COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JILL MANSFIELD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1154-96-4 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 FEBRUARY 4, 1997 

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, III 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

William Shore Robertson, Judge 

 Jeanette A. Irby (Walker, Jones, Lawrence, 

Duggan & Savage, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Robin C. Gulick (Robin C. Gulick, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Jill Mansfield appeals from the decree of the trial court 

ordering payment of child support by Robert L. Taylor in the sum 

of $250 per month. Appellant raises four questions: (1) whether 

the court erred in not imputing income to appellee because he 

voluntarily left his employment; (2) whether the court erred in 

determining that appellee had made a full and clear disclosure 

about his ability to pay child support; (3) whether the court 

erred when it determined that when appellee voluntarily left his 

employment that the voluntary leaving required a "wrongful act" 

in order for the court to impute income; and (4) whether the 

court erred when it found that appellee's employment with his own 

sole proprietorship was a bona fide and reasonable business 

undertaking, thereby finding that appellee was not voluntarily 

underemployed. We find that the trial court erred in not finding 
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that appellee's change of employment constituted either 

purposeful evasion of his support obligations or such careless 

disregard for that obligation as to require imputation of income. 

 The parties were divorced by decree on or about December 15, 

1982. Subsequent amendments were made to the divorce decree, 

including a November 3, 1988 amendment requiring appellee to 

maintain the parties' children on his current medical and 

hospitalization insurance policy and to share equally with 

appellant all uninsured medical expenses of the children. The 

decree was again amended on March 30, 1990, ordering appellee to 

pay $500 per month in child support commencing February 29, 

through January 1994. 

 In August 1995, appellant filed a petition for support, 

seeking an increase in child support. 

 Appellee filed an answer to the petition for support and a 

cross-petition to reduce child support. Appellee's 

cross-petition requested that his child support obligation be 

reduced to a level consistent with Code § 20-108.2 and that his 

child support obligation cease upon his children reaching the age 

of eighteen, regardless of whether they had completed high 

school. After a hearing, the trial court entered its final 

decree in this matter on April 16, 1996. The trial court 

concluded: (1) that appellee was not voluntarily underemployed; 

(2) that appellant's gross monthly income was $5,172 and 

appellee's gross monthly income was $800; and (3) that under the 

guidelines, appellee's presumptive child support obligation was 
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$112 but for delineated reasons appellee's monthly child support 

obligation should be $250. The trial court also denied an award 

of attorney's fees to either party. 

 The following evidence was presented regarding the state of 

appellee's finances. Appellee was employed for thirteen years by 

Atlantic Research Corporation, a defense contracting firm, before 

being laid off as a result of a reduction in force in 1992. In 

August 1992, appellee obtained temporary employment with AdTech, 

a defense inspection firm. Shortly thereafter, appellee was 

retained by AdTech as a permanent, full time employee. In July 

1993, appellee and his present wife began the process of forming 

a sole proprietorship business, "PostNet." All necessary 

documentation was completed by October 1993. Appellee obtained a 

loan through the Small Business Administration with a mortgage on 

his jointly owned marital property and invested all of his 

retirement, some $25,000, in PostNet. Subsequently, appellee 

submitted his letter of resignation to AdTech on or about January 

31, 1994. 

 Appellee testified that his efforts to start his own 

business were at least in part motivated by the fact that 

appellee's supervisor, Mr. Koch, had informed appellee during the 

summer of 1993 that he might need to look for a new job as the 

downturn in the defense industry and the completion of the 

current contracts held by AdTech might require layoffs, which 

could include appellee. Mr. Koch testified that he would have 

told appellee about the possibility of layoff no more than a 
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month prior to Mr. Koch's receipt of appellee's resignation in 

January 1994. However, Mr. Koch also testified that had appellee 

not resigned, he would have been laid off within a three to eight 

week period from the date on which appellee chose to resign. 

 Appellee testified that he did not seek any other position 

and dedicated his efforts to starting PostNet. He also stated 

that he did some consulting work after his resignation and earned 

$35 an hour for this work. Appellee did not disclose, but Mr. 

Koch testified, that appellee continued to perform some 

inspection work for AdTech after his resignation, for which he 

was paid $35 an hour. 

 Because of poor record keeping, incomplete documentation and 

a general lack of information, one cannot estimate with any 

degree of accuracy appellee's income from his sole 

proprietorship, PostNet. Appellee testified that he did not know 

his projected income from the business and that he had no budget, 

plan or goal with respect to PostNet. Appellee stipulated to 

income of $9,600 a year from PostNet. This amount coincides with 

the terms of appellee's Small Business Administration loan, 

wherein appellee contractually limited his income from PostNet to 

no more than $9,600 a year for the seven year life of the loan.1

 Appellee repeatedly admitted that he was not a good bookkeeper 

and that he had not been very careful in record keeping. 

 1At the time of the child support hearing, appellee had been 

making payments on the Small Business Administration loan for two 

years. 
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Evidence indicated that numerous transactions, including deposits 

and transfers, were not accounted for in the PostNet ledgers, or 

conversely, were entered into PostNet's ledgers but were not 

reflected in the bank's account records. In addition, outside 

consulting fees were included in the PostNet ledgers and personal 

expenses were paid from business funds. 

 In Antonelli v. Antonelli, the Supreme Court addressed the 

proper standard to be employed where a party's income has 

diminished due to a voluntary change of employment. 242 Va. 152, 

409 S.E.2d 117 (1991). In Antonelli, the father petitioned for a 

decrease in child support after voluntarily leaving a salaried 

management position with a Richmond stockbrokerage firm for a 

commissioned sales position with another Richmond stockbroker 

where the father projected he would earn about the same income as 

with his former employer. However, after the stock market 

decline in 1987, his annual income was diminished by 

approximately $10,000. The trial court found a material change 

in circumstances. However the trial court also held, relying on 

Edwards v. Lowry, 232 Va. 110, 348 S.E.2d 259 (1986), that the 

father must also prove "that the lack of ability to pay is not 

due to any voluntary act or neglect." 242 Va. at 154, 409 S.E.2d 

at 118. The trial court concluded that the father "accepted the 

risk involved in being a commissioned stockbroker" and that the 

father had failed to meet the requirements of Edwards and 

therefore would not be granted a reduction in support. Id. 

 We had reversed, holding that the trial court "imposed an 
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erroneous standard of proof" on the father. Antonelli v. 

Antonelli, 11 Va. App. 89, 90, 396 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1990). 

Interpreting the Edwards standard that a party seeking reduction 

show his or her inability to pay is not due to his or her own 

"voluntary act or because of neglect," we held that while any 

career change is a "voluntary act," the law defining child 

support was not "intended to frustrate ambition or enterprise." 

Id. Accordingly, we construed the term "voluntary act" to mean a 

"willful act done for the purpose of frustrating the feasibility 

or enforceability of the support obligation." Id.

 The Supreme Court, while endorsing our articulation of the 

Edwards standard, Antonelli, 242 Va. at 155, 409 S.E.2d at 119, 

reversed. The Supreme Court disagreed with our application of 

the Edwards standard, id., and affirmed the trial court's finding 

that "the father gambled with the children's ability to receive 

his financial support, and lost." Id. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 119. 

 The Court further concluded that "[o]f course, a father is not 

prohibited from voluntarily changing employment. But, . . . when 

the father who was under court order to pay a certain sum for 

child support, which he was able to pay given his employment, 

chose to pursue other employment, albeit a bona fide and 

reasonable business undertaking, the risk of his success at his 

new job was upon the father, and not upon the children." Id. at 

156, 409 S.E.2d at 119-20. 

 The Supreme Court's analysis in Antonelli makes clear that 

actions which are either purposefully taken with the desire to 
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evade one's support obligations or which evidence a careless 

disregard for one's support obligations, can constitute "wrong 

doing" sufficient to warrant imputation of income. 

 Further, the burden of proof rests with the party attempting 

to have their support obligation decreased. See id. at 154-55, 

409 S.E.2d at 119; Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 31, 216 S.E.2d 

20, 21 (1975). Prior to Antonelli, the Supreme Court concluded 

that 

 [w]here, as here, the father seeks a 

reduction in the amount of payments for the 

support and maintenance of his minor children 

because of a change in his financial 

condition, he must make a full and clear 

disclosure relating to this ability to pay. 

He must also show that his lack of ability to 

pay is not due to his own voluntary act or 

because of his neglect. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 Applying the Antonelli standard to the facts of this case, 

it is evident that the trial court erred in its application of 

Antonelli. Appellee bore the burden of proving that his career 

change was made in good faith and without disregard for his 

support obligation. The trial court properly considered 

appellee's motive in changing positions, i.e., whether appellee 

opted to change his employment because of a good faith desire to 

do so or instead with the intent to frustrate his ability to pay 

support. The trial court concluded the decision to change 

employment was not motivated by a desire to escape support 

payments and consequently found no violation of Antonelli. 

However, Antonelli requires not only that the trial court 
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consider appellee's motive in changing positions but also whether 

the change in position evinced a careless disregard for the 

existing support obligation. 

 Appellee decided to pursue a new career from which he could 

receive, according to the terms of his SBA loan, no more than 

$9,600 in income per year for a seven year period. Here, like 

the parent in Antonelli, appellee was aware of his support 

obligations when he undertook the new career change. However, 

unlike the situation in Antonelli, where the father obtained a 

job he believed would compensate him equivalent to his prior 

position, appellee obtained new employment that he knew would not 

provide income remotely near the level of his prior position. 

Appellee testified that he was devoting sixty hours each week to 

his new business. Yet he had continued to earn less than he 

would had he worked in a minimum wage position. He planned for 

this job to pay off in the future. His obligations to his 

children are now. Appellee's actions in this regard appear 

considerably more "careless" than those of the father in 

Antonelli because, not only did appellee fail to seek a 

comparable income to that of his prior job, he ensured that he 

would have a very low income in his new position, as he himself 

negotiated the terms limiting his income. 

 While appellee may have acted in good faith in deciding that 

a change in position would be advantageous, his new career 

choice, while a bona fide business opportunity for him, 

nevertheless evidences either a purposeful desire to avoid his 
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support obligation, or some part thereof, or a careless disregard 

for that obligation. Consequently, we find that the trial court 

erred in not imputing income to appellee and accordingly, we 

reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this 

opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.