough information is available to conclude that they are accomplishing much more than

rudimentary scientific investigations: they are providing the data, information, and experience required to design habitats and equipment which

will allow individuals to reside for the long-term

in space.

The Soviet approach to the development of

space capabilities differs significantly from the

American. Whereas the United States tends to advance from one space capability to the next by

quantum leaps, the Soviet Union tends to modify

and adapt technology that is already in hand,

thereby increasing its capability in a seemingly

more evolutionary or progressive fashion. By thus

relying on systems flight-proved in earlier space

programs, the Soviets may have been able to restrain costs and minimize the time spent in development and construction. The Soviet space

program and the U.S. satellite communications

industry are similar in that both allow for the

establishment of gradually evolving spacecraft design, and it may be advisable for the United

States, in other selected areas of space applications, for example, to adopt some form of the Soviet strategy. Already, NASA’s Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC), emphasizing the importance of system heritability, has advocated a

similar approach for planetary science.

The relative merits of automated and human

capabilities for performing work in space or, more

precisely, the criteria for establishing the optimal

mix of the automation and the human presence

for particular tasks, are the subjects of considerable debate in the United States. Although the

amount of time in space that American astronauts

have amassed is nontrivial, there is a certain degree of unreality about this debate because it cannot yet be grounded in extensive experience. The

Soviet Union, on the other hand, can draw on

a much greater fund of experience as they implement plans for integrating human and machine

capabilities for work on future space stations.

Perhaps the most important point to be made

here is that the United States and the Soviet Union

have cast the issue of humans versus machines in

different terms. U.S. space policy is to explore and

study space and to use it for general human benefit—and, where appropriate, to involve human

beings in actual spaceflight. In addition, both the

United States and the Soviet Union use their

spaceflight programs involving people to enhance

their national images. Soviet space poIicy, however, goes further; it includes the goal of learning how human beings may reside permanently

in space, both as an end in itself and as a means

of serving their national purposes. To date, the

United States has not committed itself to permanent human occupancy of space as a national

goal.

1
Executive Summary

The launching of Sputnik 1 initiated a space

race that led to the landing of astronauts on the

Moon; today the United States and the Soviet

Union are well aware of their relative strengths

and weaknesses in space activity. In most areas

of space science and space applications—best exemplified, respectively, by the Voyager missions

to Jupiter and Saturn, and the burgeoning satellite

communications industry-the United States,

through steady, long-term effort, seems to have

gained a substantial lead over the Soviet Union.

In human spaceflight, the picture is less clear

because the countries have taken quite different

approaches. In some respects, the activities of the

two countries in this arena have resembled the

race between the tortoise and the hare: while the

Soviet effort has featured apparently steady, incremental progression along well-defined lines of

development, the United States has typically

played catchup, using its strong technological

capacity to produce space achievements of startling virtuosity. Continuing development on both

sides has been fueled by a combination of political, economic, and military motives, in different

order of importance at different times.

The divergent approaches of the two countries

have led to two very different types of current

human spaceflight capability. The Soviet Union

has, since 1971, pursued a more-or-less continuous

program of development of space stations in lowEarth orbit (LEO). with the sixth Operational

model of the Salyut series now flying, Soviet cosmonauts have logged over three times the U.S.

total of crew-hours in space, and accumulated extensive experience in the conduct of flight operations, experimentation, and Earth observation in

trips that last for months. However, they are currently restricted to the use of relatively small, expendable launch vehicles for crew transportation

and resupply. The United States, on the other

hand, has an operational space Shuttle which permits the routine ferrying of crews and large payloads into orbit for over a week, currently at the

rate of some 5-6 flights per year. The Shuttle is

reusable, its staytime in orbit could be increased,

and the planned fleet of four Orbiters could provide staytime on the order of months per year.

But an individual unmodified Orbiter does not

provide a habitation combining large volume,

high power, and long duration needed for many

of the in-orbit research and development activities of interest, particularly to the life sciences and

some in the private sector.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is now considering “the next logical step”

for its space program: the establishment of a potentially permanent human presence as part of an

actually permanent LEO infrastructure, i.e., what

NASA describes as a civilian space station. If the

administration formally proposes to begin work

on such infrastructure, then Congress may find

that a detailed examination of the Soviet human

presence in space, the Salyut space stations, and

their associated space vehicles, can provide a useful frame of reference.

Early in this century, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky,

a Russian scientist and engineer, provided the

theoretical underpinnings for the Soviet space program with his visionary writings about the use

of orbiting stations as a springboard for exploring the cosmos. One can still find the influence

of his theories in the statements of modern-day

Soviet leaders.

But Soviet scientists and technicians have found

that the road to realizing their dream is a long and

difficult one. After initial successes with Sputnik

and the early orbital flights of cosmonauts in the

one-seat Vostok capsule, the Soviet space program began to feel the limitations of its technology. The 6-metric-ton (tonne; one tonne =

2205 lbs) Voskhod flew only twice, Voskhod 1

with three crewmembers, Vockhod 2 with two.

Two years later, in 1967, a new space vehicle

debuted with Soyuz 1. Despite the death of the

first Soyuz pilot in a crash landing, the Soyuzclass ship eventually became the principal means

of putting cosmonauts into space. After 12 years

of Soyuz operations, a new design, Soyuz T,

made its inaugural flight in 1979.

In the late 1960’s, the Soviets appeared to be

intent on sending cosmonauts to the Moon, but,

in view of the success of the U.S. effort to do so,

they eventually settled for landing automated

3
4

probes on the lunar surface. Subsequently, the

focus of the Soviet manned space program shifted

exclusively to the establishment of a strong

capability for near-Earth orbital operations, i.e.,

the development of space stations and associated

space vehicles. When Soyuz 4 docked with its sister ship Soyuz 5 in January 1969, the Soviets

called the resulting complex “the world’s first

space station, ” although the two craft had no connecting passageway between them. Salyut 1,

which provided one continuous volume capable

of supporting human habitation for time-periods

of the order of months, went into orbit in 1971;

the most recent of the series, Salyut 7, was

launched in 1982 and remains operational today.

Some of the Salyut stations were apparently

military in function; others seem to have been

primarily civil. With Salyut 6 and 7, the distinction became blurred; it may be that the military

no longer has a separate Salyut program. The

Soviets have maintained total secrecy in military

operations, but they have gradually become more

open with their civilian programs, broadening the

makeup of their crews to include members from

Eastern Europe and other Soviet-bloc countries,

France, and, soon, India. Although any joint

U.S.-Soviet effort (e.g., the symbolic joining of

the Apollo and Soyuz in orbit in 1975) currently

seems unlikely, future Soviet missions will probably continue to be international to some degree.

The fact that the Soviet technological base

remains relatively narrow seems to be closely

coupled with the infrequency with which rapid

innovation is achieved, both in Soviet industry

generally and in the Soviet space program in particular. Although Soviet spacecraft designers rely

heavily on automated control with cosmonauts

as backups, crewmembers have, in many instances, assumed broader duties to make up for

failures in automation. In any case, Salyut has

afforded its crews of engineers and cosmonauts

extensive experience in conducting operations in

space. Precisely how this experience will be put

to use in future operations is unclear,

Salyut may be the penultimate step leading to

a permanent, large-scale human presence in space.

Before that can be accomplished, the Soviets may

have to achieve success in developing a heavylift launcher, similar to the U.S. Saturn V, which

would allow for the construction of a second-generation station out of much larger modules, A

vehicle along the lines of the U.S. space shuttle

to provide routine access to a near-Earth station

would also be desirable, and indeed Western

sources believe that the Soviets may be developing a heavy-lift, reusable shuttle that could carry

twice the payload of the American craft. In addition, the Soviets have already conducted tests

for a l-tonne prototype of a 10- to 20-tonne space

plane.

With such spacecraft in their fleet, the Soviets

would possess both a “space truck” and a lightduty ferry vehicle to provide routine service to

an expandable infrastructure in space. With this

infrastructure as a hub of operations, extension

of human activity to geostationary orbit, the

Moon, and even Mars becomes technically feasible—indeed Soviet planners have frequently mentioned each of these as an objective. That previous

U.S.S.R. efforts to reach Mars have met with failure may, in the near term, have militated against

their initiating programs to send vehicles to the

outer planets and deep space. But it is unlikely

that the Soviets see these failures as anything more

than temporary setbacks, especially in view of

U.S. success in planetary exploration generally

and their own success in the very difficult task

of returning data from the surface of Venus—a

feat that the United States has yet to match. Indeed, a Salyut space station may provide the core

element of a future base necessary to ensure success of future trips to Mars.
—— —

Early Soviet Manned Space flight

Historical Background

A central element in the Soviet Union’s exploration and exploitation of space has been its reliance

on Salyut-class orbital stations occupied by cosmonauts. Seven of these stations have been officially announced by the U.S.S.R. as of December 1983. These facilities have begun to realize the

possibilities envisioned by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the Russian scientist/engineer who is considered the founder of Soviet astronautics. Early in

the century, he described how orbital stations

might be built, noting that they represented the

very heart of a program of space conquest.

Typical of his observations is this 1923 description of the construction of a system of Earthorbiting stations:

We take off in a space ship . . . and stay at a

distance of 2000-3000 versts [each verst equaling

0.6629 mile] from Earth, as its Moon. Little by

little appear colonies with implements, materials,

machines, and structures brought from Earth.

Gradually, independent production, though limited at first, will develop. *

Reinforcing the conviction of Tsiolkovsky, the

late Leonid Brezhnev, then President of the Soviet

Union, remarked in 1978:

Mankind will not forever remain on Earth, but

in the pursuit of light and space will first timidly

emerge from the bounds of the atmosphere, and

then advance until he has conquered the whole

of circumsolar space. We believe that permanently manned space stations with interchangeable

crews will be mankind’s pathway into the universe.2

As the launch of Sputnik l—the Earth’s first

artificial satellite, on October 4, 1957—opened the

path toward realization of Tsiolkovsky’s visions,

so the Soviet Union’s increasing ability to transport people into space in the 1960’s, 1970’s, and

1980’s has added substance to Brezhnev’s declaration. At least since the early 1970’s, the Soviet

Union seems to have taken a slow, more-or-less

‘K. E. Tsiolkovsky, CoJkcted Works, vol. 2, Moscow, Izdatel’stvo

AN U. S. S. R., 1954.

‘Kenneth Gatland, chief author, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of’

Space ~echnology (London: Salamander Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 214,

steady approach toward fulfilling the aspirations

of its engineers and political leaders. *

Vostok

Vostok (meaning “East”), a one-seater spacecraft, was the first Soviet vehicle to carry a

cosmonaut into orbit. * * Six Vostoks were

launched between April 1961 and June 1963; they

remained in orbit for periods ranging from 108

minutes to nearly 5 days. Weighing 4.7 metric

tons (tonnes) and simple in design, the vehicle

consisted of two modules: an almost spherical

capsule which carried the cosmonaut, and an

equipment package containing fuel, life-support

gear, batteries, attitude-control thrusters, and a

retrorocket to slow the vehicle for reentry into

the Earth’s atmosphere.

Vostok’s pilot was little more than a passenger.

With no orbital maneuvering capability designed

into the system, the pilot had few responsibilities

for control of the spacecraft.

On two occasions, pairs of Vostoks flew concurrently. Two A-1 vehicles launched Vostoks 3

and 4 from the same cosmodrome within 24

hours; *** Vostoks 5 and 6 were similarly launched

within 48 hours. In the second case, the Soviets

showed they could launch at precise times. In 1962

and 1963, the U.S. manned spaceflight program

could not match this achievement, the Mercury

program being plagued by a series of “holds” and

postponements.

*Many informed Western observers, as well as official Soviet

historians and publicists, would extend this characterization to the

earl y years of the Soviet program. Others, however, disagree, arguing that, especially in these early years, the appearance of an evolutionary course disguises a number of false starts, midcourse corrections, and radical changes of plan.

* ‘In preparation for the first manned flight, the Soviets, in 1960

and 1961, launched at least four Sputniks with animals aboard in

order to determine how they were affected by the operation of

various spacecraft subsystems. These included the launch s~’stem,

onboard life support and environmental control, and the reentry

and recovery system.

***The designations “A,” “D, “ “G, ” etc., are based on an

alphanumeric classification system devised by the late Charles

Sheldon of the Library of Congress. Another system designates the

launch vehicle with an “SL” and a number. Thus, the “A-2” vehicle

is the same as the “SL-4. ”

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6

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(a) LUNA 1-3

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Cred/t L C P Vick, 1982

Luna 1-3 (a); Vostok 1-6 (b) —standard launch vehicle with the first type of added upper stage A-1 (a) as used to launch

the first three Luna spacecraft; (b) as used to launch the six Vostok manned spacecraft
7

Vostok Booster

These simultaneous flights not only served as

tests of ground control and launch turnaround

capability, but also, as precursors of future

rendezvous and docking missions, allowed a determination of how closely spacecraft could be

positioned in orbit without specific orbital maneuvers. The orbital injections were so accurate

that the first pair coorbited and the second passed

within 5 miles of each other in noncoplanar orbits. * With these Vostok missions, the Soviets also

demonstrated the capability to handle communications with two spacecraft simultaneously.

Another highlight of the Vostok program took

place in June 1963 when Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman in space. Flying in Vostok

6 for 48 orbits around the Earth, she tallied more

flight time than all the male astronauts in the U.S.

Mercury program. Although relatively untrained

and rumored to have been ill throughout her

flight, Tereshkova at least achieved substantial

publicity.

Voskhod

In October 1964 and March 1965, the Soviet

Union launched the 6-tonne Voskhod (“Sunrise”),

a modified Vostok capable of carrying two or

three cosmonauts on daylong flights. Because the

Voskhod was used only for these two flights, some

Western experts believe it was intended primarily to preempt the U.S. Gemini program, which

would put two astronauts in one vehicle, one of

whom would “walk” in space. Voskhod had approximately the same pressurized volume as did

Vostok, but more volume was made available for

habitable crew space because the ejection seat and

rails were removed and because the crew wore

overalls instead of bulky pressurized space suits.

Voskhod 1, weighing 5.3 tonnes, had a threeperson crew. In Voskhod 2, which weighed 5.7

tonnes, one of the crew couches was replaced with

an inflatable airlock and associated hatches to

allow for extravehicular activity (EVA), or “spacewalking. ” During the flight one of the crew accomplished the first spacewalk of some 10 minutes

duration. * * The Voskhod program included the

first flight of a physician to conduct in situ observations; it also tested new TV and audio communications equipment, evaluated techniques for

spacecraft orientation, and employed a new solidrocket, soft-landing system. It did not, however,

*The orbits of Vostok 5 and 6 were in fact separated by almost

29” at their point of nearest approach, with the result that their relative velocity was approximately 12,000 feet per second. This hardly

could be counted as a rendezvous.

* *The cosmonaut spent a total of some 22 minutes under space

conditions—12 minutes outside the spacecraft, and the preceding

10 minutes in a depressurized, inflatable airlock.
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INSERTION

STAGE

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Credit C P V/ck, 1982

Voskhod-2 (a); Soyuz T (b) —standard launch vehicle with the improved upper stage A-2 (a) as .Jsed to launch the two

Voskhod manned spacecraft; (b) as used to launch the Soyuz T manned spacecraft
-—— —

9

include a launch escape system. As the first of a

series of individually small but cumulatively significant advances in Soviet space capabilities, the

Voskhod program brought the Soviet Union’s

total person-hours in orbit to some 507; by contrast, U.S. astronauts had accumulated 53 hours

through Project Mercury.

By the end of the Voskhod program, the Soviet

Union was dedicating its engineering expertise to

the creation of a more capable spacecraft—the

Soyuz (“Union”). During the 2-year hiatus between the flight of Voskhod 2 and Soyuz 1, the

U.S. Gemini program of 10 flights accomplished

many outstanding first-time achievements; American crewmembers also overtook their Soviet

counterparts in flight time, a lead they maintained, through the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project

(ASTP) in 1975, until the flight of Soyuz 29 in

June 1978. The Salyut 6 missions subsequently

reestablished the Soviet lead, more than double

the U.S. total.

Soyuz

Building on the technical foundation laid by

Vostok and Voskhod, the Soviet Union developed

the Soyuz space vehicle. First flown with a pilot

aboard in 1967, * Soyuz, the first of the Soviets’

truly operational spacecraft rated to carry crew,

remains, with evolutionary modifications, the

standard vehicle for transporting crewmembers

to Salyut (“Salute”) space stations. The current

design, called Soyuz T, was introduced in 1979.

Many Western observers believe that Soyuz was

initially developed to serve as part of an ambitious

program to send a cosmonaut to the Moon. However, it experienced a number of technical problems, including the inability of the A-2 booster

to launch a fully fueled and instrumented spacecraft, launch failures of the medium-lift Proton

type D-l-e and the heavy-lift G-class boosters, * *

and troubles with control systems aboard automated lunar spacecraft. These problems made it

impossible to use Soyuz for a manned lunar mission during the late 1960’s, when beating the

United States to the Moon was, presumably, of —- —

● The first flight of the Soyuz in 1967, ended with the death of

the pilot In a crash landing; this kind of craft was not flown again

until October 1968,

* *The G-series booster IS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V vehicle,

high priority. As a result, the Soviets appear to

have postponed any such lunar missions indefinitely.

Why were such technical problems not overcome? The conventional explanation hoIds that

the American lunar landings undermined the Soviets’ incentive for, and interest in, putting a

cosmonaut on the Moon. A fuller appraisal holds

that, after Apollo 11, the planned Soviet program

would have seemed second rate. The Soviets originally envisioned sending (only) one cosmonaut

in a Zond spacecraft to 1oop once around the

Moon (not to make multiple orbits) and probably

required an Earth-orbit rendezvous. But the success of Apollo 8 at Christmas 1968 and subsequent

near-perfect flights of Apollos 9, 10, and 11, apparently convinced the Soviets to concentrate on

other activities. As alternatives that could be

achieved, near-Earth, orbiting stations capable of

human habitation, and automated probes for

lunar sample return (via the Luna series spacecraft) and surface exploration (via Lunokhod 1

and 2) became the new foci of Soviet activities.

Carrying crews of one to three persons, Soyuz

has been used to conduct a wide variety of military and scientific experiments. These vehicles are

capable of orbital maneuvering, rendezvous and

docking, and solo flights with crew aboard for

up to 30 days. *

Soyuz is 7 meters in length, 2.7 meters in diameter, and up to 6,8 tonnes in weight, and

contains three connected elements that are interdependent for power, thermal control, and propulsion:

. Command Module. —Serves as the ascent

and descent compartment in which cosmonauts are ferried to and from orbit, as well

as the module in which they are stationed

during orbital maneuvers. It also contains

system function indicators and control panels

through which the cosmonauts interact with

various automatic systems. The Command

Module and the Orbital Work Module to-

*Although 18 days is the longest demonstrated flight of a Soyuz

craft with crew aboard, the Sowets have repeatedly stated this time

could be extended to 30 days. Without crew aboard, Soyuz vehicles

arc capable ot much longer duration In orbit: Soyuz T-1 recorded

a fllght ot 100 days while docked with Salyut b, Cosmos 613, undecked rerna]ned In orbit tor 60 da}rs.

25-291 0 - 83 - 2 : QL 3
10

I I

I

Cred/t C P V/ck, 1983

Soyuz 4: The original Soyuz spacecraft. Average mass: 6,500 to 6,625 kg. Overall length frclm booster interface to the

docking interface: 7.5 m. Body diameter: 2.2 m. Base diameter: 2,72 m. Descent module mass: 2,900 kg. The Soyuz

1-9 spacecraft were never launched fully fueled and fully instrumented. A full weight spacecraft would have weighed

approximately 9,000 kg, exceeding the 7,500-kg payload capacity of the Soy Jz A-2 booster
—— .—.

11

●

gether provide a total habitable volume of

nearly 9 cubic meters (one cubic meter = 35

cubic feet), roughly twice that of Vostok; in

Soyuz T the habitable volume has been increased to about 10 cubic meters. The slightly bell-shaped Command Module is a “lifting

body;” its aerodynamic properties, similar to

those of Apollo, are substantially better than

those of Vostok, lessening reentry deceleration forces on its crew and enhancing landing

zone targeting.

Orbital Work Module. —Nearly spherical in

shape, it allows cosmonauts to work, think,

eat, relax, and sleep in surroundings that are

spacious in comparison with those of the

Command Module. The Orbital Work Module is also used as an airlock through which

the crew may transfer to other spacecraft or

embark on spacewalks; an airtight hatch is

located at the interface that secures it to the

Command Module.

● Instrument and Systems Module. —Contains

a series of propulsion, maneuvering, and attitude control engines; associated fuel tanks;

and a pressurized forward section holding

major portions of the electronics for major

operating systems (environmental, attitude

control, communications, electrical, and propulsion). In some versions of Soyuz, solar cell

arrays protrude, winglike, from opposite

sides of this module, and provide charge and

recharge of a set of internal chemical batteries. Use of solar panels ceased after Soyuz

11 but was resumed with the Soviet Union’s

component of the joint U.S.-Soviet ApolloSoyuz Test Project, Soyuz ASTP,3 and retained in the Soyuz T.

. —

‘For a detailed account of this mission, see, Edward and Linda

Ezell, The Partnership—A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in the NASA History Series, 5JASA SP-420Qr Washington,

D. C,, 1978.
—

Pre-Salyut Soyuz Space Flights

As the core vehicle for Soviet-manned space activities since 1967, the Soyuz has accomplished

diversified objectives, many of them directly related to the growth of the Salyut space station program. Capable of flying with or without crews,

Soyuz has served as a test bed to observe the physiological effects of long- and short-term spaceflight

on human beings (as well as animals and plants),

to evaluate rendezvous and docking techniques,

and to appraise Earth remote-sensing equipment

and new spacecraft systems. *

In early Soyuz flights, cosmonauts exercised

skills later to be integrated into operations of the

Salyut space stations. Specifically, the space complex resulting from the docking of Soyuz 4 and

5 in January 1969 was described by the Soviets

as “the world’s first space station’’4—a somewhat

puzzling description, as there was no connecting

hatch. During the few hours when the two craft

were linked in power, control, and communications, two cosmonauts from Soyuz 5 donned selfcontained life-support systems, left their craft

through a hatch in the Orbital Work Module and,

using handrails, transferred into the docked Soyuz

4. This orbiting complex provided a total working volume of 632 cubic feet, the largest attained

to that date.

Although most observers contend that a true

space station should allow its occupants to move

from one part of the facility to another without

having to resort to spacewalking, the experience

gained in the Soyuz 4 and 5 complex was valuable in the design and development of larger space

station configurations.

In October 1969, the Soviets launched Soyuz

6, 7, and 8. In spite of their apparent failure to

● Unfortunately, in demonstrating this latitude of functions, four

cosmonauts lost their lives in two separate accidents, one in Soyuz

I and three in Soyuz II.

‘This phrase was first used in a question by the Tass correspondent

at the Cosmonauts’ press conference in Moscow, Jan. 24, 1969. (Summary World Broadcasts, Su/2984/c/4). This same claim could have

been made earlier, when two pairs of unmanned Soyuz prototypes

previously achieved successful rendezvous and docking—except, of

course, that some third vehicle would have been required to ferry

a crew to staff them,

dock two of the vehicles, they succeeded in flying the three spacecraft with their seven cosmonauts in coordinated, close formation. At the

time, the Soviets commented that the joint exercise evaluated autonomous navigation devices for

use in close-formation flying and achieved a “rational distribution” of control between man and

machine.

Acting on the assumption that the construction

of future space stations would require a mastery

of in-space welding techniques, the Soviets included a test unit on Soyuz 6. The device was

operated remotely in vacuo and manually within

the pressurized Orbital Workshop Module. Three

welding techniques were tried in vacuo: 1) lowpressure compressed arc, 2) electron beam, and

3) arc with consumable electrode. Only the second was reported to be a complete success. More

recently, the Soviets claimed those experiments

can now be “seen as an impetus to the practical

development of space technology. ”5

From its first use in April 1967 to the landing

of Soyuz 9 in June 1970, and the initiation of space

station operations, Soyuz spacecraft flew 15 persons on eight missions for a total of nearly 44 days

of operations in space. At the close of this period,

Soviet personnel—on Vostok, Voskhod, and Soyuz spacecraft—had accumulated a total of some

2,550 hours in space. By comparison, the total

at this juncture for U.S. Mercury, Gemini, and

Apollo spaceflight was far greater, being slightly

over 6,260 personnel hours.

An apparent objective of the Soyuz program

was to provide a multipurpose spacecraft to be

used in connection with an orbital space station.

Among its many roles, Soyuz was to be a temporary base for checking out the station, a supply and transport shuttle, and a vehicle for conducting additional independent studies. Given the

growing proficiency the Soviets had shown with

Soyuz, there remained no major technological

barriers to their Salyut space station program.

‘V. Kubashov, Pravda, Moscow, Apr. 26, 1980, p. 3.

13
Salyut Space Station Characteristics

Because each new U.S. spacecraft system is designed “from scratch, ” American designers tend

to emphasize quantum leaps in capability. By contrast, the Soviets reuse subsystems on different

spacecraft whenever possible. For instance, the

same propulsion, power, and thermal-control systems may be used on many vehicles. By relying

on systems flight-proved in earlier space programs, * the Soviets may have been able to reduce

costs and shorten the time spent in development

and construction. Still, most of these elements require modification. b

The Soviets are believed to have begun work

directly related to the development of Salyut space

stations in the late 1960’s. The first in this series

of stations, Salyut 1, was launched in April 1971.

To date, the Soviet Union has officially acknowledged that seven of these facilities have been

launched, one of which (Salyut 2) broke up in orbit. Cosmos 557, which failed in orbit, is generally

thought to have been a Salyut, although the Soviets have not confirmed this inference.7 * * Only

one other spacecraft, Cosmos 382, may have been

a Salyut, but the evidence for this view is meager.8

Though the Soviets experienced numerous failures

early in the Salyut program, their strategy of using

flight-proved subsystems in new programs to save

time and costs was less at fault than was their

weakness in the quality control of these subsystems.

-— ——.— —.- .——— -

‘For example, the Soyuz and Salyut (1 and 4) propulsion systems

were identical. Salyut I also used Soyuz solar panels. The propulsion unit of Molniya spacecraft was the same as that used on early

lunar and interplanetary vehicles.

‘K. P. Feoktistov and M. M. Markov, “Evolution of ‘Salyut’ Orbital Stations, ” Zern)ya i VseIennya, September-October 1981, pp.

10-17,

‘Nicholas L. Johnson, Handbook of Soviet Manned Space Flight,

vol. 48, Science and Technology Series, American Astronautical Society, San Diego, Calif., 1980, p. 209, (Note that this book was published before the orbiting of Salyut 7.)

* *As a rule, Soviet practice is to give a spacecraft a name appropriate to its class only if it achieves the purpose for which it was

intended; craft which miscarry or are aborted receive either no name

(as was the case for two that exploded in 1966) or the general appellation Cosmos. The failed Salyut 2 is the exception to this rule.

8Johnson, op. cit. Cosmos 382 was probably not a Salyut; it appears to have been considerably lighter and more maneuverable.

Its altitude (5, ooO km apogee), plane-change capability (51.6 - to

.55.9 ), and perigee increase (from 320 km to 2,577 km) link it more

probably to Cosmos 379.

Salyut-class space stations utilize several distinct

major components:

●

●

●

Salyut. —An orbital laboratory, 13 meters

(m; one m = 3.3 ft. ) in length, 4.2 m at maximum diameter and weighing approximately 19 tonnes; it provides over 100 m3 o f

usable space for up to five crewmembers. The

orbits of civil Salyuts (4, 6, and 7) lie between

362 and 338 kilometers (km; 1 km = 0.62

statute mile) above the Earth’s surface; those

of military Salyuts (3 and 5), between 274

and 241 km; that of Salyut 1, thought to be

civil, between 277 and 251 km; all have an

inclination of approximately 52 0. Two of

the sections—a transfer/docking compartment and a working/living compartment—

are habitable; the third is an unpressurized

instrument/propulsion section. Solar arrays

provide power. Salyuts 1 through 5 had one

docking port; Salyuts 6 and 7, two ports.

With a Soyuz transport craft docked at one

end and a Progress resupply ship at the

other, the total length of the complex is 29

m. Onboard laboratory equipment has included a multispectral camera, materials

processing furnaces, and devices for scientific, medical, and technological tests. *

Soyuz. —An early model of this class of

transport that was retired from Salyut operations after Soyuz 40 in 1981. This spacecraft,

flown with and without cosmonauts onboard, provided a transport link for two- or

three-person crews and supplies between

Earth and the Salyut vehicles, or, in the case

of Soyuz 22, a solo flight.**

Soyuz T.–Unveiled in December 1979. The

successor to Soyuz,9

and similar to it in external shape and dimensions, Soyuz T can

*For a more detailed description of Salyut, see Appendix A: The

Soviet Salyut Space Program.

* *Soyuz carried three cosmonauts on four flights. Soyuz 4 was

launched with one cosmonaut, but returned carrying two

cosmonauts from Soyuz 5; Soyuz 5 was launched with three and

returned with one. After three crewmen on Soyuz 11 died from

depressurization during reentry on June 6, 1971, cosmonauts were

required to wear pressurized suits, and crew size was limited to two.

‘Craig Covault, “Extensive Design Changes Mark Soyuz T,” Aviation 14’eeA & Space ~echnology Jan. 14, 1980, p. 57.

15
16

I

—

! I

I I

I

I

I

- 4

I

I

r

I

I

I I

I I

I

; - - ; “ - - ;

,

,.

11

L-----

4.15 31

Cred/t C P V/ck, 1982

Salyut launch vehicle: The Proton D-1 Launch Vehicle used to launch the Salyut Spacecraft Laboratory.

It is a three-stage launch vehicle
17

Soyuz 11 docked to Salyut 1

Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 represents a further development in the civilian Salyut Program. Major revisions are the absence

of solar panels on the Soyuz ferry and the change to three large, steerable solar panels on the station
18

Soyuz T Spaceship

*

$

Principal Characteristics

Crew

Weight

Weight of descent module

Length of the body

Maximum diameter

Span of extended solar

battery panels

Type of booster rocket

2-3 persons

6,850kg

3,000kg

6,98m

2.72m

10.6m

Soyuz

Cfed/t Drawing from “Mlsslon S:lentlflque”

Franco-Sovietique

Saliout-7

France-USSR Scientlflc Mlsslon

“Salyut-7 (F)ress Kit) for Soyuz T-6, 1982
. . . .

19

●

transport as many as three people wearing

pressure suits (or two people and a cargo

pod) to the Salyuts. ’ Operating with solar

panels, the craft sports advanced electronics

and computers; it is more maneuverable than

its predecessor, providing an automatic navigation control system that can be overridden for manual control, if desired, The orbital module of the vehicle, once its cargo has

been undoaded into the station, can act as a

container to hold used equipment and trash

for subsequent destructive reentry.** The

command module of Soyuz T is used to return the crew to Earth.

Progress. —An unmanned transport of slightly over 7 tonnes, based on Soyuz design and

using internal batteries rather than power

derived from solar cells, it links to Salyut

automatically, delivering equipment, parts,

fuel, and other consumables.’” The cargo capacity of Progress is about 2.3 tonnes of

food, water, mail, film, equipment, and propellants. Oxygen regenerators for Salyut’s

life-support system are resupplied, along with

gaseous nitrogen, if needed. 11 Salyut cosmonauts transfer much of this cargo into the station manually, but propellant for the station

is pumped automatically. Using residual pro-

*Soyuz T-3, T-6, T-7, and T-8 had crews of three.

* ● The orbital module has not been left attached to Salyut. Without

propulsion and flight control, its disposal would be difficult.

‘oK, P. Feoktistov, Scientific Orbital Complex, Monograph reproduced in English in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS),

USSR Report: Space, June 17, 1980.

‘lTass in English, 0753 GMT, Jan. 24, 1978.

pellant, Progress spacecraft also double as

space tugs, capable of pushing Salyuts into

higher orbit. The last service which Progress

can render to Salyut is to accept its refuse.

Because it is not designed for recovery, Progress is jettisoned and destroyed upon reentry into the atmosphere.

Cosmos 929-C]ass Module. ‘

z—Designed to

double the habitable volume of Salyut, this

module is flown without crew to the station

and docked automatically. Carrying its own

propulsion, guidance, and life-support systems, it is designed with several docking ports

and an ejectable “sub-module” which is large

enough to return the station’s crew and/or

heavy equipment to Earth. The first such

module, Cosmos 929, was orbited July 17,

1977, and tested as a freeflyer. The next in

the series, designated Cosmos 1267, docked

with Salyut 6 in 1981, forming an orbital

complex that flew, uninhabited, for 13

months while a variety of automated system

checkouts and flight-stability experiments

were carried out. The latest module of this

type, Cosmos 1443 (which may weigh as

much as 20 tonnes), docked with Salyut 7 in

March 1983.1

3 *

-—

‘

z

’’ Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units, ” A W’&ST, Iune

29, 1981, p. 21.

1“’Soviets Launch Module to Enlarge Salvut 7,” AU’& ST, Mar.

7, 1983, p. IQ.

*The long hiatus between the flights of Cosmos 1267 and 1443

can be attributed to the fact that the Cosmos 1267 test program was

not terminated until the summer of 1982, at which point the Soyuz

T-5 mission was already in progress.

Photo cred(t TASS

Link-up in Orbit: On June 28, 1983, the spaceship Soyuz T-9 linked up with the orbital complex Salyut T-7—’’Cosmos-1443”
20

Progress Cargo Spaceship

Doc

Principal Characteristic s

Weight

Weight of cargo dellvered

to the station

includlng:

-In the cargo compartment

-In the compartment for fuel

components

Maximum length

Maximum diameter of pressurized

compartments

Type of booster rocket

Duration of flight:

Independent

when docked

with the orbital station

Orbit parameters:

height

Incllnatlon

rotation period

7,020kg

about 2,300kg

Up to 1,300kg

Up to 1,000kg

7.94m

2.2m

Soyuz

up to 3 days

up to 30 days

200 to 350 km

51,6 degrees

about 89 minutes

Cred/t.’ Drawing from “MI sslon Sclent Iflque”

Franco-Sovietique

Saliout-7

France-USSR Sclentlflc Mlsslon

“Salyut-7 (Fress Kit) for Soyuz T-6, 1982
Salyut Activities

Launch dates of Salyut space stations announced by the Soviets: 14

Salyut I ., . . .Apr. 19, 1971

Salyut 2. . . . . .Apr. 3, 1973 (failed)

Salyut 3.... . .. June 25,1974

Salyut4 . .Dec. 26,1974

Salyut 5.... . . . . ..June 22, 1976

Salyut6 ... ..Sept. 29, 1977

Salyut 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ..Apr. 19, 1982

Salyut 1

The first in the Salyut series carried an Orion

I telescope for obtaining spectrograms of stars in

the 2,OOO to 3,OOO angstrom region of the electromagnetic spectrum; a gamma-ray telescope,

called Anna III, provided observations unattainable from Earth. Several optical and multispectralcameras were used for astronomical and Earth

photography. Photo sessions of geological and

meteorological phenomena were coordinated with

aircraft flights and orbiting weather satellites.

Making use of a hydroponic farm, biological experiments centered on the effects of weightlessness

on plant growth and nutrition. Long-term implications of the effects of microgravity on the

human organism were also studied.

A first attempt to board the station by a threeman crew on Soyuz 10 was thwarted by faulty

docking equipment on the Soyuz. A second attempt by Soyuz 11 cosmonauts was successful;

this three-man crew became the world’s first occupants of what some would describe as a true

“space station”-i.e., long-term in-space infrastructure that accommodates human beings—

residing in Salyut for 23 days. This initial success,

however, was followed by an unhappy ending.

A valve, intended for equalizing internal and external pressures as the spacecraft descended

through the atmosphere during recovery, jerked

open at the instant of the explosive separation of

the command and orbital modules, permitting the

cabin’s atmosphere to escape. The cosmonauts,

wearing no spacesuits, perished. * From then until the launch of Soyuz T-3 in 1980, Soyuz vehicles

were redesigned to allow the crew to wear spacesuits. Crew size was reduced to two to provide

sufficient room for the suits and related equipment. Salyut 1 was intentionally removed from

orbit 175 days after launch.

Salyut 2

This vehicle did not achieve stability in orbit,

began to tumble, and broke up before crews could

occupy it.

Salyut 3

Unlike Salyut 1, which had two sets of fixed

solar panels fore and aft, Salyut 3 carried two

larger panels attached just aft of the centerbody,

on the rear transfer module .15 These panels could

be rotated so the craft could continue to receive

solar power whenever it was in sunlight, whatever

its orientation. Salyut 3 was also modified so that

its docking port was aft .16 Other noteworthy modifications included higher efficiency power and

life-support systems and more convenient interior

design.

Cosmonauts aboard Salyut 3 conducted some

400 scientific and technical experiments, including high-resolution photo reconnaissance and/or

Earth resources observation, spectrographic study

of aerosol particles in the Earth’s atmosphere, the

culturing of bacteria, and the recycling of water.

The crew of Soyuz 14 resided aboard Salyut

3 for 14 days, but a follow-on Soyuz 15 crew

proved unable to effect docking. Overall, the station remained operational for twice its design lifetime. Some 2 months after Salyut 3’s final crew

departed, a data capsule was ejected and recovered on Earth. That only a few photographs,

ldco~mos 557, launched May 11, 1973, has been identified in

Western circles as a successfully orbited Salyut, although the station suffered a propulsion or command-sequencer failure, rendering it useless for human occupation. The vehicle rapidly decayed

in orbital altitude, reentering the atmosphere on May 22, 1973. See,

“Reception of Radio Signals From Cosmos 557, ” The Kettering

Group, Space flight, vol. 16, 1974, pp. 39-40.

● The cause of death was embolism, i.e., the formation of bubbles in the bloodstream.

“Although all subsequent Salyuts retained this midship mounting of solar panels, they were placed farther aft on Salyuts 3 and

5 than on Salyuts 4, 6, and 7. See, for example, AlV&ST, Dec. 4,

1978, p. 17.

‘*Ibid,

21
22

.-

6.98 m

6,700 Kg.

o

/

t

Credit C P V/ck, 1983

Soyuz 1 l/SaIyut 1. Total volume: 100.3 m3. Total weight: 25,600 kg. Total solar panel surface area: 42m2

showing noncritical interior equipment aboard

Salyut 3, have been released encourages speculation that its primary mission was probably military.

Salyut 4

The design of this station, seemingly primarily civilian in character, allowed the crew more

ready access for repair and replacement purposes.

Two navigation systems for the station’s automatic control were evaluated, as was a new teletype

system. Onboard scientific equipment, weighing

about 2.5 tonnes, was of much greater variety and

capability than that carried on previous stations.

The cosmonauts’ time was devoted each day to

a specific area of investigation-astronomical,

Earth resources, or biomedical. X-ray, solar, and

infrared spectrometric telescopes were among the

host of instruments employed. Making repeated

observations of agricultural patterns, forests, and

maritime areas, the crew collected a large body

of data on Earth resources. They also studied

micro-organisms, higher plants, and the human

cardiovascular system, measuring the tone of

blood vessels and the circulation of blood to the
——.——

23

6.98 m

I ‘1

14.42 m

I

16 m

2 I .4 m < <, #

23 m

1

I

< *

Credtt ~ C P V/ck, 198 3

Soyuz 18/Salyut 4: Total volume: 100,3 m’. Total weight: 25,600 kg. Total solar panel surface area: 60 m’

Solar panel span: 17 m

brain, The cosmonauts also evaluated the effectiveness of various exercise and diet regimes for

counteracting the reconditioning effects of microgravity,

The first crew to board Salyut 4 arrived on

Soyuz 17; they remained for 29 days. The mission of their scheduled successors, the crew of

Soyuz 18A,17 was aborted during ascent, Next

1-18A is the U.S. designation. The Soviets refer to this event as

the April .S anomaly,

aboard were the Soyuz 18B team; they remained

on the station for 62 days. Soyuz 20, a vehicle

without crew, carried biological specimens; it

docked and remained at the station for 89 days

before returning to Earth. Part of its mission was

to determine whether Soyuz could remain without

power for a relatively long time before restarting

its power supply without mishap—an important

consideration in planning for one crew to remain

aboard a Salyut for a lengthy mission. Salyut 4

was purposely taken out of orbit after 770 days

of flight.
24

Salyut 5

Salyut 5, the second station thought by Western

analysts to be primarily military, was the last in

the Salyut series to carry only one docking port,

a design characteristic which effectively prevents

a resupply vehicle from docking when a crew of

cosmonauts is already aboard. * Salyut 5 demonstrated a high-resolution camera, similar to that

on Salyut 3, that was used to study mineral deposits, seismic areas, environmental damage

caused by mud streams and railway construction

paths. A device for smelting certain metals—bismuth, tin, lead, and cadmium-and a crystal

growth experiment were evaluated in the station’s

microgravity environment. As in previous Salyuts, biological experiments on fish, plants, and

fruit flies were also conducted; algae and higher

order plants were cultivated to examine the ef-

*It is technically possible, but too risky, to back off one spacecraft fects o~ the spaceflight environment on their deand then dock another while the crew is on board the station. velopment and growth .

. 2 ?

I

14.4 m ?

21.38 m ?

6,800 1($

I

22.38 m ?

Cred/t. ~ C. P VIck, 1983

“Military” Salyut Conceptional Design: Total volume: 99 m3. Total mass: 25,300 kg. Total solar panel surface area

(estimated): over 50 m2

. Total mass: over 25,000 to 25,300 kg. Only a few written descriptions, a few movie film segments,

and a few photographs of the internal and external design layout of the Miiitaw Salyut 3 and 5 vehicles have been released
25

Over the course of Salyut 5’s stay in orbit, Cosmonauts routinely worked as in-orbit reSoyuz 21 brought a two-man crew, who remained pairmen, enabling the station’s design life of 18

on the station for 49 days; the crew of Soyuz 23 months to be greatly surpassed. Because of the

failed to dock; and the crew of Soyuz 24 remained longevity of Salyut 6, perhaps to the surprise even

aboard for 16 days. of the Soviets themselves, its crews registered an

Like Salyut 3, this station ejected a recoverable impressive list of accomplishments. Space applications and Earth observations each accounted for pod to Earth after its last crew departed, and, as

with Salyut 3, the Soviets have released only in- about one-third of the cosmonauts’ work schedternal photographs of limited interest. The sta- ule; the final third was split between biomedical

tion remained in orbit for 412 days before it was studies and astrophysics.

commanded to reenter. The two docking ports permitted 33 successful

dockings using vehicles with and without cosmonauts. At least two crews tried but failed to dock

with the station. Five long-duration cosmonaut

Salyut 6

By far the most productive of Soviet space stations, this “second generation” Salyut included

two docking ports, fore and aft; the station was

fashioned to support a new propulsion system

capable of being refueled in orbit. A waterregeneration device became a standard feature of

the life-support system, supplying crewmembers

with wash water; fresh drinking water was stored.

Many of the experimental systems tested on earlier

stations became operational on Salyut 6. A new

multispectral camera (which had been flight-tested

on Soyuz 22) and astronomical telescopes were

flown. During its mission, cosmonauts assembled

and deployed from Salyut’s aft end a dish antenna used in mapping radio emissions from the Sun

and the Milky Way, although the ultimate success of this experiment is in doubt. 18 Several

materials processing furnaces were appraised, and

infrared-sensitive semiconductors were produced.

Other experiments produced superconductors, eutectics, alloys, pure metals, glass, ionic crystals,

and metal oxides. Salyut 6 cosmonauts also

tested newly designed extravehicular spacesuits.

‘HCraig Covau]t, “Radio Telescope Erected cm Salyut 6,” AW&ST,

Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55 See also “Soviets Ready Salyut 6 Crew

Return, ” AW&ST, Aug. 13, 1979, p. 21.

“lames C. Brown, Materials processing on the Soviet Sa/yut 6

Space Station Memorandum SWN481-1OO4I, Central Intelligence

Agency, Natlona] Foreign Assessment Center, Apr. 1, 1981. Soviet

research In the materials processing-in-space arena appears extenwve. According to MIT protessor Harry Catos, before a House space

subcommittee review of space processing, a large new Soviet research

inst } t u te empl(~ys several hundred full-time sclent ists worh ing on

space material~ processing. Other countries involved in this institute

Include Poland, Hungarv, Czechoslovakia, and France, See

Astronautics and Aeronautics, September 1979, p. 9.

crews and 11 visiting crews accumulated a total

of 676 days of operation. New duration records

for human spaceflight were successively established: 96, 140, 175, and 185 days. During Salyut

6’s lifetime, eight cosmonauts from the Soviet bloc

resided in Salyut for short periods; Soyuz 33, carrying a non-Soviet crewmember, along with a Soviet pilot, failed to dock. * Salyut 6 operations introduced the use of Soyuz T and Progress vehicles, multiple-crew dockings, refueling in orbit, and

the Cosmos 1267 module. * *

Cosmos 1267 docked with Salyut 6 in June 1981

for a long series of what were described as checkouts of automated systems and “dynamic tests”

of the overall response of the structure to maneuvers while docked with another vehicle. According to Soviet space planners, Cosmos 1267 represented a “prototype space module, ” built to

expand the operations of future stations; such

modules could be dedicated to materials processing and astronomical or other scientific pursuits,

or they could be outfitted as living quarters. They

could also be undecked from Salyut, flown alongside the station and reconnected. This configuration would be particularly useful for the conduct

of experiments in materials processing, because

it could avoid perturbations caused by the station’s reactions to movements of the cosmonauts .20

The Soviets apparently were undecided about

using their long-lived Salyut 6 for future missions, ——

‘Soyuz 25 with two Soviet crew also failed to dock with Salyut 6.

* *There was no crew aboard either Cosmos 1267 and Salyut 6

during their docking of 40 days, after which both were deorbited.

‘“From Sputnik to Sa@t: 25 Years of the Space Age, !Novosti

Press Agency Publishing House, 1982, passim.

25-291 0 - El 3 - 3 : QL 3
26——.— —.— -— -. —

698 m

6,800 K g.

I I

I

18,900 K g .

13.050 m

PROGRESS

7,020 Kg.

29 m

Credit - C P Vick, 1983

Salyut 6 and attached transport vehicles Soyuz and Progress in various combinations; diagram shows, left to right,

Soyuz, Salyut and Progress: Total mass with two Soyuz: 32,500 to 32,600 kg. Total mass with one Soyuz and one Progress:

32,720 to 32,770 kg. Total mass with one Soyuz: 25,700 to 25,750 kg. Total volume with two Soyuz: 110.6 m3. Total volume

with one Soyuz and one Progress: 106.9 m3. Total volume with one Soyuz: 100.3 m3. Total solar panel surface area: 60 mz.

Solar panel span: 17 m
27 — —— — — .

and twice had Cosmos 1267 boost the complex

into a higher orbit. After Salyut 7 was launched,

Cosmos 1267 propelled Salyut 6 into a destructive reentry on July 29, 1982. The stay of Salyut

6 in orbit lasted 4 years and 10 months.21 2 2

Salyut 7

Currently, the Soviet Union is maintaining Salyut 7 in orbit. Soviet space officials indicate it is

similar in size and shape to its predecessor .23 24

Two docking ports are again provided, one of

which has been modified to handle larger spacecraft. The standard station control system on

.——. ..———

“Peter Smolders, “Saluting Saiyut’s Space Recordr ” ,Vem ScientiSt, Oct. 11, 1979, PP. 118-121.

“’’TASS Reports Termination of Flight c~f Salyut 6 Station, ” I+avda, July 30, 1982, p. 1

“B. Konovalov, “A Trip Through the ‘Salyut 7,’ “ lz~’est~jra, hlay

18, 1982, p, 3

-“’The N’em’ Salyut 7’ 1~ a \lt~dernl~vd Statl~, n, ‘ A]r and (’oimo,”

N() Q!O, ]une 5 1Q82, p 43

Salyut 7—the result of experiments conducted on

other stations—allows its crews to operate the

facility in more automatic modes.25 Recommendations from cosmonauts who had lived aboard

Salyut 6 led to an interior “modernization program” to make Salyut 7 more livable. Designers

have taken special care to protect certain observation windows, shielding both inside and outside panels with removable covers, because contaminants from propulsion unit firings, as well as

impacts from micrometeorites, degraded the windows on Salyut 6. The color scheme was changed

to improve the residential and working environment, and a refrigerator was installed.

Salyut 6 carried a submillimeter wavelength infrared telescope; Salyut 7 contains a complex of

X-ray equipment, The first long-duration crew

““Salyut 7 Incorporates State-o[-Art Upgrades, ‘ A il’&.ST, ]uly

26, 1982, pp 26-27,

.

Crewmen on Station Aboard Salyut 7
28

used a new computer-controlled 300-lb materialsprocessing furnace to produce several pounds of

semiconductor monocrystals. This furnace operates automatically when the station is unoccupied.

New systems for medical examination and diagnosis have improved the range of biomedical

parameters that can be monitored, either onboard

by the cosmonauts or remotely from the ground.

For example, a thorough electrocardiogram can

be obtained automatically. Measurements of

blood circulation in the cerebral cortex, an important parameter in near-weightless conditions,

are receiving particular attention.

Performing about 300 experiments, the station’s

first long-term crew worked to meet orders from

500 national economic and scientific centers. Soviet officials stated that, for the first time, a Salyut

space station undertook “direct research production tasks. ”26 Some 20,000 photographs of the

Earth’s surface were reportedly taken during the

first phase of this operation.

Initial operations of Salyut 7 relied on Progress

vehicles for resupply and refueling .27 The Soyuz

T-5 transported a crew of two to the Salyut in

May 1982. Subsequently, a Soyuz T-6 with three

aboard, including a French spationaut, and a

Soyuz T-7 with three, including the world’s second woman cosmonaut, visited the primary crew

on separate occasions. The primary crew set a new

world endurance record for spaceflight: 211 days.

On March 2, 1983, “a modular transport ship, ”

Cosmos 1443 (a Cosmos 929-class module), was

launched, and docked with Salyut 7 on March 10

in a configuration similar to the Salyut-6/Cosmos-1267 complex. 28 Although a Soyuz craft with

—————

1“’Kuznetsov Presents Awards to Salyut 7 Cosmonauts, ” Moscow

Domestic Service, LD291458, Dec. 29, 1982.

“In the early phase of Salyut 7, two small “subsatellites” were

launched from the station by its first long-duration crew. These satellites, Iskra 2 and Iskra 3, were constructed by students of a Moscow

Aviation Institute and served as communications satellites for

amateur radio enthusiasts, The two satellites were “launched” from

the station’s airlock. For a detailed account of early work on Salyut

7, see: “Salyut Mission Report, ” by Neville Kidger, Spaceflight, January 1983, pp. 28-29.

‘“’’Soviets Launch Module to Enlarge Salyut 7,” AW&ST, Mar.

7, 1983, p, 19.

Phofo crertlt. Novos/I

Members of the Soyuz-9 space mission

a crew of three aboard failed to dock with the

complex in April 1983, 29 a two-person crew

boarded the station on June 28, 1983, and remain

aboard as of this writing.

The Salyut-7/Cosmos-1443 orbital complex

was thought capable of housing as many as six

crewmembers. * Stationing of that many people

aboard the complex would have born out earlier

Soviet pronouncements that this configuration

was a prototype for future larger scale space stations. On August 14, 1983, Cosmos 1443, along

with its descent module (with a capacity for returning one-half tonne of cargo, but not a crew

member) was undecked from Salyut 7.** Then

on September 19, 1983, Cosmos 1443 was inten-

-—.——.

“’’Soviet Docking in Space Falls; Mission Aborted, ” Washington

Post, Apr. 24, 1983, pp. A-1, A-12.

*It is not clear that docking arrangements allow more than one

Soyuz T to dock with a Salyut 7/Cosmos 1443-type combination

at a time; such a provision wo ~ld be expected in the future.

‘•A rather complex sequence of events occurred during August

1983. Cosmos 1443 undecked on August 14. Then on August 16,

Soyuz T-9 undecked, the Salyut was rotated through 180 , and the
29

...——

The crew of the Soyuz T-7 spaceship (from left to right) –crew commander Leon id Popov, Pilot-Cosmonaut of the U. S. S. R.;

researcher engineer Svetlana Savitskaya; and flight engineer Novosti

tionally deorbited, perhaps because of a serious

malfunction affecting its operation .30 More recently, Salyut 7 itself has experienced a serious propellant leak, leaving it with two of its three oxidizer tanks empty and 16 of its 32 attitude control thrusters unusable. Because of the difficulty

of making repairs, it is less likely that Salyut 7

will become a major component of a large modular station.

Military Utility of Salyut

Salyut space stations serve both military and

civilian needs. 31 Through the mid-1970’s, each station could be distinguished as military or civilian — . —

Soyuz was redocked at the “front” end of the station. On August

17, Progress 17, bringing additional fuel, air, and water was docked

to the “back” end of the station. On August 19, the descent module

from Cosmos 1443 landed in Kazakhstan, U.S.S.R. Since the undocking of Cosmos 1443 and Salyut 7, the two spacecraft went out

of and (through firing of the motor of the Progress attached to Salyut )

came back into orbital phase, but apparently no attempt was made

to redock prior to the intentional deorbiting of Cosmos 1443.

~oA “jatjon ~ee~ & space Technology’, Oct. 10, 1983, P 25

“Johnson, op. cit., pp. 213-217

by its design, communications frequencies, orbits,

onboard equipment, and crew composition. Such

distinctions are virtually impossible to draw for

the Salyut 6 and 7 stations. Indeed, now that 6

years have passed since the last Salyut clearly

identifiable as military was used, a separate

military Salyut program may no longer exist.

Civilian Salyuts (1 and 4) were flown in higher

orbits, increasing their value for astronomical

observations. Telemetry was typical of Soviet

nonmilitary spacecraft, and the crew commander,

although usually from the Soviet military, was

accompanied by a civilian flight engineer.

In contrast, military Salyuts (3 and 5) were

flown in lower orbits, presumably to get the most

out of the capabilities of onboard photo reconnaissance assets and activities which replaced the

astronomical activities of civilian flights. * Flights

of these Salyuts, typically using radio frequencies

*In order to maintain such a low orbit tor very long, large quantities of propellant must be expended.
30 — ———

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Cosmos 1443/Salyut 7/Soyuz T: Total mass: about 47,000 kg, Total solar panel surface area: ‘[00 mz. Total power output:

7 kW. Total volume: 150.3 m3. Solar panel span: 16-17 m
associated with other Soviet military space missions, were conducted by all-military crews. They

remained in orbit for shorter periods than their

civilian counterparts and ejected capsules for recovery on Earth.

Of course, there must be some military interest

in scientific programs. For instance, astronomical

investigations completed by Salyut crews maintained the orientation of certain equipment to an

accuracy of a few arc-seconds, a capability related

to what might be needed to aim directed-energy

weaponry. The materials processed in microgravity could range from electronic components to new

pharmaceuticals,

Many activities aboard Salyut might be described, in the United States, as civil, but others

might well have military implications. Whether

military activities aboard these stations pose a

serious, near-term threat to the United States cannot be determined from the open literature. Certain military operations may have been turned

over to automated spacecraft: Soviet advancements in satellite photo reconnaissance may have

reduced the need for crewmembers to gather these

data.

Comparisons with the U.S. program are also

complicated by the fact that no operational requirements for U.S. military missions aboard a

space station, particularly those requiring crewmembers, have been formally stated. 32 However,

in view of President Reagan’s speech in March,

1983, on the subject of defense against ballistic

missiles, this assessment may be changing. 33 In

“At the Space Station Symposium held in Washington, D.C ,

in luly 1983, Richard DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense for

Research and Engineering, reiterated this position. For an earlier

discussion, see: Joel Levy, et al,, “Potential Military Applications

of Space Platforms and Space Stat ions,” Eascon 82, 15th Annual

Electronics and Aerospace Systems Conference, IEEE Conference

Record 82 CH1828-3, Sept. 20-22, 1982, pp. 269-276. This pape r

states: “It is apparent that, at this time, the DOD has not defined

any firm requirements for space platforms or space stations. ” The

military utility of a manned space station, say for photo reconnaissance, requires detailed tradeoff studies, “ . in order to

evaluate whether the increase in system performance due to man’s

presence warrants the increase of approximately an order of

magnitude in the cost of the program. Any increase in system performance achieved by such means would be measured by some, as

yet undefined, weighing of factors such as cost, risk, survivability,

reliability, threat recognition and the time to respond. ”

““President Seeks Futuristic Defense Against Missiles, ” Washington Post, Mar, 24, 1983, pp. A-1, A-13. See also, “Reagan Plans

New ABM Effort, ” Science, vol. 220, Apr. 8, 1983. More recently,

3 1

. —

any case, the military value of the Soviet space

station remains open to question.

Capability Base for Salyut Program

The Soviet technology base must inevitably affect its space program. A thorough appraisal of

this base cannot be obtained because the Soviets

tightly control what information about the program is made public. Observers, however, have

noted these characteristics: 34

Simplicity. —Compared with similar Western

systems, Soviet components are, in general,

relatively less complicated.

Commonality. —Once a basic system or subsystem is developed, it is used as much as

possible thereafter. With this approach, a relatively narrow technological base can serve

much broader needs.

Gradual Change. —This principle derives

from the other two. Because each system is

closely related to its predecessor, the risks attendant on innovation are reduced.

In sum, the Soviets prefer to use a single, reliable basic design over a relatively long time in

order to provide several generations of systems

for similar or related uses.

Professional surveys of industrial technology

in the U.S.S.R. suggest that the Soviets are generally unwilling or unable to undertake rapid innovation. In some cases, however, a few critical

suppliers and supporting industries have been able

to set priorities that led to rapid change.

the Defensive Technologies Study Team, headed by former NASA

Administrator James C. Fletcher, has been reported as concluding

that “a space-based [ballistic missile defense] system may also require a continuous manned space presence Both cost and effectiveness may justify manned systems . Development of a repair

and refurbishment system may be fie key to operational and

economic viability of space-based ballistic missile defense. ” A W’&ST,

Oct. 24, 1983, p. 50.

“Herbert P. Ely, “Impact of the Technology Base on Soviet

Weapon Development ,“ Army Research, Development & Acquisition Magazine, May-June 1982, pp. 12-13. For a broader look at

conditions of Soviet technology see: Industrial lrrnovat~on in the

Soviet Union, Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (New Haven,

Corm.: Yale University Press, 1Q82). The authors discuss Soviet

militar y technologies in detail, and conclude that they do not have

the quality and level of sophistication that those of the United States

have. In general, although Soviet industry is slow to respond to new

R&D initiatives, the technology lag is smallest in the defense and

space sectors.
Hampered by a lack of precise instrumentation

and sophisticated engineering techniques, Soviet

space designers frequently take a “brute-force” approach to problem-solving .35 Although this approach has obvious drawbacks, it does tend to

impose—in contrast to the U.S. system of singleunit production—an economy of operation

through the exploitation of continuing production

of less complex hardware. Lastly, there is a consensus that an uneven research and development

base, poor quality control, and poor quality

assurance has impeded Soviet space development

on many fronts.3b

Evidence for these evaluations is provided by

the mixed results from lunar probes and interplanetary exploration. Crossing the relatively short

distance to Earth’s neighboring Moon, Soviet

vehicles were generally successful in achieving soft

landings, trekking across the lunar terrain, and

returning samples of the Moon’s surface directly

back to Earth, Four-month dashes to the planet

Venus resulted in significant Soviet success in

landing vehicles and-operating their sensors for

brief periods on the surface of that extraordinarily

inhospitable world.

By contrast, 9-month journeys to Mars have

met with repeated failure, and no attempts have

been made to probe Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn.

The outer planets in particular, the subject of intense scrutiny by U.S. space vehicles, have so far

remained beyond the reach of Soviet probes. The

rather limited time during which important systems aboard Soviet spacecraft remain operational

is still a major limitation. This weakness also appears in spaceflights with Soviet crews, who have

been able to keep Salyuts operational by undertaking unscheduled maintenance and repair.

As these operations of Soviet spacecraft are reviewed, certain limitations become apparent:

.

“Ursula M. Kruse-Vaucienne and John M. Logsdon, Science and

Technology in the Soviet Union–A Profile (Washington, D. C.:

Graduate Program in Science, Technology and Public Policy, The

George Washington University, 1979), pp. 3-7,

‘bEven though impediments exist, can they be circumnavigated

by a concentrated scientific thrust? See, for example: John W. Kiser,

111, “Technology: We Can Learn a Lot From the Soviets, ” The Washington I’ost, Aug. 14, 1983, pp. Cl, C4. See also: Malcom W.

Browne, “Soviet Science Assessed as Flawed But Power ful, ” The

New York Times, May 20, 1980, p. C-3, which describes the buildup

of the Soviet science work force and its potential for scientific

\urprise.

Salyut.—Although Salyut is smaller than currently proposed U.S. concepts, it has accommodated Soviet crews for as long as 211 days. Attachment of a Cosmos 929-type module should

markedly improve living conditions.

Salyut cannot communicate via line-of-sight circuits directly with Ear-t h stations (in the Soviet

Union) during every ore of its 15 or 16 daily orbits. On those orbits when communication is not

possible, the cosmonauts sleep, and telemetry,

communicated via shortwave circuits, is

sometimes used to monitor basic onboard systems. Even during the in-contact orbits, the crew

can communicate with Earth stations on Soviet

territory for only 25 minutes out of every 90.

Compared with scientific equipment proposed

for any future U.S. “stations,” Soviet scientific

equipment is low in weight and used sporadically; just a small portion of it is replaceable. The

station itself can generate 4 kW of power, Cosmos

1443 contributed 3 kW from its own solar panels

while it was attached to Salyut, and additional

modules may be expected to do likewise. The low

return-weight of equipment transported back to

Earth via Soyuz T is one constraining factor; because of the delay in returning photographic film

to Earth, its use, rather than reliance on advanced

electronics, for remote sensing of the Earth is

another (although the installation of live television transmission equipment aboard the latest Salyut has partially overcome this limitation). * The

life-support system requires regular deliveries of

drinking water and supplies for purifying the

cabin atmosphere. * * The current configuration

requires that Salyut be refueled through its aft

docking port.37

Soyuz T.—This vehicle, like the original Soyuz,

is a reliable, though relatively unsophisticated,

spacecraft. Its onboard computer has no backup.

The latest mission of cosmonauts aboard Salyut

7 demonstrated an operational lifetime of Soyuz

T, while attached to the station, of 150 days. Be-

‘App. A.

* *Some water is recycled abo,ird Salyut, a capability that U.S.

spacecraft do not possess.

ITFor a discussion of rendezvo~ls and docking techniques involving Soyuz T and the Salyut stations, see: A viatsiya i Kosmonautika,

1979, pp. 36-39, translated in JPRS 74805 Space No. 1, Dec. 20, 1979,
3 3

cause the Soviets are reluctant to land Soyuz T

in the water or at night, they impose strict constraints on the duration and scheduling of its

flights. Yet, they have repeatedly demonstrated

the ability to deviate from these conditions when

necessary. No spacecraft, of course, can land

without restrictions. Indeed, the U.S. Space Shuttle Orbiter operates with even greater restrictions

than Soyuz. Major modifications of the U.S. craft

would be required if its staytime in orbit were to

approach that of Soyuz T.

General

In order to minimize one of these deficiencies,

the Soviet Union, according to a plan lodged with

the International Frequency Registration Board in

1981, intends to operate a system called the

Eastern Satellite Data Relay Network (ESDRN),

which will employ radiofrequencies similar to the

U.S. Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System

(TDRSS). The Soviet system would allow reliable,

nearl y continuous communication with Salyut

stations and other spacecraft in low-Earth orbit,

commencing perhaps as early as December 1985.

Despite the fact that the Soviet technology base

advances more slowly and still remains, in most

instances, less sophisticated than that of the

United States, it is not suggested that these factors seriously inhibit what appears to be a continuing and expanding set of objectives for productive operations in space, made possible, in

part, by people aboard Salyut-class facilities, and

determined by what the Soviets consider valuable.

Resupply, repair, and service functions, for example, are often performed by cosmonauts, who

were a key factor in the longevity of Salyut 6. The

Soviets regard the adaptability of human beings

as a form of insurance that permits continuous

and variegated space station operations .38

Whereas the U.S. program from its inception

was heavily influenced by the high visibility of

the Apollo program and the continuing presence

of test pilots, who insisted that astronauts be “in

the loop” whenever possible, the Soviet program

at the outset was heavily influenced by the Insti-

‘“G, T Beregovt]y, et a] , EvperImentd] p~jrcho]oglcd] Research

{n A ~r]at~on and Cosmond utlc-s ( ?vIoscow Navka Press, 1 Q78 ~.

tute for Automatic Control, which obviously had

a different orientation. However, the same unreliability of automated equipment that has plagued

the Soviets’ long-duration planetary probes has

made the human presence an essential element in

the Salyut program. As a result, the Soviets have

gone far in discovering how the attributes peculiar

to human beings may be put to effective use in

conducting unforeseen as well as planned activities

in the course of maintaining and operating a space

station. 39 Their growing fund of experience supports and in turn is supported by two related requirements of their ideology and their judgment

of their national security interests: that they begin

“the inevitable socialist expansion into space, ” and

that they maintain and enhance their national

prestige. These factors have resulted in what

should be appreciated as the cultivation of the

human presence in space.

The Soviets have claimed that people stationed

in space can improve the effectiveness of Earth

observations. After a period of adjustment of a

few weeks, cosmonauts report both improved visual acuity and enhanced perception and differentiation of color, making it possible for them to

identify land features and ocean phenomena (e. g.,

the presence of schools of fish) that were not expected to be visible from low-Earth orbit. These

findings have been pursued in real-time aboard

Salyut space stations.40 41

In support of the human presence, the Salyut

stations have served as medical laboratories in

which the occupants have completed comprehensive programs of biomedical and life-science research. Much of this data-gathering is dedicated

to answering the following questions: Do long

spaceflights result in unacceptable psychological

effects and produce harmful physiological alterations of the human body? If so, can these effects

be countered? In search of answers, the Soviets

—.- ——

“G, T. Beregovoy et al , ‘ Res, arch in Space Psychology, ”

l’sikhologicheski,v Zhurnai, .?(4 ), Jul\F-August 1082, pp 1(30-167 (In

English, JPRS Space, No\T 19, 1Q82 pp. 17-so, )

““Jerry Grey, Beachheads In Space A B]ueprlnt for the F“uture,

New York, 1983, p, 42.

“Personal communication from Chr I> Dodgy, Science POIICy

Research Division, Congressional Researc h $ervice, \4’ashingt(~n,

DC., re U, S,-U, S,S. R. \lrorklng Group on ~pace B]t>logy and \ledic ine, meet i ng of Ntl\’ember 1981, L“n ltc~rmed Ser\rices L’n I vers] t }’

of the Health Sc]ences (USUHS 1, Bethesda, hld
34

are planning in-flight missions that would entail

stays up to 1 year for cosmonauts.

Special exercise and diet regimes are being employed to counter changes in cardiovascular tone

and muscle systems during flight and to facilitate

the subsequent readaptation to gravity. Some

changes such as the loss of red blood cells have

been found to be self-limiting and subsequently

reversible. Others, although decreasing in rate

over time, may not entirely level off. In particular,

osteoporosis, the loss of calcium from bone, may

pose a formidable problem in the context of flight

durations of a year or more in the absence of gravit y. 4243 Extensive ground-based studies employing simulations of weightlessness (including bed

rest and water immersion) are augmenting inflight

research. 44

Medical studies of the cosmonauts, supplemented by onboard diagnostic equipment to monitor their overall health on long flights, continue

A2Arnauld E. N icog o s s ian and James F. Parker, Jr., SPaCe

Physiology and Medicine, Biotechnology Inc., NASA Headquarters

contract NASW-3469, Washington, DC., September 1982, pp.

20-24.

tsThe Soviets themw]v~ seem undecided about whether very longterm weightlessness will be a general problem. Cosmonaut Georgi

Gretchko is quoted (in “Soviets Unveil Space Station Plans, ” by Peter

Smolders, New Scientist, June 301983, p. 944) as saying of a possible trip to Mars: ‘Your heart and entire organism would have become

so accustomed to living in space that you would never be able to

stand life on Earth again. ” On the other hand, see Grey, op. cit.,

PP. 41-42: “One of the cosmonauts, Valery Ryumin, spent a full

year in space (he served on the 175-day and 185-day flights aboard

Salyut 6), and was in excellent physical condition after both flights.

He walked comfortably only one day after returning to the oppressive [sic] gravity of Earth, and was jogging happily on the third day.

After exhaustive studies of the returned cosmonauts, the Soviets’

bioastronautics mentor Oleg Gazenko concluded, ‘I believe that

humankind can be as happy in space as on Earth. ’ “

AAArnauld E. Nicogossion and Courtland S. Lewis, A Critical Review of the U.S. and International Research on Effects of Bedrest

on Major Body Systems, Biotechnology, Inc., NASA Headquarters

contract No. NASW-3223, Washington, D. C., January 1982.

to be given a high priority aboard Salyut. Certain countermeasures have been designed to maintain good health and high performance during

prolonged spaceflight. The most demanding of

these is exercise, which consumes an average of

2.5 hours during each day in space and involves

the use of specialized gear as well as conventional

exercise devices.

The Soviets have devised a comprehensive

psychological support program, including the

transport of letters and news to Salyut crews and

frequent two-way video communication with

families and research counterparts on the ground.

These measures have been instituted to counter

the cosmonauts’ isolation and heavy workload.

One challenging goal is a closed life-support

system aboard Salyut that would generate water

and air and produce food, independent of external supply .45 46 A complete growing cycle of higher order plants has been evaluated aboard Salyut,

as has control of plant diseases and use of vegetables and herbs as food for human consumption. ’ Creation of partially closed ecological systems may conceivably lead to completely closed

systems, suitable for flights of 2 years or more.

Designed in accordance with biomedical information derived from past Salyut flights, these closed

systems could be implemented for eventual flight

to the Moon and neighboring planets; such systems might also lead to substantial cost reductions

in Earth orbit operations.

’51. I. Gitelson, et al., Cfosed Ecosystems as the Means for the

Outer Space Exploration by Mer! (Experimental Results, Perspectives), IAF-81-164, presented in Rome, Italy, Sept. 6-12, 1981.

46Y. Y. Shepelev, “Biological life-Support Systems, ” ch. 10 of

Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, vol. 111: Space Medicine

and Biotechnology, M. Calvin ar[d O. G. Gazenko (eds. ), NASA,

1975. NASA Sp-374, pp. 224-308.

*Borage was grown from seedlings to leaf stage, and spring onions

from bulbs to maturity.
Future Directions

The Soviet Union’s Salyut space stations have

formed the backbone of an ambitious and expansive program involving human beings in space.

The ideological underpinning of Salyut is the desire to project and maintain an image of scientific, technological, and industrial world leadership in space. Overall, the Soviet approach toward implementing these goals has been one of

cautious advance—a step-by-step evolution consistent with an often-stated, long-term goal of

spreading Soviet influence into near-Earth space

and beyond. As was the case for the U.S. Apollo

program, the Soviet effort does not appear to be

predicated on near-term economic benefits.

The last 5 years have witnessed a growing maturity and confidence in Soviet spaceflight planning and conduct, Present Soviet activities with

Salyut are approaching the establishment of a permanent human presence in low-Earth orbit .47

Whether or not continuous human occupancy is

established soon, the Soviet Union can be expected at least to maintain and probably to expand human activities in space. The Salyut space

station is anticipated to remain the central element

for space operations involving peopIe, although

several new programs may augment the station’s

use and enhance the range of future Soviet options.

Three New Initiatives

Soviet planners appear to be looking at three

new initiatives: modular space stations, heavylift expendable boosters, and reusable launch

vehicles. President Brezhnev was apparently a

strong supporter of space expenditures; President

Andropov’s views are not fully known . 48 Although appraisals of Soviet spending are difficult, 49 one estimate puts the overall cost of the

—. —

47Rolf Engel, “Soyuz and Salyut: Stepping-stones to a Permanent

Soviet Space Station?” Znteravia, February 1982, pp. 173-177.

~ HAccording to one Western source, no major change in the Soviet

determination to expand in space is to be expected. See: Theo Pirard,

“Russia’s Future in Space, ” Space Press, June 1983, pp. 16-17.

“See, for example: “Estimating Soviet Military Spending-An Arcane Art M’ith Political Overt ones,” by Michael R. Gordon, IVational ]ournal, June 26, 1982, pp. 1140-1141, Gordon discusses the

Soyuz/Salyut program during the 1970’s at near-l y

$40 billion (in 1980-adjusted dollars). That is approximately the cost of the entire U.S. Moon

Landing program—from the first Mercury suborbital flight to the final Apollo 17 Moon landing and return. 50 Moreover, the cost to develop,

launch, and maintain Salyut 6 during its nearly

5-year tour-of-duty probably exceeded $9 billion

(in 1980-adjusted dollars).” As in the United

States, the economic climate in the Soviet Union

might well dictate the scope, scale, and timing of

any new Soviet space initiative.

Modular Space Stations

A modular station could be composed of five

to eight units, separately launched and assembled

in orbit. These plans are well within current Soviet

capabilities. Indeed, Soviet sources have identified

Cosmos 929-class modules as prototypes:

of the kind that will be linked together to

form a multi-purpose orbital station. One of the

modules will be a fitted-out laboratory, others

will perform purely technological duties. There

will also be observatory modules and whole

plants for manufacturing products in zero-g.

Lounge modules will be living quarters for cosmonauts to take a rest after the heavy workload

they will handle in space. . . . Each station can

easily be modified by changing modules to fit

changing needs of the mission . . .52

Within a constellation of such modules, Soviet

cosmonauts could begin to live in orbit more comfortably and more productively. A modular space

station could be the beginning of a usefully permanent human presence in space. Among other

possibilities, the crew of a large, well-equipped

station would no longer have to be limited to

broadly trained cosmonauts. Technicians with

particular specialties could be included in the station’s complement. In any case, a large modular

controversy surrounding U.S. estimates of Soviet military spending

which are used to justify increased American military budget

requests,

50 Enge],Op,cit,,p.175.These estimated costs for the Soviet Program include expenditures for investment, infrastructure, and

development.

“Saunders Kramer, “Salyut Mission, ” in Letters to the Editor,

AW&ST, oct. 27, 1980, p. 76.

sZDr. Feoktistov, quoted in DST-14005-022082.

3 5
36

station would allow human beings to achieve a

more normal, leisured, and productive life in

space than has hitherto been possible.

Heavy-Lift Expendable Boosters

Currently, Salyut operations are carried out

using two types of launch vehicles. The “A” series

booster, which provides over 400 tonnes of thrust

at liftoff, is the workhorse of the Soviet launcher

family .53 Variants of this booster are used to loft

Soyuz, Soyuz T, Progress, and other vehicles.

This standard launch vehicle, minus its upper

stage, was used to orbit Sputnik 1 into space in

1957—an indication of its reliability and longevit y. 54 “D” series boosters, called “Protons,” have

launched Salyut space stations and Cosmos 929-

class modules without cosmonauts onboard. The

Proton’s thrust at liftoff equals about 1,000

tonnes. There are also “C” and “F” series boosters

which meet other requirements, but those of the

“B” series have been phased out.

Under development, according to reports reaching the West, is a new booster in the “G” series

capable of producing up to 5,000 tonnes of thrust

at liftoff. Previous boosters in this series were apparently destroyed in three inaugural attempts

(1969, 1971, and 1972): one exploded on the

launch pad and two exploded in flight. Similar

to the U.S. Saturn V, the redesigned G booster,

possibly carrying cryogenic upper stages, is

several years away from operational status,

though test flights could occur between 1984 and

1986. A Pentagon analysis claims the booster will

be capable of putting very heavy payloads into

orbit (180 to 210 tonnes)—six to seven times the

payload weight of the U.S. space Shuttle.55

Some believe the new “G” series booster will

lead to the long-awaited Soviet attempt to put

cosmonauts on the Moon. Others believe it will

be used to orbit very large electromagnetic weapons. The new booster could also propel a 90-tonne

station into orbit, to be occupied by a dozen or

——

‘Appendix A describes this booster in more detail. See also

(jlu~hkc}, Valentin, Petrovich, “Development of Missile Constructlc~n ~nd C{wmonautics ]n the U. S. S. R.,” )Mashinc)stra.venive

(Nl[)wt)w Machine [ncfustry Publishing House, 1982), p. 66.

“James Oberg, “Beyond Sputnik’s Booster, ” Omni, October 1982,

pp. 22, 189.

“Soviet Military Power (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of

Defense, 1981 ), pp. 79-80.

more crewmembers by the end of the decade.

Such facilities might, in some respects, be more

attractive than space stations built from smaller

modules. With relatively small-sized modules,

such as the Cosmos 929-class, for example, there

may be as much as 30 percent redundancy of

hardware for rendezvous, docking, propulsion,

electrical power, structural support, and the like.

In a larger station, the weight of this otherwise

employed hardware could be used instead for additional instrumentation, living quarters, manufacturing facilities, and other productive equipment, All of these uses could be fulfilled by such

a launcher. As an alternative to developing such

a “G” series launcher, the Proton booster might

be upgraded to carry cosmonauts. This choice

would allow some modest improvements and

avoid the risks inherent in developing a new

launcher.

Reusable Vehicles

The Reusable Space Plane.—Speculation concerning a Soviet version of the LT

. S. Dyna-Soar

has been fueled by two Cosmos flight tests, each

apparently designed to evaluate the aerodynamic

and reentry characteristics of a winged space

plane, weighing about a tonne. These missions—

Cosmos 1374 on June 3, 1982, and Cosmos 1445

on March 15, 1983—flew identical trajectories;

each was sent into space for a 2-hour test from

the Kapustin Yar launch site near Volgograd, orbited the Earth, and landed in the Indian Ocean.

A seven-ship Soviet task force supported both

retrieval operations. Photographs of the Soviet

recovery of Cosmos 1445, released by the Royal

Australian Air Force, indicate the craft is of a

lifting-body/blended-wing design .5’ Some Western experts contend that the recovered vehicles

are prototypes designed to provide reentry data

for a larger 10-to 20-tonne version which would

carry a crew. (By contrast, the U.S. space Shuttle weighs approximate] y 100 tonnes. ) The Soviet

tests have been likened to the U.S. Asset program

of the early 1960’s, which made use of several

—-

“See the following: Craig Covault, “Soviets Orbit Shuttle Vehicle, ” A W&ST, June 14, 1982, pp. 79-80; “Soviets Launch Winged

Spacecraft, ” AW&ST, Mar. 21, 1983, p. 18; “Soviets Recover

Spaceplane in Indian Ocean, ” A W&ST, Mar. 28, 1983, p. 15; and

“Soviets Recover Spaceplane, ” 4 W&ST, Apr. 4, 1983, p, 16. See

also: U.S. Department of Defer se, Soviet Military Power, March

1983, pp. 66-68.
—— —— .—

37

m

~ -.7 -———.

+ 4

f“-
38

Photo credlf Austra//a Department of Defence

Recovery of Cosmos-1445 by the SSVRS 201 YAMAL is believed to be a quarter-scale testbed version

of the Soviet space plane

gliders on suborbital flights into the Atlantic, to

gather heating and structural load information on

winged space vehicle designs.

Some Western observers believe this program

may have begun as early as 1976. Drop tests of

the Soviet space plane from aircraft, akin to those

carried out in the U.S. space Shuttle program,

have been reported.

The Soviet space plane is expected to be capable

of ferrying three persons between the ground and

the Salyut station or other platforms in low-Earth

orbit. It should be able to provide a means of

rapid evacuation from the station and sufficient

cross-range to allow landing at any major airport.

However, its design may make little, if any, cargo

space available, thus affording no solution to the

Soviets’ inability to return heavy payloads from

space stations to Earth. Although less versatile

than the U.S. Shuttle, its greater simplicity might

be well-adapted to quick launch and turnaround

as well as rapid response to occasional reconnaissance requirements. Operation of the vehicle may

begin within 2 to 3 years.

The Reusable Heavy-Lift Shuttle .—According

to an assessment by the Department of Defense,

the Soviet Union is apparently building a “heavylift” space shuttle similar in design to the U.S.

Shuttle but capable of lofting twice as much payload into orbit. As detailed in a 1983 report on

Soviet military power,57 58 the heavy shuttle, like

the U.S. Shuttle, will be a delta-winged orbiter

mounted on an external tank with strap-on

57sov;ef~j]j~av power,M ed. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 1983), pp. 64-69.

58 Craig Covault, “Soviets Buildlng Heavy Shuttle, ” AlW&ST, Mar.

14, 1983, pp. 255-259.
—

39

— -——. —

boosters. However, its ratio of payload weight

to total vehicle weight is judged to be higher than

that of the U.S. vehicle, and the specific impulse

of its liquid-fuel strap-on boosters could be higher

than the Shuttle’s solid-fuel engines. In addition,

the U.S. Shuttle carries 40,000 lbs of main engines

and propulsion equipment on the Orbiter itself,

whereas the Soviet shuttle would carry them on

its main tank. This general configuration, whereby the Soviet shuttle would not have to recover

its high-energy main engines, would result in a

large payload bonus, though this advantage

would have to be weighed against the cost of replacing the (unrecovered) engines. Overall,

although its precise configuration and propellants

are not known, the Soviet shuttle, with liquid

strap-on boosters, could provide a payload capability of perhaps twice that of the 65,000 lbs of

the U.S. Shuttle .59

Although the smaller space plane has been undergoing tests for several years, the heavy-lift

shuttle design is relatively new and would require,

perhaps, a decade of development and testing before it would be ready for regular use. Advanced

versions of the vehicle could evolve into a twostage, fully reusable system. bo 61 At the Tyuratam

spaceport near the Aral Sea, where Soviet cosmonauts are often launched, a large runway has

been built and could be used to support operations for either type of reusable spacecraft. bz

——. .- ———

‘

+ See Picard, op. cit. It should be noted, however, that previous

Soviet practice has been to rely on space structures that, relative

tc~ comparable U.S. structures, are heavy. If this practice is continued in the heavy-lift shuttle, and if this vehicle does indeed rely

exclusively on I iquid propellants, then a payload capacity double

that of the U.S. Shuttle would imply a thrust at lift-off of some 3,000

to 4,000 tonnes.

‘“Craig Covau]t, “Soviets Developlrrg Fly Back Launcher, ”

AJ4’&ST, No\T. 6, 1978, pp. IQ-20.

“For further views on a Soviet space shuttle system, see: “A Soviet

Space Shuttle?” by Kenneth Gatland, Spacef/ight, SeptemberOctc>ber, 1978, pp. 325-326. Also, ‘The Soviet Space Shuttle Program, ” b} Lt Carl A. Forbrich, Air UrrI\, Review. May-June 1980,

PP. 55-62, and ‘The Soviet Space Shuttle: Sifting Fact From Rumor,”

by James Oberg, reprinted in Insight, the newsletter of the National

Space Institute, June-July 1980, pp. 4, Q.

“’Pictures ot the runaway have r-tow appeared In A W&ST, Mar.

21, 1983, pp 20-21.

General Considerations

Although both types of Soviet reusable spacecraft may be realized in the relatively near future,

Western experts disagree on the roles these vehicles might play with cosmonauts aboard. Some

have suggested that the space plane could serve

the Soviet military as a “space fighter. 63 Others

think that the Soviets plan to use it as a replacement for Soyuz T vehicles. The heavy-lift shuttle, on the other hand, could well have an important role in boosting a new and larger generation

of space-station modules into orbit.

The Soviets have bitterly criticized the U.S.

space Shuttle as evidence of the “militarization of

space” despite the official U.S. position that the

craft is not a weapon. Soviet criticism may arise

from a genuine fear of its use for military operations, or it may be a smoke screen to be maintained only until the Soviet Union can unveil a

similar vehicle. 64 Soviet protests against U.S.

military reconnaissance satellites, for instance,

subsided once the U.S.S.R. had launched comparable spacecraft.

“’’Soviet Militarization ot Space, ” Air Force i’blagazine, hlarch

1982, p. 42,

“Soviet sensitivities as to the military usefulness ot the U.S. Space

Shuttle and its potential for sparking Sowet ‘technological inferiority” are evidenced in: .%viet Elites— Jfrorld \ ‘iet~’ and l’ercept]ons

of the U. S., by G. Guroff and Steven Grant, Oftlce of Researchr

International Communications Agency, R-18-81, Sept, 2Q, 1Q81,

p. 17. Report observes:

The U S space shuttle, in particular, \eems to h~vt, lett $t)\lets, ln -

c Iudlng some at the highest levels, alm{)st >pcec h less \f’hen they ww

on telev islon ( private showings) what the [ I S had dt)ne ]t was clear

to many that their erstwhile “lead ‘ In the manned space race had dlwppeared, and that their own program was year, bt,htnd that ,)t the LI S

G]ven the wide publlclty of Soviet space ett{)rts man> Soviets telt until

then that the U S had all but abandoned space t{) the S[)vlet Llnlon

Many belleve that they are Incapable ot doing t% hat the [‘ S ha. dt)ne

with the shuttle Thts teeljng translates tc)r mtl+t Sc)v Iets )nt[) the turt her

bellet that It the U S wants to, It can change the mllltar}, bdlan( r )n

Its favor almost overnight that it can pull some w capon rabbit out ot

Its technological hat at an~r moment and Iea\,e the S[)\let [ ‘nl[)n tar Inehlnd

In the arms race

Soviet concern regarding U.S. intentions to develop a space weapons

capability could be ampl]~ fueled by such documents as High Fron -

tier—A New National Strategy, a Project of the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D,C. 1982, which calls for, among other element~,

a military “high performance spaceplane” for inspecting or retrle~r~l

of “suspect” space objects.

American perceptions of the Soviet milltar>’ presence )n \pace IS

typified by: “Twenty-five Years After Sputnik— The New’ Sc)vlet

Arms Buildup in Space, ” The New York Time .!lagaz]ne (let 3,

1W32, pp. 30-34, 89, 92-Q3, Q8, 100.
Impact on Foreign Policy

The Soviet Union’s space program is intended

to demonstrate, inter alia, what can be achieved

under its form of government. To this end, the

Soviets have made political capital out of their

guest cosmonaut program: a number of cosmonauts from Soviet-bloc countries—Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary,

Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, and Romania65—were

ferried to Salyut 6 for short-duration working

visits. A French spationaut was transported to and

from Salyut 7. Preparations are underway to include a crewmember from India in early 1984, and

other countries may be invited to participate

in future missions. How valuable is the guest program? At a minimum, it supports Soviet propaganda aims, and the scientific exchange, particularly with the French, may be of significant value.

In any case, the Soviets clearly believe that the

program is worth the relatively small investment

required.

These international activities suggest the Soviets

have decided to make their space program somewhat more open. Recently, they have also begun

to announce some launch dates and to allow outsiders to observe payload processing, to view

launches, and to access scientific data more

quickly,

In contrast to the United States, the Soviet

Union, in the view of some, is much more aggressive in deploying its space program as an important element in its foreign policy. Increasing openness may be the forerunner of greater cooperative

efforts, particularly in the use of more instrumentation from Eastern European sources. The cooperative Soviet-French venture to probe Venus and

Halley’s Comet, for example, will incorporate

more sophisticated technology than the Soviets

bsThe last six are in Cyrillic alphabetical order. See J. Oberg, Red

Star in Orbit.

have previously used, thus increasing its chance

of success. ”

Whereas the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)

came to fruition as a product of detente, similar

joint U.S.-Soviet ventures involving space stations

are viewed by many as out of step with current

political realities. Others suggest that such ventures are technically logical and diplomatically

feasible.” There is also a possibility that cooperative space ventures could become polarized: the

Soviet Union might increase its working relationships with Eastern European countries and, perhaps, France, while the United States works with

Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.68 Future Salyuts could incorporate “internationalized” modules dedicated to specific scientific research or

commercial application.

The impact of an evolving Soviet space station

program on U.S. space policy is unclear. Many

observers agree that a U.S.S.R, pronouncement

that a “permanent presence in space” had been

achieved would do little to reshape U.S. civilian

space objectives. Even bolder announcements of

Soviet intentions to send human beings to the

Moon or to traverse interplanetary distances to

establish a human presence on Mars, might have

little influence on U.S. pursuits. Creation of a

significant and obvious military installation in orbit, however, might well dictate an American response in kind.

In the end, a U.S. response to any new Soviet

space project would be heavily influenced by public opinion and the circumstances of that moment.

It is impossible to predict with much assurance

just what Soviet activities might trigger an important American reaction.

“’’French, Soviets Weigh Venus Mission, ” AW&ST, Nov. 22,

1982, pp. 79-80.

‘7See, for example, “Hitch Up With a Red Star, ” James Oberg,

OMN1, March 1982, p. 20.

“’’NASA Mulls International Effort on Space Station, ” A W&ST

Mar. 1, 1982, pp. 20-21.

41

25-291 0 - 83 - 4 : QL 3
Conclusion

In any characterization of the future of the Soviet space program, caution is the rule. Western

forecasters during the past 5 years expected a more

dynamic effort than the Soviets actually put forth.

Still, the Soviets have shown considerable perseverance, and their predictions about even bigger

space stations—capable of housing “large collectives” rather than small crews—should be taken

seriously. Modularized space facilities—carrying

equipment for astronomical, physical, and chemical experiments, and for technology development

purposes, adapted for multidisciplinary programs

for both civilian and military purposes—can be

expected. 69 It is possible that useful and marketable products and services could be provided.

Such stations, situated in various orbits, would

be a straightforward extension of demonstrated

Soviet capabilities. Eventually, these same facilities could involve international teams.

With a sufficient commitment of resources, the

Soviets may be able to maintain a continued human presence in space through the use of heavylift launchers and/or expanded use of currently

available boosters. A shuttle-type vehicle would

permit routine access to platforms in near-Earth

orbit. A large Salyut complex could serve as a

space transportation node or base camp.

As recently as late November 1983, the Soviet

newspaper Pravda asserted that the main thrust

of Soviet cosmonautics is “the creation of [sophisb~comments of Anatoly Skripko, Science and TechnoloW Attache

to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., at a luncheon of the

American Astronautical Society, Feb. 12, 1982. See also “Soviets

Initiating Program on Modular Space Station, ” by Craig Covault,

AlW&ST, July 20, 1981, p. 22; and “Soviets Move Toward Space

Operations Center, ” James Oberg, Aeronautics and Astronautics,

May 1982.

ticated] orbital manned complexes, which can be

improved during lengthy use and be reconstructed

depending on the nature of the tasks being tackled. 70 The next step in the Soviet space program

will aparently be “the transition from long-term

orbital stations regularly visited by replacement

crews to a multi-team, permanently manned orbital complex. ”

From a permanent foothold in near-Earth orbit, the next step might bean extension to geostationary orbit. Soviet scientists have argued that

a series of orbital stations might one day stretch

for hundreds of miles in a given orbit.72

Salyut operations are one step in the Soviet

drive toward mastery of space. It is quite conceivable that, by the end of the century, they

cound put cosmonauts on the Moon. 73

‘“Quotation from Pravda, Nov. 25, 1983, appearing in Aerospace

Daily, Dec. 1, 1983, p. 155.

7’Pravda, Nov. 28, 1983, quoted in Aerospace Daily, Dec. 1, 1983,

p, 155. The article continued as follows: “Pravda said the size of

such a complex ‘will be impressive even by the standards of construction on Earth. For instance, the parabolic antenna alone should have

an effective aperture . . . [o]n the order of 300-350 meters. In addition, it must be geared to a long period of operation—15-20 years

as a minimum. ’

“Pravda said that ‘[t ]oday, this complex is conceived as a unified

system of large-scale installations in orbit at an altitude of 200-400

kilometers, linked to Earth by freight and passenger transport

spacecraft. The complex will include specialized scientific research

laboratories, comfortable housing modules, powerful energy installations, a refueling station, repair workshops, and even construction

sites for producing and installing standardized construction components. The real potential of orbital flight for the ad hoc solution

of urgent national economic tasks will also be expanded many times

over. ’ “

72Yuri Zaitsev, “Orbital Stations—The Present and Future, ”

Moscow News, #45 (2825), Nov. 19-26, 1978, p. 11.

73’ The Soviets think that in about 20 years a journey to Mars may

be possible. By this time, spaceships may incorporate centrifuges

that simulate the conditions of living under gravity. ” Smolders, op.

cit., p. 944.

4 3
Postscript

According to accounts published in U.S. newspapers on october 12, 1983,74 the Soviets announced a nearly disastrous setback when an A-2

rocket, bearing a Soyuz T and two cosmonauts,

exploded on a launch pad at the Tyuratam cosmodrome. Apparently, just prior to scheduled liftoff, a fire was detected at the base of the launch

vehicle, and the launch escape system was triggered, either by automatic failure detection circuitry, the blockhouse crew, or the cosmonauts

themselves. The launch escape tower rocket

ejected the Soyuz orbital module and the descent

module carrying the cosmonauts moments before

the booster exploded beneath them. Subsequently, the descent module was separated from the orbital module and parachuted to Earth. The escape

rocket subjected the cosmonauts to a high velocity, high G, escape trajectory, and the landing impact velocity was substantially higher than the

normal 3.3 feet per second. Both may have sustained some injuries. This two-man crew was to

have made a week-long resupply visit to the two

cosmonauts who have been aboard Salyut 7 since

June 28, 1983.75

This accident did not seem to have placed the

crew aboard the Salyut in any great danger be-

—. . —

T~ wd~fiington post, Oct, 12, 1983, p. A-9; New York Times, Oct.

12, 1983, p, A-7.

75 For a thorough discussion both of the accident and of the failure

aboard Salyut 7, see the article “Explosion, Leak Cripple Salyut 7

Effort, ” AW&ST, Oct. 10, 1983, pp. 23-26.

because they were resupplied by Progress 17 in

mid-August and Progress 18 in October and because they were resupplied by Progress 17 in midAugust and Progress 18 in October and because

their Soyuz T-9 was still capable of returning them

to Earth, In addition, the Soviets have at least

three other (undamaged) launch pads at Tyur- ‘

atam, and almost certainly have another Soyuz

T and an A-2 booster which could have been integrated and readied for launch on short notice.

The degraded condition of Salyut 7, however,

adds additional uncertainty for future missions.

The Soviets have announced that the most recent

crew of cosmonauts returned to Earth on November 23, 1983, after a mission of 150 days.

Coincidentally, NASA has had to postpone the

first flight of Spacelab aboard the Shuttle because

“a liner that protects the lowest part of one of the

[reusable] solid-rocket engines from heat” was

almost burned through during the previous Shuttle flight.7b If the flame had burned through part

of the engine in flight, the Shuttle would have

become aerodynamically unstable some 2 minutes

after launch; the result could have been a

catastrophe.

The U.S.S.R. accident and the U.S. near-accident indisputably show that space operations are

still hazardous, even with systems that have been

flight-proved time after time,

“The Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1983, p. A-15.

45
General References

Baker, David, The History of Manned Space Flight

(New york: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982).

Gatland, Kenneth, chief author, The J))ustrated Encyclopedia of Space Technology (London: Salamander

Books, Ltd., 1981).

Johnson, Nicholas L., Handbook of Soviet Manned

Space Flight, vol. 48, Science and Technology Series

(San Diego, Calif.: American Astronautical Society, 1980).

Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970: Goals and Purposes, Organization, Resources, Facilities and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bioastronautics, Civii and Military Applications, Projections of Future Plans, Attitudes Toward international Cooperation and Space Law, Committee on

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate,

Washington, D. C., 1971.

Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75: Overview, Facilities

and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bioastronautics, Civil and Military Applications, Projections of Future P)ans, Committee on

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, vol.

1, Washington D. C., 1976.

Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union,

and Other Launching Countries/Organizations:

2957-1981, Committee on Science and Technology,

U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., Zd sess.,

Serial Y, Washington D. C., June 1982.

47
Appendixes
Appendix A:

The Soviet Salyut Space Program:

Space Station, Spacecraft, Support

and Training Facilities

Material provided to OTA by Dr. Balayan, Vice Chairman of the Intercosmos

Council of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

The Salyut Orbital Scientific Station

The creation of the Salyut orbital stations is an important stage in the development of Soviet cosmonautics, intended to increase the length of both manned

and unmanned flights.

The total mass of the orbiting scientific complex, including two transport ships, is 32,500 kilograms (kg);

the mass of the space station in orbit is 18,900 kg, the

mass of the transport ship in orbit is 6,800 kg. * The

dimensions are as follows: 1) total length docked with

two transport ships 29 meters (m), 2) station length

15 m, 3) maximum station diameter 4.15 m, and 4)

maximum transverse station dimension with solar panels open 17 m.

More than 20 portholes are provided for the conduct of scientific experiments, visual observation, and

still and motion picture photography from the compartments of the station.

Hatches in the docking units are used to aIlow the

crew to move between the transport ship and the station. After docking, the crew can work and rest both

in the compartments of the station and in the transport

ships, moving through these hatches.

Terrestrial conditions are maintained in the sections

of the station in orbit—the same gas composition, atmospheric temperature and pressure, providing the

necessary conditions for the cosmonauts’ activities.

Composition and Arrangement of Orbital Station

The station consists of five compartments: transit,

operations, scientific apparatus, intermediate, and

equipment compartments.

During powered flight the external elements of the

transit section and parts of the small-diameter operations section are protected from aerodynamic forces

by fairings which are later jettisoned.

‘These masses appear to be related to Salyut IJ and Soyuz craft

The scientific equipment installed in the scientific apparatus section is protected during powered flight by

a scientific apparatus cover which is also jettisoned

after orbital insertion.

The transit section is bounded by conical and cylindrical (2 m diameter) sealed envelopes.

The passive portion of the docking unit—the “cone”

—is installed at the conical end of the section (the active “rod” docking unit is installed on the spacecraft),

while the cylindrical portion of the section adjoins the

operations section of the orbital unit.

There is a hatch in the conical envelope of the transit section to allow servicing of the station on Earth

and to allow the crew to exit into space. The outer surface of the transit section carries:

antenna of the approach and docking unit;

optical lamps for orientation during manual docking of spacecraft;

external television cameras;

panels with temperature regulation units;

gas storage cylinders of the life-support system

containing air;

ionic and solar sensors of the station’s orientation

system;

handles and restrainers for cosmonauts in spacesuits performing space walks; and

panels for the study of micrometeorites, contamThe

ination of optical surfaces, and properties of rubber and biologic polymers.

outside of the transit section and the apparatus

installed on it are covered with a vacuum-shield thermal insulation to maintain the required temperature

conditions.

Within the transit section, which is used as a lock,

are spacesuits, panels, equipment and attachment devices to support space walks.

There are seven portholes in the transit section.

Some carry instruments for astro-orientation of the

station. These instruments, together with the corresponding control panels and knobs which control the

orientation of the station, form two control posts (post

Nos. 5 and 6).

51
52

The transit section connects to the operations section of the station through a sealed airtight hatch. The

operations sections consists of two cylindrical shells

(2.9 m diameter and 3.5 m length, and 4.1 m diameter

and 2.7 m length) connected by a conical section (1.2

m in length).

The cylindrical shells have spherical ends. The posterior end has a hatch which connects the operations

sections with the intermediate chamber.

In the operations section, equipment is arranged

along the section forming a common passageway beside the equipment, with instruments and equipment

located to the left and right. The instruments and

equipment are installed on standard racks which form

the frame of the interior,

Most of the monitoring and control systems and

scientific apparatus of the station are in the operations

section. The apparatus with which the station crew

works directly is grouped by functional purpose in five

control posts (there are two additional control posts

in the transit section, as was mentioned earlier).

Post No. 1 is the central control post of the station,

where control of the main station systems is concentrated. It is located in the lower portion of the operations section (in the small diameter area). This post

has two working locations equipped with chairs (for

restraint), communications equipment, control panels,

a lever to control the angular position of the station

in space, optical sites of the orientation system, and

portholes with no equipment.

To the left and right of the control panel are the regenerator cartridges of the station’s gas-mixture support system, as well as the refrigeration and drying

units of the temperature control system. Near the forward end of the operations section beyond control

panel No. 1 are the gyroscopic instruments of the

orientation and motion control system, mounted on

a rigid frame.

Post No. 2 (the astropost) is also in the lower, small

diameter portion of the operations section, closer to

its conical portion. This post is used for astro-orientation and astro-navigation of the station. The post

is equipped with communications equipment, an orientation control panel, and astro-instruments (installed

on two portholes).

Between post Nos. 1 and 2 in the small diameter end

of the operations section is the area where the crew

eat and rest. In this area is a table with special devices

for heating food. A drinking water container is attached to the table. Along the right side in this area

is the system which regenerates water from atmospheric moisture condensate, The cosmonauts obtain hot and cold water from this system. Behind the

interior panels on the left side is the onboard computer

apparatus. The cosmonauts can perform minor preventive repair of equipment on the table in this area,

for which they have a special onboard toolkit available.

Post No. 3 is intended to control the apparatus located in the scientific equipment section. This post is

located in the large diameter portion of the operations

section in its lower part near the rear end. Control

panels, communications equipment, and retainers are

installed here,

The instrument zone comtains the onboard radio system, radio telemetry system, and power supply system

control apparatus. Near the aft end of the operations

section on the left and right sides are the crew’s bunks,

and in the instrument arc a there are food storage containers.

In the upper portion Of: the operations section (near

the aft end) are two locks for jettisoning the crew’s

wastes into space. Wastes are collected in special containers and, after they are ejected from the lock chamber, burn up in the atmosphere.

On the aft end of the operations section is the head.

It is separated from the remaining portion of the operations section and has forced ventilation. Beside it is

a vacuum cleaner, dust filters, storage for water, linens, and other life-support system consumables.

In the forward, larger-diameter portion of the operations section is a system allowing the crew to shower

periodically.

Post No. 4 is in the lower central portion of the operations section near the conical shell. Here is the equipment used for most of the medical experiments, still

and motion picture cameras, and the scientific apparatus control panel. This post has cosmonaut restrainers and communications equipment.

Near post No. 4 is the system used to prevent ill effects of weightlessness on the cosmonauts. It includes:

● a treadmill and other devices for physical exercise;

● a bicycle ergometer;

● a pneumatic vacuum suit to create low pressure

on the lower portion of the body; and

● a muscle tissue stimulation apparatus,

One of the two portholes at post No. 4 carries an

MKF-6M multiple-zone survey camera manufactured

by Karl Zeis Jena of East Germany with electronics

and control panel.

On the left and right sides near post No. 4 are the

refrigeration and drying units of the temperature control system, the onboarc radio apparatus, electronic

units of the orientation system, and station movement

control system.

Post No. 7 works in cooperation with the scientific

equipment control post and water regeneration system

control, This post is located in the central portion of

the small diameter operations section.

Control panels are mounted on the interior to the
53

left and right; the cosmonaut who works here is restrained in a reinforced seat.

All control panels and cosmonaut working locations

are equipped with internal loudspeaker communications devices and daylight lamps. Other lamps are used

to create general illumination in the living space. During still and motion picture photography and television reports, the cosmonauts turn on additional lights

to provide the necessary illumination for the cameras.

Most of the outer surface of the small diameter operations section is covered with the temperature control

system’s radiator. On the left and right sides and in

the upper portions of the section are three solar battery panels. Special drives rotate the panels toward the

Sun at all times. In the forward portion of the operations section are the solar battery orientation system

sensors, which determine the position of the Sun in

the forward hemisphere as the station moves. Outside

the lower portion of the small diameter operations section are the automatic station orientation instruments

(an infrared vertical, solar sensor, television orientation device, etc.), Outside the conical portion of the

operations section is a special repeating action cover

with electric drive to maintain the temperature of the

porthole through which the MKF-6M camera operates.

On the outside of the large diameter operations section are the onboard radio system and telemetry system antennas.

To maintain the proper temperature the body of the

operations section is covered on the outside with mats

of vacuum shield heat insulation, while the large diameter portion of the section is also covered with a

fiberglas cover for protection from aerodynamic heating during powered flight. On the sides of the station

are panels with sensors to study the flux of micrometeorites.

The unsealed cylindrical equipment section (4.15 m

diameter, 2.2 m length) contains:

● the combined motor installation, including correcting motors and a system of low thrust motors

which creates controlled torque to orient the station in space; and

 tanks of fuel.

On the outer surface of the equipment section are:

● the approach and docking radio antennas;

● optical lamps for orientation during manual docking of spacecraft with the station;

● the solar battery orientation system sensors,

which determine the position of the Sun in the aft

hemisphere (with respect to station flight);

● the onboard radio system antennas; and

● a television camera to monitor docking of transport spacecraft.

The equipment section is thermostatted in flight and

has external heat insulation similar to the insulation

of the operations section. The equipment section is

connected to the end of the operations section; its aft

end is connected to the booster rocket.

The scientific apparatus section is in the large diameter cylindrical portion of the operations section.

It is a combination of conical and cylindrical shells

(maximum 2.2 m diameter). The end of the section is

oriented toward outer space and is equipped with a

cover.

The intermediate chamber of the station is a sealed

section consisting of cylindrical and conical shells 2

m in diameter with a total length 1.3 m. The second

docking unit of the orbital station is mounted through

the conical section on the intermediate chamber.

The intermediate chamber is used to carry equipment delivered by the transport spacecraft. An air line

is laid through it to supply air from the operations section to the transport ship to create a common atmosphere. The intermediate section has two portholes used

for visual observation, still and motion picture photography and television reporting.

Systems of the Orbital Station, Their Purpose,

and

10

The

●

●

●

Main Operating Modes

Onboard Equipment Control System (SUBK).–

SUBK controls the onboard systems:

automatically (by a programed timer);

on radioed command from the Earth; and

on command of the cosmonauts at the control

panels.

The SUBK switches the electric power supply system and protects the power supplies from short circuits, controls the pyrotechnic cartridges which open

and deploy external elements of the structure, etc., and

outputs information on the results of operations to the

cosmonauts’ panels and to Earth.

2. Orientation and Motion Control System (SOLD).

—The SOUD is intended to orient and control the motion of the space station in automatic and manual

modes.

The SOUD includes:

● a sensor apparatus (sensing elements);

— solar sensor;

— infrared vertical device (IKV);

— gyroscopic angular motion sensors;

— an ionic sensor;

— free three-way gyroscope; and

— velocity increment integrator.

● manual instruments:

— a wide-angle orienting site;

— optical orientors;

— an electronic-optical converter; and

— an astro-orientor.
54

. the “Kaskad” apparatus to maintain long-term orbital and inertial orientation;

● the approach electronic apparatus;

. lamps and targets for manual approach and docking; and

● automatic equipment and electronic units.

3. Combined Motor Installation (ODU).–The ODU

is intended to create controlled torque around the

center of mass of the station by means of low-thrust

motors, and to generate power to move the station by

means of the high-thrust motors.

The combined motor installation includes:

● correcting motors (two); and

● orientation motors.

The motors are supplied with fuel from two groups

of collectors, each of which supplies the motors

through three station control panels—pitch, yaw and

roll.

4. Command Radio Link.—The system is intended

to transmit control commands and settings from the

Earth to orbit, trajectory measurements, two-way telephone communications between Earth and the station, and television and telemetry information from

the station to Earth.

The system includes receivers, transmitters, antenna-feeder device, a programed timer (PVU), decoder,

and other electronics and automation equipment.

5. Television Communications System.—The television system is used to transmit color and monochrome

images from the onboard television cameras to Earth

and to the onboard television screen (VKU).

The system includes:

● external stationary television cameras (monochrome images);

● the reporting television camera (color);

● the reserve reporting camera (monochrome);

. video monitors (VKU);

● the antenna-feeder devices;

● special lamps; and

● automation and electronic equipment.

6. Telephone Communications System.—The “Zarya” radiotelephone communications system is intended

to provide two-way Earth-station and station-spacecraft communications in the ultra-short wave (USW)

and short wave (SW) bands. The system includes USW

receivers and transmitters, SW receivers and transmitters, and antenna-feeder devices.

To provide loudspeaker communications within the

sealed station sections, there are loudspeakers,

microphones, and amplifiers at the control posts and

working locations.

The transmission of text (alphanumeric) information from Earth to the station utilizes an apparatus

with a printer.

7. Radiotelemetry Communications system

(RTS). –The radiotelemetry system is designed to collect information and transmit it from the spacecraft

to Earth. The station carries two RTS systems; one system is used for service information, the other for information from the scientific and experimental apparatus.

Independent magnetic recorders (MIR) with magnetic tape cassettes are used to record scientific

measurements with high sampling frequency. The

magnetic tapes are returned to Earth on transport

spacecraft.

8. Orbital Control Radio System, Which Performs

Trajectory Measurements.

9. Power Supply System.—The power supply system (SEP) provides electric power for all onboard systems of the station, and also charges the buffer batteries (BB) and supplies power to transport spacecraft

docked to the orbital unit.

The system includes:

● solar batteries (SB); three solar battery panels are

installed on three planes of the station;

 the main buffer battery (BB);

● the reserve buffer battery; and

● the power supply test unit (BKIP).

The SB panels are oriented toward the Sun by means

of the solar battery orientation system (SOSB). When

a minimal voltage is reached, all consumers are automatically disconnected except for the duty systems,

and a switch is made to the reserve BBO. After spacecraft dock, the orbital unit SEP charges the BB and

supplies the transport spacecraft as long as they remain docked.

10. Life-support system (SOZh).—The SOZh is intended to provide conditions which will support the

life of the crew; proper pressure and gas composition

of the atmosphere, food and water, sanitary-hygienic

conditions, and space-walk support.

The gas composition support system (SOGS) is intended to liberate oxygen (Oz

) and absorb carbon dioxide (COZ

) and other impurities.

The system includes:

● chemical O2 regenerators;

 chemical C02 absorbers :

● gas analyzers;

● harmful impurity filters (FVPS);

● dust filters (PFs); and

● gas stored in cylinders.

Additional regenerators, absorbers, FVPs, and gas

are delivered by transport and cargo ships to replenish

the supplies and allow continued operations of the system.

The system can maintain the parameters of the atmosphere within assigned limits (C02 =0.9 mm mer-
.

55

cury (Hg) Oz = 160-280 mmHg, total gas pressure 760-

960 mmHg) by manual connection and disconnection

of regenerators and absorbers according to the readings of the gas analyzers.

The crew is supplied with water by regeneration of

water from atmospheric moisture condensate and by

reserves of stored water.

The water is stored in special containers.

Food is stored onboard the station as daily pacs in

boxes. The food supply is supplemented by delivering it on transport and cargo spacecraft.

Sanitary-hygienic conditions are maintained onboard the spacecraft by means of a sanitary installation (ASU) [head —Tr. ], shower, sets of linen, personal

hygiene washcloths, and two lock chambers (ShK)

with containers for waste ejection. Liquid wastes are

collected in the sanitary device and ejected through the

locks. Solid wastes (ASU, food, etc. ) are collected in

packets, then placed in special rigid containers designed for ejection through the locks.

Two spacesuits are used to allow two cosmonauts

to perform space walks simultaneously. The transit

section is used as a lock for this purpose.

11. Medical Monitoring and Prophylaxis Equipment. —This equipment is designed to allow regular

medical monitoring of the cosmonaut~ health and prevent harmful effects of spaceflight factors.

The system includes medical testing apparatus, an

“Aelita” combined medical examination apparatus, a

treadmill, bicycle ergometer, pneumatic vacuum suit,

units for testing and indicating parameters of the crew’s

condition upon orbital insertion, and a pharmacy.

These devices are used for:

● regular medical testing, the information from

which is transmitted to Earth through the telemetry channels;

● periodic medical examination with the “Aelita”

apparatus, the data from which are recorded onboard the spacecraft and transmitted to Earth; and

● regular crew training (with a treadmill, bicycle

ergometer, and pneumatic vacuum suit).

12. Temperature Regulation System (STR).—The

STR is intended to support the proper temperature of

structures, units, and apparatus of the orbital station

and docked transport spacecraft, and to create comfortable temperature conditions within the habitation

sections.

13. Docking and Internal Transfer System (SSVP).

—The SSVP is intended to perform mechanical, electrical, and hydraulic docking of the orbital station with transport and cargo spacecraft, and to support internal transfer of cosmonauts from spacecraft

into the station without passage through open space.

The docking unit is based on the rod (active portion) and cone (passive portion) principle.

The Soyuz T Transport Spacecraft

The Soyuz T spacecraft is an improved manned

transport spacecraft for the delivery of the crew to

Salyut orbital stations and return of the crew to Earth,

as well as transportation of cargo.

The experience gained in the development of flights

of Soviet spacecraft and stations was used extensively in designing the Soyuz T spacecraft.

The Soyuz T spacecraft is placed in orbit by a Soyuz

booster rocket, which determined the size and mass

of the new spacecraft. The well-proved Soyuz spacecraft, including the descent module, orbital (habitation) section, and instrument-equipment section, was

used as the basis for arrangement of the new spacecraft.

However, the Soyuz T spacecraft differs in a number

of details from the earlier craft, has improved

characteristics and, particularly, increased effectiveness as a transportation vehicle for orbital space

stations, plus improved reliability and crew safety.

The spacecraft is designed to carry up to three crew

members in space suits. In addition to the special onboard systems, the spacesuits protect the crew in case

of a loss of seal in the living spaces. If necessary, depending on the mission of each specific flight, the

spacecraft crew may be reduced in number with no

changes in spacecraft design. The free spaces are then

used to carry special cargo containers, allowing, in

combination with Progress spacecraft, the problem of

delivering cargo to the station and returning cargo

from the station to be solved.

Most of the onboard systems of the spacecraft were

designed anew or modernized using systems design

principles, new elements, and new production and

testing technologies.

A new motion control system has been developed

for the spacecraft, using an onboard digital computer.

The system calculates motion parameters and automatically controls the spacecraft in the optimal mode

with minimum fuel consumption, performs self-testing, and automatically switches if necessary to reserve

programs and hardware, while outputting information

to the crew via the onboard display.

The decisions implemented in the system assure

higher accuracy, reliability, and flexibility of spacecraft

control in both orbital flight and descent.

The crew can control the spacecraft manually not

only in orbit but also during descent in the atmosphere.

The approach and correcting motor and docking

and orientation micromotors operate with the same

fuel components and have a common fuel storage and

supply system, allowing more effective utilization of

onboard fuel reserves. During flight the consumption

of fuel is monitored by a special measurement system.
56

In order to improve reliability, the landing equipment system has been modernized, and the emergency crew rescue system, used as the spacecraft is placed

in orbit, has been improved.

The radio systems of the spacecraft—such as the

command-program radio link and radiometry and television systems—have been improved, and solar batteries have been included in the power supply system,

The design of the spacecraft provides for duplication of important mechanisms, sealing devices, separator units, etc.

The total volume of the living spaces aboard the

Soyuz T is about 10 m3

.

The Progress Automatic Transport

Spacecraft

The automatic transport spacecraft is intended for

delivery of the following items to the Salyut piloted

orbital station:

 scientific apparatus, photographic materials, crew

life-support supplies, instruments, and units in

need of replacement; and

● fuel components to recharge the combined motor

installation of the orbital station.

In addition, it provides for the removal of wastes and

units which have completed their operating life from

the space station.

The automatic cargo transport spacecraft has a

launch mass of 7 tonnes and consists of three main

structural units:

● the cargo section (GO) with docking unit;

● the fuel component section (OKD); and

● the instrument and equipment section (PAO),

consisting of the transit, instrument, and equipment sections.

The docking unit of the spacecraft is based on the

docking unit of the Soyuz manned spacecraft and is

designed for mechanical docking of the spacecraft with

the station, to assure an airtight seal, and also to connect electrical lines and automatically connect and seal

the main fuel supply lines. The crew passes through

the docking unit into the cargo section of the spacecraft.

The cargo section of the spacecraft is intended to

carry instruments, scientific apparatus, photographic

materials, food, water, and life-support system equipment, including regeneration installations, all mounted

on special frames and in containers. Throughout the

flight, with the docking unit hatch sealed, conditions

are maintained in the cargo section as required to

preserve all of the instruments and food products being delivered to the space station. The volume of the

cargo section is 6.6 m3

. The cargo section has an ordinary air atmosphere (7612 mmHg). The temperature

in the section is maintained between + 3° and + 30° C,

The cargo section is connected to the refueling component section. On the outer surface of the section are

three antennas of the electronic approach system, two

external television cameras (one aimed forward, the

other toward the Earth), 103 light indices (used by the

crew to monitor correct placement of the spacecraft

during automatic approach and docking). Outside the

section are the main lines which feed fuel components

from the refueling section to the connections on the

docking unit. The cargo section of the spacecraft can

carry up to 1,300 kg of cargo to the orbital station.

The refueling component section structurally consists of two truncated conical shells. The section connects at one end to the cargo section, at the other end

to the transit section and instrument and equipment

section. At the outside of the section are two light indices which supplement the light index on the cargo

section. This section is intended to carry tanks of fuel

components for delivery to the orbital station, gas

cylinders, and the equipment of the refueling system.

The gas in the cylinders (nitrogen or air) is used to

drive the fuel components during the refueling and also

to fill the habitation compartments of the station if

necessary.

The refueling system includes a system which tests

the seal of the fuel lines, a blowing system, and sensors to monitor the temperature and pressure of the

components and gas in the process of storage and refueling. During refueling, up to 1 tonne of fuel components can be transferred to the tanks of the combined motor installation of: the station.

The refueling system is controlled by the crew of

the orbital station, with radio signals from Earth controlling the cargo spacecraft end.

The instrument and equipment section is designed

to carry all of the main service systems of the spacecraft supporting independent flight, approach and

docking, flight as a part of the orbital station, and

undocking.

The transit section of the instrument-equipment section is a framework which carries the fuel tanks, spherical containers, and fittings of the approach and orientation system motors. Outside the section are 10 approach and orientation motors of the system and the

command radio link antenna.

The instrument and equipment sections are similar

to the instrument and equipment sections of the Soyuz

transport spacecraft in their design, purpose and apparatus, and equipment carried.

A Soyuz booster rocket is; used to insert the transport cargo spacecraft into orbit.

After the cargo spacecraft separates from the booster

rocket, structural elements carrying the antennas of
57

the electronic approach system and radiotelemetry

system, as well as the panel carrying the light indices,

are deployed from the spacecraft.

Basic Information on the Soyuz

Booster Rocket

The Soyuz booster rocket has three stages.

Stage I consists of four lateral units, each of which

is 19 m long, 3 m in diameter; its motor has four chambers, two of which are steering chambers, developing

a total thrust in a vacuum of 102 tonnes.

Stage II is the central unit, about 28 m in length,

maximum 2.95 m in diameter, its motor has four

chambers, all of which are steering chambers, developing a total thrust in a vacuum of 96 tonnes.

Stage III is a unit with a length of 8 m and a diameter

of 2.6 m; its motor has four chambers (with steering

nozzles), developing 30 tonnes of thrust in vacuum.

The launch mass of the booster rocket with a Soyuz

T spacecraft aboard is over 300 tonnes.

When the booster rocket is launched, the motors of

the first and second stages are ignited simultaneously. The second stage continues to operate after the four

lateral units [of the first stage] are jettisoned. The third

stage is ignited after the second stage motor has completed operation. The booster rocket uses kerosene-oxygen fuel in all stages. The total length of the booster

rocket with a Soyuz T spacecraft is 49 m. The maximum diameter at the stabilizers is 10.3 m.

Controlling the Flight of the Salyut

Orbital Scientific Station

Organization of Flight Control

Flight control of the Salyut orbital scientific station,

transport and cargo spacecraft is provided by:

● the flight control center near Moscow;

● a network of tracking stations;

● a system of modeling devices including a mathematical model of the station and a physical model

of the spacecraft; and

● a communications system with Earth and satelliteinformation transmission channels.

Flight Control Center

The flight control center performs the following

tasks:

● operational administration and coordination of

the operation of the entire system;

● collection, processing, and display of telemetry,

trajectory, and television information arriving

●

from the station and from transport and cargo

spacecraft; and

interaction with the launch and search and rescue

systems, trainers and modeling equipment, and

various organizations participating in flight support.

The flight leader and flight control personnel are

located at the center. The flight control center is

equipped with a computer system; devices for collection, processing, and display of information; internal

communications and television; remote-command output; communications with the crew; and transmission

of telegraph messages to the Salyut station. The control center is in communications with the Moscow television technical center at Ostankino.

The flight control center has been significantly improved. It now has a second control room to control

the flight of the transport and cargo spacecraft and a

modernized computer system which now allows the

problem of controlling several spacecraft simultaneously to be solved. At the same time the number of

communications channels between the center and

tracking stations has been increased to support simultaneous transmission of telephone, telemetry, and television information to the center from three spacecraft

over surface channels and through Molniya communications satellites.

The modernized computer system of the center and

the improved communications system allow transmission, processing, and display of information from all

telemetry sensors of the Salyut station and from Soyuz

spacecraft simultaneously for the control personnel.

The flight control personnel operating with the

Salyut and Soyuz spacecraft systems are a carefully

selected trained team consisting of specialists of various

profiles. They include specialists on the flight program

and flight control organization specialists, onboard

systems developers, designers of the station and transport spacecraft, scientists, ballisticians, physicians,

communications specialists, as well as specialists on

the control and maintenance of the tracking stations,

flight control central hardware, communications system hardware, plus representatives of scientific organizations of our country and other socialist countries.

Most of the control personnel are located at the

flight control center–this is the chief operational flight

control group. Some of the personnel are located at

tracking stations and on ships of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the Priroda state scientific research

and production center, and the center for medical and

biological research. The total number of personnel is

about 100. Successful performance of the flight mission and completion of scientific research and crew

safety depend on precise operations by every man.

25-291 0 - 83 - 5 , QL 3
58 —..

The organizational structure of the flight control

center personnel was developed by specialists with experience in the organization of manned spacecraft and

station flight control, is recorded in special organizational documentation, and has been repeatedly tested

in training exercises and in controlling the flights of

previous stations and manned spacecraft.

The flight leader heads the control personnel.

Flight control is performed from two rooms: the

main station flight control room and the transport and

cargo spacecraft control room.

The personnel in the rooms work under the control

of shift flight leaders.

Each room contains: the shift flight leader; specialists

responsible for the main onboard systems; persons

responsible for the operation of tracking stations; persons responsible for planning the flight program and

for complete analysis of the operation of onboard systems; a cosmonaut operator in communication with

the crew; representatives of the organizations which

develop the station and spacecraft; a ballistics expert;

a physician responsible for medical monitoring of the

crew; the shift center leader; and specialists responsible for the main system at the center (communications,

computer system, display systems, etc. ).

All specialists work at positions with individual display and communications equipment.

The personnel work in four shifts. Shift changes

occur during flight with no delay in flight operations.

Since the flight control center, tracking stations, and

communications equipment are all the same for the station and the transport spacecraft, priority had to be

assigned for their use. During orbital insertion, approach, and docking of the transport spacecraft with

the station, the transport spacecraft control room has

priority for use of equipment.

After docking and movement of the crew into the

station, priority is transferred to the main control

room. Priority transfer occurs at the moment the transfer hatches between the spacecraft and station are

opened.

Organization of Work in Control Room

Control of the station or transport spacecraft is

transferred to the control center from the launch complex immediately after separation of the last booster

rocket stage.

Up to this point the personnel in the control rooms

monitor the operation of onboard systems by telemetry, observe the crew by television, and listen to

the conversations between the crew and the launch

team.

A central screen shows the course of the booster

rocket’s flight over the entire insertion trajectory. After

separation of the spacecraft from the booster the personnel in the control room monitor the opening of the

antennas by telemetry, make contact with the crew,

and begin testing onboard systems.

Work in the room is organized as follows: When

the spacecraft enters the zone of visibility of ground

tracking stations (the movement of the spacecraft is

displayed on the central screen in the main hall) commands are transmitted to the spacecraft in accordance

with the flight program. The personnel in the room

monitor the transmission of commands and their reception by the spacecraft. The necessary onboard systems are switched on by commands from Earth or by

the crew. The tracking stations begin to receive and

transmit to the control center the telemetry, trajectory

information, and television images received from the

spacecraft. As the telemetry and trajectory data are

received they are automatically processed by the control center’s computers and transmitted to the display

devices in the control room.

Telemetry information is analyzed in detail by systems specialists who generate conclusions concerning

the status and operation of each onboard system for

the responsible personnel.

Those responsible for individual systems are in communications with the support personnel outside the

control center and can, if necessary, consult with them

or obtain additional information on the operation of

the systems.

In case of abnormal operation of spacecraft systems,

the specialist responsible for overall analysis determines the effect of any system failures on the operation of individual systems, prepares suggestions for

elimination of defects and correction of onboard system-operating modes, ard then reports these suggestions to the shift flight leader.

The physician responsible for medical monitoring

performs detailed analysis of biotelemetry data, estimating the condition of the crew and reporting it to

the shift flight leader.

As trajectory information is processed and orbital

parameters are determined, the ballistic data are

automaticall y transmitted to the control room displays.

The communications operator carries on planned

radio conversations with the crew. The person responsible for the tracking stations monitors their operation

and, if there is any deviation from the planned program, informs the shift flight leader and takes steps

to eliminate deviations.
59

The onboard computer specialist monitors operation of the computer and, if necessary, prepares

changes to the computer program which are then

transmitted to the spacecraft.

The center shift leader monitors the operation of all

services at the center and, if there are deviations in any

operations, informs the shift flight leader and takes

steps to eliminate them.

The shift flight leader, considering all the information which he receives, makes decisions concerning the

future flight program. If there are no deviations in the

operation of onboard and ground-based systems, permission is given to perform operations in accordance

with the planned program.

If it is necessary to correct the program, the correction is made by the person responsible for planning

the program. Correcting actions may be undertaken

during a session or in subsequent sessions. If necessary

in order to identify failures and test correcting actions,

a mathematical model of the station or the combined

spacecraft physical model may be used. Decisions are

implemented by transmitting instructions by radio

from the flight control center to onboard systems or

by verbal transmission of instructions to the crew.

Control Room Operation Support

In addition to the major specialists in the control

room, there are also support groups at the center. The

specialists in these groups are located in separate rooms

equipped with positions similar to those in the control rooms, The main tasks of these personnel are to

provide:

support to personnel in the control room with

calculations and information which can be used

to make decisions concerning the flight program;

consultation with control room specialists and

assistance to them in analyzing the operation of

onboard systems;

assurance of implementation of decisions made

by the shift flight leader;

support for the operation of the technical equipment at the center; and

prospective flight planning.

The personnel include the following specialists:

●

●

●

●

specialists in onboard systems preparing and

transmitting to the display devices the necessary

additional information to control room specialists;

specialists in operational planning of the flight

program, to prepare, if necessary, changes to the

flight program;

specialists in advanced planning of the flight program (1 week);

specialists in coordination of tracking station opera tions;

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

specialists in communications which support communications of the center with the spacecraft and

tracking stations;

specialists in ballistics, included in the main ballistic center staff and performing the necessary

ballistic calculations to determine the orbit, zones

of visibility, entry and exit of the spacecraft from

the shadow, maneuvers, as well as data necessary

for scientific experiments;

onboard computer specialists;

representatives of the search and rescue system,

constantly ready to go to work in case of an emergency return of the spacecraft;

the medical monitoring group, which regularly

analyzes biotelemetry and maintains communications with the flight medical support center;

a group which plans the program for the crew’s

day off, prepares music transmissions for the

crew, radio conversations between the crew and

their families, and cultural and scientific activities;

and

to provide consultations to the flight leaders during experiments sponsored by representatives of

another Socialist nation, the flight control center

includes a consultation group of specialists representing the sponsoring nation.

Training of Control Personnel

Before starting to work at the center, control personnel undergo a training cycle. Training is performed

using the mathematical model of the Salyut space station, the physical model of transport spacecraft, and

training machines. Actual tracking stations and communications devices are used in these training exercises. The crew of the Soyuz T spacecraft participate

in the training as well.

Training exercises are performed under conditions

as close to those of real flight as possible. The flight

program is developed in real time with interactions

among individual groups of control personnel, the

flight control center, and the tracking stations. Nonstandard situations which may develop on board and

on ground are simulated. The most difficult flight

stages are run through repeatedly.

The Baykonur Kosmodrom

The Baykonur Kosmodrom is a complex organization with many branches, a combination of unique

devices, automatic systems, and engineering structures

serviced by specialists of many sorts.

The Baykonur Kosmodrom is located in the Kazakh

SSR in a semidesert area with a continental climate
60

(hot, dry summer and cold, dry, windy winter). It was

founded in 1955.

The reasons for selecting the location of the Kosmodrom were that it is remote from large populated

areas, thus allowing safe rocket launches to be assured

and separation zones (i. e., areas for the landing of

returning spacecraft) to be set aside, and that many

days in this area are cloudless.

Launches are performed from the Baykonur Kosmodrom in accordance with the national space research

and utilization program of the U. S. S. R., in cooperation with other socialist nations in the “Interkosmos”

program, and also in accordance with agreements for

joint operations concluded with the United States,

France, and other nations.

The world’s first artificial Earth satellite was

launched from the Baykonur Kosmodrom, the first

cosmonaut Yu. A. Gagarin, and the first woman V.

V, Tereshkova started from Baykonur; the Luna,

Venera, Mars, and Zond automatic interplanetary stations were launched here, as were space stations and

artificial Earth satellites of various types (Kosmos,

Elektron, Polet), and the Molniya series of satellites

used to relay television programs and to provide longdistance telephone and telegraph communications.

Manned Soyuz T spacecraft and Salyut orbital stations are regularly launched from the Baykonur Kosmodrom.

The Kosmodrom is used for assembly, testing, and

launching of booster rockets with spacecraft, as well

as for final prelaunch preparation of the cosmonauts.

The main component parts of the Kosmodrom are:

● the booster rocket assembly and testing building;

● the spacecraft assembly and testing building;

● the launch areas; and

. observation, command, and telemetry points.

The residential area of the Kosmodrom is located

some tens of kilometers from the launch area and technical buildings, Here we find the cosmonaut training

complex (classrooms for technical and scientific training of crews, the sports complex with swimming pool,

laboratories to prepare the cosmonauts for flight, and

the medical complex), as well as the institute, technical

school, schools, club, stadium, television center, etc.

The Kosmodrom is connected to other points in the

nation by air, highway, and rail. The territory of the

Kosmodrom also has a well-developed network of

highways and railroads.

The operations of assembly, testing, and joining of

booster rockets and spacecraft are performed at the

technical positions in the installation and testing

buildings of the Kosmodrom, which are equipped with

the necessary testing and measurement equipment and

tools.

A number of launch and technical positions have

been constructed at the Kosmodrom. One of the most

important is the position from which three-stage booster rockets carrying the Vostok, Voskhod, Soyuz, and

now Soyuz T spacecraft are launched,

The launch structure for this booster rocket includes

a launch system with releasable supporting beams. The

rocket is “suspended” in the launch system by the supporting units. The rocket system is delivered to the

launch position from the assembly and testing building

of this technical position, where it is assembled in the

horizontal position.

The launch complex of the system, equipment, and

engineering structures used to transport the rocket

system to the launch position, set it in the launch structure, and perform prelaunch testing includes:

the transporter and erector;

the launch structures;

the launch system (supporting frames and restraining devices; cables, hoses, and cable towers);

the servicing devices (servicing frames and cabin);

and

the fuel and oxidizer supply systems.

The launch and other structures also contain: systems for filling and thermostatting fuel; a compressor

station; compressed-gas receiver; fuel storage tank; a

system to control both the preparation of the rocket

for launch and the actual launch; the command point

bunker, connected by communications lines to all

operational services of the Kosmodrom; observation

and command-measurement points; and the flight control center.

Preparation of the booster rocket for launch begins

with transportation of its stages and sections of the

spacecraft in special railroad cars from the manufacturing plants. The individual stages of the booster

rocket are delivered to the spacecraft assembly building, where they are automatically tested, assembled,

and prepared to be joined with the spacecraft. The

spacecraft is assembled and tested in the spacecraft

assembly building.

The ship is filled with fuel components and compressed gases at the filling station of the Kosmodrom,

to which the spacecraft is delivered in a special railroad

car. After it is filled and final operations are performed, the transit section and nose fairing are

attached to the spacecraft. The assembled forward unit

is then attached to the booster rocket, and the entire

rocket-spacecraft system is tested.

This completes the work at the technical position,

and the space system is delivered to the launch position on its transporter.

To install the rocket on the supporting beams of the

launch system, the transporter raises the rocket to the
61

vertical position by means of hydraulic jacks. During

this time the supporting beams are shifted from an inclined position to their operating position and accept

the weight of the rocket in its central (supporting) belt.

The rocket is thus suspended over the gas-deflecting

trough. Its tail portion is several meters below ground

level. This helps to protect equipment on the ground

from the powerful high-temperature jet of the motors.

The transporter, after placing the rocket on the supporting beams, lowers its boom to the horizontal position and rolls away the launch system. The servicing

booms, cable, and hose towers are brought up to the

rocket. As soon as they are in their operating position

the process of azimuthal guidance of the rocket and

placement of the rocket in the strictly vertical position is begun. All of these operations are performed

by mechanisms on command of the remote control system. The air system which controls the temperature

of the spacecraft is then started up. The essence of this

operation is feeding of air beneath the fairing of the

booster rocket at a rate such that the apparatus and

fuel components remain within a defined temperature

range. The air thermostatting system continues operating almost up to the moment of launch.

After the various lines are connected (fuel, drainage,

pneumatic, electrical) to the rocket and spacecraft, the

next operation begins—pressure-testing, i.e., checking

the tightness of seal of all connection points with compressed air. Any pressure drop indicates a leak.

The testing and launch apparatus then begins prelaunch testing of the onboard systems and units of the

rocket. All onboard systems are tested to determine

if they are functioning properly and their initial conditions are correctly set; individual onboard and

ground-based instruments are checked (without starting the standard programs or turning on the actuating

organs); the television, communications, command radio link, onboard power supply, and other systems

are tested. The results of prelaunch testing are displayed on all video-monitoring devices and recorded

by the telemetry systems and multichannel recording

machines. If all onboard system and unit parameters

are normal, permission is given to begin fueling the

booster and filling its compressed-air tanks.

The transfer of liquid oxygen into the booster is a

special operation. The lines and tanks are first cooled;

i.e., their temperature is artificially reduced to prevent

the liquid oxygen from boiling off and to reduce the

pressure in the booster’s tanks and lines. For this purpose a small quantity of liquid oxygen is fed in from

the storage container. As it evaporates, it cools the

tanks and lines then passes through the safety and

drainage valves in the gaseous state. After the tanks

and lines are cooled, the pumps begin to operate. The

level-monitoring system (SKU) assures precise measurement of fuel components.

Control of the filling process and monitoring of the

transmission of instructions are performed remotely

from the launch-pad command point.

At the same time as the booster rocket and the spacecraft are fueled, their systems, instruments, and units

undergo final testing, adjustment, and simulated operation, and commands are transmitted to the memory

unit of the onboard control system—it is set up to perform a definite program of orbital insertion.

Since liquid oxygen evaporates it must be topped

off; i.e., additional liquid oxygen is pumped in to fill

the tanks to the required level. The fuel components

are then drained from the filling lines, after which the

filling, drainage, and pneumatic lines are disconnected,

and the correct vertical position and azimuthal guidance of the rocket are tested.

Two hours and thirty minutes before the launch the

cosmonauts take their places in the spacecraft. The

final prelaunch and launch operation program is

started. The automatic system assures a launch at the

precise time with an accuracy of a few hundredthsof-a-second. Final monitoring of all rocket system

before the launch is performed by telemetry.

At minus 1 minute, when it becomes clear that all

systems and units of the booster rocket and spacecraft

are operating properly and the cosmonauts are ready

for the launch, the operator places a switch in the

“launch” position. The automatic final launchoperation program is started. Operations performed

are displayed on the control panel. The fuel-and

oxidizer-tank drainage lines are closed at this time. The

cable and hose towers swing away from the rocket.

The turbine pumps begin operating. The ignition is

turned on. The pyrotechnic ignition devices create

flames in the chambers of the first- and second-stage

motors. The motors develop thrust, operating in the

preliminary, intermediate, and then main operating

modes. When the motor thrust exceeds the weight of

the booster rocket it begins to rise and is freed from

the clamps of the launch system support beams. At

this instant a contact closes and the “launch” light

begins to shine on the control panel. Information on

the prelaunch preparation and insertion of the spacecraft into orbit is sent to the flight control center, where

it is processed and displayed on the common and individual screens in the control rooms. Control of the
62—. —

spacecraft is transferred from the launch complex to

the flight control center immediately after separation

of the third stage of the booster rocket.

Command, Measurement, and Search

and Rescue Systems

The flight of the Soyuz T spacecraft is controlled

through the U.S.S.R. command and measurement

complex, based on seven tracking stations in the Soviet

Union—Dzhusaly, Yevpatoriya, Ussurisk, Ulan-Ude,

Kolpashevo, Tbilisi, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy,

U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences research vessels in the

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the USSR Academy

of Sciences computer centers, These ground-based and

ocean tracking stations are located so as to provide

communications with the station and transport spacecraft in all orbits of the flight.

The longest continuous communications with the

crew are provided for those orbits when the spacecraft

dock, the crew move out for a space walk, or the

spacecraft begins its return from orbit.

Command program information is transmitted from

the control center to the tracking stations through

automated telephone communications lines and is relayed from there to the orbital station. Telemetry and

television information can also be recorded at the

tracking stations for subsequent transmission to the

flight control center.

The ground-based complex is a component part of

the Salyut space station and Soyuz T spacecraft flight

control loop. The control loop includes: the flight control center, ground-based and shipboard tracking stations, the ground and satellite communications system,

and ballistic centers.

As it controls the flight, the ground-based control

complex performs the following tasks:

● exchange of all types of information between the

spacecraft and the flight control center;

 provision of two-way telephone and” telegraph

communications between the control center and

the spacecraft crew;

● measurement of the parameters of the spacecraft’s

motion;

● organization of communications between elements of the ground-based control system and the

flight control center; and

● operational administration and coordination of

operation of tracking stations and other elements

of the ground-based system.

The tracking stations in the process of a flight measure the parameters of the spacecraft’s motion and receive telemetry and television information from the

implemented through the tracking stations by conducting conversations with the crew and transmitting radio

commands to the spacecraft,

There are about 20 telephone and telegraph communications channels between the center and a typical

tracking station. Most tracking stations have wideband

communications channels with the center, The tracking station is equipped with a computer which can perform about 50,000 operations per second. Elimination

of telemetry redundancy from the flow of telemetry

information is performed by specialized apparatus.

The throughput capacity of the data transmission apparatus used over the telephone channels is 2,400 bps.

Shipboard command and measurement points receive and transmit to the center the complete flow of

telemetry information from the spacecraft. Molniya

communications satellites ar-e used in the satellite communications system.

The tasks of the search and rescue complex include:

. search for and location of the returning spacecraft

and cosmonauts,

● determination of the coordinates of their landing,

● evacuation of the cosmonauts and provision of

medical aid,

● technical servicing of the spacecraft, and

 its removal from the landing area to its assigned

point.

The men and equipment of the search and rescue

complex are placed where the returning spacecraft will

land. Helicopters and aircralt, observing the spacecraft

visually and by radio, converge on their assigned locations along the landing track, using radio direction

finding to approach the spacecraft and accompany it

as it comes in for a landing, and maintain two-way

communications with the crew.

The returning spacecraft land in a selected area of

the Soviet Union. The descent apparatus is designed

to land on dry land; the apparatus has special systems

assuring safety of the cosmonauts should it land in

water.

In the landing area the cosmonauts are met by a

specially trained search group. This group includes

technical specialists and physicians. The search group

is provided with everything necessary to reach the

landing point rapidly and to provide any needed assistance to the cosmonauts.

The search aircraft carry parachute personnel including physicians and rescue specialists who if necessary parachute to the spacecraft after it lands. Search

and rescue equipment includes aircraft and helicopters,

ships and all-terrain vehicles. The technical specialists

and physicians included in the search group are welltrained parachute jumpers and scuba divers. The physicians of the group have available the necessary medical equipment and medications, adapted for use under . .

spacecraft. All decisions related to flight control are any weather conditions.
63 —. — .

After landing, the cosmonauts open the hatches of

the spacecraft and prepare containers of scientific apparatus and photographic film for transportation. If

necessary they can use the reserve stores onboard the

spacecraft, including warm clothing, swimsuits, signaling and radio communications devices, extra water,

and other necessary products. After landing and leaving the spacecraft, the cosmonauts take off their spacesuits and put on flight clothing. The containers of

scientific apparatus and film are turned over to the

specialists in the search group. The cosmonauts undergo post-flight physical examination at the landing

point.

If the spacecraft lands in water, the cosmonauts remove their spacesuits, don special equipment, prepare

to use their flotation devices, and maintain contact by

radio with the search service. The search group which

arrives at the landing zone helps the cosmonauts to

leave the spacecraft.

The search process, location of the spacecraft, and

evacuation of the cosmonauts from the spacecraft and

from the landing zone are all reported from the area

in which the search and rescue complex operates to

the flight control center.

The Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut

Training Center

The Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center

(TSPK) was created in 1960 and is located outside

Moscow, in Zvezdnyy Gorodok [Star Village].

The cosmonaut training center is an institution provided with modern equipment and manned by qualified specialists, capable of training crews for space and

expeditions in accordance with the increasing demands

of the time.

The specialists at the Center have accumulated great

experience in educational, scientific, and indoctrination work. They take part in studies of the prospects

of using manned spacecraft, and contribute to the improvement of spacecraft and their equipment and to

the planning of future flights.

The structure of the TSPK, the mission of its main

subunits, and [the composition of its] professional staff

of specialists are determined by the tasks which it performs in preparing and supporting space flight.

In 1968 the Center was named in honor of Yuriy Gagarin.

In 1971, for its great services in the preparation of

crews for spaceflight, its participation in the mastery

of space, and in connection with the l0th anniversary

of the world’s first manned space flight, the center was

awarded the Order of Lenin.

During the operation of the TSPK (up to June 1,

1982) 49 manned spacecraft crews were trained, including: 6 for the Vostok spacecraft, 2 for the Voskhod

spacecraft, 37 for the Soyuz spacecraft, 4 for the Soyuz

T spacecraft. Sixty cosmonauts had been in space, including 10 three times (Vladimir Shatalov, Aleksey Yeliseyev, Valeriy Bykovskiy, Petr Klimuk, Nikolay Rukavikhnikov, Valeriy Kubasov, Valeriy Ryumin, Viktor

Gorbatko, Oleg Makarov, Vladimir Kovalenok), and

15 twice, as well as 9 cosmonauts who were citizens

of other Socialist nations: Vladimir Remek (CSSR),

Miroslav Germashevskiy (Poland), Zigmund Jen

(GDR), Georgiy Ivanov (Bulgaria), Vertalan Farkash

(Hungary), Fam Tuan (Viet Nam), A. Tamayo Mendes

(Cuba), Zhugderdemidiyn Gurragcha (Mongolia), and

Dumitru Prunariu (Roumania).

In 1980 the cosmonaut training center celebrated its

20th anniversary.
Appendix B

Soviet Space Stations:

Achievements, Trends, and Outlook

Geoffrey E. Perry, MBE

November 1982

My mathematical conclusions, based on scientific data

verified many times over, show that with such devices it

is possible to ascend into the expanse of the heavens, and

perhaps to found a settlement beyond the limits of the

Earth’s atmosphere. . . . People will take advantage of this

to resettle not only all over the face of the Earth but all

over the face of the Universe. . . .

–K. E. Tsiolkovsky 1903

It is a widely held belief that the Soviet space program deliberately follows the paths described in the

early years of the century by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. 1

Be that as it may, it is certainly possible to find close

parallels between Tsiolkovsky’s writing and the course

of events, but more likely these parallels result because

modern engineers have arrived at similar solutions to

the same problems rather than because of slavish obedience or preconceived notions.

Smolders z holds that the concept of space stations

forms the nucleus of Tsiolkovsky’s vision of space

travel, Tsiolkovsky considered the construction of a

permanent base in space to be the first important step

towards a landing on the Moon and exploration of the

planets. A space station concept attributed to Tsiolkovsky depicting a closed ecological system and garden, laboratories, living quarters, and a docking port

with an airlock has been reproduced in official Soviet

publications. Illustrations of other space stations appearing on commemorative stamps owe more to the

designs of Shternfel’d and others which are to be found

in a handbook produced by the staff of the Battelle

Memorial Institute. ’ A 1964 Soviet Defense Ministry

book on Manned Space Stations listed the building of

a larger manned space station, with a crew of 30 to

50, in the 1972-75 period, as the third of five further

stages in space conquest. 4 To date, the maximum number to man a complex at any one time has been five

) V Rich, Nature 250 (London July 19, 1974), p 177

‘PL, “Soviets in Space” (Gulldford Lutterworth Press, 1973), p 34

‘(, E \$’ukelIc (ed } }{JndbmA of S(JL,Iet Space-Scwnce Rf5edrch, Gordon

,ind Breach New York 1968 pp 473-48 6

41 N Bubnov and L N Kamlnln, “Manned Space StatIons,” Voyenrmye

Izdatel stvo M/nJsterstva CXmrorry SSSR (Moscow 1964) and quoted in

M Stoiko, “Soviet Rocketry, ‘ p 209

for the Apollo-Soyuz mission and two visits to Salyut

7 .

5

After the “troika” mission of Soyuz 6, 7, and 8 in

1969, Leonid Brezhnev said, “Soviet science views orbital stations with interchangeable crews as man’s major highway into space. . . . Major scientific laboratories will appear for conducting research in space

technology and biology, medicine and geophysics,

astronomy and astrophysics. ”6

According to Feoktistov and Markov, direct work

on Salyut space stations began in 1969.7 To reduce cost

and to shorten the construction time as many units and

separate systems as possible were used from Soyuz,

Zond, and other tried and tested designs. Most of these

needed modification as they did not provide the required service-life, and basic systems, such as the heat

supply, were built from scratch. The intention of using

the manned mode opened up the possibility of in-orbit

repair and replacement of defective subsystems, thereby increasing the reliability and life of the station.

A study of Soviet space station philosophy demands

consideration of Salyut, Soyuz, and Progress spacecraft as components of an orbital complex. The Soyuz

acts as a manned transport craft between Earth and

the orbiting space station, remaining docked with the

station whilst the crew is on board, in the same manner as the Apollo was used for three missions to Skylab

and, presumably, the Shuttle orbiters will be used with

any future National Aeror autics and Space Administration (NASA) space station. Progress, a Soyuz derivative, has an unmanned role as an expendable cargo

——— vehicle.

‘Apollo, Thomas Stafford, Donahl Slayton, and Vance Brand. Soyuz,

Aleksey Leonov and Valeriy Kubaso\ Docked 1309 Z, July 17, 1975, First

undocking 1203 Z, July 19.37 min. urldocked. Second docking 1240 Z, July

19 Final undocking 1526 Z, July 19, S3 hr 17 min. total, 49 hr. 40 min. net,

Soyuz-T .5, Anatolly Berezovoi and Valentin Lebedev. Soyuz-T 6, Vladimir

Dzhanibekov, Aleksandr Ivanchenkov, and Jean-Loup Chretien, Docked 1746

Z, June 25, 1982. Undecked 1101 Z, July 2, 161 hr 15 min. total, Soyuz-T

7, Leonld Popov, Aleksandr Serebrov, and Svetlana Savitskaya, Docked

1832, Aug. 20, 1983. Undecked 1145 Z, Aug 27, 161 hr. 13 min. total,

‘Brezhnev’s statement quoted by A. !i, Yeliseyev at press conference foHowLng end of manned phase of the Salyut 6 mission, reported in Izvestiya, July

14, 1981, p. 2, reproduced in JPRS 70319, Space #13, Oct. 28, 1981, p 4

‘K. P Feoktistov and M. M, Mark{\v, “Evolutlon of ‘Salyut’ Orbital Stations, ” Zem]ya I Vselbnnya, 5, September-October 1981, pp. 10-17, reproduced in JPRS 80424, Space No. 15, Mar 29, 1982, p. 1

64
———— -.—

65

Although certain events in the history of the Soviet

space program have been spectacular at the time, it

must be realized that they are not instant technological

breakthroughs but rather are the results of careful

planning and cautious steps towards the desired goals,

The docking of the Soyuz 4 and 5 spacecraft in 1969,

claimed as establishing “the world’s first orbital space

station,”8 should be seen as the first docking of two

manned Soviet spacecraft following two successful

automatic dockings of unmanned satellites in the

Cosmos series. 9 The clue to the intended function of

the Soyuz was to be found in the name “Union,” although a characteristic element of ambiguity was also

present. The EVA transfer of cosmonauts between the

two spacecraft demonstrates the step-by-step approach

and unsophisticated design philosophy.10 Internal crew

transfer was not accomplished until Soyuz 11 docked

with Salyut 1 more than 2 years later.

The Soyuz T (T = transport) currently in use with

the Salyut 7 space station has evolved through several

variants. Tested unmanned in the Cosmos series,

Soyuz 1 malfunctioned and killed cosmonaut Komarov during the return to Earth when the parachute

failed to deploy correctly. ” This resulted in an

18-month period of redesign before testing recommenced with the unmanned rendezvous and docking

of Cosmos 186 and 188. As in Voskhod, crews flew

without spacesuits and a three-man capacity was demonstrated with Soyuz 5 although, for the Soyuz 9

recordbreaking 18-day flight, the crew was reduced to

two to permit sufficient consumables to be carried. The

loss of the crew of Soyuz 11 returning from the 24-day

mission to Salyut 1 necessitated a further period of

redesign. 12 TO accommodate a life-support system and

a spacesuited crew, one of the seats was removed and

Soyuz flew as a two-man spacecraft for the remainder

of its life, ending with Soyuz 40 in 1981.13

Prior to this, unmanned flights in the Cosmos series,

having characteristics similar to those of manned missions, pointed to the development of a new manned

spacecraft. 14 It was mildly disappointing when, on its

— . —

‘Phrase used In a question by the Tass correspondent at Cosmonauts’ press

conference In Moscow, Jan 24, 1969, reported in SU ‘ 2984 ‘C ‘4

‘Cosmos 186 launched Oct. 28, 1967 Cosmos 188 launched oct. 30 First

orbit rendezvous and clocklng at 0920 Z, Oct 30. Undecked at 1250 Z, 3

hr 30 mln total time docked Cosmos 212 launched Apr 14, 1968. Cosmos

213 launched Apr. 15 First orbit rendezvous and docking at 1021 Z, Apr

15 Undecked at 14] I Z, 3 hr 50 m]n total time docked.

IJSovuz 4, Vladlmlr shata]ov, launched Jan. 14, 1969. .$oYuz 5, Boris

Volyn;v, Yeugenly Khrunov, and Aleksey Yellseyev, launched Jan 15, 18th

orbit rendezvous and docking at 0820 Z, Jan. 16, Undecked at 1255 Z; 4 hr

35 mln total time docked

‘‘Soyuz 1 with Vladlmlr Komarov crashed Apr 24, 1967.

‘ISoyuz 11 landed on June 29, 1971, Its three crewmen, Ceorgiy

Dobrovolsk]y, Vladislav Volkov, and Vlktor Patsayev, perished

1‘Sojruz 40 landed May 22, 1981

“Cosmos 1001 launched Apr 4, 1978, recovered after 11 days, Cosmos

1074 launched Jan 31, 197~, recovered after 60 clays

first flight to the Salyut 6 space station at the end of

1979, it was named Soyuz T and then shown in photographs to have the same external shape and dimensions of the old Soyuz. 15 Internal redesign has restored

the three-man capacity, 16 whilst permitting the use of

spacesuits at critical phases of the mission, and an onboard computer has enhanced its performance. Whereas the early Soyuz spacecraft were stated to have a

30-day capability, Soyuz T 5 functioned in orbit for

106 days, during which it was docked with Salyut 7

for 103 days.17

A major disadvantage of using the Soyuz appears

to be the tight constraint imposed by lighting conditions during recovery, Information released at the time

of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) revealed that

landings should occur at least 1 hour before local sunset and that a minimum of 8 minutes should elapse between eclipse-exit and retrofire. Graphical analyses by

Christy’ s

and Clark19 show that the 31 revolutions

repeating pattern of ground tracks employed for the

Salyuts 6 and 7 lead to landing “windows” at intervals of approximately 2 months. Moreover, the duration of these windows varies from only 7 to 10 days

depending on the time of year. These windows, in

turn, impose constraints on mission durations. The 8-

day Intercosmos missions, for example, were launched

immediately prior to the opening of a landing window

so that, if the need to abort prematurely should arise,

as with the Bulgarian mission, the constraints could

be obeyed on the third day.zo To date, Soyuz T spacecraft have also obeyed these constraints and have yet

to demonstrate the capability to make normal landings

at any time of the day or night. If this practice is followed for Berezovoi and Lebedev, then the next window opening around the end of the year would prolong their mission to something in excess of 230 days.z

’

The constraints could be obeyed in an emergency at

other times of the year by moving the recovery zone

from the Kazakhstan region. Cosmonauts have been

depicted training for recovery from landings in water

should such landings prove to be necessary .22

Up to a few years ago, the orbital module remained

attached to the command module until after retrofire.

,,50YUZ. T ]aunched Dec. lb, 1979

16SOYUZ-T 3, Leonld Kizim, Oleg Makarov, and Gennadly Strekalov

launched Nov 27, 1980

I’Soyuz-T 5 landed Aug. 27, 1982

‘8R. D Christy, “Safety Practices for Soyuz Recoveries, SPacefljght 23,

1981, pp. 321-322,

l~p s C]ark “SOYUZ Missions to Salyut Stat Ions, .$pacefl~ght 21. 1979.

Pp 259-263.

‘oSoyuz 33, Nikolay Rukavishnikov and Ceorg,Y, Ivanov, Apr. IO-12 1979

“SOJ,UZ-T 7 landed in poor conditions at night, Dec 10, 1982, 21 I days

9 hr 5 rr,in record duration

2’Spacef7ight 20, 1Q78, p 305 shows Aleksey Gubarev and Vladlmlr Remeh

practicing for SOyuz 28
66

Latterly, it has been jettisoned prior to retrofire.23 The

orbital module, filled with bulky, used equipment,

burns in the atmosphere on reentry and provides a

means for disposing of unwanted material as an alternative to the regular use of the airlocks. The unloaded

Progress performs a similar function but is deorbited

over the Pacific rather than being left to decay naturally. The crew capacity of the Soyuz T is limited to three

by the use of the A-2 vehicle for its launch. This

booster, using the same first stage as that used to

launch the first Sputnik 25 years ago, is the only Soviet

booster to be man-rated to date. The larger D vehicle

now appears to be totally reliable and could possibly

be man-rated at some future date for launching spacecraft with larger crew complements, and some Western

observers speculate that the mysterious dual payload

launches at 51.6° inclination were reentry tests of

reusable winged spacecraft .24 The Cosmos 1374 mission of summer 1982 has been claimed to have been

a reentry test of a scale model winged spacecraft,

launched by the intermediate capacity C vehicle; the

Royal Australian Air Force released pictures of the

follow-on Cosmos 1445 spacecraft being recovered

from the Indian Ocean. zs Nevertheless it is not unreasonable to suppose that research and development

work leading to a reusable manned spacecraft to service a permanently manned space station is in hand.

The unmanned Progress craft is something more

than an interim measure to provide space-station crews

with fresh supplies. The Soviets have mastered the

technique for resupplying their Salyut stations with

propellant and potable water, a feat unmatched in the

Skylab missions and, as yet, unnecessary for the space

Shuttle. Moreover, the residual propellant of the

Progress engine has been used to maneuver the SoyuzSalyut-Progress orbital complex in the manner of a

primitive space tug.26

The altitudes selected for the Salyut missions below

the Van Allen radiation belts27 are not the most economical in terms of propellant usage, The relatively

high air-drag, particularly in the case of the “military”

Salyuts 3 and 5,28 made great demands on stored propellants to maintain the orbit throughout the duration

~Qrbital module 0[ first SoyUz-T discarded 25 March 1980, cataloged

by RAE as 79-lo3D but as 77-97BR by NORAD.

l~co~mos ggl-gz, Dec. 15 1976; Cosmos 997-998, Mar. 29, 1978; cosmos

1101101, May 22, 1979; and T. Williams, “Soviet Re-entry Tests: A Winged

Vehicle?” Space flight 22, 1980, pp. 213-214.

‘

sAviation Week & Space Technology 116, June 14, 1982, p, 18; and

Cosmos 2374, June 3, 1982, (Pictures of the 1983 flight of Cosmos 1445, a

similar spacecraft, taken by the Royal Australian Air Force have been published by the world’s media, )

26, ’

. . during the joint flight the engines of Progress 15 had been used

to make two adjustments of the trajectory of the orbital complex, ” ( Tass in

Russian for abroad, 1436 GMT, Oct. 14, 1982, reported in SU/7163/D/3,

ZTExp]orer I discovered radiation belt at 950 km.

2aSalyut 3256-292 km, Salyut 5214-257 km.

of the missions. Choice of a greater altitude to minimize propellant consumption exacts a penalty in terms

of surface resolution for Earth observation programs.

As space stations increase in physical size and complexity the drag problem will attain an even greater significance.

The small interior volume of the Salyut stations,

which have an effective floor-area of 16 square

meterszg in the Working compartment, must lead to

cramped conditions, especially at times when the

cosmonauts are joined by’ visiting crews. A first step

towards increasing the interior volume came with the

docking of Cosmos 1267, a “prototype space module, ”30 with Salyut 6. Although this docked complex

was never manned, it was claimed21 that future stations could be enlarged by docking with modules dedicated to different disciplines including crew rest and

relaxation. The Cosmos l267 engine was used to maintain the Salyut 6 orbit32 and eventually to deorbit the

docked complex at the close of the joint mission .33

Cosmos 1267 and its preclecessor, Cosmos 929, were

both reported to have returned part of their structure

to Earth after a period of some 30 days.34 Salyuts 3

and 5 also returned capsules during the unmanned

phases of their missions, and thus an unmanned return

capability already can be seen to exist .35

Another disadvantage of the current Salyut program

is the lack of near-continuous communication with

ground stations. For long periods in each orbit the crew

is out of touch with ground control. In the initial stage

of Soviet manned spaceflight this disadvantage was

partially overcome by the use of shortwave frequencies for voice communication as well as the long-range

housekeeping telemetry still in use today. Later, merchant ships were converted to provide communication

links through Molniya satellites,3b and purpose-built

vessels have since moderrized the space support fleet

maintained by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences .37

~gYu Semenov and L. Gorshkov, “ ‘Salyut 6’ Orbital StatIon: Home, Laboratory, Vehicle, ” Nauka i Zhizn’, April 1981, pp. 43-53, 125, reproduced

in JPRS 78779, Space #12, Aug. 19, 1981, p. 7.

‘°Cosmos 1267 docked with Salyut 6 at 0752 GMT, June 19, 1981. Moscow

Home Service, 0930 GMT, June 19, 1981, reported in SU/6755/D,’l.

JIIntewiew with Konstantin Feoktistov, UPI, 1248 GMT, June 24, 1981:

and interview with Konstantin Feoktistov, Tass, Russian for abroad, 0508

GMT, June 24, 1981, reported in SIJ/6770/Dll.

‘ * MOSCOW Home Service, 1400 GMT, July 1, 1981, reported in

SU /6770/D/l.

33 Tass, Russian for abroad, 1057 GMT, July 29, 1982, reported in

SUI 7095/D/1.

“’’Part of New Soviet Space Statitm Deorbited and Recovered, ” Defense

Daily, May 29, 1981, p. 153, (Cosmcs 1267 capsule returned May 24, 1981. )

jssalyut 3 returned capsule on Sept, 23, 1974. Tass, Russian for abroad,

1405 GMT, Sept. 26, 1974, reported in SU’4715/C ‘1 and Salyut 5 returned

capsule on Feb. 26, 1977. Tass in Rus:ian, 1502 GMT, Mar. 2, 1977, reported

in SU, 5458/C/l.

3’Tass in English, 0900 GMT, OCI. 18, 1969, reported in SU ‘3207 C 2,

“G, Bezborodov and A. M. Zhako<, “Suda Kosmicheskoy Sluzhby, ” 1zdate~’stvo “Sudostroyeniye,” (Leningrad: 1980), reproduced In JPRS L 9862,

Space FOUO 381, pp. 1-21.
67

Details of an Eastern Satellite Data Relay Network

(ESDRN) lodged with the International Frequency Registration Board in 198138 show that the Soviet Union

intends to operate a system employing frequencies i n

the Ku-band39 similar to the American TDRSS for

communicating with Salyut stations and other spacecraft in low-Earth orbit, commencing no sooner than

December 1985.

Following the end of the manned phase of the Salyut

6 mission in 1980, articles appeared in the daily and

technical press detailing the achievements and outlining future needs.’” Isvestiya stressed that those

achievements were not only in the great reliability and

longevity in space of the onboard systems and equipment but also in the vast amount of experimental work

aimed at finding solutions for fundamental scientific

problems and practical requirements on Earth today.

The requirements of 22 of the Ministries and Departments of the U.S.S.R. were considered.

More than 1,600 experiments were said to have been

performed involving some 150 items, many of which

were repeated at least once .4

1 Of these, 60 were astrophysical, 200 on the production of materials of exceptionally high purity, and 900 in medicine and biology.

Many of the latter were in cooperation with other

countries as part of the Intercosmos program. The

superpure materials ranged from the homogeneous

alloys and semiconductor materials, produced in the

Kristall, Splav, and Isparitel furnaces and ovens, ” to

vaccines produced by elect rophoresis.43 Much time

was devoted to the observation of the Earth from

space. Some 13,000 photographs were obtained using

the Kate-140 topographical and MKF-6M multispectral

cameras. 44 As a result, a supply of freshwater was

located in the Kyzyl-Kum desert and large-scale geological features coinciding with mineral deposits and

possible oil-bearing regions were identified .45 It was

stated that photographs of an area covering 1 million

kmz could be recorded on film in 10 minutes, equivalent to the result of several years’ aerial photography.” (Salyut 4 was reported to have returned photographs of 4.5 million km2 of the U.S.S.R. )47 1n ad-

——.

“Special SectIon No SPA-AA 343 1484 annexed to IFRB Circular No.

1484, Sept 1, 1981

‘“1O 82, 1 I 32, 137 and 1352 GH7 downllnk, 1462 and 1505 CHZ upllnh

““Feoktlstov and Markov, Idem , and Semenov and C,or+,kov, idem and

‘Looking to Orbit\ ~~f the Future, ls~wst]}’a July 14 i981, p 2, reproduced

In JPRS 79319, Space ~ 13, Oct 28, 1981, pp 3-6, and K Feoktlstov, “TO

Future Orbits, ” 1’ravda, June Q 1Q81, p 3, reproduced In JPRS 7931Q, Space

# 13, Ocl 28, 1981, pp 45-46

“Ib]d p 46

‘

2 Semenov and Gorshkov, ldem. p Q

‘‘Feoktlstov and klarkov Idem p 11.

~~Fe<lktl~t[)v, ldem , P 4 6

J$ Fec)kt IStov and Marko\., ldem , P 4

“A P Aleksancirov, [svesfya July 14, 1981, p 2, reproduced in JPRS

7931~, Space #13, oct 28, 1~81, p 3

“Feoktlstov and Markov, idem , p 4

dition to radioastronomy, experiments with the KRT10 in 1979,48 astronomical observations of active areas

of the Sun’s surface and other X-ray sources were made

and infrared radiation from the planets and stars was

recorded using the cryogenically cooled 1.5-meter diameter BST-lM telescope .49 For these observations an

orientation accuracy of a few arc seconds was maintained, so and some Western commentators have seen

military implications related to the pointing of

directed-energy weapons in this context .5’ Undoubtedly, there is a large area in which military and scientific experimental programs overlap each other.

Experience has shown that it is possible for crews

to work in space for long periods at a time so Iong

as they follow a regular exercise regimesz to counteract

the effects of prolonged weightlessness. Equally important is sustaining the psychological well-being of the

crew. T. this end consideration has been given to

the interior decoration of the station .54 It was found

that working to a normal Earth time schedule was beneficial both to the cosmonauts and the ground-support

teams, Regular rest days at weekends are used for

housekeeping and relaxation. The introduction of a

two-way television link” enabling the cosmonauts to

see their families whilst talking to them at the weekends was a great morale-booster as were the visits from

short-term crews. However, the strain began to tell on

the Salyut 7 cosmonauts who set the record of 211 days

in space, and their working day was reduced from 16

to 12 hours.5b

And what of the future? Steps must be taken to

overcome the disadvantages of the current program

mentioned above. More efficient transport crafts are

needed. A Soyuz can deliver only 50 kg of supplies

in addition to its crew, and Progress is limited to 2,300

kg. ” Although Progress transports delivered more

than 20 tonnes of supplies to Salyut 6 in 12 visits, the

greater part of the cargo comprised life-support system

supplies and units, fuel and replacements for onboard

systems .58 A man requires more than 10 kg of replacement life-support system elements every day, 59 and

4BN s Kardashev, A. 1, savln, M. B. Zakson, A G Sokolov, and K

P Feoktistov, “The First Radio Telescope in Space, ” Zem/,va I t’selenna,va,

No 4, July-August IWO, pp 2-9, reproduced In ]PRS 76578, Space //7, Oct

8, 1980, pp 1-15

t~Feoktistov and Markov, idem. , p 6

50 Feoktistov, idem , p. 4 6 .

““Washington Round Up, ” Aviation WeeL & Space Technolog~, 117, NO

17, Oct. 25, 1982, p, 15

~~ Semenov and Gorshkov, idem , P 15

5 ‘N. Novlkov, ‘An Extended Expedrtlon, ” SovetsL.~} L’oln No 8, 1981,

pp 29-29, reproduced in JPRS 78779 Space ~12, Aug IQ, 1~81 pp 26-29

“Ibid , p. 8.

“ldem,, p, 28,

~~l~f{l~c(~w, P%ror/d Serv]ce in Engllsh, 1000 GMT, Oct 27, 1982, reported

In SU 7182 D 1

“Novikcw, idem , p. 27.

“Feoktlstov and Markov, ldem , p. 10.

‘“Ibid p 9
68

there is an obvious need to change over to a new lifesupport system operating on a closed cycle, thereby

eliminating the need to deliver water and atmospheric

purification supplies. (A water-regeneration system did

not produce in excess of 500 liters of potable water on

Salyut 6.60 A reduction in the amount of fuel necessary for station orientation could be effected by the

adoption of an electromechanical orientation system. 61

(Trials of this type of system were conducted on Salyut

3 and must be presumed to have been less than satisfactory since this principle has yet to be adopted operationally. )

The introduction of a new onboard computer system

for Salyut 7 has relieved the crew of much routine

work connected with the operation of the station. 62

This is markedly noticeable in communication sessions

with ground control. On previous missions much time

was spent in calling “Zaria,” the ground control, in

order to confirm that two-way contact had been established. Today, the computer switches on the transmitter when the stations rises above the radio horizon of the ground station, and the cosmonauts speak

from wherever they chance to be in the station at the

‘°Feoktistov and Markov, idem,, pp 10-11.

b’Idem., p. 11.

“ MOSCOW Home Service, 1800 C; MT, May 21, 1982, reported in

SU/7034/D/2; and Moscow Home Service, 0200 GMT, May 23, 1982,

reported in SU j 7048/D ‘2; and [svestiya, July 16, 1982, reported in

SU17122/D/3.

time. Feoktistov, commenting on the introduction of

computer and microprocessor technology, has cautioned that enthusiasm for automation can lead to extraordinary complexity and, consequently, a reduction of equipment reliability. ’3

The elimination of the need to mothball the station

between periods of occupancy by long-term crews

would be a logical step in the steady evolution of

Salyut operations. A further improvement would be

the provision of facilities for receiving water and propellant from Progress transports at either of the two

docking ports. This would eliminate the transportation

and redocking which has hitherto been necessary to

relocate the Soyuz at the forward docking port in order

to accommodate a Progress at the aft port. Such redesign may also encompass provision of nonaxial

docking ports although destruction of axial symmetry

could introduce problems In maneuvering and altitude

control.

In the distant future one might expect the Soviets

to take steps to establish a permanent space station

in geosynchronous orbit’< for the collection of solar

energy, its conversion to electrical energy, and transmission to Earth by microwaves, but these possibilities

introduce difficulties several orders of magnitude greater than those solved to date.

‘

3 Feoktistov and Markov, idem., p 10.

b41dem., p. 11.
Appendix C

OTA Workshop on

Soviet Space Station Activities

List of Outside Participants

Craig Covault

Aviation Week & Space Technology

Leonard David

National Space Institute

Merton Davies

The Rand Corp.

Ed Ezell

Smithsonian Institution

John R. Hilliard

Air Force Systems Command

Nicholas Johnson

Teledyne Brown Engineering

Saunders Kramer

Department of Energy

Courtland S. Lewis

Biotechnology, Inc.

James Oberg

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company

Geoffrey Perry

The Kettering Group

Northants, England

Paul Rambaut

NASA Headquarters

P. Diane Rausch

NASA Headquarters

Marcia S. Smith

Congressional Research Service

Additional Reviewers

Hubert Bortzmeyer

Christopher H. Dodge

Russell Drew

Paul Hanle

Thomas Karas

Charles Kelly

Gordon Law

John Logsdon

George Mueller

Joseph Rowe

Carl Sagan

Charles P. Vick

Ray A, Williamson

Simon P. Worden

69