PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DAVID MILLARD; EUGENE KNIGHT; ARTURO VEGA, Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v. JOHN CAMPER, in his o fficial capacity as Director of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, Defendant - Appellant.

---------------------------- --------------------- MIKE HUNTER, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma; DEREK SCHMIDT, Attorney General of the State of Kansas; HECTOR H. BALDERAS, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico; SEAN REYES, Attorney General of the State of Utah; PETER K. MICHAEL, Attorney General of the State of Wyoming; 17 SCHOLARS WHO STUDY SEX OFFENSES; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RATIONAL SE XUAL OFFENSE LAWS, Amici Curiae. No. 17-1333

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02406-RPM)

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 20, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Melanie J. Snyder, Chief Deputy Attorney Ge neral of Colorado (Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado; Chris W. Albe r, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Colorado; James X. Quinn, First Assistant Attorney General of Colorado; Robert C. Huss, Assistant Attorney Gene ral of Colorado; Russell D. Johnson, Assistant Solicitor General of Colorado, with her on th e briefs), for Petitioner-Appellant. Ty Gee, Haddon, Morg an and Foreman P.C., Denver, Co lorado (Adam Mueller, Haddon, Morgan and Foreman P.C.; Alison Ruttenbe rg; Mark Silverstein, American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado; Sara R. Neel, American Civil Libertie s Union of Colorado, with him on the brief), for Respondent-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , SEYMOUR , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ EID , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff-Appellees David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega challenge the constitutionality of Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA). The district court held CSORA was uncons titutional as applied to the Appellees 1 because the statute inflicted cruel and unusual punishment and violat ed substantive due process guarantees. Additionally, the dist rict court held that the state courts’ application of CSORA’s deregistration proce dures to Vega violated his procedural due process rights. Defe ndant-Appellant, the State, 2 appeals from the entirety of the

1 For simplicity and readability, we will refer to Millard, Knight, and Vega as “the Appellees” throughout this opinion, unless di scussing one of them individually. 2 The original appellant was Michael Rankin, w ho was sued in his official capacity as the then-Director of the CBI. The current appellant, John Camper, replaced Rankin as the Director of the CBI in January 2018, and under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), he is substituted for Rankin as the Appellant in this appeal. For simplicity and readability, we will refer to the Appellant as “the State” throughout this opinion.3 district court’s decision. Because the district court’s ruli ng contravenes binding Supreme Court and Tenth Circui t precedent, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND A. Development of sex offender registration acts and CSORA States began adopting sex offender re gistry laws in the early 1990’s in response to the high-profile sexual assaults and murders of children by individuals with prior sex-offense convictions. See Nichols v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1116 (2016); see also 34 U.S.C. § 20901(1)–(17) (listi ng names). In 1994, Congress “conditioned federal funds on [s ]tates’ enacting sex-offende r registry laws meeting certain minimum standards.” Id. (discussing the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Regi stration Act). “By 1996, every State, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government had enacted some variation of” a sex-offender registry. Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003). In 2006, Congress revised its federal sex-offender re gistry requirements with the adoption of the Sex Offender Registra tion and Notification Act (SORNA), Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed.), transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. (2017 ed.). With SORNA, Congress created a nationwid e registry intended to “p rotect the public from sex offenders.” 34 U.S.C. §§ 20 901, 20921 (national regist ry). SORNA continues to condition federal funding to states’ maintena nce of their own sex-offender registries, but also requires states (and registrants) to provide registry information to the federal government. Id. at §§ 20913(c), 20914, 20918. SORNA requires states “make4 available on the Internet, in a manner that is readily accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public,” pertinent in formation “about each sex offender in the registry.” Id. at § 20920(a). And, the website must be searchable by zip code or geographic area. Id. Colorado has maintained so me variant of a sex-offe nder registry since 1991.
See 1991 C OLO

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. L AWS , ch. 69. It is against this legal backdrop that, in 2002, Colorado adopted CSORA. 2002 C OLO

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. L AWS , ch. 297. CSORA’s provisions render Colorado compliant with SORNA. 3 CSORA has three basic elements: (1) registration by sex offenders with local law enforcement; (2) compilation of a sexoffender registry by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI); and (3) limited public disclosure of some of the information contained in the registry. The statutory text itself explains that “it [was] not the general as sembly’s intent that the information [contained in the Registry] be used to inflict retribution or additional punishment on any person,” but rather CSOR A was intended to address “the public’s need to adequately protect themselves and their child ren” from those with prior sexual convictions. C OLO

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. § 16-22-110(6)(a); see also id. § 112(1). Registration is required under CSORA if a person is (a) convi cted of any of the enumerated thirty-plus misdemeanor or felony offenses, (b) convicted of any offense in which the “underlyi ng factual basis involves” a ny of those offenses, or (c) released from the custody of the state department of corrections after serving a

3 See Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering,and Tracking, “Substantially Implemented,” https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/substantiallyimplemented (last updated May 13, 2020) (noting Colorado has “substantially implemented” SORNA’s requirements).5 sentence for any of the offenses or an of fense with the requisi te “underlying factual basis.” Id. at § 103(1)–(2). Juveniles must also register but can petition for deregistration if they sa tisfy certain criteria. Id. at § 103(5)(a). Persons subject to the regi stration requirement must register with local law enforcement and disclose certain personal in formation including their name, date of birth, address, place of em ployment, all names previously used, the identity of any school they are attending, vehicle identifica tion number, and, for certain registrants, email addresses. Id. at § 109(1). 4 Each registrant must also provide a current photograph and a set of fingerprints. Id. at § 108(6). Most registrants must register annually, but sexually-violent offenders and those convicted of particularly serious offenses must register quarterly. Id. at § 108(1)(b), (d). The information obtained pursuant to regi stration is then compiled by the CBI, the agency that ma intains the Colorado Sex Offende r Registry (Registry). The Registry is available to state and federal criminal justice agencies, id . at §§ 109, 110, 112, and it includes the offender’s name, registration status, da te of birth, and description of the offender’s unlaw ful sexual behavior and crimes, id. at § 110(2).

4 These requirements are less restrictive than those in some other states, which limit where registrants can live and what employment they can seek. See, e.g. , A LA

. C ODE § 15- 20A-11 (prohibition on residence); C AL

. P ENAL C ODE § 290.95 (prohibited from work with minors); G A

. C ODE A NN . § 42-1-15(b)–(c) (prohibition on residence and employment); K Y
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. A NN . § 17.545 (prohibition on residence), see id. § 17.546 (prohibition on online or social media interactions with minors); M ISS

. C ODE A NN . § 45-33-24(4a) (prohibition on residence); O HIO R EV
. C ODE A NN
. § 2950.034 (prohibition on residence).6 In addition to compiling the Registry itself, CSORA also requires the CBI make some of the registrants’ information available to th e public. Upon request, the CBI must issue a list of persons on the Registry. Id. at § 110(6)(c). That list must include, at minimum, the re gistrant’s name and aliase s, address, birth date, photograph, and the offense that re quired him or her to register. Id. at § 110(6)(c), (f). The CBI also maintain s a public website searchab le by name and geographic

area. Id. at § 111(1). This website does not include information about registrants whose offenses were misdemeanors, or in formation about registrants who committed the triggering offense while they were juveniles. Id. at § 111(1)(a)–(d). However, information about those registrants is available via the Regi stry list, which as explained above, any pe rson could obtain upon re quest to the CBI. Id. at § 110(6)(c). Since the creation of the Registry, private, third-party businesse s have emerged that republish registrants’ persona l information on the internet with no limitation or regulation on repu blication. Some registered sex offende rs can petition the court to discontinue registration under certain conditions, see id. at § 113(1), while certain ca tegories of sex offenders are ineligible for deregistra tion and must continue to abide by CSORA’s registration requirements for the re st of their lives, see id. at § 113(3). Whether a sex offender is eligible for removal from the Regist ry depends on the underlying offense. 5

5 A registrant who committed a class 1, 2, or 3 felony can petition to deregister twenty years after discharge from incarceration or final release from the jurisdiction of the court, id. at § 113(1)(a), and for lower-level felonies, the registrant may petition for7 B. The Appellees Millard, Knight, and Vega are convicte d sex-offenders s ubject to CSORA’s registration requirements. 6 Together, they brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that CSORA’s registration requi rements constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; vi olate their Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy; and, in the case of juvenile-offenders like Vega , violate their right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Each alleges that re gistration has been onerous, making it harder to hold a job, find housing, raise his children, or pass a criminal background check. Milla rd contends that he had to move to a different work location because of his sex-offender status, and that he was forced to move—and had to file hundreds of applications before finally finding a new re sidence—because of a TV news story focusing on sex offenders in apartment housing, and that he incurred shame from the broad dissemination of his in formation and loud visits from police. Knight allegedly has experienced shame due to private busin esses republishing the

deregistration ten years after discharge or release. Id. at § 113(1)(b). Those who were convicted of their offenses as juveniles can also petition for deregistration. Id. 6 Millard is required to register quarterly for the rest of his life. C OLO

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. § 16-22-113(3)(b)(I). The district court inco rrectly stated that Millard would become eligible to petition for deregistration in 2017. Millard v. Rankin , 265 F. Supp 3d 1211, 1217 (D. Colo. 2017). Millard was accused of forcible sexual assault by his daughter and was convicted pursuant to the then-existing sexual assault provision, see C OLO

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. S TAT . § 18- 3-403 (1999), which according to CSORA, make s him ineligible for deregistration for the rest of his natural life. See C OLO

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. S TAT . § 16-22-113(3)(b)(I) (“The following persons are not eligible for relief . . . any person who is convicted as an adult of . . . sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of section 18-3-403, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000.”). Knight is eligible to petition for deregistration in 2021. Id. at § 113(1)(b). And Vega was eligible for deregistration at the time he completed his juvenile sentence. See id

. at § 113(1)(e). He has since twice petitioned for deregistration but was denied both times by the state court. These denials form the basis of his procedural due process claim.8 registry, is no longer able to enter his children’s school, and was denied employment at Home Depot after his background check was “red flagged.” Vega, who committed his underlying offense as a j uvenile, contends that hi s placement on the registry prevents him from finding secure employmen t, and that the state court violated procedural due process when denying his petitions for deregistration. C. The District Court Order Following a bench trial, the distri ct court concluded that CSORA (1) constituted cruel and unusual punishment 7 in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to Appellees, Millard v. Rankin , 265 F. Supp 3d 1211 , 1231–32 (D. Colo. 2017), (2) violated the Appellees’ substantive due process rights, id. at 1235; and (3) violated—through the state-c ourt’s misapplication of th e law when denying Vega’s petition to deregister—Vega’s pr ocedural due process rights, id. at 1233. The court granted declaratory judgment to Appellees. 8
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW On appeal from a bench trial, “we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its lega l conclusions de novo.” Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, KS , 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10t h Cir. 2001). In additi on, as Appellees have

7 The district court concluded “the experience of these plaintiffs . . . [shows] the effect of publication of the information require d by registration is to expose the registrants to punishments inflicted not by the state but by their fellow citizens.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1226. 8 Although Appellees requested a permanent injunction against enforcement of CSORA, the district court found that Milla rd, Knight, and Vega had not submitted any evidence to establish the requisite factors other than success on the merits. Accordingly, the district court granted only declaratory relief.9 made an as-applied challenge to CSORA, we are limited to analyzing the contours of their claims “under the particular circ umstances” of Millard, Knight, and Vega. 9 See United States v. Carel , 668 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Ci r. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS A. Eighth Amendment A deprivation cannot violate the Ei ghth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishme nt” unless it first qualifi es as “punishment.” See Carney v. Okla. Dept. of Public Safety , 875 F.3d 1347, 1352 (10th Ci r. 2017). Whether a law equates to “punishment” depend s on whether the legislature’s intent was to punish; and if not, whether there is the “clearest proof” that any punitive effects of the law negate the legislature’s civil intent. Smith , 538 U.S. at 92. This court has twice, and the Supreme Court has once, determined th at sex-offender regi stration requirements were not “punishments” because their respective legislatur es lacked punitive intent and their application l acked punitive effect. Id. at 96, 105 (finding the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act nonpunitive); Shaw v. Patton , 823 F.3d 556, 562, 577 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding th e application of Oklahoma’ s sex-offender reporting and residency requirements nonpunitive); Femedeer v. Haun , 227 F.3d 1244, 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the application of Utah’s se x-offender registration and

9 However, the district court’s use of third-parties’ testimony below does not rise to the level of clear error, see Keys Youth Serv. , 248 F.3d at 1274, because the district court’s order shows it considered third-party evid ence as reinforcement of the Appellees’ own experiences.10 notification system, including disseminati on of the information on the internet, nonpunitive). Evaluating the Colorado legi slature’s intent and comparing CSORA’s effects to those deemed non punitive by binding precedent in Smith , Shaw , and Femedeer , we conclude that CSORA’s regist ration requirements as applied to Appellees do not amount to punishment. 1. Legislative Intent The Colorado General Assembly did not intend for CSORA to inflict a “punishment.” The legislatur e expressly indicated throug h the statutory text that CSORA was not intended to “be used to in flict retribution or additional punishment on any person,” but was rather intended to address “the public’s need to adequately protect themselves and their children” fro m those with prior sexual convictions.
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. § 16-22-110(6)(a); see also id. § 112(1). We therefore conclude that the Colorado legislature’s intent behi nd the registration requirements was civil, and not punitive. See Smith , 538 U.S. at 93 (finding civ il intent behind Alaska’s sexoffense registration requirements where the “statutory text itse lf” noted that the primary goal of the law was to “protect [] the public from sex offenders”). 2. Effects Past precedent shows that CSORA’s effects on Appellees are not punitive enough to negate the legislat ure’s civil intent. To dete rmine the punitive nature of CSORA’s effects, we consid er five factors used in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963), whether the sc heme: resembles trad itional forms of punishment, imposes an affirmative disabilit y or restraint, promotes the traditional11 aims of punishment, has a rational conn ection to a nonpunitive purpose, or is excessive with respect to this purpose. Smith , 538 U.S. at 97; Shaw , 823 F.3d at 562; Femedeer , 227 F.3d at 1249. 10 The Courts in Smith , Shaw , and Femedeer determined that each of the above factors supported th e conclusion that sex-offender laws similar to or more restric tive than CSORA were nonpunitive. As explained below, neither the district court nor Appell ees distinguish their case from our binding precedent in Smith , Shaw , and Femedeer in any meaningful way with regard to any of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, leading us to concl ude that CSORA’s effects do not constitute punishment.

a. CSORA does not resemble traditional forms of punishment. For this factor, we exam ine whether CSORA’s registration requirements are “regarded in our history and tr aditions as a punishment.” Smith , 538 U.S. at 97. The district court below concl uded the requirements imposed by CSORA resembled three traditional forms of punishment: public shaming, banishment, and parole and probation. Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1226–2 7. We disagree. First, CSORA does not resemble public sh aming. The district court based its finding on the “indignity” that the Appellees suffered from “loud public visits from the police” and “ubiquitous in fluence of social media.” Id . at 1226–27. But past precedent shows that this does not amount to public shaming. The State here is not

10 There are two additional factors in Mendoza-Martinez —whether the sanction has a scienter requirement, and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime. See 372 U.S. at 168. However, as the Smith Court explained, these factors are less relevant to our analysis. 538 U.S. at 105.12 putting Appellees on display but is rather disseminating “accurate information about a criminal record,” which the Smith Court found was a “legitimate governmental objective,” and not “punishment .” 538 U.S. at 98. Any attendant “public shame” or “humiliation”—even when magnified by the “r each of the Intern et”—is a “collateral consequence of a valid regulation.” Id . at 99; see also Femedeer , 227 F.3d at 1250 (“Public shaming [and] humiliation . . . i nvolve more than the dissemination of information.” (quoting E.B. v. Verniero , 119 F.3d 1077, 1099–11 00 (3d Cir. 1997)). Second, CSORA does not resemble banish ment. The district court based its conclusion on the fact that one of the Appe llees was forced to move—and had to file hundreds of applications before finally finding a new residence—“because of a TV news story focusing on sex offe nders in apartment housing.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1227. But such obstacles are le ss onerous than Oklahoma’s residency restrictions that place an outright ban on se x-offenders “living within 2,000 feet of a school, playground, park, or child care center,” which this court in Shaw found did not equate to banishment. 823 F.3d at 559, 568. Moreover, the Appellees’ struggles here did not stem from affirmative state ac tion—such as the reside ncy restrictions in Shaw —but instead from third parties a nd businesses implementing their own procedures. CSORA mandates the dissemina tion of information, which does not constitute “banishment.” Smith , 538 U.S. at 98 (“[B]ani shment[] involve[s] more than the dissemination of information.”); see also Femedeer , 227 F.3d at 1250. Last, the application of CSORA to the Appellees does not amount to probation. The district court concl uded otherwise, reasoning that CSORA’s13 requirements for in-person reporting and di sclosure of email addresses and chathandles provided law enforcement superv isory capabilities akin to probation. Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1228 (citing C OLO

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in Shaw we concluded that in-person reporti ng does not amount to probation. 823 F.3d at 566. And our reasoning there a pplies equally to CSORA’s email and chathandle disclosure requirements. Any monitoring capability stemming from these requirements falls short of th e “far more active” role law enforcement plays in a probationer’s life, such as mandating employment, requiri ng consent before moving or changing jobs, and forbi dding drug and alcohol use. Id . at 564–65. Moreover, CSORA’s mandates are “regulatory require ments separate from [the] underlying sexoffense conviction,” whereas “p robation historically involv e[s] a ‘deferred sentence’ based on the underlying offense.” Id . at 566. b. CSORA does not impose affirmati ve disability or restraint. For this factor, we must assess wh ether CSORA “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint.” Smith , 538 U.S. at 97. The distri ct court held that it did because its in-person reporting requirements and use of the Registry restrained the Appellees’ “abilities to live, work, accompany their children to school, and otherwise freely live their lives.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1229. We disagree, however, because we held in Shaw that neither the in-person reporting requirements, nor the more onerous residency-restrictions, of Oklahoma’s sex-offender laws constituted an affirmative disability or restraint. Shaw , 823 F.3d at 569, 571. It is true that Millard’s employer moved him to a differe nt work location and that Home Depot14 declined to hire Knight becau se of his background. But we find these effects to be less harsh than a lifelong bar on work in a particular industry, which the Supreme Court in Hudson v. United States found did not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). We therefore find that CSORA has not affirmatively disabled or re strained the Appellees here.

c. CSORA does not promote the traditional aims of punishment. For this Mendoza-Martinez factor we assess whet her CSORA as applied promotes traditional ai ms of punishment. Smith , 538 U.S. at 97. The district court held that CSORA appears to promote th e traditional aims of retribution and deterrence. Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1229–30. Th e district court premised this conclusion on CBI Director Rankin’s test imony that deterrence was one of CSORA’s
purposes, see id. , and that CSORA’s requirement s are based purely on statutory offense classifications, not an individual asse ssment of how likely a registrant is to reoffend, which implies that CSORA is retributive and deterrent in nature. Id. at 1230. However, both these determ inations run afoul of Smith. First, as the Smith Court explained, deterrent purpose alone is not enough to render a regulatory scheme criminal in nature. Smith , 538 U.S. at 102. “Any number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment . To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ w ould severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation.” Id. (quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted). Second, the Smith Court also rejected the argument15 that tying the length of the reporting requireme nt to the nature of the offense, rather than individual risk, renders the re gistration obligation retributive. Id . (“The broad categories, however, and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the da nger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.”)

. We therefore reject the distri ct court’s reasoning and hold that CSORA’s requirements are consiste nt with its regulatory objectives. d. CSORA is rationally relate d to a nonpunitive purpose. Here, we evaluate whether CSORA “has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.” Smith , 538 U.S. at 97. The district c ourt found that CSORA is rationally connected to Colorado’s “avowed regul atory purpose of public safety.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1230. We agree. CSORA re quires more serious o ffenders to register more often than others. C OLO

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e. CSORA is not excessive in relati on to its nonpunitive purpose. For this last Mendoza-Martinez factor, we assess whether CSORA is “excessive” in relati on to its public safety objective. Smith , 538 U.S. at 97. We conclude that it is not. Below, the cour t held that CSORA’s very long registration requirements and substantia l disclosure of personal information, without any individual risk assessment or opportunity to soften CSORA’s requirements based on16 evidence of rehabilitation, were excessive in relation to CSORA’s supposed public safety objective. Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1230. Again, we reject the district court’s conclusions because they run counter to governing precedent. In Smith , the Court rejected the court of appeals’ reasoning that the registration statute was excessive becau se it (1) applied to all sex offenders without regard to future dangerousness; and (2) placed no limits on the number of persons who had access to the information. 538 U.S. at 103. Instead, the Court held states were permitted to impose even very long reporting requirements based on categorical judgments about specific crimes , and that states we re not required to evaluate individual risk to avoid a finding that registra tion acts were excessive in relation to their regulatory purpose. Id. at 104. Further, if the weekly to quarterly reporting requirement was not excessive in Shaw , 823 F.3d at 576, then neither is the less-demanding quarterly to annual requirement here. In sum, Supreme Court precedent and our governing case law compel us to reject the district court’s decision. U pon de novo review of the application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that the Appellees have not presented the clearest proof of punitive effect, and that therefore CSORA is not punitive as applied17 to Appellees. 11 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendmen t does not bar its application in this case. 12
B. Substantive Due Process We now review Appellees’ claims that CSORA violates their substantive due process rights. The district court found that the application of CSORA violated substantive due process beca use it gives the public the pow er to “arbitrarily,” and without notice, “inflict puni shments beyond those imposed through the courts.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1235. Separately , the Appellees argue that CSORA offends substantive due proce ss because it creates an “irr ebuttable presumption” that a registered sex offender will reoffend. We disagree with the district court and the Appellees and find instead that CSORA does not violate subs tantive due process.

11 We recognize that the Colorado Court of Appeals has split amongst itself on the question of whether juveniles convicted of multiple sex offenses can be constitutionally subjected to lifetime registration pursuant to CSORA. Compare People in Interest of C.M.D. , 452 P.3d 133, 136–39 (Colo. A pp. 2018) (holding that CSORA’s requiring of juveniles with multiple convictions to register for life does not constitute punishment) with People in Interest of T.B. , --- P.3d ---, No. 16CA1289, 2019 WL 2528764 at *4–*9 (Colo. App. June 20, 2019) (holding the opposite, and finding that not only does CSORA impose a punishment but it is cruel and unusual), cert. granted , People in Interest of T.B. , No. 19-SC690 (Colo. 2020). We conclude the Colorado Supreme Court’s impending decision in T.B. is inapplicable to the present matter, as none of the Appellees is a juvenile offender with multiple juvenile sex offenses such that they are subject to lifetime registration. See id. (limiting cert. question to “[w]hether mandatory lifetime sex-offender registration for multiple juvenile offenses is facially cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment” (emphasis added)). Millard is subject to lifetime registration, but for an offense he committed as an adult. And, althou gh Vega was a juvenile offender, he had only one sex offense conviction (juvenile or otherwise), so he is eligible to petition for deregistration and is not subject to a lifetime registration requirement. 12 Because we hold that CSORA does not im pose “punishment,” we need not analyze whether its requirements are “cruel and unusual.”18 The Supreme Court has held that “the Du e Process Clause spec ially protects . . . fundamental rights and liberties.” Washington v. Glucksburg , 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Laws that violate such right s undergo heightened scrutiny and will be deemed invalid unless they are narrowly tailored to a co mpelling state interest. Id. at 721. But if a law does not violate funda mental rights, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id . at 728. The Appellees fail to s how how CSORA violated th eir fundamental rights. They cite no case holding that complian ce with a sex-offender registration law implicates a “deeply r ooted” fundamental right. Rather, all courts to have considered the issue have concluded otherwise. See Litmon v. Harris , 768 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014); Does v. Munoz , 507 F.3d 961, 963–65 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore , 410 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2005). We therefore must determine whethe r CSORA is rationally related to a legitimate government interest . CSORA easily passes this test because, as discussed earlier, there is a rational connection betw een it and the government’s interest in public safety. 13 Accordingly, we reject the Appellees’ substantive due process claims. 14

13 In the district court’s words, “[t]he re is a rational relationship between the registration requirements and the legislative purpose of giving members of the public the opportunity to protect themselves and their children from sex offenses.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1235. 14 CSORA’s scheme satisfies rational basis ev en for Vega, who was a juvenile at the time of his crimes. CSORA treats juvenile of fenses differently from adult offenses, and Vega has benefitted from those heightened pr otections. His name does not appear on the state website, and he was eligible to petition for deregistration at the end of his juvenile sentence. And, as the State correctly notes, th e out-of-state cases Vega cites imposed much19 The district court concluded that CS ORA violates substa ntive due process because of the public’s allegedly “arbitrary” infliction of punishment. But this would not amount to substantive due process even if the public ha s indeed acted arbitrarily. The “touchstone of due process is protecti on of the individual ag ainst arbitrary action of government .” County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (alterations omitted) (emphasi s added). And below, the al leged “arbitrariness” with which the district court took issue related not to government action, but to public action. Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1235. We similarly reject the Appellees ’ arguments that CSORA’s alleged “irrebuttable presumption” of re-offense offends substantive due process. The Appellees do not connect this argument to any recognized f undamental liberty interest, or otherwise explai n why an “irrebuttable pres umption” in this context would be unconstitutional. Th eir briefing suggests it is per se unconstitutional to erect an irrebuttable presumption without a certain “adequacy of ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy th at the classification serves.” Aple. Br. at 26 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989)). But Michael H. explains that the problem with a “presumption” is not the presumption itself, but whether the “presumption” implicates a constitutionally -problematic legal classification. Id. at 120–21. The answer to that question, agai n, depends on the nature of the right at

longer registration requirements on juveniles. See Aple. Br. at 30–31 (discussing Interest of C.K. , 182 A.3d 917, 934–36 (N.J. 2018) (lifetime registration for juveniles); In re J.B. , 107 A.3d 1, 14–20 (Pa. 2014) (25 years mandatory registration); In re C.P. , 967 N.E.2d 729, 748 (Ohio 2012) (25 years mandatory registration)).20 issue: classifications affec ting fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, but othe r classifications need not be so narrowly tailored. See Glucksburg , 521 U.S. at 720–21, 728. 15 Accordingly, because the Appellees fail to connect CSORA’s alleged “irrebuttable presum ption” of re-offense to a fundamental right, their argument on this score fails. C. Procedural Due Process Vega claims that two Colorado magist rate judges violated procedural due process when rejecting his petitions to discontinue his registration obligation because, according to him, th e judges misapplied the relevant standard. The district court below agreed with Vega and declared that “[t]he procedures followed by the state in considering his pe titions did not comport with basic principles of fundamental fairness.” Millard , 265 F. Supp 3d at 1232. But we vacate this judgment because the district c ourt lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear Vega’s claims related to the state-court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower fede ral courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co ., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Kline v. Biles , 861 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by framing his or her challenge to a state-court judgment as a due process claim. See Campbell v. City of Spencer , 682 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Ci r. 2012) (holding Rooker Feldman barred Fifth Amendment

15 And, in fact, in Michael H. , the Court upheld the presumption at issue, concluding there was no “historical tradition” or funda mental right implicated. 491 U.S. at 124.21 due process claim); see also Castro v. Kondaur Capital Corp. , 541 F. App’x 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpub lished) (holding due process claim barred by Rooker-Feldman when reviewing that claim would impermi ssibly involve reexamination of the statecourt judgment). Vega’s procedural due pr ocess claim is, at its core, that the state court misapplied CSORA. The district co urt thus could not have granted relief without reexamining the state-court judgments , and it therefore l acked jurisdiction to decide the issue. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment on the Eighth Amendment and substa ntive due process claims and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Further, we VACATE the district court’s judgment regarding the procedural due process claim and REMAND with instructions to dismiss th at claim for lack of subj ect matter jurisdiction.