Beyond the Paths of Heaven

The Emergence of Space Power Thought

A Comprehensive Anthology

of Space-Related Master’s Research

Produced by the

School of Advanced Airpower Studies

Edited by

Bruce M. DeBlois, Colonel, USAF

Professor of Air and Space Technology

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of th

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beyond the paths of heaven : the emergence of space power thought : a comprehensiv

anthology of space-related master’s research / edited by Bruce M. DeBlois.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. Astronautics, Military. 2. Astronautics, Military—United States. 3. Space

Warfare. 4. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. School of

Advanced Airpower Studies-

 -Dissertations. I. Deblois, Bruce M., 1957-

 UG1520.B48 1999 99-3572

 358’ .8—dc21 CIP 

ISBN 1-58566-067-1

ii
Contents

Chapter Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PART I

Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture

1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . . 

Stephen E. Wright

2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s

 Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Frank Gallegos

3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National

Security Space Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Christian C. Daehnick

PART II

Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives

4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space

Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

David W. Ziegler

PART III

Space Control Perspectives

5 Counterspace Operations for Information

Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

James G. Lee

iii
Chapter Pag

6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . . . . . . . . . . 30

Cynthia A. S. McKinley

PART IV

High-Ground Perspectives

7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive

Space Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

William W. Bruner III

8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch

Space Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Michael A. Rampino

9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact

or Fiction? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Gregory Billman

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Illustrations

Figure

1 World Market Share of Large Jet Airplane

Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 Space System Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3 Offensive Counterspace Options . . . . . . . . . 28

4 Offensive Counterspace Options for

Tier-One Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5 Offensive Counterspace Options for

Tier-Two Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

iv
Figure Pag

6 Offensive Counterspace Options for

Tier-Three Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

7 The Dual Track Technology Progression

(Film-Based and Digital Processing) . . . . . . . . 31

8 Warfare—the Human Expression of

the Battle for Ascendancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

9 The Forms of Modern Warfare

(Categorized by Mankind’s Development

of Group Lethality Tools) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

10 SPOT Control and Data Reception Network . . . . 34

11 Current RLV Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

12 Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery

within Three Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

13 Space Regions and Environs . . . . . . . . . . . 51

14 Earth and Moon Gravity Wells . . . . . . . . . . 51

15 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Home-Based Terrestrial Forces . . . . . . . . . 52

16 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Deployed Terrestrial Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 53

17 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Engaged Terrestrial Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 53

18 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Space Power versus Terrestrial Forces . . . . . 54

Table

1 Aerospace Industry Sales

(millions of current dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . 

v
Table Pag

2 Trade Balance of Selected Commodities

(billions of dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 US Government Research and Development

Expenditures (millions of current dollars) . . . . . 1

4 Changing Aircraft Production Costs . . . . . . . . 3

5 USSPACECOM Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

6 USCENTCOM Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

7 Persian Gulf War Space Power Shortcomings

and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

8 Advantages of Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 10

9 Perceived Disadvantages of Space Systems . . . . 11

10 Space System Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . 11

11 Space Architecture Elements . . . . . . . . . . . 11

12 Space Architecture Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 11

13 Command-Oriented Architecture Priorities . . . . 11

14 Demand-Oriented Architecture Priorities . . . . . 11

15 Space Architecture Determinants . . . . . . . . . 13

16 Constellation Implications, Command-Oriented

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

17 Launch Vehicle Implications, Command-Oriented

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

18 Constellation Implications, Demand-Oriented

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

19 Launch Vehicle Implications, Demand-Oriented

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

vi
Table Pag

20 Theater RSTA Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

21 Theater RSTA Qualitative Requirements . . . . . 14

22 Command-Oriented Architecture for RSTA

Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

23 Demand-Oriented Architecture for RSTA

Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

24 Space-Capable Nations by Tier Groups . . . . . . 25

25 Existing and Projected Landsat Ground

Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

26 Existing and Projected SPOT Ground Stations . . 26

27 Qualitative Measures of Various Civilian Satellite

Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

28 Ground Resolution Requirements for Object

Identification (in meters) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

29 Landsat and SPOT Spectral Band Applications

(in microns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

30 Civil/ Military Uses of Multispectral Imagery . . . 27

31 Planned Imagery Systems 1995–2000 . . . . . . . 32

32 Resolution Required for Specific Military Tasks . . 33

33 Some Means of Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

34 SPOT Direct Receiving Stations . . . . . . . . . . 34

35 Attributes of Proposed RLV Concepts and

One Popular TAV Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

36 Summary of Attributes of a Notional RLV . . . . . 45

vii
Table Pag

37 CONOPS A and B RLV Capabilities . . . . . . . . 45

38 Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery

within Three Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

39 Summary of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

viii
Overview

Bruce M. DeBlois

Major issues have plagued the US military spac

community for years. Foremost among these issues is th

relationship between air and space. At a recent airpowe

conference, military leaders from the western power

presented discussions of airpower and space issues with 

pervasive underlying assumption: that the next logical step

from the exploitation of airpower and space capabilities wa

the merging of the two environments toward the exploitation

of “aerospace” power. 1 The current distinction between air an

space rests on the fiscal and technical inability to merg

them—an inability that is soon to be overcome. Conferee

dismissed environmental distinctions between the two on th

grounds that there is no absolute boundary between air an

space. 2 In Paths of Heaven, the chapter titled “Ascendan

Realms: Characteristics of Air and Space Power,” I examin

this assumption from the perspective of 21 different militar

characteristics and conclude it to be invalid. The reason

extend well beyond an inability—fiscally and technically—t

merge the two realms.

Similarities based upon functions and the lack of a distinc

boundary are offset by distinctions in the physica

environments. The physical laws of air and space ar

profoundly different. A vehicle flying on a cushion of air is no

equivalent to a vehicle in free-fall orbit. Aside from the issue o

access due to huge differences in energy requirements, th

airborne vehicle is maneuverable and allows for flexibl

operations while the space-borne platform is fixed to 

high-velocity orbital path. The latter expends little energy t

stay in a fixed orbital position, allowing it a duratio

capability well beyond airborne vehicles. The issue is no

whether the two environments can be merged technically, bu

given that they can be merged, should they be merged. An

analogy is useful to illustrate the argument.

ix
Land and sea forces maintain a two-dimensiona

perspective and relatively slow pace of operations. Th

amphibious mission certainly illustrates the fact that there i

no absolute boundary between land and sea for militar

purposes. Fiscal and technical capability to merge the tw

environments in an attempt to exploit surface power exists. In

spite of these similarities, land power and sea power have no

been merged as surface power because of environmenta

differences. The question is not whether to make a land/se

capable vehicle or system, but whether they should be th

mainstay of a military surface capability. The answer is 

resounding no. Given limited fiscal resources, the choic

between making either 1,000 land/sea vehicles or making 49

land vehicles, 490 sea vehicles, and 20 land/sea vehicles i

trivial. A land vehicle will out-perform a land/sea vehicle on

land, and a sea vehicle will out-perform a land/sea vehicle a

sea. Most missions are either at land or at sea; only a few

cross the hazy boundaries. It makes sense to invest in th

best capability for the environment in which the mission wil

be performed. Doctrine, organization, and strategies flow from

the environments and the systems employed to exploit thos

environments. Hence land power is distinct from sea power

Surface power would be a less optimal approach.

The same argument holds true for air and space power. Ai

and space forces maintain a three-dimensional perspectiv

and relatively fast pace of operations. The similarities en

there. Although there is no absolute boundary between ai

and space, no physicist would refute the fact that once th

fuzzy boundary is transcended, the nature of the environmen

changes radically. Fiscal and technical capability to merge th

two environments in an attempt to exploit aerospace power i

emerging, but should it be pursued? Again, environmenta

differences drive the answer. The question is not whether t

make an aerospace capable vehicle/system, but whether w

should make many as the mainstay of a military aerospac

capability. The answer, again, is a resounding no. A spac

vehicle will out-perform an aerospace vehicle in space: 

typical aerospace vehicle will carry the baggage of ai

capability, such as wings, into space. An air vehicle wil

out-perform an aerospace vehicle in the air: A typica

x
aerospace vehicle will carry the baggage of space capability

such as radiation shielding, in the air. Most missions ar

either in the air or in space, and only a few missions ar

performed at the boundary. As was the case with land an

sea, it makes sense to invest in the best capability for th

environment in which the mission will be performed. Hence

airpower is distinct from space power. Aerospace power, lik

surface power, would be less than an optimal approach. Th

crux of the argument rests on the distinction in physica

environments, which may not be obvious to a society raised

with science fiction presenting maneuverable, flying spac

fighters. The fact that the environments and related physic

are drastically different is above reproach. The chapters in

this book embody independent graduate research on space

related issues, and all assume the distinction between air an

space.

Many of the chapters are products of one of several school

of space power thought. From a theoretical perspective, th

seminal work by David Lupton sorts the “how-to-approach

space” controversy into four categories.3 The sanctuary schoo

views space as a realm free of military weapons, but allows fo

military-related systems providing such functions as treat

verification and intelligence activities. Advocates maintain th

only way to ensure the legal overflight aspect of current spac

treaties is to declare space as a war-free zone or sanctuary

This school calls for virtually no funding of military spac

programs involving weapons in space. The sanctuary schoo

has a substantial following in the domestic and internationa

populace, though many in the military see it as a “head-in

the-sand” approach to national security. This militar

perspective is unfortunate, since the strong case in favor o

the military advantages of a space sanctuary posture warrant

objective consideration. 4

The survivability school argues that military forces should

deemphasize space access, but for less idealistic reasons—th

assumption that space forces are inherently exposed an

vulnerable. Survivability adherents assert that the probabilit

of using nuclear weapons in the remoteness of space i

higher. This, the fact that weapons effects have longer range

outside of an inhibiting atmosphere, and the vulnerabilit

xi
associated with predictable orbit locations support th

survivability position. Remoteness also allows for plausibl

deniability, thus making the decision to attack more likely

The survivability school calls for the recognition that spac

forces are not dependable in crisis situations. They are critica

systems openly exposed and make for likely targets. Militar

space missions should thus be limited to communications

surveillance, reconnaissance, and weather reporting. From

this perspective, investment strategies ought to fund thos

missions, along with redundant space-terrestrial programs

and perhaps ground-based antisatellite (ASAT) systems.

The space control school recognizes the importance of spac

as coequal with air, land, and sea power. The result is tha

military space policy must balance investments in space, air

sea, and land power to meet the anticipated threat. Of the fou

schools, space control is the face worn by the Department o

Defense (DOD) and the Air Force since the 1980s. Curren

political emphasis on jointness prompts a space contro

approach as evidenced in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basi

Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force; Air Forc

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD-4, Space Operations Doctrine; Field Manual (FM) 100-5

Operations; and Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, an

Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14, Space Operations.

5

The high-ground school advocates space as the location from

which future wars will be won or lost. The view of usin

space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) to convert th

current offensive stalemate of mutually assured destruction t

mutually assured survival has some appeal. The growin

number of supporters of this school advocate expande

militarization of space and the adoption of a correspondin

policy. In their view, investments ought to focus on bot

offensive and defensive space systems at the expense of air

land, and sea systems. Funding would include space-based

ASAT systems, directed-energy warfare (DEW), and BMD wit

maneuverable, space-to-space, space-to-air, and space-to

ground capability. Air-to-space (airborne laser or kineti

miniature homing vehicle ASAT) and ground-to-space (direc

ascent ASAT) systems would also warrant investment. 6

xii
These schools of thought often extend beyond the militar

perspective into the policy arena. Each school has suppor

from a variety of constituencies, and each plays a role in th

way the military has approached space as a potentia

war-fighting realm. Beyond the theoretical controversies, th

fundamental problem within the military space communit

stems from a violation of military principle: unity o

command/effort. Former commander in chief for spac

(CINCSPACE), retired Air Force Gen Charles A. Horner, whe

asked by the chairman of the Senate Armed Service

Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, if he was in charge of space

replied that—it depends because he is the one commander in

chief (CINC) that exercises little control over his ow

command. The National Aeronautics and Spac

Administration (NASA), the Defense Information System

Agency (DISA), the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO), th

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Central Imagery Offic

(CIO), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Nationa

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), th

departments of Commerce, Transportation and Interior, th

National Science Foundation, and the White House Office o

Science and Technology Policy all intrude upon CINCSPACE’s

budget, while many of the same organizations intrude upon

his launch, on-orbit control, research and development (R&D)

and acquisition authority. 7 In addition to the governmenta

intrusion into his joint command, CINCSPACE must also dea

with service infighting over who should have the dominan

role in space.

Military space lift vehicle requirements, space architectures

and ground support infrastructure are more major issues

Graduate students at the School of Advanced Airpowe

Studies (SAAS) researched and discussed a variety of thes

issues and their efforts are brought together here as 

collection of master’s degree research theses. The significanc

of this book lies in the synergism of the contributions

Although each of the following articles reflects varying

well-documented, independent perspectives with bot

strengths and weaknesses, in total, the articles give a matur

summary of the best available military thought regardin

space power. A summary of each thesis follows. The first thre

xiii
papers examine space organization, doctrine, and archi

tecture. The remaining are loosely grouped as predominantl

sanctuary/survivability, space control, or high-groun

perspectives.

Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture

“An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation” analyze

the need for a national aerospace strategy that encompasse

the linkage of the aerospace industry and military aerospace

Stephen E. Wright’s assessment of the US aerospace industr

reveals that it provides the kind of high-technology an

high-wage jobs necessary to improve the nation’s standard o

living. Likewise, a vibrant military aerospace is essential t

national security. The writer evaluates current militar

strategies against a set of political imperatives and th

reliance each strategy has upon aerospace power. The result

of this process show that each military service relies o

aerospace power for the success of its strategy. By couplin

these facts with the serious problems that exist in th

aerospace industry and in military aerospace, the autho

shows the need for the United States to develop a nationa

aerospace strategy. The final section of the study propose

this goals and objectives of such a strategy and recommend

the formation of a national aerospace council to develop an

implement a national aerospace strategy.

The strengths of Wright’s work lie in his presentation. Th

critical issue is not how to get to space or what to do when w

get there. The issue is, and has always been, support of 

flourishing economy and a national security policy tha

protects it. The commercial and/or military use of space i

pertinent only as it supports national interests. Wrigh

recognizes this and establishes that the health of the U

aerospace community is in the US national interest. Th

breadth at which the author examines the issue is evidenced

by his nonparochial approach examining the criticality o

aerospace from Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Forc

perspectives. Broaching the topic from this vantage show

several limitations. Although he examines future conflic

broadly, he addresses current and emerging politica

xiv
imperatives as they direct current and near-term employmen

of aerospace forces. This limitation is somewhat excusable, a

it would require an extensive futures study to establish futur

political imperatives, and even then, those future politica

imperatives would be, at best, educated guesses. As for th

emerging political imperatives, each of the services’ strategie

conveniently supports the imperatives. While the services hav

produced effective, satisfying strategies for nurturing an

employing aerospace power, it is hard to believe that they hav

produced efficient, optimum strategies. The fact that th

services claim that a joint, national strategy for aerospace is 

necessity suggests that there must be some redundanc

between the separate services’ strategies. Further researc

into how such a joint, national strategy would impact eac

service is necessary, but was beyond the scope of Wright’s

work. Finally, lumping of air and space together makes i

difficult to cull which of Wright’s main points apply to spac

power. The argument can be made that even if th

environments and systems are radically different, air an

space capabilities both emerge from the same technica

community—the aerospace community. Thus the claim tha

the United States needs a coherent, national aerospac

strategy has merit.

Such a national strategy would, no doubt, have a significan

impact on doctrine. The lack of a national aerospace strateg

may in part be responsible for the many doctrinal short

comings cited in this book.

Frank Gallegos’ purpose in writing, “After the Gulf War

Balancing Space Power’s Development” is to expose suc

doctrinal shortcomings which caused significant problems in

the employment of space power during the Persian Gulf War

Comments like “the Gulf War was the first space war” wrea

of revisionist history and seem to indicate that the United

States entered the war with a well-thought-out strategy fo

employing space power. Nothing could be further from th

truth. Space technology was certainly exploited, but it

effectiveness against a lack-luster adversary tends t

overshadow the inefficiency in its employment during Deser

Shield/Desert Storm. Ironically, the success of spac

xv
technology in that war may be the biggest obstacle in

correcting significant doctrinal shortcomings.

Gallegos presents many perspectives on the role spac

played in the Gulf War. Each results in different points of view

on space shortfalls, which once brought together, produces 

rich pool of recommendations. While United States Spac

Command (USSPACECOM) recognized the lack of capabilit

(normalized operations and theater missile defense), the wa

fighter, that is United States Central Comman

(USCENTCOM), accented a lack of doctrine, training, an

support. The Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS) emphasized 

different set of issues exemplified by a fundamental flaw in

space architecture: a cold war mentality which focuses on

supporting strategic levels of war and overlooking operationa

and tactical support. The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

Final Report to Congress, unlike other sources, emphasized

technology’s shortcomings, particularly space launch an

communication satellite vulnerabilities. Gallegos’ summation

of these shortcomings provides a comprehensive summary o

the many limitations space presented to the war fighter in th

Persian Gulf War.

The strength of Gallegos’ work lies in his clear summation o

lessons from the war, many of which boil down to poo

doctrinal development, a problem which he claims continue

today. One weakness of his analysis is the assumption tha

lack of doctrine is a problem. A valid counterposition is tha

the lack of doctrine aimed at weaponizing battlefield space is 

well-thought-out, military sanctuary strategy. Gallego

recognizes that the newly formed Fourteenth Air Force, Spac

Warfare Center, and Space Support Team have all attempted

to fill the experience and doctrinal gap, but for a variety o

reasons, have fallen short. Recognizing a problem is 

beginning toward a solution, but the lack of a clear method fo

correcting the doctrinal shortfall is a weakness of the work

Stating that we need more doctrinal development falls short o

stating who is to do it, on what sort of continuing cycle it is t

be done, and in what forum it is to be developed—Air Force

joint, and/or combined. Furthermore, the contention that

xvi
the inclination to be on the leading edge of technology

often comes with a mutually strong penchant to disregard

the teachings of the past

offers a false dilemma of either technological development o

doctrinal development. The fact that space technologica

development leads its complementing doctrinal developmen

does not mean that the former comes at the expense of th

latter. Beyond these obvious limitations, Gallegos provides 

useful summary of the major space lessons of the Gulf War

His articulation of the cold war space paradigm as a highl

classified, strategic approach to space, which emphasize

technological research and development over doctrina

development and operational integration is accurate, an

offers the next generation of space strategists an objectiv

perspective. As emphasized in the GWAPS , space architectura

development is one possibility such doctrinal developmen

may support, a subject examined by the next author.

In “Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Securit

Space Architectures,” Christian C. Daehnick makes a credibl

argument that US posture toward developing a spac

architecture in support of national security is strongly biased

by an historical inertia of organizational development, a

opposed to a rational decision to produce the most efficien

and effective architectures. 8 He defines the current approac

to space architecture as a command-oriented approach an

offers an alternative: demand-oriented space architecture

Command and demand architectures vary on three counts.

Physically, the current command-oriented architectur

focuses on heavy lift for specialized cargos and requires bi

investments for a few large systems with extensive ground

based infrastructures. A demand-oriented architecture would

involve lighter lift requirements not tailored to any specifi

cargo and would require dispersed investments in man

systems with smaller ground-based infrastructures.

Temporally, the development cycle that supports th

command-oriented architecture is restricted to incrementa

improvements in design, manufacture, and deployment, a

the sunk costs in current systems compel future investment

to support them. Once deployed, the paradigm is long-loiter

xvii
on-orbit capability with long-lasting mission-specifi

capability. The demand-oriented approach allows for radica

change, as huge sunk costs in particular systems do not exis

Additionally, the paradigm can shift, allowing ground-to-spac

missions to meet situational requirements on demand, a

opposed to maintaining predetermined capabilities on orbit.

The third difference between command-oriented an

demand-oriented architectures is probably the most profound

Philosophically, the command-oriented approach grew out of 

high-performance, 100-percent reliability aircraft manufac

turing community. It was politically motivated by a controlled

response to the USSR during the cold war. The demand

oriented architecture is a rational approach without zero-faul

tolerance or cold war biases. It emphasizes responsiveness

flexibility, ease of operations, and cost attributes over high

performance and reliability (most spacecraft, unlike mos

aircraft, are unmanned). While the command-orientatio

prescribes centralized command, control, and execution

directed by specific group interests, demand-orientatio

allows for flexibility in command, control, and execution

Military use may require centralized command and contro

and decentralized execution analogous to the traditiona

method of allocating scarce air assets. Depending on th

military situation, a demand-oriented architecture would allow

for a more distributed network of space assets which would

reduce each asset’s vulnerability. Corporations, on the othe

hand, may see the low-cost communication space asset as 

capability that is readily decentralized in command, control

and execution.

The strength of Daehnick’s research rests in his pre

sentation of a different approach, one that has not bee

previously considered and seems superior to the old way o

doing business. By framing US current posture as 

command-oriented paradigm, and offering an alternative

Daehnick sheds new light on long-held beliefs. For instance

duration is often seen as a characteristic advantage of spac

power. But on-orbit capability equates to spending limited

monies on specific capabilities before the situation tha

generates the demand exists. By comparison, th

demand-oriented alternative of an earth-to-space, tailored

xviii
response diminishes the worth of durable, on-orbit capability

Daehnick discusses many strengths and weaknesses of space

and further recognizes that many of those weaknesse

(life-cycle costs, inflexibility, timelines) are not a resul

inherent to the environment, but more a result of a prechose

architecture.

The weakness of Daehnick’s work is that he presents th

current command-oriented architecture in a negative light. H

describes that architecture as a flawed approach to highligh

the strengths of the demand-oriented approach rather than a

a credible alternative. Ironically, had a strong case fo

command-oriented space architecture been made, th

argument against it would have been more credible. To be fair

the author does not simply advocate a demand-only oriented

space architecture. In his conclusion, he recognizes that 

hybrid command/demand-oriented space architecture i

possible and may be the optimum solution. The value of thi

work does not reside in the debate over command or deman

orientation but lies in the recognition that alternative spac

architectures exist, which in turn frees future space planner

from the command-orientation paradigm. This broa

examination of space strategy, doctrine, and architectur

provides an objective backdrop for the remaining papers.

Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives

The SAAS is a professional military education facility. No

surprisingly, students interested in space-related research ar

apt to be space enthusiasts. Upon initially consolidating thi

volume, an overall weakness became apparent: No con

tributing author had made the case against pursuing spac

for military purposes beyond intelligence, surveillance, an

reconnaissance (ISR). Although each research paper i

balanced in its analysis, the balance is between command o

demand architecture, or between one concept of operations fo

reusable launch vehicles or another. None of the paper

questioned whether the US’s pursuit of weaponizing space a

this time in a sound military strategy. I challenged David W

Ziegler, a space enthusiast, to do just that.

xix
In 

Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuar

Thought,” Ziegler outlines the historical development of U

space policy, and the lessons of that review reflect a tradition

of American restraint. From that context, he makes the poin

that US interests in space are currently limited to sur

veillance, reconnaissance, intelligence (SRI), and signa

relaying. Ziegler lays out the logic that currently and for th

foreseeable future, we don’t live in space, there are no natura

resources which can be cost effectively developed in space, no

is space a travel medium. Furthermore, the cost of accessin

space is currently enormous—and that alone may be good

reason for waiting until commercial exploitation of th

medium drastically reduces the cost of getting there. Th

enormous-cost-now/cheaper-cost-later argument is furthe

strengthened as the author takes a serious look at require

ments and opportunity costs. Aside from competing socia

programs outside the DOD, the opportunity cost to othe

military programs, which could satisfy the same need or othe

significant need is staggering.

Ziegler then presents a line of reasoning that even th

staunchest space enthusiast would agree to be novel. There i

a lot of interest in emerging technologies that facilitate acces

to space. But what if equivalent investment was aimed a

different, surface- or air-based solutions to meet the sam

requirements? In spite of unequal funding, advances in

surface-based, fiber-linked telecommunications threaten

high-cost/highly vulnerable space-based counterparts

Long-loiter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are also beginnin

to fill ISR requirements in a more cost-effective, flexible, an

responsive manner than equivalent space-based assets.

Beyond the lack of interest, huge opportunity costs, an

substitute technologies, Ziegler has tapped the best availabl

intelligence sources which estimate that the United State

faces virtually no peer threat in space for at least 10 to 1

years. The author defines peer threat as a competitor tha

seeks to dominate space to the same level as the United

States. Hence the author recognizes little utility in furtherin

the militarization. The author did find challenging threats

threats weaker than peer threats that seek to deny or destro

US capabilities but lack an ability to field similar capabilitie

xx
Surface-based, directed-energy ASATs stand out as a potentia

weapon that a challenging threat could employ even if it lack

the technology to field space-based ASATs. This discussion

serves to articulate the survivability viewpoint, and the autho

expounds upon significant limitations of space-based systems

Additionally, any attempt at this time to weaponize spac

threatens a renewed arms race in a realm that offer

significant advantages over the air realm. There is no logic in

escalating the armaments game.

Based on this analysis of historical precedents, US interest

in space, the cost of access, the potential of substitut

technologies, the lack of a peer threat, and the presence o

challenging threats, Ziegler concludes by defining space as 

credible military sanctuary, as a place where forces can b

posited and trained, but an attack on that sanctuary change

the political nature of the conflict. Such a definition dominate

US current posture in space. It distinguishes between the U

current militarization of space and suggested weaponization o

space. The author presents a credible argument that 

sanctuary strategy in space has significant merits. The work

also highlights the danger of blindly proceeding beyond th

militarization threshold and plunging the United States int

an era of space weaponization.

Ziegler effectively articulates the argument that favors a militar

sanctuary strategy regarding US use of space. The argumen

balances the remainder of the papers which, by-in-large, assume

a natural escalation to space weaponization.

Space Control Perspectives

James Lee, in “Counterspace Operations for Information

Dominance,” examines space strategy from the traditiona

perspective that space control is a military requirement, bu

he adds a nontraditional twist by emphasizing that contro

does not necessarily require the use of antisatellite weapons

The work shows space control in a new light that defines it in

terms of information rather than the physical environmen

Tracking the development of US space power, Lee highlight

the fact that the US notion of space control grew out of th

cold war paradigm, a path which led the United States t

xxi
anticipate a peer competitor in space. Hence, space contro

developed as a notion of physically controlling the spac

medium. Making that notion stronger was its compatibilit

with previous experience. The development of sea power an

airpower demonstrated that once access to those domain

became common, it was necessary to physically dominat

them during conflict.

A strength of Lee’s work resides in his excellent summary o

unclassified US and foreign satellite reconnaissanc

capability. He supports the argument that access to spac

surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are essential t

the employment of US military power and that thos

capabilities are spreading around the globe. Given thes

developments, Lee recognizes that the United States requires 

space control strategy which can be tailored to particula

threats and situations, and has the practical aim o

controlling information traffic from space. He offers 

three-dimensional model that considers the capability of th

threat (extensive space access, limited space access, o

purchased space information); the situation (peace, crisis, o

war); and the space system to be manipulated or targeted

(ground, up/down link, or orbital elements). While the pape

makes sense in terms of giving the commander flexible option

in the control of space information, the model seems to b

over-simplified, particularly in its categorization of suc

human events as peace, crisis, or war. This is perhaps not s

much a weakness of the work, as it is an opportunity fo

further research and thought. Clearly, the issue of spac

control in the information age is complex—a function o

threat, capability, circumstance, domestic and internationa

relations, and international law. With the advent o

proliferating access, the space medium may be beyond th

ability of any one nation to control, and perhaps Lee’s notion

of space control as a matter of controlling information is mor

practical. In any event, the United States will have to develop

its space doctrine under the assumption that the adversar

will have some space information access, or in the words o

the next author, we will have to proceed under the assump

tion that “the enemy has our eyes.”

xxii
When the Enemy Has Our Eyes by Cynthia A. S. McKinle

is primarily intended for space operations personnel who ar

tasked with the challenge of becoming space strategists. It i

also of value to individuals who seek unclassified information

about reconnaissance satellites, an understanding of change

within the military space community, or an analysis of th

space control mission. In reviewing the historical foundation

of America’s space-based strategic intelligence assets

McKinley identifies the visionaries who gave the United State

its strategic eyes and the revolutionary technology tha

unnerved the US’s closest competitor. Further, she discusse

the use of strategic intelligence in theater warfare. The autho

offers a unique perspective for looking at the context in whic

national and international actors may prosecute warfare

which leads to illumination of the space control challeng

facing the United States. To take positive steps towar

meeting that challenge, McKinley offers an analytica

approach for space control and applies the results to 

commercial reconnaissance system. The author conclude

that the space control mission is more challenging in today’s

multipolar world than it was during the cold war.

The strengths of McKinley’s work include a practica

analysis of space control and the military role in space for th

next five to 10 years. The author compares a survey of th

historical inertia which drives current space policy

capabilities, and force structure to the future context o

warfare including a realistic estimate of future spaced-based

capabilities. The merger leads the author to examine th

significant role of imagery in future warfare and to recommen

a space control strategy (access and denial). The mos

significant limitation of the study rests on the assumption

that the enemy will have the same information as the United

States. This is clearly pessimisstic.

Further, limitations of McKinley’s effort are primarily 

matter of scope. The thrust is limited to strategic intelligenc

and the role of space-based imagery with a primary focus on

force enhancement. Additionally, the author’s theory o

warfare is well thought out, but may unnecessarily constrain

the vision of the future role of space in military affairs. Finally

the potential of extensive space-based weapons with th

xxiii
primary function of force application is briefly mentioned, bu

not seriously considered.

High-Ground Perspectives

In “National Security Implications of Inexpensive Spac

Access,” William W. Bruner III recognizes that the governmen

of the United States is about to embark on an ambitiou

enterprise. As per Presidential Decision Directive/Nationa

Science and Technology Council (NSTC)-4, National Spac

Transportation Policy, 5 August 1994, the United States i

planning to make a significant leap forward in repeatable an

economical access to space. While routine access to orbit wil

give the United States a clear advantage in the ability to us

near- earth space to serve national political, economic, an

military interests, those responsible for making national spac

policy and writing military space doctrine are fallaciousl

doing so based upon the old assumption of infrequent an

expensive space access. The author explains that the difficul

and expensive access assumption is primarily a result of a

expectations gap where early promises of space exploration, a

well as recent promises of routine space access via th

shuttle, have left the public somewhat disillusioned. He als

cites (1) the erroneous notion that the United States wil

necessarily lead the way into space; (2) perceived treaty

policy, and legal limitations; (3) the Challenger accident; an

(4) the lack of a coherent national space policy are reason

this country is dragging its feet in the space access effor

Bruner asserts that these impediments will wane due to new

political, economic, and technological realities. His analysis i

balanced, as it addresses the cases for and against standin

down, the status-quo, pursuing expendable launch vehicle

(ELV), and pursuing reusable launch vehicles (RLV). Th

cost-benefit analysis seems to favor the latter. The autho

emphasizes that life-cycle costs make the RLV more attractiv

than the ELV, while at the same time RLVs allow for th

expansion of military capabilities.

The most significant strength of the paper lies in th

author’s ability to recognize military possibilities for an RLV

concept beyond the limitations of expectations and policy

xxiv
which are for the most part, self-imposed. His concept of usin

RLVs for on-orbit refueling shatters the old paradigm of orbita

mechanics dictating inflexibility. The concept allows on-orbi

upgrades, repairs, replacements, access to higher orbits, an

capability for orbital maneuvers—traditionally assumed to b

cost prohibitive.

Several inconsistencies appear. On the one hand, th

author is optimistic regarding technology’s ability to provid

space access and assumes this access readily allows fo

military space-to-earth precision capabilities. On the othe

hand, the author is pessimistic regarding technology’s abilit

to provide remote control to spacecraft, insisting that onboard

human judgment is often a necessity. This is somewhat ironi

in that progress in the technologies of remote control an

virtual environments is to a large extent already proven

whereas the technological pursuit of ready access to space ha

been disappointing. Bruner’s basic contention, that spac

offers an inherent energy advantage, is also optimistic from

the spacelift perspective and, at the same time, ignores th

possibility of other technologies. While his contention is tru

from a potential and kinetic energy standpoint, he does no

address, for instance, the advent of directed energy tech

nologies, which could very well turn the advantage o

altitude/elevation into the disadvantage of exposure. Finally

toward the closing sections, the work takes somewhat of a

Air Force parochial turn, degenerating into a discussion o

which service should take the lead in space, the Navy or th

Air Force. Although the discussion regarding the applicabilit

of Navy and Air Force cultures to space is interesting, it is a

aside from the main theme. Further, the analysis offers a fals

dilemma: Should the Navy take the lead from the environ

mental perspective of living and working in a stationary bu

hostile environment, or should the Air Force take the hea

from the functional perspective of employing military powe

from the third dimension? A separate space force is just one o

many alternatives to the dilemma.

A primary limitation of the work is that while Brune

accurately recognizes what international laws and treaties d

allow, he overlooks what domestic policy won’t allow. Space a

a sanctuary may not be part of international law, but tha

xxv
may be irrelevant, if domestic expectation demands it. Brune

reaches out 20 or 30 years and assumes the militarization o

what he calls “decisive orbits” to be an accepted practice

without considering the broader context of domestic an

international politics or nongovernmental commercia

interests. Although this is a recognizable limitation of th

work, it is also excusable. As part of his professiona

obligation as a military planner/strategist, Bruner is expected

to plan contingencies that might warrant military action. In

this regard, he has provided some of the best military vision o

what space power could be in the future.

In “Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Spac

Vehicle,” Michael A. Rampino also pursues military concepts o

operations (CONOPS) without answering fundamental question

regarding who is the threat and what are the requirements t

negate that threat. As with Bruner’s work, this is a justifiabl

planning approach from the military perspective. Militaries don’

necessarily need to arm for contingencies, but they ought t

plan to arm for contingencies. When that plan recognizes a nee

for long-term investment to arm appropriately, the issue o

preparedness in the absence of a clear and present adversar

has merit. Rampino’s thesis emphasizes that the US militar

must be prepared to take advantage of reusable launch vehicle

should the NASA-led effort to develop an RLV demonstrato

prove successful.

The strengths of the work are many, the most obvious bein

the structured methodology. The author develops two differen

concepts of operations from a detailed investigation of militar

requirements and current paths to produce the capability t

meet those requirements. The first concept attempts to mak

the fullest military use of a roughly half-scale notional RLV t

accomplish not only traditional spacelift missions but also th

additional missions of returning payloads from orbit

transspace operations, reconnaissance, and strike (in an

from space). The second concept is based on the full-scal

vehicles currently being proposed under the RLV program. I

too attempts to make expanded use of RLVs, but militar

application is inhibited by design attributes and a focus on

completely commercial operation. Both of these CONOPS ar

comprehensively described via their mission, the systems the

xxvi
require, the operational environment, the command an

control links, the support they require, and the means b

which they are employed in civil and military situations

Subsequent to the detailed descriptions, a comparativ

analysis of the two concepts proceeds with criteria whic

include capability, cost, operations efficiency and effective

ness, and political considerations.

Major conclusions are drawn from that analysis. RLVs ar

recognized to have military potential, yet the design choice

for any operational RLV must be measured in terms of risk

cost, capability, and operations efficiency and effectiveness

Given this preliminary analysis, the choice of a larger vehicl

is found to be accompanied by more risk. Beyond the RLV

itself, supporting science and technology development is th

crucial issue. Particularly, increased investment in propulsion

technology is warranted. The final conclusion gives the entir

space community a clear focus: The top priority for the RLV

program, even from the DOD perspective, should remain

cheap and responsive access to space.

Based on the conclusions, Rampino puts forth thre

recommendations. The US military should become a mor

active participant in the RLV program, the United State

should not pursue development of operational RLVs before th

technology is ready, and finally, it is not too early for the U

military to think deeply about the implications of operationa

RLVs for war-fighting strategy, force structure planning

training, and doctrine.

As with any other research, this work has limitations o

scope. While the author effectively extrapolates spac

capability to the 2012 time frame, he assumes a comman

and control structure dictated by current Air Force doctrine

This assumption places his 2012 space capabilities in a 199

context. From a broader perspective, the requirements for 

military RLV were garnished from the military environmen

Asking the military to produce military requirements does no

necessarily mean there is a genuine need. Of course, this tie

back to the initial point of the military planner’s role o

developing courses of action in the event of military need.

The final paper, by Gregory Billman, also makes simila

assumptions. “The Inherent Limitations of Spacepower: Fac

xxvii
or Fiction?

Billman squarely addresses the US approach t

space. He finds it odd that many of the self-imposed

limitations to exploiting space stand in light of twentiet

century US airpower experience. The analogy seems strong

The first employment of airpower concerned a primary focu

on observation and reconnaissance; it rapidly evolved into a

offensive form of military power due to advantages o

response, speed, and reach; and finally, doctrinal an

organizational development followed the new capabilities

Billman compares space power with the forms of terrestria

powers by examining each across a set of military forc

characteristics that he generalizes into five distinct categories

strategic agility, commitment and credibility, economi

considerations, military considerations, and politica

considerations. 9 While the latter three initially appear unclea

and unfocused, Billman delineates them as a reasonabl

means of categorization. A weakness of the work is th

lumping together of all terrestrial military powers (air, land

and sea), on the grounds that they all have gravitationa

limitations while space power uses gravity to its advantage

The grouping of terrestrial forces comes across more as 

matter of analytical convenience rather than a technicall

justifiable assertion. It may have been beyond the scope of th

work, but a similar analysis comparing space, air, land, sea

and perhaps even information power would be enlightening.

A strength of the analysis is Billman’s recognition that a

these five categories of characteristics apply to terrestrial an

space forces, they must be measured at different phases o

employment. Each military force characteristic will vary as th

instruments of that force are home based, deployed, or engaged

Billman’s analysis strongly favors the advantages of spac

power under all five military force characteristics. Assumin

space power to be predominantly in a deployed, or even engage

state, he supports the argument that it has strategic agility an

commitment and credibility advantages without the economic

military, and political risks of terrestrial forces. This, couple

with the airpower/space power developmental analogy, leads th

author to conclude that space power should develop as 

separate capability which exploits the medium in all militar

xxviii
roles, including the force application role. He asserts tha

space power must no longer be merely a supporting force.

While the air and space power analogy is useful on certain

specific points, extrapolating the analogy into sweepin

recommendations on the US’s future approach to space is 

fundamental breech of logic. On one count, the similaritie

between airpower and space power development wer

emphasized, without any serious effort to examine distinction

between the two. On a second count, numerous examples o

using gross historical analogies in major policy decisions hav

been documented with a single resounding outcome: Th

decision they lead to is most often wrong. 1 0 The most significan

weakness of the work is not a limitation of historical inference

though, but one of omission. The author establishes that th

only limitations of US space power are self-imposed. He makes 

strong case for the advantages afforded by a future space forc

unencumbered by those limitations. The shortcoming is that h

never articulates why those self-imposed limitations exist. H

loosely attributes their existence to policy, but policy is ofte

made for good reasons. Those good reasons in this case includ

international law, domestic and international opinion

significant technical limitations, opportunity costs, and even

military advantages of a sanctuary approach. While the autho

summarizes with three requirements to overcome th

self-imposed limitations: a change of military perspective, spac

as a separate military area of operations (AOR), an

military/ civilian cooperative efforts, these recommendations ar

hollow in the absence of a detailed examination of why thos

self-imposed limitations exist.

Conclusion

There are perhaps two weaknesses that remain in spite o

the synergy of this consolidated volume. First, although man

of the works begin with a historical survey, the total leaves th

impression of lacking context. 1 1 For example, some author

assume the space community to be distinct from the ai

community, yet to date those technical communities are on

in the same, made up of such aerospace giants a

Lockheed-Martin and McDonnell-Douglas. Exploring th

xxix
contextual development of the space community reveals man

current space trends, such as the preoccupation wit

zero-fault tolerance. Such trends may seem irrelevant for th

space architect planning efficient unmanned operations, but i

is a reality, as it is ingrained in an air community that fo

almost a century has had human cargo.

The second weakness, evident in several of the works, is th

idea that advocating one position or another on space powe

must be done in the context of a zero-sum game. That is, i

must be to the benefit or detriment of another form of militar

power. In some ways, the zero-sum game of economic fundin

forces this issue. This tends to overshadow the fact that new

forms of military power have historically complemented on

another, allowing missions that were unachievable from 

single environment. Sea power did not supplant land power

airpower did not supplant land and sea power, nor will spac

power supplant air, land, and sea power. 1 2 The enlightened

joint approach to the employment of military power recognize

that different environments require different forces, and al

must work in harmony. It seems shortsighted to advocate 

distinct military force for a new environment at the expense o

other forces. It is the situation at hand, and not the physics o

position of a particular environment, that dictates th

dominance of one force over another. In advocating differen

aspects of the US role in space, it is not the intent of thi

editor or this learned group of air and space professionals fo

our material to be taken without an appreciation of the air

land, and sea roles in putting forth the most effective join

force in support of national security. The intent is 

comprehensive examination of space power: the Ziegler an

Billman works being extremes which illustrate the value o

this collection of papers. While each may overlook th

perspectives and assumptions of the other, collectively the

comprehensively address the subject. What Bruner, Rampino

and Billman overlook or assume away is addressed in Ziegler

Mckinley, and Lee’s work. The reverse is also true. Addi

tionally, these sanctuary, survivability, control, and high

ground perspectives are balanced against a background of th

most significant issues: space organization (Wright), doctrin

(Gallegos), and architecture (Daehnick). As the collection o

xxx
strengths addresses most of the weaknesses, this collection

reflects a mature, documented consolidation of militar

thought on space power.

Notes

1. Air Power & Space—Future Perspectives 1996, Queen Elizabet

Conference Centre, Broad Sanctuary Westminster, United Kingdom

Airpower Conference, 12-13 September 1996.

2. Professor and Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, “Characteristics o

Aerospace Power,” panel 1 presentation, Air Power & Space, 12 Septembe

1996.

3. David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwe

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988).

4. A broad definition of military sanctuary is a place where aggressiv

forces can be postured, but attacks in that sanctuary would change th

nature of the conflict. Under this definition, China was a sanctuary fo

communist forces during the Korean War and more recently, Argentina wa

a sanctuary during the Falklands War. Space is considered to be such 

sanctuary today as evidenced by the number of militarized space-born

systems and lack of weapons on these systems. To assume the sanctuar

notion of space is now obsolete at least requires justification. What i

lacking among the space enthusiast arguments is a discussion o

opportunity costs—that is, not the fact that space access is affordable, bu

what other capabilities are not pursued at the expense of space acces

(such as airpower, research and development, or education). Given a stud

of opportunity costs, the space sanctuary concept may be a very vali

military strategy. See Professor Lawrence Freedman, “Sanctuary or Comba

Zone? Military Space in the 21st Century,” Air Power & Space, 1

September 1996. The counter to Freedman’s argument was given by US Ai

Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen Thomas S. Moorman: Violation of the spac

sanctuary will not be one of choice, but of a response to a projected threat.

5. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 

March 1992; AFDD-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine , draft, 1 September 1997

AFDD-4, Space Operations Doctrine, 22 May 1996; JDTTP 3-14, Spac

Operations, April 1992; FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, 2–16 throug

2–18. It is worth noting that although capabilities-based planning ha

merit, threat-based and objective-based planning are other options wort

consideration.

6. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: US Policy 1945–198

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 206–7. As early as 197

miniature homing vehicles were successfully launched from F-15 platform

using first stage boost via a modified Boeing short-range attack missil

(SRAM) and second stage boost via a Vought Altair III.

7. Air Force Association, “Special Report: Facing Up to the Spac

Problem,” 1 November 1994.

8. The seminal work of Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Ne

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1971), clearly distinguishes rationa

xxxi
organizational, and bureaucratic decision making, and further discusse

the benefits and shortcomings of each.

9. Gregory Billman takes a unique perspective on commitment an

credibility. While standard deterrence theories assume commitment to be 

function of an actor putting himself at risk, and credibility a function o

demonstrated capability, Billman hypothesizes that the lack of risk an

ease of use of space-based assets engender commitment and credibility. Th

lack of risk Billman focuses on is risk to the operator, and while that i

reduced for an unmanned space asset, the risk in deterrence theory is ris

of reprisal to the operators or any other form of political, economic, an

military fall-out (pun intended). Much of that risk is retained when using 

strategic weapon, manned or not.

10. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Ph

and the Vietnam Decision of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universit

Press, 1992).

11. Cynthia A. S. McKinley’s article is the notable exception, being we

grounded in historical development.

12. Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, “Ascendant Realms-Characteristics of Air an

Space Power,” in Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theor

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).

xxxii
PART I

Space Organization, Doctrine,

and Architecture
Chapter 1

An Aerospace Strategy for

an Aerospace Nation

Stephen E. Wright

America is an aerospace Nation. Our aerospace technology

and industry is a national treasure and a competitive edge,

militarily and commercially. Assured access to air and

space are as important to the Nation’s economic well-being

and security as access to the sea has always been. . . .

Now, more than ever, we have the opportunity to mature the

abilities of our air and space forces and make them even

more useful tools for meeting our national security

objectives.

Global Reach—Global Power

I agree. The purpose of this paper is to examine why forme

secretary Donald B. Rice is correct in his statement and t

expand his focus of “air and space forces” to include the aero 

space industry.

1 Together, the aerospace industry and its mili

tary counterpart combine to form United States (US) aero 

space power. That capability requires a national aerospac

strategy to exploit its potential in providing for the futur

economic and national security well-being of the Unite

States. What factors then make a national aerospace strateg

important for America’s future?

To state that the world is changing its geopolitical cours

seems an understatement. Several world events occurred in

1991 that indicate global relations underwent changes on 

scale not seen since the post–World War II years. The defeat o

Saddam Hussein in Desert Storm infused Americans wit

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Col Phillip Meilinger, PhD

Reader: Col Kenneth Feldman, PhD

3
confidence in their military forces. Never before had aerospac

power so decisively dominated a conflict. The transformation

of the Soviet Union ushered in a new political environmen

that alters the cold war paradigm of international relations

The changing geopolitical environment alone provides impetu

for reconsidering US national security strategy; however, th

need to review that strategy becomes essential in light of th

economic imperatives facing the United States. Since the lat

1980s, the US economy grew at a meager rate (one to thre

percent a year) while at the same time the national debt mor

than tripled. With yearly budget deficits exceeding $300–40

billion per year, domestic issues became the focal point for th

1992 presidential race that resulted in President Bill Clinton’

election.

The newly elected Clinton administration quickly spot

lighted the aerospace industry. The reductions in defens

spending initiated by the Bush administration coupled with 

poorly performing world economy resulted in a crisis situation

in the aerospace industry. United States’s airlines lost ove

$10 billion from 1990 to 1992 and layoffs in both the airline

and aerospace manufacturing were numbering in the thou 

sands. In office just over a month, President Clinton travele

to Washington state to assure Boeing employees that he wa

concerned about the future of the vital aerospace industry. 2

Today, both military and commercial aerospace struggle to

ward an uncertain future. What that future entails depend

upon decisions made today. The United States must deter

mine if and how it will remain the preeminent aerospace na

tion or falter and assume some lesser position. To begin thi

odyssey, one needs to ask some basic questions.

Is the United States the preeminent aerospace nation

American aircraft manufacturers control more than 80 per

cent of the worldwide, large commercial jet market. Further

with the political and economic downturn in the former Sovie

Union, no nation provides the range of space services that th

United States does. Desert Storm demonstrated America’

military aerospace dominance—there are no competitors in

the world today.

4
But, is the United States an aerospace nation? Navalists ar

gue that the United States is a maritime nation. Their argu men

usually hinges on water and weight. First, water covers 70 per

cent of the globe and second, most of the cargo, by weight, i

transported by ship. However, 100 percent of the globe is cov

ered by air and by value for amount shipped, aerospace loom

far ahead.3 For example, less than one-third of one percent o

goods (by weight) imported or exported to or from the Unite

States do so by air. However, this tiny fraction of a percent in

weight accounts for over 32 percent by value of those goods—

percentage value that doubled from 1970 to 1990. As a manu

facturing industry, maritime concerns generate only one-eight

the product value of the aerospace industry. Perhaps we would

be better served to say the United States is an aerospace nation

with significant maritime interests.

If indeed the United States is an aerospace nation, how d

its component parts, economic and military aerospace, relat

to the future well-being of the United States; what problem

exist that indicate the United States needs an aerospace strat

egy; and what ideas form the basis for such a strategy? Thes

questions presage the rest of this paper.

The next section describes the importance of the aerospac

industry to the US economy. This study then looks at th

reasons that war remains a concern for national security con

siderations and discusses the political imperatives that wil

govern the application of military force in the future. The nex

section reviews the espoused strategies of the military service

and examines them in light of the political imperatives an

their reliance upon aerospace power for successful execution

The following section considers the problems facing the eco

nomic and military elements of aerospace power and offer

ideas as to the nature of a national aerospace strategy.

The Economics of Aerospace

From the earliest theorists of airpower to current day aero

space strategists, many including economists and politician

have recognized the important relationship between the aero

space industry, the economy, and the government’s aerospac

5
forces. Giulio Douhet linked all three aspects in his semina

work, The Command of the Air.

4

 In addition to forecasting 

future for military aviation, he devoted considerable effort t

explaining “aerial navigation” as a new form of transporta

tion.5 Gen William “Billy” Mitchell clearly understood the po

tential of airpower when he stated, “Those interested in th

future of the country, not only from a national defense stand

point but from a civil, commercial and economic one as well

should study this matter carefully, because air power has no

only come to stay but is, and will be, a dominating factor in

the world’s development.”6

Another early airpower strategist, Alexander de Seversky

foresaw the necessity to couple the development of commercia

and military aerospace. He stated that “their developmen

must be scientifically meshed into the military-aeronautica

structure” of the United States. 7 Then Secretary of the Ai

Force Rice noted the “great potential [for aerospace forces] t

draw on advanced technologies” and the increasing impor

tance of technology to national defense.8 President Clinton an

Ross Perot both acknowledge the importance of the aerospac

industry to the well-being and competitiveness of the overal

US economy. Finally, noted economists Robert Reich, Laur

D’Andrea Tyson, and Lester Thurow point to aerospace as on

of the key industries for the future. 9

The linkage between commercial and military aerospace, th

two components of aerospace power, differs fundamentally

than those for land and sea power. No one connects tanks an

the automobile industry by intimating that if the Unite

States stopped building tanks it could no longer build auto

mobiles. Likewise, this linkage is missing from the relation

ship between naval forces and the merchant marine. Th

United States has the premier navy in the world; yet, the US

merchant marine ranks far from the top, and other than nava

construction, commercial shipbuilding received only one orde

for a vessel larger than 1,000 gross tons in fiscal year 1991.1 

In contrast, Japan is the world’s leading shipbuilder and ha

the largest merchant marine but a very limited navy.

Aerospace enjoys a unique position in the relationship

between its industry and military components, the US gov

6
ern ment, and the economy. The relationship is synergistic

in its effect within each of these elements. Three question

help us understand this unique relationship. First, what im 

pact does the aerospace industry have on the US economy

Second, what links the aerospace industry and governmen

aerospace components? Third, what explains the ties between

these elements?

The Aerospace Industry and the US Economy

After World War II the aerospace industry experienced 

growth streak that propelled it to the number one rankin

export industry in the United States in 1991—exceeding even

agriculture.1 1 Over this time frame, the aerospace industr

grew into an industrial sector of great importance to the over

all US economy.

One key indicator of the industry’s growth is sales. In 194

the industry had sales of almost $1.5 billion; by 1991 thi

figure exceeded $134 billion.1 2 Table 1 details this growth in

sales and shows the almost 100-fold increase. Over the last 3

Table 1

Aerospace Industry Sales

(millions of current dollars)

Year Total Sales DODa

NASA &

Other

Government

Agenciesb

Other

Customersc

Related

Products

1948 1,493 1,182 117 134

1955 12,411 10,508 786 1,117

1965 20,867 11,396 4,490 2,816 2,165

1975 28,373 13,127 2,727 7,727 4,792

1985 96,571 53,178 6,262 21,036 16,095

1990 134,375 60,502 11,097 40,379 22,396

a

Includes foreign military sales

bNASA formed in 1958

cPrimarily nonmilitary aircraft sales

Source: Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) of America, Inc., Facts and Figures.

7
years, aerospace accounted for 2.5 to 3.5 percent of the US

gross national product (GNP) and averaged nearly 4 percent o

all manufacturing industries. 1 3

Jobs are another measure of aerospace’s impact on th

economy. In 1990 aerospace provided 1.295 million jobs

about the same number of jobs as the automobile industry

Moreover, aerospace furnishes the kind of high-technology

high-skill, high-value jobs that economist Reich argues ar

critical to an improving standard of living. 14 During th

post–World War II period, production workers in aerospac

enjoyed on average a 10 percent advantage in hourly wage

over the average worker in durable goods manufacture. 1 5

Employment of scientists and engineers yields another indi

cation of aerospace’s economic power. Since the 1950s, one o

every four scientists and engineers worked in aerospace. Th

fact that aerospace scientists and engineers received from 7.

to 9.0 percent more pay than their contemporaries in othe

fields serves as another indicator of the importance of thes

workers to the national economy. 1 6

Another key sign of aerospace’s influence on the econom

results from its position as the nation’s top net exporter an

its number six position in industry in terms of value of ship 

ments in 1991. 1 7 The nearly $30 billion (net balance) in ex

ports in 1991 surpassed even agriculture and accounted fo

nearly $1 in every $10 of US exports.1 8 Table 2 contrast

Table 2

Trade Balance of Selected Commodities

(billions of dollars)

Commodity Exports Imports Balance

Aerospace 39,083 11,801 27,282

Agriculture 40,003 22,099 17,904

Chemicals 36,485 20,752 15,733

Motor Vehicles 25,480 79,003 (53,523)

Source: AIA, Facts and Figures 91–92 and The Statistical Abstract of the United States.

8
aerospace exports and imports with three other major produc

groups. Aerospace leads the nation in export balance.

A final indicator of the importance of the aerospace industr

comes from its preeminent position in the world market fo

large jet aircraft. Figure 1 graphically portrays this trend.1 

Even today, the United States maintains a market share in

excess of 80 percent of the world market despite Lockheed’

withdrawal from the large jet manufacturer competition.

These indicators show the aerospace industry to be a cru 

cial part of the overall health of the US economy. The presi

dent, economists, and of course the military all see aerospac

as one of the key useful technologies for the future well-bein

of America. In the final decade of the twentieth century, aero

space can look forward to a projected total world air traffi

growth of 5.4 percent. 2 0 Clearly, aerospace represents a crucia

industrial field that is important to the future competitivenes

of America’s economy.

Source: James W. Chung, “Whither the U.S. Aerospace Industry?” Breakthroughs, Winter 1992–93.

Figure 1. World Market Share of Large Jet Airplane Deliveries

9
Linking the Aerospace Industry

and Government Aerospace

A synergistic relationship exists between the aerospace indus

try and government aerospace . Tyson describes this effect stat

ing, “The synergies between the military’s emphasis on perform

ance and flexibility and the commercial sector’s emphasis on

cost and reliability have been central to aircraft technology an

innovation.”2 1 She goes on to note that “a competitive commer

cial aircraft industry thus contributes to a nation’s militar

prowess.”2 2 The relationship Tyson describes is obviousl

driven by technology, and many examples abound to illustrat

this connection.

A key area linking the two entities is engine technology

Engineers first designed jet engines for military aircraft in

World War II, and their efforts continued in the postwar era

Boeing used its J-57 engine in its proposal for the B-52 an

later coupled this same engine to the United States’s firs

successful commercial jet aircraft, the Boeing 707. 2 3 The com 

petition to develop jumbo jet technology to haul oversized mili

tary cargo resulted in the engine designs to power aircraft a

large as the Lockheed C-5. Boeing put this technology to us

on its Boeing 747. The 747 went on to become the greates

post–World War II success story in commercial aviation his

tory.

Several other innovations mark this association between in 

dustry and government. Designers still use the swept-win

design of the B-47; the Boeing 707 being the first commercia

jet aircraft to incorporate this innovation. Airbus incorporated

fly-by-wire technology, originally pioneered in the F-16 fighte

aircraft, into its A320 aircraft—the first commercial jet s

equipped. Supersonic flight not only resulted in aircraft design

introductions but also drove improvements in metallurgy an

fuels. The composite materials found in the military’s newes

stealth aircraft have increasingly found their way into commer

cial aircraft. Composite structures not only add strength, bu

reduce weight resulting in more fuel-efficient aircraft.

The technology spin works in the other direction as well

The commercial sector improves and innovates many new sys

tems that find their way into military use. The airline industr

10
improved onboard radar capabilities originally developed b

the military and produced specialized weather radar equip 

ment. Many military aircraft, especially transport aircraft, in 

corporate this technology. The commercial industry enhance

the capabilities of cathode ray tube technology creating “glas

cockpits” that enhance the presentation and type of informa

tion presented to pilots. Newer military aircraft, like the F/A

18 and F-117, incorporated this technology into their cock 

pits, increasing the performance of their flight crews. Although

the highest risk technology still flows from government-to-in 

dustry, significant transfer occurs in both directions. Clearly 

dedicated link exists between these two aspects of aerospac

power. Thus far we have seen how important the aerospac

industry is to the US economy and the linkage that exist

between it and the government. The next section seeks t

explain why this relationship exists.

Explaining the Linkage

The focal point in an explanation of the linkage between

government and industrial aerospace is risk. In the Unite

States the government reduced the risk accrued to aircraf

manufacturers by underwriting their production costs via in 

direct and direct means. The primary indirect methods wer

research and development (R&D) funding and military aircraf

purchases. Direct risk reduction resulted in the federal fund

ing of the US space program; however, space accrued much

higher political risks as a result of that arrangement.

After World War II the federal government continued to un

derwrite a large portion of aviation research and development

In the 1950s and 1960s, aerospace R&D exceeded 30 percen

of all federally funded R&D dollars and approached almost 4

percent in the 1960s.2 4 From the mid-1970s until the start o

the Reagan military buildup, 50 percent of all federal R&D

dollars went to aerospace and from 1984 to 1989 this percent

age increased to over 60 percent.25 Table 3 provides the detail

of the R&D dollars. The preponderance of aerospace R&D

funding comes from the National Aeronautics and Space Ad 

ministration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)

From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, NASA and DOD fur

11
nished approximately 97 percent of federal aerospace R&D

funds.2 6 Tyson refers to this national R&D effort as the “visible

hand of government.”2 7

Table 3 shows that three of every four aerospace research

dollars comes from federal sources. If one breaks out aero

space funds from the rest of industry, one finds a federal-to

industry funding ratio of one-to-three, a virtual reversal from

that of the aerospace industry. 28 Not only is the cost of R&D

high in the aerospace industry; failure can be disastrous t

the individual company. Of the $4–6 billion to produce a new

aircraft product line, development expenses represent two

thirds of fixed costs. 2 9 These represent high entry barriers fo

any business, let alone one as volatile and risky as commer

cial aircraft manufacture. Tyson quotes the Office of Technol

ogy Assessment as estimating that, in 1991 dollars, it cost $

million in 1936 to develop the McDonnell Douglas DC-3. To 

day, Boeing expects to pay over $10 billion to develop it

Boeing 777. 3 0

These facts serve to highlight the high cost of R&D in th

aerospace industry and the risk that must accompany an

Table 3

US Government Research and Development Expenditures

(millions of current dollars)

All Industries Aerospace Industry

Year Total Total Federal Funds Company

Funds

1950 1,143 * 1,080 *

1960 10,509 3,558 3,180 378

1970 18,062 5,245 4,032 1,213

1980 44,505 9,198 6,628 2,570

 1990** 104,344 25,357 19,217 6,140

*Breakout of data not avilable

**Last year data available

Source: Facts and Figures.

12
investment of that magnitude. In effect, the risk of failur

represents an all-or-nothing gamble that forces the builder t

“bet the company” with each major aircraft venture.3 1 Boein

sank every resource it had to launch the 747 program, nearly

bankrupting the company. Lockheed’s failure with the L101

aircraft forced it out of the commercial aircraft manufacturin

business altogether. The list is long for those companies that

like Republic, Wright, and Curtiss, great names in aviation

are no longer corporate entities.

The government takes direct action to support the aircraf

industry by its purchase of military planes. Several companie

like Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Northrop make thei

living primarily through government contracts. Many othe

firms rely upon the government for varying but significan

portions of their revenues. At times government support ha

taken the form of loan guarantees like the $250-million loan

guarantee to Lockheed in the 1970s.

A special risk results from government involvement in aero

space—political risk. Nowhere is this risk manifested s

clearly as in the US space industry. 3 2 Through NASA, th

government controls the price and schedule of the US spac

launch business. Further, NASA exerts additional oversight a

the certification authority for flight payloads. By funding mos

of the US space program, the government virtually eliminate

risk to space manufacturers. Risk enters in when politica

decisions result in severe handicaps for the industry. For ex

ample, prior to the Challenger accident, the United State

made the decision to forego all other launch vehicles and rely

solely on the space shuttle (this decision was made in an

attempt to make the shuttle program more cost-effective). Af

ter the Challenger accident, the United States failed to launch

another satellite for two years because it had no alternativ

launch capability. The resulting gap in American launch capa

bilities allowed European competitors (primarily France) to en

ter the space business as effective challengers.

The historical data shows that the federal government effec

tively reduced operating risk for the aerospace industry by fund

ing R&D and purchasing military aircraft. In essence, this fund

ing amounted to a subsidy of the industry and served to mitigat

13
the risk involved in the development of high-technology, high

cost aircraft. This government support through R&D dollar

underpinned the industry throughout its development an

fostered the cross flow of technology from the commercial in 

dustry and the government (especially military) sector of aero

space. The government further supported its aerospace indus

try by purchasing large numbers of aircraft and funding th

space program. With drastic cuts in defense procurement

industry risk will increase.

In the next section, the potential for future war and als

some imperatives that will govern the application of militar

force are examined.

War and Political Imperatives

The second element of aerospace power is the military one

Prior to looking at how military aerospace capabilities influ 

ence the military strategies of the services, one must conside

two questions. First, will war or conflict be a factor in th

future conduct of nations? Second, if war and conflict persis

in the future, what political imperatives might control a US

response to a crisis? Understanding these two issues will pre

pare the reader to assess the role of aerospace power in th

military strategies discussed later.

A Future of Armed Conflict

The nature of the international security environment i

changing. In the former Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin’s support

ers appear fewer in number, and he operates in a growin

climate of unrest. Can Yeltsin hold onto the democratic re

forms or will Russia return to communism? If the Russians d

revert to communism, will it be with the same global ambi

tions seen during the cold war? How will the nations of th

world deal with the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What can

these same nations do about growing ethnic unrest in th

southern regions of the former Soviet Union? These questions

and the many more that could be asked serve to highlight th

uncertainty the United States and the rest of the world face in

building toward the future. There are, however, two question

14
that must be addressed before examining the military servic

strategies devised to meet the challenges of the future. First

will there be armed conflict in the future, and if so, why

Second, what political imperatives may drive the US respons

to potential conflicts?

The global unrest discussed above indicates that the occur

rence of armed conflict is one of the few certainties the world

faces in the future. Since the end of the cold war and Deser

Storm, the United States, as part of ongoing United Nation

(UN) efforts, sent over 20,000 troops into Somalia to feed peo

ple and restore law and order. The United States flew militar

aircraft in the Middle East to enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq

American forces conducted operations to impel UN economi

sanctions on Iraq and Serbia. Also, the United States commit

ted forces to implement the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herze

govina. At the same time, the United States finds itself losin

its “War on Drugs” and concerned about the “economic war

of the twenty-first century. 3 3 What then are the potential cen

ters of conflict for the future?

To predict the future, sometimes a look to the past is benefi

cial. People/countries have fought wars for a variety of rea

sons. Historically, nations most commonly have gone to wa

for economic reasons. Agrarian societies sought the acquisi

tion of more and better land. As trade became a more dom

nant feature of society, the issue became trade routes, re

sources, and colonies. Today, some argue that economi

warfare involving the use of armed forces is a thing of th

past. Is it? George Friedman and Meredith Lebard in thei

book, The Coming War with Japan, provide compelling argu 

ments that a war between the United States and Japan is no

just possible but “inevitable.”3 4 Their key tenet states that an

immutable tension exists between Japan, needing to obtain

resources and expand into markets for its products, and th

United States, needing to protect its own economy from th

ravages of trade deficits and declining economic power. Ac 

cording to Friedman and Lebard, the dynamics of each coun

try, as it seeks to optimize its economic position, will prope

the two countries toward conflict. The conflict described b

Friedman and Lebard portends a shooting war of global pro

15
portions. Is this theory too far-fetched? One might ask: Wha

happens if a country attempts to extort US financial market

by manipulating currencies or debt financing? In the summe

of 1992, changes in German currency exchange rates greatly

affected economies around the world (negatively for the mos

part). What would the United States response be if that kin

of manipulation were purposefully directed at its economy t

compel economic crisis? Would not the United States constru

such action as an invasion of sovereignty and a possibl

threat to the “economic” survival of the nation? It appear

plausible that a whole new world of economic coercion is pos

sible in the global electronic marketplace of the future.

Ideological concerns represent a second rationale for con

ducting war. Several variations of this category exist. First

religious differences served as justification for bitter wars, th

Crusades being an excellent example. A second variation, an

offshoot of religion (and often enmeshed in religious differ

ences), is ethnic friction. Cultural differences between peopl

often result in conflict. In the Middle East, the Persian Iran

ans and the Arabs of Iraq fought one of the bitterest wars in

history in the 1980s. In this case, the power of cultural differ

ences exceeded the ties of religion. Iraqi Shiites fought with

Iraqi Sunnis against their Shia brethren in Iran. Certainly th

breakup of Yugoslavia illustrates both the religious and th

cultural tensions that can produce war. A final source of ideo

logical contention between countries results from difference

in governmental processes. The cold war pitted communism

and its totalitarian rule against the West’s democracy. With

the waning of communism, some strategists predict that thi

kind of conflict will subside. They pin their hopes on th

tenuous assumption that democracies do not go to wa

against each other. Unfortunately, there are many “demo

cratic” totalitarian governments in the world. In 1990, th

United States invaded Panama to capture “elected” presiden

Manuel Noriega and bring him to the United States to fac

drug-related charges. Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington

argue convincingly that by the end of this century the world

will face an increase in totalitarian regimes with potential in 

stabilities resulting from expected power transition prob 

16
lems.3 5 Thus, an assortment of ideological reasons may resul

in conflict for the United States.

A final category of rationales for war results from thos

leaders who seek some form of self-aggrandizement. Thes

leaders seek to create their own personal legacy at the ex

pense of their own people and the people of affected countries

Saddam Hussein provides a recent example of this kind o

leader. Although no one knows his reasons for attacking Ku 

wait, a plausible hypothesis states that he sought to set him 

self up as the leader of the Arab world, much as Gamal Nasse

attempted to do some 30 years before. Napoléon fits this mold

especially in the final years of his military career when th

opposing coalition (British, Germans, Russians, and Austri

ans) sued for peace on generous terms, but he held out seek 

ing one last great victory. The world political scene has rarely

lacked some new Napoléon, Adolph Hitler, or Hussein.

While conflict still appears inevitable, not every disagree

ment will escalate to war; however, armed conflict seems mor

certain today now that the overwhelming fear of nuclear Ar 

mageddon has abated with the decline in tensions between

the United States and the former Soviet Union. What politica

imperatives, then, will direct the responses, specifically th

use of armed force, in crisis situations?

Political Imperatives for Future Conflicts

Carl von Clausewitz wrote that war was an extension o

political intercourse; thus, it comes as no surprise that politi

cal imperatives (others may consider them to be restraints

govern the conduct of conflict. Whether conflict resolution in 

volves an economic, diplomatic, or military solution, politica

imperatives will preside over the issue(s) in dispute. Nine dic

tums will govern the application of the military instrument in

crisis situations in the future.3 6 The first imperative result

from the change in East-West relations. The monolithic threa

of communism, reflected in the nuclear arsenals of the Unite

States and Soviet Union, has lessened greatly with th

breakup of the former Soviet Union and subsequent dissolu 

tion of the Warsaw Pact. The bipolarity indicative of the old

17
international security paradigm has been altered to one re

flecting greater multipolarity.

The second imperative is an extension of the first. In th

future, the United States will focus on regional crises. Th

relaxation of tensions between East and West manifested itsel

in an explosion of third world ethnic violence. The southern

border countries of Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and man

African countries are experiencing great unrest and threaten

international security. Burgeoning populations in Asia an

Africa are increasing migratory pressures and increasing so

cial tensions for improvements in the quality of life. The grea

disparity between the concentrations of wealth in the North

ern Hemisphere versus the Southern Hemisphere exacerbat

the cultural tensions that already exist. In the former Sovie

Union, drastic changes must occur, otherwise the stabilizin

effects of the nuclear standoff between the United States an

the Soviet Union will be lost in a wave of regional upheaval

Thus, as the US national security and national military strate

gies state, the focus of future wars will be regionally based.

The third imperative flows from the two previous dictums

The global community will face more threats, although o

lesser worldwide impact, in the future. As described above, th

potential sources of conflict multiplied after the superpower

lifted the lid on East-West tension.

The next area of political direction is based upon the as

sumption that the United States desires to continue in its rol

as the leading power within the international community

With the many threats that exist in the world today and th

interconnected relationships within the business community

the United States appears to have little choice but to remain

engaged in the political process of nation-states.

The fifth imperative involves another assumption. It as

sumes that the desire to remain an economic power will serv

to direct US policy. Americans will see this dictum reflected in

further reductions of the defense budget, increased emphasi

on job creation and training, and so forth. Economic concern

will indeed be a compelling force in political decision making.

The remaining four political imperatives deal exclusively

with how the United States will employ force in the future. Th

18
sixth imperative assumes the United States will strive to wag

short, decisive wars, and to avoid long, costly wars of attrition

such as Vietnam. This dictum directly reflects the overarchin

concern for the economic welfare of the nation.

Another imperative that falls out from the concern for th

economy is the employment pattern of US forces. In the pas

the United States forward deployed much of its active dut

forces. The US Army had hundreds of thousands of troops in

Europe, and the Air Force had hundreds of fighter aircraft an

crews. The Navy has maintained a yeoman’s schedule of flee

deployments in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans a

well as in the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf area

Now, however, the United States will continue to withdraw

troops from overseas locations and reduce its naval commit

ments consistent with decreasing defense budgets and nava

force structure. Clearly, America finds itself in a position tha

requires the use of forces that can project power from th

United States to whatever geographical destination is require

by circumstance. The United States simply will not be able t

afford large, forward-deployed forces in the future.

The eighth political dictum issues from the previous impera

tive. Because fewer troops will be forward deployed, a capabilit

to respond from the United States must be present to allow

America to meet its treaty commitments with its allies. Histori

cally, responses to the smaller, regional type crises envisione

for the future required a rapid response capability. Example

abound illustrating this demand, such as the Berlin airlift in th

late 1940s, the Suez crisis in the 1950s, and on up to Grenada

Panama, and the Desert Shield portion of Gulf War II. Thes

crises, and hundreds of other emergencies and disasters, de

manded the rapid response of US forces to distant places t

achieve the desired political outcomes of US policy.

The final imperative involves casualties and collateral dam

age. In the future, unless the war is one of survival for th

United States, wars must minimize both casualties (Unite

States and adversary) and collateral damage to the enemy’

noncombatant structures. Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson , one o

the key architects of Desert Storm’s air campaign, recalled in

an interview that President George W. Bush stated “in n

19
uncertain terms

 that Coalition forces needed to minimize th

loss of life and damage to any of Iraq’s cultural symbols o

nonwar supporting facilities.3 7 The requirements to minimiz

casualties and collateral damage will increase as a result o

Desert Storm because of the accuracy exhibited by precision

guided munitions (PGM) and the precise bombing demon

strated by high-technology weapon systems like modern air

craft and cruise missiles. In tomorrow’s conflict environment

the exigency for accuracy will be more demanding, requirin

even more capable weapon platforms and munitions.

These imperatives underpin the military responses possible in

future crises. Assuredly, as time goes by, some of these dictum

will change. Certainly the president in office and the makeup o

the Congress at the time of a given crisis will greatly influenc

which of these imperatives receives greater emphasis in a give

situation. For the military services these imperatives serve t

limit the strategies each service can employ and/or contribute t

the kit bag of options for US political leaders.

Of Aerospace and Military Strategies

Each of the military services has sought to develop strate

gies that operate within the political imperatives discussed in

the previous section. This section relates each strategy to th

political imperatives discussed in the previous section an

shows how dependent each strategy is upon aerospace power

Naval Expeditionary Forces . . . From the Sea

On 28 September 1992, Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe

Chief of Naval Operations Adm Frank B. Kelso II, and Comman

dant of the Marine Corps Gen Carl E. Mundy Jr. signed a whit

paper delineating the Navy-Marine Corps strategy of the future

They titled the strategy, . . . From the Sea .

This new construct refocuses the Navy away from a blue

water perspective towards regional, littoral operations. Th

Navy-Marine Corps team seeks, through forward deploymen

and presence, to provide on-call power projection and crisi

response to littoral conflict.

20
In devising this strategy, the naval services assumed the

had control of the seas; therefore, they could now concentrat

on littoral warfare. 3 8 The concept calls for the “team” to seiz

and defend ports and naval bases, and/or to control coasta

air bases to allow entry of US air and army forces as re

quired. 3 9 Upon successful penetration, naval forces then turn

the mission over to heavier Air Force and Army units. Thi

reliance on Air Force and Army firepower coupled with

planned reductions in Naval and Marine Corps capabilitie

indicates that the strategy envisions the team operating at th

lower end of the low-intensity conflict spectrum.4 0 Thus, . . 

From the Sea is a limited focus strategy tightly linking th

Navy and the Marine Corps in the projection of power upon

littoral areas.

The new construct identifies four key operational capabilitie

necessary for success. First, the team recognized that command

control, and surveillance capabilities are essential to joint an

combined operations.4 1 The secretary of the Navy (SecNav) d

rected the Naval War College’s Wargaming Center to evaluat

the new strategy with respect to the Navy’s Program Objectiv

Memorandum (POM), the Navy’s programmatic budget.4 2 Th

Navy discovered that the entire architecture of command, con 

trol, communication, computers, information, and intelligenc

(C4ISR) required increased attention. The war game identifie

key problem areas such as positive identification systems

real–time battlefield damage assessment, and multispectral sur

veillance. Further, the Navy found that it needed improved intel

ligence dissemination capabilities. These shortcomings reflec

the increasing emphasis on the exploitation of space for th

successful employment of naval strategy. 4 3

The team identified battle space dominance as the secon

key operational capability. Naval forces consider this area th

heart of naval warfare. The two components of the battl

space are landward and seaward. Naval forces seek within th

littoral area, to control the sea (on and below the sea), the air

and operations on the land. Space control receives emphasis

too. As the strategy states, “We must use the full range of US

coalition, and space-based assets to achieve dominance in

space as well.”4 4

21
Achieving battle space dominance makes possible the third

key capability, power projection . The naval forces team ex

pects to use its mobility, flexibility (tailorable forces), an

technology to mass its strength against enemy weaknesses

Embedded in this aspect of the construct is the fourth capa

bility, force sustainment. The . . . From the Sea strategy tout

the Navy’s ability to sustain deployed operations and its abilit

to remain on station for long periods.

The new naval forces expeditionary strategy does reflec

most of the political imperatives discussed above. The strateg

shifts its focus from a Soviet, blue-water threat to a regional

littoral one. 4 5 The complete refocus of the team to littoral war

fare indicates implicitly that the naval services recognize th

increase in lesser threats and that the United States will de

sire to maintain a leadership role in those areas. The new

strategy recognizes the economic and threat imperatives re

sulting in downsizing of its force structure as it seeks to mak

its operational capabilities work in a more flexible manner. In

the future, the team will increasingly operate surface action

and amphibious readiness groups independent of carrier bat

tle groups (CVBG). As stated in . . . From the Sea, the Navy

Department “must structure a fundamentally different nava

force to respond to strategic demands and these new force

must be sufficiently flexible and powerful enough to satisfy

enduring national security requirements.”4 6 The new strateg

recognizes the imperative for minimizing casualties as evi

denced by its listing this goal as one of the seven key result

in the SecNav Strategy-POM war game. 4 7

At odds with the political imperatives is the strategy’s reli

ance on forward deployment/presence to enhance respons

time to a crisis. As long as the Navy-Marine Corps can main 

tain forward basing in Japan, the Mediterranean, and th

Indian Ocean (the Marines still have a significant amount o

prepositioned equipment afloat there), the naval team can

achieve power projection measured in days versus weeks. Th

move to lighten Marine forces will ease deployment and sus

tainment problems for the corps but, at the same time, rein 

force a limited role at the lower end of low-intensity conflict

Thus, they will be used in short conflicts or as early on force

22
awaiting the arrival of heavier air and army units. Overall

within its stated focus, the . . . From the Sea strategy confirm

and operates within the stated political imperatives.

The results from the Navy’s Strategy-POM war game illus

trate the areas the Navy-Marine team must focus on to “flesh

out” its new strategy. The study also offers us a tool to show

the dependence of this new strategy on aerospace power

Larry Bockman and Brad Hayes list seven major results from

the game; six directly relate to aerospace power (the seventh

emphasizes the importance of minimizing casualties in an

future conflict). 4 8

The first key result area recognizes the increasing impor

tance of C4ISR systems. Bockman and Hayes list requirement

for command data links, position location gear, and super an

extremely high-frequency communications. In the surveillanc

area, they note the need to exploit multispectral capabilities

All of these areas require extensive use of aerospace power

The global positioning system (GPS), used so successfully in

Desert Storm, can provide immediate help to navigation capa

bilities. Improved capabilities in satellite systems like the De

fense Satellite Communications System and Land Satellit

System (LANDSAT) will enhance capabilities in global com

mand, control, and communications (information handling

and multispectral imaging. Improving the links between op 

erators and national intelligence satellites will facilitate th

flow of intelligence information to the users most in need o

their data.

The need for defensive capabilities against theater ballisti

missiles (TBM) was the second key result area. This aerospac

threat requires the ability to detect, target, and kill not only

the missile but also the launcher. Such aerospace assets a

the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) an

strategic surveillance, satellites will complement the Navy’

effort to develop antiballistic missile defenses on its Aegi

cruisers and provide the Navy with the initial tools to face thi

threat.

Third, the increased integration of PGMs for naval aircraf

will provide the strike capability for attacking TBM launcher

and other high-value, hard targets. Bockman and Hayes not

23
the Navy seeks penetrating weapons in greater numbers than

ever before. 4 9 Obviously, the Navy desires to increase the flexi

bility of its aircraft firepower.

To aid weapons delivery, the Navy-Marine team seeks t

procure multimission, low-observable aircraft. This fourth ke

area coupled with the fifth area, the acquisition of unmanne

aerial vehicles (UAV) illustrates the Navy’s reliance on aero

space power to provide the penetration force of the nava

forces team.

Finally, the Strategy-POM game reinforced the need to resolv

the Marines’ need for medium vertical lift; a problem exacer

bated by the political haggling over the V-22. Once again, aero

space is at the forefront of naval power projection strategy.

Thus, reflected in this major evaluation of its new strategy

US naval forces recognized the absolute necessity of aerospac

power for their ability to prosecute their strategy today and in

the future. As the Germans learned at the Battle of Britain

and the Navy learned at Pearl Harbor, control of the air mus

be achieved before surface operations can be successfully con

ducted against an aerospace-capable adversary. The Navy an

the Marine Corps clearly realize the need for space operation

to enhance communications, navigation, and surveillance. Im 

plicit in . . . From the Sea is the requirement for aerospac

control and dominance. No one can imagine exposing am

phibious or carrier forces to an environment where US o

allied air control is lacking. The linkage of CVBGs to amphibi

ous readiness groups to form the new naval expeditionar

force team reflects the concern for gaining and maintaining ai

control in littoral warfare.

Army Operations

The Army’s new doctrine, Army Operations, seeks to projec

strategically agile forces while providing the bulk of US for

ward presence on five continents.5 0 Gen Gordon R. Sullivan

then Army chief of staff, notes several forces of change in th

international environment: democracy, ethnic strife, ideologi

cal and religious tenets inimical to free markets and democ

racy, economic crises in many countries, proliferation of mili

tary technology, and threats from drug traffickers.5 1 He goe

24
on to note that these forces drive the Army toward a strategi

power projection footing. Further, Sullivan sees two constant

that result in the need for a capable Army. First, endurin

American global interests of democratic and economic proc

esses require access to critical resources and free economi

and political interaction.5 2 Second, there is the argument tha

50 years of American world leadership cannot be abandoned

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, states the Army’s role i

to apply “force to fight and win quickly, with minimum casua

ties,” and, as General Sullivan states, “With the Army, Amer

ica signals that national interests are at stake.”5 3 To meet th

challenges that General Sullivan poses in his world view, th

Army developed a strategy geared to mobility and versatility

Based on a mobility study, the Army has set requirements t

move one light and two heavy divisions from the United State

to a conflict theater 7,500 miles away in 30 days. Further, th

Army plans to transport the remainder of the corps and tw

more divisions to the theater within an additional 45 days. To

accomplish this task, the Army wants to fund a $13-billion

buy of 39 ships including medium roll-on, roll-off ships. To

fight the war envisioned by Army strategists, the service devel

oped a strategy to maximize the maneuverability of Arm

forces as seen during Desert Storm.

The Army’s new strategy focuses on power projection as it

central element.5 4 To accomplish its mission, the Army plan

to function within an eight-phase construct of force-projection

operations. The phases may occur sequentially or run simu

taneously depending on specific circumstances. The eigh

phases are predeployment activity, mobilization, deployment

entry, decisive operations, restoration, redeployment, and de

mobilization. The first three phases entail activities leading u

to the embarkation of troops. These activities include training

requirements formulation, the assembling of troops and mate

riel, and deployment execution.

The entry phase may be opposed or unopposed. The Arm

wants a forced-entry ability capable of success under an

conditions. “Speed is especially important” as the Army want

to seize the initiative. 5 5 The entry phase sets the stage fo

25
decisive operations by creating the environment within it

area of influence to mass forces to destroy the enemy.

In the decisive operations phase, the Army brings speed, ma

neuver, shock action, and violent aggressive tactics to over

whelm the enemy with as little loss of US lives as possible. Th

strategists plan to attack only at critical times and emphasiz

offensive operations, using the defensive only as required. Key t

accomplishing this phase is the use of massed fires to suppor

maneuvering troops and massed combat service support to sus

tain operations. The supported land commander will require no

only close air support (CAS) but interdiction fires short of, an

beyond, the fire support coordination line.

The Army seeks to dominate the enemy through battlefield

preparation and shaping. Preparation actions include estab

lishing the detection area, using available detection sensors t

define the battlefield, determining the location of high-value tar

gets, and protecting the main battle force and logistics suppor

elements. Army commanders seek to shape the battlefield t

gain and maintain the initiative. To accomplish this task, the

rely upon the heavy use of air assets and long-range fires t

disrupt the enemy. By integrating tactical air support, battlefield

air interdiction, and conventional weapons (and nuclear an

chemical ones if required), the Army plans to mount a massiv

fire support effort to throw the enemy force off balance and keep

them there. The planners also note the need to deliver logistic

support to maintain the high tempo of operations.

The final three phases of restoration, redeployment, an

demobilization occur after “the cessation of armed conflict.”5 

In these phases, the Army plans to assist in the restoration o

civil order including civil affairs activities and the clearing o

military hazards (mines, ammunition, etc.). Prior to redeploy

ment, the Army remains prepared to resume hostilities should

the peace fail. Demobilization completes the transfer of Arm

units to a peacetime posture.

To employ this strategy in a war-winning manner, the Arm

adopted five key tenets that help establish conditions for vic

tory. 5 7 Those tenets are initiative, agility, depth, synchroniza 

tion, and versatility. To gain a greater understanding of th

Army’s strategy, we will briefly review each tenet.

26
In its first tenet, initiative, the Army imputes an offensiv

spirit in the conduct of all operations. 5 8 Using offensive strike

the Army seeks to never let the enemy recover from the shoc

of attack. If placed on the defensive, the Army seeks to quickly

turn the tables on the attacker and reestablish offensive op 

erations. For operations other than war (OOTW), Army force

seek to control the environment instead of allowing it to con

trol operations.

The second tenet is agility. 59 Agility, the prerequisite for seizin

and holding the initiative, is achieved by reacting faster than th

enemy. The Army views agility as much a mental as a physica

quality. The strategy plans to use greater quickness to rapidly

concentrate strength versus enemy vulnerabilities.

Depth, the extension of operations in time, space, re

sources, and purpose, serves as the third tenet.6 0 The Arm

envisions a three-dimensional maneuver battlefield extendin

up to 300 kilometers or beyond. This extension represents 

vast projection in the depth of the battlefield from even th

150 kilometer moves in Desert Storm. For OOTW, the Arm

wants to extend area activities as above to affect and shap

the environment to achieve the desired political resolution.

The fourth tenet, synchronization, seeks to achieve “the fo 

cus of resources and activities in time and space to mass a

the decisive point.”6 1 The Army views synchronization as “both

a process and a result.” Synchronization incorporates such

activities as intelligence, logistics, and fires with maneuver t

achieve synchronized operations. In short, the Army wants t

get the “maximum use of every resource where and when i

will make the greatest contribution to success.”

With versatility, the final tenet, the Army wants its units t

have the capability “to meet diverse mission requirements.”6 

Thus, Army forces could inherently adapt to different mission

or tasks, even tasks that may not have been on the unit’

original mission-essential task list. How, then, does the new

“Operations” strategy reflect the new political imperatives, an

how does it rely on aerospace power? General Sullivan pro

vides clear insight into the development of this strategy. Hi

view of global changes and the need to meet future challenge

are reflected in the emphasis on deployability and maneuver

27
In his acknowledgement of the constants requiring a highly

capable Army, General Sullivan recognized the need to hav

forces capable of projecting US power to ensure that demo

cratic and economic imperatives are met. Further, the deploy

ability of the new Army appreciates the need to respond rap

idly to regional crises. The focus of the Army’s new operation

manual, FM 100-5, to apply “decisive force to fight and win

quickly, with minimum casualties” clearly recognizes the im 

peratives for short, minimum casualty wars. Thus, “Opera

tions” clearly supports the new political imperatives facing th

United States in the future.

The key new element in the Army’s new construct clarifie

just how reliant the strategy is upon aerospace power. Crucia

to Army actions in the future is the replacing of close battl

with deeper maneuvers employing joint operations, fighting a

the maximum range of weapons. In short, the Army seeks t

push out the engagement line to avoid casualties. To do this

the Army must employ aerospace power.

In entry- and decisive-operations phases of the new strat

egy, the Army needs the sophisticated “eyes and ears” of aero

space assets to conduct the intelligence preparation of th

battlefield. Currently the Army uses Guardrail aircraft to con

duct electronic and signal surveillance of the battle area. The

also employ Mohawk aircraft to do close-in targeting of enem

forces out to some 50–70 kilometers. (JSTARS will provide th

Army with the capability to do this mission virtually through 

out the theater, as was evidenced in its performance in Deser

Storm.) The Air Force aids this process by providing air an

space systems to conduct intelligence gathering operation

throughout a theater of operations, facilitating Army desires t

function out to 300 kilometers. Conducting deeper operations

the Army will rely more heavily upon satellite communication

systems as its units move beyond line-of-sight communica

tions ranges. The Army discovered in Desert Storm that th

GPS provides exceptionally accurate navigation data. This ca

pability will expedite targeting, resupply, and battlefield man

agement capabilities for ground forces.

As discussed previously, the conduct of decisive operation

required significant amounts of aerospace power for interdic

28
tion and CAS. Of course, Army helicopters are a fundamenta

part of aerospace power on the battlefield. Recall that Army ai

assault brigades sealed off the roads out of Kuwait toward

Iraq during Desert Storm. Improving helicopter technology i

one of the four critical technology areas for the future Army

according to General Sullivan.6 3 Furthermore, aerospac

power provides the rapid airlift capability that allows the Arm

the logistics flexibility to mass for decisive operations. Whil

Army attack helicopters will be involved increasingly with

CAS, Army doctrine still views the principal function of it

aviation brigades as a flexible maneuver force. 6 4

Finally, to support Army deployment to and from the thea

ter, aerospace power—through strategic and tactical airlift (t

include helicopters)—provides the Army the ability to delive

high-value replacement equipment or parts (even repair units

exactly when and where needed. No other mechanism pro

vides this combination of flexibility and response time.

Like the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Army of the futur

has set its sights on a strategy that demands the uniqu

capabilities that aerospace power brings to the combat envi

ronment. Aerospace power inherently embodies each of th

five key tenets for successful Army operations. Aerial powe

always seeks the initiative, uses its own agility and flexibilit

to deliver ordnance or beans throughout the combat theater

and offers the capability to choreograph the deep fires neces

sary to minimize casualties in future conflicts. Thus, through 

out its new strategy, the Army weaves aerospace power into it

operations to provide it with the decisive edge for war winning

Global Reach—Global Power

The Air Force calls its strategy Global Reach—Global Power

As did the other services, the Air Force took notice of the en

of the cold war and refocused its attention to regional issues

The Air Force adopted a strategy designed to provide “th

quickest, longest range, leading edge force available to th

President in a crisis.”6 5 The Air Force envisions itself as be

coming the force of first choice and serving as the primar

instrument of national military power. 6 6

29
The Air Force foresees conflict based upon a regiona

threat. Complicating this focus are two factors. First, th

declining force structure requires the Air Force to operat

with fewer assets. Second, the proliferation of sophisticate

weapons and technologies creates a dangerous threat environ

ment for operations. 6 7 The heart of Global Reach—Globa

Power is encapsulated in the following quote from the 199

white paper:

The demands of our new military strategy play to the inherent

strengths of air and space power. In an age of uncertainty, with the

location and direction of future challenges almost impossible to

predict, space forces allow us to monitor activities around the world

and to know the battlefield even before our forces arrive. With smaller

forces overall and fewer deployed overseas, airpower’s ability to

respond globally—within hours, with precision and effect—is an

invaluable capability that is America’s alone. 6 8

Gen Merrill A. McPeak, then Air Force chief of staff, state

the mission of the Air Force in a speech at Maxwell Air Forc

Base (AFB), Alabama. 6 9 He said that “the job of the forces w

bring to the fight is to defend the United States through con

trol and exploitation of air and space.” Five key objectives an

five key tenets support this mission.7 0 First, the objective

begin with the goal of sustaining deterrence, relying primarily

upon nuclear forces. Next, the Air Force seeks to provide ver

satile combat capability through its ability to conduct an

sustain theater power projection operations. Third, the Ai

Force wants to provide rapid global mobility via its airlift an

air-refueling tanker aircraft. In fact, with the new regiona

focus, the Air Force envisions greater demands for both o

these capabilities, especially for operations other than war.7 

Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Air Force wants t

control the high ground of space and command, control, com

munications, and intelligence (C 3I). It seeks to do this by at

taining and maintaining space dominance. In its last objec

tive, the Air Force desires to enhance US influence abroad b

strengthening security partners through deployments, exer

cises, and education and training programs.

To achieve these objectives, the Air Force relies on what i

considered to be the “inherent” tenets of characteristics o

aerospace power. These five tenets are composed of speed

30
range, flexibility, precision, and lethality. 72 As might be ex

pected, the Air Force considers Desert Storm the validation o

these tenets. The combination of stealth aircraft, crew train 

ing, PGM, air refueling (an “indispensable force multiplier”)

and the introduction of space into combat operations affirm

these characteristics.7 3 For nearly 40 days, the world watche

aerospace power dismantle Iraqi war-making capability with

amazing deftness and finesse. General McPeak stated that th

Air Force has become the “maneuver force par excellence.”7 4

For the Air Force, space represents an area of increasin

importance. The Air Force contributes 80 percent of the De

partment of Defense space budget and provides, as mentione

previously, some 98 percent of space manpower. 75 In Globa

Reach—Global Power the Air Force states that “space force

superiority of speed and position over surface and air force

points to control of space as a prerequisite for victory. Spac

superiority has joined air superiority as a sine qua non o

global reach and power.”7 6 Most important, control and exploi

tation of space provides the capability to achieve a level o

battlefield situational awareness never before possible. Som

of the fog of war has cleared from the battleground. As th

strategy states, in the future the “control of the high groun

will increasingly make space forces part of the versatile com

bat forces—decreasing the time required to respond to aggres

sion and allowing us to strike anywhere with overwhelmin

but discriminate power.”7 7 Within the new Air Force strategy

Global Reach—Global Power, there is evidence of each of th

future political imperatives. Up front in this strategy, the Ai

Force acknowledges the end of the cold war and the need t

downsize its forces while changing to a regional focus. Th

extended quote presented above clearly reflects the impera

tives of a new, regional focus with fewer forces (reflecting th

economic imperatives at work in American politics). Anothe

clear indicator of the Air Force’s response to changing circum

stances is its shift in viewpoint on strategic and tactica

weapon systems. In the post–Desert Storm environment, th

Air Force views its weapons platforms in terms of mission

accomplishment, not by an arbitrary label. Fighters, pre

viously labeled as tactical weapons, may accomplish strategi

31
bombing while B-52s may conduct tactical strikes agains

troop concentrations.7 8 In fact, the Air Force no longer refer

to its units as fighter or bomber wings; it simply calls them

wings (e.g., the 1st Wing, formerly the 1st Tactical Fighte

Wing).

Global Reach—Global Power concentrates on the ability t

project power from the continental United States (or a few for

ward bases) to any point on the globe. Clearly the Air Forc

recognizes the political emphasis on improving US economi

competitiveness by decreasing defense costs. The Air Force’

strategy supports that effort by seeking to provide forces tha

can do the job without the expense of forward basing and de

ployment. In time of crisis, however, the Air Force plans to tak

advantage of its airlift and air refueling capabilities to quickly

project power when and where it is needed.

The Air Force is restructuring itself to provide forces that ca

“punch hard and terminate quickly.”7 9 A prime example of thes

efforts is the formation of composite wings providing ready forc

packages capable of delivering the hard punch. Key elements o

the strategy serve to support US imperatives of short wars wit

minimal casualties. Former Air Force Secretary Rice targete

these aspects in one of his first writings on the new strategy. 8 

He pointed out that the Air Force sought the ability to strik

quickly with lethality and survivability. He credits stealth tech

nology with providing this combined capability. The discriminat

nature of PGMs provides the capacity to limit collateral damage.

Thus, the Air Force’s new strategy clearly supports the new

political imperatives driving national security policy. Natu 

rally, the Air Force relies upon aerospace power to suppor

national security objectives. But, as stealth and PGMs helpe

redefine the capabilities of aerospace power, space will rede

fine those capabilities in the future.

Space, then, will be the high frontier of military aerospac

power, and the Air Force plans to “operationalize” space force

to benefit all war fighters.8 1 Gen Charles A. Horner, one-tim

US Space Command commander, notes the stunning suc

cesses of Desert Storm in areas like navigation, weather, sur

veillance, missile warning, and communications.8 2 He recog

nizes the need to improve upon these capabilities. The Ai

32
Force leads the efforts to develop next-generation missil

warning systems like the Follow-on Early Warning System

(FEWS). The GPS not only provides superb navigational dat

but may help solve the friendly fire problem seen in Deser

Storm. A major program, Talon Sword , seeks to take data from

national reconnaissance assets and transmit that information

directly to aircraft cockpit displays.

Space represents the future of the Air Force and, increas

ingly, aerospace power will be projected through space sys

tems. Although the cost of operating from space is high, th

force leverage gained is immense. Indeed, the Air Force i

committed to providing the United States with the forces t

control and exploit air and space.

Serious problems, however, face the aerospace nation. Th

next section examines the major problems confronting US

aerospace power and offers the beginnings of a national aero

space strategy.

A National Strategy

for the Aerospace Nation

In previous sections, economic and military aspects of aero

space were examined. These two components combine to pro

duce aerospace power. The US aerospace industry is a busi

ness that provides a significant portion of the nation’

high-value, high-technology manufacturing base. Militarily

the tremendous importance of aerospace to the future strate

gies of each of the military services was noted. If, as thi

thesis argues, aerospace power is crucial to the economi

well-being and national security of the United States, then on

would expect the United States to have a national strategy fo

aerospace power. No such strategy exists. Furthermore, cur

rent efforts aim only at either the economic or military compo

nents—no strategy exists to integrate these elements into 

cohesive policy of national aerospace power.

Two questions, then, remain to be answered. First, wha

problems exist indicating the need for such a strategy? Sec

ond, what is entailed in a national aerospace strategy; wha

are its objectives and recommended processes?

33
Trouble in the Aerospace Nation

Earlier the importance of the aerospace industry to the US

economy was discussed. However, serious problems aboun

for both the economic and military components of aerospac

power. The aerospace industry concerns will be examined firs

and then the military ones. To discuss the industry problems

the discussion is limited to the aircraft manufacturing an

airline subsets of the aerospace industry. Most of the prob 

lems facing these two concerns affect other aspects of th

aerospace business. Together they account for over 50 percen

of total aerospace sales US aircraft production supplies 8

percent of the world’s large commercial jet aircraft. Thus

these two segments of the aerospace industry provide a good

way to review the problems plaguing this vital industry.

In industry, the trouble starts with the bottom line. From

1990 to 1992, the world’s airlines lost $10.8 billion; US carri

ers accounted for 73 percent of that total or some $7.85 bil

lion.8 3 Employment statistics further highlight the industry’s

woes. The aerospace business lost 87,000 jobs in 1991; pro

duction workers declined in number by more than 7 percent.8 

Boeing alone cut 10,000 employees in 1992 and plans to slash

another 28,000 from its payroll by 1994. 8 5 Since mid-1990

Douglas Aircraft Company reduced its work force from ap

proximately 43,000 to only 19,000. It expects to cut anothe

four thousand jobs this year. 8 6 Worker reductions affect man

agement, too. United Airlines recently announced it was trim 

ming 20 percent of its senior officers in the face of continuin

losses.8 7 Further, United wants some $300 million in wag

concessions from its employees in an effort to improve it

financial picture (United alone lost almost $1.3 billion in

1991–92). Another factor is the declining market trend in mili

tary and commercial aircraft sales. Between a 1981 high poin

and 1991, the number of military aircraft delivered by indus

try fell by 30 percent.8 8 Commercial aircraft sales turne

downward in 1991. Both Boeing and Douglas scaled bac

production some 40 percent to meet the reduced demand.8 

Already this year aircraft manufacturers suffered $15 billion

in cancelled orders.9 0

34
But these are just the symptoms; what are the roots of th

problems? At the heart of industry’s problems is the issue o

competitiveness. The key to competitiveness in the aerospac

industry is risk management. The American aerospace indus

try historically has used government military contracts an

R&D funding (see table 3) to reduce its production costs

thereby reducing product risk. Table 4 illustrates the dramati

increase in development costs that federal contracts and R&D

funding helped to offset.

These traditional risk management supports are diminish

ing in the face of budget deficit pressures. As discussed ear

lier, military aircraft sales are in decline. Also, the Clinton

administration proposes to realign the ratio of nondefense t

defense R&D funding from the current 40:60 ratio to a 50:5

ratio. 9 1 How critical is federal research and development fund

ing? Recall that federal funding comprises three of every fou

dollars expended on aerospace R&D (all other manufacturin

industries receive only 1.4 in 10 dollars from federal R&D). 9 

How will the US aerospace firms compete with foreign consor

tiums like Airbus, which has the financial backing of thre

Table 4

Changing Aircraft Production Costs

Aircraft Type Year Entered Service Development Costs

(1991, $ millions)

McDonnell Douglas DC-3 1936 3

McDonnell Douglas DC-6 1947 90

McDonnell Douglas DC-8 1959 600

Boeing 747 1970 3,300

Boeing 777 10,000a

a

Estimated

Source: Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Was

ington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992); and “Making Elephants Fly,” The Economist, 

January 1993, 77.

35
powerful governments? What happens to the Far East marke

if Japan targets the aircraft building industry through th

financial backing of its Ministry of International Trade an

Industry? Eiju Toyoda, chief executive officer of Toyota Moto

Corporation, told visiting Boeing executives that Toyota wa

“in the transportation business. It’s our destiny to be in th

airplane business.”93 The challenge to American leadership in

aerospace is very real.

The US government exacerbates the competitiveness issu

with inconsistent policies. For example, the Clinton admin

stration’s proposed energy tax will add approximately $1 bil

lion in tax burden to the airline industry. Further, the cuts in

federal R&D funds to aerospace described above can only

worsen the very industry the president is committed to sup

port. Additionally, the onset of Stage II noise restrictions ma

create a greater demand for quieter aircraft but will increas

airline debt burden as companies are forced to buy new air

craft. Clearly, the industry requires a national strategy to inte

grate these facets of market and government policy.

Civilian and Department of Defense policy makers suffe

from their own strategic dysfunctions. Each service has it

own aerospace force dependencies; however, no DOD-level in 

tegration office exists to coordinate military aerospace power

In fact, as analysts for The Economist point out, the DOD

remains the only Western military establishment with sepa

rate service acquisition systems.9 4

A more dramatic indication of military dysfunction is evi

dent in the DOD response to Sen Sam Nunn’s (D-Ga.) ques

tioning of the efficacy of the military’s having four air force

(meaning the four services). 9 5 The DOD response came in Gen

Colin L. Powell’s report on roles and missions. 9 6 The repor

argues that “the other services have aviation arms essential t

their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly

to project America’s air power.”9 7 The debate argues that as i

makes no sense to assign all radios or trucks to one service

so too it would not make sense to assign all aircraft to on

service. Is this an aerospace rationale? Would we need aero

space forces to operate differently in the services’ strategies i

there were only one air service? Would we not be better serve

36
to describe what we want US forces (land, sea, and aerospace

to do and develop an integrated strategy to achieve some de

sired end state? For example, if the nation wants a highly

mobile amphibious assault capability, it needs marines with

airpower. If the nation wants sea control and power projection

capabilities with minimal reliance on other nation support, i

needs a navy with airpower in the form of carrier air wings. I

the United States wants an army with the capability for sus

tained, heavy combat with low casualties, it will need aero

space power. If the nation wants to exploit air and spac

forces as it did in Desert Storm, it will need many air an

space capabilities. Future service strategies depend on aero

space power. The political imperatives driving those strategie

devolve upon aerospace capabilities. If the Defense Depart

ment is to answer Senator Nunn, it must answer within th

context of a military aerospace strategy.

The ties linking the aerospace with its military counterpar

were forged through two world wars, a cold war, Korea, Viet

nam, and other lesser conflicts. Add to this crucible of th

past the economic challenges of the future and one sees th

desideratum of aerospace power. To achieve a position of pre

dominance in aerospace, the United States requires a nationa

aerospace strategy.

Whither the Aerospace Nation?

If this paper serves no other purpose, it must serve as 

wake-up call, a call to action for the aerospace nation.9 

United States policy makers must view aerospace power as 

national treasure. If such economists as Reich, Michael Por

ter, and Thurow are correct, the aerospace industry will b

critical to America’s future economic prosperity. Each argue

that the future belongs to those nations with trained, skille

workers who add unique, high value to products. Each agree

that aerospace is one of those industries. Militarily we canno

operate without control of aerospace—all military strategie

rely upon it. Aerospace dominance provides the capability fo

US forces to win within the political imperatives of the future

especially with reference to casualties. Aerospace power, both

its economic and military elements, is under great pressure t

37
succeed in the future. To do so requires a national aerospac

strategy.

What, then, should be the goal of an aerospace strategy

The economic vision needs to be one that aspires to world

leadership in aerospace technology. The military vision i

clear—provide aerospace control and exploitation capabilitie

on demand, regardless of whether land, sea, or aerospac

forces represent the predominant medium in any given cir

cumstance. Together these two ideals combine to form th

goals of the US aerospace strategy.

What are the broad objectives that work to achieve the goal

stated above? To paraphrase Tyson, “Ultimately, the fate o

the nation’s [aerospace strategy] depends not on trade battle

fought abroad but on the choices we make at home: in

macroeconomic policy, education policy, technology policy, in 

dustrial policy (and national defense policy).”9 9 Ms Tyson’

framework is used herein to offer broad objectives and idea

for formulating a national aerospace strategy.

On a macroeconomic level, the national strategy should

contribute to the economic well-being of the United States

Aerospace should help the United States improve the standard

of living for its people. Further, improved economic well-bein

ensures the United States the capacity to support militar

capabilities to secure national security interests. 100

The leading objective of US macroeconomic policy is t

make the aerospace industry profitable and competitive in th

world marketplace. Several policy options work to attain thi

goal. A key option task is to level the playing field of aerospac

competition. As seen earlier, federal R&D funding and militar

aircraft purchases supported (subsidized) US commercia

aerospace in an indirect manner. The European Communit

used direct subsidies (direct government financial support) t

help Airbus break through the start-up barriers in the aircraf

manufacturing field. Now other countries (like Japan) seem

poised to take off. Bilateral/multilateral agreements need t

account for these extra-market forces. The 1992 Unite

States-European Community bilateral agreement on trade in

civil aircraft provides a starting point. This agreement stipu 

lates a set percentage (33 percent) for direct government fund

38
ing of aircraft development. The agreement also states tha

“indirect (i.e., military) supports should neither confer unfai

advantage . . . nor lead to distortions in international trade in

such aircraft.”101 Trade agreement discussions with aspirin

entrants to the aerospace industry (like Japan) would have t

provide provisions for new players to overcome the high entr

barriers to the aviation business.

Another key to macroeconomic policy is the question of for

eign investment in US aerospace. The United States needs t

develop consistent policies to accommodate foreign invest

ment. In his book, The Work of Nations, Robert Reich lays ou

the argument that where investment dollars come from i

irrelevant. 102 What matters is having the production an

skilled workers in the United States. That way, if the foreign

investors pull out, the United States still has the people an

process. Naturally, one would have to consider security is

sues; however, the high cost of aerospace development is driv

ing firms to seek joint ventures, consortium, and ad hoc ar

rangements to generate the skills and/or funds to produc

new products. As Reich and others argue, globalization of th

aerospace industry is a trend that is here to stay.

US tax structures provide another issue of concern fo

macroeconomic policy as it applies to aerospace. Obviously, in

an industry that carries as much debt as aerospace, tax struc

ture is very important. The aerospace strategy must produce 

consistent tax plan that encourages civil research and develop 

ment investment. At the same time, this new tax structure mus

recognize that commercial success from R&D expenditures is a

inherently low-return proposition. Further, the strategy needs t

avoid/resolve situations like the proposed energy tax that work

at cross-purposes to other industry promoting efforts. Few in 

dustries can absorb a $1 billion tax mistake.

Education policy requirements are often overlooked in pol

icy proposals. The aerospace industry needs highly skille

engineers, designers, and craftsmen to compete in the future

Likewise, the military requires highly qualified engineers

technicians, and flyers. The objective of US education polic

must be to provide education and training to equip its worker

with the skills to compete for and obtain the high-technology

39
high-wage jobs that result in an increased standard of living

This policy must not limit itself to college education but mus

be extended to include vocational training so that a supply o

educated and trained technicians is available to the industry

Reich argues for “positive economic nationalism” focused on

improving job skills through national education programs.10

He argues that the educational (and financial) elites mus

accept the social responsibility to raise the educational an

training standards of America’s workers. Whatever mecha

nism the strategy adopts will impact not only aerospace bu

the nation as a whole.

The aerospace strategy should commit the United States t

a technology policy seeking dominance in the aerospace field

commercial and military. As noted earlier, President Clinton

directed US policy toward this objective by stating that certain

technologies are more important than others if the Unite

States is to compete in the future global economy. Aerospac

is one of those “designated” technologies. Technology transfe

between the commercial and military sectors lies at the hear

of technology policy.104 Currently, the United States is struc

tured to deal only with the transfer of military technology t

the commercial sector; the Defense Advanced Research Pro

jects Agency (DARPA) leads this effort. This policy needs to b

broadened to include transfers from the commercial sector t

the military.

A concern exists, however, that the new DARPA focus de

grades its primary job of developing new defense-related tech

nologies.105 Reports indicate DARPA suffers from underman

ning and high personnel turnover, begging the question o

whether or not DARPA is the best choice for this job. Severa

analysts recommend creation of a National Advanced Re

search Projects Agency (NARPA) to facilitate the transfer o

defense and other technologies into the commercial secto

freeing DARPA to continue to concentrate on its own projects

Separating the two agencies would minimize security concern

and allow NARPA to adopt a more visible role in sponsorin

the commercial transfer of technology than DARPA. The tw

agencies could be linked by agreement or by formal structur

40
to achieve the cross flow to make dual-use technology run

both directions.

A fundamental industrial policy consideration concerns th

legal framework within which industry and military aerospac

operate. The industry needs a centralized methodology t

guide industry and military programs. This methodolog

would help the administration and Congress develop and en

act legal structures that provide a streamlined, consistent wa

for aerospace industries to move into and out of joint ven

tures, ad hoc partnerships, and so forth. Further, the lega

construct should address investment, ownership, technolog

transfers, and government funding guidelines (this list is b

no means all-inclusive). The development of these guideline

will require international agreement. International law an

transparency regimes must be pursued to provide oversigh

capabilities. Militarily, these guidelines should serve a simila

streamlining purpose to aid foreign military sales and foreign

aid involving aerospace issues. Certainly, these legal concern

cut across most of the policy ideas offered in this paper.

The defense policy objective should seek to provide an inte

grated aerospace plan for congruous force application and pro

grammatic support (development, acquisition, maintenance) o

military aerospace. Instead of having four aviation and spac

programs, the Department of Defense needs to view its aero

space power as a single entity. As we have seen, aerospac

power has a central role in each of the services’ strategies. Fur

ther, the high cost of obtaining aerospace capabilities and con 

tinuing reductions in DOD budgets require the adoption o

methods to eliminate needless redundancies without giving u

needed capabilities. Programmatically, the Defense Departmen

should consider combining its service acquisition systems, a

least for aerospace.

The United States is not without an example in developing 

broad construct under which to craft a national aerospac

strategy. The president’s National Space Council provided th

space community the kind of oversight direction envisione

for an aerospace strategy. 106 The council, chaired by the vic

president, sought to integrate all US space efforts for govern

ment, industry, and space customers (military and civilian)

41
The aerospace strategy requires a similar high-level process

That process must encompass both elements of aerospac

power, industry and military, and include the governmenta

agents included on the space council. Thus, the space counci

construct provides an excellent methodology from which t

initiate a national aerospace strategy.

The scope and effort required to develop and implement 

national aerospace strategy will necessitate the realignment o

many government organizations. A National Aerospace Counci

could provide the oversight/integration leadership to manag

the many changes implicit in the development of a nationa

aerospace strategy. The time to start this process is now. Aero

space power is too critical to the economic and national securit

well-being of the United States to be left to the chance direction

of market forces and budgetary pressures.

Closing Remarks

The United States has undergone many starts and stops in

both its economic and military elements in its development a

an aerospace nation. This paper showed the absolutely essen

tial contribution aerospace power makes to the security an

well-being, economically and militarily, of the United States

There can be no doubt that America is an aerospace nation

However, many problems cloud US aerospace power and ne

cessitate a national strategy that encompasses both element

of its power.

The aerospace industry provides the jobs, skills, and prod 

ucts that serve to increase the US standard of living. It serve

as a visible symbol of the technological expertise and eco

nomic power of America. Militarily, the United States face

uncertainty about potential threats; however, as long as it can

control and exploit aerospace at will, its future is secure from

hostile intent.

Americans can be justifiably proud of what aerospace powe

has accomplished for the United States: the first man on th

moon, worldwide dominance in aircraft and space manufactur

ing, and military aerospace forces capable of providing decisiv

results in combat. Now, the United States must go forward

42
with a national aerospace strategy that secures the leadership

role of the aerospace nation for the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, Global Reach—Glob

Power, white paper (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, Novem 

ber 1992), 15.

2. Jim Impoco and David Hage, “White House Workout,” U.S. News 

World Report, 8 March 1993, 28.

3. Trend information presented here extracted from the US Bureau o

the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992 , 111th editio

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO]), 1992.

4. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983).

5. Ibid. Douhet provides extensive analysis of the future of aerial trans

portation on pages 77–92. He details his views on the relationship betwee

economics, industry, and national security within the context of aviation.

6. William “Billy” Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: Dover Publica 

tions, Inc., 1988), 119.

7. Alexander de Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simo

and Schuster, 1942), 295.

8. Rice, 1.

9. Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Vintage Book

1992); Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Techno

ogy Industries (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics

1992); and Lester Thurow, Head to Head, The Coming Economic Battl

Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William Morrow and Co

Inc., 1992).

10. United States Department of Transportation, MARAD ‘91, Maritim

Administration 1991 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Maritime Admin

stration, 1992), D, 2.

11. James W. Chung, “Whither the U.S. Aerospace Industry?” Break 

throughs, Winter 1992–1993, 12.

12. Aerospace Industries Associaton of America, Inc., Aerospace Fact

and Figures 92–93 (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries of Americ

Inc.), 13. Hereafter referred to as Facts and Figures, Facts and Figure

79–80 , 13; and Facts and Figures 1960, 10.

13. Facts and Figures 92–93, 48; Facts and Figures 85–86, 18; and Fact

and Figures 79–80, 16.

14. Reich, 3.

15 . Facts and Figures 92–93 , 147; Facts and Figures 79–80, 131; and U

Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, 111t

edition (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 410. Hereafter referred to as Statis

tical Abstract of the United States: 19xx . Statistical Abstract of the Unite

43
States: 1991 , 413; Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975 , 366; an

Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965, 237.

16 . Facts and Figures 92–93, 153; and Facts and Figures 79–80 , 132.

17. Chung, 12.

18. Ibid.; and Impoco and Hage, 28.

19. Chung, 15.

20. Ibid., 16.

21. Tyson, 157.

22. Ibid., 160.

23. Robert J. Serling, Legend and Legacy, The Story of Boeing and It

People (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1992), 107.

24 . Facts and Figures 92–93, 105; and Facts and Figures 79–80, 101.

25 . Facts and Figures 92–93, 105.

26. Ibid., 108.

27. Tyson, 157.

28 . Facts and Figures 92–93, 105.

29. Tyson, 162–63.

30. Ibid., 163, table 5.3; and “Making Elephants Fly,” The Economist, 2

January 1993, 77.

31. Tyson, 168.

32. John L. McLucas, Space Commerce (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Un

versity Press, 1991), 203–4.

33. Cable News Network reported on 15 April 1993 that a recent stud

showed that children, especially those in the eighth grade, are increasin

their use of drugs, including a rising rate of LSD usage as the “new” drug o

choice.

34. George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japa

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), first paperback edition, 1992, xiv.

35. Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, “Dead Dictators an

Rioting Mobs,” International Security , Winter 1985–1986, 112–46.

36. Pieces of the imperatives that follow in the text are to be found i

many articles. The key articles used to develop this section include, Globa

Reach—Global Power; FM 100-5, “Operations,” final draft, January 1993; H

T. Hayden and G. I. Wilson, “Defining the Corps’ ‘Strategic Concept,’” Ma

rine Corps Gazette , May 1992, 44–46; Carl E. Mundy Jr., “Expeditionar

Forces: A Defining Concept for the Future,” Sea Power, April 1992, 43–44

48, 50, and 52; . . . From the Sea—Preparing the Naval Service for the 21

Century (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, September 1992)

hereafter referred to as . . . From the Sea ; Stan Weeks, “Crafting a Ne

Maritime Strategy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1992, 30–37; an

Thomas C. Linn, “Naval Forces in the Post–Cold War Era,” Strategic Review

Fall 1992, 18–23.

37. Edward O’Connell, “A Look into Air Campaign Planning” (unpub

lished research paper, US Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C

1992), 17.

38. . . . From the Sea, 1–2.

44
39. Ibid., 4.

40. “Remarks of Gen Carl E. Mundy Jr., before Congress,” Marine Corp

Gazette, April 1992, 36. General Mundy stated that the Marines were cu

ting 50 percent of their tanks and 30 percent of their towed artillery t

achieve a lighter, more agile force. This initiative results in a marked de

crease in firepower. Further, the Navy has reretired its battleships thereb

reducing the capabilities of naval gunfire.

41. . . . From the Sea, 7.

42. Larry J. Bockman and Brad C. Hayes, “Breathing Life into the Nava

Service’s New Direction,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1993, 48.

43. . . . From the Sea, 7.

44. Ibid., 8.

45. Ibid., l-2.

46. Ibid., 2.

47. Bockman and Hayes, 49.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Gordon R. Sullivan, “‘Vital, Capable and Engaged,’” Army, Octobe

1992, 24 and 28.

51. Ibid., 24.

52. Ibid.

53. Sullivan, 28; and FM 100-5, 2-3.

54. The information for this chapter was taken primarily from chapter 3

FM 100-5.

55. FM 100-5, 3-10.

56. Ibid., 3-11.

57. Ibid., 2-11.

58. Ibid., 2-11 to 2-12.

59. Ibid., 2-12 to 2-13.

60. Ibid., 2-13 to 2-14.

61. Ibid., 2-14 to 2-15.

62. Ibid., 2-16.

63. Sullivan, 28.

64. Lt Col Mark P. Gay, USA, joint war-fighting instructor, Air Wa

College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala., interviewed by author, 29 Apri

1993.

65. Rice, 4.

66. Ibid., 2–3.

67. Ibid., 2.

68. Ibid.

69. Merrill A. McPeak, “Does the Air Force Have a Mission?” lecture

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 19 June 1992, 5.

70. Rice, 1 and 3; and McPeak, 4.

71. Rice, 7–8.

72 . Rice, 1; and McPeak, 4.

73. Rice, 7.

45
74. McPeak, 6.

75. Rice, 8.

76. Ibid., 8. Emphasis is in the original text.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., 3–4.

79. Donald B. Rice, “Punch Hard and Terminate Quickly,” Air Forc

Times, 26 March 1990, 23.

80. Ibid.

81. James W. Canaan, “Space Support for the Shooting Wars,” Air Forc

Magazine , April 1993, 34.

82. Ibid., 31.

83. Danna K. Henderson, “1993: Hesitant Optimism, Hopes for Join

Efforts,” Air Transport World, January 1993, 24.

84 . Facts and Figures 92–93 , 138. Facts and Figures included employ

ment data up to 1991; 1992 numbers were not available.

85. Henderson, 24.

86. Bruce A. Smith, “Commercial Strategy Developed for Douglas,” Avia

tion Week & Space Technology , 22 February 1993, 26.

87. James T. McKenna, “United Cuts 20% of Senior Officers,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology , 22 February 1993, 37.

88. Facts and Figures 92–93, 40.

89. Michael A. Dornheim, “Cuts, Layoffs Affirm Transport Boom’s End

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 February 1993, 22.

90. Henderson, 25.

91. Impoco and Hage, 28.

92. Facts and Figures 92–93 , 105.

93. Dori Jones Yang and Andrea Rothman, “Reinventing Boeing Radica

Changes Amid Crisis,” Business Week , 1 March 1993, 61.

94. “Slimming the General,” Economist, 16 January 1993, 64.

95. Rick Maze, Air Force Times, 13 July 1992, 3. Senator Nunn aske

his question in a speech delivered to the Senate on 2 July 1992.

96. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on Roles

Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washing

ton, D.C.: GPO, 1993), xv.

97. Ibid.

98. James W. Chung, “Whither the U.S. Aerospace Industry?” Break 

throughs, Winter 1992–93, 12.

99. Tyson, 296.

100. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economi

Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House

1887); and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Malabar, Fla.: Robe

E. Krueger Publishing Co., 1982).

101. Tyson, 208.

102. Reich, chap. 22.

103. Ibid., chaps. 23–25.

46
104. My reference here to technology transfer is somewhat different from

the normal connotation. Normally one associates technology transfer a

that occurring between states. Indeed I recognize that construct; however, 

believe that issue needs to be discussed as part of industrial policy.

105. William B. Scott, “Caution Urges on DARPA Changes,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology , 1 February 1993, 28.

106. The charter of the National Space Council reads, “The Nationa

Space Council is responsible for advising the president on national spac

policy and strategy, and coordinating the implementation of the president’

policies. It was authorized by an act of Congress in 1988 and was estab

lished as an agency of the government by President Bush on April 20

1989.” The council was chaired by the vice president and included th

secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and En 

ergy and the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the assistan

to the president for National Security Affairs, the assistant to the presiden

for science and technology, the chief of staff to the president, the director o

Central Intelligence, and the administrator to the National Aeronautics an

Space Administration.

47
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61
Chapter 2

After the Gulf War:

Balancing Space Power’s Development

Frank Gallegos

It is a military axiom to “take the high ground”—and space

is the ultimate high ground. In the Gulf War, US space

forces were virtually unopposed, but in the future that may

not be the case. . . . Without question, it was fortunate that

there were six months to get ready. The next time, that

luxury may not exist, and we must be prepared. . . . The

first need is a key element—development of space doctrine

to provide guidance and direction at all levels of war, across

the full spectrum of conflict.

—Lt Col Steven J. Bruger

Early military applications of space-based assets bore littl

resemblance to their successful use in “the first information

war.”1 The United States developed most of its early space sys 

tems to serve the cold war nuclear deterrence strategy. The nee

to protect space sources and methods resulted in a high degre

of secrecy and organizational compartmentalization. As a resul

when Operation Desert Shield began, the highly fragmente

leadership of the space community lacked coherent doctrine

operated with an inherited top-down “technology push” for sys 

tem requirements, and had little space power experience. 2

Space power was simply unprepared to support the theate

commander in chief (CINC) in other than the cold war strate

gic role. 3

The experiences of the Gulf War confirmed these charac

teristics—the majority of the documented lessons concerned

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Col Dennis Drew (retired)

Reader: Dr James Corum

63
a lack of doctrine or a lack of space literacy or experience. In

the development of space power, doctrine and experience hav

evolved much more slowly than the pace of technology. In th

interim, have the US participants redressed the imbalanc

that existed in the development of space power as witnessed

in Operation Desert Shield/Storm? At issue for space polic

makers is the question of whether or not reforms in technol

ogy, experience, or doctrine will move the US military spac

program toward a more robust war-fighting capability.

From its meager beginnings in the Vietnam conflict, spac

power evolved dramatically. In Vietnam the military used

space-based platforms primarily for weather forecasting, navi

gation assistance, and communications support. During Op

eration Urgent Fury in Grenada, US forces used the Flee

Satellite Communications (FLTSAT) and Leased Satellite Com 

munications (LEASAT) Systems in a command and contro

role for the first time in a joint operation. Operation El Dorad

Canyon in Libya and Operation Just Cause in Panama wer

the first major operations in which US forces used information

from space-based national intelligence systems.4 In addition

Operation El Dorado Canyon was the first operation in whic

a space system developed as a Tactical Exploitation of Na 

tional Capabilities Program (TENCAP) project was used. 5

United States war fighters were not able to use the full arra

of civil, military, commercial, and national intelligence satel

lites until the Gulf War. Space-based assets carried over 8

percent of all messages to and from the US Central Com 

mand ’s (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Satellit

intelligence data was essential for planning the air campaign

critical for early warning of surface-to-surface missile system

(Scud) ballistic missile attacks, and aided in determining en 

emy positions and activities.6 For the first time in any militar

campaign, Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites provided

precise position information essential for navigation over a

almost featureless desert terrain. Arguably, space “came o

age” for war fighters in the Gulf War, but the situation was fa

from perfect.

US Space Command (USSPACECOM) traced some of th

most significant problems from the Gulf War to a core is 

64
sue—normalizing space operations for theater operators.7

 Fo

example, since very little basic and operational doctrine ex 

isted, space preplanning for wartime situations lagged wel

behind space technology. Because USCENTCOM had not ar

ticulated how space power ought to be used in its AOR an

USSPACECOM was not fully prepared to provide “normalized

support, US military forces were largely uninformed and un

prepared for using space power when Operation Desert Shield

began. The normalization of space operations for theater op

erations was still not complete as of 1995. Space power doc 

trine and experience are still significantly lagging behin

space technology. All three of these threads of develop

ment—technology, doctrine, and literacy/experience—are cru 

cial, but the lack of balance is particularly important becaus

it points to the focus of what should be the next phase o

development in military space policy.

A definitive guide to the future focus of space power devel

opment requires sophisticated cost-effectiveness and opera 

tional analysis. However, it is possible to make a useful, quali

tative analysis based on recent experience and genera

assumptions about the relative costs and leverage of reforms

Are funds better spent on acquiring technology, improvin

experience, or developing doctrine? Which solution offers mor

leverage for the future?

After the Gulf War, the Air Force, Army, and Navy move

quickly to provide better space power support to the war fight

ers. Senior Air Force leadership founded the space numbered

Air Force (Fourteenth Air Force), activated the AF Space War

fare Center (SWC), and established space support team

(SST). Following the Air Force lead, the Army and Navy estab

lished their own space support teams. In general, USSPACE 

COM, all service components, and the national intelligenc

agencies attempted to provide better support to the combatan

commands and more efficient preplanning of existing spac

forces.8

Fourteenth Air Force is now responsible for war planning

readiness, and execution while serving as the Air Force war

fighting component to USSPACECOM.9 The Air Force activate

the SWC to refine doctrine, develop tactics, formulate con 

65
cepts, and demonstrate systems and technologies that im 

prove military operations and the employment of space force

in warfare. Finally, all service components, USSPACECOM

and intelligence organizations currently deploy space suppor

teams to help conduct integrated space operations for th

theater CINC.

In contrast to the significant reorganization of space forces

doctrinal changes were less dramatic. At the time of this writ 

ing, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 4, “Space Operation

Doctrine” is still in coordination and may be approved in 1995

Arguably the most important doctrinal manual, Joint Doctrine

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14, Space Op 

erations, was in coordination prior to the Gulf War and is stil

at least a year away from closure.1 0 The space support team

mentioned above are available to deploy and support the wa

fighter; however, joint doctrine is still not available to guid

their actions four years after the end of “the first information

war.”1 1 Indeed doctrine lags, suggesting important near-term

focus for policy. The thesis of this study is that a lack of spac

power doctrine and experience caused the majority of th

space-related problems in the Gulf War. Further, while th

space community has made efforts to normalize space opera 

tions since the war, the lack of doctrine and experience is stil

the major impediment to effective war fighting today and fo

future conflicts.

Focus

This study focuses on basic and operational Air Force an

joint space doctrine which was available to the principal spac

participants (USCENTCOM and USSPACECOM) before, to

and during the Gulf War, including operation plans (OPLAN)

Equally important, this study relies largely on the unclassified

portions of the after action reports from these two unified

commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Universal Lesson

Learned System (JULLS), the Gulf War Airpower Surve

(GWAPS), and the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Re

port to Congress (CPGW). When possible, these document

were verified with primary sources.

66
Assumptions

The Gulf War validated the operational worth of space sys 

tems. Space-based communications, weather, navigation, re

connaissance, and intelligence offered the war fighter capabili

ties unparalleled in earlier conflicts. The Gulf War provided 

glimpse of how space control in the next century could be a

crucial as air and sea control have been in this century.

In the next century, space will contribute significantly t

national economic, political, and security objectives. Nationa

civil, and commercial space agencies have a need to develop

space systems in a complementary, not competitive process

Within the Department of Defense (DOD), cooperation is es

sential so that the information received from space asset

continues to benefit war fighters. Outside the DOD, trus

space power literacy, and cooperation are critical to ensur

efficient use of all space systems. The impact of space powe

for the future makes the thesis of this study all the mor

important.

Methodology

This study uses an inductive examination of evidence to sup

port the author’s thesis. The following section illustrates th

USCENTCOM and USSPACECOM space lessons from the Gul

War and generalizes these experiences into three threads o

development: technology, experience, and doctrine. From tha

perspective, a description of the efforts to solve the problem

from the war is offered. Subsequent to that, observations from

this study lead naturally to future implications.

Establishing the Framework:

Lessons from the Gulf War

History, whatever its value in educating judgment, teaches

no ‘lessons’. . . . Alternatively one might argue that a given

conflict teaches many lessons: unfortunately, most of them

are wrong.

—Sir Michael Howard

67
This section establishes a framework for analysis by or 

ganizing the lessons from after action reports, the GWAPS

the CPGW: Final Report to Congress, and other nonofficia

works into three broad categories of space power develop 

ment: technology, experience, and doctrine. 1 2 A lesson re

quiring the acquisition of new technology to resolve the is

sue is included in the technology thread. A lesson leading t

or requiring the accumulation of new knowledge, literacy

skill, or reorientation is organized in the experience thread

For example, airpower strategists learned from World War I

experience that the first requirement for nearly all militar

operations was air superiority. Finally, a problem indicatin

a lack of a codified, sanctioned body of propositions to guid

how space power ought to be used is attributed to a lack o

doctrine. For the purposes of this study, doctrine include

not only formal, published doctrine, but also directives

manuals, and other official published guidance.

These common threads of the development paradigm ar

not foolproof; they offer a simple framework for analysis and 

point of departure for future investigations. Using this three

part framework, it quickly becomes obvious that the majorit

of the space power problems encountered during the Gulf Wa

can be attributed to a lack of doctrine and experience. Unfor

tunately, the development of US space technology continues t

outpace both doctrine and experience.

US Space Command After-Action Report

“Normalizing space support for the war fighters” is th

common theme echoed by the authors of USSPACECOM’

after-action report.13 The writers of this report made an obvi

ous effort to address the importance of establishing an

updating detailed space annexes (annex N) in the war-fight

ing CINC’s operation plans. Table 5 illustrates the lesson

from the viewpoint of USSPACECOM and the correspondin

category in the space power development process.

More preplanning is required; the supported CINC’s OPLAN

need work; and communication requirements should be in 

cluded in OPLANs. Space annexes to OPLANs either did no

exist or were underdeveloped before the Gulf War. Prior t

68
Operation Desert Shield, US Central Command’s OPLAN did

not address how space power would be used in the AOR. 1 4 I

remarks to the Eighth National Space Symposium in Apri

1992, Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., the vice commander o

Air Force Space Command during the Gulf War, confirmed

this fact. He commented that if the US military learned any

thing from the Desert Storm example it was that preplannin

is essential. “The best example of the lack of planning that w

had is that General Horner went to war without a space an

nex—he did not have in his US Air Forces, Central Comman

(CENTAF) operations plan a space annex.”1 5 As a result of th

lack of preplanning, weather vans, ground antennas, intelli 

gence terminals, and other space-related ground equipmen

were omitted from the time-phased force and deployment lis

(TPFDL).1 6 Inadequate preplanning is a theme common to al

the reports analyzed for this study.

Forces should normalize all space support and tactical warn 

ing support. USSPACECOM did not fully realize or plan for th

important role space power would play in missions other tha

strategic ones. By normalizing space support at the theater level

Table 5

USSPACECOM Lessons

Lesson Category

More preplanning required—May not have six

months of buildup for the next war.

Doctrine

Supported CINC OPLANs need work. Doctrine

Include communication requirements in OPLANs. Doctrine

Normalize all space support. Doctrine and Experience

Normalize tactical warning support. Experience and Technology

Operational control of military satellite

communication systems remains fragmented.

Doctrine and Experience

Maintain the US multispectral imagery capability. Experience

Source: USSPACECOM After Action Report, 31 January 1992.

69
USSPACECOM envisions operating its space systems as th

Air Force operates its aircraft on a day-to-day basis. Through

the documentation of these lessons, the authors not onl

highlighted the value of normalizing space support to th

theater war fighter, they also ensured readers would under 

stand the significance of theater ballistic missile warning fo

the future. Gen Charles A. Horner, who had the unique experi

ence of being the joint forces air component commander durin

the Gulf War and CINC USSPACECOM after the war, declare

that the number one lesson of the Gulf War was that the U

must develop a ballistic missile defense system capable of di

rectly supporting the requirements of deployed forces as well a

North America.1 7 Normalizing space operations mandates th

development of doctrine so that forces may organize, train, an

equip to prepare for future wars.

Operational control of military satellite communication sys 

tems remains fragmented. Participants experienced the frus

trations caused by a lack of centralized control of space com 

munication systems. While USCINCSPACE is given combatan

command (COCOM) by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs o

Staff, no formal relationship exists between USSPACECOM

and the managers of the several military satellite communica 

tion systems.1 8 The operational control of these satellite sys 

tems remains fragmented among the various space agencies

services, and commands. This experience highlights the need

for a centralized satellite communication structure in peace

time and war. 1 9

The United States must decide whether to maintain its onl

multispectral imagery (MSI) capability, the aging LANDSAT, o

to continue to rely on other nations for MSI support. 2 0 MS

proved to be beneficial by providing US and Coalition force

the opportunity to better understand and react to changes in

the battlefield terrain. It will also offer future war fighters th

ability to rehearse their missions, determine optimum tactics

and identify major threat lanes or attack axes to more effec

tively exploit training and technology in combat.2 1 Finally, 

the US Commerce Department continues to control LANDSAT

on a day-to-day basis, agreements must be maintained t

allow for peacetime military training and wartime control

70
While this lesson covers all three threads of the developmen

process, experience is the core issue.

USCENTCOM After Action Report

The war fighter’s perspective was somewhat different tha

USSPACECOM’s perspective. US Central Command developed

five hundred JULLS after the war. 22 While USSPACECOM em

phasized normalizing space operations, the supported com 

mand accented the need for better doctrine, training, and sup

port from the experts. Table 6 is a compilation of th

USCENTCOM lessons and the corresponding thread of spac

power’s development process. The lessons highlighted are no

the only USCENTCOM lessons related to space operations

however, at the unclassified level they represent the vast ma

jority of the space power problems discovered b

USCENTCOM during the Gulf War.2 3

US forces need better preplanning for space support doc 

trine on the use of ground mobile force (GMF) terminals. Afte

the war, USCENTCOM planners were acutely aware of how

little useful space power doctrine existed. Space power doc 

trine was either nonexistent or inadequate for the Gulf War

Through innovation and ingenuity during the six-month

buildup of Operation Desert Shield, many forces made spac

power work. However, a six-month buffer is a luxury th

United States may not have in future conflicts.2 4 In addition

as the Gulf War developed and grew, military forces needed

more GMF satellite communication terminals than doctrin

prescribed and the TPFDL provided. The VII and XVIII Corp

experienced shortages as a result. 2 5

USSPACECOM needs a liaison to CINCs. The Space Demon 

stration Program and National Military Intelligence Suppor

Team (NMIST) are critical for timely battle damage assessmen

(BDA). These lessons provided the impetus for the postwa

SST concept.2 6 Based on the Gulf War, USCENTCOM planner

realized they did not have the expertise to effectively use spac

power. Their solution was to import the knowledge from th

different space sectors for peacetime exercises and to continu

having experts provide operational demonstrations of the ca 

pabilities provided by space power.2 7

71
Forces need centralized control of communications. Becaus

of the many sectors involved with satellite communications, in 

itial control was, at best, fragmented.2 8 Early in Operation Deser

Shield, US Central Command assumed control of the validation

process for all long-haul strategic communications. Withou

centralized control, early deploying units might have used al

available resources before hostilities began. 2 9 Unity of comman

in allocating the limited resources, satellite capacity, and fre

quency spectrum, in particular, was vital to subsequent uni

deployments.3 0 The Gulf War validated the importance of exer 

cising centralized control of theater communications.

USSPACECOM did not have a booster to meet a CENTAF

request to accelerate the launch of the next Defense Satellit

Communications System (DSCS) satellite. 3 1 The DSCS satellit

would have improved USCENTCOM’s overly taxed communi

cations capability significantly. The inability of the United

States to launch satellites in a short period of time is a seriou

weakness.

Table 6

USCENTCOM Lessons

JULL Category

Better preplanning required for effective space

support.

Doctrine

Doctrine required on the use of ground mobile

force terminals.

Doctrine

USSPACECOM liaison to CINCs required. Experience

Space Demonstration Program. Experience

NMIST critical for timely battle damage

assessment.

Experience

Centralized control of theater communications

must be exercised.

Experience

Space launch responsiveness. Technology

Source: USCENTCOM After Action Report, 15 July 1991.

72
Gulf War Airpower Survey

The GWAPS authors focused on describing the “space prod

uct” and its operational impact. Even though the classified

space power research by the GWAPS personnel is much mor

detailed, the unclassified report used here tells a story consis 

tent with that of the classified reports. This unclassified repor

addressed five central themes.

Planning and Training for the Use of Space Systems. I

the areas where space capabilities were not fully integrated

with doctrine and tactics (e.g., BDA and other intelligenc

functions), the importance of the five and one-half months o

Desert Shield preparation cannot be overemphasized. 3 2 Whil

some annexes to USCENTCOM’s Operation Plan 1002 wer

ample, weaknesses or omissions in other areas were inade

quated for training or real-world events.

In the cases where adequate doctrine existed, space powe

was used effectively. In cases where doctrine did not exist o

was inadequate, the results of space operations reflected th

absence of in-depth preplanning. 3 3

Space Mobilization. The time to mobilize space power var

ied across the board. In some cases, the equipment was im 

mediately available due to peacetime requirements (e.g., F-16

equipped with GPS receivers). In other cases, the time to mo

bilize depended on preplanning, launch variables, and th

availability of trained personnel. 3 4 If any one of these variable

was deficient, there was a corresponding deficiency in mobili

zation.

Military Utility Space Systems. The contribution o

space power was evident in terms of concrete war-fightin

results. In some cases, however, desired results could only

be achieved by crossing functional boundaries. For example

the detection of Scuds by the Defense Support Program (DSP

constellation required action from several of the Coalitio

forces to destroy these mobile targets. The lesson here is tha

doctrine must provide the flexibility to cross functiona

boundaries.

Command and Control of Space Systems. The highly clas

sified, strategic focus of the US military space community wa

not suitable for the tactical environment of the Gulf War. Th

73
cold war mentality of the space community oriented its suppor

to strategic customers prior to the war (e.g., National Comman

Authorities [NCA] and various intelligence agencies). Complicat

ing this predicament, many of the key intelligence-related asset

were not controlled by the war-fighting commander.3 5

After Operation Desert Storm, the space community realized

wars in the future will likely require theater-level support from

space forces. This lesson also implies that centralized contro

of space systems by the war-fighting commander is preferred

over other arrangements.

The Role of Commercial Space Systems and Receive

Equipment. Commercial space systems played a significan

role augmenting the military Coalition forces. In addition, th

Coalition members cooperated to deny Iraq access to satellit

imagery from France’s commercial Systeme Probataire pou

l’observation de la Terre (SPOT). 3 6 Military forces not only ex 

perienced the value of using commercial satellite systems

they now better understand the value of denying the enemy’s

use of commercial satellite systems.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress

As expected, the writers of the CPGW described the lesson

and observations from the war in a much broader contex

than the sources previously cited. 3 7 They were also more inter

ested in describing weapons and technology than operationa

concepts. Table 7 illustrates the space-related shortcoming

and issues from volume II, appendix K, of the report.

The United States does not have a reactive space-launc

capability. This observation is a common theme addressed b

the majority of the studies referenced for this chapter. U

space launch, responsive or otherwise, continues to be a na

tional problem.

Tactical warning capabilities must be improved. Whil

USSPACECOM emphasized the lack of experience and th

need for doctrine in this area, the writers of the CPGW illus

trated the need for improved technology to solve the tactica

ballistic missile warning problem. Specifically, they believ

that in the future, an improved sensor to replace the DSP i

appropriate.3 8

74
GPS and most satellite communications are vulnerable t

exploitation. The Gulf War confirmed the need for the produc

tion, distribution, and integration of GPS receivers incorporat

ing selective availability decryption. The Gulf War experienc

also proved the value of fielding the Military Strategic an

Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellite system and installing anti

jam modems for super high frequency (SHF) fixed-base satel

lite terminals and tactical ground mobile terminals. 3 9

The aging LANDSAT system under Commerce Departmen

control must be replaced. The writers of the CPGW an

USSPACECOM’s after action report agree on this issue. Th

Gulf War experience validated the importance of maintainin

an MSI capability available for military use.

Table 7

Persian Gulf War Space Power

 Shortcomings and Issues

Shortcoming/Issue Category

The United States does not have a reactive

space-launch capability.

Technology

Tactical warning capabilities must be improved. Technology

GPS and most satellite communication

(SATCOM) are vulnerable to exploitation.

Experience

The aging LANDSAT system under Commerce

Department control must be replaced.

Experience and Technology

DSCS connectivity remained fragile due to age

and condition of satellites and ground stations.

Experience and Technology

For future operations, planners must consider

the challenges of operating within another

nation’s command, control, communications (C3)

infrastructure.

Doctrine and Technology

Military doctrine and training must institutionalize

space-based support to operational and tactical

commanders and incorporate it into operational

plans.

Doctrine

Source: CPGW Final Report to Congress, Vol. 2, April 1992.

75
DSCS connectivity remained fragile due to age and condi

tion of satellites and ground stations. In the opinion of thes

authors, the older DSCS satellites and ground terminals re

quire modernization. The experience from the war warrants a

increase in the number of military satellites providing world 

wide command and control coverage. In addition, procuremen

of smaller more mobile ground terminals, similar to a proto 

type used by the XVIII Airborne Corps, is needed to aid in

transport to and within the theater.4 0

For future operations, planners must consider the chal

lenges of operating within another nation’s C3 infrastructure

and military doctrine and training must represent institution 

alized space-based support to operational and tactical com 

manders and be incorporated into operational plans. The las

two issues from the CPGW are similar to previous lessons from

USSPACECOM and the GWAPS .

Status of the Lessons

USSPACECOM and US Central Command are the only tw

sources discussed with any type of formal approach to track

ing the lessons of the Gulf War. However, either through omis 

sion or by design, none of the space power lessons from th

Gulf War are actively monitored by either of the unified com 

mands today. 4 1

After the Gulf War, USSPACECOM initiated action on

many issues attributed to the Gulf War, even though the

did not actively monitor the status of any of their lesson

through a formal process. While issues such as space sup 

port teams and better OPLANs received considerable atten 

tion and each lesson was assigned a point of contact (POC)

no agency was assigned the responsibility for resolving th

fate of those lessons. Because of this, it is difficult to deter 

mine with confidence which Gulf War experiences USSPACE 

COM considered lessons for the future and which experience

were discarded after some scrutiny. Without question th

USSPACECOM lessons did receive some level of hearing im 

mediately after the war. USSPACECOM initially disseminated

97 copies of its report to 13 agencies including all war-fightin

CINCs.4 2 While there was wide distribution of the lessons, th

76
point is that no mechanism existed to either discard a lesson

as an anomaly, develop a solution, or elevate the problem t

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.

In contrast, US Central Command inserted its lessons from

the war into the JULLS . This process required the comman

to evaluate the five hundred lessons from the war and recom 

mend what action should be taken for each. The recommenda 

tions ranged from designation as a noted item to flagging 

lesson as a remedial action project (RAP) requiring periodi

monitoring until resolved.4 3 However, after the space powe

lessons were routed through the JULLS process, none wer

designated remedial action projects. 4 4 This does not mean th

space-related lessons were not considered important, onl

that other processes or programs may already incorporate 

solution to those problems. The lessons from USCENTCOM

received much wider dissemination due to their inclusion in

the JULLS database. While neither of the principal unified

commands during the Gulf War currently monitors its respec

tive lessons for resolution, USCENTCOM’s lessons were adju 

dicated through a formal process.

Synthesis of the Lessons

In the development of space power, it is apparent from th

studies examined that technology continues to surpass th

progress of doctrine and experience. Arguably, the majority o

lessons examined here were related to a lack of doctrine or 

lack of experience (80 percent). The imbalance between spac

technology, doctrine, and experience is not a new phenome

non, but it is commonly overlooked.

Gen Charles A. Horner synthesized the most importan

space power problems from his unique perspective as the join

force air component commander during the war and as com 

mander in chief of USSPACECOM after the war. The first ma

jor problem he noted was the lack of experience US forces ha

in using space assets, especially with respect to intelligenc

systems.4 5 US forces simply were not familiar with using infor

mation obtained from satellite constellations like the DSP an

GPS. The second significant problem General Horner noted

was the overclassification of space information. 4 6 The classifi 

77
cation of satellite products initially undermined the relation 

ship between the United States and the Coalition forces an

was a major impediment in getting information to the wa

fighters. In General Horner’s opinion, the way to resolve thes

problems is to shed the cold war strategic heritage of spac

and to tear down the walls of classification the space intelli

gence community has built around itself. 4 7

In a separate work, Mackubin Thomas Owens reviewed 

number of Gulf War studies and distilled all of the lesson

to three principles. “On first examination, these principle

might seem so broad as to be trivial. Yet our lack of succes

in Vietnam demonstrates that we have not always paid a

much attention to these principles as we should have. Thes

lessons can be summarized as follows: people and organiza 

tion matter; technology matters; and ideas (doctrine) mat

ter.”4 8

Technology, experience, and doctrine do matter. To maxi

mize the potential of space power for future conflicts, it i

evident from the material presented here that the Unite

States needs to reassess the level of effort placed in develop 

ing space power doctrine and experience. Unfortunately, th

inclination to be on the leading edge of technology ofte

comes with a mutually strong penchant to disregard th

teachings of the past.4 9 The next section describes the effort

made since the war to improve these three developmenta

threads.

After the Gulf War—Uneven Improvement

The Air Force has a well understood, war-tested military

doctrine for air power. The crux of the problem is Air Force

insistence that the same doctrine applies to space.

—Kenneth A. Myers

It seems that the majority of the space power problem

encountered during the Gulf War resulted from a lack of spac

power doctrine and experience. Since the Gulf War, the devel

opment of space power remains uneven—doctrine and experi

78
ence continue to trail behind technology. While the search fo

superior systems is required, until space doctrine is on a

even plane with the emerging technology, the employment o

space power will not be optimized.

Space operation plans have improved; however, joint spac

doctrine remains unpublished. For example, while variou

SSTs are training regularly with war fighters, no joint doctrin

exists to guide them on command relationships or how th

space portion of the next war ought to be waged. Finally, new

organizations designed to educate, train, and support the wa

fighters are making headway to normalize space operations

The US military is making progress in all three threads o

space power development, but at uneven rates of advance

with technology clearly in the lead—a circumstance due in

part to the legacy of space power.

Space Power’s Legacy

The genesis of the American military space community’s focu

on research and development (R&D), vice operational suppor

began in response to the Soviet launch of sputnik in 1957

Following this event, the United States quickly became th

world’s leader in space power. However, the United States linke

most military space development to support cold war nuclea

deterrent strategies. High strategic stakes caused tight securit

and aggressive technological development. Space became 

highly classified technology-oriented operation, characterized b

restricted access to information about satellite capabilities tha

created impediments to supporting political and economic lead

ership in the United States. 5 0 This approach may have been

appropriate for the cold war; however, Operation Desert Storm

and a different world environment indicated a change was in

order. Changing this mentality has not come easily, nor is th

process close to completion. In a major study after the Gulf War

commonly referred to as “The Wilkening Report,” distinguishe

authors advised Dan Quayle, then the vice president, of thi

reality.5 1 They warned that the cold war security requirement

continued to contribute to the inefficiencies in the conduct of th

nation’s space program. 52 The origin of space power in th

79
United States established a pattern of development that ha

proven difficult to overcome.

The experience of space operators has also varied. In th

early years, many aviators with extensive flying experience in

World War II and Korea were the core space operators. Thi

changed in the mid-1960s when the requirements of the Viet

nam War stripped the space community of its flyers and henc

its operational focus. 5 3 Since then, the highly classified spac

program developed the reputation for breeding a R&D vic

operational mentality that has been difficult to overcome.

The Gulf War was a turning point in revitalizing the opera 

tional focus for space power. In addition, to infuse more op

erational thinking into the space community, the Air Forc

merged intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operators int

Air Force Space Command. 5 4 Although considerable effort ha

gone into overcoming the R&D heritage of the United State

space community, the transformation is incomplete.

What Lessons Apply to the Future?

Before examining where senior military space leadership fo 

cused development efforts after the Gulf War, it is importan

to determine if the pursuit of a resolution is worthwhile. Perti

nent to this question is the well-known analysis of World Wa

I airpower “lessons” developed by I. B. Holley Jr. “These les

sons are much the same as those which might have bee

derived equally well from the Civil War or, for that matte

from any other war. As was true of former conflicts, World Wa

I emphasized the necessity for a conscious recognition of th

need for both superior weapons and doctrines to ensure maxi

mum exploitation of their full potential.”55 In other words

wherever military leaders fail to emphasize the need for bette

weapons in lieu of more weapons, they usually suffer seriou

disadvantage. When military leaders fail to formulate doctrin

to exploit innovative weapons, they suffer further disadvan

tages. 5 6 In terms of technological development, the analysi

thus far highlights the need for space power leadership t

develop a responsive launch capability for the United States

ensure war fighters retain the ability to acquire MSI, an

develop a new system to provide theater ballistic missile warn 

80
ing. But equally important, this analysis suggests senior lead

ership should develop forward-looking space power doctrine t

guide and educate war fighters.

In an era when space power is envisioned to perform man

new missions with very limited resources, Dr. Holley’s advic

rings true. If the majority of the problems related to spac

power in the Gulf War fall into the categories of experienc

and doctrine, military leaders should be making every effort t

formulate military doctrine to match the innovative spac

weapons. New doctrine will not only provide a direction fo

waging the next war, it can be used to train and educate wa

fighters on the applications space power can provide. Failin

this, the nation may repeat the regretful pattern of the ai

weapon after World War I, recklessly groping forward wit

each technological innovation.57 The salient question is, hav

US military leaders apportioned space power development ef

forts appropriately among technology, experience, and doc 

trine since the Gulf War?

Technology

Space power leadership is aggressively seeking resolution t

the technological problems encountered in the Gulf War. In

general, the senior leadership continues to expand R&D o

new space technologies. For example, funding for TENCAP 

which contains the major classified and unclassified Air Forc

technology projects, has increased by an order of magnitude

At the unclassified level, the budget for TENCAP is now $3

million per year versus $3 to 4 million prior to the Gulf War.5 

While resolution of the technological problems is far from

complete, technology continues to receive an unbalanced por

tion of attention in the development of space power.

After the Gulf War, Air Force Space Command established

the SWC to support combat operations through a variety o

functions. One of its charters was to take the lessons learned

in the Gulf War and apply them to day-to-day operations an

wartime support. 59 Of note here is that TENCAP, well estab

lished prior to the Gulf War, dominates the SWC’s function

and finances. After the war, TENCAP expanded its operation

to leverage the billions of dollars spent on “national technica

81
means.

6 0 The TENCAP system is organized using the pre

viously classified code word Talon in six separate programs

The four principal technology divisions are command, control

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) (Talo

Command); mission support (Talon Ready); force application

(Talon Shooter); and special operations (Talon Night). Talon

Touch and Talon Vision provide communications connectivit

and processing power support to all the programs.6 1 Thes

technology programs dominate the SWC’s day-to-day activi

ties.

To normalize tactical warning support, the 11th Spac

Warning Squadron recently reached a milestone in theate

missile warning. Its Attack and Launch Early Reporting t

Theater (ALERT) system reached initial operating capabilit

(IOC) on 10 March 1995. 6 2 The ALERT program was develope

following the Gulf War to find better ways of using the DSP

satellites for theater ballistic missile defense.6 3 The technology

acquired to secure this capability under the Talon Shield pro 

gram responds to some of the lessons illustrated earlier. Th

ALERT program is a technological attempt to normalize an

improve tactical warning support to the war-fighting CINCs.

The lack of a responsive space launch capability is the sub

ject of many studies and debates, but a decision addressing 

long-term resolution to the problem is at least a year away. 6 

This decision could result in an operational vehicle by 2005. 6 

As described previously, the need for a responsive spac

launch capability in the United States was a significant les

son from the Gulf War. As a result, the fiscal year 199

defense bill tasked the secretary of defense to provide a pla

to improve the US launch capability. The result was Ge

Thomas S. Moorman’s Space Launch Modernization Pla

which, in turn, led to Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC

4, “National Space Transportation Policy,” issued on 5 Au 

gust 1994.6 6 The policy calls for a two-track effort. First, th

short-term solution requires continued access to space b

supporting and improving existing space launch capabili

ties—namely the space shuttle and current expendabl

launch vehicles (ELV). Second, the long-term goal is to pur

sue reliable and affordable access to space through focuse

82
investments in, and orderly decisions on, technology develop 

ment and demonstration for next-generation reusable trans

portation systems.6 7 President Clinton assigned responsibil

ity for the next-generation reusable technology developm ent/

demonstration program to the National Aeronautics an

Space Administration (NASA). 6 8

To solve the problem of the United States’s aging MSI an

other national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanc

(ISR) capabilities, USSPACECOM is working with the Offic

of the Secretary of Defense. MSI was extremely beneficia

during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm providing U

and Coalition forces the opportunity to better understan

and react to changes in the terrain. It also offers future wa

fighters the ability to rehearse their missions, determine op 

timum tactics, and identify major threat lanes or attac

axes to more effectively exploit training and technology in

combat.69 However, the failure of LANDSAT 6 coupled with

the DOD decision to stop funding for LANDSAT 7 leaves th

military dependent on the aging LANDSAT 5 and foreig

sources, such as the French SPOT system, to satisfy MS

requirements.7 0 In fact, during the Gulf War, we relied exclu 

sively on the French for MSI requirements.7 1 The MSI work 

ing group has not resolved this issue but is committed t

resolve the problem by the turn of the century. 7 2

Experience

After the Gulf War, several significant organizational fixe

were geared to improve space power experience and to normal

ize space support to the theater commanders. To solve some o

the major problems witnessed in the Gulf War, senior Air Forc

leaders created the Fourteenth Air Force, the SWC, the Nationa

Test Facility within the SWC, and the SST concept.

On 1 July 1993, the Air Force established Fourteenth Ai

Force as its operational space component to USSPACECOM t

integrate space support for theater warfare, organize spac

support to theater operators, and to train/exercise with spac

systems.7 3 For the first time, airpower leaders organized spac

power in a familiar manner to mirror the way the rest of th

Air Force operated. Fourteenth Air Force is now responsibl

83
for war planning, readiness, and execution. It serves as th

war-fighting component to USSPACECOM for satellite contro

missile warning, communications, navigation, space surveil

lance, and space launch opertions.7 4

Establishing Fourteenth Air Force was one piece of the or

ganizational solution enacted to resolve the problems identi

fied during the Gulf War. In December 1993, the Air Forc

conceived the Space Warfare Center. The SWC’s charter is t

refine doctrine, develop tactics, and formulate concepts an

capabilities to better apply space for all war fighters. Integra

to the SWC are the war-gaming and analytical capabilitie

embodied in the National Test Facility, also located at Shrieve

Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado. The National Test Facility i

responsible for helping educate, train, and prepare war fight

ers for joint warfare by providing space scenarios for militar

exercises worldwide. 7 5 General Horner, then the CINC AF 

SPACECOM, originally envisioned the SWC to be Air Forc

Space Command’s version of Red Flag and the Air Corps Tac

tical School all under one roof. He saw a need for an organiza 

tion to develop the “space tactics and doctrines” while develop

ing prototype programs under the TENCAP program.7 6 I

reality, SWC personnel are developing many new space tech 

nology ideas but very little space power tactics and doctrine.

Air Force Space Command implemented the final organiza 

tional change by developing Air Force Space Support Team

(AFSST). 7 7 USSPACECOM service components and intelligenc

agencies followed with their version of this concept.7 8 Th

AFSSTs will normally work with the joint force air componen

commander to provide space support.7 9 At a minimum, SST

from each of the three service components, USSPACECOM, an

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) deploy to support al

of the theater CINCs. War-fighting CINCs requested suppor

from the SSTs in 20 exercises during 1994.8 0 In a more recen

exercise in South Korea, more than 15 separate SSTs deployed. 

Many agencies are now spring-loaded to support the wa

fighter, but without the aid of joint space doctrine to describ

the relationship between the SSTs. 8 2

The Space Warfare Center is also conducting space course

for different levels of training. First, the Space Tactics Schoo

84
(STS) completed its inaugural class in July of 1994. 83 Thi

school (formerly the Space Tactics Instructor Course) was con 

ceived by General Horner to give the career space and missil

officers an avenue to improve their professional knowledge. In

another attempt by General Horner to pattern space power afte

airpower, the STS was designed after the USAF Weapon

School. 8 4 Its mission is to foster interagency “cross-pollination

so the best techniques and experiences can be transferre

among the different elements of the space community. 8 5 The Ai

Force developed another training course for the Air Force Spac

Support Teams. This course is chartered to increase spac

power awareness and instruct personnel who assist the theate

air component commanders and their staffs. Finally, a thir

space power training opportunity offers a three-to-four-day ori

entation course designed for audiences with broad backgrounds

including senior leadership. 86 All of these courses are attempt

to increase space power experience and literacy.

Doctrine

War-fighting commanders and service components are de

veloping doctrines to guide the use of space power in the nex

war. In spite of these steps forward, doctrine remains wel

behind the gait of space power’s technological developmen

With the help of USSPACECOM, Fourteenth Air Force, th

SWC, and the service components, war-fighting CINCs hav

made progress in developing their individual OPLANs.8 7 “Spac

Operations Doctrine” (AFDD-4) is nearing completion afte

years of coordination. 8 8 Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) is i

the early stages of a major revision and is probably severa

years away from completion. Finally, “Joint Space Doctrine

(Joint Pub 3-14) has been in the coordination process sinc

before the Gulf War. 89

US Central Command OPLAN 1002-95. Prior to the Gul

War no doctrine was available to guide or educat

USCENTCOM war fighters on space power. Since the war

USCENTCOM planners have incorporated a space power an

nex (annex N) in their OPLAN describing specific space asset

available for future planning. 9 0 While not a replacement fo

basic or operational space doctrine, annex N to this OPLAN i

85
a small step in the right direction. Nevertheless it does no

provide the guidance needed to maximize space power’s ro 

bust capabilities.

Air Force Manual 1-1 . The current version of AFM 1-1

March 1992, assumes the same basic doctrine that applies t

airpower applies to space—“aerospace power.”9 1 The next versio

of AFM 1-1, is expected to overturn this decision.9 2 The drafter

of the new version expect to separate airpower and space powe

into distinct roles and missions. This separation is a complet

reversal of policy provided to the authors of the 1992 version

Based on the recommendations of the “Blue Ribbon” Todd Com 

mission on Space, the writers of the 1992 version of AFM 1-

were instructed to totally integrate air and space. 9 3 The Ai

Force’s indecision on integration of air and space is yet anothe

reason why space doctrine continues to flounder. As outlined

the new version will take the position that space capabilitie

cannot be derived by simply applying the term aerospace t

what is an otherwise comprehensive airpower doctrine. 94

Major Air Force commands will have an opportunity t

include applicable space power experiences from the Gul

War into AFDD 1. It is difficult to predict when AFDD1 wil

appear, but if it follows the same pattern as its predecesso

it may be years away from completion.9 5 It is too soon for th

authors of AFDD1 to predict how the space power experi

ences from the Gulf War will affect the new document.9 6

AFDD 4. If approved as currently written, AFDD 4 offers 

small doctrinal step for space command, but a huge leap fo

the military space community. This document has been in

coordination since the Gulf War. 9 7 If AFDD 4 is approved a

currently written, it will address many of the space powe

experiences from the Gulf War. For example, AFDD 4 de

scribes command of space forces, roles and missions of spac

forces, space employment concepts, space power for the thea 

ter campaign, and education and training. All of these topic

are directly related to the experiences of the Gulf War. 9 8

In fact, of the space power doctrinal documents examine

in this study, the draft of AFDD 4 is the only reference wit

a general description of the relationship between the war

fighting CINCs and the space support teams.9 9 Although th

86
current draft of AFDD 4 is a less robust version of previou

drafts, it offers some relief in the doctrinal stalemate.

Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure

(JDTTP) 3-14, Space Operations. Arguably the most importan

doctrinal document, Joint Pub 3-14, is no closer to completion

than it was four years ago. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued th

program directive for Joint Pub 3-14 on 30 March 1990

USSPACECOM initiated plans to distribute the first, fully coordi

nated version of Joint Pub 3-14 by May 1991. 100 Unfortunately

the publication is mired in the coordination process and will b

rewritten prior to another coordination cycle. 101

Joint Pub 3-14 is the most important doctrinal reference

not only because future operations are likely to be joint effort

but also because the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

recently included a statement in all joint publications stipulat

ing they will be followed except when in the judgment of th

commander, exceptional circumstances warrant otherwise. 10

This is especially important for joint space operations becaus

of service, unified, and national space support teams aug

menting the joint force commander’s staff during war.

Space Power’s Development after the Cold War

Efforts to address the problems encountered during th

Gulf War are evident in all phases of the development of spac

power, but it is apparent that technological innovations stil

receive an unbalanced share of space power attention. Th

development of Air Force basic doctrine, Air Force operationa

space doctrine, and joint space doctrine is embarrassingly fa

behind innovative space technologies.

The disdain of space doctrine is a well-documented fact

In January 1988, Colin S. Gray made the following commen

about space doctrine: “It has been 43 years since the firs

spacecraft was launched (Germany’s V-2 rocket) and 3

years since Sputnik, yet today there is no doctrinal litera 

ture worth reading on the subject of battle field space.”10

Gray’s statement is as accurate today as it was in 1988

Later, Lt Col Alan J. Parrington made similar comments in

the Airpower Journal: “The United States has not decide

what it wants to do in space, how it can achieve its aims, o

87
what equipment it needs for future space exploration. If th

US government is to eliminate confusion and give direction t

the space program, it must first develop a cohesive militar

space doctrine.”104

Col Edward C. Mann III supports Parrington’s declaration b

summarizing the short shrift many Air Force officers give Ai

Force basic doctrine in a recent publication, Thunder and Ligh

ning: “Boring or not, when the popes (chief of staff), cardinal

(four-star generals), and archbishops (three-star generals) dis 

dain doctrine, the faithful will follow suit.”105 Finally, Lt Co

Steven J. Bruger describes the actions needed to prepare U

space forces for the next space war. Bruger states, “The firs

need is a key element—development of space doctrine to provid

guidance and direction at all levels of war, across the full spec 

trum of conflict.”106 The development of space doctrine at al

levels has been and continues to be the largest impedimen

facing the military space community today.

Conclusion

We need joint doctrine that clearly defines control and force

application to support the evolution of space systems from a

pure supporting role into a menu of joint space force options

whose stated purpose is to ensure overall US space

superiority.

—George Moore, Vic Budura, and Joan Johnson-Freese

Summary of Findings

The overwhelming majority of the documented lessons in th

Gulf War concerned either a lack of doctrine or a lack of spac

literacy/ experience. The military space community is years awa

from internalizing these experiences. While the space commu

nity pursues ideas to normalize space power operations, doc 

trine is an afterthought—“dull, boring, and useless,” or “impor 

tant but not read by warriors.”107 Specifically, the lack o

doctrine continues to impede efforts to maximize effective wa

fighting with space power assets. Less costly reforms in doc 

trine could offer more leverage for the future US military spac

program when combined with the existing space power tech 

88
nology. The synergy of improvements to AFDD 1, approval o

AFDD 4, and the creation of joint space doctrine offers 

cost-effective boost to the advancement of space power for th

future. Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., vice chief of staff of th

Air Force, feels that the complete internalization of spac

power lessons from the Gulf War is at least a generation o

war fighters away. 108 More focus on doctrine can accelerate th

internalization of recent space power experiences. The impac

of redressing the imbalance existing in the development o

space power makes the thesis of this study a prime considera 

tion for the next logical step in future space power policy.

Primary Conclusions

1. The majority of space power lessons from the Gulf Wa

resulted from a lack of doctrine and experience.

2. Technology remains the military space community’s pri

mary focus—doctrine and experience continue to lag well be

hind technology in the development of space power.

3. Space doctrine development is long overdue.

4. USSPACECOM did not have a formal process of monitor

ing the space power lessons after the Gulf War.109

5. Space power advancement is still impeded by the cold

war mentality and the extreme security requirements associ

ated with this era.

Recommendations

The US space community should focus on redressing th

imbalance among doctrine, experience, and technology in

space power’s development. Among the Gulf War lessons, th

USSPACECOM exercise database, and the JULLS, sufficien

historical information is available to help write useful spac

power doctrine. In particular, Joint Pub 3-14 is urgentl

needed to help guide the influx of space support teams in

theater exercises. After approval, “Space Operations Doctrine

(AFDD 4) can potentially serve as an accurate guide for th

rewrite of the space power portion of Air Force Basic Doctrin

(AFDD 1). Finally, the US military space community is danger 

ously close to completely discarding forward thinking in spac

89
doctrine. We must reverse this mind-set to ensure that doc 

trine guides the development and employment of future spac

systems.

The development of space doctrine and the liberation o

the space community from the security restrictions of th

cold war paradigm will spur education concerning the at

tributes of space power. All services will benefit from th

development of space doctrine because it can serve as th

basis for space power professional military education (PME)

An aggressive space power PME program, from basic train 

ing to the senior service schools, is the only way to fully

internalize space power lessons. In addition, a major ste

forward in educating the force and establishing core compe

tency would tear down the walls of classification the militar

space intelligence community has built around itself. Th

United States will be better served by establishing a singl

military space sector with representation from all the serv

ices. The current ultra-secret intelligence space sector i

very resilient but inefficient.110 In short, the United State

should “give the warfighting CINCs more control over intelli

gence support.”111

The integration of all military and intelligence space activi

ties will not only increase the war-fighting CINC’s influence on

space power support, it will help centralize the acquisition

control, and tasking of satellites. The military space commu

nity must continue to search for superior weapons and forc

multipliers—this is an essential requirement. However, cur

rent acquisition and management of national satellites ar

fragmented. The recent Report of the Commission on Role

and Missions of the Armed Forces supports this finding. Th

commission recommends that the secretary of defense inte 

grate the management of military and intelligence space ac

tivities, assign the development of the integrated architectur

of military space systems to a joint service office, and desig

nate the Air Force as the primary (not sole) agency for acquisi

tion and operation of multiuser space-based systems.112 Thes

changes will make the already aggressive development o

space power technology much more efficient.

90
Notes

1. Many authors reference the Gulf War as the “first space war”; how 

ever, since we have used space assets in warfare since Vietnam, it seem

more appropriate to call Operation Desert Storm the “first information war

This is the first time a war revealed just what impact information manage 

ment can have. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson

A League of Airmen: US Airpower in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, Project Air Force, 1994), 4, 181–84.

2. In AFM 1-1, space power is defined as “that portion of aerospac

power that exploits the space environment for the enhancement of terres 

trial forces and for the projection of combat power to, in, and from space t

influence terrestrial conflict.” This definition originated in a draft to AFM

2-25 which no longer exists. Another definition is found in the current draf

of AFDD 4: “Spacepower is the capability to exploit civil, commercial, intell

gence, and national security space systems and associated infrastructure t

support national security strategy and national objectives from peacetim

through combat operations.” This study uses the AFDD 4 definition. Ai

Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States A

Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 300. AFDD 4, “Space Operations Doctrine,” draf

1 May 1995, 3.

3. Many of the reports analyzed for this thesis use the words strateg

and tactical to differentiate between missions to support the nuclear deter 

rence strategy of the United States and other than nuclear missions respec 

tively. Strategic and tactical are more appropriately used in terms of levels o

war or effects during war. For a useful definition, see Col John Warden, Th

Air Campaign (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 2–3.

4. Lt Col Mike Wolfert, address to the Space Issues Team on Roles an

Missions, Washington, D.C., 14 November 1994, slide S2-OVER 3.

5. Gulf War Air Power Survey , vol. 4, “Weapons, Tactics, and Trainin

and Space Operations” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Forc

1993), 169. (Hereafter cited as GWAPS .)

6. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, address during the SPACE TALK ‘94 Briefing

16 September 1994.

7. USSPACECOM, Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Assessmen

(U) (Peterson AFB, Colo.: USSPACECOM, 31 January 1992), 65–67 (Se

cret/NoForn); and US Central Command After Action Report, Operation De 

sert Shield/Storm (U) (MacDill AFB, Fla.: USCENTCOM, 15 July 1991

37–47 (Secret/NoForn). Information extracted from both reports is unclass

ified. (Hereafter cited as USSPACECOM after action report [AAR] an

USCENTCOM AAR.)

8. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14

Space Operations, 15 April 1992, V1-5.

9. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “Space Acquisition Conference Re 

marks,” 27 May 1994, 2.

10. At the most recent Joint Space Doctrine working group meeting

USSPACECOM/J5, Maj William Doyle stated that Joint Pub 3-14 will b

91
rewritten. He projected the document to be in final coordination 12 to 1

months from this meeting. Maj William Doyle, “Joint Space Doctrine Work 

ing Group,” Peterson AFB, Colo., 31 May–1 June 1995.

11. Moorman, 7.

12. This concept was adopted from Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retire

Colonel Drew presented this framework on 2 May 1995 during the School o

Advanced Airpower Studies Course 680—Airpower Theory II. For a simila

framework see Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Lessons of the Gulf War,” Strate 

gic Review, Winter 1992, 51.

13. A useful definition comes from James W. Canan in “‘Normalizin

Space,” Air Force Magazine, August 1990, 12. Canan defines normalizing a

follows: “This means launching and operating its space systems as matte

of-factly and purposefully as it does its aircraft and treating those system

as workaday and warfighting tools, not as showpieces in the sky.” I woul

add “acclimating the cold war space culture into everyday operational life

USSPACECOM AAR, 65.

14. USCENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90, United States Air Force Historic

Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

15. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, “Remarks to the Eighth National Spac

Symposium,” Colorado Springs, Colo., 2 April 1992, 1.

16. Ibid.

17. Gen Charles A. Horner, “Space Seen as Challenge, Military’s Fin

Frontier,” Defense Issues 8, no. 34 (22 April 1993): 1.

18. USSPACECOM AAR, 67.

19. Ibid.

20. “Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Database” (U) o

CD-ROM, Navy Tactical Information Compendium (NTIC) (Washington

D.C.: Department of the Navy, December 1994), disk 2, JULLS 92659

18177 (Secret/NoForn). Information extracted is unclassified. Also, Conduc

of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington

D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), K 50-51. (Hereafter cited as th

CPGW .)

21. Moorman, “Space Acquisition Conference Remarks,” 4.

22. USCENTCOM AAR, 37.

23. Ibid.

24. Michael M. Garrell, There Are No Space Wars, How Do CINC’s Figh

Using Space Forces? (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 17 June 1994), 1

Garrell argues that it is clear from the postwar analysis that the successfu

use of space power was due largely to innovation, creativity, and ad ho

procedures, not operational thinking.

25. JULLS 31538-21500.

26. USSPACECOM Joint Space Support Team (JSST) Briefing

USSPACECOM/J33S, undated, slide J3-1-30-10.

27. JULLS 50352-59445 and 91747-98856.

92
28. Lt Col Steven J. Bruger, 

Not Ready for the First Space War, Wha

about the Second?” Naval War College Review 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 7

Also, CPGW , K 31.

29. JULLS 15242-11100.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 50612-8818.

32. GWAPS , v.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., v–vi.

35. Ibid., vi.

36. Ibid.

37. CPGW, ix and K 50.

38. Ibid., K 49.

39. Ibid., K 48, 49.

40. Ibid., K 48.

41. Lt Col Robert E. Miller, chief of USSPACECOM’s Joint Training an

Simulation Section, interview by author, 1 June 1995.

42. USSPACECOM AAR, Attachment 2.

43. Mark G. Cooney, JCS Evaluation and Analysis Division, interview b

author, 1 May 1995. For a detailed description of the JULLS process, se

CJCS Instruction 5716.01, 1 October 1994, B-l.

44. Ibid.

45. Gen Charles A. Horner, interview by author, 28 April 1995.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Owens, 51.

49. For an enlightening view of doctrine, see Col Dennis M. Drew, “O

Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine,” Air University Review, January

February 1982, 40–48.

50. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, “Creating Tomorrow’s Space Forces

speech to the San Francisco Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., 

December 1993.

51. The writers of the Wilkening Report include Laurel L. Wilkening

appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 as vice chairman of th

National Commission on Space; Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson, USAF, Re 

tired, first director of the Strategic Defense Initiative; Edward C. “Pete

Aldridge, former secretary of the Air Force; Joseph P. Allen, former astro

naut with NASA; Daniel J. Fink, with over 40 years aerospace engineerin

experience; John S. Foster Jr., former director of Lawrence Livermore Na 

tional Laboratory; Edward Frieman, former director of Energy Research wit

the Department of Energy (DOE); Don Fuqua, served 12 terms as a U

congressman; Gen Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, Retired, former commander o

NORAD and AF Space Command; John M. Logsdon, author of The Decisio

to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest; and Bruce C

Murray, former director of NASA/California Institute of Technology Jet Pro

pulsion Laboratory. A Post Cold War Assessment of US Space Policy; A Tas

93
Group Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 17 Decembe

1992), appendix 11. (Hereafter cited as the Wilkening Report.)

52. Wilkening Report, 23.

53. Lt Col Mike Wolfert, chief of Air Force Space Command Strategy

Policy, and Doctrine, interview by author, 1 June 1995.

54. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, “Public Affairs Background for Quer

Response,” 30 June 1993. Effective date of the transfer was 1 July 1993.

55. I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Office of Ai

Force History, 1983), 175.

56. Ibid., 175–76.

57. Ibid., 178.

58. Maj Joe Squatrino, Space Issues Committee, Air Force Roles an

Missions, interview by author, 15 May 1995.

59. Lt Col Kip Hunter, “TALON Programs Overview,” Space Tactics Bulle 

tin 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 5.

60. Col Mike Francisco, “SWC Support to Warfighters,” Space Tactic

Bulletin 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 3.

61. Hunter, 5.

62. Capt John Kennedy, “Theater Missile Warning Unit Reaches Opera

tions Milestone,” The Guardian, April 1995, 13. Also see Sean D. McClung

“TALON SHIELD Declares Victory!” Space Tactics Bulletin 2, no. 1 (Novem 

ber 1994): 3.

63. Kennedy, 13.

64. Space Launch Modernization Study (Washington, D.C.: Departmen

of Defense, 18 April 1994), 17–19.

65. NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Transportation Po

icy, 7 November 1994, 13.

66. Ibid., 3.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Moorman, “Space Acquisition Conference Remarks,” 4.

70. Horner, “Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee

March 1994, 25.

71. Wolfert interview.

72. Ibid.

73. Moorman, “Space Acquisition Conference Remarks,” 2.

74. Ibid.

75. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, “Presentation to the Committee o

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, US House of Representatives

Washington, D.C., March 1994, 5.

76. Moorman, presentation to the House, 5–6.

77. AFDD 4, 10.

78. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, commander in chief, USSPACECOM, “Orland

Air Force Association,” speech, Orlando, Fla., undated, 6.

79. Ibid.

80. USSPACECOM JSST briefing, slide J3-1-30-12.

94
81. Wolfert interview.

82. Maj William Doyle, Joint Space Doctrine Working Group, Joint Pu

3-14 Working Group, USSPACECOM/J5X, Peterson AFB, Colo., 31 May–

June 1995.

83. Lt Col Dan Chapman, “Space Tactics School (STS) Completes In 

augural Class,” Space Tactics Bulletin 2, no. 1 (November 1994): 4–5; Cap

David Koster, “Space Training—Coming Soon to a Theater Near You!” Spac

Tactics Bulletin 2, no. 1 (November 1994): 5–6.

84. Chapman, 4.

85. Ibid.

86. Brig Gen David L. Vesely, “Commanders Corner,” Space Tactics Bu

letin 2 , no. 1 (November 1994): 1.

87. Horner interview.

88. Wolfert interview.

89. Joint Space Doctrine Working Group.

90. Moorman, “Space Acquisition Conference Remarks,” 4

USCENTCOM OPLAN 1002-95, undated, submitted on 1 June 1993. Thi

OPLAN was never approved. Annex N is a general list of capabilities bu

does not provide guidance on how to use space power to fight the next war.

91. AFM 1-1, vol.1, 5.

92. AFDD 1, outline chap. 3.

93. Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired, project team chief and princip

author of the 1992 version of AFM 1-1, interview by author, June 1995.

94. Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt Col John G. Tockston, “Real Tenets o

Military Space Doctrine,” Airpower Journal, Winter 1988, 55. Also, see M

Grover E. Myers, “Aerospace Doctrine We’re Not There Yet,” Air Universit

Review, September–October 1986, 91–99.

95. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, i. The time period between the latest two versions o

AFM 1-1 was eight years and two months. If the next version follows th

same pattern, AFDD 1 will be available at the turn of the century.

96. AFDD 1, outline. Also, Mr. Wayne R. Williamson, principal author o

AFDD 1, Air Force Doctrine Center, interview by author, 15 June 1995.

97. Wolfert interview.

98. Ibid.

99. AFDD 4, 8–10. Also, Joint Space Doctrine Working Group.

100. Joint Chiefs of Staff Program Directive for Joint Pub 3-14, Messag

date time group, 301638Z March 1990, Washington, D.C., 1.

101. Joint Space Doctrine Working Group.

102. It is also important to note that “if conflicts arise between th

contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, thi

publication (Joint Pub 3-14) will take precedence for the activities of join

forces.” Joint Pub 3-14, ii. It is the opinion of this author that the doctrin

community as a whole has taken these statements as license to avoi

development of forward-looking doctrine. During the most recent Join

Space Doctrine Working Group, all service representatives indicated tha

their senior leadership has interpreted these “directive” statements to mea

95
that doctrine cannot include futuristic guidance. If a space mission (forc

application) is not possible today because of politics or funding, it shoul

not be described in any doctrinal publication. This thinking is a step back 

ward in doctrinal development, especially for space-based assets. Spac

power’s operational potential will be maximized in the future. The Gulf Wa

is only a glimpse of what the United States will benefit from robust spac

power capabilities.

103. Colin S. Gray, “Space Warfare: Part I, the Need for Doctrine,” Na 

tional Defense, January 1988, 25.

104. Lt Col Alan J. Parrington, “US Space Doctrine: Time for a Change

Airpower Journal, Fall 1989, 51.

105. Col Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm an

the Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Pres

1995),164–65. Also see Colonel Mann’s description on page 181: “As suc

war is subject to all the vagaries of the human mind, spirit, and will. S

long as this is true, ideas, concepts, philosophies, and doctrines will alway

matter.”

106. Bruger, 79.

107. Mann, 164.

108. Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., vice chief of staff of the Air Forc

interview by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 5 June 1995. I agree with Gener

Moorman that until Air Force personnel can communicate the importanc

of space power from the ranking general officer to the basic airman, an

until we have space power advocates or heroes (as we did with airpower

only then will we fully internalize the lessons from the war.

109. Recently, USSPACECOM instituted a program to monitor lesson

from any exercise to which the joint space support teams deploy. USSPACE 

COM will monitor all lessons from these exercises and will submit signifi 

cant findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for inclusion in the Joint Univers

Lessons Learned System. Miller interview.

110. Reports indicate that the ultrasecret space programs are likely t

remain tightly veiled, especially in the National Reconnaissance Offic

James M. Gifford, “New Clinton Policy Aims to Reduce Government Se 

crecy,” Space News, April 24–30 1995, 14.

111. “Directions for Defense; Report of the Commission on Roles an

Missions of the Armed Forces” (Arlington, Va.: Commission on Roles an

Missions of the Armed Forces, 1995), 2-6, 2-7.

112. Ibid., 2-7.

96
Selected Bibliography

Books and Reports

Baird, Henry D. Is It Time for a Joint Space Componen

Commander? Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 19 Jun

1992.

Blackwell, James, Michael J. Mazarr, and Don M. Snider. Th

Gulf War: Military Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991.

Butterworth, Robert L. Space Systems and the Militar

Geography of Future Regional Conflicts. Los Alamos

N.Mex.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, January 1992.

Campen, Alan D., contributing editor. The First Informatio

War. Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992.

Clapp, William Q. Space Fundamentals for the War Fighter

Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 22 June 1994.

Collins, John M. Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years

Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989.

Drew, Dennis M., and Donald M. Snow. Making Strategy

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988.

Garrell, Michael M. There Are No Space Wars: How Do CINC’

Fight Using Space Forces? Newport, R.I.: Naval Wa

College, 17 June 1994.

Hays, Peter L. “Struggling towards Space Doctrine: US Militar

Space Plans, Programs, and Perspectives during the Cold

War.” PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

1994.

Holley, I. B., Jr. Ideas and Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Offic

of Air Force History, 1983.

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Militar

Space Programs in a Changing Environment: Issues for th

103rd Congress. Washington, D.C., 1 December 1992.

Lowery, Craig Z. Joint Space Operations in the 21st Century

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1993

Lupton, David E. On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988.

Mann, Edward C., III. Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm

and the Airpower Debates. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Ai

University Press, April 1995.

97
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102
Chapter 3

Blueprints for the Future:

Comparing National Security

Space Architectures

Christian C. Daehnick

In recent years it has become a cliché to speak of the grow 

ing importance of space systems and their capabilities to U

national security in general and to military operations in par

ticular. At the very least, the changing national security envi

ronment and our experiences in the Gulf War have caused 

more open discussion of what those space-based capabilitie

are and what they should be. Along with a greater awarenes

of space has come realization that the systems often seem

unresponsive to the needs of some users and that gaps exis

in our capabilities. Many see the current US space architec

ture as fragmented and inflexible. At the same time, decreas

ing budgets mean that the solution to any problems canno

simply be the purchase of additional capability; the times de

mand more efficient answers.1

Complacency about our space capabilities at this poin

would be dangerous. Although the United States presently

has the best space systems in the world and military pee

competitors or threats to our national survival are beyond th

horizon, there is a danger that efforts over the coming year

will not adequately address the shortfalls of the current spac

architecture. Space systems that remain unresponsive, fail t

live up to expectations, or fail to evolve toward new capabili

ties will disillusion national and military policy and strateg

makers, who might then either ignore space capabilities en 

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Lt Col Robert Owen, PhD

Reader: Dr James Corum

103
tirely or back other, possibly less effective solutions. Ulti

mately, such a situation will hurt the United States.

Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to making th

national security space architecture more effective. The first i

incremental, working to eliminate inefficiencies and expan

access to space systems and capabilities in a gradual fashion

It would by and large retain the command, control, and task

ing arrangements, communications channels, organizationa

structures, and space system design and operating proce

dures of the current architecture. A less conservative ap

proach would involve a shift to a fundamentally differen 

architecture based on decentralization and improved respon

siveness. Which approach will produce the best capabilitie

for the United States, given limited resources?

Answering this question begins with a clearer under 

standing of the alternatives. The current space architecture i

primarily command-oriented: centralized, driven by specifi

performance requirements and employing a push approach t

providing services. Numerous initiatives are under way t

modify current space systems and make them more respon 

sive, but fundamental changes would be needed to make th

architecture demand-oriented. Demand orientation implies 

more decentralized organization, a user-pull approach to pro 

viding services, and a focus on responsiveness.2

The basic question of this study is whether command- o

demand-oriented architectures can make better use of spac

for national security purposes, and better respond to a chang

ing security, technological, and budgetary environment. Th

question is complicated by real tensions between the charac

teristics of command- and demand-oriented systems. They d

not perform all functions equally well, and each approac

requires some compromises. For example, a command-ori

ented system requires investment in large, complex system

and only permits incremental changes in the architecture.

The incremental approach may not be a satisfactory long

term solution. Although attractive, and to some extent neces

sary, because it makes best use of what the United States ha

already invested, it begs several questions. Does such an ap

proach attempt to defy fundamental trends in technology, op

104
erational requirements, and budgets? Because of the basi

philosophy underlying current space systems, will we remain

tied to small numbers of large, complex, expensive, and vu

nerable systems spread ever more thinly trying to satisfy mu

tiple users? Will these users then grow more dissatisfied wit

the responsiveness of space systems to their needs and seek

other solutions? Will space systems take so long to design

build, and deploy that they are technologically out of date a

soon as they are deployed? If the answers to these question

are “yes,” we may do less, not more in space in the future, t

the detriment of our national security.

The radical alternative is to shift to a demand-oriented arch

tecture; one that more directly responds to the needs of today’

primary users and can adapt more readily to changes in require

ments or technological opportunity. The primary elements woul

be smaller, more distributed, and autonomous space system

that could be tasked directly by the users and more closel

integrated with other military operations. Such tailored, distrib 

uted constellations of space systems would both be enabled b

advances in microelectronics, miniaturization, automation, an

modularity, and offer a better way to keep our space system

modern and effective. This approach also appears to fit bette

with a world of global commitments and pop-up crises than ou

current systems. Unfortunately, such a shift in architecture

does not come without cost, nor will it satisfy all requirements. 

demand-oriented architecture will require a more responsiv

space launch capability than we currently have. It will als

require a change in satellite design philosophy to emphasiz

rapid production and deployment, perhaps at the expense o

spacecraft lifetime. These trade-offs may reduce performance in

some areas, which might be acceptable to some customers bu

unacceptable to others.

Problems will arise if recognized issues of coverage, respon 

siveness, timeliness, and so forth are not or cannot be ad

dressed by the space architecture. If our space system design

and operational philosophy remains closely linked to a cold

war environment, our space architecture will likely be inade

quate for the world of the next century. 3 Demands on spac

systems are rising as budgets decrease. Unfortunately, the ac

105
quisition, deployment, and to some extent operation of ou

space systems may remain caught in a vicious cycle of up

wardly spiraling cost, complexity, and time, making it difficul

to accommodate the changed circumstances. The technica

problems will be compounded if institutional inertia and or 

ganizational turf battles are allowed to impede constructiv

change. What is needed is an objective method for deciding i

the challenges can be better met by a command- or demand

oriented approach, or if elements of both are required.

This work is an effort to develop a methodology for compar

ing different space architectures . Since an overriding issue i

how and why the question of space architecture matters t

future national security, the work begins by describing th

capabilities and limitations of space systems. This begs th

question, though, of whether those limitations are absolut

and intrinsic—unavoidable consequences of some charac

teristic of the space environment—or actually the result of th

design choices made in creating the existing cold war based

space architecture. Building on these basic issues, this effor

paper next describes command- and demand-oriented spac

architectures in terms that allow objective comparison. Nex

the work describes the fundamental factors—requirements

technology, and budgets—that determine future space archi

tectures, and how these determinants affect different types o

architectural approaches. The two approaches (command- an

demand-oriented) are compared against a test case involvin

theater reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

(RSTA). Though not comprehensive, this test case provide

broadly useful insights into future options for national secu 

rity space doctrine and policy.

Describing Space Architectures

Architecture: n. Construction or structure generally; any

ordered arrangement of the parts of a system.

—Webster’s Illustrated Contemporary Dictionary

A space system architecture, shaped by the determinants o

requirements, technology, and cost at the time of its design, ha

106
inherent capabilities and limitations. Comparing architectura

alternatives is the best way to highlight strengths and weak

nesses of different approaches to developing a system of sys 

tems, but this requires a common framework. This section

describes the advantages and limitations of space systems

asserts that not all the drawbacks traditionally associate

with space systems are intrinsic, and closes by presenting 

way of categorizing and comparing space architectures tha

are used in the rest of the work.

Types of Advantages and Limitations

A proper evaluation of alternative approaches to an issu

begins with an objective discussion of the advantages an

limitations of each approach. 4 Advantages and limitations of 

class of environment-based systems (air, sea, land, or space

are either fundamental or derived.5

The first type (fundamental), which is based on the physic

and phenomenology of the environment or medium, could als

be called enabling or constraining. In other words, fundamen 

tal advantages (or limitations) cannot be altered, only over 

come or exploited.

The second type (derived) is based on our ability to exploi

the environment, which in turn depends on technology, doc 

trine, and cost.6 Derived advantages and limitations, though

related to fundamental characteristics, are subject to chang

as military forces for example, acquire new physical abilitie

and knowledge.

Distinguishing between fundamental and derived advan

tages or limitations can be difficult, especially when a way o

operating has become so entrenched that its genesis and ra 

tionale are obscured. Failure to do so, however, may mea

that the most effective solutions to a problem are not consid 

ered.7 Thus, the ability to compare begins with an under 

standing of the recognized advantages and limitations of spac

systems and a realization that these are produced from a

interaction of fundamental or environmental qualities with de

sign choices.

107
The Advantages of Space Systems

Perhaps because the use of space for military operations

and particularly unclassified discussion of it, is a relativel

recent phenomenon, and because applications of space powe

continue to evolve, there are nearly as many lists of the ad

vantages of space systems as there are authors. For example

Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Training, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3

14, Space Operations, refers to the various missions spac

systems can perform (communications, navigation, surveil

lance, etc.) as space system capabilities.8 More to the point, i

describes space characteristics (extent, vantage, gravity, com 

position, radiation, temperature, and propagation) and opera 

tional considerations (difficult access, placement, long-dura 

tion flight, maneuver, global coverage, decisive orbits

weapons range, and organization). 9 While recognizing in th

text both that the environment affects the characteristics o

the systems and that this environment offers both opportuni

ties and constraints, the JCS pub does not explain the con 

cept completely. For example, it does not make clear what th

net effect of the characteristics of extent and composition wit

weapons range and platform speed (an unmentioned feature

might be. 10 It also, probably necessarily, oversimplifies suc

concepts as orbit predictability. Except for some rather opti

mistic and unsupported statements, time and timeliness ar

hardly dealt with at the unclassified level as factors in spac

operations. Finally, the operational considerations are clearl

based on existing systems; a valid approach, but one that ma

inhibit thinking about alternatives.

Evolving doctrinal discussions at US Air Force Space Com 

mand focus on the unique attributes of space systems: con 

centration, timeliness, continuity, and perspectives.1 1 This lis

appears to be a step in the right direction, but it still contain

some troublesome embedded assumptions about the architec

ture. For example, the attribute of continuity “relates to th

long operational duration of spacecraft” implying “there is n

need to generate forces during a period of increased tension o

readiness.”1 2 This of course assumes we have (and can afford

all the capability we will ever need on orbit at all times, an

108
also that we won

t lose some of that capability (to mishap o

hostile action) at unfortunate times.

The SPACECAST 2020 study conducted at Air Universit

cited two “paramount advantages of space—unparalleled per 

spective and very rapid access to [distant points on] th

Earth’s surface.”1 3 These seem close to being fundamental

Perhaps significantly, the advantages were not asserted a pri

ori, but culled from the ideas presented in the study.

Each of the authors or organizations impose particular bi

ases on the use of space in describing space attributes an

doctrine. These biases affect their interpretation of the advan

tages (and limitations) of space, so each list is somewhat in 

complete. A reasonable synthesis of the fundamental advan

tages of space is shown in table 8.

These advantages are based on two characteristics of space

The first is that space operating restrictions are determined b

the function of the spacecraft, not its location (unlike nationa

airspace or territorial waters). 1 4 The second is that the physic

Table 8

Advantages of Space Systems

Space Advantage Reason

Nonterritorial operations No worries about overflight rights or provocations in

prehostility phases of a crisis.

Vantage point: The ultimate high ground providing the following three

features:

 - Viewing angle - Ability to avoid any obstructions as necessary

 - Wide area perspective - Ability to see an entire area of interst at once, potential

 for synoptic coverage

 - High energy states - High speed, useful for rapid transit or potentially to

 enhance weapons effects

Global access Ability to get to any region on earth, support operations in

separated regions.

109
of space systems place them higher than other systems an

give them access to large areas of the earth in a relatively shor

period of time. These two features, manifested in table 8, seem

both generic enough to allow further refinement and broa

enough to capture the truly distinctive characteristics of space

The list is undoubtedly open to debate, but at this point onl

one difference from other lists will be highlighted: longevity (o

continuity) is deliberately excluded. This is a design choic

based on orbit selection and spacecraft characteristics, not a

inherent quality of all space systems. Also, this “advantage

does not come without costs, as discussed later.

Of course, none of the advantages are unqualified, nor ar

they necessarily unique to space. Combinations of feature

(global access and nonterritoriality, for example) point out th

unique contribution space can make, and provide the ration 

ale for pursuing space solutions, even in the face of significan

disadvantages and limitations.

The Limitations of Space Systems

Few authors, particularly in the space community, discus

the disadvantages or limitations of space systems in any de

tail. Such points are usually left to the advocates of alternat

approaches (e.g., airborne or surface-based) as they compet

for funding. As a result, several features of space systems tha

are more closely tied to design choices or even specific system

concepts than to the environment itself have become accepted

as generic disadvantages of space.

Space systems have perceived shortcomings in their abilit

to conduct routine, sustained, and effective military opera 

tions (table 9). 15 Efforts to overcome these limitations can tak

several forms: upgrades, mission diversion, or architectura

change. The first, focusing on process and procedures, doe

not seek to address any fundamental limitations, but to im 

prove space system performance at the margins, or in kinde

terms, to take full advantage of existing capabilities. The sec

ond, mission diversion, involves replacing, augmenting, o

avoiding the use of space-based systems through the use o

such alternative means as airborne platforms for surveillanc

and reconnaissance, and terrestrial fiber-optic links for com 

110
munications. 1 6 The architectural change response is the mos

radical and has arguably not been tried in the national secu 

rity arena. 1 7 To explain how deliberate architectural choice

affect space system characteristics, the study needs a frame

work for comparison.

Developing a Framework

The first element of the framework is a series of definition

(table 10). To construct a generic framework for a space archi

tecture the space, ground, and launch segments—fleshed ou

with their elements, as defined—make up one axis of a matrix

The second axis is the attributes. The result forms the basi

for describing the specific features of an architecture, an

thus allows comparison of different architectures. The real

world determinants of requirements, technology, and cost a

described later provide additional detail and refinement.

Table 9

Perceived Disadvantages of Space Systems

Perceived disadvantage Meaning

Distance Space systems must operate remotely.

Predictability Enemy knows when satellites will be overhead.

Poor continuity Lack of dwell time and gaps in revisit time.

Poor responsiveness Ability to respond to crises they weren’t designed for

(strategic) and to theater requirements (operational).

Inflexibility Long planning lead times, difficulty of making changes.

Unsatisfactory timeliness Inability to distribute information to end users quickly.

Vulnerability To attack or natural disaster.

Environment Harsh radiation, temperature, debris, etc.

Cost Both space systems and access to space are expensive.

111
Elements of a Space Architecture

The challenge is to make the list of elements a useful break

out inclusive of different types of systems but not overly spe

cific. One way to do this is to use general types of elements a

Table 10

Space System Terms and Definitions

Architecture

The overall, grand design for the hardware, infrastructure procedures,

and measures of performance of a “system of sytems.” A strategic

theory for exploiting space and a doctrine for employing space

assests are implicit in an architecture, though these things may not

be well articulated.

National security

space architecture

The architecture assoicated with military, intelligence, and other

functions commonly referred to as the “national security” sector.

Segments

Parts of an architecture grouped by their role and environment. The

space segment is what remains on orbit for the duration of its

mission. The ground segment is employed by space “operators” and

“customers” to make the space segment useful to terrestrial

operations. The launch segment is concerned with deploying the

space segment, though certain kinds of “launch” vehicles may

perform other missions.

Elements

The component pieces of the segments; for example, the ground

segment would include command, control, communications,

processing and distribution, logistics, and supporting infrastructure

elements.

Operator An organization that controls the activity of a space sytem.

Customer An organization or individual with a need for a space product or

service.

Attributes

The desired/required, implied or predetermined characteristics of the

elements. For example, survivability (robustness?) is a general

attribute, which is determined by a system’s size, “hardness,”

maneuverability, stealthiness, and other properties (subattributes).

Some measure of survivability may be required by military necessity

and expected threat. The way this is specified will determine parts of

other attributes, such as cost or logistics.

Functional area Force enhancement, force application, space control, space support.

Mission area A subset the functional areas, such as navigation under force

enhancement.

Determinants Operational requirements, technology, cost.

112
described below, rather than listing every possible element o

each segment.

The space segment consists of the mission payload, th

spacecraft, and the constellation. The mission payload in 

cludes the sensors, transceivers, or other equipment that pro 

duce a satellite’s capability. Depending on design, this could

be either a fairly modular and easily identified element, or i

could (in a highly integrated system) merge with the space

craft element. Normally though, the spacecraft element pro 

vides support to the payload, power, navigation, control, an

maneuvering capability, communications, and structure. Th

constellation is the number of satellites and their orbits. To 

gether, the elements of the space segment determine much o

the performance, lifetime, degree of ground support required

and other qualities of a space system.

The ground segment is composed of elements that suppor

the satellites in orbit and exploit the information they provide

and can be broken down into telemetry, tracking, and contro

(TT&C), facilities and infrastructure, and user equipmen

TT&C is primarily related to those functions needed to main 

tain the satellites in orbit and ensure they perform properly

Facilities and infrastructure are buildings, antennas, an

other support equipment, but also any intermediate commu

nications or processing capabilities needed to deliver an

make the product of the satellites useful to their ultimat

customers. This also includes common use equipment, suc

as the space surveillance network which keeps track of orbit 

ing objects. User equipment could range from things lik

Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers and special satellit

communications (SATCOM) equipment to field-deployabl

ground stations and tactical dissemination capabilities. Th

features of the ground and space elements interact strongl

and provide many potential areas for trade-offs.

The launch segment includes equipment, facilities, and proce 

dures needed to deploy the space segment. These can be divide

into the command and control functions and the sites require

to physically prepare and launch a vehicle. Of course the vehicl

itself makes up the third category of launch segment elements

Although it is called launch , this segment would also includ

113
other functions, such as orbit transfer, recovery, and deorbi

or even suborbital missions. It may be worth calling this th

transport segment as (if and when) the United States move

toward a more comprehensive and sophisticated space capa 

bility. This segment, though traditionally seen as completel

subordinate to the requirements of the spacecraft designers

may in fact hold the key to flexibility in the other segments.1 

Summarizing the discussion above, the basic elements of 

space architecture can be listed as in table 11.

By themselves, the elements described above offer only 

physical description of a space architecture. 1 9 Functiona

characteristics, like data transmission, information process

ing, and data fusion, are in fact incorporated in the physica

elements as are seen in later architectural description. To

make value judgments about an architecture and especially t

compare alternatives, some qualitative description is needed

For this purpose, the attributes below will help complete th

picture.

Table 11

Space Architecture Elements

Segment Element

Space Mission payload

Spacecraft

Constellation

Ground Telemetry tracking and control (TT&C)

Facilities/infrastructure

User equipment

Launch/transport Command and control

Launch sites/ranges

Vehicle

114
Attributes of Space Systems

As defined in table 12, the attributes describe the charac

teristics of each element. These attributes should anticipat

design requirements and possibilities, but not predetermin

the actual design.

The attributes in table 12 reflect the key consideration

involved in designing space systems.

2 0 As with the elements o

a space architecture, it is useful to group the attributes int

categories rather than deal with specific items separately. Th

reason for this is that overspecifying the attributes can unin 

tentionally foreclose design choices. For example, the generi

attribute of robustness could be achieved in several ways in 

volving the following interrelated (to themselves and to othe

attributes) qualities:

Table 12

Space Architecture Attributes

Attribute Definition

Performance Ability to provide a service with necessary detail, precision, and

accuracy.

Responsiveness Ability to deliver the required performance as needed and on

time.

Flexibility Ability to shift functional or geographic focus.

Robustness

The system should not fail catastrophically or become unable

to perform its mission satisfactorily in the face of attack or

mishap.

Logistics requirements Quantity and type of support needed.

Reliability/availability The chance of the system being fully or sufficiently operational

day-to-day.

Ease of operations Degree of specialized training required.

Environment impact Amount of debris, waste or other pollution or need to construct

new facilities.

Cost Life cycle: research, development, acquisition, operation, and

disposal.

115
• survivability through hardening of spacecraft; location

(altitude); proliferation/distribution of assets; stealth

deception/decoys; defense (either organic or with dedicate

platforms); and maneuver (this and defense depend on

threat detection and assessment);

• ability to augment/reconstitute capabilities through on-orbi

spares or rapid launch;

• graceful degradation of individual systems and/or th

constellation; or

• reduced vulnerability to attacks on links and ground site

through autonomous satellites; antijam/low probability o

intercept/encryption; and hardening, mobility, and/o

proliferation of ground equipment. 21 

The attributes are presented without priority or weighting a

this point. Adding that level of detail—deciding on the relativ

importance of the attributes—requires making strategi

choices about the nature of the space architecture. Fully de

scribing the elements and making design choices (such as th

one on robustness mentioned above) requires both prioritiza 

tion and application of real-world determinants. The frame

work is already of some use in describing generic types o

architectures. Specifically, it can help illuminate the differ 

ences between command- and demand-oriented approaches.

Command and Demand Orientation

The distinction between command and demand orientation

is significant because the two types are optimized differentl

and have different priorities. In this sense, there is a similarit

to the debate over centralized versus distributed control o

airpower. 2 2 The two types of architecture also imply significan

differences beyond command, control, and organization

namely in the capabilities, design, and deployment of spac

systems.

A command-oriented architecture is a centralized approach

relying on central direction and control for efficiency an

economy of force. In theory, as with the centralized control o

airpower, this command-oriented system ensures that th

best use is made of scarce yet flexible assets. Because of th

116
nature of space systems (worldwide access) and the potentia

significance of the functions they perform, this kind of archi

tecture responds first to national and strategic needs, leavin

needs at the operational and tactical levels to be satisfied a

lower priorities or as by-products of higher-level requests.2 3

Command orientation emphasizes the attribute of perform 

ance in specific tasks, which has several consequences. I

leads to small numbers of large, complex, high performance

and long-lived satellites with highly specialized mission sup

port infrastructure, and attempts to make long-range fore

casts of future space system requirements. To deal with futur

contingencies, the system must anticipate unknowable de

mands, which often leads to the inclusion of performanc

“pads” in the design. The number of launches needed to main 

tain this architecture is small, though it often uses heavy-lif

vehicles. The attributes emphasized here—as with the satel

lites—are performance and reliability.

Organizationally, a command-oriented architecture (in the

ory) has a single executive agent for the mission. In practice

however, the value of space systems for various missions an

the security/secrecy requirements for “exotic” capabilities ca

lead to vertically integrated organizations to design, develop

and operate systems specialized along functional lines. Opera 

tions within each of these “stovepipes” are centralized, an

then an additional element of centralization is added through

coordinating or oversight committees. This phenomenon tend

to improve the responsiveness of a system to its functiona

community, but at the expense of making access from outsid

that community more difficult.

To help visualize the nature of a command-oriented architec 

ture, a matrix combining the elements and attributes of a spac

architecture can be used to reflect the priorities described above

Of necessity, this will be a rough portrait; it cannot readil

incorporate qualitative features (such as the degree to which 

spacecraft might need to operate autonomously) without th

framework becoming much more detailed. Nor is it easy to por 

tray the relative importance of the different elements in terms o

resource allocation without creating confusion. As a first cut a

describing an architecture type, as a possible basis for an op 

117
erations analysis approach, and in preparation for applyin

the real-world determinants of the next section, this approac

has some utility. Using this framework, a command-oriented

architecture would look like table 13.

For simplicity, the table uses only three levels of priority

with darker symbols indicating greater relative weight/empha

sis of each attribute-element pair in design considerations (l

= high, w = medium, m = low). This does not mean that a low

emphasis is unimportant, only that it would fare poorly in 

trade-off with a higher priority item. Finally, this is an attemp

to describe a hypothetical command-oriented architecture, no

one that exists in the real world.

In contrast, a demand-oriented architecture is organize

around the attributes of responsiveness and flexibility. 2 4 Agai

in theory, this type of system would accommodate the need

of any potential user with the priorities determined by a give

situation. To support these goals, a demand-oriented architec

Table 13

Command-Oriented Architecture Priorities

Space segment Ground segment Launch segment

Payload Constel. Craft TT&C Facilities User C

2 Sites Vehicle

Performance l l l l l w l l l

Responsiveness w w w l w l w m m

Flexibility w w m m w m m w m

Robustness l l l w m m w w m

Logistics requirements m m m m m m m m m

Reliability l l l l l l l l l

Ease of operations m m m w w w w m m

Environmental

impact m m m m m m m w m

Cost m m w m m w m m w

118
ture would consist of relatively (to command orientation

larger numbers of smaller, more autonomous, specialized, an

short-lived satellites deployed in constellations that could b

tailored to specific situations. Because of the larger numbe

and more rapid launches that would be required, launch sys 

tems would be driven by two primary attributes—responsive 

ness and cost—and would operate much more like current ai

transport. Specialized infrastructure—from launch through

end user equipment—would be minimized, either by a reduc

tion in infrastructure requirements or through sharing of in 

frastructure with other systems.

Organizationally, command and control would be decentral

ized to some extent, for example with fielded units at som

level able to directly task as well as receive information from

space systems, though overall spacecraft “health and welfare

functions might be performed centrally. The danger that 

demand-oriented system presents, if poorly coordinated, is th

same as that of decentralized airpower-potentially inefficien

poorly coordinated, and misdirected effort (table 14).

Table 14

Demand-Oriented Architecture Priorities

Space segment Ground segment Launch segment

Payload Constel. Craft TT&C Facilities User C2

Sites Vehicle

Performance w l w w w l l l w

Responsiveness w l w w l l l l l

Flexibility m l l l w w l l l

Robustness w l w w m l l l l

Logistics requirements m w w m m l m l l

Reliability w l w w w l l m w

Ease of operations l w l l w l w w l

Environmental

impact m m m m m m m w w

Cost l w l w w w l l l

119
In comparison to the command-oriented architecture, thi

illustration shows differences in the attributes that are impor

tant for particular elements, as well as differences in the pri

orities of attributes across the architecture. This is particu 

larly noticeable in comparing the priorities for the launc

vehicle and in comparing the emphasis placed on the flexibil

ity and reliability of different elements in the two architec

tures. It also shows that there are more high priorities in th

demand-oriented architecture, perhaps an indication of wh

creating one may be difficult. Although not fully representativ

of the differences between the architectural types, the char

illustrates the value of building an analytical framework.

The next section explains the priorities and why some of th

features described as part of one architecture are not availabl

to the other. For several reasons, pure architecture types can

not exist in the real world. Some of those reasons, which wil

help to introduce the real-world determinants, can be illus

trated by a brief look at our current architecture.

Current Architecture

A thorough description of our current national securit

space architecture is not possible in an unclassified paper

but the outline of its functions shows that it is primaril

command-oriented. The four Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spac

functional areas are force application, space control, force en 

hancement, and space support. 2 5 Except for ballistic missiles

which still have only a strategic nuclear mission, we have n

force application capability from or through space. Likewise

we have no space control capability except for the monitorin

function of the space surveillance network. The force enhance

ment mission areas that are currently supported are naviga 

tion, communications, missile warning, environmental sens

ing, and RSTA. 2 6 Space support consists of launch, satellit

control, and logistics.

With few exceptions, the architecture reflects the charac

teristics of command orientation . Overall, considering th

number of missions performed and potential customers, ther

are a relatively small number of spacecraft.2 7 Satellite constella 

tions tend to reflect the coverage needs of the cold war. 2 8 We als

120
have a small number of operating sites—the primary ones are a

Shriever AFB, Colorado, and Sunnyvale, California, and ther

are only two launch sites.2 9 Our launch vehicles and operatin

procedures are not able to respond rapidly to a crisis. 30 Finally

those who can task, communicate with, or even receive informa 

tion from a space system directly are relatively few.3 1

Such functions of the current architecture as communica 

tions, certain intelligence indicators, and missile warnings ar

now provided relatively transparently to the ultimate user

through such existing channels as the tactical information

broadcast system (TIBS), tactical receive equipment (TRE), an

tactical related applications (TRAP). These are excellent exam

ples of a push approach, since the transparency of informa

tion delivery causes users to often be unaware of the contribu 

tions of space systems, or the potential or procedures to ge

additional information.

In practice, the architecture was designed to respond to th

needs of the National Command Authorities and national in 

telligence centers and to support strategic nuclear missions. I

still has these as its top customers and priorities.3 2 The archi

tecture has evolved over the past few years, but it has done s

by exploiting built-in but underused capability, not by chang

ing its basic orientation.

Of course, there are exceptions. The GPS system is on

obvious example with widespread applications. Also, ther

have been numerous Tactical Exploitation of National Capa 

bilities (TENCAP) initiatives by the services, especially sinc

the Gulf War, to make national systems more useful to theate

commanders in chief (CINC) and war fighters. The creation o

the Space Warfare Center and space support teams promise t

bring in some elements of demand orientation, but thes

measures do not change the basic characteristics of the archi

tecture. Access, allocation, and priorities are decided centrally

and there are only a few assets to satisfy many needs.

There are many interrelated reasons for this focus. Securit

has played a major part, since there exists the need to limi

knowledge of our most sophisticated capabilities. Security wil

continue to be a source of tension given a limited number o

assets, since any knowledge of their operating procedure

121
could compromise their effectiveness. A lack of well-docu 

mented requirements for expanded capabilities and in som

cases an inability to articulate requirements from the side o

the war fighter remains a factor. Bureaucratic politics hav

also played a part. Those organizations that in the past suc

cessfully pressed a claim to some control over a capability now

are reluctant to give up any of it. Technology has certainl

been a factor, since for many years our space systems were on

the cutting edge and therefore limited by what was deemed

possible. Cost, which certainly relates to technology, is often 

deciding factor in whether we can do a certain mission an

how it will be done. Finally, national politics, whether of th

visionary or the pork barrel sort, has affected everything from

the direction of space research and development (R&D) to th

nature of our spacelift and space access.

Perhaps the bottom line is that our current space architec

ture was not built as part of a grand design, but rathe

evolved gradually under the pressure of many influences. Pol

icy makers are now struggling with technical, physical, an

bureaucratic inertia, and the various demands of a changed

national security environment, shrinking budgets, and an ex 

ploding technology base to determine the future of our spac

architecture. The question for the next section is whethe

there is a rational way to evaluate these many influences, an

what messages this process might hold for the future direction

of space systems.

Applying Real World Determinants

Even if “ideal” command or demand architectures do no

exist in the real world, it is useful to ask when a bias toward

one approach or the other is appropriate. No general discus

sion can anticipate all the factors that might affect the choic

of a system or architecture. In keeping with the theme of 

framework for comparison, the study proceeds with a method

for applying real-world determinants in the areas of opera 

tional requirements, technology, and budget to the framework

of space architecture elements and attributes.

122
The first step is to identify the determinants, describe how

these challenge assumptions made in the past, and describ

how the determinants interact. Finally, the determinants ar

applied to the generic framework of command or demand ar 

chitectures to show how the inherent assumptions and re 

strictions of each produce different implications.

Real-World Determinants: Requirements

In the real world, requirements are debated endlessly an

often have different meaning to different people. Requirement

also tend to be focused on specific missions or mission areas

at least when formalized as official documents. Though devel

oping detailed requirements in itself implies some analysis

there are a few generic requirements for future space system

that would seem to apply across the board.3 3

The first is that in the uncertain international environment o

the post-cold-war world, we cannot optimize coverage of an

particular region for an indefinite length of time. US interests ar

global, and our potential enemies are both less obvious than th

Soviet Union, and more likely to be changing (this year’s frien

could be next year’s revolutionary trouble spot). Compoundin

this problem is the fact that fewer US forces will be forwar

based, so that much, if not all, of the ground support equipmen

we need to exploit space in response to a crisis will have to b

deployed from the continental United States.

The second requirement is for capabilities to be available a

the earliest possible stages of any crisis. History suggests tha

a prompt and appropriate response to a developing situation

can often obviate the need for a more drastic response later

To make this possible, the United States must have forces

including space systems, that can be on the scene, tailored t

the situation, and fully operational in limited time. The ques

tion is just how short the reaction time must be; shorter i

likely to be better, but at what cost?

The third requirement is that systems be able to function

with little strategic warning and, perhaps in the case of spac

systems, that they provide the strategic warning. In othe

words, systems must not only have short operational and tac

tical reaction times (the issue above) but will have to be adapt

123
able to vastly different types of situations.3 4 Crises of the fu 

ture will tend to pop up unpredictably or else suddenly flar

up after a long period of dormancy to grab the headlines an

demand attention from policy makers. Somalia, the previousl

repressed nationalist and ethnic conflicts in eastern Europ

and the former Soviet Union, and North Korea’s nuclear weap

ons are all recent examples. The dilemma posed by this an

the preceding requirement is that the kind of coverage needed

for global situational awareness is so massive that it will ta

our ability to deploy and operate the systems and assess th

information.

The fourth requirement is that capabilities be flexible enough

to respond to many different types of crises, from large-scal

armored attacks to humanitarian relief operations. Also, the de

mand for the services of our space architecture is likely to ex

pand suddenly and massively. For example, the desire to limi

collateral damage in wartime and the possibilities of precision

weapons have opened the door to potentially huge requirement

for extremely detailed data on short notice. Worldwide deploy

ments in response to crises could mean great surges in deman

for remote, high bandwidth communications capabilities. Th

dilemma is whether to build capabilities that will be insufficien

and then prioritize tasks, build in so much excess capabilit

that unanticipated tasks can be accommodated, or try to aug

ment and update capabilities as required.

The final general requirement is that our systems perform

their functions with little or no delay for processing, analysis

and transmission of information. This has been expressed in

many ways—real time, near real time, and in time—and im 

plies not just the delivery of a product, but its delivery t

exactly the right customers in an immediately useful form. In

a future world where transit through space is used for rapid

delivery of cargo, people, and weapons, these concerns wil

apply to the physical as well as the ethereal.

In summary, the future national security space architectur

will have to function globally, bring its full capability to bea

on an uncertain enemy and situation rapidly, and provid

enough of the right kind of service in near real time. Man

aspects of this situation favor space systems of any kind, bu

124
not without reservation, especially when we must operate in 

constrained budget environment as is discussed below.

Real-World Determinants: Technology

This study does not explicitly evaluate all technologies tha

could contribute to space systems. As in the area of require

ments, there are some trends and general issues that meri

consideration. The first is the general trend away from th

Department of Defense (DOD) leading developments in high

technology sectors of the economy to DOD’s product cycle

trailing far behind those of the commercial world. Arguably

this is a reversal of an historically atypical post-World War I

trend, but the implications for development of future system

are profound. As equipment takes longer to produce, it wil

increasingly include out-of-date components, design practices

and materials. This is true in many militarily significant area

such as microelectronics, though not in certain niche area

such as armor plating and nuclear submarine construction

The question faced is whether space systems are one of thos

niche areas or not.

A related issue is the current trend favoring dual-us

spending for government research and development money

How well do space systems take advantage of this trend? Wil

a dual-use focus allow the government to continue investin

as much as it believes necessary in all the military niches? I

not, what are the priorities in technology development, and d

they support space system requirements?

In specific technology areas, advances over the past few

years have been dramatic. This is particularly true of micro 

electronics and microprocessors. Not only is their capabilit

today much greater than anything expected when our curren

space systems were designed, but progress in the near futur

may be even more rapid. Are military systems in general, an

space systems in particular poised to take advantage of this?

Both military and commercial R&D have made possible ad

vances in command, control, and communications. Highe

bandwidth links, especially using lasers, new methods of com 

pressing information to fit into less bandwidth, more efficien

125
ways of managing communications channels, the developmen

of more autonomous machine capabilities, and the develop

ment of expert systems to reduce human workloads are al

examples. Has the space system design kept up?

Several technologies funded by the Strategic Defense Initiativ

Organization (SDIO) during the 1980s appear close to fruition

now. These include miniaturization of sensors, many spacecraf

components, and the ability to design and build smart struc

tures that provide strength, rigidity or precise alignment, an

vibration control at a fraction of the weight of current designs

Materials technologies, advanced by many different research

and development efforts, also offer a chance to reduce weight o

increase performance of structures and surfaces.

Both the commercial and to a lesser extent the militar

sectors of industry have made progress in the related fields o

standardization, modularity, and flexible manufacturing. 3 5 To 

gether, these capabilities allow products tailored to a specifi

customer’s desires to be produced quickly without requirin

extensive, costly redesign, testing, and fabrication by hand

How well do space systems take advantage of these capabili

ties and trends?

On the negative side, there has been relatively little progres

in recent years in improving spacelift capability. With mino

exceptions, such as the Pegasus small launch vehicle, ou

systems and operating concepts remain closely tied to th

ICBM-derived launchers we have used since the beginning o

the space age.3 6 Concepts that could radically cut costs an

improve access to space would seem to merit high priority, bu

the efforts and results to date have been paltry. 3 7 Is this be

cause of technological hurdles or because of a lack of institu 

tional agreement on what is needed? Can space architectur

comparisons shed any light on this issue?

In general, reviewing technology and technology trend

raises the issue of what are the best choices or combination

for a future space architecture. Does the nature of an archi

tecture affect its ability to apply new capabilities? Do tech 

nologies make possible some things thought unworkable in

the past?

126
Real-World Determinants: Budget

No discussion of real-world determinants would be complet

without the bottom line. Cost has already been raised as a

issue in terms of how much capability we can afford, an

what sort of research and development we will be able t

pursue, so what are the general outlines of the budgetar

determinants?

First, absent a new perceived threat to our national sur

vival, defense budgets likely will continue to decline absolutely

and in purchasing power in the near term. In an effort t

prevent the current military from becoming a hollow force, th

research and procurement accounts of the budget will prob

ably be sacrificed to maintain current readiness. Space sys 

tems are no exception: the prospect for new system starts in

the near term is poor and getting worse, and the acquisition

community seems unable to produce any new answers.3 8 Eve

the development programs in the “black” world, traditionall

thought to have almost unlimited budgets to get their job

done, seem to be feeling the pinch. 3 9

As research, development, and acquisition budgets shrink

there is increasing emphasis on reducing the life-cycle costs o

systems, including operations, maintenance, and disposa

along with procurement. The catch-22 is that building sys 

tems with lower life-cycle costs requires more up-front invest

ment in improved designs. In a worst case, this could mean n

options but incremental upgrades to system designs. Again

this raises the question, do space architecture alternative

offer any way out of this dilemma?

Finally, the budgetary environment raises the question o

whether anything can be done in the national security spac

business to take advantage of the market forces of the com 

mercial sector. Although this issue has mostly been discussed

in terms of the commercial sector providing such services a

launch, communications, and even remote sensing, we should

ask if there are space architectural options that might be mor

adaptable to a world in which market forces, not governmen

priorities, drive most investment decisions.

127
How Do the Determinants Interact?

In discussing the determinants, many of their interaction

have already become apparent. Requirements drive a system

toward greater capability while budgets place limits on wha

can be done, whether in terms of numbers, quality, or th

amount of research and development. Technology, however

can cut both ways. It can force costs higher while enhancin

performance, or it can make a mission possible with fewe

resources than before. Sometimes technology can create new

missions or capabilities, which are very difficult to quantify. 4 0

Generally, the interaction of the determinants produce

questions that must be answered by engineering trade stud

ies. Can enough assets be kept on orbit to cover all situations

Conversely, can an augmentation be deployed fast enough t

matter? Can the ground support equipment needed to mak

use of our space assets be deployed in a timely manner? Wha

is affordable? Is there a way to get more capability for th

same or less money? What are the priorities? Do we/can w

sacrifice missions and reduce manning?

Recognizing the way the determinants interact is crucial

because doing so exposes the steps needed to solve a problem

By way of illustration, consider the process of designing 

satellite. If the design process begins with requirements tha

specify a certain satellite lifetime, those requirements wil

drive several design features such as the quality of parts

redundancy in the system, and the amount of fuel for orbi

maintenance. These features, combined with the mission o

the satellite, determine its weight and orbit, hence the launc

vehicle required. If access to space is expensive, and th

number of satellites being launched is small, requirement

and fiscal pressure will drive the designers to add additiona

capability to each satellite, thus increasing its complexity an

weight. In extreme cases, this could force the satellite to b

launched from a more capable (and expensive) launch vehicle

At this point, recognizing the amount of money being invested

in this single system and the number of requirements it i

intended to fulfill, designers will feel pressure to make it eve

more reliable and longer-lived. This means even higher qual

ity, more redundancy, and so forth. Concurrently, recognizin

128
that the system will be on orbit for many years, designers wil

need to build in additional performance margin. All of thes

activities lengthen the time needed to build, test, and deplo

the satellite, and increase costs dramatically. The result is 

stagnating development system, a dearth of successful new

program starts, and a reliance on modifications to proven bu

often dated designs to keep costs under control. Unfortu 

nately, this is very much the situation that the space researc

and development community finds itself in today. Figure 2 is 

simplified illustration of how the interaction of real-world de

terminants, through three linked cycles of design, perform 

ance, and lifetime raise costs, and how this in turn create

demands for more costly features.

The key to breaking the vicious cycle of space system acqu

sition and getting more capable satellites on orbit rapidly an

Figure 2. Space System Cycles

Source: E. Dionneand and C. Daehnick, “The Future Role of Space Experiments,” American Institute 

Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Paper 92-1697, presented at the AIAA Space Programs and Techno

gies Conference, Huntsville, Ala., 24–27 March 1992, 2.

129
affordably lies in understanding the nature and causes of thi

interaction. Because different types of space system architec

tures address requirements and take advantage of technolog

differently, evaluating those architectural approaches ma

produce some useful insights.

How Do the Determinants Affect Architectures?

Summarizing the determinants in a compact form produce

table 15. If it were possible to represent these determinant

and the elements and attributes of a space architectur

mathematically, the matrix in table 13 or 14 could be cros

multiplied with table 15 to produce a complete description o

an architecture.4 1 Such precision is unlikely to be useful

though, in dealing with qualities that are difficult to estimat

and that often involve value judgments. A more subjective an

qualitative approach is likely to be more useful. 4 2

Two questions need to be answered. What affect do th

determinants have on specific elements of the architecture

and how does one apply the determinants to the attribute-ele 

ment pairs of tables 13 or 14? To illustrate the process, tw

elements of a space architecture are evaluated: the constella 

tion and the launch vehicle. As should be clear from this an

the following section, those elements provide a good repre

sentation of the differences between command and deman

systems, though a complete picture is only possible if th

other elements are incorporated.

Applying the Determinants

The first step is to take a simplified version of the matrix

used for tables 13 and 14 (reflecting only one element) an

add columns for each of the determinants. Money figures bot

as an attribute (cost) and a determinant (budget). This is be

cause money is both a characteristic of design choices (bette

parts cost more) and a sometimes (seemingly) arbitrary re

striction imposed for nontechnical reasons. The matrix is used

to record qualitative implications (derived from observation) o

each of the determinants in table 15 for each attribute of th

selected element. A priority column reflects what was assigned

130
in the previous section, and gives an idea of how to weigh th

implications when assembling an overall conclusion. 4 3 At thi

level, of course, without discussing a particular mission area

specific requirements cannot be formulated. For now, the dif

ferences between command and demand orientation can b

illustrated relatively.

Implications for a Command-Oriented Architecture

From the general principles of a command-oriented sys 

tem—that efficiency or economy of force and therefore cen 

tralization are most important—the implications or features o

the architecture for each element can be surmised. These ar

presented in tables 16 and 17 for the satellite constellation

and the launch vehicle. It’s important to remember that th

effects of various determinants are highly interactive through 

out the architecture.

A few points about the command-oriented architectur

stand out. First, the architecture responds to real-world de

terminants by building relatively small numbers of highly

capable and expensive systems. The space assets are re

Table 15

Space Architecture Determinants

Requirements Technology Budget

Global coverage DOD ability to drive technology In decline, especially for research,

development, and acquisition.

Early access Increased emphasis on dual use Need to reduce life cycle costs

Pop-up crises Microprocessor revolution Can market forces be tapped?

Flexible,

expandable

capabilities

Command, control, and communications improvements

Rapid throughput Miniaturization, structures,

material

Standardization and modularity,

flexible manufacturing

131
placed infrequently, and these factors lead to small number

of launches of relatively high-performance vehicles.4 4 In th

case of each element shown here, the need for reliability i

ensured by building more capability and redundancy int

the hardware and the procedures, a practice which achieve

the goal but at significant cost.45 In turn, the cost of keepin

the system working strongly affects the ability to invest in

radical changes to hardware or operating procedures; thes

simply don’t have the priority to get funded. The result is 

relatively slow evolution of capability, limited ability to ex

ploit commercial developments, and ever-increasing operat

ing costs.

Table 16

Constellation Implications, Command-Oriented Architecture

Priority Implications — Constellation

Constel. Requirements Technology Budget

Performance l Fewer, larger, more

capable satellites

Mission-specialized,

over-designed, long

lead times

Government the sole

customer

Responsiveness w Adapt/exploit existing

capability

Design to customer

spec, leads to “stovepipes”

Add as many

satellites as budget

allows

Flexibility w Add multiple functions Improve C3

, distribution More satellites?

Robustness

l Emphasis on

individual satellite

survival

High mean time

between failure,

redundancy, best

available at tech

freeze

Hardening, counterASAT (antisatellite)

accidents?

Logistics m

Preplanned launch of

spares/replacements Each satellite unique Limited incentive toimprove

Reliability l Likely to need all

satellites at all times

Redundancy on each

satellite, high

reliability parts

Plan for large ground

C

2

 network

Ease of

 operations

m Specialized operators

needed

Focus on ground

segment upgrades

Limited incentive to

try new methods

Environment m

Boost higher or

deorbit Extra fuel No money for nuclear

Cost m

Emphasis on

capability,

regardless of price

Investment leading to

better mission

performance

Space segment a

large portion of life

cycle cost

132
Implications for a Demand-Oriented Architecture

Demand orientation has responsiveness and flexibility as it

overriding goals or principles. To this end, the performance o

any individual piece of the architecture is less important tha

overall capability, with implications as seen below.4 6

The assertion that a demand-oriented architecture will trad

off some capability to save money may make some peopl

uncomfortable, and sounds like the claims of the military re

formers of the early 1980s that our systems were too comple

and expensive to work well. 4 7 In fact, demand-oriented sys 

tems do not try to push the state of the art in technologies

but they do try to take advantage of the most recently avail

able technology and to get it operational faster. This still re

Table 17

Launch Vehicle Implications, Command-Oriented Architecture

Priority Implications — Launch Vehicle

Vehicle Requirements Technology Budget

Performance

l Driven by large

satellite, orbit

Proven designs,

upgrades to

increase payload

Dual-use fine but

government

requirements

primary

Responsiveness m Months of notice Build on launch pad

okay

Minimize

infrastructure

investment

Flexibility m

Vehicle tailored to

satellite

Limited use of standardizationWhatever is needed

to get the job done

Robustness m None built-in, need to

manage risk

Careful procedures,

reduce risk

Better to accept delay

cost than have one

fail

Logistics m Whatever is needed Proven techniques Limited incentive to

reduce

Reliability l

Single loss

catastrophic

Prefer proven

systems

Unlikely to invest in

new concepts

Ease of

 operations

m Large numbers,

contractors needed

Use specialized equipment to meet

performance goal

Little incentive to

invest in

improvements

Environment m Performance still key Expendables, solid

boosters acceptable

Only highly toxic

additives

insupportable

Cost w Need to buy smallnumbers of

expensive vehicles

Refinements such as

payload increases,

but no radical

change

Focus on reducing

research, development, and

acquisition cost

133
sults in capable systems using advanced technology, but doe

not require deployment of a system to wait for programmed

innovation (tables 18 and 19).

As with the constellation, the need for new investment in

launch vehicles appears to be a problem given the real-world

budget determinants. One could argue, however, that the typ

of investments needed by the military closely parallels the typ

of investments needed for the commercial space launch mar 

ket and for emerging markets such as rapid surface-to-surfac

cargo delivery. 4 8 In general, the demand-oriented system i

better positioned to exploit technological advances as they oc 

cur regardless of who has sponsored them.

The type of changes called for—improved operability, re

duced cost-per-pound to orbit, and more rapid response—

Table 18

Constellation Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture

Priority Implications — Constellation

Constel. Requirements Technology Budget

Performance

l Emphasis on

systemic versus

satellite measures

Distributed

architecture, use

most recent

technology

Because of the

requirement for

incorporation of

multiple new

technologies, need

more RD&A money

this is somewhat

offset since many of

the technologies are

being pursued

commercially.

Responsiveness l

Right product

available quickly to

all users

Tailored systems,

rapid build and

launch

Flexibility l Adapt to changing

situation

Standardization,

modularity, C3, onboard processing

Robustness l Proliferate, degrade

gracefully

Autonomy,

distribution, C3, onboard processing

Logistics w

Augment and

replenish

Standardization, modularity

Reliability l

Backup/swing

capability vice

individual system

Redundancy, selfhealing

constellations

Ease of

 operations

w

More systems > need

for standardized

operations

Autonomy, C3, processing, expert

systems

Environment m Boost or deorbit Extra fuel, short-life

orbits No money for nuclear

Cost w

Trade off some

capability for

affordability

Technology investment requirements heavy,

but dual-use a possibility

134
would benefit any architecture, but only the demand-oriented

architecture requires them. In the command-oriented ap

proach, there is little or no incentive to invest in the new kind

of capabilities mentioned above. The type and number o

space systems being deployed, the way in which the architec

ture responds to new requirements or unexpected events, an

the underlying philosophy of what is important all determin

the kind of support infrastructure, including launch.

One other point bears mentioning. Smaller payloads may b

compatible with reduced cost-per-pound to orbit. This goe

against conventional wisdom, since in any aerospace vehicl

the greater the payload, the more the costs can be spread ou

However, just as airlines do not operate 747s on every passen 

ger route, there is a limit to economies of scale through size

Table 19

Launch Vehicle Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture

Priority Implications — Launch Vehicle

Vehicle Requirements Technology Budget

Performance w Less payload needed Aid rapid access to

space

Need for investment

in operability of

launch systems;

requires a shift to a

new kind of vehicle

while keeping

existing capabilities

working through a

transition

Responsiveness l Launch on demand

hours/days Aircraft-like operations

Flexibility l Surge capability Standard interfaces,

reusable vehicles

Robustness l

Multiple vehicles/

launch sites

Ability to operate

from multiple sites 

Logistics l Minimize Reduce special

handling equipment Reduce expenditures

Reliability w

A figure of merit, not

a hard fast

requirement

Only what is

consistent with

safety

Gradual approach;

improve with

practice

Ease of

 operations

l No need for

contractor support

Ability to operate with

reduced support 

Build on aircraft

experience?

Environment w

More launches imply

need to reduce

impact

Reduce noise, toxins,

waste

Avoid cleanup, legal

restrictions

Cost l

Bring down cost per

pound to orbit

drastically

Reusable vehicles,

smaller payloads

Focus on reducing

operations costs

135
First, the vehicle must be purchased and large systems wil

cost more. This drawback is compounded by the need t

spread larger development costs over a (generally) smaller pro 

duction run. In operations, if an airline cannot fill the larg

vehicle, it will not get all of the benefit of that vehicle’s lowe

operating costs per pound of payload. Finally, in the case o

space-lift systems, range (which tends to favor large air vehi

cles) is not a factor since almost all of a launch vehicle’s

energy is used to raise its speed. The benefits of large struc

tures (like wings) are reduced because there is no cruise re

gime, and the penalties are increased (all the mass minus fue

must be accelerated to the final velocity). Although the trade

offs are complicated, the implication is that designing to 

specific payload size is a poor way to build a space-lift sys 

tem.4 9 Maximizing operability and minimizing life-cycle cost i

better. If access is cheap enough, payloads will be redesigned

to fit.5 0

Narrowing the Focus

The above examples are somewhat general and certainly no

as rigorous as possible, and improving them requires addi

tional detail. It may be possible to compare the performance o

space architectures in detail across all mission areas at once

but that is beyond the scope of this study. Comparing th

advantages and disadvantages of command versus deman

systems for a single mission area should illustrate the proces

and provide some additional insights for the big picture.

Architectural Comparison for the Theater

Reconnaissance, Surveillance,

and Target Acquisition Mission

As presented to this point, the framework for architectura

comparison does not say much about when command- o

demand-oriented architectures are preferable. Adding a spe

cific mission focus is the next step.

This section describes the general outlines of theater RSTA

requirements, shows how these affect (or are affected by) th

136
other determinants of technology and budget, and applie

them to the elements and attributes of the competing spac

architectures. This illustrates the method and produces som

useful insights about architectural choices.

Why Examine Theater RSTA?

RSTA is an expansion of the traditional reconnaissance an

surveillance missions.5 1 Theater RSTA is an essential part o

space support to the war fighter since it supports the theate

CINC or his forces.5 2 Although the emphasis on theater-leve

operations may change, currently it serves as the basis fo

most force planning and strategy discussions.5 3

Theater RSTA is a good example, despite limitations on un

classified discussion, because it provides the full range of design

responses—upgrades, diversions to different platforms, or arch

tectural change—to shortcomings identified from operational ex

perience.5 4 Further, it combines the significant issues relating t

space architectures with a mission important enough to high 

light the consequences of making poor space choices.

RSTA Mission Description

The theater RSTA mission involves providing the United

States and the theater CINC awareness, flexibility, and infor

mation needed to respond to actual or potential crises. Thi

ability must be available throughout all phases of an evolvin

situation, from precrisis indications and warning through hos 

tilities to postconflict monitoring. Theater RSTA includes 

wide variety of specific tasks determined by the forces involved

and the information they require, and these tasks are no

solely military, especially in those phases of the situation tha

do not involve armed conflict. Table 20 summarizes these is 

sues conceptually as a prerequisite to determining mission

requirements.

Table 20 focuses on the specific contributions RSTA ca

make to the theater mission. RSTA provides information in 

way that accommodates each phase of the crisis and adapts t

potential enemy action. This adaptation can result in suc

tasks as augmentation and reconstitution. The table does no

137
extend to such derived capabilities as deterrence based on th

enemy’s knowing that his adversary is watching and can re

act. Nor should the table imply that only space forces ca

perform the theater RSTA mission. A space system that per 

forms or supports this mission will have the elements of th

architecture already presented, though many of those ele 

ments will support other missions as well.

Questions for Architectural Comparison

Each part of the RSTA mission raises questions about th

type of architecture needed. In the past, the desire of th

United States to monitor and anticipate crises in “important

Table 20

Theater RSTA Description

Phase Function Meaning/Tasks

Precrisis Monitoring Global basic awareness (framework system)

Emerging

 crisis Access

Quick reaction augmentation for theater of interest

 - improved synoptic coverage

 - gather additional detail; intelligence preparation

 of the battlefield - limited war-fighting capability

 if needed

War Exploit the “high

ground”

Theater-level situational awareness

Timely location of enemy forces, description of their

 activity

Reduce effectiveness of camouflage, concealment,

 and deception

Detect and characterize “indicators,” aid in identifying

 centers of gravity

 Find specific targets; report information to “shooters”

 “in time”

Augmentation as appropriate

Replenishment and/or reconstitution as needed

Postcrisis

Drawdown

redeploy, but

maintain

awareness

Monitoring as necessary

 - unobtrusive; noninvasive if appropriate

Deactivation/redeployment when no longer needed

 - or replenishment and augmentation for continuing

 mission

Source: Air Force Space Command, “Space Primer,” preliminary draft, February 1995, and personal expe

ence in discussing the requirements for future RSTA systems with personnel at Air Force Space Comman

and Air Combat Command in 1992–1993.

138
parts of the world, coupled with fiscal constraints, has mean

that some theaters were much better covered than others.

Keeping in mind the generic requirements of the previou

section, space planners must ask if the national security envi 

ronment of the future will permit the United States to main 

tain the disparity between theaters, or if something like globa

situational awareness or global presence is needed.5 5 If th

United States needs expanded capability, how can our RSTA

forces achieve it, and what can we afford? Likewise, should

the United States continue to place most space RSTA invest

ment in systems that provide highly detailed coverage of rela 

tively small areas of interest? 5 6 At the same time, as precision

weapons delivery capabilities improve and the national leader 

ship’s and American public’s desire for economy of force an

lack of collateral damage demands ever more accurate targe

information, do RSTA systems not also need to provide mor

highly detailed information of more types than ever before

The goal of architectural comparison is to illustrate the trade

offs involved and suggest answers to these questions.

RSTA Mission Requirements

Table 20 shows a need for a time-phased mix of presence

persistence, and access to respond to an emerging geopolitica

crisis. By their nature, space systems will usually be first “on

the scene” and will provide the initial RSTA functions. De

pending on the situation, US objectives, and the means avail

able, additional capabilities to augment the RSTA architectur

in the theater of interest could be deployed. 5 7

A natural example of a RSTA mission is the detection, loca 

tion, tracking, and targeting of theater ballistic missil

launchers. 5 8 Briefly, RSTA assets must be able to aid intelli

gence preparation of the battlefield by gathering information

on bases, operating areas, order of battle, and so forth prior t

any hostilities, keep this information updated as the crisi

evolves, and determine the location of as many launchers a

possible at all times and provide sufficient information fo

targeting. Once hostilities have begun, RSTA systems wil

need to locate as many missiles and launchers as possibl

before they can do any damage to friendly forces, keep track o

139
the missiles

 movements, and provide timely targeting update

to weapons platforms. Qualitatively, an RSTA architecture wil

have to include the features listed in table 21.

These requirements present three challenges to a theate

RSTA architecture. The first concerns sensors. Some of th

requirements are impossible for a single sensor to satisfy si

multaneously, for example, the need for both wide area cover 

age and high-resolution information.5 9 It is also impractical t

put sensors that cover all the relevant spectra—spanning a

least radar to infrared wavelengths—on a single platform.6 0 I

may be impractical, depending on cost and employment con 

straints, to deploy some of the sensor types ideally used in 

given situation.

The second challenge is that the type, quantity, and timeli

ness of RSTA information needs vary considerably among cus

tomers. Aircrews planning missions will need the most curren

threat information for ingress, egress, and the target area

details on aim points; and sufficient information to acquire th

Table 21

Theater RSTA Qualitative Requirements

Quality Requirements

Access All parts of the theater, unrestricted by enemy defenses

Coverage Wide area synoptic plus ability to focus on specific areas

Revisit time Allowable gaps in coverage will depend on target; days for fixed sites

with little activity, hours or minutes for mobile forces

Spectra Sufficient to penetrate weather, camouflage, and foliage, and to aid in

target discrimination and identification

Resolution Consistent with requirements for target identification and status

determination

Geolocation Sufficient to cue other sensors, provide adequate target data to

weapons

Information

 dissemination

Ability to provide enough information of the right kind to all customers in

a timely manner as often as necessary

140
target with onboard sensors and place a weapon 

in the bas

ket.” Campaign planners will need detailed information on

particular targets: hardness, extent, dispersal, other physica

characteristics, and the targets’ use and interaction with othe

aspects of the enemy system. In general, planners need an

information that will help determine the importance of a targe

to the enemy’s war effort, achieve our campaign objectives

and assess the target’s vulnerability to attack. Assemblin

enough information and performing this kind of analysis wil

take time so planners can usually live with somewhat les

reporting timeliness.

In assessing effects, timing, timeliness, and detail are al

important. 6 1 Senior military leaders will want a broad overview

of events in the theater so that they can try to judge if event

are unfolding according to plan. Although to some extent thi

overview can be synthesized from detailed information, tha

approach risks missing the forest for the trees. Policy maker

may want to use RSTA to look for indicators of enemy inten 

tions; thus, they may need to examine in detail areas of littl

use to other RSTA customers. Finally, events may force 

diversion of RSTA to address a task because of its political o

strategic, as opposed to operational, import. 6 2 All of these de

mands for information will have to be accommodated by a

RSTA system.

The third challenge is an outgrowth of the first two. Give

the competing and sometimes conflicting demands for infor

mation, how does the architecture respond? Has the architec

ture been set up to accommodate all users? How can capabili 

ties be augmented? Can national-level capabilities b

dedicated to a theater, and under what circumstances migh

they be recalled? Who “owns” theater RSTA assets? How ca

they be used most efficiently and effectively? Although th

theater war fighter is intended to be the focus of theater RSTA

can the involvement of national-level agencies be avoided

These questions address the issue of who sets priorities fo

use of limited assets and on what they base those decisions

In establishing an architecture, how many requirements ca

be anticipated, and who is best at determining these—a cen 

tral operator or the customer?

141
Space systems will make a contribution to meeting the thea 

ter RSTA requirements. How they do this, what kind of capa 

bilities they will have, and what other issues they raise wil

depend on the choice of architecture.

The Command-Oriented Approach to RSTA

The premise of a command-oriented space architecture i

that the national-level capabilities will provide the first reliabl

indications of a crisis. These capabilities will then be appor

tioned to some extent to support the theater, but the need t

monitor other situations around the world will force compro 

mises. 63 Whatever support can be made available will be allo 

cated by a central authority from a fixed pool of assets, and a

a rule, there would be no augmentation of space capabilitie

that hadn’t long since been planned. If one were to design 

space architecture to support theater RSTA requirements us

ing this approach, the general outlines would appear a

shown in table 22.

Table 22

Command-Oriented Architecture

for RSTA Requirements

Implications of RSTA Requirements

Space Segment Ground Segment Launch Segment

Performance

Emphasis on strategic

needs, tactical met as

collaterial function

High throughput;

centralized tasking

Ensure that standing

capabilities are kept on

orbit; replenishments

launched on schedules

determined years in

advance

Responsiveness Change orbits Provide central direction

to shift assets

Flexibility

A byproduct of built-in

overcapacity

Ability to produce multiple

products centrally; deploy

some functions forward

Robustness Defend, harden Defend, distribute Keep CONUS sites

 operational

Logistics

Prepare to augment for a

long conflict

Deploy comm links,

specialized ground

stations

Prepare to augment for a

 long conflict

Reliability Essential Have skilled technicians

to fix on-orbit problems

Near 100% necessary

Ease of

 operations Secondary to reliability Deploy specialists

Secondary to reliability

142
Table 22 is divided by segment for simplicity and to give a

overall view of the architecture. In general, the effects of apply

ing the requirements of a specific mission are apparent at thi

level, though to see the effect on specific design choices would

require a further breakout.

Technology and budget determinants, as illustrated pre

viously, are to a large extent already included in the abov

table. Some of their key impacts on the command-oriented

theater RSTA space architecture are reliance on a relativel

small number of large satellites, emphasis on ground-based

versus onboard processing of information, and the channelin

of information through central locations.

The command-oriented architecture leans toward centrali

zation for doctrinal and physical reasons. Small numbers o

satellites mean there is little or no slack in the system t

respond to a surge in demand, so a central clearinghouse fo

tasking is established. This central authority is distant from

the theater, both physically and in terms of organizationa

hurdles, since it spends most of its time responding to na

tional-level requests for information.

Centralization also results from the hardware design. Devel

opment and production of large and complex satellites take

years, and designers often cannot anticipate changes in tech 

nology with any certainty. 6 4 Coupled with a lack of standard

interfaces and operating systems on satellites, this makes i

extremely difficult to insert the latest capabilities. The result i

that the processing electronics on a spacecraft will be severa

generations behind what can be put in a ground station; con 

sequently, designers tend to put minimal processing capabilit

into the satellite. 6 5 This results in high data rate downlin

requirements and, in turn, means that a ground statio

equipped to receive and process the signals must have signifi 

cant hardware capability (often peculiar to the system) an

highly trained personnel. Neither of which is conducive to eas

and rapid deployment to the theater.

The type of information disseminated is also affected b

both doctrinal and budget concerns. Because the satellite pro 

vides data in only one form, the ground station must conver

it into something useful. Again, because of the high level o

143
skill required to do this (and potentially because the produc

is subject to interpretation), the command-oriented system

favors centralizing production and working to assemble th

kind of product each user needs. The disadvantage is that thi

takes time, especially when data is coming in quickly an

there are many requests for products. Further, it requires tha

the end users understand the system’s capabilities and limita 

tions to ask for the right product; this often means adaptin

the theater’s operating methods to fit the needs of what i

supposed to be a supporting function.

Observations on the Command-Oriented

Approach to RSTA

Command-oriented space RSTA systems will be best suited

for detecting and responding to the concerns of their primar

customers—national-level authorities. These systems are ca 

pable of producing highly detailed and customized products

and centralized control should ensure that the space system

on orbit are used efficiently but not over tasked. A command

oriented architecture, because it is intended to have virtuall

its full capability on orbit at all times, may provide the maxi

mum available global coverage and situational awareness.

A command-oriented architecture , unless it is uncon 

strained by funding, will respond poorly to surges in demand

especially if those surges occur in parts of the world that d

not have optimum coverage or call for sensors that are no

deployed. In other words, the effectiveness of a command-ori

ented system depends on its designers’ ability to anticipat

specific requirements. Command-oriented systems will suffe

from untimely information distribution, again especially a

times of increased demand, and probably will use stand

ardized products and request formats. These characteristic

will result in a lack of flexibility and produce frustratio

among the customers.

Because the same systems serve all users, the capabilitie

of the systems are determined by the most pressing nationa

needs. Since there are only a few available assets, the prod

ucts of a command-oriented space RSTA architecture will hav

to be carefully protected. Security is necessary to ensure tha

144
enemies, including those not engaged with us at the momen

do not learn so much about our capabilities that they ca

develop effective countermeasures. Unfortunately, these secu 

rity requirements will restrict access to the information. Allie

and even many of our own troops may not have sufficien

“need to know” to get access to the best information available

Finally, a command-oriented architecture gives the theate

CINC little, if any, control over space assets. This does reduc

the decision-making burden on the CINC’s staff, but it als

leaves open the possibility that support from the space sys 

tems will not be provided when needed most.6 6

Two further observations are necessary. The characteristic

of a command-oriented theater RSTA space architecture a

described above are nearly identical to the characteristics o

our current space RSTA systems. One example is in the are

of flexibility. The Defense Support Program (DSP) early warn 

ing satellite, although not intended to support theater wa

fighting, took advantage of certain built-in capabilities in ex 

cess of what was needed for its strategic warning mission t

cue other sensors and weapons in a limited way during th

Gulf War. It’s also apparent that the disadvantages of a com 

mand-oriented space architecture are very close to the com 

monly perceived disadvantages of space systems in general, a

discussed previously. A comparison with a demand-oriented

approach should help answer the question if these are in fac

generic to space systems.

Responses to the Command-Oriented

Approach to RSTA Shortfalls

There are three ways of responding to a shortfall in capabil

ity—by improving or upgrading existing assets, by divertin

missions allocated to one type of system to another one, or b

using the same types of systems in a different architectura

framework. All three have merits, and the first two are bein

vigorously pursued to enhance our theater RSTA capabili

ties. 6 7 Architectural change, which has received less attention

may offer the greatest long-term payoff in providing bette

space RSTA.

145
Upgrades or improvements to the current US RSTA archi

tecture involve speeding up processing times, making mor

information on system capabilities and limitations available t

users in the field, pushing more information to the field (in 

cluding changing rules on classification), producing bette

data fusion, working to eliminate system-specific equipmen

and to provide common terminals and ground stations, an

reducing the number of barriers between theater users an

those who actually control the systems.6 8 Fundamentally

though, the architecture remains the same. Assets are stil

centrally controlled, and the improvements are a matter o

degree, not a matter of kind.

For example, the custom product network allows users a

forward locations to create such custom imagery products a

mosaics of pictures. 6 9 This provides the users the additiona

flexibility of enhancing their intelligence preparation of th

battlefield, but these mosaics are limited to material that ha

been archived or is being sent forward. 7 0 Users must als

consider whether a mosaic picture of the battlefield with eac

piece possibly taken at a different time or by different sensor

is sufficiently accurate for their purposes. For some applica 

tions, this mosaic may be accurate enough, but not for others

In other words, while a step forward, this solution is only 

partial answer.

Another category of solutions is diversion. In the case o

theater RSTA, this means using airborne sensors to cover th

gaps that perhaps are too difficult for space sensors to fill

Airborne sensors also offer such advantages as the ability t

loiter over a particular area for hours or even longer. By em 

ploying unmanned vehicles, reducing payload (and hence ve 

hicle) sizes, and employing low observable features, such plat

forms can provide coverage over otherwise denied areas, thu

incorporating some of the advantages of space systems. 7 1

Aerial vehicles also have drawbacks. They require fairly regu 

lar launch and recovery operations, and because they are lim 

ited to atmospheric speeds, they will have to be based in theate

or fairly close to avoid lengthy transits and the sacrifice of loite

time. These considerations mean aerial vehicles will have a con 

siderable logistics tail, much of which will have to be deploye

146
in the theater. Not only does this add to the number of thing

that are high priority for immediate delivery, but it could com 

plicate the basing and scheduling of other aircraft. Finally

there is the overflight issue. Even though the probability o

detection may be low, a political decision is necessary befor

taking the risk of overflying sensitive territory.

Aerial vehicles offer tremendous possibilities. In some cases

they may be the only way to get close enough to a target t

obtain the right kind and quality of information.7 2 The bes

solution to the theater RSTA problem will undoubtedly incor

porate aerial vehicles, but should they necessarily address al

the disadvantages of a command-oriented system?

Before discussing the demand-oriented architectural ap

proach to theater RSTA, there is one other avenue to improv

today’s capabilities that should be recognized. This might b

called a hybrid of diversion and architectural change, since i

involves using systems that are not under direct military con 

trol to augment military capabilities. For example, the Frenc

Systeme Probatoire pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) imag

ing satellite and the LANDSAT multispectral sensing satellit

provide useful products which have been incorporated int

databases in the past. One might argue that in the future, a

the market for earth observation products grows, the theate

CINC could have a variety of commercial sources from whic

to obtain information.7 3 This idea also has merit, but wit

several caveats. First, depending on the political situation, th

availability of those products to us, our allies, and our adver 

sary is questionable. 7 4 Second, the timeliness of the informa

tion is far from ideal.7 5 Third, the data may arrive in a forma

incompatible with the rest of the theater RSTA architecture

requiring additional processing and further delays. All of thes

concerns indicate that although commercial augmentatio

may be a valuable addition to RSTA capabilities, it may not b

one to rely on in a time of crisis.

The Demand-Oriented Approach to RSTA

The main premise of a demand-oriented architecture is tha

those individuals responsible for the theater, aided by nationa

capabilities, will have the first indications of a crisis and b

147
able to identify additional RSTA needs. A truly demand-ori

ented system will respond by surging and augmenting capa 

bility, including deploying additional space assets tailored t

the situation in terms of orbit and mission payload.76 Table 2

summarizes the demand architecture.

In an extreme form, a demand-oriented architecture would

have a minimum essential capability in place for worldwid

strategic monitoring. On identification of a crisis, the theate

CINC would activate a plan to augment space RSTA capabili

ties. These augmenting assets would be tailored to the thea 

ter’s needs and would be tasked directly by theater forces.

Because these RSTA capabilities would not be at the na

tional level, the security requirements would be less stringen

and the information distribution broader. The space system

themselves would primarily be small, relatively short-lived

systems so it would neither be a major commitment of re

sources to deploy them nor a significant setback if one failed

to work. This implies an extremely responsive space-lift capa 

Table 23

Demand-Oriented Architecture

for RSTA Requirements

Implications of RSTA Requirements

Space Segment Ground Segment Launch Segment

Performance Emphasis on operationallevel needs

Information on demand

to any user

Ability to surge number of

launches

Responsiveness Additional capability

available in days

Tasking at low

operational level 

Orbit satellites within

hours of need

Flexibility Add new satellite types;

autonomous platforms

Interoperable with all

RSTA assets

Deploy different satellites

to different orbits

Robustness Proliferation; replace and

reconstitute as needed Proliferation of equipment Operate from multiplesites

Logistics Reduce number of

unique parts

Minimize unique

equipment

Reusable (or cheap

expendable) vehicles

Reliability High for functions; lower

for individual satellites

On par with other

computers/electronics

High for function, not

individual vehicle

Ease of

 operations

Access and control easy

for users

Standardized equip and

procedures Rapid turn times

148
bility, one that can surge to place potentially dozens of satel

lites in orbit over a few days, and then sustain a launch rat

to augment or replace satellites as needed. For crises of indefi 

nite duration or for a world in which the need to augmen

capabilities occurs on a regular basis, a reusable launch sys 

tem that provides access often and inexpensively offers clea

advantages over an expendable system.

Observations on the Demand-Oriented Approach to RSTA

A demand-oriented architecture offers clear advantages t

the theater CINC in terms of responsiveness to tasking an

the ability to tailor the coverage to the situation. Because o

the proliferation of satellites, it offers the ability to get close t

continuous observation of the theater from space. In a futur

situation in which an enemy could threaten some or all as

pects of our space architecture, the demand-oriented ap

proach is clearly more robust than a command-oriented one

It presents the enemy with a proliferated and distributed tar

get set both in space and on earth. Each of the targets i

relatively small and insignificant in itself, and there are n

critical nodes that will cause the whole system to cease func

tioning. Because of proliferation, the architecture is also les

vulnerable to accident or natural disaster.

On the other hand, the distributed architecture will have 

less capable initial configuration than the command-oriented

system, and augmenting it will take a finite amount of time.7 

Also, because of the smaller size of the spacecraft, there ar

missions they will not perform as well as the satellites of 

command-oriented architecture. Perhaps most critically, th

demand-oriented architecture requires a satellite building an

launching capability that the United States does not currentl

possess, but which is attainable. 7 8

Assembling a Workable Theater RSTA Architecture

Satisfying theater RSTA requirements takes more capabilit

than any one class of solution can bring to the table. Th

above discussion explains how the current, command-ori

ented US space architecture cannot meet all the requirements

149
It also shows that each of the potential enhancements to tha

system has drawbacks, making it unlikely to solve the prob

lems alone. Because the eventual solution will take the form o

a hybrid architecture, there will be many challenges to ensur

ing the entire network of systems is interoperable in terms o

communications, ground stations, databases, geographic co 

ordinate references, and so forth. There are numerous initia 

tives under way to make the best use of the United State

considerable assets.

The class of solution that has received the least attention t

date is the potential to build a space architecture that bot

takes advantage of the unique characteristics of space an

provides the theater user the control and responsiveness he o

she needs—in other words, a demand-oriented architecture

This type of solution offers considerable potential, but wil

require work in both technological and doctrinal areas. B

helping to identify the key issues, a framework for architec

tural comparison may advance the process.

Utility of A Framework

for Comparing Architectures

Previous sections have built and elaborated on a framework

for describing and comparing space architectures. This sec

tion answers some of the questions raised in the process an

consolidates observations in four areas. First, the distinguish

ing characteristics of the command- and demand-oriented ap

proaches are reviewed. Second, these characteristics are used

to define which perceived disadvantages of space are inheren

and which are a result of design choices. Third, the key effort

needed to overcome those design disadvantages are identified

and finally, the contribution that having a framework make

to this process is discussed.

Distinctions between Command- and

Demand-Oriented Architectures

Command- and demand-oriented architectures can be dis 

tinguished by physical, temporal, and philosophical differ 

150
ences. The physical ones are the most obvious—satellite siz

and number and launch vehicle size and type. Command-ori

ented architectures will have fewer, larger, and more comple

space systems. Those systems will individually be more capa 

ble than those of a demand-oriented system. Space lift will b

an infrequent activity that is scheduled far in advance an

optimized to lift the maximum weight into orbit per launch. In

demand-oriented systems, satellites might be built to perform

a specific mission and would be more likely to use off-the

shelf components than custom-designed ones. Although les

complex overall, demand-oriented satellites will be “smarter

More of the navigation, system management, communication

and information processing capabilities will be on orbit tha

in a command-oriented architecture. Information from a satel

lite is more likely to be broadcast or directly downlinked t

end users than in the command-oriented system.

The temporal differences are of two types. First, systems fo

the command-oriented architecture will take longer to design

build, and deploy. Technology will be inserted more slowl

than in a demand-oriented system, and satellites will be de

signed to last longer. Demand-oriented satellites could b

built on short notice and for relatively short (months instea

of years) duration missions. The second type of difference is in

the response of the system to new situations. A demand-ori

ented architecture can be reconfigured rapidly and is designed

from the beginning to provide the fastest possible response t

its users. The command-oriented architecture changes slowly

if at all, in response to changing situations on the ground, an

tends to sacrifice timeliness of information for precision.

Underlying the physical and temporal difference are th

philosophical or doctrinal ones. In a command-oriented sys 

tem, efficiency and economy of force are the driving principles

which lead to centralization both of command and control an

of information distribution. In a command-oriented architec

ture, the designers assume that a central authority not onl

has the greatest ability to control tasking and distribution bu

is also best postured to decide upon priorities. In contrast, 

demand-oriented architecture is built around the principles o

flexibility and responsiveness, under the assumption that th

151
end users of a system

s product are best able to determin

priorities and control tasking. Both control and dissemination

of information (or execution) are distributed and decentralized

leading to a more robust but somewhat anarchical and ineffi 

cient system.

Command-oriented architectures are inherently better suite

to missions having long-term and reasonably predictable re

quirements. Demand-oriented architectures in contrast are bes

suited to those missions that are unpredictable, may involv

sudden changes in the capabilities needed, and could conceiv 

ably be of short duration. A command-oriented architecture em 

phasizes efficiency by making best use of assets in place, bu

this requires excellent long-range planning. A demand-oriente

architecture relies on the ability to react and adapt quickly t

new situations, even if this means accepting less than optimum

use of assets. Paradoxically, for unpredictable situations, th

demand-oriented architecture may be the most efficient one. B

allowing rapid changes in capability, it prevents the architectur

from having to be overdesigned initially and, by providing a mor

rapid and tailored response, it may preempt the need for a large

or longer term commitment.

The Inherent Disadvantages of Space

Here is a recap of the list of perceived space disadvantage

from table 9.

• Distance

• Predictability of movement (to the enemy)

• Poor continuity, meaning

— lack of dwell time (a low-earth-orbiting satellite has 

point on the ground in view for only about 10 minute

out of every orbit)

— gaps in revisit time (the ability to have a specific mis 

sion capability over a specific point on the earth wit

sufficient frequency)

• Poor responsiveness

— (strategic) to crises the systems were not designed for

— (operational) to theater requirements

152
• Inflexibility for retasking

• Unsatisfactory timeliness/distribution of information

• Vulnerability to attack or natural disaster

• Need to operate in a harsh environment

• Cost

Are there any lessons from the foregoing architectura

comparisons concerning which of these disadvantages ar

inherent and which are design dependent?

Distance is an intrinsic disadvantage. There are some mis 

sions where proximity is needed, and to be in space a platform

must be in a sustainable orbit, generally accepted as at least 9

miles above the surface of the earth.7 9 As a result, these are th

closest approaches a space system can make.8 0 Other practica

concerns may push this minimum higher, but to keep things in

perspective, our airborne systems will sometimes have to oper 

ate at similar ranges from the target to see deep with reasonabl

security and have to look through more air in the process.8 1 Th

other aspect of this drawback is that this distance is vertical

Considering the high speeds needed to achieve orbit, a larg

increase in kinetic and potential energy is needed to enter spac

from earth. As a result we have not yet been able to deploy spac

systems routinely and inexpensively.

Predictability is also inherent in orbital systems, but wit

significant caveats. First, orbital mechanics is not determinis 

tic; knowing a satellite’s location precisely requires frequen

observations. Unless the satellite is in a synchronous orbi

orbital perturbations will change its path from what has bee

predicted in a relatively short period of time. 8 2 This phenome

non is compounded if the satellite has the ability to perform

even small maneuvers (especially if out of sight of enemy sen 

sors). 8 3 With the addition of decoys, a satellite could leave eve

relatively sophisticated adversaries uncertain as to the actua

time that they were being overflown. 8 4 Maneuvers cost fuel

which in turn shortens the life of the satellite, but this could

be overcome either by deliberately designing the rest of th

satellite to last a short time (and thus saving money) or possi

bly by refueling the satellite on orbit. In other words, although

maneuver of an orbiting body is difficult, relatively small ma

153
neuvers can have substantial effects. The disadvantages o

predictability can largely be overcome.

Continuity is clearly a function of design, and usually be

comes an issue because of cost constraints. If enough satel

lites are built cheaply and if launching them and maintainin

them in orbit is affordable, there is no physical reason wh

space systems could not provide continuous coverage over an

part or all of the globe. This is due now with GPS (24 satel

lites), Iridium (66 satellites), and Teledesic (approximatel

eight-hundred satellites). Communications constellations wil

also provide coverage from much lower orbits. The problem i

that in lowering the altitude to overcome the distance problem

the number of satellites needed rises considerably, whic

complicates the cost and command and control issues. Use o

advanced technologies such as standardization and modular 

ity, flexible manufacturing, and autonomous spacecraft opera 

tions make the problems manageable; however, these ap

proaches clearly fit more closely into a demand-oriente

architecture.

Responsiveness and flexibility are strongly architecture de

pendent. An architecture that can be tailored to an emergin

situation on the ground would provide good strategic flexibility

An architecture that can be rapidly augmented to provide addi

tional capabilities will fulfill the needs of operational users. 

command-oriented system by its nature is ill-suited to thes

kinds of adjustments; however, and our lack of a responsiv

spacelift capability makes the problem worse. Even if we had 

launch-on-demand system, a command-oriented architectur

would not be flexible and responsive. This is due to the long lea

times for satellite building, the requirement that they last a lon

time, the cost of each satellite, and our operating procedure

that put most of the maintenance and control functions on th

ground, and thus require large numbers of operators.

Less obvious, but equally important, is the fact that th

architectural philosophy strongly influences the responsive 

ness of spacelift systems. Although it is desirable to be able t

launch satellites rapidly, a command-oriented architectur

may hinder the development of rapidly responsive launch ca 

pabilities. Since the command-oriented architecture is ill

154
suited to take advantage of these capabilities, it provides littl

incentive to justify the development costs of a revolutionar

kind of space access which we only use a few times a year.8 5

Timeliness also is a function of design. Even a command-ori

ented system, given sufficient motivation, can push information

through its bottlenecks quickly on occasion. By removing th

choke points of centralized processing and control, a demand

oriented system can respond rapidly to almost any request.

Vulnerability, whether to enemy action or to mishap, ca

also be greatly reduced by design. The more systems there ar

on orbit, the smarter those systems are, the more pathway

available for information transmission, the more launch sites

and the more ground sites capable of tasking the satellites

the less chance there is that loss of any one component wil

seriously affect the system. Because this is the case, eac

component could be designed and tested to less stringen

specifications, which would make the cost of proliferating sys 

tems more bearable.

The need to operate in a harsh environment is an inheren

feature of space systems. But what is the answer to this prob

lem? Long system life is seen as a plus, but this seems t

tackle an environmental disadvantage head on. It also adds t

the cost and technological backwardness of spacecraft by in 

creasing their weight and complexity and thus lengthening th

time needed to design, build, test, and deploy them. Muc

cheaper systems could operate perfectly well for more limited

periods, so that in the long run responsiveness could be im 

proved at no greater cost. This disadvantage of space show

that alternative architectural approaches can mitigate eve

inherent limitations of the operating environment.

Cost is a drawback for space systems, but it may not be a

insurmountable barrier. Cost is driven by many things, bu

two stand out—the satellite itself and the cost of access. Man

current satellites are extremely expensive, but so are aircraf

carriers and B-2 bombers. Just as not all ships and aircraf

are as expensive as those premier systems, neither are al

satellites. In fact, by taking advantage of new technologies an

methods as described throughout this study, individual satel

lites could be produced relatively inexpensively. 8 6 As fo

155
launch, the combination of demand for responsiveness, ro 

bustness, and low operating costs with the potential of im 

proved design and construction capabilities could finally pro 

vide the incentive to pay the up-front costs of developing 

radically improved spacelift system. There will always be 

price to pay for having an advanced capability, but it need no

be exorbitant.

From the discussion above, the intrinsic disadvantages o

space systems appear to be distance and harsh environmen

The rest are essentially a function of two things: the design

choices made in developing the space architecture, and th

difficulty (cost and slowness) of access to space which is als

related to architectural design choices. Even the intrinsic dis 

advantages of space are no worse than the intrinsic disadvan

tages of air or the ocean in the sense that properly designed

systems will always be needed to exploit the environment.

The Key Factors Needed to Overcome

Design-Driven Disadvantages

The features of a demand-oriented architecture enabl

space system designers to make better use of rapidly evolvin

technology. At the same time, that technology may make som

of the features of a demand-oriented architecture possible. Fo

example, by taking advantage of a standardized and modula

spacecraft design, including operating system software, futur

military space operators could draw from a stock of subsys 

tems and essentially “bolt” together a satellite in a few hours.8 

Since the design and interfaces would be standardized, 

minimum amount of testing would be needed before the sys 

tem was deployed. Using an advanced internal architecture

the basic components could be assembled to support severa

different missions.8 8 Sensor or other mission payload package

could likewise be designed to fit the standard interfaces.

By assembling a satellite shortly before launch, operator

could incorporate the latest in processor and storage technol

ogy. 8 9 Just-in-time assembly would produce better perform 

ance on orbit and would cut down on the stockpiles of part

that would have to be continually maintained.9 0 With im 

proved on-orbit performance, satellites could do more fo

156
themselves including autonomously navigating, maneuvering

and monitoring their own health and status. Except for emer 

gency situations, the amount of ground support needed by th

satellite could be reduced to almost zero, making the addi

tional support costs of proliferated constellations small. Th

additional processing capability would also allow the satellite

to provide different kinds of products directly to the users, fo

example, on-board target detection processing and cuein

other sensors or combat forces with target type and location

At the same time, the satellite could pass a full image of a

area already annotated with detected targets to theater head

quarters for correlation with other sources and send unproc 

essed raw data to a central location for evaluation of the satel

lite’s performance. This ability has the potential to make RSTA

systems much more decentralized and available to multipl

users. 9 1

An architectural approach resulting in a proliferation o

autonomous and potentially maneuvering satellites on orbit an

increasing transits of space will strain existing ability to monito

activity in space. At some point, an enhanced space surveillanc

capability will need to be deployed, one that can adapt to thi

new environment.9 2 This will probably include space-based sen 

sors and a new concept of space traffic control.

Technology trends seem to favor the demand-oriented ap

proach. As more advanced capabilities become part of th

commercial sector, particularly in electronics and software bu

also in materials, design, and manufacturing, our nationa

security space architecture will be challenged to adopt th

capabilities ever more rapidly. In many cases, the technologi

cal advantage among military forces will go not to the countr

that can develop the best technologies, but to the one that ca

best exploit new technologies regardless of the source. In 

similar vein, technological advantage is becoming more per 

ishable, and it is ill-advisable to lock into a specific technolog

for 20 plus years. The key to exploiting the trends in technol

ogy is to change design philosophy to one that not only ac

cepts early obsolescence but plans for it. This will undoubt

edly prove uncomfortable to some (as it does to any persona

computer buyer who finds a cheaper and better system on th

157
market a month later), but it is also the key to adapting to 

rapidly changing environment and to making swift progress

thus staying ahead of rivals.

Inevitably, the concept of a demand-oriented architecture wi

depend on the performance and cost-effectiveness of small satel

lites, sometimes called lightsats. Space systems can be buil

rapidly and affordably only if size, weight, and complexity ar

reduced.9 3 Lightsats have numerous critics as well as advo

cates.9 4 Because of progress in miniaturizing components an

subsystems, there is substantial reason to believe that perform 

ance goals can be achieved, especially if those performance goal

are realistic, that is, based on need rather than want.9 5 A mor

debatable proposition is whether satellites can ever be chea

enough to be routinely considered for short duration (three to si

months) or special purpose missions.9 6

Taking advantage of commercially available equipment an

relatively large production runs and using smaller, mor

modular spacecraft would dramatically reduce the cost of eac

satellite.9 7 This would be of little use, however, if launch cost

were not also dramatically decreased. 9 8 The preceding section

should make it clear that rapid, affordable space lift is a criti

cal issue in moving toward the advantages of a demand-ori

ented space architecture. 9 9 Advocates of improved space capa 

bility for the United States should make the development o

greatly improved spacelift an overriding priority.

How Does an Architectural Comparison Framework Help?

The Department of Defense has recognized the need for 

coordinated approach to developing future space capabilitie

and has designated a deputy defense undersecretary for spac

acquisition and technology programs.100 Building on this con 

cept, the Air Force has proposed seven strategies to improve th

space capabilities of the United States.101 Both actions imply 

recognition that future space capabilities must be considered in

a holistic sense. Addressing problems or pursuing opportunitie

in just one area—satellite size, launch systems, command an

control, or operational concepts—at best leads to suboptimiza 

tion and at worst leads to poor conclusions by assuming awa

key issues or ignoring interdependencies. To avoid this pitfall

158
some method of describing what a space architecture is an

how its components interact is needed.

The framework for architectural comparison presented in

this paper is a foundation for thinking about the real differ 

ences between alternative approaches to designing space sys 

tems. With considerable expansion, it could serve as the basi

for quantitative comparisons between different architectura

designs. At this point, however, its main value is in providin

some qualitative boundaries to the debate and helping t

frame questions about both space system hardware and th

underlying operational philosophy or doctrine. By highlightin

the nature and extent of the differences between comman

and demand orientation, their respective advantages and dis 

advantages, and the relationship of the architectural feature

to real-world determinants, the framework also opens the wa

to discussion of what doctrinal or physical changes are desir 

able in future space systems.

Summary and Implications

This study has explored the possibility of using the concept

of command and demand orientation to describe not only th

way information might flow in a space system but also t

encompass the nature of the entire space architecture includ

ing hardware, facilities, and operational procedures. To giv

this expanded definition of command and demand orientation

meaning, the study presented a framework for describing an

ultimately comparing space architectures in terms of thei

physical elements, operational and other attributes, and th

real-world factors determining how an architecture will look

and perform.

This approach appears to have some utility. Although th

distinctions that the study draws between command- and de 

mand-oriented architectures are largely qualitative, they ar

real and unambiguous. Command orientation manifests itsel

in a centralized system with extensive ground control; a rela 

tively small and fixed number of large, highly capable on-orbi

assets; and a spacelift capability driven by reliability and th

need to launch on schedule. In contrast, a demand-oriented

159
architecture will be decentralized and distributed with mor

processing and control functions in orbit, a relatively larg

number of smaller satellites that can be augmented in a shor

period of time, and an emphasis on system-wide (constella 

tion) performance as opposed to the performance of an indi

vidual satellite. Demand-oriented systems, unlike command

oriented systems, favor satellites that can be built quickly an

affordably using the latest off-the-shelf technology. Demand

oriented architectures will tend to allow more users at a lowe

organizational level to communicate directly with the satellite

and will delegate authority to task space systems to the opera 

tional level. The spacelift capability required by a demand-ori

ented architecture must be responsive and be able to surge t

augment on-orbit capabilities.

An architecture with demand-oriented characteristics als

appears to be the only viable alternative if in the future a

enemy contests the right to use space freely. The demand-ori

ented approach is inherently more robust, able to absorb

damage, and able to respond with augmented or replenish

ment capability. A command-oriented architecture, because o

the centralization and the criticality of each asset, is less ro 

bust in the face of attack or mishap. Although the concept o

wars extending to space is not yet widely accepted, spac

superiority has not yet become an issue in a conflict, and a

present the threat seems minimal in both a strategic an

tactical sense similar to the threat of aircraft to surface ship

before World War II—this is an issue that space planner

should not ignore.

The contrast between command- and demand-oriented ar 

chitectures reveals that many of the disadvantages tradition 

ally associated with space systems—among them predict

ability, inability to provide continuous coverage, and poo

responsiveness and flexibility—are more a function of archi

tectural design characteristics than the inherent limitations o

the environment. With the right approach to space system

design, much more can be achieved in space than expected

On the other hand, failure to separate fundamental or intrin 

sic limitations from those imposed by design choices can lea

to less overall capability by producing faulty assumptions.

160
It should come as no surprise that the current US nationa

security space architecture is predominantly command ori

ented with the associated advantages and disadvantages

Since this is the only architecture that most space planner

are familiar with, it is also unsurprising that many planner

think of those advantages and disadvantages as intrinsic t

space systems. Furthermore, the United States tremendou

investment in existing systems and the undeniably superb

capabilities of those systems encourage the development o

incremental improvements rather than wholesale changes in

equipment or concepts of operations.

Although this situation has valid historical and technica

roots, changes over the past several years in the geopolitica

environment have reshaped basic assumptions about require

ments and budgets. Budgetary reality means that the United

States cannot respond to additional needs by deploying mor

of the existing kind of systems; it’s simply not affordable

Emerging requirements clearly point to the need for a mor

demand-oriented architecture, at least to augment the com 

mand-oriented “backbone” in times of crisis, if not to provid

the bulk of the space support to regional or theater CINCs

Providing a fundamentally different architecture is the bes

way to be responsive to the needs of the theater war fighters

to convince those war fighters that space assets will always b

there when needed, and to encourage full use of the advan

tages of space.

Demand-oriented architectures require not only the devel

opment of new procedures, but the exploitation of new tech 

nology. Technological trends—in computing power, structures

materials, and design techniques, such as standardized inter 

faces and modular construction, enable a break from the vi 

cious cycle of increasing cost and complexity that space sys 

tems are now in and allow for more rapid deployment o

modern systems. Harnessing the capabilities in those tech 

nologies will make possible smaller, less expensive, but stil

highly capable space systems. The same trends also make i

imperative that we assess our current doctrine and practices

since failure to recognize and adapt to a changing environ 

ment could allow an enemy to leap ahead of us in capability.

161
To take advantage of the potential of demand-oriented sys 

tems, some obstacles must be overcome. These obstacles ar

two-fold. First, planners are saddled with outdated assump

tions about what space systems can and should do. Th

United States lacks a coherent strategy for controlling an

exploiting space that could help shape military doctrine an

direct system development efforts. Second, the ability t

change the nature of space architectures depends heavily on

creating a much more responsive and inexpensive spacelif

capability. Unfortunately, the nature of the current nationa

security space architecture does not produce sufficient incen 

tives to develop that new type of spacelift.

The United States needs to move toward more rapid exploi

tation of technological opportunities vice comprehensive, dedi

cated leading edge development. This process needs to b

made routine so that a space architecture can adapt mor

rapidly when hit with surprises or opportunities. Since it’s

impossible to anticipate everything, flexibility must be buil

into future space assets—but at the “architectural” level, no

by creating heroically capable individual systems. Perhaps th

ultimate test of a space architecture is whether it encourage

or retards this flexibility.

Recognizing that the United States cannot, and should no

completely abandon the type of space systems that hav

served it well for over 30 years, there are still some usefu

steps to be taken. Strategy and doctrine for decentralized

space operations keyed to supporting the theater CINC

should be developed from a clean sheet of paper, with n

preconceptions as to what is possible. A detailed analysis o

the potential for demand-oriented systems to respond to re

quirements and technological opportunities in several mission

areas should be conducted. Development of a spacelift system

that provides rapid, reliable, and inexpensive access to spac

must be given the highest priority, with the payload such 

system carries treated as a measure of merit, not specified in

a requirement. To demonstrate the possibilities of new types o

space systems, DOD should promote a design-to-cost compe

tition for small satellites to perform various missions, an

should encourage the development of modular designs an

162
standard interfaces. If such steps are taken in parallel—and i

is important to recognize that strategy, doctrine, technology

cost goals, and perhaps above all, the ability to get usefu

payloads into orbit as quickly and as often as the strateg

demands, are linked—the next few years could see the emer 

gence of a new space architecture.

Fundamentally, the choice of an architectural approach in

developing future space systems matters. We first need to recog

nize that there are viable alternative approaches. To understan

the nature and implications of those alternatives, we need 

common basis for discussion and comparison. The framewor

presented in this study is a first step in that direction.

In the words of Air Force Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold in 1945

“National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whos

doctrines and techniques are tied solely on the equipment an

process of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in

progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrine

ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, ca

only delude the nation into a false sense of security.”102 Th

words are as relevant for space forces as they have been fo

the Air Force, and as applicable today as ever.

Notes

1. This study is concerned with national security as opposed to th

commercial or civil sector of space operations and with the near-eart

region (both terms as defined in Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Doctrine, Tactic

Training, and Procedures [JDTTP] 3-14, Space Operations, 15 April 199

because these are the areas of immediate concern to the US military, an

because the ability to exploit near-earth space will be the foundation for an

future, wider ranging endeavors. This focus does not preclude discussion o

issues that overlap with other sectors, such as the relevance of the commer 

cial sector to our launch and technology development.

2. The terms command oriented and demand oriented were used in Ai

University’s 1994 SPACECAST 2020 study. Traditionally, those terms hav

been used to describe the information flow in a system, but they seem t

have implications for every aspect of a space architecture. In part, thi

paper arose from a need to more fully explain and justify those terms an

ideas.

3. This environment has a single major adversary, a focus on strategic

nuclear intelligence needs, an overriding national priority that demand

performance with little regard for cost or operational difficulties, and a

163
organizational and security structure with 

stovepiped systems with littl

interoperability or connectivity to conventional military forces. Historian R

Cargill Hall, in “The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framin

American Astronautics to Serve National Security,” unpublished essay

January 1994, 2, says that our “astronautical enterprise” was “impresse

with a near-indelible Cold War seal” by its origins. See, for example, th

Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force in Space in the 21st Century, Executiv

Summary (Washington, D.C.: the Panel, 1992); Gen Charles A. Horne

commander in chief, US Space Command, “Space Seen as Challenge, Mil

tary’s Final Frontier,” prepared statement to the Senate Armed Service

Committee, 22 April 1993; Gen Charles A. Horner, “Space 1990 and Beyon

. . . The Turning Point,” presentation to the US Air Force Today & Tomorro

conference; Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, “Space: A New Strategic Frontier

undated essay, 14–15; and John T. Correll, “Fogbound in Space,” Air Forc

Magazine , January 1994, 22–29.

4. I. B. Holley, “Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft,” A

University Review , September–October 1983, 10.

5. I am more accustomed to the term capabilities and limitations. Also 

use advantage to avoid confusion with joint publications which use th

word capability to mean the ability to perform a specific type of mission.

6. For example, altitude (a characteristic of air or space systems) offer

the possibility of seeing farther, but it requires being able to see far enoug

(meaning resolving those things of interest from the background) and over 

coming or living with obscuration.

7. Old methods can be perpetuated beyond their useful limits. For 

discussion of the persistence of the horse cavalry and the lessons for spac

forces, see Brig Gen Bob Stewart, USA, Retired, untitled address to th

Space Support to the Warfighter Conference, Peterson AFB, Colo., 15 De 

cember 1993.

8. Joint Pub 3-14, III-2 to III-5. This definition appears to imply tha

space systems offer no unique capabilities, so it doesn’t help in derivin

space “advantages.”

9. Ibid., chap. 2.

10. Platform speed and weapons range are based on the environmen

(gravity, composition, etc.) and make the extent of the environment irrele 

vant in some cases. Does it matter how far a satellite travels to perform it

mission? No, what matters is the amount of time it takes.

11. Air Force Space Command, “Space Primer,” preliminary draft, Febru 

ary 1995.

12. Ibid., 7.

13. SPACECAST 2020 Executive Summary (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Un

versity, June 1994), i.

14. An example is a prohibition on basing weapons of mass destructio

in orbit per the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, “The Treaty on Principles Govern

ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spac

including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”; and Joint Pub 3-14, A-5. I

164
other words in international law there is no legal basis for 

closing space o

restricting access to it, even if it were physically possible. The continuity o

the medium ensures that once in space a spacecraft has access to th

entire planet’s surface. Of course, space could become a battleground in th

future, as the high seas have been in the past.

15. A low-earth-orbiting satellite has a point on the ground in view fo

only about 10 minutes out of every orbit. Revisit time is the ability to have 

specific mission capability over a specific point on the earth with sufficien

frequency. Vulnerability of a satellite requires some elaboration. Although 

can be difficult to physically reach a deployed satellite, some, especially i

low orbits, could be vulnerable to directed energy weapons, ECM or physic

attack. Weight is at a premium, and spacecraft themselves are usually quit

“soft.” Many ground stations are relatively soft targets. Launch facilities fo

current systems are also vulnerable to terrorist or other attack or to natur

disaster.

16. This can go the other way also, as seems to be the case with th

Global Positioning System largely replacing terrestrial navigation systems.

17. Examples of this in the commercial sector are the Motorola Iridium

and Microsoft/McCaw Teledesic communications satellite concepts which

because of a desire for global coverage and other requirements, use rela 

tively large numbers of low-earth-orbiting constellations rather than trad

tional geosynchronous platforms. Although neither is yet deployed, Iridium

is approaching deployment on or ahead of schedule. William B. Scott, “Irid 

ium on Track for First Launch in 1996,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 

3 April 1995, 56–61. Teledesic is pressing ahead with launch options an

other advance planning.

18. Referred to as the “tyranny of the payload.” The Honorable Sheila E

Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, address to the National Security Indus

trial Association, Crystal City, Va., 22 March 1994, 3.

19. This study differs from AFDD-4, Space Operations Doctrine, 1 Ma

1995, which lists three elements: space, ground, and the “link,” whic

primarily means communications. The identification of space, ground an

launch segments, and the breakdown into more specific elements, is bot

more in line with traditional space system descriptions and more useful i

forming an architectural comparison. Dr. James R. Wertz and Dr. Wiley 

Larson, eds., Space Mission Analysis and Design (Dordrecht, The Nether

lands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 9–10.

20. I base this on my experience in conducting the operational analysi

of the SPACECAST 2020 study, on my education as an astronautical engi 

neer, and on various texts and short courses on space system design in 

cluding TRW Space and Technology Group, TRW Space Data Book , 4th ed

(Redondo Beach, Calif.: TRW S&TG Communications, 1992); Wertz an

Larson; and James R. French and Michael D. Griffen, “Spacecraft System

Design and Engineering,” short course presented as part of the America

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Professional Studies Serie

14–15 February 1990.

165
21. Steven R. Petersen, Space Control and the Role of Antisatellite Weap 

ons (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, May 1991), 72; and Mark H

Shellans and William R. Matoush, “Designing Survivable Space Systems

Aerospace America, August 1992, 38–41.

22. Stephen J. McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot: Centralized versu

Organic Control (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994).

23. An example is the “push” orientation of certain intelligence inform

tion, meaning that everything available that meets certain broad parameter

is forwarded. The system makes little attempt to respond to the “pull” o

specific requirements from the field.

24. An imperfect but helpful analogy would be to contrast Marine Corp

air organization and doctrine, particularly for close air support, to that o

the US Air Force. McNamara.

25. Joint Pub 3-14, III-5.

26. Based on functional descriptions in Air Force Space Command

“Space Primer.”

27. Unclassified sources typically list about 60 national security sate

lites, a third of which are in the Navigation Satellite Timing and Rangin

(NAVSTAR) GPS constellation, to perform missions worldwide. Paul B

Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Inst

tution, 1987).

28. This assertion can only be inferred indirectly from comments i

unclassified literature, For example, Adm William O. Studeman in “Th

Space Business and National Security: an Evolving Partnership,” Aerospac

America , November 1994, 27, says that the United States is “living off th

resources of the past. The space inventory in orbit today is generally les

capable than that in orbit during Desert Storm.”

29. This does not include sites dedicated to operating classified system

or the numerous sites of the Air Force Satellite Control Network. The forme

are examples of stovepiping in specific functional areas, and the latter ar

manifestations of a command-oriented architecture, not of a decentralize

or distributed command and control system, as is explained in the section

which follow. Since some orbits can only be reached from one of thes

launch sites, in effect we have no backup in case that site should becom

unavailable.

30. The United States would need two to three months to replace 

satellite that failed unexpectedly. Some satellite and launcher combination

would take nearly a year to replace. Horner, “Space 1990 and Beyond,” 11.

31. The exception to this, of course, is the GPS constellation, since it is 

broadcast system.

32. According to Martin Faga, budget cuts “translate into less service fo

policymakers and intelligence consumers.” Bill Gertz, “The Secret Mission o

the NRO,” Air Force Magazine , June 1993, 60–63. See also Horner, “Spac

1990 and Beyond,” 5; and Studeman, 29.

33. The general nature of the requirements is apparent in A Nationa

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Th

166
White House, July 1994), and current US National Security Strategy, an

the Department of the Air Force, Global Presence 1995 (Washington, D.C

Government Printing Office [GPO], 1995).

34. As opposed to the cold war situation, in which the predominan

strategic concern was a large-scale conflict with the Soviet Union, the ind

cators of an emerging crisis could be developed and refined over years, an

systems could even be built specifically to look for certain indicators.

35. An example is interfaces (physical and electrical) of software or o

certain key components. The personal computer and automobile businesse

offer numerous examples. Standardization should not be taken to extreme

One size (or color or model) will not fit all customers.

36. These exceptions are minor since there are no operational (as op 

posed to research and development) DOD satellites suitable for Pegasu

launch. The space shuttle is different of course, but it is not really a playe

in the national security space architecture for political reasons (DOD pay

loads were phased out of shuttle launches following the Challenger explo

sion in 1986), operational concerns (there are few shuttle flights every yea

and manifesting a major payload on the shuttle must be done years i

advance and requires extensive coordination, testing, safeguards, and inte 

gration work) and cost (even by conservative estimates, launching a shuttl

costs more than any other system). See the Space Launch Modernizatio

Study Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1

April 1994), 13.

37. See Maj William W. Bruner III, “The National Security Implications o

Inexpensive Space Access,” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpowe

Studies [SAAS], June 1995) for a discussion of the strategic and operation

implications of a vehicle that provided rapid, reliable, and low cost access t

space.

38. A perfect illustration of this is our attempt to replace the DSP earl

warning system, which is basically a 1960s design. Since the early 1980

we have attempted to develop the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System

the Advanced Warning System, the Tactical Warning/Attack Assessmen

System, and the Follow-On Early Warning System. All were canceled an

then reborn under a new name, the latest of which is alert, locate an

report missiles (ALARM). The reasons for these repeated failures are com 

plex, but the root of the problem may be that our observe-orient-decide-ac

(OODA) loop is too slow. We take so long to specify requirements for 

system, design and test it, and field it that the requirements and budgetar

ground shifts out from under us, leaving the system with no support. I

goes without saying that this cycle adjusts poorly to rapidly changing tech 

nology. For an idea of the complexity of the political and bureaucrati

issues involved, see United States Congress, House Committee on Govern

ment Operations, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Strateg

Satellite Systems in a Post-Cold War Environment (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 

February 1994).

167
39. Studeman, 27; and Gertz, 63. Trying to satisfy requirements n

longer seems to be an option, and much of the space community seem

resigned to just doing the best they can with the money they’re given. A

Martin Faga is quoted in the Gertz article: “It isn’t the requirements. Th

requirements are infinite.”

40. Low observable, or stealth, technology is a good example of the latte

two points.

41. As in linear algebra.

42. Though perhaps still one that would lend itself later to numeric

weighting and operations analysis.

43. This is done to compare the command- and demand-oriented ap

proaches. For a different sort of comparison, the weighting would obviousl

reflect different criteria.

44. This becomes a problem because the small number of launche

means that each one must succeed, yet the need to push performance t

the maximum forces costs up and reliability down, According to W. Pau

Blase, “The First Reusable SSTO Spacecraft,” Spaceflight, March 1993, 9

as you approach the limits of performance, every 10 percent increase i

performance doubles the cost and halves the reliability.

45. In the case of the launch vehicle, everything may be sacrificed fo

performance, so that reliability can be ensured only by intensive review an

highly involved checks and cross-checks.

46. For example, the ability of a constellation of electrooptical sensors t

have continuous coverage of an area of interest and timely reporting of tha

information may be more important than the resolution of an individu

sensor.

47. These assertions were at least challenged by performance in the Gu

War.

48. Especially if Iridium, Teledesic, and similar concepts come to fru

tion. Bruner.

49. For more on this, see SPACECAST 2020 Final Report, vol. 1 (Maxwel

AFB: Air University, June 1994), specifically the section entitled, “Spacelif

Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and On-Orbit.”

50. For this assertion to be true, cheap enough means that savings o

launch costs are greater than the cost of redesigning the satellite. In som

cases, this may mean redesign at the architectural rather than the satellit

level. For example, it may not make sense to launch a large geosynchronou

communications satellite in pieces and assemble it on orbit, but the sam

mission could be accomplished by several smaller, lower-capacity commun

cations satellites, either in geosynchronous or lower orbits, at a lower lif

cycle cost.

51. RSTA recognizes the expanded utility of integrating the more intell

gence-oriented aspects of the mission with those directly supporting opera

tions, with the ultimate goal of creating (as the Russians call it) a reconnais 

sance-strike complex that will detect, locate, identify, and attack enem

forces much faster than they can react.

168
52. The phrase, 

support to the war fighter, has cropped up in briefing

attended by the author on everything from developmental systems to Spac

Command organization. It appears in virtually every article on militar

space written since the Gulf War, and, in the form of “support to militar

operations” has even become a raison d’être for parts of the national intell

gence community. See, for example, Studeman, 26.

53. An example is the DOD Bottom-Up Review which is based on th

ability to fight two major regional contingencies. The theater CINC focu

was, of course, promoted by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and reinforce

by experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

54. These are primarily discussed as lessons learned from Desert Storm

See, for example, Moorman; Lt Gen James R. Clapper Jr., “Imagery—Gu

War Lessons Learned and Future Challenges,” American Intelligence Jou

nal, Winter/Spring 1992, 13–17; and Kevin H. Darr, “DIA’s Intelligenc

Imagery Support Process: Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Be 

yond,” American Intelligence Journal, Winter/Spring 1992, 43–45.

55. Department of the Air Force, Global Presence.

56. One of the major shortcomings identified in the Gulf War was th

inability of RSTA systems to provide synoptic coverage of the theater. Stude 

man, 26. Actual capabilities of our space RSTA systems are classified, but 

is fair to surmise from their cold war mission of monitoring the USSR tha

they are optimized to collect highly detailed information on fixed targets, no

to provide near-real-time coverage of a dynamic situation. As partial confir 

mation of this, many recent TENCAP projects have focused mainly on inte

ligence preparation of the battlefield functions. Chief of naval operation

(CNO), briefing, N-632, “JCS TENCAP Special Project 95 Night Vector, Pro

ject Summary,” April 1995. There are exceptions, and there have bee

efforts to allow our current space systems to provide more direct suppor

(Talon Sword, Radiant Ivory), but I believe in general that the statement i

the text is true.

57. The United States will employ systems to fill in gaps in coverage o

add a type of sensor not normally present.

58. RSTA was one of the foci of Exercise Roving Sands 1995, in whic

the author took part as a member of the air operations center.

59. D. Brian Gordon, “Use of Civil Satellite Imagery for Operations De 

sert Shield/Desert Storm,” American Intelligence Journal, Winter/Sprin

1992, 39.

60. Covering all relevant spectra is impractical because of inevitabl

space, weight, and power constraints; the possibility of physical or electro

magnetic interference among different sensors; the engineering drawback o

having to design the platform to suit the most demanding of sensors (e.g

providing far more stability than most sensors need for the one that doe

require it); and the volume of data that would result, which would eithe

require multiple data links on one platform or a link of extremely hig

capacity.

169
61. These factors make battle damage or combat assessment one of th

most consistently difficult tasks for intelligence.

62. This importance is similar to the Scud hunt during the Gulf War. O

course this doesn’t effect RSTA alone, but also the conventional forces wh

must deal with the problem

63. For example, it may not be possible to adjust the orbit of a satellit

to optimize coverage over a given region, either because it would use up to

much of the satellite’s maneuvering fuel (and hence its operational life), o

because coverage of some other theater requires a compromise orbit.

64. The “technology freeze date” for a major space system is typically fiv

or more years before the first launch. Since that satellite is likely to operat

for several years, the onboard electronics could be 10 to 15 years behin

what is available on the ground toward the end of the satellite’s life.

65. Additionally, processors use power and produce heat. Both of thes

phenomena add weight to the satellite design.

66. Similar concerns have been raised in the past about virtually a

types of forces—air combat forces, airlift forces, and naval forces. The solu 

tions worked out to date have generally given the CINC control of any force

while they are operating in his area of responsibility, a compromise that i

somewhat problematic with regard to space systems.

67. CNO briefing; “Space Warfare Center,” Space Tactics Bulletin 1, no

1, June 1994. On the air side, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Offic

is planning to spend $9.23 billion over the next five years. Maj Gen Kennet

R. Israel, “An Integrated Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy,” Unmanne

Systems 12, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 17–32.

68. Since the current system is primarily command oriented, it offer

good examples of how to improve a generic command-oriented architecture

For example, the Vista project and the joint force air component com 

mander (JFACC) joint situational awareness system (JSAS) described in th

CNO briefing.

69. CNO briefing.

70. Additional coverage can be requested, and this system makes 

easier to know what to ask for, but the theater user is still at the mercy o

someone else’s priorities.

71. Maj Stephen P. Howard, “Special Operations Forces and Unmanne

Aerial Vehicles: Failure or Future?” (master’s thesis, SAAS, June 199

describes how unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with enhanced capabilitie

could contribute to the special operations forces missions.

72. An example is the use of a laser imaging, detection, and rangin

(LIDAR) or other active sensor to discriminate real targets from decoys, o

performing highly detailed battle damage assessment.

73. See, for example, Dr. Brian McCue, “The Military Utility of Civilia

Remote Sensing Satellites,” Space Times, January–February 1994, 11–14

and Dr. Ray A. Williamson, “Assessing U.S. Civilian Remote Sensing Sate

lites and Data,” Space Times, January–February 1994, 6-10.

170
74. John G. Roos, 

SPOTs Open Skies Policy Was Early Casualty o

Mideast Conflict,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1991, 32.

75. According to Joint Pub 3-14, B-15, requests for LANDSAT data ca

take from several days to several months to fill. Because of the orbit and th

limitations of the sensors, a given area on the ground is imaged only ever

16 to 22 days.

76. This implies that the demand-oriented system might be overlaid o

an existing, command-oriented architecture in times of crisis.

77. Arguably, though, in a world of multiple, ongoing crises there ma

be considerable residual capability on orbit that could be chopped from

CINC to CINC as appropriate.

78. On building satellites quickly, see Leonard David, “Faster, Bette

Cheaper: Sloganeering or Good Engineering?" Aerospace America, Januar

1995, 28–32, and “New Techniques Allow 22-Day Satellite Assembly,” Avia 

tion Week & Space Technology, 3 April 1995, 57. There are many opinion

on ways to radically improve space lift; three examples are John A. Coppe

et al., “Future single stage rockets: Reusable and Reliable,” Aerospace Ame

ica, February 1994, 18–21; John R. London III, LEO on the Cheap: Method

for Achieving Drastic Reductions in Space Launch Costs (Maxwell AFB, Ala

Air University Press, October 1994); and SPACECAST 2020 Final Report, vo

1. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has also spearheaded efforts t

provide more user-responsive space assets. One example is the DARPASA

program.

79. Joint Pub 3-14, 1–2. The US Air Force awards astronaut wings fo

flights above 50 miles. The thermosphere—the boundary above which th

atmosphere provides virtually no protection from ultraviolet radiation—be 

gins at about 55 miles. Wertz and Larson, 194. In legal terms, there is n

authoritative definition of where national airspace ends and internation

space begins.

80. This not to say that weapons or other payloads coming from o

through space could not perform missions now done, for example by air 

craft, only to note that even with the increased speed of an orbital o

suborbital system there will be a delay before the payload arrives. If th

target is immobile, located where an aircraft cannot reach, or too we

hardened to be destroyed by a nonnuclear aerial weapon, a space solutio

may be attractive.

81. This makes a difference for some missions, since atmospheric ab

sorption and disturbance is greater at some wavelengths in the electromag

netic spectrum than others. Notes from Air Force Institute of Technolog

Course Physics S21, Space Surveillance, Summer 1989.

82. Geosynchronous, sun-synchronous, and Molniya orbits are exam 

ples. William E. Wiesel, Spaceflight Dynamics (New York: McGraw Hil

1989), chap. 3 and 66–67. Over a period of time, the lack of precise know

edge of initial conditions and the effect of various perturbations on th

satellite’s orbit grow into a large enough positional uncertainty that a viewe

171
no longer has a track on the satellite. Regular observations are needed t

update a satellite’s orbital elements.

83. These maneuvers can be on the order of meters per second of veloc 

ity change, compared to orbital velocities on the order of 10 kilometers pe

second.

84. This hypothetical conclusion is based on the difficulty of predictin

the track of a given space object in the absence of sufficient observations. 

our operational procedures force us to use a particular, more predictabl

orbital path, this advantage is nullified. History shows that this liability i

not confined to space systems, witness the often predictable pattern of ai

operations in Vietnam.

85. Since satellites are large, heavy, and complex; require a long time t

build; last a long time; and are extremely expensive, they are not likely to b

stockpiled. Performance and reliability of satellites and launch systems ar

emphasized above all else, and in general the command-oriented architec 

ture depends on having adequate capabilities in place for crises, not o

augmentation or reconstitution and replenishment.

86. Certainly the backers of Teledesic are betting that this is true.

87. Although we cannot yet do this, trends in technology clearly point i

this direction. “New Techniques Allow 22-Day Satellite Assembly,” 57, dis 

cusses reducing satellite assembly and testing time from years to days an

uses the analogy of the revolution Henry Ford brought to automobile as

sembly. Continuing that analogy, there is every reason to suspect that a

assembly automobile lines of today are far more efficient and flexible tha

they were in Henry Ford’s day, future satellite assembly—with the aid o

type certification to reduce individual satellite testing, standardized mod 

ules, and so forth—will also be much simplified. It bears remembering tha

the Iridium satellites are both fairly complex and designed for five- to seven

year lifetimes. The satellites needed for augmenting a demand-oriented ar

chitecture could be much simpler.

88. The architecture could be like the open systems architecture used b

the personal computer industry.

89. This advantage does not minimize the difficulties of using commer 

cial electronic equipment in space, but it can be done with intelligen

design, suitable redundancy and without expecting 100 percent reliabilit

or exceptionally long lifetimes.

90. This just-in-time delivery would presume reliable suppliers.

91. Certainly a tremendous amount of onboard processing, perhap

even intelligence, will be needed to produce an RSTA architecture that coul

broadcast information—as GPS does—without overwhelming most user

with unnecessary data. This kind of concept also requires that each receive

be able to correlate, fuse, and act on information from the multiple off

board sensors that it may be receiving. Although these seem like difficu

problems, they also seem like issues that must be tackled if we are not t

depend on centralized processing nodes and a few high-capacity data link

In other words, these problems must be solved if the US military is going t

172
prepare to fight in a high-tempo operating environment against enemie

who understand our reliance on information and have the means to attack

92. SPACECAST 2020 Final Report, vol. 1, section D, “Space Traffic Con 

trol, The Culmination of Improved Space Operations.”

93. There is no consensus on the definition of a lightsat, though 

lightsat is usually a satellite of 1,500 to 2,000 pounds or less. The Teledesi

satellites fall into this category. In recent years, there has been increasin

talk and development work on microsats weighing as little as a few pound

Theresa Foley, “Tiny Satellites Aim to Please the Bean Counters,” New Yor

Times, 5 March 1995, 10F.

94. For example, Donald C. Latham, “Lightsats: A Flawed Concept

Armed Forces Journal International, August 1990, 84–86. S. Roy Schuber

James R. Stuart and Stanley W. Dubyn, “LightSats: The Coming Revolu 

tion,” Aerospace America, February 1994, 26–29, 34; “Fitting the Small t

the Infinite,” The Economist, 12 October 1991, 87–88.

95. The Clementine lunar mapper and asteroid rendezvous missio

showed many of the reasons for pursuing this course. For $80 million, fa

less than any previous mission outside of near-earth orbit, a satellite weigh 

ing just over five hundred pounds (without fuel) was able to provide valu 

able and in many cases unique scientific information. The mission was no

completed due to a software defect, which highlights a danger of buildin

satellites “faster and cheaper.” Given time, additional testing, and consider 

ably more money such problems can be avoided, but the point of th

Clementine demonstration was to make acceptable some risk to gain rapi

and affordable response. Col Pedro L. Rustan, “Clementine: Mining New

Uses for SDI Technology,” Aerospace America, January 1994, 38–41; an

Rustan, “Clementine: Measuring the results,” Aerospace America, Februar

1995, 34–38. It’s worth mentioning that doing things the conventional way

with substantial testing and a much larger budget, is no guarantee o

success either. Witness the loss (for causes still not precisely known) o

NASA’s Mars Explorer mission. For the ideas of one of the pioneers, se

William E. Howard III, “Cheaper by the Dozen?,” US Naval Institute Proceed

ings, February 1989, 70–74.

96. An example is a constellation dedicated to providing near-continuou

RSTA coverage of a particular theater.

97. How much costs can be reduced is a difficult question. How muc

they should be reduced is perhaps a better question. In other words, wha

cost per satellite would the military find acceptable for an important mis 

sion for which the hardware was expendable? I suggest that the cost go

for a satellite to enable this approach should be in the neighborhood o

what a cruise missile costs, around $1 million.

98. How much can launch costs be decreased? A better question ma

be, how low do launch costs have to be to make a responsive launch system

cost effective? Based on research and numerous discussions during th

SPACECAST 2020 study, I believe the threshold is about five hundre

dollars per pound, so that the total lift cost for a nominal 1,000-poun

173
satellite would be five hundred thousand dollars. To achieve this kind o

cost level, the launch vehicle would almost certainly have to be reusabl

This compares to current launch costs of roughly four thousand dollars t

$12,000 per pound on relatively nonresponsive launch systems. Unite

States Air Force Space Command, Space Launch Modernization Plan (Moo

man Study) Executive Summary (Peterson AFB, Colo.: Department of De 

fense, 18 April 1994). The Pegasus light launch vehicle is currently th

cheapest dedicated ride that is not piggybacking on another satellite’s large

launch vehicle. Pegasus can attain orbit at about $12 million for a payloa

under 900 pounds, but at a cost-per-pound of nearly $15,000. London, : 5.

99. Another valid question is, “Given a responsive space launch capabi

ity, how does one ensure that it will have enough capacity in times of crisi

without huge overhead costs (either for an inventory of expendable vehicle

or an idle fleet of reusable ones) during noncrisis periods?” The answer is t

build reusable vehicles that can have multiple missions, perhaps includin

surface-to-surface cargo transport, weapons delivery, or even reconnais 

sance. In SPACECAST 2020 Final Report, vol. 1, the chapter “Spacelif

Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and On Orbit” discusses how this could be don

with a transatmospheric vehicle using a modular (or containerized) payloa

approach.

100. William B. Scott, “’Architect’ to Reshape Defense Space Policy

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 February 1995, 50.

101. Briefing, “Seven Strategies for Space—The Way Ahead,” Col C. A

Waln, USAF Space and Missile Systems Center; Col H. E. Hagemeier, Ai

Force Space Command, and Mr. Darrell Spreen; USAF Phillips Laboratory

January 1995.

102. AFM 1-1, Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 1984, 4–7.

174
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181
PART II

Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives
Chapter 4

Safe Heavens: Military Strategy

and Space Sanctuary

David W. Zeigler

Undoubtedly the most provocative subject in any discussion

of the future of space is the subject of space weapons and

the likelihood of their use. Here I am referring to the

broadest categories: space-based lasers to shoot down

hostile intercontinental ballistic missiles, space weapons

that attack other satellites, or weapons released from space

platforms that destroy terrestrial targets. Today these kinds

of systems clearly break the current thresholds of

acceptability and introduce Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

issues, as well as social and political reservations. But the

21st century could well see a change.

 —Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr.

Today, as they have since the 1950s, American leaders ar

debating the efficacy of US space weapons. In military circle

these discussions frequently gravitate to issues of technology

legality, cost, and the military employment of the weapon

themselves. Such a focus—one that predominantly concern

itself with how space weapons can be deployed—inevitabl

overshadows the question of what happens if they are de

ployed. This result jeopardizes the foundation of knowledg

from which Americans will judge the merits of space weapons

Decision makers may be forced to act without a complete an

rigorous analysis of the compatibility of space weapons wit

national strategy.

When Basil H. Liddell Hart succinctly defined strategy a

“the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1997.

Advisor: Maj Bruce DeBlois, PhD

Reader: Dr Karl Mueller

185
the ends of policy,

 he correctly subordinated a nations forc

structure and doctrine to its national policy objectives—the

are inextricably linked. 1 As a result, militarily promising weap

ons and doctrines can still prove incompatible with highe

policy objectives. Three historical examples illustrate this idea

beginning with the Allies’ choice of weapons against German

in the Second World War.

During World War II, the Allies developed proximity-fuze

antiaircraft shells used with great success against Germa

V-1 missiles. Undoubtedly these same weapons would hav

brought the Allies better performance against the Luftwaffe in

combat over France and Germany. Allied commanders banned

the weapon from that region, however, fearing that if the Ger 

mans manufactured their own from a captured specimen the

might use it with devastating effectiveness against Allied

bombers in the crucial combined bomber offensive (CBO)

Although deploying the shells to continental Europe offered

military advantages, those advantages were incompatible wit

the CBO’s central role in Allied strategy.

President James Earl “Jimmy” Carter’s rejection of the neu 

tron bomb offers an example of higher national policy rulin

out a promising weapon system still in the conceptual stage

The president’s complete repudiation of these weapons rested

not with their ineffectiveness—they were well-suited for stop

ping a Soviet offensive while preserving Europe’s infrastruc

ture—but rather with the incompatibility of the bombs wit

broader American strategy. That strategy motivated the United

States to internationally maintain the moral high ground, pre

serve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition

and promote arms control.

American deliberations over chemical weapons provide th

most contemporary illustration of the potential clash betwee

military expediency and national policy objectives. In Apri

1997 the US Senate formally ratified the Chemical Weapon

Convention by obligating America to forsake future develop

ment, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use o

chemical agents. The treaty was controversial in that suc

historical American adversaries as Russia, Libya, and Ira

refused to sign it.3 Treaty critics preferred, instead, to preserv

186
America

s freedom to retaliate with chemical weapons agains

adversaries who used such weapons against American troops

They accurately asserted that lacking such freedom weakened

the ability of the United States to control conflict escalation

As with the case of the neutron bomb, however, the United

States elected to forgo the military benefits of a chemical de

terrent in deference to higher political objectives. US leader

calculated that America’s reputation as a responsible super 

power and its commitment to arms control were better served

by formally renouncing the American chemical arsenal.

Military policy makers for space find themselves treadin

similar waters. Today, space weapons are becoming increas

ingly practical in terms of military promise and associated

costs. Yet in the context of higher military and national strat

egy, the decision to deploy them is complicated by related

social, political, economic, and diplomatic factors. As in th

past, military missions like “space control” and “space forc

application” cannot be decoupled from broader national strat

egy. Though they may promise military advantages, spac

weapons are desirable only if they prove to be compatible wit

policy at the national level.

There is no question that Department of Defense (DOD

officials fully appreciate the subordination of military spac

operations to America’s civilian-led national strategy. In Feb

ruary 1997 the commander in chief, US Space Comman

(CINC USSPACECOM), Gen Howell M. Estes III, emphasize

that decisions to develop space-based weaponry are not mad

by the military. “We . . . support whatever decisions ou

elected leadership may arrive at with regard to space contro

and the weapon systems required,” he remarked.4

As the elected leadership moves closer to these decisions

military strategists should work now to consider the issue o

space weapons from every angle, including potential argu 

ments against their development. A quick review of today’s

defense literature, however, reveals that this is not happening

While there is much written in support of space weapons an

their attendant missions, attempts to understand the counter 

arguments against deploying space weapons are scarce. Few

strategists, if any, are testing the conventional wisdom o

187
space weapon proponents with any rigor. For example, mili

tary planners and strategists are silent on the evidence o

some 40 years of American cold war space policy—a histor

that shows US national interests ultimately being served b

preserving a space sanctuary relatively free of American spac

weapons. This should not be the case. There must be a disci

plined consideration of why cold war space operations devel

oped the way they did and the relevance (or irrelevance) the

have today. Instead, some advocates for space weapons con 

tinue to see sanctuary thought as a form of “unstrategy,

viewing its proponents as “making head-in-the-sand plans.”

This perspective only serves to undermine useful debate. I

leads to a situation in which everybody interprets the univers

of possible strategies to include only those they are alread

predisposed to. As a result, even the most ardent spac

weapon advocates find themselves at a disadvantage whe

crafting strategy. They compromise their ability to implemen

a weapons program that still incorporates, to the extent possi

ble, useful features of sanctuary thought. They forfeit the op

portunities, afforded by another point of view, to fairly ap

praise and ameliorate any weaknesses associated with spac

weapons.

Regardless of their initial convictions, strategists mus

strive for totally objective thought. They should take apar

every conviction and recast it to optimally fit the current situ 

ation. They must explore all avenues of approach to a problem

and ranges of possible solutions. Hence the purpose of thi

study. It endeavors to develop a better understanding of th

arguments against space weapons by asking the question

Could pursuing a space sanctuary in the near future benefi

the national interest? The product—the space sanctuary argu 

ment articulated here in the strongest reasonable terms—of

fers military strategists a counterpoint to round out the pro

weapons literature on their shelves. Since its purpose is t

challenge mentally and not to persuade, the question o

whether space should or should not be weaponized is lef

unanswered. Instead, strategists are invited to put the sanctu 

ary perspective in their cognitive “toolboxes” as but one o

many tools required to decide the future of space weapons.

188
In laying out the sanctuary perspective, basic concepts essen 

tial to any discussion of sanctuary thought are first clarified. An

underlying premise is emphasized: that US military strat

egy—especially one associated with space—cannot be divorce

from broader national strategy. Since that is true, Presiden

William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton’s 1996 US national securit

strategy is used to give the phrase “national strategy” greate

substance. The clarification of basic concepts concludes with

definitions for “space weaponization” and “space sanctuary.”

Having established a framework for discussion, the stud

turns to America’s history with space weapons. Any treatmen

of contemporary military space policy must at least conside

where the nation has been in the past. Although most o

America’s space history is indelibly colored by the cold war—

geopolitical environment far different from that of 1997—i

nevertheless bears some relevance for policy today. The re

strained manner in which the United States pursued anti

satellites (ASAT) through the end of the 1980s is a classi

example of sanctuary concepts in action.

Contemporary American space policy remains relativel

consistent with that of the cold war. Domestic support fo

operational space weapons is growing, however. After transi

tioning from the past to the present, fundamental conviction

driving the arguments of American space weapon advocate

today are explored. These convictions are then challenged wit

sanctuary counterarguments. The case for a sanctuary polic

is further bolstered with rationale independent from the con 

victions of weapon advocates. No attempt is made to critiqu

the weaknesses of the sanctuary argument presented—furthe

acknowledgment that this study merely aims to give sanctuar

thought its full day in court. It is left to the reader to balanc

the space weapon and space sanctuary perspectives.

With the sanctuary argument complete, the conclusion call

upon military strategists to embrace the complex debate ove

national military space strategy. It encourages strategists t

consider military space policy from every perspective in searc

of the very best strategy. Strategists are also challenged t

disregard the idea that sanctuary thought leads to a passiv

national strategy. Instead, examples illustrate how sanctuar

189
tenets demand coordinated action of all national instrument

of power. They also show how sanctuary thought remain

relevant even if there is an eventual US decision to deplo

space weapons.

Definitions

The United States is a spacefaring nation—it operates som

two hundred military and civilian satellites with a combined

value of $100 billion. 6 As impressive as these statistics appear

they do not reflect the additional billions of dollars and mil

lions of American lives influenced every day by space commu

nication, navigation, weather, environment, and national se

curity satellites. Space is big business and is inseparable from

US economic strength. It attracts international attention an

therefore diplomatic power. It is absolutely crucial to Ameri

can military operations. Since the “high frontier” underpin

almost every facet of US national power, American strategist

must consider space from a perspective broader than pur

military concerns. To do so, however, they must defin

“broader perspective.” In that regard, A National Security Stra

egy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1996) provide

a solid point of departure and conveys the president’s priori

ties for formulating and conducting national policy. “The na

ture of our response must depend on what best serves ou

own long-term national interests. Those interests are ulti

mately defined by our security requirements. Such require

ments start with our physical defense and economic well-be

ing. They also include environmental security as well as th

security of our values achieved through expansion of the com 

munity of democratic nations.”7 Subsequent use of “nationa

interests” in this study is meant to connote the four mos

basic security requirements arranged by the White House

physical defense, economic well-being, environmental secu 

rity, and the expansion of the community of democratic na

tions.

The rudimentary framework provided by the 1996 publication

prompts military strategists to evaluate space strategies acros

the full spectrum of national interests. Before that oc curs, how 

190
ever, strategists must clearly understand the space strategie

themselves. Therefore, the specific ideas conveyed by “spac

weapon” and “space sanctuary” must be explicitly defined.

A space weapon is defined as any system that directly work

to defeat space assets from terrestrial- or space-based location

or terrestrial-based targets from space. Space weaponization i

distinct from the extensive militarization of space that began in

the late 1950s. Since that decade, nations have launched thou 

sands of military satellites into space to support surveillance

reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and military re

search.8 Today, these satellites make important but indirect con 

tributions to the final defeat of targets. Space weapons, if eve

employed, will directly attack and defeat targets via mechanism

ranging from physical destruction to spoofing.

Significantly, the definition adopted for space weapon

leaves out two categories of weapon systems that routinel

operate in space—ballistic missiles and antiballistic missile

(ABM). Although ballistic missiles traverse space en route t

their targets, they are more accurately appraised as surface

to-surface systems. In addition ballistic missiles are well es

tablished in strategic thought and provide national securit

with a deterrent function that has long since been accepted

Considering ballistic missiles as space weapons, then, would

inordinately complicate the debate with no apparent gain.

The same is true of the second notable exclusion from th

definition for space weapons, the ground-launched ABMs. In 

cluding ABM systems in the context of the space sanctuar

debate would cloud the central issues related to weapons tha

attack targets in space and weapons that attack targets from

space. Note, however, that ABM systems modified to perform

ASAT missions are not excluded. In that event, the modified

system clearly becomes a space weapon.9

Understanding what is implied by the concept space sanctu 

ary is as important as defining space weapons. In the strictes

sense, space is a sanctuary when it is completely un

threatened by terrestrial- or space-based weapons. This defini

tion, however, is impractical on two counts. First, such 

sanctuary has not existed for decades and realistically neve

will again. It therefore becomes a rather inflexible construc

191
for a serious policy discussion. Second, even when a nation

sincerely believes a sanctuary exists, other nations may dis 

agree. Consider that starting in 1981 the Soviets strenuousl

objected to the American space shuttle as an ASAT because o

its capability to “snatch” satellites from space.

A second, more flexible, definition for space sanctuary migh

see it in light of national intentions. By this reckoning, a spac

sanctuary would exist even where nations possessed spac

weapons, so long as they truly intended never to use them

Again, however, the construct becomes problematic. Good in 

tentions notwithstanding, no nation as a practical matter ca

accept an armada of adversarial space weapons on the fait

they would never be used. Instead of continuing to search fo

a conceptual definition of space sanctuary in absolute terms

then, this study seeks a more pragmatic approach linked t

current realities.

Today, the number of operational space weapons is un

changed from that of a decade ago. In fact the number i

actually down from cold war peaks discussed in the next sec

tion. The international community, therefore, lives with a de

gree of space weapons that is stable. Nations are not fieldin

new weapon systems and the operational systems that alread

exist are extremely limited in capability. As support builds fo

American space weapons, however, US decision makers ar

rapidly approaching a crossroads—a point of decision. Thi

study asserts that any US strategy advocates a space sanctu 

ary if it endeavors to cap the current level of space weaponiza 

tion where it stands today. In other words, a sanctuary exist

today given the present equilibrium.

Introducing new space weapons would violate that sanctu 

ary. If the threshold for viewing space as a sanctuary is set a

current levels of weaponization, then the strategist ought t

know the history that generated those levels. The next section

describes past space weapons and elucidates the drivers be

hind America’s space weapons policy during the last 50 years

192
Space Weapons and the American Experience

The cold war was a tense affair. For 40 years, two globa

superpowers stood toe-to-toe, eye-to-eye poised for a war tha

promised devastation for both. Amidst this tension, the impe

tus for superiority was so strong and the level of mutual dis 

trust so powerful, that America’s nuclear arsenals were buil

to levels far beyond what some assert were ever useful. Th

global confrontation also drove innovation and modernization

of American conventional forces. United States policy maker

never deliberately allowed the Soviets to achieve favorabl

asymmetries in major weapon systems except antisatellit

weapons. Many caution that the cold war fostered geopolitica

conditions so unlike today’s that its lessons are totally irrele 

vant. In her book Rational Choice in an Uncertain World

Robyn Dawes notes that “a great deal of thinking is associa 

tional, and it is very difficult indeed to ignore experience tha

is associationally relevant, but logically irrelevant.”1 0 Corre

spondingly, one might assert that while today’s weapon race

appear to be comparable to those of the cold war, the uniqu

bipolar tension of the cold war makes any comparison of th

two logically flawed—what worked in the cold war may fail in

today’s multipolar world. That hypothesis, however, is mor

true for some weapon systems than it is for others. In the cas

of space weapons it is suspect.

The American cold war experience with space weapons pre

sents a bit of a conundrum. Despite the pressure for relativ

military parity, if not US superiority, the Soviets finished th

cold war with an operational ASAT while the United State

possessed none. Significantly, this asymmetry cannot b

traced to greater Soviet technological prowess. Instead, it

roots lie with American restraint. Unilateral arms restrain

during the cold war, however, runs counter to the prevailin

sentiments of that period. If the United States did in fac

deliberately opt against pursuing an aggressive ASAT pro 

gram, it must have been to advance interests beyond simpl

military effectiveness.

American cold war space policy, therefore, is highly relevan

for space sanctuary advocates in 1997. The sanctuary argu 

ment proposes the very restraint observed in that era. It sug

193
gests that broader national strategies can preempt even th

strongest justifications for space weapons just as occurred

during the cold war maelstrom. For this reason, the argumen

for a space sanctuary strategy should consider the history o

cold war space weapons.

Two Historical Themes

This section briefly describes America’s historical experienc

with space weapons. From the 1950s to the start of the 1990s

two general themes emerge.

First, although space weapon technologies matured over th

years, any long-term US commitment to a vigorous spac

weapons program was constrained by perceived American vu

nerabilities in space. When operational US ASATs did appear

they were in direct response to the Soviet threat of orbitin

nuclear weapons. Second, in spite of their reluctance to de

velop space weapons, US policy makers consistently “hedged

their bets” with the technological insurance of space weapon

research.

Protecting American Vulnerabilities through Restraint

Historical US space policy consistently embraced America

restraint in the deployment of space weapons. Policy maker

were motivated to legitimize and protect other US space mis 

sions from attack. On two occasions, US policy makers or

dered ASAT systems to go operational. In both cases, the sys 

tems were motivated by Soviet involvement with orbitin

nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1950s, the United States was engaged in a cold

war of atomic proportions. The perceived adversary was 

monolithic Communist movement adroitly led by the Sovie

Union—a conviction reinforced by the confrontation with th

Soviets over the blockade of Berlin, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Pac

and the Korean War. The technology was nuclear and th

introduction of relatively lightweight hydrogen bombs now

meant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-launched war

heads were feasible. 1 1 Assessing the situation in 1954, Presi

dent Dwight D. Eisenhower observed that “modern weapon

194
have made it easier for a hostile nation with a closed society t

plan an attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied

to the nation with an open society.”1 2 His observation has

tened the first military space program, Project Feedback, 

study recommending that the United States develop satellit

reconnaissance as a matter of “vital strategic interest to th

United States.”1 3 By July 1954 Program WS-117L (advanced

reconnaissance system) was approved. 1 4 It was the first step in

a long-term American commitment to satellite reconnaissance

The first serious US discussions of space weapons wer

prompted by the Soviet launch of sputnik in October 1957

Already that year, Gen Bernard A. Schriever, US Air Force, ha

stressed the need for “space superiority,” predicting that in de

cades to come the decisive battles would be fought in space. 

Sputnik inflamed such convictions—even the public soon

shared the concern over a perceived “space weapons gap” with

the Soviets. 16 This public climate led defense officials to be mor

specific in their calls for American space weapons. Gen Jame

Gavin , US Army, urgently recommended that Americans “ac

quire at least a capability of denying Soviet overflight—that w

develop a satellite interceptor.”1 7 In November 1957 his servic

proposed two ASAT solutions: a modified Nike Zeus ABM and 

“homing satellite” carrying a destructive charge. 18

Despite the mounting pressure to weaponize space, Presi

dent Eisenhower resisted. He believed it was more imperativ

that the international community embrace the legitimacy o

the satellite reconnaissance mission.1 9 In his estimation

jumping out to a lead in ASATs would undermine the credibil

ity of America’s efforts to promote space for “peaceful” pur

poses and encourage the Soviets to redouble their own ASAT

efforts. By 1958 Eisenhower articulated this policy in Nationa

Security Council (NSC) 5814/1, stating the United State

should “in anticipation of the availability of reconnaissanc

satellites, seek urgently a political framework which will plac

the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites in political and psy

chological context favorable to the United States.”2 0

By the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy was forced

to reassess Eisenhower’s sanctuary strategy when Sovie

statements and actions indicated they might develop orbitin

195
nuclear bombs. Kennedy feared such weapons could black

mail Americans in a crisis and knew waiting to counter th

threat, after it appeared, might embarrass his administration

later.2 1 So in May 1962, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Rober

S. McNamara ordered the Army to modify the Nike Zeus ABM

for a future ASAT role. The modified system, Program 505

was based at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Eac

missile carried a nuclear warhead capable of destroying satel

lite targets.2 2

As evidence of Soviet efforts to deploy orbital bombs contin 

ued to mount, so did pressure for a long-range America

ASAT. In 1963 President Kennedy approved Program 437—

ground-launched ASAT system based on the Thor intermedi

ate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)—stating that the United

States should “develop an active antisatellite capability at th

earliest practicable time, nuclear and non-nuclear.”23 Program

437 was eventually based at Johnston Island in the Pacific

Like Program 505 it carried a nuclear warhead. 2 4

Both Programs 505 and 437 went operational in May 1964. 

Program 505 was quickly phased out by May 1966 in deferenc

to Program 437’s longer range. 26 Four factors indicate that thes

programs were simply emergency stopgaps against a specifi

nuclear threat and did not signal an American priority to deplo

a general-purpose ASAT against other types of satellites. Firs

after the United States conducted the Starfish Prime series o

space nuclear tests in 1962, American policy makers clearl

understood that nuclear ASAT detonations would crippl

friendly satellites as well as hostile ones.2 7 Second, any use o

Programs 505 and 437 would have violated the Partial Test Ba

Treaty signed only one day before President Kennedy approve

Program 437.2 8 Third, both systems were hamstrung by thei

single remote bases. Operating from fixed locations severely lim 

ited the number of satellites vulnerable to each system. Satel

lites that were periodically vulnerable would often be out of view

for days.2 9 Finally, more flexible systems for targeting genera

purpose satellites across the spectrum of conflict—nonnuclea

ASATs—were never produced despite President Kennedy’s direc 

tive. DOD considered several projects, but each failed to win

administration endorsement.3 0

196
President Lyndon B. Johnson 

s administration completed

the ASAT programs started by Kennedy, sharing the view tha

any US ASAT program was principally a hedge against Sovie

orbital weapons. An administration report stated that “a

anti-satellite capability (probably earth to space) will b

needed for defense of the United States. . . . Current high

priority efforts should be continued and extended as neces

sary in the future.”3 1 Significantly, that same report consid 

ered using American ASATs against “space targets in time o

war whether or not the orbital nuclear delivery vehicles wer

introduced.” It also proposed that US ASATs could “enforc

the principle of noninterference in space.”3 2 When it came t

these additional missions, however, the Johnson administra 

tion reiterated Eisenhower’s conclusions—targeting Soviet sat

ellites invited retaliation and the United States was more de

pendent on its space assets. As the report stated, “th

usefulness to the United States of observation [satellites] . . 

as a means of penetrating Soviet secretiveness is obvious. Th

value to the USSR may be less clear; indeed, the value i

probably much lower.”3 3 As a result, the Johnson administra 

tion proved ambivalent to ASATs, and little was done to re

place the limited capabilities of Program 437.3 4 That decision

was complemented by Johnson’s broader space policy: “W

should continue to stand on the general principle of freedom

of space. We should actively seek arms control arrangement

which enhance national security. We should pursue vigor 

ously the development and use of appropriate and necessar

military activities in space, while seeking to prevent extension

of the arms race into space.”35 President Johnson’s policy wa

another example of America’s traditional inclination for sanc

tuary thought and a key contributor to international accep

tance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The treaty’s signatorie

agreed “not to place in orbit around the earth any object

carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons o

mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, o

station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”3 

America’s ASAT posture and policy remained rooted in th

sanctuary perspective through 1977. As a case in point, Pro 

gram 437 was terminated on 1 April 1975, leaving the United

197
States with no operational ASAT capability. 3 7 This termination

is particularly striking in light of the Soviet involvement wit

ASATs during the same period.

The Soviets began testing their co-orbital ASAT in 1967.3 

The tests’ prevailing pattern involved the launch of a targe

satellite followed by the launch of a “killer satellite” boosted

into a coplanar orbit. Typically within two orbital revolutions

the killer satellite would be maneuvered to detonate near th

target satellite, destroying it in a cloud of shrapnel.3 9 Although

these tests often failed, when the initial series of Soviet test

ended in December 1971, they had demonstrated the ability t

intercept US photoreconnaissance, electronic intelligence

weather, and TRANSIT NNSS (US Navy navigation satellit

system). 4 0

President Richard M. Nixon’s national security advisor

Henry A. Kissinger, reacted to the Soviet ASAT tests by callin

for a “quick study” of possible US responses in 1970. 4 1 Re

markably, the lack of urgency was such that the report wa

not submitted until 1973. By that time détente, including th

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I treaty and the Sovie

hiatus in ASAT testing, had diverted interest from the subjec

of ASATs.4 2

Détente aside, the report’s findings are further indication o

US reluctance to deploy space weapons—even when provoked

It recommended steps to reduce the vulnerability of US satel

lites to attack but explicitly argued against a US ASAT pro 

gram in response. The rationale was reminiscent of previou

administrations. A US ASAT was “not an area where deter 

rence works very well because of dissimilarities in value be

tween US and Soviet space systems.”4 3

By 1977, however, three developments gave new impetus fo

a renewed US ASAT effort. The first was a series of govern 

ment panels expressing concern over the growing vulnerabilit

of US satellites. The second was the blinding of US satellite

over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and th

resumption of Soviet ASAT testing. The third was a presiden

concerned about the obvious cold war asymmetry in ASAT

capability.

198
In 1975 President Gerald R. Ford

s advisors convened th

Slichter Panel to review the military applications of space. Th

panel focused on satellite reconnaissance and tactical com 

munications concluding that “the US dependence on satellite

was growing and that these satellites were largely defenseles

and extremely soft to countermeasures.”4 4 This warning wa

the catalyst for a second panel convened to specifically ana

lyze these vulnerabilities and consider the need for an Ameri

can ASAT program.

4 5 The Buchsbaum Panel determined tha

an ASAT would not enhance the survivability of other U

satellites—deterrence was ineffective given the heavy Ameri

can dependency on space. The Buchsbaum Panel did recog

nize, however, that while the United States was more depen

dent on space than the Soviets, the Soviet dependency wa

increasing. In this regard, the panel believed an America

ASAT possessed at least some utility against Soviet intelli

gence and radar ocean reconnaissance satellites. This utilit

could also strengthen ASATs as a negotiation chip in futur

arms control discussions. 4 6

Anxiety over the vulnerability of US satellites was height

ened by the blinding of US satellites over the USSR and th

resumption of Soviet ASAT testing. On three occasions in

1975, US satellites were saturated with intense radiation from

sources in the Soviet Union.4 7 These incidents reinforced re

ports that the Soviets were rapidly progressing in directed

energy weapon technologies. 4 8 To aggravate matters further

the Soviets resumed testing of the co-orbital ASAT. In 197

alone, there were four such orbital tests.4 9 The net effect o

these developments was a subtle shift in US ASAT policy pre

saged at the end of 1976 by comments from the Director o

Defense Research and Engineering Malcolm Currie . “The Sovi

ets have developed and tested a potential war-fighting anti

satellite capability. They have thereby seized the initiative in

an area which we hoped would be left untapped. They hav

opened the specter of space as a new dimension for warfare

with all that this implies. I would warn them that they hav

started down a dangerous road. Restraint on their part will b

matched by our own restraint, but we should not permit them

to develop an asymmetry in space.”5 0

199
Subsequent policy statements continued to emphasize re

straint and space as a medium for nonaggressive purposes

but in January 1977 President Ford released National Secu 

rity Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 345 ordering DOD to de

velop an operational ASAT. 5 1

President Carter inherited Ford’s NSDM 345 weeks after i

was signed. Elected on a platform of arms control and reduced

military spending, however, Carter returned the nation to it

tradition of working to stabilize space as a sanctuary. He con 

tinued with the ASAT initiative principally on the grounds tha

it would strengthen arms negotiations as a bargaining chip. I

arms control succeeded, the American ASAT would never be

come operational. President Carter’s 1978 Presidential Direc

tive on Space Policy stated that “the United States finds itsel

under increasing pressure to field an antisatellite capability o

its own in response to Soviet activities in this area. By exercis 

ing mutual restraint, the United States and the Soviet Union

have an opportunity at this early juncture to stop an un

healthy arms competition in space before the competition de

velops a momentum of its own.”5 2 In line with this policy, th

Carter administration opened ASAT arms control talks wit

the Soviets in June 1978. 5 3 The negotiations stalled over 

number of issues, however, and finally collapsed with the So 

viet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 5 4

By the time President Ronald W. Reagan assumed office in

1981, America’s ASAT program was in an advanced stage o

development. 55 Specifically, the miniature homing vehicl

(MHV) ASAT—a direct ascent, air-launched missile designed t

home in on and collide with satellites—was approaching th

point of operational testing. 5 6 In contrast with Carter’s per 

spective on space weapons, Reagan unabashedly accelerated

the program stating at the beginning of his first term “th

United States will proceed with development of an antisatellit

(ASAT capability), with operational deployment as a goal. Th

primary purposes of a United States ASAT capability are t

deter threats to space systems of the United States and it

allies and, within such limits imposed by international law, t

deny any adversary the use of space-based systems that pro 

vide support to hostile military forces.”5 7

200
In further contrast to his predecessor, Reagan pressed on with

the MHV ASAT effort even as the Soviets called for a spac

weapons treaty. In 1983 Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyk

proposed to supplement the Outer Space Treaty so as to outlaw

the use of force in space to include a prohibition on “any spac

based weapons intended to hit targets on the Earth, in th

atmosphere, or in space.” Significantly, the Soviets underscore

the sincerity of their calls by imposing a unilateral moratorium

on their own ASAT testing in the same year.58 Nevertheless

Reagan categorically rejected all Soviet offers citing variou

weaknesses in the proposed treaty drafts.5 9

In spite of President Reagan’s strong support, the MHV

ASAT program faced congressional opposition. The Sovie

overtures for a space weapons treaty were well received b

legislators and many viewed the MHV as an unnecessary star

to an arms race in space. 6 0 As a result, Congress passed a law

in 1984 that banned further US ASAT testing. Only a shor

lapse between this ban and its successor permitted a Septem 

ber 1985 test to occur. On 13 September 1985, an F-1

launched an MHV ASAT at a US satellite collecting scientifi

data in space. Seconds later, the MHV struck the satellit

shattering it into several hundred pieces. 6 1 The success belied

the program’s future. In March 1988 congressional test re

strictions and budgetary limitations killed the ASAT program

before it went operational. 62

Although President George W. Bush was handed a dea

ASAT program in 1989, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiativ

(SDI) remained very much alive. Ironically, the Bush adminis

tration deemphasized any push for an operational US ASAT

effort because of SDI. The administration believed ASATs wer

destabilizing and above all a threat to the sophisticated ballis 

tic missile defense satellites planned for the future. Address

ing the question of stability, President Bush’s National Secu 

rity Advisor Brent Scowcroft observed that “all scenario

involving the use of ASATs, especially those surrounding cri

ses, increase the risks of accident, misperception, and inad

vertent escalation.”6 3

The vulnerability of the expensive SDI space architecture t

ASATs was also recognized early in its development. The govern 

201
ment

s Defensive Technologies Study Team found in 1984 tha

“survivability is potentially a serious problem for the space

based components. The most likely threats to the components o

a defense system are direct-ascent antisatellite weapons

ground- or air-based lasers; orbital antisatellites, both conven 

tional and directed energy; space mines; and fragment clouds.”

The technologists designing the SDI architecture would echo th

same thoughts in subsequent years. According to the director o

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1986, “if exten 

sive strategic defenses are deployed, the ASAT and counter ASAT

picture changes completely. This is particularly true if space

based weapons are developed and deployed. Under such cir 

cumstances, all space assets, whether needed for defense o

offense, for warning or other purpose, would have to operate in 

very hostile environment.”65

President Bush, then, returned the nation to a familia

ASAT policy. President Eisenhower had rejected operationa

ASATs because of the US’s dependency on reconnaissanc

satellites. Subsequent administrations rejected operationa

ASATs because of the US’s growing dependency on satellites o

all types. President Bush rejected operational ASATs, in par

because of a predicted US dependency on ballistic missil

defense satellites.

The fact that Bush elected not to deploy an operational ASAT

does not mean he dismissed ASAT work altogether. In 1989, 

year after the MHV was canceled, all three military service

remained engaged in ASAT research.6 6 This approach to ASAT

is patently American and represents a second consistency in th

history of US space weapons. US policy makers have consis 

tently “hedged their bets” with the technological insurance o

space weapons research and development (R&D) programs.

Technological Insurance through ASAT Research

As the first president to adopt a sanctuary policy for space

Eisenhower nevertheless authorized the Advanced Researc

Projects Agency (ARPA) and all three of the military services t

conduct space weapon research. NSC 5802/1 called for a “vigor 

ous research and development program” to consider weapon

against “satellites and space vehicles.”6 7 Consistent with hi

202
broader policy, however, Eisenhower disapproved the service

requests for more advanced stages of system development.6 8 

B-47-launched ASAT missile tested in the Bold Orion program

and the satellite interceptor (SAINT) program were two notabl

R&D efforts during Eisenhower’s presidency. 69

In the course of congressional hearings in 1962, Director o

Defense Research and Engineering Dr. Harold Brown acknowl

edged that the Kennedy administration would follow Eisen 

hower’s precedent of pursuing ASAT R&D as insurance

Brown stated that “we must, therefore, engage in a broa

program covering basic building blocks which will develop

technological capabilities to meet many possible contingen 

cies. In this way, we will provide necessary insurance agains

military surprise in space by advancing our knowledge as 

systematic basis so as to permit the shortest possible time la

in undertaking full-scale development programs as specifi

needs are identified.”7 0

Technology associated with the X-20 Dynasoar, a manned

hypersonic space glider, is perhaps the most well recognized

military space R&D program during this era. 7 1 That program

as well as the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, lasted well int

the Johnson years.72 The United States continued to conside

vigorous R&D as sufficient insurance against future spac

weapons threats even as the Soviets demonstrated their co-or 

bital ASAT. President Nixon’s NSC recommended that th

United States respond to the Soviet demonstrations with a

R&D effort aggressive enough to permit quick turnaround o

an operational ASAT system.7 3 The MHV ASAT program even 

tually fulfilled this R&D requirement for both the Ford an

Carter administrations.

Measuring national commitment to ASAT R&D after 1983 i

very difficult due to President Reagan’s SDI. The line betwee

ASAT and ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapons is s

blurred as to often make it impossible to distinguish betwee

the two. Indeed, some opponents regarded SDI as little mor

than cover for a “bloated ASAT development effort.”7 4 Whil

that assertion is undoubtedly inaccurate, it correctly appreci

ates that defensive capabilities against ballistic missiles ca

equate to offensive capabilities against satellites. Since this i

203
so, it is reasonable to assert that the United States continued

to pursue ASAT technologies through the R&D associated wit

SDI and President Bush’s subsequent global protection

against limited strikes (GPALS).

In the two years after President Reagan’s Star Wars speec

in 1983, SDI became the Pentagon’s largest single R&D pro 

gram.7 5 Reagan’s planned SDI architecture included space

based missile warning satellites, traditional ground-based

ABMs with conventional warheads, and constellations of space

based interceptors—hundreds of satellites, each equipped

with small rockets to destroy ICBMs. Over the long-term, SD

intended to replace this architecture with various directed-en 

ergy weapons deployed on the ground, in the air, and in

space. 7 6

The 1972 ABM Treaty clearly influenced SDI’s research an

test methodology. Since the traditional interpretation of tha

treaty only allowed for testing of sanctioned ground-based

ABM systems and their components, the Reagan administra 

tion declined to conduct SDI space experiments in the ABM

mode.7 7 As a result, active space experiments were alway

conducted against other “space objects,” not missile compo

nents, underscoring the tenuous distinction between BMD

and ASAT R&D.

With the end of the cold war, President Bush reoriented SD

to GPALS. Since the Soviet threat was now replaced by that o

rogue nations with rapidly developing ballistic missile pro 

grams, GPALS emphasized more mature technologies suitabl

for theater and tactical defenses.7 8 In addition to the tradi

tional warning satellite and ground-based ABMs, Brillian

Pebbles—an improved space-based interceptor—became th

critical space weapon in GPALS. Brilliant Pebbles would con 

sist of hundreds of small interceptors deployed in orbits 40

kilometers above the earth. These interceptors would maneu 

ver to collide with any detected ballistic missiles. 7 9

Although the concepts for SDI and GPALS never matured t

operational systems, they fostered significant advances in

space weapon technologies. For example, ground ABM test

showed significantly improved probabilities for interceptin

ballistic missiles from long ranges;8 0 a high-intensity particl

204
beam irradiated a miniature reentry vehicle in 1986;8 1 spac

experiments collected data on target signatures in space; 8 2 

neutral particle beam was fired in space from a satellite;8 3 an

in 1991, SDI Office officials unveiled a chemical laser wit

practical potential to be an effective space-based weapon. 8 4

Conclusions Regarding the Historical Trend

In summary US space policy has a strong sanctuary tradi

tion behind it. Since the 1950s and through eight US presi

dential administrations, Americans significantly restrained

their deployment of space weapons. Policy makers recognized

that acting otherwise invited international counterefforts tha

in turn, would jeopardize satellites viewed as essential t

American national security. In place of operational spac

weapons, US decision makers opted for research designed t

maintain technological parity in space weapons in case pro 

duction was required to meet new threats. History shows th

US government deployed operational ASATs only when th

Soviets directly threatened the continental United States wit

nuclear space weapons, and the utility of these ASATs wa

quite limited.

Undoubtedly, the United States’s sanctuary policies wer

instrumental in limiting the degree to which space weapon

proliferated. Today, space remains relatively unweapon 

ized—defying more than 40 years of a superpower arms rac

in land, sea, and air weapons. It would be impossible to gues

with any precision how things might have turned out had th

United States opted to aggressively weaponize space.

Are US space policies of the past relevant for today’s deci

sion makers? That question has no simple answer becaus

historical contexts never precisely repeat themselves. Never 

theless, history provides a powerful case study of space sanc

tuary policy. Understanding the sanctuary perspective in it

strongest form requires one to fully appreciate the implica 

tions of the historical record. If contemporary US leaders elec

to weaponize space today, that decision will stand in marked

contrast to almost all US space policies of the past. It would

be viewed, domestically and internationally, as a significan

discontinuity in US national strategy.

205
Contemporary US Policy on Space Weapons

The United States is committed to the exploration and use of

outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the

benefit of all humanity. “Peaceful purposes” allow defense

and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national

security and other goals. The United States rejects any

claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or

celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any

limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to

acquire data from space. The United States considers the

space systems of any nation to be national property with

the right of passage through and operations in space

without interference. Purposeful interference with space

systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign

rights.

 —President Clinton’s National Space Policy

19 September 1996 

Today, US space policy continues to reflect the sanctuar

tradition of the past. Like so many of his predecessors, Presi

dent Clinton opposes aggressive weaponization of space.

President Clinton is being challenged by space weapon ad

vocates around the defense community and in Congress. A

that debate unfolds, the United States persists with a familia

course of action—space weapons research and development t

a point short of operational deployment.

Space Weapons and the Clinton Administration

While President Clinton tacitly accepts the military mission

of space force application (the projection of firepower agains

surface targets from space) and space control, he clearly ha

reservations about space weapons. The White House’s Na 

tional Space Policy directs the DOD to “maintain the capabilit

to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhance

ment, space control, and force application.”8 5 A more pointed

statement remarks later on that “consistent with treaty obliga 

tions, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain

space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space

and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.”8 

206
These policy statements cannot be construed to mean Presi

dent Clinton emphatically endorses space weapons. His ad

ministration has consistently demonstrated an aversion t

such systems.

When President Clinton assumed office in 1993, he acted t

prune space weapons from two high-profile defense initiatives

First, he redirected the Ballistic Missile Defense Office’

agenda to emphasize local theater missile defense (TMD) a

the expense of a more global national missile defense architec

ture.8 7 Reflecting a stricter adherence to traditional interpreta 

tions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, this new approach to ballisti

missile defense substituted ground-based defenses for space

based weapon systems. 8 8 Specifically, the Brilliant Pebbles in 

terceptors central to President Bush’s global protectio

against limited strikes was conceptually replaced by the Pa 

triot advanced capability, the upgraded Aegis radar, and th

theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD)—all ground-based

ABM systems. The only space systems to survive the rear

chitecture were satellites designed for passive surveillance. 8 9

President Clinton’s aversion to space weapons is communi

cated in his ASAT policy, as well. After his inauguration, h

marked for termination President Bush’s kinetic energy (KE

ASAT initiative.9 0 He has yet to propose a budget with fundin

for that system.9 1

The Convictions of American Space Weapon Advocates

Growing elements of Congress and the defense communit

are resisting the president’s position, however. Since 1994 th

Senate has sustained the KE ASAT program with unrequested

funds.9 2 In the fiscal year 1997 budget, for example, Congres

unilaterally added $50 million to develop this antisatellite sys 

tem.9 3 An analyst for the Congressional Research Service note

that on the subject of ASATs, “the current Congress is cer 

tainly more supportive than the last several congresses.”9 4

Congress, supported by senior defense leaders, believes it

actions are consistent with national security requirements

Their case is built around two basic convictions. First, propo

nents believe space is too central to America’s power to remain

unprotected. They view the US space infrastructure as a cen 

207
ter of gravity. Soon after assuming command of the US Spac

Command, Gen Howell M. Estes III, noted that, “we are th

world’s most successful space-faring nation . . . , one of th

major reasons the United States holds its current position in

today’s league of nations. But, we are also the world’s mos

space-dependent nation, thereby making us vulnerable t

hostile groups or powers seeking to disrupt our access to, an

use of, space. For this reason, it is vital to our national secu 

rity that we protect and safeguard our interests in space.9 5 Th

ability of our potential adversaries to affect our advantage in

space is growing. We, in military space, are just now begin 

ning to consider and deal with these threats.”9 6

Senior DOD leaders particularly highlight America’s growin

dependence on space systems for economic and military prow 

ess. In February 1997, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defens

for Space Robert V. Davis underscored the economic vulner 

ability of satellites that pass extensive electronic commerc

through space. 9 7 That same month, CINC USSPACECOM cau

tioned that DOD space systems also present adversaries wit

lucrative targets. He observed that “in purely military terms

the national dependence on space-based systems equates to 

vulnerability. History shows that vulnerabilities are eventuall

exploited by adversaries, so the United States must be pre

pared to defend these systems.”9 8 Recognizing these vulner 

abilities, many policy makers see space combat and weapon

as inevitable. “The United States will . . . eventually fight from

space and into space,” remarked Gen Joseph W. Ashy, CINC

USSPACECOM at the time of interview.9 9 “We are developin

direct-force applicators,” he emphasized on another occasion

“They can be delivered by terrestrial [means], as well as from

aircraft, shooting [targets] in the air or in space.”100 Secretar

of the Air Force Sheila Widnall allowed that these direct-forc

applicators might range from shooting down satellites to les

obtrusive interference with an adversary’s signals.101

As a second basic conviction, US space weapon proponent

believe that adversaries will unilaterally develop space sys 

tems in pursuit of greater relative power. Proponents are con 

cerned about hostile space intelligence surveillance, and re

connaissance, information (ISR) satellites, as well as hostil

208
space weapons. They recommend the deployment of US spac

weapons to counter these international developments.

US advocates of space weapons decry the improving IS

space posture of our potential adversaries. At the end of 1995

some 31 nations or international ventures had at least on

such satellite payload in orbit. 102 Gen Robert S. Dickman, th

DOD’s space architect, predicts that in the next decade mor

than 20 nations will field space systems that “will have som

ability to influence the battlefield.”103 Such systems will pu

US soldiers at risk, as adversaries take advantage of the forc

multiplication offered by their own satellites. In the words o

the deputy undersecretary of defense for space, the United

States must begin to prepare for adversaries that “will be abl

to use space to [their] advantage the same way we use it fo

ours. . . . I guarantee, in the near future, that threat wil

emerge; it’s only a matter of time.”104 Vice Chief of Staff of th

Air Force Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr. sees this developmen

as unacceptable. “Just as it would be unthinkable in a futur

conflict to permit an adversary to use an aircraft to reconnoi

ter our battle lines for intelligence and targeting, so is i

equally unacceptable to allow enemy reconnaissance satellite

free and unhindered flight over US military positions. An op

erational ASAT capability designed to eliminate an adversary’s

space capabilities must be considered an integral part of thi

country’s force structure.”105

General Moorman’s message is winning support on Capito

Hill, where some lawmakers worry about enemy reconnaissanc

satellites and commercial satellites. “There is concern in thi

Congress over the proliferation of imagery” from commercial sat

ellites that can be used for military purposes, said a Congres 

sional Research Service policy analyst. The DOD is sensitive t

similar concerns. In March 1997, for the first time, the Arm

publicly linked its eight-year-old ASAT development with th

threat of foreign space-based remote sensing. Specifically, th

Army Space and Strategic Defense Command acknowledged i

needs rapid development of an ASAT to combat the growin

“spread of space-based photography” that has led to concern

that “hostile reconnaissance could be used against the United

States and allied military forces in the future.”106

209
In addition to the threat posed by proliferating ISR satellite

around the globe, advocates of space weapons are wary of for 

eign ASATs. Senior DOD officials acknowledge that the facilitie

and launch pad for Russia’s co-orbital ASAT are still in place.1

Many strategists also point to the likelihood that others wil

follow suit. One such strategist logically points out the attrac

tiveness of ASATs to America’s competition. “We should expec

interest in anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to proliferate. . . 

ASATs may represent a particularly attractive weapon, becaus

the problems posed by a hostile satellite may be most effectivel

banished by attacking a single target in space rather than nu

merous and dispersed Earth-bound targets. The United State

has concentrated its space functions on a small number o

satellites, meaning that the loss of one or more systems in th

midst of hostilities could have fatal repercussions.”108

Motivated by convictions that space is a US center of gravit

and that foreign military competitors will exploit space sys 

tems of their own, weapon proponents are successfully im 

pacting today’s plans and budgets. For the first time sinc

President Reagan’s SDI, a draft National Security Space Mas

ter Plan endorses the creation of an offensive space capabilit

against “surface, space, and airborne targets” as US nationa

policy.109 Consistent with this master plan, the Pentagon i

requesting some $84 million for RTD&E under budget lines fo

“space and electronics warfare,” “advanced materials for weap

ons systems,” “advanced weapons technology,” and the “DOD

high-energy laser facility.”110 This money would be in addition

to the congressional funding for a KE ASAT.

Thoughts on Departing the Traditional Sanctuary

In summary, while President Clinton resists deployment o

space weapons, other senior policy makers continue to argu

for their utility. These policy makers see space weapons a

inevitable guardians of US access to space—access fundamen 

tal to national power. In addition, advocates promote spac

weapons as a counter to proliferating foreign ISR and ASAT

technologies.

It is interesting that these convictions were just as tru

during the cold war as they are today, if not more so. Then

210
US leaders also recognized that space played a central role in

US national security. The threat posed by Soviet ISR satellite

and ASATs was considerable during the cold war. In fact, bot

the threat and its implications were arguably far graver tha

those posed by potential adversaries today. Yet, US official

restrained themselves from more than token weaponization o

space during that conflict.

How contemporary US decision makers would distinguis

their situation from that of cold war strategists is a length

debate in itself. Perhaps today’s looser association of space with

the nuclear “sword of Damocles” permits greater freedom to ac

aggressively there. Then again, perhaps technology has mature

to the point where cost-effective weapon concepts are feasible

The proliferation of ballistic missiles to the third world and 

heightened US sensitivity to casualties might make those cost

effective space weapons particularly attractive.

Whatever the differences between the eras, some US deci

sion makers believe those differences now make space weap

ons necessary. Indeed, they may be absolutely correct—thi

study in no way attempts to belittle their concerns. Neverthe

less, decisions addressing space weapons should be post

poned until strategists seek out and understand all sides o

the debate. This is the goal of the next section. It seeks t

round out the debate by articulating a contemporary argu 

ment against space weapons today.

The Sanctuary Argument

This section strives to articulate the strongest possible cas

against weaponizing space further in the immediate future. I

works to capture the essence of what sanctuary advocate

might argue given their “day in court.” The basic premise o

this sanctuary argument is that US interests are better served

by preserving the present equilibrium in space weapons. I

cannot be overemphasized that the case presented here doe

not propose that the United States should never introduc

space weapons, but rather that it should postpone weaponiza 

tion until current conditions change.

211
No attempt is made here to rebut the sanctuary argument

Rather, this section aims to present space weapon advocate

with a counterargument to round out the debate. Indeed, th

section will be written with a parochial edge to emphasize tha

counterargument.

The sanctuary argument is presented in two parts. First, i

challenges the two basic convictions of space weapon advo 

cates previously summarized. In some cases, that means as

serting the basic convictions are incorrect. Where the convic 

tions are incontestable, it means offering policy alternatives t

space weapons. Second, the argument makes a positive cas

for a contemporary sanctuary strategy independent of the tw

basic convictions—with the goal of connecting such a strateg

to broader national interests.

Challenging Weapon Advocates’ Basic Convictions

As a first conviction, weapon advocates propose that spac

is central to US power and must be protected as a center o

gravity (COG). This conviction rests on the fundamental as

sumption that in guarding against exploitation of a presumed

US space Achilles’ heel there is no alternative but to protect i

with space weapons. Military history offers many examples o

similar dilemmas solved by eliminating the COG rather tha

protecting it. In the 1960s, US military credibility rested heavil

on bombers and land-based ICBMs. These systems consti

tuted a friendly COG. Improved Soviet nuclear strike capabili

ties eventually rendered these COGs vulnerable. The principa

US response was not to protect their land-based forces b

active defenses designed to defeat inbound Soviet missiles

Instead, the United States mitigated its vulnerability by reduc

ing the extent to which the ICBMs and bombers themselve

were COGs. The development of submarine-launched ballisti

missiles devolved part of the nuclear mission to a third me

dium—the sea. US strategic vulnerability was reduced. A sim

lar approach is open to policy makers concerned about th

exposure of US space assets.

Strategists must recognize that space communication, sur

veillance, reconnaissance, and navigation systems are no

COGs because they are in space; they are COGs because the

212
are centralized communication, surveillance, reconnaissance

and navigation systems. Options exist, however, to shar

these missions with other terrestrial systems and pursue 

widely distributed space architecture. This decentralization

would not only reduce US vulnerability in space but might d

so without degradation of mission performance. Significantly

as the vulnerability is reduced, the case for space weapon

weakens. Protection is accomplished through decentralization

and diversification rather than through active defenses.

Current technology hints that this approach to national se

curity is reasonable. Unfortunately, the possibility is masked

by the past successes of centralized space assets. Operation

such as Desert Storm continue to foster a paradigm tha

space is now and must always be the principal medium fo

DOD command, control, communications, computers, and in 

telligence (C 4I) systems. An overwhelming 90 percent of th

coalition’s intertheater communications and 60 percent o

their intratheater communications were carried by satellites in

that conflict. These statistics downplay the fact that 40 per 

cent of the intratheater communications were successfull

carried through terrestrial communication links. Microwave

tropospheric, and switched network communications quickl

established operational connectivity and began to replac

point-to-point satellite communications at both the inter 

theater and intratheater levels. 111

The statistics from Desert Storm also understate the vulner 

ability of satellite communications (SATCOM) to jamming, in 

terception, monitoring, and spoofing. The Iraqis were know

to have at least four Soviet-made ultrahigh frequency jammer

capable of shutting down up to 95 percent of the wartim

communications to and from the US Navy. 112 Such vulnerabil

ity led the cochair of a Defense Communication Agency review

of the Gulf War to emphasize the need for alternatives t

SATCOM.113 Some of the more promising alternatives that per 

mit this are maturing at a blistering pace.

Fiber-optic technology is one example and is already rou 

tinely used by the commercial sector. A single optic fiber ex 

ceeds the entire carrying capacity of current satellite designs

In fact, the international demand for fiber-optic paths ha

213
prompted trans-Atlantic cables boasting 60,000 channel

each. The performance and cost-effectiveness of fiber optic

presages its rapid growth in the future.114 In addition to fibe

optics, technologies employing microwave, millimeter wave fre

quency, infrared, and laser communications also offer enor

mous broadband capabilities. 115

General Dickman, the DOD space architect, recently ad

vanced another alternative to present SATCOM architectures

Citing that one of his biggest challenges was getting the mili

tary and national security space communities to accept “a

different way of looking at space,” Dickman proposed commu

nication packages be carried aboard unmanned aerial vehicle

(UAV).116 The military is on the verge of being able to field suc

a capability. For example, by the end of 1997, the United

States was scheduled to build two Global Hawk UAVs capabl

of line-of-sight data link communications. These vehicles ca

be launched from ranges up to three thousand nautical mile

and still loiter over a target area for 24 hours at altitude

greater than 60,000 feet. 117 With launch bases closer to th

theater, loiter times approach 48 hours. The communication

payload built for the Global Hawk is equally impressive. I

essentially equals the communications capacity of a defens

satellite communication system (DSCS) satellite, making th

Global Hawk a viable and extremely cost-effective satellite sur

rogate. 118 The current DOD contract fixes the average uni

price of the Global Hawk at $10 million.119 This contrast

dramatically with the $140-million price tag of a DSCS satel

lite and its $86-million Atlas booster.120

In addition to their contributions to communications, sys 

tems such as the Global Hawk are strong candidates to per 

form reconnaissance and surveillance missions traditionall

dominated by satellite platforms. The Global Hawk carries a

advanced suite of ISR capabilities. The data from these sen 

sors is processed by the equivalent of an onboard supercom 

puter before downlink—a system that allows coverage of 

geographic area the size of Illinois in just 24 hours at three

foot resolution. 121 It is also capable of spot images with one

foot resolution.122 No wonder a summary of UAV contribution

reads like that of satellites: “responsive and sustained dat

214
from anywhere within enemy territory, day or night, regard

less of weather, as the needs of the warfighter dictate.”123 Sig

nificantly, the UAV provides these capabilities within an archi

tecture that is easily reconstituted. It is less expensive and fa

simpler to replace a downed UAV than a satellite lost on orbi

The last major satellite mission area is that of navigation. No

discussion of the Gulf War can overlook the significant contri

bution of the global positioning system (GPS). By the end o

the war, close to 10,000 receivers guided ships, aircraf

tanks, and infantry soldiers through deserts with no distin 

guishable landmarks.124 GPS is even more valuable today

DOD is basing the guidance of a new generation of precision

guided munitions on space-based data. This trend leads advo 

cates of space weapons to posit that GPS satellites warran

protection from attack or interference. Nevertheless, the bette

solution might be to shift navigation capability back to terres

trial systems. Inertial navigation systems, for example, fre

navigation from external data links and are rapidly improving

Not only are inertial navigation systems becoming more accu 

rate, they are also becoming more portable, as the militar

recognizes. Between 1996 and 1999 the Pentagon plans t

triple its investment in micromechanical systems with an em 

phasis on miniaturized inertial measurement, distributed

sensing, and information technology. 125 A concerted emphasi

on these kinds of technologies could not only build a militar

relatively insensitive to attack on its space navigation asset

or jamming of its signals but also might allow the United

States to deny less-developed adversaries access to free GP

data when the shooting starts.

Shifting space missions to terrestrial mediums is one way t

minimize US vulnerabilities in space. Another way is to evolv

today’s centralized space architecture to one that is more dis 

tributed and decentralized. Not only would this further miti

gate the potential US vulnerability in space but system per 

formance might actually improve. Lt Col Christian C

Daehnick, in the previous chapter of this book, determined

that a space architecture with smaller, distributed satellite

“more directly responds to the needs of today’s primary user

and can adapt more readily to changes in both requirement

215
or technological opportunity.

126 Others are reaching the sam

conclusions.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) revealed it wil

downsize its national security satellites to a maximum of “1⁄2

their current size, and in some cases 1⁄4 of the current weight,

while making them more capable than today’s spacecraft.12

Similarly, the Air Force’s improved space and missile trackin

system will eventually launch 12 to 24 681-kilogram satellite

into a distributed constellation.128 In the future, the spac

community may consider even these satellites overly large an

centralized. The Phillips Laboratory will begin space-based

testing of miniaturized components that could lead to grape

fruit-sized smart satellites within a decade.129

As US space assets shrink in size and weight, “clouds” o

small satellites will foster survivability by eliminating singl

point failures in mission capability. The smaller satellites als

enhance survivability by allowing more economical launc

systems to replenish satellite constellations. In anticipation o

this, the US Air Force is considering a reusable launch vehicl

(RLV). The RLV technology, developed in the National Aero 

nautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs, promise

to reduce today’s $4,500-per-kilogram costs for low Earth or

bit payloads to some $450 per kilogram. NASA administrato

Daniel Goldin predicts the RLV will also bring a tenfold im 

provement in launch reliability. 130

In summary, advocates of space weapons are correct in

their diagnosis, but misguided in their cure. The degree t

which the United States has centralized its communication

surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation systems in spac

translates to a potentially serious US vulnerability. Rathe

than introduce weapons to defend these assets, however, th

systems themselves could be decentralized and diversified

across the air, land, and sea mediums. In this way, the Ameri

can COG in space could be defended by eliminating it. Not

that this does not mean the United States should work t

abandon space. Instead, it means finding a balance betwee

reliance on space and terrestrial systems, between centraliza 

tion and decentralization, so as to mitigate the value of U

216
space assets as a COG and obviate the requirement for spac

weapons for defense.

As a second conviction, space weapon advocates postulat

that the US’s international competitors will unilaterally mov

to exploit and control space. More specifically, this conviction

assumes that adversaries will develop effective ISR space plat

forms. Next, it presumes that adversaries will not stop wit

ISR space systems but will strive to weaponize space as earl

as possible––with or without provocation from similar US ac

tions. The significance of the first assumption and the accu 

racy of the second are debatable. For the first, it is disputabl

whether foreign ISR satellites should significantly alter U

military effectiveness. Even if they did, the United State

would find it very difficult to target them without recrimina

tion. The commercial and international character of satellite

present the targeteer with troublesome sensitivities. Evidenc

against the second assumption asserts that, unless provoked

by extensive US space weaponization, the US’s adversarie

will not be inclined to pursue space weapons.

Some proponents of space weapons believe foreign ISR sat

ellites—particularly reconnaissance—warrant weapons fo

preemptive strikes. There are other ways to defeat ISR system

without incurring the costs and risks associated with spac

weapons. Consider that an opponent being as “blind” as th

Iraqis were during the Gulf War is a historical anomaly an

not a prerequisite for victory. In World War II, for example, th

United States prevailed over adversaries who possessed IS

assets nearly equal to those of the Allies. Allied techniques lik

concealment, communications security, deception, and opera 

tions security proved to be effective countermeasures to en 

emy ISR capabilities. In this respect, Americans would do wel

to recall the effectiveness with which the North Koreans, Chi

nese, North Vietnamese, and Afghani mujahideen operated

against superpower militaries. These superpowers possessed

space and air superiority—accessing at will any spot in th

theater with ISR capabilities. Repeatedly the superpower

were frustrated by their opponents’ low-tech countermea 

sures. December 1950 offers one telling example. In tha

month, a surprise Chinese offensive drove the US Eight

217
Army back into southern Korea. To support the Eighth Army

the Fifth Air Force was ordered to locate precisely the Chines

forces on the other side of the front. Robert F. Futrell note

that 10 days of unspared aerial reconnaissance and 27,64

reconnaissance photographs revealed nothing in front of th

Eighth Army’s position. What the all-out reconnaissance effor

missed were 177,018 troops of the Chinese Fourth Field

Army—true masters of camouflage and operations security. 131

Although US countermeasures will not render enemy IS

satellites totally benign, US military effectiveness is far from

lost. Seeing US forces is one thing, attacking them is another

The United States employs a formidable array of defensiv

technologies designed to prevent enemy penetrations of al

types. Even the troublesome ballistic missile threat is well on

its way to being thwarted by maturing US theater ballisti

missile defense systems. The United States also possesses th

world’s most effective offensive forces, capable of destroying a

enemy’s terrestrial links to ISR satellites. So while the adver 

sary’s satellite may not be blind, the data is nevertheless los

For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi access to Arab

sat telecommunication satellites was severed when a coalition

air attack destroyed the Arabsat earth station in Baghdad.132

In summary, then, the United States is neither compelled

nor limited to countering enemy ISR satellites with spac

weapons. US military effectiveness can be preserved through

operational security, defensive technologies, and attacks on

the key terrestrial nodes supporting the enemy space systems

US strategists still bent on augmenting passive countermea 

sures with preemptive attacks on foreign ISR satellites fac

the challenging task of distinguishing between military an

commercial systems. Writing from the Centre for Defenc

Studies and Space Policy Research Unit in Great Britain, Alas

dair McLean notes that “all remote sensing satellites rela

data on the area of the earth’s surface they observe. If, within

that area, lie sites of military interest, the data thus obtained

is of military value. Likewise, communications satellites, eve

if not specifically dedicated to military use, can be used fo

such purposes, whether by normal commercial contracts, o

by special agreement in time of crisis or conflict.”133

218
The Meteosat-4 satellite , operated by the European Spac

Agency, illustrates McLean’s contention. That satellite trans

mits signals every 30 minutes to any user with proper receiv 

ing equipment. During the Gulf War, a Plymouth College pro 

fessor built his own homemade receiver and was surprised t

see that he could detect troop concentrations in the Gulf are

from the weather imagery. Clearly this shows the “undoubted

military potential of the most innocent civilian satellite.”134 Th

high-resolution imaging capabilities of the French System

Probatoire pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) made it les

innocent in the context of the Gulf War. Fortunately for th

United States, SPOT Image agreed not to sell its photorecon 

naissance outside the coalition. During the same conflic

however, the US-based company that operates Landsat in 

sisted on selling imagery to noncoalition countries, arguing i

had a legal obligation to do so. 135 Such uncooperative civilia

and commercial systems present military planners with dubi

ous if not provocative targets. Aggressors against these sys 

tems must carefully balance military necessity with collatera

damage. They must also recognize that allies may be users o

the targeted systems. This is precisely what happened in th

Gulf War. Iraq had access to civilian-run Intelsat, Inmarsa

and two regional Arabsat telecommunications satellites.13

Such arrangements will immeasurably complicate future ef

forts to attack satellites.

Whereas foreign ISR satellites are a reality, foreign spac

weapons are not. Today there is little to suggest that anothe

nation with the economic, technological, and space expertis

required to pursue space weapons is inclined to do so. Thi

includes Russia, Europe, Japan, and China.

Except for the United States, Russia is the only nation to hav

demonstrated any historical interest in ASAT technologies. In

November 1991, the Russians announced that their co-orbita

ASAT remains “operational” today. Although this Russian ASAT

does threaten certain US space assets, its effec tiveness should

be kept in context. First, in 29 tests of the system betwee

October 1968 and June 1982, there were 12 failures. 137 Sec

ond, the most recent test was conducted 12 years ago. 13

Third, tests were only conducted across orbital inclinations o

219
62 to 66 degrees and altitudes of six hundred to 1,00

miles.139 Most of the US’s satellites are at altitudes greate

than 1,000 miles and well outside the tested inclinations. Th

performance of the Russian co-orbital ASAT is limited by othe

operational constraints as well. Days are often required t

achieve the orbital conditions that allow a successful launc

and intercept. In addition, the nature of the co-orbital inter 

cept provides advance warning of hostile intentions, thus al

lowing evasive actions on the part of the target. In David

Lupton’s words: “US terrestrial assets are more vulnerable t

numerous threats (including terrorist acts) than are spac

systems threatened by the Soviet ASAT.”140 Reportedly th

Russians have also experimented with other forms of ASAT

weaponry. Starting in the 1970s, Russia extensively pursued

high-powered, ground-based lasers and microwave weapons

A more conventional ASAT program, very similar to the U

F-15 air-launched ASAT, was also kicked off in the lat

1980s.141 Although it is unclear what these efforts finall

achieved, there are no indications that any of the concept

matured to become operational systems. Nor is it likely any o

the concepts will do so, given the current fiscal condition o

the Russian space program. In January 1997, Russian Spac

Agency (RSA) Director Yuri Koptev warned that without in 

creased funding, Russia would be unable to maintain even 

skeleton space program. He acknowledged that of 20 nation

active in space research and satellite launches, Russia ranked

second to last. Only India spent less. In 1996 this meant tha

only 11 of the RSA’s 27 planned civil missions were actuall

launched. The RSA’s woes are affecting its personnel, as wel

Since 1989 half the engineers and technicians have left th

RSA as Russian spending on space programs fell each of th

previous eight years.142 Money is so scarce that Russia risk

losing its place in the highly visible international space station

program. Vice President Albert Gore warned in 1997 that Rus

sian participation would be jeopardized if Russia failed to re

lease millions of rubles withheld from time-critical con 

tracts.143

Less information is available on Russia’s annual militar

space budget, but requests for 1995 reveal planned expendi

220
tures roughly equal those of the RSA. 144 This indication o

dramatically reduced spending on military space systems i

corroborated by other evidence. In 1996 there were no Globa

Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) navigation satellit

launches despite the fact that three GLONASS satellite

stopped transmitting signals in that year. 145 Consider also tha

between 1962 and 1994, the Russians averaged more tha

two photoreconnaissance spacecraft on orbit. During tha

same period, there was never a gap in coverage. 146 Today

although it had planned to keep at least one imaging system

operational, Russia has no imaging reconnaissance satellite

in orbit—a Russian first that stands in stark contrast to th

five imaging satellites the United States currently has aloft.14

As yet another example of deep spending cutbacks, the Rus

sians postponed the December 1996 launch of a new missil

warning satellite “to conserve carrier and spacecraft.”148 I

light of this and the other operational and fiscal constraint

noted above, a concerted Russian effort to develop spac

weapons appears unlikely in the near future.

While Russia struggles to regain its footing in space, Europ

is pursuing strategies for cooperation in the civilian sector

Joint European endeavors in military programs like the Helio

reconnaissance satellite are clearly the exception and not th

rule. 149 Consistent with this position, European nations con 

tinue to rebuff US initiatives to cooperate in ballistic missil

defense technology developments. Hence, Alasdair McLean’s

conclusions on Europe and space weapons: “no evidence ex 

ists for any real enthusiasm for European nations to develop

active space-based weapon systems.”150

Any analysis of Japanese ambitions to weaponize spac

must ultimately consider Japan’s constitutional prohibition

against offensive military capabilities. Since 1945, Japan ha

severely constrained its defense expenditures in deference t

public support for that prohibition and the military securit

already provided by US forces. 151 Japan’s national sentimen

fosters budget woes for the Japanese Defense Agency. Plan

for a missile warning satellite were scrapped in favor of th

short-term solution of buying US airborne warning and con 

trol system (AWACS) aircraft instead. 152 On a related note

221
Japan recently declined to participate in a joint venture t

develop an operational theater missile defense. This evidenc

indicates that Japan is not inclined to weaponize space.

In terms of space programs, China is Asia’s most visible na 

tion. Recently, however, Chinese energy has been devoted t

securing the cooperation of the United States and Europe in

aerospace ventures. New Chinese initiatives into the next cen 

tury include an improved booster, technology work geared to 

Chinese manned space presence, new imaging spacecraft, an

many new communication satellites. Analysts see the Chines

willingness to cooperate as China’s admission that it is fallin

behind its Asian neighbors, such as India and Japan, which ar

already cooperating with the West.153 A series of booster failure

confirms that there may be cause for Chinese concern. Th

August 1996 explosion of a Long March 3 rocket pushed China’

launch failure rate to more than 30 percent and is the sixth

failure in less than four years. 154 In contrast, the January 199

failure of a US Delta 2 at Cape Canaveral represents an anomal

for a program that enjoys a 98 percent success rate even afte

the accident.155 In total, then, it is reasonable to conclude tha

the Chinese desire to encourage cooperation with the West an

the Chinese struggle for reliable space technology will discour

age near-term pursuit of advanced space weapons—as long a

they do not feel threatened.

In summary, any assertion that the United States shoul

aggressively pursue weaponization to beat adversaries alread

rushing in that direction is questionable. While it is true tha

potential adversaries continue to perfect ISR spacecraft, US re

sponses are not limited to shooting those spacecraft down

Time-tested techniques with passive countermeasures and at

tack of terrestrial choke points offer alternative solutions. Sinc

these options remain effective, the United States should shu

provoking potential adversaries by unilaterally employing spac

weapons. In addition, a close examination of the principal actor

in space today indicates that the nations pursuing ISR space

craft do not appear to be inclined to weaponize space. A depo

larizing world headed toward widespread democracy, tigh

military budgets, mission failures, and flat out disinterest in

weapons currently motivate these principal actors to put asid

222
space weapons development. Therefore, contrary to the view o

a world racing to weaponize space, the world seems poised t

follow the US lead. Today, foreign interest in space weapon

may hinge entirely on US restraint or weaponization.

Independent Arguments for a Sanctuary Strategy

Simply refuting the basic convictions of space weapon advo 

cates shortchanges the strongest possible argument for 

sanctuary strategy. Sanctuary strategists should also attemp

to prove their concepts best serve US national interests on

other grounds. These interests are broader than the militar

objectives that support them. White House policy maker

clearly convey these broader interests in the 1996 Nationa

security strategy. That document states that “the nature o

our response must depend on what best serves our own long

term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined

by our security requirements. Such requirements start wit

our physical defense and economic well-being. They also in 

clude environmental security as well as the security of ou

values achieved through expansion of the community of demo

cratic nations.”156

As a starting point to extending the sanctuary argument, i

is reasonable to postulate that physical security, economi

well-being, and democratic expansion depend on the quality o

American international relations. If that is accepted, the valu

of weaponizing space should, in part, be judged by its effect on

those relations. It is quite possible that weaponizing spac

may turn out to be unacceptably provocative—particularly in

the post-cold-war world—leading to global instability and de

teriorating US foreign relations.

Space weapons are provocative because they inherently pos 

sess offensive utility. Consider that war in space is much lik

the infamous shoot-out at the OK Corral. In that gunfigh

armed men constituted an enduring offensive threat to al

other gunslingers. There were no defensive shots, and at al

times anybody was a potential target. Space is similar. Th

laws of astrodynamics routinely give space weapons (ground

and space-based) clear line of sight to the satellites or territo 

ries of other nations. Such weapons could be fired instantane

223
ously and without warning. Significantly, these circumstance

encourage future space combatants to preempt adversaries b

shooting first. This destabilizing result is discussed below in

more detail.

Even if space weapons could be understood as defensive

the US’s current treaty obligations make it likely that step

toward weaponizing space will strain its international rela 

tions. The 1972 ABM Treaty, for example, bans developmen

testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or com 

ponents. The treaty also limits the United States and Russia

each to a single ABM site with no more than one hundred

missiles.157 Except for the protection of National Technica

Means of Verification granted in Article XII of the same treaty

international law is ambiguous if not silent on the subject o

ASATs.158 The traditional international precedent of “tha

which is not prohibited is permitted” would seem to remov

ASATs from treaty constraints. The difficulty in distinguishin

between ASATs and ABMs makes this problematic since 

powerful ASAT weapon also threatens ballistic missiles. There

fore, a concerted US effort to develop any weapons that projec

destructive force into or from space will foster protest from

those sensitive to violations of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Objec

tions from the Russians are particularly worrisome since the

have clearly linked both Strategic Arms Reduction Talk

(START) treaties to continued US compliance with the ABM

Treaty. Under these accords, thousands of missiles will b

destroyed by the United States and Russia. Clearly, preservin

these accords is well within the US’s national interest. In th

words of one of the ABM Treaty negotiators, “A missil

scrapped is a missile that does not have to be shot down.”159

If space weapons are indeed offensive by nature and if the

unavoidably challenge international law, then US actions t

weaponize space could easily aggravate the security dilemm

that fosters arms races. Nations exist in a setting where n

diplomatic sovereign arbitrates international conflicts. Eac

must ultimately rely on its own strength for protection an

constantly look for shifts in relative power.160 This preoccupa 

tion with relative position means that even arms acquisition

intended purely for self-protection are destined to menac

224
one

s global neighbors.161 What one state views as insurance

the adversary will see as encirclement.”162 In this way, U

initiatives to strengthen its relative posture in space could

drive other nations to follow suit—even if each is motivated b

what it sees as peaceful goals. It is the classic prisoner’s

dilemma: each state pursuing its own self-interests in spac

only to find in the end that all are worse off than if they ha

cooperated.163 Those familiar with game theory know the op

portunity to break this cycle occurs when a principal playe

risks compromising immediate self-interests for the longer

term good of all. Since the United States undoubtedly lead

the world in space weapon technology, the question becomes

Will America lead the world toward cooperation or conflict?

The traditional view of space power as a symbol of interna

tional prestige is another force driving nations to keep pac

with US technology. In their book The Prestige Trap, Roger B

Handberg and Joan Johnson-Freese study what motivated th

US, European, and Japanese space programs. They specifi 

cally address the question of why these nations made seriou

resource commitments to exploiting a medium that promised

little in the way of immediate return.164 The answer, in al

three cases, was primarily prestige and national pride (with 

dash of scientific curiosity). 165 While acknowledging that thes

early space efforts were often civilian in character, the author

note that “civilian space policy has clear links to the military

industrial policies within most societies. The technologies an

technical skills involved in civilian space endeavors in man

cases have clear and ready applications to military technolog

. . . the boundary is thin and easily breached.”166 On eithe

side of this boundary, US strategists should expect their inter 

national competitors to keep pace with US developments.

Some strategists might remain relatively unfazed by compe

tition from staunch allies like the Europeans and Japanese

They should pause to reflect, however, because the introduc

tion of space weapons might jeopardize those alliances. From

his study of contemporary history, Stephen M. Walt concluded

that nations are far more likely to ally against dominan

threats than they are to bandwagon with them.167 This balanc

ing behavior occurs because nations recognize their odds fo

225
survival are improved by confronting a rising hegemon befor

it becomes too strong to resist. Since allying with a hegemon

entails the gamble of trusting it, the safer strategy is to join

forces with other less threatening nations.168 The factors tha

incite this reaction to an emerging hegemon are the hegemon’s

aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensiv

intentions. 169 Nations will be more prone to balance as th

threat gets stronger, closer, more offensively capable, an

more hostile. This framework poses problems for US strate 

gists planning to weaponize space. Space weapons increas

US power with systems already noted as inherently offensive

In his paper on the implications of space weapons, Dr. Kar

Mueller postulates that space weapons will also “increase th

effective proximity of the United States to previously distan

states.”170 The net effect of these changes might well foster a

international perception that a new and different US threat i

emerging. This perception could lead nations presentl

friendly or neutral toward the United States to balance agains

it when US space weapons are deployed. At a minimum, na

tions may at least become less willing to cooperate with th

United States. 171 Such was Germany’s fate when Admiral Tir 

pitz built a formidable battle fleet as a means of coaxing Brit 

ain’s alliance. Instead, the British redoubled their own ship 

building and moved diplomatically closer to France an

Russia.172

In general, the United States tends to underestimate how it

actions affect the security dilemma and international balanc

ing. The United States sincerely believes its actions are cate

gorically peaceful and are perceived as such by other nations

However, this is not the way the rest of the world—includin

allies—always views the United States. In a multipolar world

the United States is the single most powerful competitor. Thi

distinction naturally impels other nations to observe th

United States with at least some suspicion. As an illustration

US Space Command acknowledged that it officially “predict

when selected satellites will be in position to perform intel

ligence collection against US forces and military/militar y

related installations, and makes these predictions available t

installation commanders.” Most Americans would clearly cas

226
this statement in a benign light. They would view such 

capability as defensive—the inherent right of US forces to re

main aware of when they are being observed. There are report

edly some in the international community who have a differ 

ent interpretation, however. They link this US Spac

Command mission with US Army statements that justify th

KE ASAT program as fulfilling a requirement to deny hostil

remote sensing and reconnaissance capabilities. According t

Military Space , that “potential linkage . . . generated som

uneasiness, especially among foreign space officials.”173

Whatever the reaction of the international community, th

introduction of weapons into space would be strategically de

stabilizing. Robert Jervis postulates that the military stabilit

of the international system resides in two variables: firs

whether defensive weapons can be distinguished from offen 

sive ones and second, whether defensive or offensive weapon

are superior.174 Since space weapons were shown earlier to b

inherently offensive, the question of international stability u

timately depends on whether one believes space weapons ar

superior. Certainly, the US Air Force suspects that they are

The new Air Force strategic vision, approved at the 1996 Co 

rona meetings, states, “We are now transitioning from an Ai

Force into an air and space force, on an evolving path to 

space and air force.”175 What Air Force leaders have apparently

concluded is that space is becoming a dominant medium o

the future. If they are right, Jervis’s framework predicts tha

space weapons will tend to destabilize the international order

Such weapons favor the side that strikes first and penalize th

side that hesitates. In warning, Thomas C. Schelling wrote

“The whole idea of accidental or inadvertent war, of a war tha

is not entirely premeditated, rests in a crucial premise—tha

there is such an advantage, in the event of war, in being th

one to start it.”176 The US Congress Office of Technology As 

sessment echoed similar thoughts years later: “Pre-emptiv

attack would be an attractive countermeasure to space-based

ASAT weapons. If each side feared that only a pre-emptiv

attack could counter the risk of being defeated by enemy pre

emption, then a crisis situation could be extremely unsta 

ble.”177 This particular congressional assessment, and that o

227
Jervis and Schelling, invite US caution with space weapons

The United States may weaponize space only to fight a wa

that otherwise need not have occurred.

If the future does in fact find the United States in a wa

featuring space combat, advocates of space weapons assume th

United States will prevail. They believe that US technologica

prowess and industrial power will preserve space superiority

There is no guarantee, however, that the United States will in 

definitely possess space superiority—a grave reality since pursu 

ing it may mean forfeiture of the US’s hard-won and tentativ

superiority in the air, land, and sea arenas. Consider the impli

cations of space weapons for US defense spending.

From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2002, defens

budgets projected by Congress and the president are expected

to decline an average of 20 percent from fiscal year 199

spending. The Congressional Budget Office reports that th

administration remains about $101 billion short of the mone

required for a fully modernized Bottom-Up Review force. 17

Those shortfalls are further exacerbated by the continuin

pattern of diverting procurement funds to pay for operation

and maintenance (O&M) costs associated with US peace en 

forcement forces abroad. 179

In this budget-constrained environment, funding for spac

weapons could only come at the expense of other US defens

forces. These forces are constantly challenged by global com 

petitors for technological and operational superiority. So fa

the United States has done well to preserve its advantag

through relentless modernization of its systems. Those mod

ernizations are expensive and today are stretched out beyon

the life cycle of the systems they replace. While acknowledgin

that today’s force can handle today’s threats, the current chie

of staff of the Air Force recognizes that resources are no

available to modernize everything at once. His acquisitio

plan, therefore, calls for just-in-time modernization. F-22s ar

phased in to replace today’s fighters just as those fighters ar

made obsolete by foreign developments. The C-17 is delivered

just as C-141s retire. “We are phasing in the capabilities s

that they arrive when we need them,” he states, but “delays in

the modernization will create vulnerabilities very soon.”180 Wh

228
start an arms buildup in space when budget limitations al

ready threaten essential programs like the joint strike fighte

and the evolved expendable launch vehicle? Funds allocated

to space weapons undermine the budget upon which the U

services’ just-in-time modernization is predicated. It gamble

that investing in space superiority is worth the resulting de

cline in relative advantage in the other mediums.

Just as there is no guarantee that the United States wil

maintain air, land, and sea superiority if it shifts significan

funds to space programs, there is also no guarantee that th

United States will emerge the winner in the space weapon

race itself. It is entirely possible that another nation could

beat the United States or “leapfrog” past US accomplishment

late in the race. It is widely recognized that several Europea

and Asian nations are rapidly advancing technologically. In

fact, the United States no longer leads the world in som

sectors. Twenty years ago, for example, the United State

launched 80 to 90 percent of all commercial satellites in th

world. Today, that figure stands at 27 percent and continue

to drop as the Russians, Chinese, and French make in 

roads.181 The French alone own more than 50 percent of th

launch market share. 182 These statistics and other example

challenge the assumption that the United States could neve

be bested in a technology that proves to be crucial to wa

fighting in space. It might be somebody else who first develop

some concept as revolutionary as British radar in the Battle o

Britain, the German blitzkrieg in the Battle of France, or th

Russian sputnik during the cold war.

Not only is it possible that foreign know-how might over 

power the United States in some key technology sector, bu

US know-how might work against the United States in a rac

for space superiority. Dr. Mueller cites nuclear history as a

example of this. Today, an early US nuclear monopoly contin 

ues to erode with every additional nation that acquires nu

clear weapons. It cannot be ignored that the growing US vu

nerability to such weapons is in part compliments of th

United States. It was the United States that demonstrated th

feasibility of nuclear weapons and paid the tremendous nonre

curring development costs to do so. It was from the United

229
States that atomic secrets leaked to its chief adversary. In

general, the growing fraternity of nuclear powers benefited

from US hindsight and experience. It ought to be expected

that the same thing could be repeated should the United

States accelerate development of advanced space weapons. 183

So far, independent arguments for a sanctuary strateg

suggest that weaponizing space in no way guarantees th

United States is better postured to meet security challenges

In fact, a practical requirement to cut other US defense expen 

ditures to pay for space weapons may actually make th

United States less secure. This could happen if the US’s mili

tary advantages in space weapons were offset by new disad

vantages in the air, land, and sea mediums or if potentia

adversaries won the contest for space superiority. Even if th

United States were to successfully establish an enduring su

periority in all mediums, it might prove so provocative as t

isolate the United States from the international community

This isolation would undercut the US’s stated national inter 

ests in physical security, economic well-being, and expansion

of democratic values. In addition to the potential impacts on

these interests, weaponizing space also jeopardizes US inter 

ests in the environment and domestic programs.

US policy makers are growing increasingly concerned tha

space debris will begin to impede peaceful commercial exploi

tation of space. This concern dates back to 1967 when th

United States signed the Treaty on Principles Governing th

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space

Article IX of that treaty requires parties to “conduct explora 

tion . . . so as to avoid their [space and celestial bodies

harmful contamination.”184 In 1996 the president of the United

States directed that “the United States will seek to minimiz

the creation of space debris. . . . The design and operation o

space tests, experiments, and systems will minimize or reduc

accumulation of space debris consistent with mission require

ments and cost-effectiveness. It is in the interest of the U

Government to ensure that space debris minimization prac

tices are applied by other spacefaring nations and interna

tional organizations. The US government will take a leadership

role in international fora to adopt policies and practices aimed

230
at debris minimization.

185 This environmental concern is rea

and must be factored into the decision to weaponize space

Space combat is potentially very messy—recall that a singl

test of the US’s miniature homing vehicle ASAT produced frag

ments by the hundreds.186 Combat of this sort could easil

come at the expense of commercial exploitation of space. Driv 

ing that point home, the French satellite Cerise was crippled

in a collision during 1996. It was destroyed by a fragment o

an Ariane booster upper stage.187 Less than a year later, on 1

February 1997, the space shuttle Discovery was forced t

dodge a Pegasus upper stage fragment.188

US space weapons not only jeopardize the environment

they also threaten US budget deficit reduction and domesti

spending. It is not unrealistic to expect that weaponizin

space, especially if it occurs in the context of an arms race

could be one of the United States’s most expensive militar

undertakings to date.

Since 1984, SDI and BMD researchers have spent $39 bil 

lion and the Congressional Budget Office estimates that a

effective space-based missile defense, alone, will cost anothe

$60 billion through 2010. 189 Notably, these estimates assume 

benign space environment controlled and exploited by th

United States. They do not consider foreign challengers in

space nor do they consider future military space operation

other than ballistic missile defense. Both consideration

promise to hike costs further.

These spending estimates come amidst strident calls to re

duce the US national debt—calls that political leaders ar

slowly heeding. Experts project the US’s debt at $5,457 trillion

after fiscal year 1997. At the end of the same fiscal year, th

annual federal deficit, having narrowed roughly $200 billion

from 1992 to 1996, is predicted to widen back to $125.7

billion.190 Remedying these fiscal conditions could well consti

tute a national interest more compelling than unilateral U

action to accelerate the weaponization of space.

Allocating the nation’s scarce dollars to important domesti

programs may better serve US interests, as well. In 1996 a

estimated 555,000 Americans died of cancer—215,000 mor

than in 1971. Current trends indicate that by the year 2000

231
cancer will overtake heart disease as the US

s number on

killer.191 Researchers studying cancer are funded from a slice o

the National Institutes of Health $12-billion annual budget.192 I

1994 Congress comprehensively reviewed that budget and th

fight against cancer in total. The ensuing report concluded tha

current research funding is inadequate to “capitalize on un

precedented opportunities in basic science research.”193 Futur

funding, however, stands in direct competition with that fo

space weapons. It is a compelling assertion, however, that re

searchers attacking a disease that every year kills 10 times th

number of US combatants lost in Vietnam deserve higher prior 

ity than insurance against hypothetical space threats. Consider

also, that cancer research is but one of hundreds of domesti

programs in similar circumstances.

In summary, developing space weapons may not serve U

national interests. Weaponizing space brings opportunit

costs that fundamentally challenge US security interests a

defined by the national security strategy. These opportunit

costs are steep, and while they may be justified in scenario

where the United States is clearly threatened from space, the

appear dubious given the superiority the US military enjoy

today.

Summarizing the Independent

Argument for Space Sanctuary

In 1996 the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) conducted 

series of war games to simulate the effectiveness of force

proposed for 2010. In two of the games, US and “red team

forces faced each other with highly capable space weapons in

their orders of battle. In both cases, the games opened wit

what one observer referred to as a “space Armageddon.” Th

flag officers, having quickly discovered that space weapon

severely curtailed operational freedom of their air, land, an

sea forces, were forced to win total space superiority befor

proceeding with their terrestrial campaigns.194

Advocates of space weapons would be quick to point out tha

the JWFC war games prove their point—the United States mus

move now to control space or risk losing it in future conflicts

232
This section, however, indicates that space weapon propo

nents should look deeper into the issues motivating them t

support weaponizing space now . It asks them to carefully dif

ferentiate the question of if space should be weaponized from th

question of when space should be weaponized. Today, th

United States may have better alternatives with which to reduc

the vulnerability of US space systems, as well as better alterna 

tives with which to reduce the exposure of US terrestrial force

to enemy space ISR. In addition, strategists should continue t

debate the proposition that weaponizing the high ground un

questionably optimizes US national interests. US space weap

ons, even if advertised as defensive systems, may unacceptabl

undercut broader US interests related to international relations

global arms stability, military superiority, and domestic con 

cerns. Finally, it is possible that other nations currently hav

neither the inclination nor the resources to start their own

weaponization programs in space. They could well discover tha

inclination, however, if the United States proceeds with a spac

weapons program of its own.

Conclusions

Strategy . . . is concentrated upon achieving victory over a

specific enemy under a specific set of political and

geographic circumstances. But strategy must also anticipate

the trials of war, and by anticipation to seek where possible

to increase one’s advantage without unduly jeopardizing

the maintenance of peace or the pursuit of other values.

 —Bernard Brodie

Four years after World War II, Bernard Brodie called upon

military strategists to make their thinking broader and mor

sophisticated. Brodie believed uniformed officers well versed in

the military links to political, social, economic, and interna

tional dynamics were essential to formulating the best U

security policies.195 The nuclear age that followed his com 

ments made this requirement more important as well as mor

challenging. Clemenceau’s assertion that war was too impor

tant to be left to generals foreshadowed the predominant rol

civilians would play in formulating US defense policy after th

233
introduction of nuclear weapons. Civilians like Brodie, Her 

man Kahn, Schelling, and Albert Wohlstetter were responsibl

for most of the truly groundbreaking work underpinning th

United States’s fledgling nuclear strategy—a result fostered a

much by military disinterest in strategic policy as it was b

civilian interest in the same.

While the value of civilian contributions should never g

unappreciated, the absence of substantive military nuclea

theorists should never pass as acceptable. Surely US nuclea

strategy would have been improved had bright military officer

asserted themselves in matters other than execution of policy

Such officers, if properly prepared, might have brought th

invaluable perspective of military professionals schooled in th

complexities of national and international power.

Today, national strategists debate space weapons in a polic

climate not unlike the early days of nuclear strategy. Th

subject of space weapons also attracts strong civilian interven 

tion and has done so since the 1950s. As was the case wit

nuclear policy immediately after World War II, there is still n

comprehensive theory or strategy for space power. In fac

even the most rudimentary ideas about space power remain

undeveloped. One thing is certain. The United States will de

velop a space theory and strategy in the future. The question

is who will develop it. Will military strategists distinguis

themselves and be included this time around?

Bearing this question in mind, the 1997 USSPACECOM effor

to draft a military space theory and doctrine was an encouragin

development. 196 That effort will succeed if those involved strive t

see space power in the broadest of terms. Theorists and strate 

gists alike must consider far more than weapon technologies

principles of war, and campaign planning. They must consider

from every angle, the contributions of space to a nation’s

power and the means by which a state’s actions in space do o

do not influence other nations. Strategists should recommen

courses of action in matters like space weapons only afte

rigorously considering all perspectives.

The previous section examined the issue of weaponizin

space from one such perspective—that of a sanctuary advo 

cate arguing the strongest possible case against furthe

234
weaponization of space at this time. Since a basic purpose o

this study is to give military space thinkers something wit

which to mentally wrestle on their own, the sanctuary argu 

ment was offered without criticizing it. That is left for strate 

gists to do within the context of their specific problems. In

addition, the logic behind the convictions of weapon advocate

was treated only to the point of establishing the framework

upon which to build the sanctuary discussion. No doubt th

case for space weapons today could have been articulated in

more depth and with greater sophistication. That too was be

yond the basic purpose and is also left for future strategists.

There are two final points which are important for strate

gists who are judging the merits and shortcomings of th

sanctuary argument. First, the sanctuary position should

never be construed as a passive national strategy. Second

strategists who conclude that US national interests are indeed

served by introducing space weapons will still find the sanctu 

ary perspective invaluable to their planning.

It is incorrect to see the sanctuary strategy as passive or t

believe that it requires policy makers to stand idly by whil

competitors seize the initiative. Instead, the sanctuary strat

egy replaces US investments in space weapons with action

through other national avenues. Any deliberate decision t

pursue a sanctuary space strategy warrants aggressive diplo 

matic, informational, military, and economic support. As a

illustration, US diplomats might seize the initiative by de

nouncing space weapons in international forums. In turn, in 

ternational cooperation in space could be fostered through

treaties and agreements. Any sanctuary strategy would un

doubtedly require strong investments in national and militar

systems capable of recognizing treaty violations. Economi

trade might be conditionally linked to nations demonstratin

“good faith” in space treaty matters. Finally, and consisten

with their military tradition, the United States would be wis

to maintain a technological posture that always protects it

ability to accelerate weapons development to meet threats

This posture recognizes that the conditions conducive to 

sanctuary strategy can change over time to favor a weapons

oriented strategy instead.

235
It is equally mistaken to dismiss the sanctuary perspectiv

as irrelevant if the United States does set out on a strategy t

weaponize space. Weaponization occurs in degrees, and at an

given time the strategist must carefully balance the merits o

further weaponization with the value of preserving the sanctu 

ary which still remains. The best strategy will rarely discoun

one entirely in favor of the other. There will normally be a

optimum point somewhere between the extremes of tota

weaponization and a complete sanctuary.

Indeed, the United States’s first steps toward any hypothetica

weaponization of space might be heavily influenced by sanctuar

thought. Weapon systems might remain ground-based so as t

minimize any provocation associated with space-based weapons

Weaponizing covertly could further defuse the risk of provoca 

tion, and sharing key technologies with staunch allies migh

help assuage their suspicions and fears. Mindful of tentativ

superiority of American air, land, and sea forces, US strategist

might opt to field technologies for space control missions but no

for force application. This would minimize the risk of potentia

adversaries hitchhiking on US force application technologies t

undermine our advantage in terrestrial military strength. Inter 

national and national concerns over space debris might lead th

United States to field systems that kill without fragmentation

The possible permutations are numerous and strategists mus

determine which ones best suit their situations.

The sanctuary perspective helps identify the space infra 

structure that will support space weapons in the same way i

helps the strategist to tailor the specific nature of the spac

weapons themselves. Consider space launch systems. The re

quirement for quick, cost-effective, and reliable access t

space is well understood by the military space community. I

recognizes that without it, satellite forces become more expen 

sive and prone to gaps in coverage. Sanctuary thought, how 

ever, leads space strategists and acquisition decision maker

to strengthen the justification for responsive launch beyon

the force “push” that it provides.

Earlier, the sanctuary perspective proposed that spac

weapons were inherently offensive and therefore destabilizin

in a crisis. Responsive launch systems, however, help reestab

236
lish stability. They permit strategists to create a protected

second-strike capability by retaining a significant portion o

their space weapons on the ground, hence reducing incentive

for preemptive attacks against space systems in orbit. In thi

way, launch reconstitution plays a stabilizing role similar t

the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. Here, then, is a paten

case where the sanctuary perspective should lead even 

weapons proponent to modify strategy for the better. There ar

certainly more such cases.

In conclusion, the sanctuary argument broadens the un

derstanding of US strategists wrestling with the question o

space weapons. The argument exposes domestic and interna 

tional issues that might otherwise be overlooked. It allow

military strategists to more completely weigh alternatives

thereby strengthening the military’s contribution to US spac

defense policy.

Henry IV once remarked, “I never suffer my mind to be s

wedded to any opinions as to refuse to listen to better one

when they are suggested to me.”197 The wisdom of the six 

teenth-century king’s approach is timeless. Contemporary de

cision makers should approach any decision on space weap

ons with a good deal of listening. They should understand th

sanctuary perspective not because they are comfortable wit

its conclusions, but because they are uncomfortable if the

never hear it. There is, after all, a lot at stake for the United

States.

Notes

1. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. rev. (New York: Meridian, 1991

321.

2. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of Franc

and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Pres

1981), 377.

3. Tim Zimmerman, “Chemical Weapons: Senate Skeptics Ratify 

Treaty,” U.S. News & World Report, 5 May 1997, 44.

4. Warren Ferster, “U.S. Military Develops Plan to Protect Satellites

Space News 8, no. 7 (17–24 February 1997): 6.

5. Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis 

Summer 1995, 428.

6. Ferster, 26.

237
7. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement an

Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Februar

1996), 11.

8. Statistics on the number, type, and national origins of satellites sinc

1957 are updated annually by Air Force Magazine. See also Tamar A. Me 

huron, “Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine, August 1996, 38–40. For mor

details on modern international space activities, see USAF Phillips Labora

tory, Europe and Asia in Space: 1993–1994 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ka

man Sciences Corp., 1994), 347.

9. On US ABM programs, see B. Bruce-Riggs, The Shield of Faith (Ne

York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); and Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missil

Defense Controversy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977).

10. Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World (Orlando

Fla.: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1988), 103.

11. Curtis Peebles, Battle for Space (New York: Beaufort Books, 1983

51.

12. Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force and the Militar

Space Program, Air Force History and Museums Program (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 4.

13. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–198

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 30.

14. Ibid., 30.

15. Ibid., 48.

16. Ibid., 47–48.

17. Ibid., 49.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 51.

20. Ibid., 55.

21. Ibid., 75.

22. Peebles, Battle for Space, 83–85.

23. Stares, 80–81.

24. Peebles, Battle for Space, 89–90.

25. Stares, 119; and Peebles, Battle for Space, 90.

26. Peebles, 85.

27. Ibid., 92.

28. Stares, 81. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited nuclea

test explosions in all mediums including space.

29. Ibid., 127.

30. Ibid., 128–29.

31. Ibid., 93.

32. Ibid., 94.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 97.

35. Ibid., 93.

36. Ibid., 103. The Outer Space Treaty also reserved the moon and othe

celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and forbids the testing o

238
any type of weapon, the establishment of military bases, and the conduct o

military maneuvers on the moon or other celestial bodies. This is anothe

illustration of the sanctuary paradigm in action.

37. Peebles, Battle for Space, 94.

38. Ibid., 103.

39. Ibid., 105.

40. Ibid., 103.

41. Stares, 162–63.

42. Ibid., 165.

43. Ibid., 164.

44. Ibid., 169.

45. Ibid., 170.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 146.

48. Ibid., 145.

49. Peebles, Battle for Space, 112.

50. Stares, 174.

51. Ibid., 171.

52. Ibid., 185.

53. Peebles, Battle for Space, 111.

54. Ibid., 113–14.

55. Stares, 116.

56. Peebles, Battle for Space, 122.

57. Stares, 218.

58. Ibid., 231.

59. Ibid., 232.

60. Peebles, High Frontier, 67.

61. AU-18, Space Handbook: A Warfighter’s Guide to Space, vol. 1 (Max

well Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, December 1993), 43.

62. Peebles, High Frontier, 67.

63. Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, Mass

Cambridge University Press, 1992), 145.

64 . Star Wars Quotes (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, Jul

1986), 115.

65. Ibid., 36.

66. Charles A. Monfort, “ASATs: Star Wars on the Cheap,” Bulletin o

Atomic Scientists , April 1989, 10.

67. Stares, 49.

68. Ibid., 50.

69. Ibid., 109 and 112.

70. Ibid., 76.

71. Peebles, Battle for Space, 53–54.

72. Stares, 98.

73. Ibid., 164–65.

74. Monfort, 10.

75. Reiss, 51.

239
76. Peebles, High Frontier, 67–68.

77. Reiss, 91.

78. Ibid., 186–88.

79. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman on Armed Serv 

ices, U.S. Senate. Strategic Defense Initiative: Estimates of Brilliant Pebble

Effectiveness Are Based on Many Unproven Assumptions (Washington, D.C

Government Accounting Office (GAO), March 1992), 2.

80. Reiss, 56, 88.

81. Ibid., 88.

82. Ibid.

83. Patricia A. Gilmartin, “Successful Neutral Particle Beam Firing Pave

Way for More Ambitious SDI Test,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 2

July 1989, 31–32.

84. Michael A. Dornheim, “Alpha Chemical Laser Tests Affirm Design o

Space-Based Weapon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 July 1991, 26

85. White House, Fact Sheet: National Space Policy, 19 September 1996, 5.

86. Ibid., 6.

87. David Mosher and Raymond Hall, “The Clinton Plan for Theate

Missile Defenses: Costs and Alternatives,” Arms Control Today, Septembe

1994, 15.

88. Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Clinton Hews to Narrow View on ABM Treaty

Congressional Quarterly, 17 July 1993, 1894.

 89. Mosher and Hall, 15–16.

90. Pat Cooper, “ASAT Funds Boosted in Senate,” Space News, 2

May–2 June 1996, 6.

91. Pat Cooper, “U.S. Political Battles Threaten Antisatellite Project

Space News, 24–30 June 1996, 7.

92. Pat Cooper, “ASAT Funds,” 6.

93. Pat Towell, “Clinton Signs Republicans’ Fortified Defense Bill,” Con 

gressional Quarterly, 12 October 1996, 2931.

94. Cooper, “U.S. Air Force Considers Antisatellite Weapons,” Spac

News, 26 February–3 March 1996, 4.

95. Gen Howell M. Estes III, CINC US Space Command, speech to th

Air Force Association Annual Symposium, Beverly Hills Hilton, Los Angele

Calif., 18 October 1996.

96. Ferster, 26.

97. Ibid., 6.

98. Jennifer Heronema, “A.F. Space Chief Calls War in Space Inevitable

Space News, 12–18 August 1996, 4.

99. William B. Scott, “USSC Prepares for Future Combat Missions i

Space,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 5 August 1996, 51.

100. Steve Weber, “ASAT Proponents Fail to Reverse White House Po

icy,” Space News, 19–25 September 1994, 7.

101. Mehuron, 40.

102. “Space Control Study Looks at Shielding Assets,” Military Space, 3

September 1996, 7.

240
103. William B. Scott, 

New Milspace Doctrine Vital, Aviation Week 

Space Technology, 22 April 1996, 26.

104. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “Space: A New Strategic Frontier

Airpower Journal, Spring 1992, 22.

105. Cooper, “ASAT Funds,” 6.

106. “SSDC: ASAT Needed for Denial of Sat Recon,” Military Space, 

March 1997, 1.

107. “Space Control Study Looks at Shielding Assets,” 7.

108. Steven Lambakis, “The United States in Lilliput: The Tragedy o

Fleeting Space Power,” Strategic Review, Winter 1996, 35–36.

109. “Second DOD Forum: ‘Guide Stars’ and Hail, Farewell,” Militar

Space, 17 February 1997, 3.

110. “National Security Space Master Plan Finished,” Military Space, 1

February 1997, 5.

111. Joseph S. Toma, “Desert Storm Communications,” in The First In 

formation War, ed. Alan D. Campen (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA Internation

Press, October 1992), 3.

112. Alan D. Campen, “Iraqi Command and Control: The Informatio

Differential,” in The First Information War, 175.

113. Larry K. Wentz, “Communications Support for the High Technolog

Battlefield,” in The First Information War, 21.

114. Gordon R. W. MacLean, “Will Fiber Optics Threaten Satellite Com 

munications?” Space Policy, (May 1995): 95–99.

115. Dr. Joseph N. Pelton, “Why Nicholas Negroponte Is Wrong abou

the Future of Telecommunications,” Telecommunications, January 1993, 38

116. “First Space Architecture Is Released, Others Delayed,” Militar

Space, 16 September 1996, 1–3.

117. Maj Gen Kenneth Israel, “High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aer 

ial Vehicle,” DARPA Tactical Technology Office, 13 January 1997, n.p. On

line, Internet, 13 January 1997. Available from http://www.arpa.mil/asto

hae.html.

118. Capt Mike Evans, Headquarters C4A, Scott AFB, Ill., telephon

interview with author, 10 December 1996.

119. Colin Clark, “Global Hawk Rolls Out; First Flight By Fall,” Defens

Week, 24 February 1997, 7.

120. “EELV, SBIRS Tops Space,” Military Spaces 17 February 1997, 8.

121. “Global Hawk: Tier II Plus High Altitude Endurance Unmanne

Aerial Reconnaissance System,” commercial brochure from Teledyne Rya

Aeronautical.

122. Clark, 7.

123. Israel.

124. Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “The Future of United States Ai

Force Space Operations: The National Security Dimension,” address to th

National Security Section, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., 

December 1993, Vital Speeches, 60 (15 March 1994): 326.

241
125. Anne Eisele, 

Phillips Moves toward Light, Tiny Satellites, Spac

News, 13–19 January 1997, 17.

126. Christian C. Daehnick, “Blueprints for the Future: Comparing Na 

tional Security Space Architectures” (master’s thesis, School of Advance

Airpower Studies [SAAS], June 1995), 3.

127. “NRO Satellites to Shrink in Size, Technology Director Says,” Spac

Business News, 19 February 1997, 8; and “NRO Plans for Smaller Sate

lites,” Space News, 17–23 February 1997, 23.

128. “LM Eyes A2100 for SBIRS High,” Military Space, 20 January 1997, 7

129. Anne Eisele, “Lower Costs Drive Development in Europe, Japan

and the United States,” Space News, 17–23 February 1997, 17.

130. Ibid., 8.

131. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–195

(Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 272–73. On Vietnam

and Afghanistan, see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The America

Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989); and Edward B

Westermann, “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear versus the Muja 

hideen in Afghanistan, 1979–1989” (master’s thesis, SAAS, June 1997).

132. Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: Th

Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” in The First Information Wa

122.

133. Alasdair McLean, Western European Military Space Policy (Alder

shot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992), 101.

134. Ibid.

135. Lambakis, 421.

136. For a precise accounting of what nations use Intelsat, Inmarsa

and Arabsat, see Andrew Wilson, ed., Jane’s Space Directory: 1996–97, 12t

ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1996), 289, 297. The situ 

ation with Arabsat in the Gulf War is particularly interesting. Arabsat i

headquartered in Saudi Arabia and plays a vital role in Middle East commu 

nications. Its 21 members include Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabi

and Syria.

137. David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Max

well AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 69.

138. USAF Phillips Laboratory, Europe and Asia in Space: 1993–199

(Colorado Springs, Colo.: Kaman Sciences Corp., 1994), 347.

139. Lupton, 68.

140. Ibid., 69.

141. USAF Phillips Laboratory, 348.

142. Nicolay Novichkov, “Russian Space Chief Voices Dire Warnings

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 January 1997, 26.

143. “Mission Control,” Military Space, 17 February 1997, 3.

144. USAF Phillips Laboratory, 20.

145. “Mission Control,” 3.

146. USAF Phillips Laboratory, 334.

242
147. Craig Covault, 

Advanced KH-11 Broadens United States Reco

Capability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 January 1997, 24.

148. Ibid., 24.

149. McLean, 127.

150. Ibid., 119.

151. Joseph P. Keddell Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managin

Internal and External Pressures (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), xiii, 8.

152. “Increases Seen in Space Early Warning,” Military Space , 2 Septem 

ber 1996, 7.

153. Craig Covault, “China Seeks Cooperation, Airs New Space Stra

egy,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 October 1996, 29–32.

154. Simon Fluendy, “Up in Smoke: Latest Launch Failure Could Co

China Dearly,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1996, 69; an

Mark Ward, “China’s Exploding Space Program,” World Press Review, Jun

1996, 36.

155. Craig Covault, “Delta Explosion Halts $1 Billion in Launches

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 January 1997, 33.

156. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement an

Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Februar

1996), 11.

157. McLean, 179.

158. Ibid., 177.

159. Sidney N. Graybeal and Daniel O. Graham, “Should the United State

Build a Space-Based Missile Defense?” Insight, 11 September 1995, 19.

160. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politic

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62.

161. Ibid., 63.

162. Ibid., 64.

163. Ibid., 67.

164. Roger B. Handberg and Joan Johnson-Freese, The Prestige Trap: 

Comparative Study of the United States, European, and Japanese Spac

Programs (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1994), 212.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., 3.

167. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Worl

Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), as reprinted in Th

Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, ed. M

chael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass

MIT Press, 1995), 238.

168. Ibid., 210.

169. Ibid., 214.

170. Karl Mueller, “Why Building Space Weapons Would Threaten U.S

Security: The Perils of Occupying the High Frontier” (paper, SAAS, Maxwe

AFB, Ala., 1997), 6.

171. Ibid.

172. Walt, 216.

243
173. 

Project SATRAN Warns of Hostile Recon from Space,Militar

Space, 14 April 1997, 7.

174. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” Worl

Politics 30, no. 2, (January 1978): 187–214.

175. “Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

Headquarters USAF, 25 November 1996, n.p. On-line, Internet. 25 Novem 

ber 1996. Available from http://www.af-future.hq.af.mil/21/logi/mist.htm

176. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yal

University Press, 1966), 227.

177. Reiss, 145.

178. “AIA’s Fuqua: Aerospace Recovery Under Way,” Military Space, 

January 1996, 7.

179. “QDR Sets Pace, Questions,” Military Space, 17 February 1997, 6.

180. Johan Benson, “Conversations with General Ronald Fogleman

Aerospace America, July 1996, 16.

181. Moorman, 328.

182. Pierre Sparaco, “Arianespace Seeks Non-European Allies,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology, 27 January 1997, 62.

183. Mueller, 9.

184. William J. Burke and Rita C. Sagalyn, “Active Space Experiment

Affect Treaty Obligations,” Signal, June 1990, 74.

185. The White House, “National Space Policy Fact Sheet,” Septembe

1996, 14.

186. AU-18, Space Handbook: A Warfighter’s Guide to Space, vol. 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1993), 43.

187. Leonard David, “Severity of Orbital Debris Questionable,” Spac

News, 24 February–2 March 1997, 4.

188. “Shuttle Avoids Collision with Pegasus Debris,” Space News, 2

February–2 March 1997, 2.

189. Stan Crock, “Star Wars Junior: Will It Fly?” Business Week, 1

July 1996, 89.

190. Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators” (Washingto

D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1996), 32.

191. Rita Rubin, “Special Report: The War on Cancer,” U.S. News 

World Report, 5 February 1996, 54.

192. Gary S. Becker, “The Painful Truth about Medical Research,” Bus

ness Week, 29 July 1996, 18.

193. “Better Coordination, More Funds for Cancer Research Urged

Chemical and Engineering News, 10 October 1994, 20.

194. Lt Col Ed Felker, Chief, Joint Vision 2010 Concepts Branch, Join

Warfighting Center, interview with author, 13 January 1997.

195. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1, no. 

(July 1949): 499.

196. Gen Howell M. Estes III, CINC USSPACECOM, directed his com 

mand to complete a space theory and doctrine by May 1998. In an interview

244
dated 24 March 1997, the general highlighted the lack of such a work a

the single largest obstacle to astute space policy making in the future.

197. Peter G. Tsouras, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book (London, Eng

land: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 289.

245
PART III

Space Control Perspectives
Chapter 5

Counterspace Operations

for Information Dominance

James G. Lee

The launch of the Soviet “sputnik” satellite in October 195

shocked the world and propelled the rhetoric and the realitie

of the cold war into the space age. At the same time, the Sovie

feat raised the threat of mass destruction from space an

served as the basis for strategists to argue for a means t

shoot down enemy satellites. Although the arguments used t

justify the need for an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon hav

changed in the years since sputnik, the policy and strategy fo

its employment have always focused on the need to destroy, o

threaten to destroy, Soviet satellites on orbit.

The Need for a Change

Since the mid-1960s, US military strategy has focused on

deterrence based on flexible response. US deterrent power i

based on a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional forces

augmented by strong alliances, forward basing, and powe

projection. Likewise, US military space systems were initiall

developed in a cold war context and viewed as primarily stra 

tegic systems—supporting the Strategic Air Command, the in 

telligence community, and the National Command Authorities

Timely, accurate, and unambiguous strategic and tactica

warning information from reconnaissance, surveillance, an

communication satellites provided situational awareness o

our perceived enemy and became integral to the deterren

power of the triad.

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Col James K. Feldman, PhD

Reader: Lt Col Gary P. Cox, PhD

249
In essence US military space systems became a de fact

hidden leg of the strategic nuclear triad. The stability of U

and Soviet nuclear deterrence rested on the ability of spac

systems to collect, process, and disseminate information. Th

balance of information provided by space systems resulted in

each side having a sufficient degree of timely warning of th

other side’s actions. Maintaining the balance in warning infor

mation prevented one side from achieving surprise and ren 

dering the other side incapable of a nuclear retaliatory strike

In fact, the value of the information from space systems wa

viewed as essential for cold war stability, and many argued

that space must remain a sanctuary to preserve stability. Ge

Charles Gabriel, Air Force chief of staff, subscribed to thi

position when he argued that the value of an ASAT weapon

was not as an offensive device intended for creating an imbal

ance by conducting a first strike attack against the Sovie

satellite system, but rather as a weapon deployed to dete

attacks on US space systems.1 If deterrence of Soviet attack

upon US space systems failed, the ASAT was to be employed

to restore the balance of information by counterattacking So 

viet satellites.

A recent, and perhaps the most compelling, argument for a

ASAT was articulated in 1987 by Gen John Piotrowski whil

serving as commander in chief, United States Space Com 

mand. General Piotrowski argued that, while space system

remain integral to the deterrent power of our nuclear triad

space systems have also become critical to the successful con 

duct of conventional war. General Piotrowski believed the abil

ity to negate enemy satellites would enhance the war-fightin

capabilities of US terrestrial forces. Therefore, he concluded

the true value of an ASAT rested with its contribution to deter 

ring conventional war with the Soviet Union, and if deterrenc

failed, its ability to deny the Soviets use of their critical spac

systems.2 Piotrowski’s cold war argument for an ASAT sug

gests that a counterspace capability may also be needed in a

evolving world to increase deterrence of conventional conflict

and if deterrence fails, to deny information to the enemy.

The cold war appears to be over, but the world is, in man

ways, much more complex. Gone is the relatively simpl

250
arrangement of bipolar alliances and loyalties that have char

acterized the four decades since World War II ended. In on

sense the cold war made the US national security strategy an

foreign policy straightforward; to a large degree nations wer

considered either pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet. Today, the tradi

tional and historical ethnic and religious animosities, onc

held in check by the fear of a common enemy, have reemerged

and, in some cases, erupted in civil war. The future may likel

be characterized by an increase in regional political instabili

ties, economic and social dislocation, and a widespread diffu 

sion of conventional military power, coupled with the prolifera 

tion of the capability to create and deliver chemical, biologica

or nuclear devices.

The thawing of the cold war has also brought changes in U

military force structure. The dismantlement of the Warsaw

Pact and the Soviet Union has left US political leadership wit

the perception of a reduced external national security threa

This perception, coupled with what seems to be an out-of

control US national debt, has resulted in a willingness t

reduce US strategic and conventional military forces and thei

forward-based presence overseas.

Although US forward presence is shrinking, the US wil

remain committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) and the collective defense of such other nations a

Japan, Korea, and some of the nations of Southwest Asia. To

project power rapidly and respond effectively to crisis situ 

ations worldwide, US conventional forces are becoming lighte

more rapidly deployable, and more expeditionary.

In the future the United States may not have the same oppor 

tunity for extended mobilization in preparation for war as wa

afforded in Operation Desert Shield. Regional crises and con 

flicts probably will be “come as you are,” and the necessity t

collect, process, and disseminate strategic and tactical informa 

tion on the enemy’s forces and terrain may become increasingl

important to expeditionary forces that must fight effectively in

potentially unfamiliar terrain against an unfamiliar enemy. Like

wise, allowing an enemy access to information on US force de

ployments, order of battle, movements, and logistics could jeop 

ardize US ability to stage and deploy forces, and successfu ll

251
execute US military strategy. Therefore, it would seem that th

ability to control information may become increasingly impor

tant, and possibly decisive, in future military operations.

Since the ability to collect, process, and disseminate infor

mation to field commanders may become a decisive contribu 

tor to victory in future conflicts, information warfare action

may emerge as an essential function in crisis response an

war. At the operational level, information-warfare denies th

enemy the capability to collect, process, and disseminate in 

formation with the objective of creating a positive information

gap between friendly and enemy forces. This positive informa

tion gap has been referred to as information dominance.

Information Dominance

The concept of information dominance first emerged in th

writings of Soviet military theorists in the late 1970s as part o

a discussion of the concept of military technical revolutions

The Soviets coined the phrase, “military technical revolution

to describe past and future eras in which extreme transforma

tions in warfare occurred or may occur as a result of th

exploitation of technology. The Soviets, however, did not se

technology in and of itself defining the revolution as th

phrase might suggest. Rather, they saw the operational an

organizational innovations resulting from the exploitation o

the technology as defining a military technical revolution.3

The Soviets predicted that the technological advances oc 

curring in US information collection, processing, and dis

semination, coupled with the increasing range and accu 

racy of precision-guided munitions, would lead to the nex

military technical revolution. They believed, if fully ex

ploited, these technologies could become the basis for logi

cally integrated, yet geographically distributed, weapon

systems whose elements perform reconnaissance, surveil

lance, target acquisition, and target engagement. The in 

creased emphasis of modern weapon systems on the reli

ance and the ability to collect, process, and disseminat

information seems to suggest that the ability to establis

252
information dominance over an adversary could be increas

ingly important to the conduct of military operations.4

Information dominance can be described as a condition in

which a nation possesses a greater understanding of th

strengths, weaknesses, interdependencies, and centers of grav

ity of an adversary’s military, political, social, and economi

infrastructure than the enemy has on friendly sources of na 

tional power.5 Attaining information dominance could mean th

difference between success and failure of diplomatic initiatives

successful resolutions of crises, or war, or forfeiture of the ele 

ment of surprise to the enemy in military operations. Therefore

the ability to attain information dominance can widen the ga

between friendly actions and enemy reactions, and allow friendl

commanders to manage the enemy’s decision cycle by control

ling and manipulating the information available to them.6 O

the other hand, failure to achieve information dominance at th

onset of hostilities could lead to the inability of friendly forces t

conduct military operations successfully.

Today more than ever, information is power. Consequently

military operations to attain information dominance should

probably be initiated at the onset of a crisis to facilitate rapid

mobilization and power projection sustained through the cri

sis and, if necessary, through war. 7 Information dominanc

can be obtained by conducting offensive and/or defensiv

military operations. Offensively, information dominance ca

be attained by collapsing an adversary’s command and contro

infrastructure through such offensive operations as the dis 

ruption of critical communication links; or by denying acces

to reconnaissance and surveillance information, such a

blinding optical sensors with ground-based lasers. Defen 

sively, measures such as hardening, frequency hopping, an

encryption further ensure information dominance by helpin

to ensure friendly forces have uninhibited access to communi

cations, surveillance, and reconnaissance information pro 

vided by space systems. 8 Therefore, delaying and denying 

potential adversary information, while providing similar infor

mation to friendly forces, can indeed be a valuable mechanism

for balancing power during peacetime and a decisive terres

trial force enhancer/multiplier during war.

253
Role of Space Systems

Just as there is a synergism among air, land, and se

forces, there appears to be an emerging synergism betwee

space systems and terrestrial forces, suggesting that spac

systems are becoming inseparable to land, sea, and air war 

fare. Existing military space systems have demonstrated a

ability to provide near-real-time command and control

weather, surveillance and reconnaissance, and navigation in 

formation to air, land, and sea forces. In Operation Deser

Storm, for example, US Air Force space systems provided

near-real-time surveillance data of Iraqi Scud missile launche

directly to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) comman

center in Saudi Arabia. This warning data was then used t

alert coalition forces and direct Patriot air defense artillery fir

against the Scud missile and direct air strikes in counterbat

tery operations against the Scud launchers. The integration o

information from space systems with modern weapon deliver

systems and precision munitions during Desert Storm would

seem to validate the Soviet vision of the next military technica

revolution and the importance of space systems to the concep

of information dominance.

As space systems become more valuable to attaining na

tional security and to our ability to support allies and promot

international stability, their value to information dominanc

increases as well. Given the increasing importance of informa

tion from space systems to terrestrial military operations, at

taining information dominance appears to require the capabil 

ity to conduct counterspace operations.

However, the ability of the United States to conduct coun

terspace operations may become increasingly difficult as spac

systems and technologies proliferate among nations. Indeed

the majority of the world space programs and systems ar

considered civilian systems and were not initially developed o

intended for dedicated military purposes. It may be prudent t

assume that nations subsidizing civilian space activities ar

also exploiting these “nonmilitary” satellites for military an

national security information.9 For example, the French

commercial space system Systeme Probatoire pour l’Observa 

tion de la Terre (SPOT) has demonstrated an intelligenc

254
capability by providing commercial photographs of Soviet lase

facilities at Sary Shagan.1 0 The inherent military capabilities o

civilian space systems suggest the proliferation of space sys 

tems and technologies could have serious military implica 

tions with respect to our ability to establish information dom

nance.

In the past, the United States and Russia could exercise 

degree of control and leverage over the information other na

tions received from space systems through our collective mo

nopoly on the ability to build and launch satellites.1 1 Howeve

France, Japan, China, India, and Israel have all launched an

orbited civilian satellites with imaging capabilities. Further 

more, nations such as Brazil, Canada, and Great Britain ar

also developing satellite systems capable of providing imager

with potential military utility. Indeed, nations do not need t

own space systems to have access to information from space

Numerous space-faring nations, such as France, Russia, an

Japan offset the cost of developing and deploying space sys 

tems by marketing their information.12 In light of the increas

ing global instabilities and uncertainties, some nations ma

find it advantageous to make militarily useful information

from civilian satellites available to countries hostile to th

United States—Brazil to Libya or China to Iran—for example.1 

It is not unreasonable to speculate that in the future th

United States could find itself in a crisis situation, or war

with an adversary either operating its own space system, o

relying on information from another nation’s space system. In

this situation the United States is usually portrayed as havin

only two options: do nothing, or destroy the enemy’s satellit

with an ASAT. Under international law it is generally accepted

that the destruction of a nation’s space system as an act o

self-defense is justified. 14 However, in situations where th

enemy is acquiring information from a space system owned b

a neutral third party, the unilateral destruction of that satel

lite with an ASAT is considered an act of aggression and 

violation of that nation’s sovereignty. 1 5 This suggests tha

there may be situations in which employing an ASAT to de

stroy a satellite may simply not be an acceptable alternative.

255
The apparent trend for global proliferation of space system

and marketing of space information seems to raise doubts re

garding the flexibility and responsiveness of our current spac

control strategy and our ability to achieve information dom

nance. This work evaluates current space control strategy in

terms of the ability to ensure information dominance in th

evolving national security environment characterized by the in 

creasing proliferation of space systems. A discussion of the phe

nomenon of global proliferation of space systems and the mili

tary utility of civilian imagery systems is the focus of the nex

section. The section immediately following it entails an assess

ment of current space control strategy and policy with respect t

the emerging threat from proliferated space capabilities. The las

two sections offer both an alternative space control strategy t

deny the enemy the use of information from space systems an

a means to implement that alternative space control strategy.

Proliferating Space Technology

Nations possessing space capabilities can be divided int

three tiers. First-tier space-capable nations possess dedicated

military and civilian space capabilities on the cutting edge o

technology. Second-tier nations develop and use dual-purpos

space systems for both military and civilian purposes. Third

tier nations lease or purchase space capabilities or product

for military and civilian purposes from first- and second-tie

nations.1 6 Table 24 gives examples of nations in each of th

three tiers.

Proliferation of Civilian Space Capabilities

Nations within the first tier, the United States and Russia

have disseminated surveillance and reconnaissance product

from dedicated military satellite systems to alliance partner

for many years. There are also several civilian corporation

selling such space products as communication channels

weather information, and earth imagery on the internationa

market to almost any nation able to pay the price. In fact, one o

the major sources of earth imagery available on the commercia

market is from the US civilian satellite system, Landsat.

256
Landsat is an earth-remote sensing satellite system. Ther

are currently two operational Landsat satellites each capabl

of providing imagery in seven spectral (color) bands, and on

black and white panchromatic band. The most recent Landsa

launched, Landsat 6 in 1992, is capable of producing black

and white images with a ground resolution of 15 meters.

Initially owned and operated by the National Oceanic an

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Landsat system wa

privatized in 1979 and is now operated by a private company

EOSAT, for NOAA. Under the provisions of the Remote Sens

ing Act, Landsat data must be made available for sale to an

individual or nation on a nondiscriminatory basis. The secre

tary of defense, however, does have the authority to determin

customers or circumstances for which the sale of Landsa

data can be denied for national security reasons. Presently

the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established an

criteria or specific provisions for restricting the sale and distri

bution of Landsat imagery.

In addition to selling processed Landsat imagery products

NOAA/EOSAT also oversees the establishment and licensin

Table 24

Space-Capable Nations by Tier Groups

First Tier United States

Russia

Second Tier France

Great Britain

China

Japan

India

Israel

Third Tier* Brazil

Italy

Australia

Thailand

South Africa

Canada

Iran

Iraq

Pakistan

*Not all inclusive, only major nations in this category are listed.

257
of Landsat ground stations in foreign countries. In addition t

the Landsat ground station in the United States, there ar

currently 13 licensed stations with plans to build another tw

outside the United States. These Landsat ground stations ca

receive and process Landsat data directly from the satellites

Table 25 shows the locations of current and projected licensed

Landsat ground stations.

The technology and facilities required to build and operate 

Landsat ground station are simple and relatively cheap whe

compared to the cost of developing, launching, and operating 

comparable satellite system. Costs to construct a Landsa

ground station are about $20 million, plus an additional $

million a year in operational costs. The NOAA/EOSAT licensin

fee is a flat $600 thousand a year.17 Once licensed, ground sta 

tions are permitted to receive, process, and sell Landsat infor 

mation in accordance with the US policy on nondiscrimination.

Although the technology and equipment to build and oper 

ate a Landsat ground station is straightforward and inexpen 

sive, it is also subject to US export controls. The US govern 

ment uses export controls and its final approval authority fo

Table 25

Existing and Projected Landsat Ground Stations

Existing Projected

United States Ecuador

Brazil New Zealand

Argentina

Spain

Italy

South Africa

Saudi Arabia

Thailand

Indonesia

Australia

China

Japan

Sweden

Pakistan

258
foreign ground station construction as a means to control th

proliferation of space technology.

Consequently, no member of the former Soviet bloc has ye

received approval to establish a Landsat ground station.1 

Controlling the information from Landsat is, however, a differ 

ent matter. Presently, the only way to restrict the foreign

ground stations from directly receiving and processing down 

linked Landsat data would be for EOSAT to command th

satellite sensor not to image the area in which data is to b

denied. 1 9 Commanding the sensor “off,” however, would als

deny imagery data from the specific area to other licensed

ground stations and the United States because the curren

Landsat satellites have no onboard data storage capability. 2 

In addition, since most foreign ground stations do not hav

the capability to command the Landsat, controlling unauthor 

ized direct access to Landsat data appears fairly reliable.

Russia, the other first-tier space nation, also sells photo

graphic imagery of the earth’s surface from satellites. This infor 

mation, however, is derived from their KFA 1,000 camera carrie

on board the Resurs series military satellites. In 1987 the Rus

sians began to sell, through the Soyuzkharta company, blac

and white photographic images with five-meter ground resolu 

tion of any site/area located in nonsocialist countries. Even

though the Russians seem to be in need of hard currency an

concerned with the survival of their space program, they hav

not yet licensed, nor do they appear interested in commerciall

licensing foreign satellite ground stations.

The Resurs satellite represents older technology and uses 

recoverable film canister from the satellite to produce eart

imagery rather than processing downlinked digital imager

data like Landsat. Although technologically obsolete compared

to Landsat, the five-meter ground resolution of Resurs im 

agery is one of the best available on the commercial market.

Second-tier space nations are growing in both numbers an

capability. France was the first nation to challenge America

and Russian dominance in space with its commercial spac

launcher, Ariane, and is now a third major competitor in th

commercial remote sensing market.

259
The French SPOT can provide multispectral remote sensin

data in four spectral bands with ground resolutions of 10 meter

in black and white panchromatic imagery, and 20-meter resolu 

tion for imagery in other spectral bands. SPOT Imaging Corpora 

tion describes the current capabilities of its satellite as havin

sufficient resolution to allow detection of objects 10 to 30 meter

in size, recognition of objects 20 to 60 meters in size, and de

scription of objects 60 meters or larger. 2 1 In addition, the imag

ing sensor onboard SPOT satellites has the ability to look 2

degrees to the right or left of the satellite track. This off-nadi

imaging capability allows the same area of the Earth to be im 

aged on successive orbits from different viewing angles. Fusin

multiple images of the same area from different viewing angle

results in a capability to produce stereo images.2 2

Imagery data from SPOT satellites can be transmitted di

rectly to ground stations or archived on tape recorders on

board the satellite for later transmission.23 Regardless of th

source, all imagery data is downlinked to either the SPOT

primary control center near Toulouse, France, or the SPOT

control center near Kiruna, Sweden. 2 4 These two ground sta 

tions are primarily responsible for processing the imagery dat

stored on the onboard tape recorders and data collected ove

the north polar region, Europe, and North Africa.2 5

SPOT Image has also established a global network of receiv 

ing stations to receive, process, and disseminate satellite im 

agery on a similar nondiscriminatory basis as NOAA/EOSAT

for the Landsat system. Table 26 shows the location of curren

and planned SPOT ground stations worldwide. French expor

controls governing the transfer of technology to establish an

operate a SPOT ground station are similar to those employed

by the United States. SPOT, however, also restricts the area in

which each ground station is authorized to receive and proc 

ess data.2 6 India, for example, is authorized to receive imager

data directly from the SPOT satellite only while the satellite i

within a 2,500 kilometer (km) radius of the Indian groun

station. 2 7 Thus the Indian ground station can only receive an

process images of its own territory even though it is capable o

receiving and processing data encompassing a much greate

area. SPOT accomplishes these restrictions by withholdin

260
certain bits of information regarding the satellite’s mode o

operation and orbit needed to process data from the satellite.

Through a combination of the receiving restrictions and th

onboard tape recorders, SPOT was able to deny Iraq images o

the Persian Gulf region during operations Desert Shield an

Desert Storm while providing these images to the Coalition

forces.2 8 SPOT does, however, acknowledge that a ground station

could break out the information needed to circumvent the re

strictions and gain access to the data from unauthorize

zones.2 9 Although this ground station would not be able to sel

these images overtly, it could provide them to the host country’

government for intelligence purposes or sell then clandestinely.

In addition to its civilian space systems, France is also ex 

panding its space program into the military arena by spinnin

off the civilian SPOT satellite technology to develop a ded

cated military reconnaissance satellite called Helios.3 0 Helio

a joint development project with Italy and Spain, is reported t

have ground resolutions approaching 0.3 meters using bot

multispectral imagery and a synthetic aperture radar. Al 

though Helios imagery will most likely not be available fo

purchase on the commercial market, the similarities betwee

Table 26

Existing and Projected SPOT Ground Stations

Existing Projected

France Ecuador

Sweden China

Canada South Africa

India Taiwan

Canary Islands Indonesia

Brazil Saudi Arabia

Pakistan

Thailand

Japan

Israel

Australia

261
SPOT and Helios technology could result in significant im 

provements for the SPOT system.

Peter Zimmerman, a physicist at the Carnegie Endowmen

for International Peace, speculates that with minor improve 

ments in optics SPOT imagery resolution could be improved t

2.5 meters.3 1 In fact, the next generation SPOT satellite, SPOT

5, is reported to be capable of providing earth imagery a

resolutions less than five meters. Richard Del Bello of th

Office of Technology assessment believes the blurring of mili

tary and civilian technology will result in one-meter groun

resolution becoming a commercial imagery standard by th

year 2000. 3 2 This seems entirely likely and achievable consid 

ering the projected resolution capabilities of SPOT 5 and it

expected competition with the Russians who are already be

ginning to market imagery with a 2.5-meter resolution.

Some other second-tier space nations include China, Israel

Japan, and India. China, in addition to operating a license

Landsat ground station, launched its first photo intelligence sat

ellite in 1975 and has since orbited at least 12 imaging satel

lites.3 3 The Chinese FSW-1 series imaging satellites use a recov

erable film canister retrieval method for returning images t

Earth after an average mission duration of two weeks.3 4 Th

imaging products derived from the FSW-1 satellites are believe

to be capable of less than 80-meter resolutions and clearly sup

port civilian resources and military reconnaissance activities

China is also engaged in a joint program with Brazil to produc

and launch the China/Brazil Earth Remote Sensing satellit

(CBERS).3 6 Projected for a late 1993 launch, CBERS will provid

multispectral imagery, similar to SPOT and Landsat, with a

expected ground resolution of 20 meters.3 7 In addition to devel

oping a remote sensing capability, the Chinese also have a

expanding launch capability with the Long March series o

boosters. The most recent Chinese booster, Long March 2E, i

considered a heavy-lift vehicle with performance between the U

Atlas II and Titan IV boosters. The Long March 2E is capable o

boosting 9,200 kilograms into low Earth orbit or 3,370 kg into 

geosynchronous transfer orbit. 3 8

Another second-tier space nation, Israel, started its spac

program in 1988 as a response to Israeli discontent with hav

262
ing to rely on the United States to provide satellite imagery. 3 

Several high-ranking Israeli cabinet officials suspected tha

the United States withheld satellite imagery prior to the 197

Yom Kippur War. Therefore, with the assistance of South Af

rica, Israel built and launched OFFEQ-1 in 1988, and OFFEQ

2 in 1990. 4 0 Although the Israelis deny the OFFEQ satellite

carry a photo-reconnaissance payload, the nature of the orbi

200 km at the lowest point and 1,500 km at the apogee, is 

good indication that they have some intelligence gatherin

utility. 4 1

Japan is another second-tier space nation with a rapidl

developing civilian space capability. The Japanese Earth Re

mote Sensing Satellite (JERS-1), launched in 1992, possesse

seven spectral bands capable of producing images with 18

meter ground resolution and a synthetic aperture radar capa 

ble of 25-meter ground resolution.4 2 Data from the JERS-

satellite is not available commercially, although Japan’s Na 

tional Space Development Agency (NASDA) may authoriz

sales of data in the future. 4 3

Japan is also actively developing a commercial space launc

capability. NASDA has been pursuing a space-launch program

since 1969; however, in exchange for US rocket technology

Japan agreed to launch only Japanese payloads. 4 4 NASDA’

newest space launcher, the M-II, is entirely a Japanese design

and will allow Japan to enter the commercial launch marke

Scheduled for an initial launch in 1993, the H-II is reported t

have the ability to place 9,080 kg into low Earth orbit an

3,600 kg into a geosynchronous transfer orbit.45

India is another nation actively pursuing self sufficiency in

space. The Indian Resources Satellite series (IRS1A-1988, 1B

1991, and 1C-projected for a 1993 launch) has two sets o

imaging sensors with ground resolutions of 72 meters and 3

meters respectively. 4 6 The next generation of Indian remot

sensing satellites is projected to have improved sensors givin

it a multispectral resolution of 20 meters and a panchromati

imaging resolution of 10 meters. 4 7

Third-tier space nations such as Pakistan, Indonesia, an

Luxembourg have chosen, for political or economic reasons

not to develop or operate their own satellites. Tier-three nation

263
acquire space information products through direct purchas

or through licensing agreements to build ground stations. Al

though these nations depend on foreign sources for thei

space needs, this dependence is mitigated to some degree b

building their own ground stations and obtaining licensin

agreements to receive and process foreign satellite data, as in

the case of Landsat and SPOT.

Military Utility

As increasing sophistication of civilian space technology blur

the distinction between military and civilian space capabilities

the probability civilian satellites will be used for military an

national security purposes also increases. SPOT Image Corpora 

tion, for example, openly advertises the intelligence gatherin

and military utility of SPOT imagery.4 8 Marketed as “The New

Way to Win!” SPOT illustrates the potential for nations to exploi

the inherent military capabilities of civilian systems for militar

and national security purposes. As the number of nations devel

oping their own satellites or establishing satellite ground sta 

tions to process satellite imagery increases, the proliferation an

exploitation of civilian imagery data for military purposes coul

impact the ability of the United States to prepare for and con 

duct military operations.

Assessing the military utility of civilian systems requires a

understanding of some of the qualitative measures used t

evaluate the capabilities and utility of remote sensing/imagin

satellites. Spatial resolution, spectral resolution, and revisi

time are the most common attributes used to compare an

assess the capabilities of imaging satellites. Table 27 show

the spatial and spectral resolution and the revisit frequency o

several civilian imaging/remote sensing satellites with com 

mercially available products.4 9

Spatial resolution refers to the size of an object on th

ground a sensor can distinguish. For optical sensors, spatia

resolution is typically the area on the ground that is observ

able by a single light-sensitive-sensor element, or pixel. A pixe

for an infrared sensor, for example, is a single infrared cel

The area observable by the single sensor pixel is called 

sensor’s instantaneous field of view (IFOV). A sensor canno

264
detect any object on the ground smaller than its IFOV. Nor

mally it takes at least two pixels to distinguish what a de

tected object actually is. Therefore, although a satellite with 

10-meter IFOV can detect a 10-meter object on the ground

under normal circumstances it can only distinguish object

20 meters or larger in size.

For military purposes spatial resolution characterizes the sat

ellite’s ability to perform such delineation tasks as detection

general identification, precise identification, description, an

technical analysis. Detection refers to locating a class of object

or an activity, such as a naval vessel or a rail switching yard

General identification is the ability to determine a general targe

group, while precise identification is the ability to discriminat

within a target group. General identification of missiles, for ex

ample, would distinguish between ballistic missiles and surfac

to air missiles. Precise identification of missiles, on the othe

hand would distinguish between Hawk or Patriot surface-to-ai

missiles. Description refers to determining the size/dimension

configuration/layout, component construction, or equipmen

count of the target group, such as the difference between a

F-15E or an F-15C. Technical analysis is the detailed analysis o

specific equipment within the target group. Imagery support

ing technical analysis allows the capability or limitations of 

piece of equipment to be evaluated. Table 28 shows th

Table 27

Qualitative Measures of Various Civilian Satellite Systems

 Country

Resolution

Meters (m)

Spectral

Channels

Revisit

Cycles

 France/SPOT 10–20 m 4 2.5 days

 Japan (JERS-1) 25 m 7 44 days

 Russia* (Resurs/KFA

 1,000 camera)

5 m 2 14 days

 USA (Landsat 6) 15 m 8 16 days

*The Russian Resurs satellite was initially developed for military purposes; however, imagery is now markete

for commercial purposes.

265
Table 28

Ground Resolution Requirements for Object Identification

(in meters)

Targeta Detectionb

General

IDc

Precise

IDd Descriptione

Technical

Analysisf

Bridges 6 4.5 1.5 1 0.3

Communications

 Radar

 Radio

3

3

1 

1.5

0.3

0.3

0.15

0.15

0.015

0.015

Supply Dumps 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.03 0.03

Troop Units (in

 Bivouac or on

 Road 6 2 1.2 0.3 0.15

Airfield Facilities 6 4.5 3 0.3 0.15

Rockets/Artillery 1 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.045

Aircraft 4.5 1.5 1 0.15 0.045

C

2

 Headquarters 3 1.5 1 0.15 0.09

SSMg/SAMh Sites 3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045

Surface Ships 7.5 4.5 0.6 0.3 0.045

Nuclear Weapons

 Components 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.03 0.015

Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.06 0.045

Land Mines 9 6 1 0.03 0.09

Ports and Harbors 30 15 6 3 0.03

Coasts/Beaches 30 4.5 3 1.5 0.15

Rail Yards and

 Shops 30 15 6 1.5 0.4

Roads 6–9 6 1.8 0.6 0.4

Urban Areas 60 30 3 3 0.75

Terrain 90 4.5 1.5 0.75

Surfaced

 Submarines 30 6 1.5 1 0.03

aChart indicates minumum resolution in meters at which target can be detected, identified, described, or analyzed. No sou

specified which definition of resolution (pixel-size or white-dot) is used but the chart is internally consistent.

bDetection: location of a class of units, object, or activity of military unit

cGeneral Identification: determination of general target type

dPrecise Identification: discrimination within a target group

eDescription: size/dimension, configuration/layout, component construction, equipment count, etc.

f Technical Analysis: detailed analysis of specific equipment

gSurface-to-surface missile

hSurface-to-air missile

266
ground resolution needed to perform the various delineation

tasks for various objects of interest to military planners. 5 0

Historically, analysts generally believed that to be useful fo

military purposes, imagery and remote sensing satellite

would need ground resolutions less than 10 meters.5 1 Typ

cally satellites with ground resolutions greater than 20 meter

were not considered militarily significant, being viewed as use

ful primarily for terrain analysis and economic purposes.5 

There is, however, growing evidence that satellites wit

ground resolutions between 10 and 20 meters, such as Land

sat and SPOT, can have significant military utility. The United

States Defense Mapping Agency, for example, is one of th

largest users of SPOT and Landsat imagery. Commercial im 

agery from Landsat and SPOT have been instrumental in th

generation of three-dimensional targeting information fo

cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions.5 3

In addition to the potential tactical applications of civilia

imagery systems like Landsat and SPOT, there are also possi

ble significant strategic applications. Coupled with a prior

knowledge from other sources of intelligence that can identif

a general area to be imaged, Landsat and SPOT have als

demonstrated some military utility by providing useful strate 

gic intelligence information. Tables 25–28 show how the 10- t

20-meter ground resolution of Landsat and SPOT imagery ap

pears to have more than adequate resolution capabilities t

detect and provide general identification of major port and rai

facilities, urban areas, and surfaced submarines. The satellit

photographs used by the US government in public interna

tional forums to substantiate US accusations that the Sovie

radar at Krasnoyarsk constituted a violation of the Antiballis 

tic Missile (ABM) Treaty were SPOT images. 5 4

Other nations in addition to the United States use commer 

cially available imagery from civilian satellites to augmen

their military strategic intelligence efforts. West Germany, fo

example, acknowledged using SPOT images to gather intelli

gence and confirm the existence of the disputed chemical war

fare plant in Libya.5 5 Another example is the Japanese, wh

purchased Landsat photos in 1985 to identify and assess air 

field improvements for TU-22 Backfire bombers at Zavitinsk. 5 6

267
Spectral resolution is the second qualitative measuremen

pertinent to imaging systems. Spectral resolution refers to th

various light frequencies, such as infrared, ultraviolet, visibl

light, X-ray, and so forth, that sensors are designed to detec

Using several spectral bands to observe the same patch o

earth simultaneously can provide information that allows th

discrimination between vegetation and soil, identification o

thermal gradients in the ocean, measurement of surface mois 

ture, and a variety of other analyses. Current civilian technol

ogy, however, restricts the data capacity of satellite downlinks

therefore, there are tradeoffs between the number of spectra

bands and the spatial resolution of sensors. Typically, th

more spectral bands a satellite sensor has the larger the spa 

tial resolution. Conversely, the fewer spectral bands, th

smaller the spatial resolution. The total amount of raw dat

for each image is increased in proportion to the number o

spectral bands. Likewise, the amount of raw data for eac

image is also increased as the spatial resolution decreases

For example, the amount of raw data per image for a senso

with one spectral band is about half as much as a sensor wit

two spectral bands.

Collecting imagery of the same area in different spectra

bands can often provide more information than a high-qualit

black and white image with ground resolutions of less than 1

meters. This is because various soils and plants have differen

chemical characteristics and, therefore, reflect light in differ 

ent frequencies. The variations in the way light is reflected

cause soil, plants, and man-made objects to look different in

various spectral bands. Table 29 shows spectral bands of th

Landsat and SPOT satellites and the capabilities associated

with each of the different spectral bands. Imaging an area wit

a sensor in the green light spectral band, for instance, could

not distinguish between real vegetation and green camouflage

but imagery in any of the near- or mid-infrared band could

The use of Landsat and SPOT imagery during Desert Storm

provides a good example of the military utility of imagery in

different spectral bands. Whenever a vehicle traversed over th

ground, sand, or grass, the ground was disturbed. This dis 

ruption caused chemical changes in the terrain that could b

268
identified using multispectral imagery from Landsat and SPOT

and provided US war fighters with useful insights into Iraq

operations. 5 7 Likewise, imagery from Landsat and SPOT, i

made available to the media, could have revealed US plans fo

the left hook at the start of the ground war. 5 8 In addition

fusing the data from different spectral bands of the same are

on Earth can reveal various surface features undetected b

imagery in a single spectral band. Table 30 shows a compari

son between the civil applications for multispectral imager

and some of the related military applications of multispectra

imagery from satellites such as Landsat and SPOT. 5 9

The last qualitative measure for assessing the utility of im 

aging and remote sensing satellites is timeliness. There ar

three variables affecting the timeliness of remote sensing im 

agery: satellite revisit time, image processing time, and imag

Table 29

Landsat and SPOT Spectral Band Applications

(in microns)

Landsat SPOT Application

.45–.52

 (Blue light)

Coastal water mapping soil/vegetation

 differentiation deciduous/coniferous

 differentiation

.52–.60

 (Green light) .50–.59 Green reflectance from healthy vegetation iron content in rocks and soil

.63–.69

 (Red light) .61–.68 Chlorophyll absorption for plant differentiation

.76–.90

 (Near-Infrared) .79–.89 Biomass survey water body delineation

.80–1.1

 (Mid-Infrared) Crop vigor

1.55–1.75

 (Mid-Infrared) 1.58–1.75 Plant moisture content cloud/snow differentiation

2.08–2.35

 (Mid-Infrared) Soil analysis

10.4–12.5

 (Thermal Infrared) Thermal mapping soil moisture

269
delivery time. Timeliness, therefore, refers to the “throughput

time—the time it takes from tasking the sensor to delivery an

exploitation of the product.

One variable in timeliness is revisit frequency. Revisit fre

quency is the time, usually in number of days, it takes th

satellite to fly over the same point on the Earth twice. Fo

example, a typical orbit for a remote sensing satellite has a

altitude of 800 km and an inclination of approximately 9

degrees. Satellites in this type of orbit have a frequent revisi

time at high latitudes and an infrequent revisit time at low

latitudes. Measured at the equator, the more frequent th

revisit time the greater the opportunity to image the area o

interest on the ground and the quicker an image can be pro 

vided to the war fighter.

Table 30

Civil/Military Uses of Multispectral Imagery

 Civil Application Military Application

 Soil features Terrain delineation

Attack planning

Trafficability

 Surface temperature ASW support

Trafficability

Airfield analysis

 Vegetation analysis Terrain delineation

Camouflage detection

 Clouds Weather

Attack planning

 Snow analysis Area delineation

Attack planning

 Surface elevation Mapping, Tercom

 Ice analysis Navigation

ASW support

 Water analysis Amphibious assault planning

 Cultural features Targeting, BDA

270
Some military planners have suggested that to be useful fo

weapon system targeting and keying a throughput time of les

than two or three days is needed, while throughput times les

t han 30 days could be useful for ocean surveillance and battle

damage assessment.6 0 Throughput times greater than 

month, however, would only be considered useful for fixed

target surveillance, verification, and terrain analysis.6 1

During Desert Storm, Landsat images were routinely deliv 

ered to the theater commander anywhere between five and 1

days after the request. 6 2 If the area to be imaged was alread

in EOSAT’s database, the delivery time would be less. Give

the Landsat revisit time of 16 days, it could take the tw

Landsat satellites between one and eight days before one o

them would image the desired area and another three to fou

days for EOSAT/NOAA to provide the imagery to the DMA. 6 

After DMA had received the imagery, it normally took only on

day to forward it to the theater commander.6 4 Given the timeli

ness criteria suggested by military planners, Landsat’

throughput range between five and 13 days substantiates it

capability to provide targeting, damage assessment, surveil

lance, and terrain analysis information.

The throughput time for the SPOT system is estimated to b

between four and 14 days. Although the revisit time on th

SPOT satellite is 26 days, the satellite’s capability to view area

up to 27 degrees off centerline enables SPOT to image a given

area between three and six days after initial tasking. Imag

processing normally takes about one day and, dependin

whether or not the requester has direct access to SPOT data

delivery times can range from zero to seven days. In the fina

analysis the timeliness of SPOT imagery, between four and 1

days, also appears to have significant military utility for target

ing, damage assessment, surveillance, and terrain analysis.

Military Utility

The end of the cold war and the disbanding of the Warsaw

Pact, coupled with decreasing US military presence overseas

has motivated US allies in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific t

reexamine their security needs. An increasing number of na

tions is choosing not to remain dependent on the United

271
States to provide critical space services and products. As 

result, they have commenced to develop or purchase commer 

cially available space products.

Proliferating space technologies and products could hav

significant implications for US national security. First, prolif

erating space capabilities could provide regional military pow 

ers with an advantage over US forces in any future regiona

conflict. Advantage could be gained by eliminating the U

ability to achieve strategic and tactical surprise. The inabilit

of US forces to achieve surprise could lead to protracted en 

gagements. 6 5 Second, modern warfare is becoming highly de

pendent on space systems for communication, intelligenc

gathering, and environmental monitoring. Operation Deser

Storm provides a good example of how the control of spac

may be a decisive factor in dominating the battlefield and th

successful execution of a nation’s military strategy. Just as ai

was the “high ground” during World War II, Korea, and Viet

nam, space is emerging as today’s “new high ground.”6 6 As th

capabilities and military utility of civilian space platforms in 

crease, so does the probability that these systems will be inte 

grated with ballistic missiles and deep strike weapons.6 7

In sum, a new type of space threat seems to be emerging

Although future conflicts for the United States will probabl

be confined to militarily inferior regional powers, the increas

ing availability of space technologies and products could offse

US military advantages. The United States, therefore, mus

ensure that its space control policy and strategy is flexible an

responsive to deal with the changing world space order.

Traditional Space Control Methods and Strategy

For most of the last 40 years, US national security strateg

has focused on the containment of the Soviet Union and th

spread of the communist ideology. 6 8 Consequently, the threa

of Soviet military power became institutionalized. The nee

to counter the threat presented by the Soviets’ antisatellit

system was the principle rationale for the US antisatellit

program.6 9 US space control policy and strategy was derive

from the threat. The threat from space, however, is changing

272
Although Russia remains the only nation capable of challeng

ing US access to space, the proliferation of space technologie

and capabilities suggests a potential threat emerging from

space against US terrestrial military operations. Having char

acterized and discussed the proliferating threat, this work now

assesses the effectiveness and credibility of current space U

control policy and strategy against the threats posed by tier

one, -two, and -three space-capable nations.

Before the effectiveness and credibility of our space contro

policy and strategy can be assessed, a brief explanation of Ai

Force framework is necessary. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 

Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Marc

1992, lays out the framework in which Air Force space con 

trol planning and operations are performed and serves as th

source of contextual definitions for the roles and missions o

space control.

AFM 1-1 integrates space control into the basic role o

aerospace control. According to AFM 1-1, the ideal aim o

aerospace control is the absolute control of the air and spac

environment. All military activities having the objective o

gaining and maintaining control of the air and space environ 

ment fall into two broad mission categories: counterair an

counterspace. The purpose of counterspace mission is to gain

and maintain control of space through offensive and defen 

sive counterspace operations. According to AFM 1-1, the ob 

jective of offensive counterspace operations is to “seek ou

and neutralize or destroy enemy space forces in orbit or o

the ground at a time and place of our choosing.”7 0 The objec

tive of defensive counterspace operations, on the other hand

can be viewed from the perspective of active and passiv

counterspace defense. The aim of active counterspace defens

is to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy forces in

space or passing through space attempting to attack friendly

forces, or to penetrate the aerospace environment abov

friendly surface forces. 7 1 The objectives of passive counter

space defense are to reduce the vulnerabilities and increas

the survivability of friendly satellites and include measure

such as frequency hopping, nuclear hardening, and maneu 

verability. Although the survivability and protection o

273
friendly space assets is essential if the enemy threat agains

our space forces is significant, typically the most efficien

method for achieving control of space is to attack the enemy’

assets close to their source. 7 2 With respect to space systems

this infers attacking satellites in orbit.

Space Policy

The National Space Policy , published 2 November 1989

acknowledges the vital role space systems play in achievin

national security objectives. This policy states the nationa

security objective of space control is to ensure freedom o

action in space. 7 3

The Department of Defense (DOD) also recognizes tha

space control includes both freedom of access to space an

the ability to deny this access to a potential enemy. Unlike th

balanced approach of the National Space Policy, DOD polic

appears to be oriented towards offensive counterspace opera 

tions, emphasizing the need for a flexible and responsive mix

of antisatellite weapons to degrade the effectiveness of an en 

emy’s ground, air, and sea forces by denying them suppor

from space-based systems. 7 4 Furthermore, DOD envisioned

the ASAT fulfilling a response-in-kind role, acting to dete

attacks against US satellites by the Soviet ASAT system.7 5

Gen John Piotrowski, the former commander in chief o

United States Space Command, not only reaffirmed the offen 

sive orientation of our current space control policy, but estab

lished the strategic objectives of offensive counterspace opera 

tions. According to General Piotrowski, an ASAT weapon i

needed, not only to deter attacks against US space assets, bu

as a deterrent against a Soviet decision to go to war and, i

deterrence fails, as a needed war-fighting capability. 7 6

Traditionally, military planners have envisioned the ASAT

war-fighting capability as a hard kill (i.e., physical destruc

tion) weapon system, such as a satellite interceptor missil

(kinetic energy) or a ground-based laser (directed energy)

engaged in offensive counterspace operations to destroy or 

biting enemy satellites. DOD’s most recent ASAT project wa

seeking to develop a ground-based kinetic energy intercepto

274
with provisions in the long term for the development of 

directed-energy ASAT. 7 7

Strategy Implications

As outlined in AFM1-1, our current space control strateg

can be summed up as a strategy aimed at achieving spac

supremacy. 7 8 In this context, space supremacy means abso

lute control of the space environment. 7 9 The ability to achiev

space supremacy is presumed, as articulated by Genera

Piotrowski, to deter attacks against US space assets, dete

against a Soviet decision to go to war, and, if deterrence fail

serve as a critical war-fighting capability. Any assessmen

therefore, of the flexibility and credibility of our strategy fo

relying on an ASAT weapon for offensive counterspace opera 

tions must be made in the context of the condition desired

deterrence and war fighting against the emerging spectrum o

potential threats from tier-one, -two, and -three space-capabl

nations. Before assessing current space control strateg

against the emerging threat, one inconsistency regarding ou

current ASAT policy must be addressed. General Piotrowsk

stated an ASAT was needed to deter attacks on US spac

assets. The belief that an ASAT can deter attacks on US satel

lites did not originate with General Piotrowski; rather it has it

basis in the initial argument used by the Air Force to justif

an ASAT. According to this argument, the United States i

more dependent on space systems than the Soviets and th

ASAT will be a strong deterrent against Soviet attacks on U

space systems. The inconsistency of this argument lies in th

fact that if space systems are actually more important to th

United States than to the Soviets, how can threatening Sovie

space systems deter an attack on US space systems? Thi

would seem to be analogous to threatening a chess opponent’s

knight in hopes of deterring him from taking your queen

Rather, the perceived asymmetry between the importance o

US and Soviet space systems to their overall war-fighting ca 

pability suggests that the threat from the Soviet ASAT could

be used to limit US ability to respond in a crisis situation.

Because space systems are becoming increasingly importan

for successful conventional military operations, the capability t

275
deny critical information and functions from space system

contributes to conventional deterrence and is militarily usefu

if deterrence fails for other reasons. Of course, the extent t

which an ASAT contributes to deterrence depends on the op

ponent’s perception of the importance of his space systems t

his ultimate success and the extent to which he believes yo

have the will to deny him the use of these space systems. I

would seem logical to assume that as the space capabilities o

nations decrease from tier-one through tier-three, so too doe

the importance of space to their overall military strategy. Fur

thermore, as the importance of space systems to a nation’s

war-fighting capability decreases from tier-one through tier

three, so too does our incentive to use an ASAT weapon

Therefore, it appears that as the space capabilities of a nation

decrease across the tiers, the contribution of an ASAT to de

terrence also decreases.

The war-fighting utility of an ASAT against the emergin

space threat resulting from the proliferation of space technol

ogy and products is assessed in the three scenarios that fol

low. The first scenario looks at a conventional conflict betwee

the United States and another tier-one nation while the sec

ond scenario deals with conflict with a tier-three nation

Lastly, the third scenario discusses the utility of the ASAT in

conflicts between the US and a tier-two nation.

The first scenario is conventional conflict between th

United States and a tier-one space-capable nation. As dis 

cussed, the nations currently comprising tier-one are Russia

and the United States. In a wartime environment, US an

Russian space systems will provide reconnaissance, surveil

lance, weather, navigation, and mapping/geodesy information

as well as provide communication functions essential for com 

bat operations. However, enhancing our terrestrial forces’ war

fighting operations is not just a function of how much infor

mation can be provided, but also a function of how muc

information can be denied by the enemy. 8 0 Consequently, in

addition to their extensive dedicated military space systems

Russia also has an operational ASAT weapon that would likel

be used to deny critical war-fighting information and func

tions from our space systems to our national comman

276
authorities and theater commanders. It is precisely this sce

nario that has served as the motivating threat for US spac

control policy, strategy, and force structure. Clearly, using a

ASAT in a conventional war with the Russians to destroy thei

satellites appears to provide the most reliable means of deny

ing critical military information and functions from space sys 

tems.

The second scenario, conflicts with a tier-three space-capabl

nation, represents the most likely type of conflict we may fac

in the future. Tier-three space-capable nations are those na

tions that do not actually possess a space capability but re

ceive satellite information from tier-one or tier-two nation

either by direct purchase or by operating licensed satellit

ground stations. Regardless of how tier-three nations receiv

their space information, third-party satellite imagery and sur

veillance can affect US national security. 8 1 The war-fightin

utility of an ASAT in a conflict with a tier-three nation may b

limited because of the political consequences of using a

ASAT. These consequences can be illustrated by considerin

the situation where the United States is engaged in a limited

war with a tier-three nation licensed to operate a SPOT groun

station. In this situation it is extremely difficult to envision th

United States using an ASAT to destroy a French SPOT satel

lite. First, in accordance with the outer space treaty, attackin

a nation’s satellites is an act of war. It is unlikely that th

United States would commit a unilateral act of war agains

France over SPOT imagery. Second, an attack on a SPOT

satellite would likely result in some sort of retaliation. Retali

ation could range from political and economic sanctions in 

volving France and other European countries to some sort o

military retaliation. Politically the European community could

deny port call privileges, deny overflight, or cancel status-of

forces agreements for forward-based US forces in Europe

Militarily, France could choose to broaden its support or eve

enter the conflict against the United States. France could als

consider executing a response-in-kind option by exploiting th

inherent ASAT capability of their strategic ballistic missiles

Any military benefit of attacking a SPOT satellite, therefore

277
would seem to be overshadowed by the associated risk o

conflict escalation.8 2

The third scenario involves the use of an ASAT against 

tier-two nation. Second-tier space-capable nations have littl

or no dedicated military space systems and rely primarily on

their civilian space systems for war-fighting information an

functions. 8 3 In addition, most tier-two nations currently do no

have a dedicated ASAT capability and do not present a signifi 

cant threat to orbiting US space assets. 8 4 The use of an ASAT

to destroy a second-tier space-nation’s satellite in a conflic

situation falls in a gray area. On one hand, similar to the firs

scenario, destroying a satellite providing information and serv

ices to an enemy during war would seem justified with th

ASAT being the most reliable means of ensuring the denial o

information and those services. On the other hand, most tier

two nations typically sell the data from their satellites on th

commercial market to other nations. Therefore, in this sce

nario, destruction of the satellite not only denies the enem

information and services, but also denies all the licensed op

erators of foreign ground stations and their customers. Th

time and cost to reconstitute this capability may result in

long-term economic retardation, not only for the tier-two na

tion, but also the users of the satellite data as well. Economi

hardships, coupled with some preexisting political instability

could lead to increased regional instabilities and potentia

hostilities directed against the United States. This would seem

to imply that although the destruction of a civilian satellit

may be militarily prudent, the long- and short-term impact

on nonbelligerent countries could result in intolerable politica

consequences.

Traditional Space Control Methods

and Strategy Summary

On the surface, the current space control strategy empha

sizing the employment of ASAT weapons might seem viable

However, after assessing this strategy in the context of th

existing space threat and the emerging space threat from th

proliferation of space technologies and capabilities, there ap

pear to be some weaknesses.

278
First, although ASATs contribute to our overall conventiona

deterrent capabilities, the extent they contribute seems to di

minish across the threat spectrum. As the space threat de

creases from a tier-one to a tier-three nation, the contribution

of an ASAT to conventional deterrence also decreases.

Second, regardless of the inherent military utility a civilia

satellite may possess, the military benefits of destroying 

civilian satellite must be weighed against the potential politi

cal backlash created by intentionally targeting and destroyin

a nonmilitary system.

As Gen Donald J. Kutyna, another former commander in

chief of US Space Command, inferred, enhancing terrestria

force operations through offensive counterspace operations i

a function of how much information can be denied the en 

emy. 8 5 This reinforces the notion that the actual threat from

space systems is the information they provide and not th

space systems themselves. However, in accordance with ou

policy, doctrine, and strategy, the stated goal of offensiv

counterspace operations is to achieve supremacy over the en 

vironment (space) to deny the enemy the use of space through

the destruction of his space-based assets. This appears t

shift the focus away from the information and functions spac

systems provide, and leads one to focus only on the destruc

tion of the orbiting asset.

The military utility of an ASAT appears to depend on politi

cal and military factors limiting the feasibility of destroyin

satellites. The current focus of offensive counterspace opera 

tions on space supremacy through an ASAT seems to lack th

flexibility and responsiveness needed to deny potential ene

mies information across the spectrum of conflict scenarios

This would suggest we refocus our space strategy away from

space supremacy and the denial of space for enemy use to 

strategy based on the denial of information.

Counterspace Operations

for Information Dominance

Before discussing offensive counterspace operations in sup

port of information dominance, an understanding of the strate 

279
gic objectives of an information dominance strategy is in or 

der.

As presented previously, information dominance should b

thought of as a state in which a nation possesses a highe

degree of understanding of an adversary’s military, politica

social, and economic strengths, weaknesses, interdependen 

cies, and centers of gravity, while denying the same informa

tion on friendly sources of national power to the adversary. 8 

Military actions directed against the enemy should be under 

taken with the strategic objective of delaying, disrupting, an

denying information used by the enemy leadership for th

effective execution of military strategy. The objective is to con 

vince the enemy of his inability to execute his military strateg

successfully. Therefore, in an information dominance strategy

the strategic center of gravity is the enemy leadership, bot

military and civilian, that relies on information to execute th

national military strategy. In essence, the end game is to co 

erce the enemy by increasing his uncertainty regarding hi

ability to successfully execute his military strategy.

In modern warfare, space systems will be the strategic an

tactical eyes and ears of a nation’s national security estab

lishment. Therefore, controlling space is essential to achievin

information dominance. In an information dominance strat

egy, however, the objectives of space control must be viewed in

a different context. Currently, as outlined in AFM 1-1, th

objective of space control is to gain space supremacy or con 

trol over the environment of space. The nature of this objectiv

has, historically, tended to focus offensive counterspace opera 

tions on the destruction of the satellite in space. Space contro

under an information dominance strategy, on the other hand

seeks control over the information or products space system

provide. An objective of this nature recognizes that space sys 

tems are distributed weapon systems, consisting of three seg

ments: an orbital segment, a ground segment, and a lin

segment, connecting the orbital and ground segment togethe

and disseminating the information to military and civilia

leadership. 8 7 Controlling the information from space system

can be accomplished by attacking any of these segment

and does not necessarily involve the physical destruction o

280
equipment or facilities. The operational objective of offensiv

counterspace operations for information dominance, therefore

is to delay or deny an enemy’s capability to collect, process

and disseminate information by disrupting or destroying, a

required, the enemy’s space systems.

Operational Concept

Since information dominance can create uncertainty regard 

ing the focus and thrust of the theater campaign, offensiv

counterspace operations should normally precede other theate

operations. To attain information dominance, offensive counter 

space operations should use a combination of lethal and non 

lethal weapon systems to attack the operational center of gravit

of a space system. Depending on the space system, enemy, an

level of conflict, the center of gravity can be located in any of th

three segments of an enemy’s space system.

Operational centers of gravity in the orbital segment of a

enemy’s space system can be the entire satellite or the satel

lite subsystems critical for mission performance. This implie

a satellite does not have to be destroyed to prevent it from

accomplishing its mission. Rather, permanently or temporaril

damaging or disrupting vital satellite subsystems can preven

satellites from effectively accomplishing their mission. Exam

ples of vital subsystems include satellite attitude control sen 

sors, mission sensors, uplink/downlink antennas, and powe

generation systems.

The center of gravity in the link segment is the communica 

tions link, the radio frequency used to pass information to an

from the satellite. Since most satellites rely on uplinked com 

mand and control information from the ground for station

keeping, payload management, and satellite health and statu

functions, attacking a satellite’s uplink during critical com 

manding periods could seriously degrade mission perform 

ance. The effectiveness of electronic jamming, however, is lim 

ited because of line-of-sight restrictions and increased satellit

autonomy; therefore, attacking the downlink, rather than th

uplink, is usually easier and more reliable at disrupting 

space system. Since the satellite downlink telemetry contain

the mission information and health and status information on

281
the spacecraft and the satellite

s sensor, successfully attack

ing the downlink directly attacks information flow and, there

fore, has a more immediate effect on achieving information

dominance.

The centers of gravity in the ground segment include satel

lite launch facilities, command and control facilities, and proc 

essing stations (airborne, sea-based, and fixed or mobile land

based). All parts of the ground segment are vulnerable t

attack from various means such as clandestine operations, ai

attack, and direct ground attack.

Weapons for Offensive Counterspace Operations

What type of technology is needed to conduct offensiv

counterspace operations for information dominance? Histori

cally, doctrine and policy addressing space control has fo 

cused primarily on the hard-kill technologies to destroy orbit 

ing satellites. Other technologies, however, can be used t

achieve offensive counterspace objectives without physical de

struction of the orbiting satellite. Nondestructive soft-kill (e.g

mission-kill) technologies can permanently disable the satel

lite without destruction while nonlethal technologies ca

achieve nonpermanent space-system mission degradation an

disruption. The specific technologies used for offensive coun

terspace operations can be grouped according to the segmen

they are targeted against: orbital, link, or ground.

Offensive counterspace weapons used to attack the orbita

segment of a space system usually fall into two technolog

categories: kinetic energy and directed energy. Kinetic energ

is a hard-kill technology causing physical destruction of th

orbiting satellite. Weapons based on kinetic energy emplo

projectiles that can be launched into space to destroy orbitin

satellites through the shock of impact. There are various type

of kinetic energy ASAT weapons: exploding fragmentary war

heads, guided nonexplosive warheads that collide with satel

lites, and space mines. The benefit of using a kinetic energ

ASAT weapon is the high probability or certainty of denyin

the information from the attacked satellite. The disadvantages

on the other hand, include a lack of plausible deniabilit

282
r egarding the reason the satellite failed and the originator o

the attack.

Perhaps the most flexible of the technologies used for offen 

sive counterspace weapons is directed energy. Directed energ

weapons can be employed to achieve a destructive hard kill, 

nondestructive soft-kill, or a nonlethal temporary disruption o

degradation. Examples of directed-energy weapons are laser

and high-power microwave weapons. Lasers use electromagneti

radiation (light) for either lethal or nonlethal attacks on satel

lites.8 8 Depending on their power, lasers can damage, disrupt, o

destroy a satellite by overheating its surface, puncturing th

outer surface of the spacecraft to expose internal equipment, o

by blinding critical onboard mission or control sensors. 

Ground-based lasers, such as the Russian laser at Sary Shagan

are estimated to have a satellite hard-kill capability up to 40

km and a soft-kill capability up to 1,200 km.9 0 Another directed

energy technology that can be used for offensive counterspac

operations is high-power microwave. High-power microwav

weapons employ radio frequencies to damage satellite electron 

ics. Unlike kinetic energy and some types of laser attacks, high

power microwave weapons achieve satellite subsystem failur

rather than vehicle failure. 9 1 Intelligence estimates suggest it i

possible to construct a microwave radiation weapon today with 

satellite soft-kill capability of about 500 km. In addition, micro

wave radiation at lower power levels can be effectively used fo

satellite jamming. 9 2 There are several advantages of using directed 

energy weapons against the orbital segment in offensive coun

terspace operations. First, directed energy attacks take place a

the speed of light, therefore, the result of the attack is nea

instantaneous, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of enem

defenses. Second, there is plausible deniability associated with

soft-kill and nonlethal satellite attacks. Potential adversarie

may not have the capability to detect the nature, nor the source

nor whether a hostile action actually occurred. Hence, plausibl

deniability can be useful in politically sensitive situations. Third

the desired results can be tailored from nonpermanent disrup

tion and degradation to permanent degradation and destruction

The link segment, as mentioned earlier, consists of the elec 

tromagnetic energy used for space system uplink, downlink, an

283
in some cases a crosslink. Given that the link segment is mad

u p of electromagnetic energy, the primary technology used t

attack the link segment is electronic warfare. There are two way

of using electronic warfare to attack the link segment: jammin

and spoofing. Jamming is essentially transmitting a high

power, bogus electronic signal that causes the bit error rate in

the satellite’s uplink or downlink signals to increase, resultin

in the satellite or ground station receiver’s losing lock. 9 3

Attacking the link segment by spoofing involves taking ove

the space system by appearing as an authorized user, such a

establishing a command link with an enemy satellite an

sending anomalous commands to degrade its performance.9 

Spoofing is one of the most discrete and deniable nonletha

methods available for offensive counterspace operations.95

Offensive counterspace operations directed against th

ground segment include all offensive actions directed agains

a satellite launch complex, satellite command and control fa 

cilities, and satellite ground processing stations. The groun

segment is vulnerable to all types of terrestrial attacks from

special operations to strategic attack with gravity bombs

While the ground segment is the most vulnerable segment in 

space system, it may also represent the higher political an

military risk. Typically, ground segments for space system

are distributed within the enemy’s homeland to reduce singl

point failures and to reduce their vulnerability to attack. In

addition, high development costs associated with dedicated

military space systems and rapidly advancing commercia

technology possessing inherent military utility has resulted in

an increase of dual use (military/civilian) space systems

Therefore, in many tier-two and tier-three space-capable na

tions, ground segment targets are usually located near urba

areas susceptible to collateral damage and civilian casualties

Although susceptible to all forms of direct attack, it may b

more politically acceptable and less risky militarily to attack

ground segment targets with highly accurate precision muni

tions in discriminating attacks.

In the final analysis the available technologies for conductin

offensive counterspace operations appear flexible and respon 

sive; however, the employment options are situation dependent

284
Offensive Counterspace Options

As discussed, the biggest drawback of our current offensiv

counterspace strategy is that there are some conflict situ ation

in which destroying an enemy’s satellite with an ASAT is no

an attractive or realistic option. However, an information

dominance strategy has as a primary objective the delay o

denial of information; therefore, employment options for offen 

sive counterspace operations can exist for all threat nations

at all conflict levels, against all segments of a space system.

Employment options for conducting offensive counterspac

operations in an information-dominance strategy are influ 

enced by three major variables: the threat (e.g., tier-one, -two

or -three), the level of conflict (e.g., peace, crisis, or war), an

the segment of the space systems to be attacked (orbital, link

or ground). Figure 3 illustrates how options for offensive coun

terspace operations can be viewed discretely depending on th

combination of variables the situation represents. Dependin

on the threat and the level of conflict, employment options fo

offensive counterspace operations applicable to the three seg

ments of a space system can range from “no option” at the low

end of the spectrum, to ASAT attacks against the satellite o

Figure 3. Offensive Counterspace Options

285
strategic attack against the ground station at the high end o

the spectrum.

Examples of suggested offensive counterspace employment op 

tions for tier-one, -two, and -three space-capable nations ar

shown in figures 4, 5, and 6. Although an information-dominanc

strategy provides our military planners with greater flexibility fo

conducting counterspace operations, examination of figures 4, 

and 6 reveals two trends shaping offensive counterspace opera 

tions. First, as the level of conflict moves from peace to wa

within a tier group, the different segments of a space system

subject to attack increases and the level of acceptable violence o

the attack also increases. For example, figure 5 shows tha

during a crisis the orbital segment of a second-tier nation coul

be attacked with nonlethal disruption weapons whereas durin

war, the orbital segment could be attacked by either hard- o

soft-kill mechanisms.

Second, as the threat from space decreases across the tie

groups from tier one to tier three, the conflict threshold fo

attacking space systems segments increases while the level o

acceptable violence of the attack decreases. This is illustrated

by comparing the available options for attacking the orbita

Figure 4. Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-One Nations

286
segment during war on both figures 4 and 6. In no case i

attacking an orbital segment of a tier-three nation with hard

and soft-kill mechanisms viewed as being politically accept

able, whereas it would be against a tier-one nation.

The ability to delay and/or deny information from spac

systems, at all levels of conflict, permits the establishment o

information dominance during peacetime and its sustainmen

through crisis and war. Determining options for offensiv

counterspace operations for information dominance can b

illustrated in the following scenario. The potential for a crisi

exists between the United States and a tier-three space nation

with a licensed SPOT ground station. If a crisis erupts, the U

wants to be prepared with a rapid show of force in the theate

of operations and has, therefore, issued a warning order t

preposition forces. To ensure secrecy, the theater commande

has requested offensive counterspace operations be conducted

to deny the enemy nation information from the SPOT system

that could reveal the force mobilization. As shown in figure 6

the only available option for offensive counterspace operation

during peacetime is electronic warfare against the link seg

Figure 5. Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-Two Nations

287
ment. If the situation escalated to a crisis, or to war, th

options for counterspace operations would expand and even 

tually span all segments of the space and cut across th

spectrum of violence from nonlethal to lethal soft-kill, to letha

hard-kill.

Summary

Information dominance strategy as an alternative to th

current space control strategy has several advantages. Firs

because the strategy focuses on the denial of information

rather than the denial of the environment, the link an

ground segments of the space system correctly reemerge wit

an increased relevance to offensive counterspace operations

This total systems approach has essentially increased opera 

tional flexibility of offensive counterspace operations by in 

creasing the operational centers of gravity that can be tar 

geted. Second, the total systems approach, coupled with 

philosophy that satellite destruction is no longer essential

has resulted in an increase of available technologies for offen 

sive counterspace operations. Options for employing existin

Figure 6. Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-Three Nations

288
capabilities such as nonlethal directed energy, electroni

countermeasures (ECM), and precision-guided munition

seem more politically viable than the destructive ASAT, whic

in the past has been questioned by many within Congress

Finally, the increased number of space system targets subjec

to attack, coupled with the ability to employ a broader assort

ment of lethal and nonlethal technologies, creates options fo

employing offensive counterspace operations across the spec

trum of conflict.

Offensive Counterspace Operations

in Support of the Theater Campaign

Traditionally, offensive counterspace operations have bee

synonymous with an ASAT capability employed to deny th

medium of space through the destruction of the enemy’s orbit 

ing satellites. However, the United States does not currentl

have a capability to destroy satellites on orbit, and judging from

the political opposition to such weapons, is not likely to get one

Indeed, even if the United States had an operational ASAT capa 

bility, situations exist in which the attack and physical destruc

tion of an adversary’s satellite is not politically desirable. If th

United States is to deny the enemy critical war-fighting informa 

tion from satellites, it must adopt an offensive counterspac

strategy capable of defeating the enemy’s space order of battl

within existing political constraints.

Conducting offensive counterspace operations with an ob

jective of attaining information dominance does, however, offe

an alternative strategy for controlling space information to th

operationally limited strategy of space supremacy. Offensiv

counterspace operations under an information-dominanc

strategy center on delaying and denying the information an

support, space systems provide by disrupting or destroying, a

required, targets within the orbital, link, and ground segment

of the enemy’s space system. Consequently, a total system

approach to targeting, encompassing the link and ground seg

ments, in addition to the orbital segment, is employed.

Implementing an offensive counterspace strategy based on

information dominance in support of a theater campaign re

289
quires the resolution of two major issues: organizational re

sponsibility for implementing an information-dominance strat

egy and the need for a comprehensive space order of battle fo

the emerging threat from space. The first issue to be resolved

is that of organizational responsibilities, or more specifically

who is responsible for developing and implementing the offen 

sive counterspace strategy.

The Unified Command Plan assigns the responsibility of th

space control mission to the commander in chief United State

Space Command (USCINCSPACE); however, the issue of who i

responsible for developing and implementing the strategy fo

offensive counterspace operations in support of a theater cam

paign would seem to be driven by the responsibilities of th

supported commander vis-à-vis the supporting commander. Ac 

cording to Joint Pub 5-02.1 , Joint Operations Planning System

(JOPS), vol. 1, the supported commander is responsible for coor 

dinating and synchronizing war-fighting activities of the sup

porting commander’s military forces in conjunction with his own

forces.9 6 In addition, the supported commander normally has th

authority to designate the objectives and the timing and dura 

tion of the supporting commander’s actions within the theater. 

The supporting commander, on the other hand, is responsibl

for determining the needs of the supported force and takin

actions to fulfill them by providing forces and/or developing 

plan for supporting the supported commander.9 8 Although th

supported commander has the authority to determine objective

for the supporting commander, assigning the plan developmen

function to the supporting commander would suggest the re

sponsibility for strategy development and implementation als

rests with the supporting commander. According to Joint Pu

0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, the supporting force gives sup

port or operates in support of another force—the supporte

force. Because of their war-fighting role in theater campaigns

space forces are normally designated supporting forces. Conse

quently, USCINCSPACE, as the supporting commander, woul

be responsible for developing the theater plan for counterspac

operations in support of the supported CINC’s objectives.

Although USCINCSPACE is responsible for implementing of

fensive counterspace strategy within the theater, there re

290
mains no one within the theater specifically identified for inte 

grating counterspace operations into the theater campaign

plan. The emergence of space power as a potentially decisiv

war-fighting capability in the aftermath of Desert Storm pro 

vides some incentive to identify an individual or organization

responsible for integrating counterspace operations into th

theater campaign plan.

One alternative would be to create a Joint Forces Spac

Component Commander (JFSCC) responsible to the Join

Force Commander (JFC). Since Congress chose not to assign

the space warfare mission to any single service, but rather t

the unified command US Space Command (USSPACECOM)

the organizational relationship of the JFSCC to the other serv

ices and the unified command for space is not clear. Realisti

cally the JFSCC should be some sort of USSPACECOM ele 

ment reporting directly to the JFC, and conceptually b

similar to a subunified command. One major problem with th

JFSCC concept, however, is that as a component command

the forces assigned to the JFSCC would normally be under th

operational command of the JFC. However, the operationa

command of USSPACECOM space forces will not chop to th

JFC. 9 9 Therefore, the JFSCC would essentially be a facilitato

or coordinator with USSPACECOM for the surveillance, recon 

naissance, communications, and weather support require 

ments of the theater component forces. Although facilitatin

and coordinating the space requirements into the theate

campaign is an important function, creating a new componen

command, led presumably by a general officer, to perform

coordination activities that could be performed by existin

staff elements, seems to be a misappropriation of resources.

With respect to counterspace operations, the JFSCC would

coordinate between USCINCSPACE and the JFC and compo

nent commanders to ensure the space control strategy is con 

sistent with the overall theater strategy and the counterspac

operations are integrated into the theater campaign plan. In

this capacity the JFSCC would have a role similar to that o

the US Transportation Command liaison, who, also has n

forces assigned.

291
Another, and perhaps more dependable, alternative for of

fensive counterspace operations in support of a theater cam

paign would be to establish a space planning and operation

cell under the JFACC. One potential organization capable o

assuming the planning function of offensive counterspace op

erations for information dominance would be Air Force Spac

Command’s (AFSPACECOM) Forward Space Support in Thea 

ter (FSST) team.

The objective of the FSST team is to provide regional CINC

space expertise to facilitate the near-term theater-level inte 

gration of air and space.100 FSST teams are currently assigned

to Air Force component commands to assist in developin

operations plans (OPLAN), training, and ensuring integrated

space support.101 While the primary focus of the FSST team

currently centers around the force-enhancing attributes o

space forces, adding counterspace operations responsibilitie

appears feasible. Given the propensity for offensive counter 

space operations to be conducted by air and electronic warfar

forces, subordinating the space planning and operations cel

to the JFACC would appear to facilitate the integration of th

enemy space order of battle into the overall air operation

planning effort and the resulting air tasking order (ATO).

The second issue to resolve for offensive counterspace op

erations in support of the theater campaign is the requiremen

for a comprehensive space order of battle for potential ene

mies. The space order of battle required to support offensiv

counterspace operations for information dominance mus

have the same total systems approach as the targeting phi

losophy. The enemy’s order of battle for the orbital segment o

a space system includes information such as ephemeris, sub

system vulnerabilities, maneuverability, sensor configuration

and periods of natural disruption such as solar interference

satellite eclipse, and proximity operations. Ground segmen

order of battle information would include information suc

as the locations of ground stations and control facilities, th 

existence of mobile ground stations, and ground station vu

nerabilities (such as electrical power). Likewise, order of battl

information on the link segment would include information on

the number of up/downlinks, frequencies, and antijam/en cryp 

292
tion capabilities. In addition to the information relating to th

physical attributes of a space system, space order of battl

should also include such operational information as how th

system is used, an assessment of its potential contribution t

the enemy’s overall military strategy, system reconstitution

capabilities, and periods of critical commanding. The existenc

of a comprehensive space order of battle will facilitate th

integration of offensive counterspace operations into the thea 

ter operations plan and inclusion of space order of battle tar

gets into the ATO and electronic warfare plan.

Integral to USCINCSPACE’s responsibility for plannin

counterspace operations within the theater is the task of de

veloping and maintaining the space order of battle for th

threats from space. Currently, USSPACECOM’s Space Defens

Operations Center (SPADOC) is responsible for developing an

maintaining the space order of battle with data provided from

the Joint Space Intelligence Center and the Space Surveillanc

Center. Because of the cold war legacy imprinted on our spac

control strategy, space order of battle is oriented on the Sovie

space threat and focuses primarily on the orbiting satellite

and includes information such as the satellite function, con 

figuration, orbital parameters, and overflight predictions

However, since an information-dominance strategy focuses on

attacking the entire space system, the level of effort needed t

develop and maintain a space order of battle for counterspac

operations appears to exceed the current capabilities of th

SPADOC.

As space technology proliferates, the need for a US strateg

to exercise control over potentially threatening space system

increases. Basing our offensive counterspace operations on 

strategy of information dominance seems to be a logical ap

proach for determining the focus of a space control campaign

Even though the United States has no dedicated operationa

ASAT capability to provide the lethal, hard-kill options, ther

are many operational weapon systems that possess inheren

capabilities for lethal soft-kill, or nonlethal counterspace ap

plications.

It is increasingly clear that space capabilities are becomin

more decisive in the outcome of war. In the current politica

293
environment, there is a need to be more creative and innova 

tive in approaches to solving national security problems. Infor

mation dominance represents a different approach for con 

fronting the threat from multilateral space capabilities and fo

viewing the objectives of the space control mission.

Notes

1. House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appro 

priations for 1985, 98th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, 192.

2. Gen John L. Piotrowski, to Congressman William Dickinson, letter, 

July 1989.

3. Lt Col Andrew D. Krepenivich Jr., The Military Technical Revolution, 

Preliminary Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of De 

fense, Office of Net Assessment, July 1992), 3.

4. Ibid., 14.

5. Ibid., 22.

6. Col Gordon Middleton, USAF , “Information-based Warfare of the 21

Century,” Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel on Space, November 1992, 2.

7. Krepenivich, 22.

8. “Building Space Power for the 21st Century,” Air Force Blue Ribbo

Panel on Space, unpublished white paper, 4 November 1992.

9. “The New Hierarchy in Space,” in Commercial Observation Satellite

and International Security , ed. Michael Krepon, et al. (New York: St. Martin’

Press, 1990), 19.

10. James T. Hackett and Robin Ranger, “Proliferating Satellites Driv

US ASAT Need,” Signal, May 1990, 156.

11. Thomas Mahnken, “Why Third World Space Systems Matter,” Orbis 

Fall 1991, 577.

12. Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, GEO, LEO, and the Future (Maxwe

Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, August 1991), 2.

13. Hackett and Ranger, 155.

14. Sylvia Maureen Williams, “International Law and the Military Uses o

Outer Space,” International Relations, May 1989, 413.

15. Ibid., 413.

16. Mahnken, 564.

17. Mary Umberger, “Commercial Observation Satellite Capabilities,” i

Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security , ed. Michae

Krepon, et al. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 12.

18. Leonard S. Spector, “Not So Open Skies,” Space Policy , Februar

1990, 16.

19. Judy Collins, Earth Observation Satellite Corp., telephone interview

with author, 26 May 1993.

20. Ibid.

294
21. Jeffrey T. Richelson, 

Implications for Nations Without Space-base

Intelligence Collection Capabilities,” in Commercial Observation Satellite

and International Security , ed. Michael Krepon, et al. (New York: St. Martin’

Press, 1990), 59.

22. Hugh DeSantis, “Commercial Observation Satellites and their Mil

tary Implications: A Speculative Assessment,” Washington Quarterly , Sum 

mer 1989, 186.

23. Forcast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Forecast In 

ternational, March 1993.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Spector, 14.

27. Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Forecast In 

ternational, March 1993.

28. Marcia S. Smith, “Military and Civilian Satellites in Support of Allie

Forces in the Persian Gulf War,” CRS Report for Congress, 27 Februar

1991, 7.

29. Spector, 14.

30. Krepon, 19.

31. DeSantis, 189.

32. Ibid., 189.

33. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Future of Space Reconnaissance,” Scien 

tific American , January 1991, 42.

34. “Chinese Space Program Sets Aggressive Pace,” Aviation Week 

Space Technology , 5 October 1992, 48.

35. Lt Col Bret Watterson, USAF, “Proliferation of Remote Sensing Sys 

tems,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, briefing, 24 Decem 

ber 1991.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. “Chinese Space Program Sets Aggressive Pace,” 48.

39. Richelson, “The Future,” 42.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ann M. Florini, “The Opening Skies: Third Party Imaging Satellite

and US Security,” International Security, Fall 1988, 107.

43. Robin Riccitiello, “Radar Imagery Sales Grow at Slow Pace,” Spac

News, 30 November–6 December, 1992, 6.

44. Elizabeth Corcoran and Tim Beardsley, “The New Space Race,” Sc

entific American, July 1990, 76.

45. Ibid., 75.

46. Watterson.

47. Mahnken, 573.

48. “Spot a New Way to Win,” advertisement, Defense Electronics , No

vember 1988, 68.

295
49. The Russian Resurs satellite was initially developed as a dedicate

military system. Umberger, 11.

50. Florini, 98.

51. Ibid., 101.

52. Ibid., 95.

53. Krepon, 18.

54. Richelson, “Implications for Nations,” 55.

55. William J. Broad, “Non Super Powers Are Developing Their Own Sp

Satellite Systems,” New York Times, 3 September 1989.

56. Richelson, “Implications for Nations,” 55.

57. US Space Command, United States Space Command Operations De 

sert Shield and Desert Storm Assessment (U) (Secret), 43. Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

58. Watterson.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. US Space Command, 45.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 46.

65. Vincent Kiernan, “Gulf War Led to Appreciation of Military Space

Space News, 25-31 January 1993, 3.

66. Earl D. Cooper and Steven M. Shaker, “The Commercial Use o

Space,” Defense and Diplomacy , July/August 1989, 35.

67. DeSantis, 189.

68. National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, 1.

69. Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C

Brookings Institution, 1987), 73.

70. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 6.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 11.

73. US National Space Policy, 16 November 1989, 10.

74. Department of Defense, Report to the Congress on Space Control (U

July 1989, iv (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified.

75. Ibid.

76. Gen John L. Piotrowski, letter to Congressman William Dickinson, 

July 1989.

77. Maj Steven R. Petersen, USAF, Space Control and the Role of Ant

satellite Weapons (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, May 1991), 69.

78. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 10.

79. Ibid.

80. Gen Donald J. Kutyna, CINC US Space Command, testimony t

Senate Armed Service Committee, 23 April 1991.

81. Ann M. Florini, “The Opening Skies: Third Party Imaging Satellite

and US Security,” International Security , Fall 1988, 122.

296
82. Stares, 122.

83. France is perhaps the current exception with the Helios satellite.

84. This is recognition of the fact that nuclear-capable nations with 

ballistic missile or space launch program possess an inherent ASAT capa

bility. Nuclear ASATs, however, have limited operational utility due to th

persistence of residual electromagnetic pulse known as the Argus effect.

85. Kutyna, “Spy Satellite Systems,” New York Times, 3 Septembe

1989.

86. Krepinevich, 8.

87. Stares, 74.

88. Ibid., 75.

89. Ibid., 76.

90. LCDR James S. Green, USN, US Plan for Space Control (Maxwe

AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 3 March 1989), 7.

91. Ralph Zirkland, Evaluation of Soviet Exploitation of CM/CCM in Spac

Warfare, Defense Technical Information Center, Defense Logistics Agenc

(U), November 1983 (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified.

92. Maj William O’Dell, Application of Electronic Countermeasures in th

Defense of US Space Objects (U) (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Sta

College, May 1973) (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified.

93. Electronic Warfare Threat to US Communication Links (U), Defens

Intelligence Agency (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified.

94. Ibid.

95. Stares, 82.

96. Joint Pub 3-14, “Joint Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques, and Proce 

dures (TTP) for Space Operations,” final draft, 15 April 1992, I–17.

97. Joint Pub 3-14, II–15.

98. Joint Pub 3-14, I–17.

99. AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide , 1991,1–34.

100. AFM 2-25, “Air Force Operational Doctrine: Space Operations,” in 

itial draft, April 1993, 20.

101. AFM 2-25, 20.

297
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Chapter 6

When the Enemy Has Our Eyes

Cynthia A. S. McKinley

On 17 January 1991, the United States entered a war tha

turned the military space community upside down. Until the

the military space community’s focus was locked on the stra 

tegic concepts that were developed and refined throughout th

cold war. The Gulf War expanded that focus to include th

operational and tactical levels of warfare. This change is caus

ing space strategists to consider a broader spectrum of spac

functions for enhancement, and perhaps most importantly 

broader spectrum of measures for space control.

In addition to this expanded focus, the reconnaissance sat

ellite playing field continues to undergo significant changes

During all but a few years of the cold war, there were only tw

players in the spy satellite game. This was slowly changin

toward the end of the cold war. At the time of its invasion o

Kuwait, the Iraqi military was receiving support from the So 

viets and purchasing satellite imagery from the French. Soo

after the invasion, the Soviets joined many other nations in

their condemnation of the Iraqi government’s behavior an

the French refused to sell imagery products. This left th

United States in possession of a temporary monopoly on th

ability to routinely and unobtrusively probe the enemy’s bat

tlefield with highly accurate reconnaissance satellites. Thos

space assets revealed volumes about the Iraqi capabilitie

and intentions for battle. The United States assured its Gul

War victory through the combined strengths of its overwhelm 

ing offensive power and its unprecedented knowledge of th

battlefield. As the world watched this display, it quickly

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, PhD

Reader: Dr Karl Mueller, PhD

303
learned that future warfare success may require a simila

illumination of the battlefield.

As the lessons of the Gulf War are being internalized, na

tional and international actors are endeavoring to participat

on the high ground of space reconnaissance . The movement t

gain access to high-quality satellite photoreconnaissance dat

has turned into a stampede in only four years. For a nation

such as France that has been in the photoreconnaissanc

business for nearly a decade, this stampede is enabling it t

move a rung higher on the international competitive ladder

For Russia it represents an opportunity to regain stature an

much-needed wealth. It also shows the world that Russia re

mains a superpower in the space business, one of the mos

prestigious of all fields for national pride.

Combining the modified space operations focus and th

multipolar space systems playing field, the next war is likel

to differ from the Gulf War. Indeed, in the next war, it is likel

that the enemy will have our eyes. The United States must b

prepared to pursue active space control measures to deny th

enemy’s access to critical reconnaissance information. How 

ever, this problem cannot be solved out of context; the spac

control mission does not stand alone. It is shrouded in nearl

40 years of history. Furthermore, space control must b

achievable within the constraints of current and future inter 

national environments. Space control’s history and environ 

ments need to be unraveled to reach an understanding of how

the United States can execute space control in the contempo

rary world. This monograph provides information that may b

helpful to future space strategists and decision makers in

determining how to accomplish this mission.

This work integrates research, analysis, and synthesis t

take the reader through the study’s three subdivisions of th

past, the future, and the challenge. Each subdivision offer

unique information to help the reader understand the spac

community’s focus during the cold war and how that i

changing, and to place the space control mission in its contex

before attempting to offer space control methods.

Part 1, “The Past,” recounts the rise of strategic space intel

ligence, explains the revolution brought about by digital imag

304
processing technology, and elaborates on the changes result 

ing from the employment of space’s strategic assets in moder

theater warfare. Part 2, “The Future,” speculates on the form

of modern warfare and imagery’s potential role in them. Par

3, “Meeting the Challenge,” discusses the space control mis 

sion and various denial methods that will be considered fo

employment against the commercial reconnaissance system.

Part One: The Past

The Rise of Strategic Space Intelligence

Strategic space intelligence is one of the first products of th

cold war. Today, it remains one of the United States military’s

most important assets. Its formative years were molded b

three themes: competition to lead the nation’s space program

the strategic nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union, an

the technological challenges of the new frontier.

Planting the Seed. The evolution of America’s space-based

reconnaissance systems traces to the conceptual seed planted

by Wernher von Braun in May 1945. Von Braun, developer o

the V-1 and V-2 rockets for Nazi Germany, is credited wit

reuniting Adolph Hitler’s Peenemuende rocket team to form

the nucleus of America’s civilian and military space programs

Using the knowledge he gained from his rocketry work, Von

Braun provided a report to the United States Army that exam

ined German views on the potential of rocket-launched satel

lites.1 This seed quickly grew into an inter- and intraservic

rivalry that drove the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces into 

competition to become the agency responsible for future mili

tary satellite vehicles. By October 1945, the Navy had publish

ed its views on the use of satellites. Already behind the powe

curve, Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, director of research an

development for the Army Air Forces, commissioned the RAND

Corporation to conduct a three-week crash study on the feasi

bility of space satellites. 2 General LeMay and Gen Carl A

Spaatz, commanding general of the Army Air Forces, quickl

realized that this new frontier was another mission area tha

could help justify the formation of an independent air force

305
Thus, Army Air Forces involvement, along with the intens

interservice rivalries, encouraged this little-understood do

main to become a fertile arena for the competitive exchange o

ideas.

During the ensuing years, the scientific and military commu

nities studied the feasibility and operability of potential satellit

systems. With both strong proponents and opponents arguin

the potentials and limitations of such technological challenges

the research and development path was by no means smooth

Despite these difficulties, by 1951, the Air Force was able t

define its requirements for an operational satellite system. Ther

were three primary requirements for an Air Force satellite sys 

tem: (1) an ability to produce photography of sufficient quality t

enable trained interpreters to identify objects such as harbors

airfields, oil storage areas, large residential areas, and industria

areas; (2) a capability to provide continuous daytime observation

of the Soviet Union, cover its land mass in a matter of weeks

and record the data collected; and (3) an ability to produce 

quality photographic product suitable for the revision of aero

nautical charts and maps.4

During these early days of concept exploration and require

ments definition, many agencies worked independently with 

out the benefit of oversight. This changed in December 195

when the Air Research and Development Center gathered

many of the proliferating aspects of the research and develop

ment groups into a single project entitled Project 409-40. Pro 

ject 409-40’s mandate was to provide the first operationa

imagery satellite system. The prospective satellite system fo

this project was given the weapons system designation of WS

117L. 5 The satellite was to be based on state-of-the-art televi

sion and videotape recorder technology. However, its engi

neers soon realized that the 144-foot resolution that thi

system could provide was inadequate for the task. This tech 

nological problem fueled the skepticism and hostility of man

Department of Defense personnel who doubted that such sys 

tems could ever be of value. But the believers persisted, due in

part to President Dwight Eisenhower’s vision and his determ

nation to gain information on the Soviet Union’s nuclea

weapons delivery vehicle capabilities.

306
The Technological Capabilities Panel formed by Presiden

Eisenhower in 1954 provided a briefing in February 1955 on

the options for obtaining intelligence data about the Sovie

Union. The panel included such notables as Massachusett

Institute of Technology president James R. Killian Jr., Polaroid

founder Edwin H. Land, Harvard astronomer James G. Baker

and Washington University’s Joseph W. Kennedy. 6 These aca 

demic and industry leaders advised President Eisenhower tha

there were three options for gaining photoreconnaissance dat

on the Soviet Union: build strategic reconnaissance aircraf

attempt balloon reconnaissance, or develop a satellite recon 

naissance system.7 Supporters of satellite systems hoped th

committee would recommend the satellite solution as the top

priority, but the committee’s official recommendation was t

build strategic reconnaissance aircraft.

Not swayed by the committee’s focus on near-term solu 

tions, the Air Force quickly issued General Operational Re

quirement Number 80. Issued less than a month after th

committee’s report to the president, this document established

an official requirement for an advanced reconnaissance satel

lite.8 By November 1955, the basic technical tasks were de

fined and approved and the project was given the code nam

Pied Piper. Pied Piper’s goals were to provide a complete sate

lite reconnaissance system, including ground facilities fo

analyzing and disseminating imagery, and to be fully opera 

tional by the third quarter of 1963. Three corporations com 

peted for the rights to build this visionary project: Radio Cor

poration of America, Glenn L. Martin, and Lockheed Aircraft

By October 1956, the Air Force had made the contract award

decision. Lockheed was notified to proceed with its develop

ment of an advanced reconnaissance satellite as well as th

upper stage Agena vehicle that would propel the satellite int

low Earth orbit.1 0

The Threat: Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack. Work on th

WS-117L project progressed at a steady pace until the Soviet

shocked America with their launch of sputnik on 4 Octobe

1957. This unsettling event shook the foundations of the mili

tary and scientific communities, the government, the popula 

tion of the United States, and helped consolidate the commu

307
nities

 work toward meeting the challenge and threat posed b

the Soviets. On 22 January 1958, the National Security Coun

cil issued directive number 1846, assigning the highest prior

ity status to the development of an operational reconnaissanc

satellite.

By February 1958, space experts were briefing Presiden

Eisenhower on the two potential imagery acquisition method

using space platforms. One was the original method proposed

in Project 409-40, that is, using a film-scanning technique

and the other used a film and satellite recovery method. Presi

dent Eisenhower decided that the film and satellite recover

system offered hope of immediate payoffs and decided to as

sign program development responsibilities to the Central Intel

ligence Agency (CIA). Several factors led to these decision

President Eisenhower was concerned that the Pied Piper non 

recoverable technology would not yield an operable satellite a

quickly as needed, was not enthusiastic about an Army role in

space, was concerned about security failings, and had confi 

dence in the CIA’s ability to lead the program because of it

experience with the secret development of the U-2 airborn

imagery collection system. Thus, at the February 1958 meet

ing, President Eisenhower approved the infamous Corona pro 

ject. The Corona system was designed to quickly provide a

operational spy satellite through development of a recoverabl

capsule system. The CIA’s marching orders were to have th

system ready for use by the spring of 1959.1 1

The cover for the Corona program was the Discoverer satel

lite program. Additionally, the government established a mili

tary research and development agency, the Advanced Re

search Projects Agency, to handle the public aspects of th

project. The portions of the WS-117L project that pertained t

reconnaissance satellites were canceled and restarted in th

highly secretive world of the CIA under the Corona cover. Th

Air Force was tasked only with the responsibility of testin

techniques for recovery of a capsule ejected from an orbitin

satellite. After a February 1959 launch failure and the Sovie

recovery of a capsule launched in April 1959, the CIA’s Coron

project met with success in 1960. It was in that year tha

American space experts successfully launched and recovered

308
two film capsules. By 1961, the CIA

s film recovery program

was stable and provided regular imagery of the Soviet Union.

Using state-of-the-art equipment, the CIA secretly acquire

imagery of great military significance throughout the 1960s. Th

imagery met the specifications laid out in 1951 by the Air Force

and more importantly, could identify exactly what the Soviet

were accomplishing in the strategic nuclear arena. This program

and its follow-ons were deemed highly successful at providin

high-quality photographic imagery for the United States unti

the program was superseded in October 1984.

Film-Based Solutions Today, Electro-Optics Tomorrow

The decision to pursue the film-based recovery system was 

prudent decision considering the technological capabilities o

electro-optics in the late 1950s. Eventually however, electro

optical technology would evolve to the point where its produc

would match that of the film-based systems and surpass th

latter’s ability to provide near-real-time intelligence data. Believ

ing this to be true, the many proponents of electro-optical sys 

tems continued to develop and refine this emerging technology.

Although it may not have been viewed this way in th

1960s, what appears to have emerged is a dual-track technol

ogy progression. One track was the logical short-term solution

and the other was the long-term method for providing cold

war strategic intelligence. Figure 7 provides an analysis an

synopsis of this dual-track technology progression.

Despite official cancellation of all Air Force satellite activitie

except recovery techniques, work on the onboard film scan

ning system continued to challenge its proponents. The earli

est available evidence that anyone was pursuing digital pro

cessing technologies for military application appears in a 195

report. In its report to the Air Force, Radio Corporation o

America recommended—and the Air Force accepted—the ide

of a combined film and digital-based system.1 2 This plan called

for using a film scanning technique in which a conventiona

camera photographed the target and the film was developed

on board. Once developed, the film was scanned with a fin

light beam and the resulting signal was sent to a groun

receiving station. The ground station translated the signa

309
310
back into an image. The Air Force program that used thi

technology was the Samos program. 1 3

The Air Force’s Samos program launched its first satellite in

October 1960. After achieving only two successful launches in

its five attempts between 1960 and 1962, this program wa

deemed a failure and officially canceled in 1962. However, thi

cancellation may have been an attempt to divert the notice o

the Soviets and others. Samos-5, the last of the Samo

launches, was the most successful and provided imagery reso

lution in the 30-meter range, not much worse than that pro 

vided by the multispectral imagers of today’s Systeme Proba

toire pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) systems. 1 4 Although

officially canceled, its technological advancements reappeared

that same year in the CIA’s second generation program cod

named Keyhole. While some of the Keyhole satellites contin 

ued to exploit the successful film-based system, others wer

designed to use the film scanning technique. 15 Although neve

launched, some development work occurred through the KH-5

Army mapping and the KH-6 Tallinn mission satellites.1 6

It appears that the first successful use of low-quality digita

image processing technology occurred at the National Aeronau 

tics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA used the KH-5 film

scanning camera on its lunar orbiters, Ranger and Surveyor, i

the mid-1960s and later in Mariner 4, Mariner 9, and LAND

SAT.1 7 When Mariner 4 was launched in 1964, it was advertise

as using the first all-digital imaging system. Seven years later

Mars became the first planet to be mapped entirely from digita

remotely sensed data. The use of digital image processing tech 

nology for lunar and planetary exploration continued through 

out the 1970s with the launches of Pioneer, Viking, and Voyage

series spacecraft. By 1972 NASA was ready to apply the technol

ogy to earth remote sensing and on 23 July launched the firs

LANDSAT satellite. LANDSAT was the first American spacecraf

to provide multispectral imagery. 1 8

By 1976, with 15 years of space reconnaissance work be

hind them, America’s imagery network was established an

performing well. It was about to become even better. America’s

space strategists and scientists were about to elevate the sat

ellite imagery program to an advanced technological plateau

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While they comfortably sat on the successes of the film-based

imagery systems, analysts realized that NASA’s digital imagin

systems were small indicators of the CIA’s spy satellite work

In the bicentennial year America succeeded in turning th

tables on the Soviet Union. In 1976 America also rattled th

bear’s cage by launching the first KH-11 reconnaissance satel

lite into its near-polar orbit.

The Digital Imagery Revolution

By 1976 the United States and the Soviet Union were ex 

perts at the orbital cat-and-mouse game of satellite reconnais 

sance. Both nations used film and satellite recovery system

and routinized their operational procedures. Despite eloquen

protests about spy satellites’ violation of national sovereignty

both nations acquiesced to the Open Skies policy. 1 9 Both na 

tions realized that these systems provided insights into eac

other’s strategic nuclear activities and thus provided som

stability in a dangerous world.2 0

Soon after celebrating its two hundredth anniversary, th

United States launched a satellite that revolutionized the pho

toreconnaissance business and set the stage for its later us

in operational- and tactical-level warfare. For a few shor

years, the United States operated alone on this plateau o

technological achievement. However, achievement breeds im

tation. The Soviet Union and France soon developed simila

systems.

Charge Coupled Devices and Computers: Keys to the KH

11. The KH-11 satellite launched on 19 December 1976 was th

first photoreconnaissance satellite to provide high-quality non 

film-based imagery. The KH-11’s real-time sensing systems an

high-resolution charge coupled device (CCD) cameras enabled i

to distinguish military from civilian personnel. 2 1 The infrare

and multispectral sensing devices of the later models can locat

missiles, trains, and missile launchers by day or night, and ca

distinguish camouflage and artificial vegetation from livin

plants and trees. Space analyst Jeffrey Richelson claims th

KH-11 is capable of 15-centimeters (approximately six inches

resolution using a mirror at least two to three meters diamete

(similar to the Hubble Space Telescope). 22 The launch of th

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KH-11 was a significant milestone in the achievement o

space-based imagery products and represented a personal tri

umph for Leslie Dirks, the CIA’s deputy director of science an

technology.

The KH-11’s roots reach back to RAND’s 1945 concept of 

television-type imagery return system.2 3 Realizing that th

technology of the 1950s and 1960s was inadequate to provid

the near-real-time data that the national reconnaissance com 

munity wanted, Dirks continued to believe it would be avail

able in the future. The breakthrough technology by which th

KH-11 became capable of collecting and transmitting imager

in real time lay in its use of CCD. The CCD originated at Bel

Telephone Laboratories in the late 1960s, when two re

searchers, William S. Boyle and George E. Smith, sought t

invent a type of memory circuit.2 4

For those in the government who had access to the revolu 

tionary digital imagery provided by the KH-11, they realized

the significance was obvious and immediate. Although initiall

limited to data collection for only a few hours each day, 

system that could provide near-real-time images of Earth gav

decision makers a near instantaneous ability to see exactl

what the adversary was doing. 2 5 For the analysts, this new

system released them from the light table and stereoscope.2 

With digital image processing technology, the analysts bega

using the much more flexible and dynamic medium of com 

puters.

Using computers, the analysts recalled imagery from th

database and manipulated it through a variety of viewing op

tions. For example, the analysts changed the contrast to in 

crease the visibility of objects that were in shadows, obscured

by haze or thin cloud cover, or photographed with too much o

too little exposure.2 7 Computers began performing the task o

object detection. Changes in a particular target area were de

termined using a technique known as electronic optical sub

traction. Among the other computer advantages were the abil

ity to improve the image resolution and the ability to delet

distortions inherent in photographic systems.2 8

The American Monopoly. From 1976 to 1982, the United

States was the only nation utilizing digital image processin

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technology in its reconnaissance satellites. Combining thi

technology with its older film-recovery systems and airborn

platforms such as the U-2 and SR-71, America’s ability t

acquire strategic intelligence surpassed that of any other na

tion.29 A few of the important bits of strategic intelligence dat

that these systems provided were nuclear weapons develop

ments and tests, adherence to arms control agreements, loca 

tions of strategic and tactical aircraft, troop deployments, an

military construction.

The United States’ monopoly on digital image processin

technology crumbled in 1982, when the Soviets launched thei

fifth-generation reconnaissance system. With this system, th

Soviets followed the Americans in liberating themselves from

reliance upon the film-recovery system. Their fifth-generation

satellite offers 20-centimeter resolution, nearly the same a

the KH-11.3 0 The speed with which the Soviets were able t

bridge the technology gap with the Americans is probably ex 

plained by the several thefts of KH-11 documents that oc 

curred shortly after the first KH-11 was launched. 3 1

Several copies of the specifications for the KH-11 system

appeared in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. The firs

arrived through William Kampiles, a Greek-American who be

gan working for the CIA in 1977. 3 2 Unhappy with his pay

tedious work, and unglamorous watch tours, Kampiles re

signed from the CIA after less than a year and journeyed t

Greece in 1978. Packed in his suitcase was a copy of numbe

155 of the KH-11 System Technical Manual. 3 3 Once in Greece

Kampiles approached a Soviet Embassy official and offered t

provide American intelligence documents. Although he re

quested $10,000 for the KH-11 document, Kampiles received 

mere $3,000 for the technical manual that opened the door t

one of America’s greatest technological achievements.3 4

Aided by America’s technology secrets, the Soviets wer

ready to launch their first digital imagery satellite system on

28 December 1982. 3 5 Analysts know little about this first all

digital Soviet satellite. In fact, some analysts still question

whether it actually represents the Soviets’ first attempt to us

digital processing. Their first undisputed use of digital tech 

nology occurred with the launch of Cosmos 1552 on 14 Ma

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1984. Collection systems have not detected signals from thi

or subsequent fifth-generation satellites, so analysts believ

that the data is retrieved by way of Molniya or geosynchro 

nous communications satellite links. 3 6 Russia continues t

use its Generation 5 satellites today and has apparently devel

oped a Generation 6 follow-on to this initial successful use o

digital processing technology.

The French Go Commercial. France, one of the five acknow

ledged nuclear powers, joined the digital image processing worl

only four years after the Soviets. Unlike its American and Sovie

predecessors, French entry into this domain occurred in th

commercial marketplace. The French government began th

SPOT program in 1978 and first exploited digital image process

ing technology satellites with its launch of SPOT-1 in 1986. Th

SPOT system does not offer the high resolution of its militar

counterparts; it provides 20-meter multispectral and 10-mete

panchromatic resolution imagery. Also unlike its American an

Soviet counterparts, the French government did not attempt t

underwrite all of SPOT’s developmental costs. From its incep

tion, national and international government and private firm

have participated in the program. Over a dozen French, Belgian

and Swedish agencies had a stake in the success of SPOT-1

Today, the expansive SPOT Imagery Corporation provides im 

agery to customers on every continent.

The French entry into the commercial exploitation of digita

image processing technology could have signaled the begin 

ning of the transformation of photoreconnaissance imagery t

operational and tactical use, but it wasn’t until the United

States needed such data in a regional war that the militar

space community began to realize that a fundamental trans

formation was under way.

Transformation: Strategic Intelligence in Theater Warfare

Throughout the cold war, space-based strategic intelligenc

enhanced global stability by enabling governments to monito

crises and watch for remote nuclear weapons tests.3 7 Observa 

tion satellites monitored possible threats to the regimes estab

lished by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1970 Nuclea

Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the 1972 Strategic Arms Limita 

315
tion Treaty. These treaties played an active role in monitorin

the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, an

the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Utilizing their strategic eyes

the superpowers kept watch over turmoil in many theaters.

However, it wasn’t until the Gulf War of 1991 that America’s

strategic eyes were actively integrated into every phase o

theater warfare. 38 This integration was, and is necessary fo

the modern battlefield commander to monitor today’s ex 

panded theater of operations. Just as telescopes once provided

extended vision to the horse-mounted commander, reconnais 

sance satellites help modern commanders control, manage

and coordinate simultaneous operations over thousands o

square miles. Because of the immense complexities of moder

warfare, the orbiting remote sensing systems provide critica

information that helps the commander achieve success. Awar

of these modern warfare demands, it is now easy to see that in

the fall of 1990, the most secretive strategic intelligence pro 

gram in America’s unknowingly sat on the doorstep of radica

change.

We Have No Maps! When the coalition forces were deployed

to the Persian Gulf region, the maps of Kuwait, Iraq, an

Saudi Arabia were old and out of date.3 9 To correct this defi 

ciency, multispectral imagery satellite systems were used t

prepare precise maps of the Gulf area. Multispectral image

were used to show features of Earth that exceed human visua

detection. With the ability to provide seasonally adjusted bat

tlefield maps, the multispectral imagery analysis identified

land cover, healthy and stressed vegetation, soil boundaries

soil moisture content, fording locations, and potential landin

or drop zones. These images also allowed analysts to identif

shallow water areas near the coastline and earth surface area

in which spectral changes had occurred. With this informa

tion, military operational personnel gleaned data that would

help achieve military victory. Desert Shield and Desert Storm

engineers had valuable data that enabled plans for militar

airfield construction; Marines knew which areas were best fo

amphibious assault; land forces could monitor enemy opera 

tions; and air attackers could examine attack routes, verif

target coordinates, and identify potential landing zones.

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One of the great values of Desert Storm

s multispectral im 

agery was its use for aerial combat mission planning an

operations. It was combined with other Defense Mappin

Agency (DMA) databases and used by pilots to display attack

routes and targets as they should appear at flight and attack

altitudes. Prior to the air campaign, the military electronicall

overlaid SPOT images of Iraq on digital terrain maps for mis 

sion rehearsals. Additionally, these images were displayed in

the Mission Support Systems (MSS) vans deployed in th

theater. The MSS heralded the first in-theater use of mobil

downlink stations.4 0 These units permitted processing an

analysis of data by battlefield intelligence units. For comba

operations, imagery was a standard part of target folders, an

aircrews expected its uninterrupted availability. When review 

ing their tasking orders, aircrews wanted and expected to se

a picture of every target.4 1

Examples of the use of SPOT imagery in the air campaign

include both destructive and constructive applications. Th

imagery was a key element in the rapid planning and launc

of a successful F-111 attack on a single building in Kuwai

City to eliminate key elements of the Iraqi military leader 

ship.4 2 The SPOT panchromatic imagery closely resembles th

resolution and visual appearance of infrared targeting dis 

plays.4 3 Thus, the images were helpful during flight opera 

tions. F-117A stealth aircraft pilots carried the imagery from

the onset of hostilities. The SPOT pictures helped them attack

such targets as the Iraqi air defense operations center, minis 

try of defense, intelligence center, and other high priority tar

gets.4 4 To assist in the Scud hunts, SPOT imagery was used t

identify terrain or man-made features where Iraqi missil

launchers might hide.4 5

Equally important, the SPOT imagery helped avoid the los

of civilian lives by identifying the locations of mosques, hosp

tals, schools, and residential areas. Attack angles for specifi

weapons were calculated so that bombs or missiles with long

or short-range impact had the least chance of causing collat

eral damage. 4 6 On at least one occasion, SPOT imagery as

sisted in the rescue of a downed F-16 pilot. 4 7 Rescue mission

planners used the images to examine the topography of th

317
area where the pilot ejected. They made judgments abou

where he would likely go based on seeing the same topograph

from ground level. During the rescue operation, the imager

was used to guide forces to the area.

With its low-resolution quality, SPOT’s main contribution

came from its ability to provide bathymetric, hydrographic

and terrain categorization in support of air, naval, and groun

combat operations. In short, this exceptional view of the terri

tory and composition of the land and waterways gave coalition

forces an unprecedented insight into the environment. 4 8

The Soviets’ Views. The Soviets were impressed by Amer 

ica’s space abilities in theater warfare. 4 9 As a provider o

much of Iraq’s war equipment, the soviets were dismaye

that space-based reconnaissance, systems detected—an

smart weapons quickly destroyed—much of Iraq’s moder

equipment. Despite the coalition’s success in this area, th

Soviets were pleased with the Iraqi maskirovka techniques.5 

The effectiveness of Iraqi camouflage techniques drew posi

tive remarks from several Soviet officers.5 1 The late Marsha

Sergei Akhromeyev commented that Iraqi systems of deco

targets and decoy target groupings caused problems for coa 

lition forces in the first weeks of the air war. General Malt 

sev speculated that nearly 50 percent of the first Coalitio

strikes were carried out on false targets because of Iraq’

extensive deployment of sophisticated dummy air defens

systems. 5 2 Of even greater significance, Iraq was able to us

basic camouflage and dispersal techniques to conceal ballis

tic missiles, chemical and nuclear weapons equipment, an

probably other information as well. 5 3

The Uniqueness of the Gulf War. As a commercial re

source, SPOT’s value in theater warfare has led many t

speculate on the threat posed by a future adversary’s acquisi

tion of high-quality imagery. One of the unique features of th

Gulf War was the broad allied Coalition that included th

majority of space-based reconnaissance-capable nations. Al

though Iraq had procured SPOT imagery prior to its invasion

of Kuwait, the French terminated all sales of Gulf-related im 

agery within days of the invasion.5 4 Viewing SPOT as a com 

mercial venture, the board of directors stated their intent t

318
sustain a nonmilitary image. A spokesperson for the corpora 

tion stated that the board of directors did not want SPOT t

appear to the general public as a company that aggressivel

follows military developments.5 5

The official statements do not indicate a categorical refusa

to allow SPOT to provide imagery during conflict or war situ 

ations. SPOT officials have repeatedly reminded the world o

the corporation’s open access policy and refusal to censor it

imagery products. 5 6 Rather, it was the unique circumstance

surrounding the Gulf War that caused the French corporatio

to temporarily modify its policy. When SPOT has viewed 

conflict situation as an opportunity to provide newsworth

imagery, it has readily offered to do so. 5 7 Thus the uniqu

high level of belligerence and subsequent world condemna

tion of Iraq’s invasion led SPOT officials to refuse to supply

imagery and to publicly state that it is not their role to track

military forces.5 8 Interestingly, their altruism in this situatio

would have quickly disintegrated if any other imagery agenc

had decided to provide similar data. 5 9 At the time, the only

other agency that could have made such a decision was th

Earth Observation Satellite (EOS) Company that operate

LANDSAT. According to Phillipe Renault, deputy director-gen 

eral of SPOT Image, if EOS had sold LANDSAT images to Iraq

SPOT Image would have done likewise in the interest of busi

ness competition. 6 0

As the world approaches the twenty-first century, interna

tional economic competition is preparing it for unprecedented

access to high-quality imagery data. Thirty years of techno

logical evolution and international competition have signifi 

cantly altered strategic space intelligence. Its employment ha

changed and its ownership expanded. Imagery intelligence ha

emerged from its highly secretive cocoon; it has experienced

an enormous technological revolution; and most recently, it

value has been applied to the operational and tactical levels o

warfare. Having reached the end of this short review of th

emergence, development, and transformation of strategi

space intelligence and the military space community, thi

monograph now looks to the future. Part 2 provides a perspec

319
tive on modern warfare and the context for the use of imager

intelligence data.

Part Two: The Future

The Forms of Modern Warfare

Before attempting to speculate on a future adversary’s us

of imagery intelligence data in warfare, the strategist needs a

understanding of some of the variations of modern warfare

This is critical because strategists must recognize that not al

adversaries are the same, nor are many at an evolutionar

position similar to that of the United States. Each of the po

tential adversaries the United States may face occupies it

own region on a multidimensional warfare evolutionary scale

Each adversary’s technological, organizational, and concep

tual capabilities will widely vary. Thus, they cannot be en 

gaged in like manner.

A singular employment strategy will not work against di

verse adversaries and should not be blindly pursued. The dis 

cussion that follows is a departure from traditional warfar

analysis. It is offered as another perspective of the evolution

and complexities of modern warfare.

Understanding Warfare. Modern warfare is a multifaceted

enterprise, one whose evolutionary complexity has mirrored

that of human society. This complexity ensures that human

ity’s attempts to explain modern warfare are as taxing toda

as they were for primitive humankind. 6 1 While primitive hu

mankind grappled with the rudimentary skills that charac

terized early warfare, humanity must attempt to put its arm

around many forms of warfare that include highly technica

tools and complex organizational and doctrinal concepts

While no individual can master all of the complexities of mod

ern warfare, those complexities can be described by manage 

able concepts and frameworks.

Warfare is the human expression of the battle for ascen 

dancy. At its roots lay differences about the desirability of th

status quo. Status quo issues may concern territory, power

legitimacy, dominance, ideology, or a host of other topics

320
Each entity or actor on the international or national landscap

has a variety of tools and methods for preserving or attempt

ing to change the status quo. The international battle for as

cendancy remains the purview of a small subset of humanit

until one side determines that a core interest, value, or belie

is threatened or perhaps that the status quo power is incapa 

ble of representing the interests of a subset. While a state o

war may be referred to metaphorically very early on (for exam

ple, a trade war), the military is accustomed to referring to th

existence of a state of war only when it is directed to an

becomes engaged in force application against the tools of a

opposing force. Once a military force is engaged, there ar

three possible outcomes: the status quo is changed, the force

languish in stalemate, or there is no change to the status quo

If the group seeking change is victorious, it becomes th

guardian of the contemporary status quo. The defeated forc

then becomes the entity seeking to change the status quo at 

later point in time. A diagrammatic interpretation of this con 

cept is offered in figure 8.

The Forms of Modern Warfare. In trying to gain a perspec

tive on this “visible” portion of the warfare spectrum, it be

comes apparent that throughout the evolution of civilization

people have improved their war-fighting skills by unlockin

technological and cognitive secrets. Using technological ad

vancements as a categorical base, humankind has developed

three definable forms of warfare. This categorization is organ

ized by the concept that certain technological advancement

have produced significant evolutionary fractures. The frac

tures have signaled a major change in size of the adversaria

group that an entity is able to coerce. The three forms o

warfare are primordial, industrialized, and nuclear warfare

Figure 9 provides an overview of two dimensions of this multi

dimensional framework.6 2

As humanity develops each new form of warfare, it contin 

ues to maintain and refine its earlier forms. As the secret

within each form are unlocked, humanity modifies the rang

of its technical coercive capability. Additionally, each new

technical ability challenges humanity to harness that new

power, focus it, and exploit it through higher orders of organ

321
322
323
izational and conceptual abstraction. In some cases, for exam

ple, Napoleonic warfare, the warriors’ lethality was increased

through organizational improvements. For example, in nuclea

warfare the owners have attempted to harness the latest de

structive tool to make it more useable. The technological, or

ganizational, and conceptual achievements are pursued in th

belief that they will elude the adversary and thus provid

success in warfare. Without attempting to delve too deepl

into the three forms of warfare or reach into other aspects o

this multidimensional analysis, a superficial examination is in

order.

The foundation of primordial warfare is based on an individ 

ual or group’s need to coerce individuals or small groups. Thi

form includes hand-to-hand combat and the use of elemen 

tary weapons as clubs, swords, and small firearms. Organiza 

tionally, its evolution has been expressed through Napoleonic

tribal, and protracted guerrilla warfare. Recent technologica

developments in this form of warfare seek coercion through

the use of nonlethal weapons.

Industrialized warfare is the form of warfare that member

of militaries prefer to deal with because it typically concern

forces that resemble themselves and which operate in wha

is commonly referred to as conventional warfare. The foun

dation of industrialized warfare is based on an individual o

group’s need to coerce a larger organized force. It include

all of the nonnuclear tools that industrialized society ha

created for use in warfare. Examples of such tools includ

the machine gun, tanks, airplanes, missiles, many of th

space assets, and information technologies. The many enti

ties that have gained industrialized warfare capabilities pro 

vide extensive variety to this form of warfare. Each has mas

tered its own unique level of technological, organizational

and conceptual sophistication. Additionally, in this form o

warfare, humanity has succeeded in organizing systems o

tools into complex and coordinated attack systems. For ex

ample, this form includes Germany’s concept of blitzkrieg

the United States Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine, air cam

paigns, and emerging concepts of information warfare. In

this form of warfare humanity now spends most of its physi

324
cal, organizational, and conceptual resources in both vertica

(advanced technology) and horizontal (advanced organiza 

tional and conceptual) development.

The foundation of nuclear warfare is based on an individua

or group’s need to coerce a very large group or entire popula 

tion. In this form of warfare, the use of nuclear weapons ca

quickly transform the objective from coercion to annihilation

This form of warfare so preoccupied politicians and strategist

during the cold war that its definitional and organizationa

complexity quickly overshadowed that of preceding forms o

warfare despite its shorter history. Strategic thinkers wrot

volumes about deterrence; superpower nations devoted enor

mous treasures to placing photoreconnaissance and infrared

satellites on orbit to locate nuclear weapons and to alert it

citizens of their employment. Current developments in thi

form of warfare may prove to be very difficult to deal with in

the near future. Recent efforts in this form of warfare hav

concentrated on ways to make nuclear weapons less destruc

tive and thus more useful. There are frequent reports tha

uranium is trickling out of the former Soviet Union. Worse ye

“red mercury,” potentially the key ingredient of miniature nu

clear bombs, may actually exist despite the skepticism o

some experts.6 3

These three forms of warfare (primordial, industrialized, an

nuclear) encapsulate modern warfare. Probably the singl

most important fact to keep in mind is that these warfar

forms exist in today’s world. Technical, organizational, or con 

ceptual developments within one form of warfare do not ne

gate or supplant the other forms. Humanity merely continue

to refine each form to fully exploit the advantages within each

Additionally, an individual or group may combine portions o

the forms of warfare or elements within the forms to coerce a

adversary. As an example, during the Vietnam War, the Nort

Vietnamese combined portions of industrialized and primor

dial warfare. Being able to extract from the warfare form

those elements that best fit a country’s capabilities and re

sources provides a great deal of flexibility when seeking t

coerce an adversary. Today’s modern warfare reservoir offer

great variety and complexity depending upon the limitations o

325
the political objectives: the physical, organizational, and con 

ceptual capabilities of the actors and financial resources.

The future warfare bazaar may reveal the transition of cur

rent technological breakthroughs as creators of new fracture

that enable different forms of coercion. This in turn would

modify the framework to include additional forms of warfare

One possibility is that an actor will choose to depart from

international agreements and deploy space weapons that ar

capable of holding the planet hostage. This would definitel

cause an evolutionary fracture, adding space warfare as a new

form. Another possibility is that the proliferation of emergin

chemical, biological, nuclear, or genetic terrorism weapon

will reveal themselves as similar transitionary devices. The

could become originators of humankind’s transition from to 

day’s state-ordered system to one dominated by anarchy. O

this note, this study turns to look at imagery’s role in moder

warfare.

Imagery in Future Warfare

How important will imagery be in future warfare? Further 

more, how will the United States respond to an adversary’s

acquisition of indigenous or commercial space reconnaissanc

products? 

Because modern warfare comes in many variations, th

United States must be able to analyze an opponent’s physical

organizational, and conceptual capabilities. Among the asset

the United States will use to unravel these capabilities are it

well-established satellite imagery assets. National and interna

tional actors who appreciate imagery’s value and see the eas

with which it may be acquired will seek to exploit it. With it

recent Desert Storm experience and continued technologica

superiority, the United States military will continue to lea

this evolution.

Imagery’s Role in Modern Warfare. Imagery’s primar

value will remain at the strategic level of warfare because of it

continuing importance with respect to combating nuclear war 

fare. In a world where nuclear proliferation is a growing con 

cern, the ability of reconnaissance satellites’ to peer into re

stricted areas will continue to prove that strategic spac

326
intelligence is necessary for maintaining peace in a nuclea

world.

Imagery’s value in industrialized warfare will vary depend

ing upon the adversary’s capabilities. For the United States

reconnaissance satellites comprise a portion of the system o

systems it uses to gain strategic, operational, and tactica

intelligence during warfare.6 4 This highly evolved system o

systems includes satellites, manned and unmanned aircraf

and surface forces. Potential adversaries’ capabilities are les

evolved, but could include some combination of these force

being used at all three levels of warfare. The technologicall

sophisticated actors will have indigenous imagery capabilitie

and healthy imagery databases; other actors will have pur

chased imagery and may have similarly healthy databases

some will not have any imagery capability. A few will hav

achieved capabilities comparable to those of the United States

These nations may own indigenous capabilities or have pur

chased strategic imagery and be capable of augmenting it wit

operational and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. 6 5 Other ad

versaries will assume less-evolved stages of development, per 

haps they will be able to employ imagery only for genera

information.

As expected from many industrialized warfare tools, satellit

imagery intelligence offers less in primordial warfare than in

the other forms. In this form of warfare, it may provide onl

general strategic intelligence information. More useful media

for imagery intelligence in this form of war are airborne strate 

gic and tactical reconnaissance platforms, in particular, un

manned aerial vehicles.

If not critical in the conduct of primordial warfare, imager

intelligence will continue to be one of the most importan

military uses of satellites in industrialized and nuclear war

fare. Its denial to an adversary in those forms of warfare could

prove critical for the United States.

Understanding the Challenge. Satellite imagery is n

longer the preserve of major powers and specialized units wit

top secret clearances. Japan, China, India, and Israel have al

launched and placed in orbit imaging satellites with varyin

capabilities. Brazil, Canada, and Great Britain have plans t

327
develop imagery systems. Twenty-meter resolution multispec

tral and 10-meter resolution panchromatic imagery is com 

mercially available from SPOT Image Corporation; five-mete

resolution panchromatic imagery is available from Russia’s

Soyuzkarta agency. By the year 2000, several corporations wil

provide imagery of one-meter resolution quality.

SPOT Image Corporation’s commercial network extends be

yond that of any other supplier and continues to grow. 6 6 Th

military value of SPOT imagery during the Gulf War is result 

ing in millions of dollars in procurements from internationa

military users.6 7 As of 1994, SPOT Image Corporation wa

operating ground receiving stations in 14 countries and sellin

imagery products on an unrestricted basis.6 8 In addition to it

current capabilities, SPOT Image plans to upgrade its network

by launching SPOT-5 in the year 2000. SPOT-5 will provid

five-meter resolution quality data.6 9

Having surprised the world in 1987 when its Soyuzkart

agency announced its intention to begin selling high-qualit

imagery of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of the Inde

pendent States (CIS) continues to offer strong competition in

the satellite imagery business. Currently, CIS’s KFA-100 cam

eras provide the best commercially available imagery data.7 

Although this imagery is advertised as being of five-mete

resolution quality, customers have received imagery assessed

at 1.3-meters resolution. 7 1

For many years, the United States refused to launch com 

mercial satellites whose resolution was better than 10 meters

however, with the combined pressures imposed by th

Soyuzkarta sales and the lack of restrictions on non-US com 

mercial space agencies, it was clear to the US government tha

the superpower monopoly on high-quality satellite imager

was ending. 7 2 As a result, early in 1987, the United State

announced that it had lifted its 10-meter resolution launc

limit.7 3 By the end of 1995, a commercial US corporation wa

providing three-meter resolution imagery. By 2000, two U

firms plan to begin offering one-meter resolution quality data

Table 31 provides a summary of the types of imagery data tha

will be available in the next few years. 7 4

328
With these developments in the remote sensing world, it i

likely that future adversaries will own or have access to high

quality imagery data. Iraq’s limited access along with SPOT

Image Corporation’s willingness to restrict its data minimized

the risk of exposure of American combat deployments, move 

ments, and battle plans in 1990 and 1991. Additionally, Ira

could not begin to cope with the extent of the coalition’s satel

lite and airborne reconnaissance capabilities. In the Gulf War

these, along with America’s other overwhelming capabilities

were the exclusive province of coalition forces.7 5 However, wit

the numerous sources discussed above, the Gulf War may b

the last in which the United States holds an overwhelmin

imagery advantage. It appears certain that in future warfare

the enemy will have our eyes. But what exactly do these eye

give to an adversary?

Militarily Useful Imagery Data. For surveillance data to b

useful for military purposes, the resolution quality needs to b

25 meters or better.7 6 With 25-meter resolution, an analys

can identify such things as large buildings, road structures

rivers, and lakes. According to Maj Gen William K. James

director of the DMA in 1991, effective military mapping re

quires a system with a ground resolution ranging from three

Table 31

Planned Imagery Systems, 1995–2000

1995 USA World View 3m

Russia Almaz-1B (radar) 5m 1996 Japan ADEOS 1 & 2 8m

Canada Radarsat (radar) 10m 1997 USA Eyeglass 1m

India IRS-1C 10m 1999 USA Space Imaging

Inc.

1m

France SPOT-4 10m 2000 France SPOT-5 5m

Source: Berner, Lamphier and Associates, “Many Nations Feed Commercial Imagery Markets,” Space New

6–12 March 1995, 9.

329
to five-meters, five-band spectral resolution, precise metri

data, stereoscopic coverage, and broad area collection. 7 7 Thi

kind of imagery provides the ability to identify, for example

bombers on an airstrip, ingress and egress routes; differenti

ate between soil types and elevation; and, if provided in digita

format, a medium that allows pilots and soldiers access to 

volatile display system capable of providing battlefield famili

arization.

For terrain analysis or general detection capabilities, low

resolution imagery systems work well. For precise equipmen

identification, the best system is that which provides the high 

est resolution. If one is viewing, for example, a TU-95 Bea

bomber that is 49.5 meters long and has a wing span of 51.2

meters, the aircraft can be detected using the 10-meter reso

lution provided by SPOT panchromatic imagery. General iden 

tification can be attained using the five-meter resolution im 

agery provided by the Soyuzkarta agency. To begin to see, fo

example, engine details, the analyst needs the more precis

imagery that will be commercially available by the year 2000

If one is viewing a much smaller object, for example, a MiG-2

Fulcrum fighter aircraft, the minimum resolution required fo

detection is 4.6 meters. For general identification, one need

1.5-meter resolution. For precise identity, one needs 0.9-mete

resolution. For description, one needs 0.15-meter resolution

Table 32 provides a synopsis of the value of imagery of variou

qualities.

Looking to the future, the US military must assume that it

most technologically advanced adversaries will seek to achiev

a level of proficiency similar to or better than that achieved b

the United States in Desert Storm. The US military continue

to analyze its Gulf War successes and failures in the never

ending quest to ensure that US forces are the most capable in

the world. Because of the lessons of this war, significan

changes are under way in the US military.

The Leading Edge. The unparalleled experience of the Unite

States reconnaissance satellite world and recent Desert Storm

experience affords a position at the leading edge of imager

exploitation. The United States has quickly moved to internaliz

some of the Desert Storm lessons and prepare for future war

330
fare. Two exciting developments in this area are the Digita

Warrior and Eagle Vision programs.

Digital Warrior allows US combat units to merge intelligenc

data and computerized mission planning. Using this capability

units can load their mission programs into simulators to prac

tice upcoming missions or into weapons computers to carry ou

attacks.7 8 The Digital Warrior system that enables this use

commercially available desktop personal computers to bring to

Table 32

Resolution Required for Specific Military Tasks

(vertical scale on left lists resolution using the metric scale; on the right vertical scale, the

resolution is listed using the English scale)

Source: Capt James R. Wolf, “Implications of Space-Based Observation,” Military Review,

April 1994; and Lyn Dutton et al., Military Space, Washington, Brassey’s, 1990.

0.03m

(3cm)

0.1m

(1dm)

1m

100m

Urban areas

Ports/harbors

Railroad yards

Troop units

Roads

Minefields

Bridges

Airfield facility

C

2

 nodes

Radar

Supply dumps

Vehicles

Urban areas

Ports/harbors

Railroad yards

Troop units

Roads

Minefields

Bridges

C

2

 nodes

Radar

Supply dumps

Vehicles

Urban areas

Ports/harbors

Railroad yards

Troop units

Airfield facility

Roads

Minefields

Bridges

C

2

 nodes

Radar

Supply dumps

Vehicles

Urban areas

Ports/harbors

Railroad yards

Troop units

Roads

Minefields

Bridges

C

2

 nodes

Radar

Supply dumps

Vehicles

Airfield facility

Ships/subs

Aircraft

Vehicles

Detection General

Identification

Precise

Identification

Description

Technical

Intelligence

~ 33 fee

~ 40 inc

~ 4 inch

~ 1 inch 

10m

331
gether intelligence data, weapons specifications, and informa 

tion updates as the mission unfolds. 7 9

Both the Air Force and Navy recommended that SPOT im 

agery become an integral part of a much more operationall

oriented space-based imaging reconnaissance capability. 8 0 Th

Air Force’s Eagle Vision program will allow small mobil

ground stations to receive SPOT imagery directly from space

craft.8 1 In many instances, the US military has found that th

broad fields of view provided by SPOT imagery were muc

more useful and available than the narrow fields of view pro 

vided by advanced national spacecraft. According to Air Forc

planners, if the aircrews had been limited to using standard

maps, they had approximately a 30 percent chance of destroy

ing a target. Using SPOT data, the first strike success rat

jumped to 70 percent.8 2

The significance of these changes is that the Gulf Wa

marked a turning point for the US military’s use of space

derived imagery data. The Gulf War proved that the strategi

systems developed during the cold war had operational an

tactical value. 8 3 The ongoing acquisition of imagery satellite

and their products by potential adversaries alters the futur

warfare equation and thus raises the priority of the spac

control mission. Part 3 discusses the space control mission in

the context of employment against imagery systems and ana

lyzes a commercial surveillance system to determine how bes

to deny such information to a future adversary.

Part Three: Meeting the Challenge

Denial

With the preceding knowledge of imagery’s history as well a

a different perspective on modern warfare and imagery’s po

tential role, the stage is set for the final section of this study

This work now moves forward to meet the challenge of spac

control in a multipolar, technologically advanced world. Fo

the space strategist, this means understanding the space con 

trol mission and having the ability to work through the prob

lem of effective post cold war, post-Gulf War space contro

332
measures. To be effective, the strategist needs an awareness o

the effects of targeting various portions of the space system

infrastructure. With the international stampede to acquire im 

agery data, reconnaissance satellites may represent one of th

first categories of space systems against which the United

States may need to exercise active space control measures.

The Space Control Mission. Space control is an amor 

ph ous term whose current definition has lost its connection

with United States Air Force doctrine. According to Air Forc

Manual (AFM) 1-1 , Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

Air Force , control has two sides: it permits friendly forces t

operate more effectively, and it denies these advantages t

the enemy. 8 4 Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Proce

dures (JDTTP) 3-14 , Space Operations, defines space contro

as combat against enemy forces in space and their infra 

structure. 8 5 This narrow definition lacks the substance an

flexibility of the Air Force’s use of the term control and thu

may close a strategist’s mind to the broad spectrum throug

which US instruments of power may successfully deny th

use of space assets.

A more encompassing definition of space control should ac

knowledge both sides of the term. It could describe the denia

portion of the term as the diversion, delay, disruption, or de

struction of an adversary’s space capability. The dual objec

tives of access and denial require a variety of capabilities

ranging from protective measures for friendly satellite system

to destruction of an adversary’s spacecraft. Both lethal an

nonlethal means can be employed to limit or deny an adver 

sary’s capability to use space systems or to distort the infor

mation they provide.

Space-derived intelligence data provide early indication

and warnings of crises; ensure dissemination of targeting an

planning data; remove uncertainties about the weather an

the location and synchronization of forces; and facilitate effec

tive command and control of forces. These data help nationa

leaders exercise the political, economic, and diplomatic instru 

ments of national power. US forces may be directed to den

access to these capabilities through effective space contro

actions.

333
To deny the adversary

s use of space, US forces may target 

wide range of assets including, but not limited to orbitin

spacecraft, launch sites, production facilities, research an

development laboratories, operations headquarters, fixed- an

mobile-command and control ground sites, data reception an

analysis sites, power generation facilities, data links, and th

many technicians, operators, analysts, and management per 

sonnel who create and operate these highly technical systems

The spectrum of denial ranges from achieving temporary o

limited data loss to causing extensive long-term systemic loss

Some examples of denial actions include but are not limited t

implementing an international agreement to shut off a satel

lite’s downlink, terminating imagery sales, destroying groun

sites, destroying or disrupting system software programs

spoofing or jamming link signals, damaging or disrupting sat

ellite subsystems, and disabling or destroying the satellite

Before choosing any of these measures, the strategist mus

determine the outcome being sought and what tools can b

employed to achieve the intended effect while concurrentl

minimizing unintended effects.

Before proceeding with the denial analysis, a short discus

sion of political constraints is in order. Current internationa

law curbs direct attacks against satellites. Because satellite

are the sovereign territory of the satellite owner, attack

against them are considered violations of national sover 

eignty. 8 6 In spite of this fact, most of the literature on spac

control is monocular in its discussion of the means of spac

control. Few nations have emerged from the trappings of cold

war concepts to see space control as anything beyond employ

ment of antisatellite weapons.8 7 That topic has kept the mili

tary space community and many national-level strategists in

its grip since the dawn of the space age and hindered analyti

cal thought about how to deny access to space’s bounty.

Furthermore, armed forces’ personnel at the tip of the war

fare spear spend most of their time focusing on the weapons o

war. For those at the leading edge of technology, it is easy t

understand this focus. The weapons are high technolog

“toys” that fascinate the imagination. This preoccupation i

inadequate for the strategist. The strategist must move beyon

334
this fascination and focus on the outcome that is being sough

when the United States uses its military or other instrument

of power.

Denying the Advantages. During the cold war, the US mili

tary’s adversarial problems were in clear focus. There was 

much better understanding of who the enemy was and wha

capabilities he would bring to a conflict. The problem is muc

more complex today and for future war fighters. Considerin

only the space control portion of the conflict equation, durin

the cold war, the United States faced an adversary who owned

highly capable reconnaissance satellites and existed in 

closed society within a large land mass. With the limited tech 

nologies of the day, ASAT attack was perhaps the only viabl

method of space control. Today, the landscape is much differ 

ent. Tomorrow’s adversary may be receiving imagery data from

foreign or domestic commercial vendors. US governmenta

agencies may be receiving data from some of those very sam

sources or include their use in contingency plans. This con 

currently complicates yet broadens the scope of the denia

portion of space control’s mission. Now, more than ever be

fore, denial efforts cannot be executed without considering th

political, economic, and physical ramifications of those efforts

The strategist must determine what effect is needed an

how best to achieve that effect. Looking at the problem o

satellite imagery control, as mentioned earlier, the range o

objectives extends from temporary or limited data loss to th

long-term future loss of related space systems. For each o

these, there are numerous ways to achieve the objective de

pending upon the circumstances surrounding the actors, th

linkages between the actors and those unrelated to the con 

flict situation, the conflict situation itself, the space systems

the actors’ capabilities, and so on. Many such factors wil

impact the national strategy. Table 33 was developed as a

aid for developing space strategy. 8 8 It does not purport to rep

resent all possible effects, weapons, or means. Rather, it i

offered as a tool for the space strategist who is attempting t

approach strategy through rational analysis.

As shown in table 33, the strategist will achieve effects fo

varying lengths of time. The effect may be felt by an isolated

335
group of users or by all agencies who depend upon a launc

site to gain access to space. During the heat of battle, on

common goal is immediacy. This is especially true for th

United States, where there is a desire to terminate conflict

quickly. For an on orbit, operational space system, this raise

the importance of the first group of options and lowers th

importance of attacking, for example, the spacecraft’s head

quarters facilities, fabrication facilities, and launch sites.

To gain an immediate effect on the adversary while avoidin

costly and unintended effects against friendly users, th

Table 33

Some Means of Denial

Objective Tool or Weapon Means of Denial

Immediate temporary or limited

data loss

Diplomacy/ownership Agreement to terminate downlink

Shutter control

Terminate imagery sales

Physical attack Attack a ground C2 or receiver site

that has a backup system

Software virus/worm Destroy software coding to

temporarily disrupt spacecraft or

site operations

Electronic warfare Spoof or jam signal links to disrupt

or degrade spacecraft or site

operations

Directed energy Temporarily disrupt or degrade

spacecraft operations

Immediate long term data loss Physical attack Attack ground receiver station tha

does not have any backup system

Directed energy Cause repairable damage to

spacecraft

Immediate satellite destruction Physical attack Destroy all ground C2 sites to

cause spacecraft malfunction /

destruction

Electronic warfare Spoof/jam C2 links to cause

spacecraft failure

Directed energy Cause irreparable damage to

spacecraft

Kinetic kill Use ASAT to destroy spacecraft

Potential future or long term impact Physical attack Headquarters

Remove replacement capability by

destroying spacecraft storage or

fabrication facilities

Remove replacement capability by

destroying launch site

336
strategist must look to the measures shown at the top of tabl

33. Of those means, some are much easier to implement tha

others. For example, while an exacting software virus or worm

could be employed to achieve temporal and specific results

the war fighter must either have had access or had gain ac

cess to the system to employ this tool. This may require ac

cess long before the current adversary was considered to be 

potential threat. Most space systems employ highly secur

cryptology devices to avoid such problems. Thus, while listed

as an option, this weapon may not be feasible.

Looking at another of the options in this category, a physica

attack against a receiver site that is known to have a backu

system may provide the temporal success needed. It may remov

the space assets from the adversary’s tool box without causin

significant long-term effects. It may also maintain the flexibilit

for more inclusive measures at a later time.

Switching to the middle categories, directly attacking th

satellite will have immediate effects, but it also has man

unattractive consequences. First of all, in today’s interdepen

dent information-based society, destruction of a satellite ma

effect more actors than desired. It may effect a very larg

group of users, some of whom may be allies or even the United

States government. For those with orbital analysis or astro 

nautical experience, the idea of shattering large in orbit satel

lites immediately brings to mind two nightmares. The first i

the orbital analyst’s nightmare of trying to identify and track

(perhaps for hundreds of years) the hundreds of resultan

debris objects. The second is the orbital analyst’s and astro 

nauts’ nightmare of determining and reacting to the destruc

tive effects that those pieces of debris may have on friendl

satellites or manned spacecraft. 8 9 Additionally, such an attack

minimizes the coercive leverage gained by lesser-destructiv

measures. Because of the far reaching unintended effect

caused by spacecraft destruction, it is one of the least pre

ferred of the attack options. Permanent or temporary disable 

ment through other means, for example, electronic warfare

may achieve the desired effect without risk to US or allied

manned or unmanned spacecraft.

337
Looking briefly at the final category, when dealing with a

in orbit system, these targets appear to be the least beneficia

of the targeting categories. It is possible that none of them wil

have an immediate effect upon the conflict.9 0 For example

attacking a spacecraft’s headquarters will not immediatel

stop the data flow from the satellite to the command an

control station or to the receiver station. At best, such a

attack will have an unknown future effect on operations du

to the loss of financial and management support. Similarly

attacking the launch facility, or spaceport, may deny the ad

versary’s ability to launch replacement satellites, but it ma

also remove that spaceport from the small inventory of avail

able launch facilities and cause far-reaching, long-term effect

on the entire space industry. 9 1

In concluding this overview of selected denial measures, on

final item is important to keep in mind. When considering th

options, the decision maker must remember that many com 

manders are involved in all phases of conflict and that the

may require different measures to achieve their campaign ob

jectives. Without close coordination, one commander may de

mand the elimination of a satellite or ground station whil

another needs to keep that same system operating to permi

deception operations. This is where the demands of warfar

and the global nature of satellite systems require that a spac

denial campaign be centralized in the hands of a space sys 

tems expert.9 2

The space control mission is becoming increasingly impor

tant as the world’s powers become proficient in exploitin

space resources. Regardless of who becomes an adversary o

the United States, the military must be prepared to advise it

decision makers about the most effective means for achievin

space control. The complex and interconnected contemporar

world demands that this advice be given only after completin

an analysis similar to that offered above. Simply advocating

for example, spacecraft destruction will not answer the ques

tion of how to achieve space control. In what follows, th

results of the above analysis will be applied to the world’s

leading commercial imagery provider to illuminate the implica 

tions of attempting to deny its data to a future adversary.

338
An Analysis of the SPOT System

While the SPOT system may not be the only means by which

to procure high-quality imagery intelligence in the near future

it is analyzed here because it has the most extensive network

and an aggressive marketing plan to ensure its continued

relevance. 9 3 As with any space system, there are four critica

components for SPOT operations: spacecraft, ground stations

communications links, and personnel. To deny SPOT imager

data to an adversary, some or all of these components ma

need to be targeted. Exact target selection would need to con 

sider the conflict level, constraints, and the desired outcome.

An Overview of the SPOT System. The main contractor fo

the SPOT program is the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiale

(CNES) headquartered in Toulouse, France. CNES is responsibl

for orbit maintenance, payload programming, and data reception

and preprocessing. Upon successful launch from the spacepor

at Kourou, French Guiana, the SPOT spacecraft travels in 

circular sun-synchronous orbit, designed to provide imagin

coverage at approximately 10:30 AM local time. Its altitude is 83

kilometers 9 4 and its orbital inclination is 98.7 degrees.

The SPOT spacecraft includes twin high-resolution sensor

called high-resolution visible imagers that acquire either pan 

chromatic imagery in the 0.51-to-0.73 micrometer wavelength

range or multispectral imagery at lower spatial resolution. 9 5 Th

high-resolution visible instruments measure the reflected sola

energy radiated from Earth’s surface to create an image. Th

imagers are comprised of a camera (including the optical sys 

tem), light-sensitive detectors, and an electrical subsystem fo

signal processing and camera control. 9 6 Recorders on SPOT-1

-2, and -3 can hold 22 minutes of data. With SPOT-4 an

SPOT-5, this will increase to 40 minutes of data.

Moving to the ground segment, space systems such a

SPOT require extensive data processing facilities. The com 

plete remote sensing system must provide capabilities fo

command and control of the spacecraft, imaging sensor com 

mand and control, telemetry data acquisition, telemetry de

commutation, extraction of the digital imagery from the te 

lemetry, formatting and display of the imagery, and delivery o

data products to the users.9 7 Processing operations are catego 

339
rized into several levels of sophistication.9 8 The resultant prod 

ucts are supplied in several formats including standard com 

puter-compatible tapes, MS-DOS diskettes, photographic for

mat, and CD-ROM.

There are two types of fixed-data reception stations are Sta 

tion Reception des Images Spatiales (SRIS) and SPOT Direc

Receiving Stations (SDRS). The primary SRIS receiving station

are located at Aussaguel (SRIS-T), near Toulouse, France, and a

Esrange (SRIS-K), near Kiruna, Sweden. These two SRIS receiv

real-time data as SPOT passes over the north polar region

Europe, and North Africa within a 2,500-kilometer range. To 

gether, the reception capacity of these two stations is 500,00

images per year. The equivalent of seven hundred scenes ar

archived every 24-hour period at each site.

There are 15 SDRS around the world.9 9 These stations onl

receive real-time imagery and are thus limited to the amoun

of data stored on board SPOT as it comes within range. Th

locations of the SDRS are listed in table 34.

In addition to the SRIS and SDRS fixed-data reception sites

the Gulf War coalition forces utilized the first mobile reception

systems. Those provided for the conflict were called MSS. Fig

ure 10 provides a summary of the SPOT system network.

Table 34

SPOT Direct Receiving Stations

Prince Albert Canada Islamabad Pakistan

Gatineau Canada Hyderabad India

Cotopaxi Ecuador Alice Springs Australia

Cuiaba Brazil Lad Krabang Thailand

Maspalomas Spain Pare-Pare Indonesia

Riyadh Saudi Arabia Taipeh Taiwan

Tel Aviv Israel Hatoyama Japan

Hartebeesthoek South Africa

Source: Andrew Wilson, Jane’s Space Directory 1994–1995 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Gro

1994), 393.

340
Source: Andrew Wilson, Jane’s Space Directory 1994–1995 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Grou

1994), 393.

Figure 10. SPOT Control and Data Reception Network

341
Denying the SPOT Imagery Advantage

Denying SPOT imagery data to an adversary may be a chal

lenging task. The strategic-level intelligence data it provide

can be accumulated over time and kept on file. If the adver 

sary is acquiring timely operational and theater-level data, i

may be possible to take measures to deny this information.

To cause the immediate temporary or limited loss of data t

an adversary, the United States could enlist the services of it

diplomatic personnel to convince the French government tha

SPOT Image should terminate sales or downlink services t

the adversary. The precedent for this would be SPOT Image’s

willingness to terminate sales of Middle East imagery durin

the Gulf War. 100 Air, ground, or sea force attacks could term

nate operations at a fixed SDRS or mobile MSS. Human intel

ligence operatives could be employed to eliminate particula

data transfers or to provide misinformation. For an interna

tionally intertwined system such as SPOT, these may be th

only options by which to attempt space control due to th

negative side effects of other means.

The options that seem likely to be politically, economically

technically, or operationally unwise or unfeasible include in 

stalling a software virus or worm, spoofing or jamming th

spacecraft signal links by way of electronic warfare or directed

energy weapons, attacking the CNES Mission and Operation

Control Center and Network Operations Center, the SRIS

sites, destroying the SPOT satellite by way of directed or ki

netic energy weapons, attacking CNES headquarters, destroy

ing SPOT fabrication facilities and destroying the Kouro

spaceport. These actions would affect all SPOT customers

cause multinational discord, disrupt US military use of th

data, obligate the US government for expensive replacemen

costs, and if the spaceport is destroyed, cause enormous fi 

nancial losses across the entire space industry.

Considering the unique problems that this system provides

it is apparent that the SPOT system’s international valu

minimizes the feasible space control actions that can be ac

complished by the military. Of the actions discussed, only two

physical attack against a fixed or mobile regional receiver sit

and human intelligence (HUMINT) activities, appear as viabl

342
means to gain immediate temporary or limited data loss. As 

suming these measures can in fact be successfully conducted

one may achieve limited results. If the adversary’s database i

intact, he may still have access to strategic-level intelligenc

and perhaps some operational-level data. Perhaps the bes

that can be expected is the termination of temporal-opera 

tional or tactical-level data.

One final note on the above analysis is essential. The risk o

applying the results of a conceptual analysis to a particula

system is that one then falsely extrapolates the attributes o

the part (SPOT) to the whole (all space systems). The autho

has attempted to avoid this shortcoming but also realizes tha

SPOT represents today’s most sophisticated commercial im 

agery network. It may thus be among the first to cause head

aches for American leaders who are tasked with engaging 

technologically adroit adversary. An analysis similar to tha

accomplished above for the SPOT system may yield simila

results for other satellite systems, in particular, many of th

communications satellites. For actors with indigenous sys 

tems designed to serve a solitary actor, America would be a

greater liberty to take aggressive space control actions. It i

thus critical that the strategist have the background informa

tion that will clarify the constraints under which the spac

control measures must operate.

Conclusions and Implications

The author has attempted to provide information for spac

strategists and nonspace personnel alike. The work has ac

quainted readers with some strategic space intelligence his 

tory, described its revolution, touched upon the significance o

using strategic space intelligence in theater warfare, offered 

unique outlook on modern warfare, and contributed analytica

tools to the space control mission. To place the study in per 

spective, the conclusions reach into the future by considerin

the implications.

America’s first space strategists and scientists were deter 

mined to provide the tools necessary to ensure security an

stability in a nuclear world. Their work provides an example o

343
how human vision can stimulate the achievement of techno

logical breakthroughs that change history. As is so often true

once technological secrets are unlocked and mastered, it i

only a short time before the closest competitor closes the gap

Once the digital imagery genie was out of the bottle, it took

only one theater war to enlighten the rest of the United State

competitors about the potential of imagery in warfare. For th

military space community, the Gulf War represented a funda 

mental of the United States break with the past. During th

cold war, attempts to demonstrate the operational and tactica

value of strategic space assets were seldom encouraged. Ther

was little deviation from the strategic missions and only a few

personnel were involved in exploring space systems’ value fo

auxiliary missions. It is thus not surprising that when lookin

at the military space community’s Gulf War shortcomings

critics latch on to the lack of space doctrine for theater war

fare. They were destined to find little theater-level doctrin

because, quite simply, the use of the United States’s strategi

space assets for theater warfare was not a primary, secondary

or tertiary mission during the 30 years of cold war militar

space operations. The only group actively seeking use of stra 

tegic space assets in theater warfare were those involved in

tactical exploitation of national capabilities program (TEN

CAP). The space forces used for the Gulf War did not provid

everything the operations personnel wanted or needed, but the

rose to the challenge of turning their world upside down an

are credited with significant contributions to the coalition’s

success. From this, there are two important reminders for th

future. First, obtaining such a fundamental change in focu

cannot be executed overnight. Cold war mind-sets and proce

dures still permeate every military space subcommunity. Re

sistance to change will continue until leaders help those com 

munities grasp the requirements of the post cold war

post-Gulf War world. Secondly, the strategic space mission

have not been replaced by the new operational and tactica

ones. Instead, the scope of the latter missions has expanded

and their significance has been raised. During their enthusi

astic exploration of space systems’ potentials for theater war

fare, space strategists must remember to accept space systems

344
limitations. Satellite reconnaissance is only one of several method

for procuring timely imagery data. In many cases, the preferre

method for acquiring imagery reconnaissance information wil

still be through the use of airborne strategic or tactical plat

forms.

As the United States competitors quickly seek space-derived

imagery products, the United States faces a future where it

adversaries may cloak themselves in different forms of war

fare. The United States must understand the unique abilitie

of the adversary’s and combinations of warfare forms an

tools before it can successfully engage them in combat. Today

a multitude of actors operate spacecraft and do so in consor 

tia. Although the United States is the world leader in th

exploitation of space reconnaissance systems, United State

allies and adversaries are closing the gap. They will be skilled

at using indigenously produced or commercially procured

space imagery. The imagery will assist them in maintainin

regional peace as well as in waging war. The responsibility fo

regional monitoring may become less of a US concern as othe

nations procure satellite imagery systems and assume moni

toring responsibilities. Commercially available imagery dat

give, at the very minimum, the ability to procure and maintain

strategic databases. This allows an adversary to develop at

tack plans and rehearse missions. The interconnectednes

and multiple uses for reconnaissance data suggest that spac

strategists must analyze the adversary’s use of space system

and its international linkages before recommending spac

control action.

The existence of “many eyes” makes the space control mis 

sion more challenging than at any previous time. It does no

as some proclaim, justify procurement and deployment of an

tisatellite weapons or other space weapons for space control

During the cold war’s formative space years, the United State

and the Soviet Union could each claim to control space. The

owned the space control mission by default: there were n

challengers during those early years. Each nation, at variou

times, owned and demonstrated the antisatellite weapons b

which it intended to exercise space control. But those forma

tive years are now part of the military space community’s

345
history. The advent of commercially available space reconnais 

sance data limits the Uunited States ability to control spac

regardless of the weapons it chooses to develop. If the adver 

sary has developed a strategic database, destruction of por

tions or all of a space system’s infrastructure cannot remov

this peacetime endowment. At best, destruction may remov

the imagery’s operational- or tactical-level application. Know 

ing this, a worthy adversary will have devised ways to ensur

access to the imagery it needs. The adversary may have cre

ated a redundant system of systems that includes strategi

and tactical airborne reconnaissance platforms. Another op

tion for the adversary might be to attempt to undermine o

negate the United States’s superior technological capabilitie

by using unfamiliar or different organizational or doctrina

concepts.

The analysis suggests that both space- and ground-based

antisatellite weapons are less viable in today’s multipola

world. Because of the interdependence of today’s space assets

spacecraft attack will in most cases affect multiple actors. An

attack may impose upon United States taxpayers high finan

cial liabilities. The debris cloud caused from satellite destruc

tion may unintentionally damage or destroy friendly manned

or unmanned spacecraft. Since the adversary may have al

ready procured the database necessary for military operations

spacecraft attack may not accomplish the original objective o

denying data. Thus, spacecraft attack may be an ineffectiv

space control measure in many contemporary warfare scenar 

ios. Their use may escalate the conflict, terminate allied sup

port, and eliminate a resource for US military forces. Thes

facts of space attack are often dismissed or forgotten due t

the exotic appeal of space attack weapons. These weapon

capture the warriors’ imagination because they represent sci

entific discovery’s latest breakthroughs in harnessing man’s

destructive capabilities. Additionally, they induce warriors t

prepare for their employment because they promise to destro

inanimate objects hundreds of miles from the natural huma

domain. This promise allows their sponsors to peddle them a

the necessary and sufficient space control solution. Suc

trappings do not take into account the realities of spacecraf

346
attack that become apparent through analysis of weapons ef

fects. Antisatellite weapons may have been the only method t

achieve space control in the early decades of space exploita 

tion, but they are not as viable in today’s information dom

nated society. Spending vast sums of taxpayer money to pro 

cure cold war systems for a twenty-first century world ma

leave the United States with unusable weapons and ineffectiv

strategy. Space control strategies for the twenty-first centur

must be based upon more than one option.

The space control mission may be more elusive than in th

past, but that does not imply it is beyond the United States’s

grasp. The best control measures are those which incur the leas

amount of risk, cost, and unintended consequences. Reasone

space control for the next century may be limited to terrestrial

based activities such as diplomatic bargaining or surgical at

tacks against certain ground-based operations. Precision surgi

cal attack is a capability that the United States military force

excel at with their air-, land-, and sea-based force application

weapons. What is important to remember is that the recommen 

dations the space strategist select should be based on analysis

rather than on reliance upon cold war solutions that are stil

proposed, yet may not be valid. The United States’s achieve 

ments in developing the air, land, and sea weapons of industri

alized warfare are capable of delivering the temporary spac

control that it needs for warfare. The United States does no

need to step up to the realm of space warfare to achieve spac

control.

Proceeding along the space warfare path has several unat

tractive consequences. It affects arms control agreements an

raises questions about world dominance and planetary protec

tion. Although the international system is characterized b

anarchy, most nations have agreed to live within the limits o

international law and to attempt to resolve differences peace

fully. In the early days of space achievement, the major pow 

ers rejected the calls of military leaders to use space for terres

trial attacks and the moon as a ballistic missile base. The

agreed to limit military activities in space. Those who advocat

departure from these decisions reopen debates on and con 

cern about two important international arms control issues

347
First, US pursuit of space weapons reduces the effectivenes

of current arms control agreements. Second, it jeopardizes U

ability to gain additional agreements. Ignoring the problems o

arms control may propel the world along the path of lawless

ness and violence, moving warfare to yet a higher plateau from

which humankind is able to destroy itself.

Turning to the world dominance and planetary protection

problems, these two concerns stem from the fact that an en 

tity in charge of space weapons is capable of threatening an

spot on the planet. If the United States were in charge o

space weapons, then it could be in a position to dominate th

world or claim that its destiny is to become the protector o

the planet and its peoples. In either case, an adversary wh

disagrees with these roles may attack the United States

homeland or assets abroad. An entity who does not want th

United States to dominate the world or act as its police forc

may be encouraged to execute preemptive strikes, perhap

through the use of nuclear, chemical, biological, or geneti

weapons. Assuming that the United States has no designs on

planetary domination and that the nations of the world agre

that the United States should police the planet, how migh

this impact the United States? In addition to making th

United States a more attractive target for attack, assumption

of this role could result in the United States becoming em 

broiled in every regional conflict. As the United States take

this path, other nations may use their resources to pursu

national objectives. To gain insight on how this path ma

develop, consider some of the CIS activities.

The Commonwealth of Independent States holds nearly al

of the space achievement records. CIS names normally pre

cede those of Americans in the record books. Their knowledg

of space exceeds that of any other nation. They hold all spac

endurance records and currently operate the world’s onl

space station. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, CIS ha

gained access to the world’s space markets, including those o

the United States. They seek further cooperative space en 

deavors yet do not protest calls by members of the US mili

tary, industry, or Congress to deploy space weapons. If Con 

gress approves the deployment of US space weapons, CIS

348
space experts could use their space resources for interplane

tary exploration and exploitation. This once again opens th

door for them to place their names before those of Americans

they could become the first nation to establish a space colon

charged with extracting another planet’s precious materials. I

the United States is physically and economically embroiled in

solving regional problems, it may miss the opportunity to ta

along as a junior partner in this endeavor.

The space weapons path is not an attractive path for th

United States. As the current generation of war fighters identi

fies space threats and industry responds with cold war solu 

tions, both forget that the contemporary world is much differen

from that in which they spent their formative years. Pursuin

space weaponry could place arms control agreements at risk

could lead to perceptions that the United States wants to domi

nate the planet, and could lead to US assumption of the role o

planetary protector. The ability of the United States’s scientist

to unlock new destructive capabilities does not necessitate th

development or use of these capabilities. Before advocatin

weapons development or procurement, space strategists mus

understand the past, present, and future environments an

analyze how to achieve the desired objective. Furthermore, th

strategists must project the consequences of space procuremen

decisions. The military space community has not yet emerge

from its cold war mind-set. The challenge for present-day spac

strategists is to redefine their raison d’être and the scope of thei

missions in an intertwined international environment. Th

twenty-first century will not accept cold war solutions. Th

space procurement decisions for the next century must provid

a force structure that is based on the challenges of future spac

operations.

Although intended primarily for space strategists, this work

provides nonspace operations personnel with some of th

complexities and realities of space operations and moder

warfare. With a message for present and future strategists

planners, and decision makers, it interjects a measure of real

ity into warfare plans. That reality demands an analysis o

effects rather than blind allegiance to exotic weapons an

visionless adherence to predetermined employment concepts

349
For those who immediately leap to destructive methods o

coercion, it reminds them of the value of other instruments o

power. For those who, unversed in space operations, transfe

air and terrestrial warfare concepts to space without under 

standing the medium or the consequences of their proposed

actions, it offers a more rational approach to decision making

Those who persist at ignoring the differences between air an

space or proselytize about the powers of space exploitation

without solid historical, experiential, or analytical foundation

may be destined to follow in the footsteps of airpower theorist

who have kept many air strategists’ ideas imprisoned in bi

nary thought. This work takes a first step toward avoidin

that affliction for the United States’s future space strategists.

Notes

1. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhol

Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 2.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Ibid., 9.

6. Ibid., 12.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 12–13.

9. Ibid., 13.

10. Ibid., 17.

11. Ibid., 26–27.

12. Ibid., 19.

13. Ibid., 44. According to Richelson, Samos did not stand for the com 

monly referred to Satellite and Missile Observation System. Richelson’

sources stated that the WS-117L project director selected the name “Samo

in the belief that no one would produce an acronym from it.

14. SPOT is the French civil earth observation program operated b

SPOT Image Corporation. SPOT Image is headquartered in Toulous

France. The Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNDES) is the main con 

tractor for the program. See Andrew Wilson, Jane’s Space Director

1994–1995 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1996), 183. SPO

Image Corporation, CNES, The Catalogue of SPOT Products and Service

1989, 3. SPOT’s multispectral imagers provide 20-meter resolution data.

15. Wilson, 183-84. The Keyhole satellites that continued to exploit th

film recovery system included the KH-4A, KH-4B, KH-7, KH-8, and finally

the KH-9 known as “Big Bird.”

350
16. Richelson, 61. The major objective of the KH-6 Tallinn mission sate

lite was to obtain close-look photography of the site near the Estonian cit

of Tallinn, where 1961 Corona photographs showed possible antiballisti

missile deployments. The National Photographic Intelligence Center’s inter

preters believed that the photos showed construction for the deployment o

SA-5 Gammon interceptor missiles.

17. William B. Green, Digital Image Processing: A Systems Approach, 2

ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1989), 2.

18. Ibid., 2–3.

19. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn o

the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 230–31. The Open Skie

policy stems from a proposal made by President Dwight Eisenhower t

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at a summit meeting on 21 July 195

The policy was formally rejected by Khrushchev but became a de fact

agreement as each nation pursued the use of imagery satellites to view th

other nation. 

20. Others argue that the imagery satellites destabilized the strategi

nuclear standoff. Because the satellites provide precise targeting data, th

superpowers could develop a counterforce vice countervalue nuclear stra

egy. This was seen as destabilizing because the counterforce strategy en 

courages preemptive strategic nuclear attack to ensure national survival.

21. Wilson, 184. The KH-11 provides eight to 12 images per minute. Fo

details on the workings of CCD imaging devices, see Green, 37–38.

22. Wilson, 184.

23. Richelson, 126.

24. Ibid., 128–29. Using this technology, the KH-11 scans its targets i

long, narrow strips and focuses the light onto an array of CCDs with sever

thousand elements. The light falling on each CCD during a short, fixe

period of time is then transformed into a proportional amount of electri

charge. In turn, the electrical charge is read off and fed into an amplifie

which converts the current into a whole number between zero and 256. Th

number represents a shade of color ranging from pure black to pure whit

Each picture can be transmitted as a string of numbers, one from eac

element.

25. Ibid., 134. Data collection was limited to only a few hours each da

due to power limitations. The power required to transmit the data to th

relay satellite was so great that it drained power far faster than it could b

replenished by the satellite’s solar panels. To increase its effectiveness, th

KH-11 operated in concert with the KH-8 and KH-9 until this limitation wa

solved.

26. Ibid., 135. Stereoscopes allow photo-interpreters to superimpos

photos taken from different angles. Such superimposition can yield a three

dimensional effect that makes it easy to determine the height and length o

weapons bunkers, space launch vehicles, or other objects of interest.

27. Ibid., 136.

28. Ibid., 137.

351
29. One could argue that the United States

s needs in this area uniquel

exceed those of other nations. Being such an open society, it is easy fo

other nations to acquire data about the United States. Potential adversarie

of the United States excel at keeping their societies closed and informatio

about their strategic systems hidden. Thus, one could say that the mo

sophisticated imagery systems emerged naturally in the United States be 

cause “necessity is the mother of invention.”

30. Wilson, 158.

31. To learn more about the national betrayals that occurred in the sp

satellite world during the 1970s, see Richelson, 157–84; and Robert Lind

say, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionag

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).

32. Richelson, 157–58.

33 . Ibid., 158.

34. Ibid., 161.

35. Wilson, 159.

36. Wilson, 154; and Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Wash

ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 209. Molniya satellites provid

government and military communications. They circle Earth in a highl

elliptical orbit (commonly referred to as a Molniya orbit) that provides ex

tended dwell time over the northern hemisphere.

37. Daniel Deudney, “Unlocking Space,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1983–84

95. One public example of observation satellites’ monitoring value was th

nuclear test facility construction site spotted in South Africa by a Sovie

satellite in 1977. After intense diplomatic pressure, South Africa dismantle

the site.

38. Two factors help set the stage for this transformation: the Air Force’

Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) project and the fa

of the former Soviet Union. TENCAP began using the national satellites fo

tactical operations in the 1980s, but its scope expanded significantly afte

the Gulf War, when the Air Force created the Space Warfare Center (SWC

to give the war fighter direct access to space’s bounty. TENCAP was one o

the first projects assigned to the SWC and has undergone significant growt

since SWC operations began in November 1993. The fall of the Soviet Unio

changed the international focus from a battle between the superpowers t

regional contingencies. While these two factors set the stage for the shift t

operational and tactical warfare, it took the Gulf War to hasten the militar

space community’s metamorphosis. For information on TENCAP, see Th

Space Tactics Bulletin (Falcon AFB, Colo.: Space Warfare Center).

39. Vice Adm William A. Dougherty, US Navy, “Storm From Space

Proceedings, August 1992, 51.

40. Guy Durham, “Satellites’ Keen Eyes Help Allies See Victory,” A

Force Times, 3 June 1991, 26.

41. Eliot Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary (Maxwell AFB

Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 28 March 1993), chaps. 4 and 14.

352
42. Craig Covault, 

USAF Urges Greater Use of SPOT Based on Gulf Wa

Experience,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 July 1992, 63.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 65.

46. Ibid., 63.

47. Ibid., 65 .

48. Gen Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argue

that the intelligence available to the coalition was the best in militar

history. Gen Colin L. Powell, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions o

the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, Februar

1993), 11–13. See also Cohen, chaps. 4 and 12; and Dougherty, 51.

49. Capt Brian Collins, “Soviet View of the Storm,” Air Force Magazin

July 1992, 73.

50 . Maskirovia is a CIS term which, loosely translated, means deception

51. Collins, 74.

52. Ibid.

53. William Burrows, “Give Space Reconnaissance Systems a B+,” Spac

News, 5–18 August 1991, 21; and Cohen, chaps. 2, 4, and 15.

54. Peter B. de Selding and Andrew Lawler, “SPOT Halts Sales of Gu

Area Imagery,” Space News, 13–19 August 1990, 3.

55. Phillipe Renault, deputy director-general of SPOT Image, as quote

in de Selding and Lawler, 21.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. One example of such an occurrence is the controversial image

provided on a Libyan chemical weapons plant. The Department of Defens

claimed the plant had been destroyed by fire.

58 . Ibid .

59 . Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Had he been asked to explain warfare, the task before primitive ma

would appear to us to be a rather simple affair. He had few tools with whic

to work and if warfare involved anyone other than the two opponents, 

may have involved only a few others in a loosely organized group. Howeve

this stretched the limits of his cognitive dexterity. Explaining his form o

warfare could have appeared as complex a task as that which humanit

undertakes today in trying to understand modern warfare.

62. Discussions on other portions of this multidimensional interpreta

tion are beyond the scope of this project. Many people refer to the Gulf Wa

as the first space war. Author disagrees with this. Space systems wer

critical in the Gulf War, but to call this the first space war implies tha

space forces played more than a supporting role. To have a space war, ther

must be at least two space-faring entities battling for control of the plane

or other resources through the use of terrestrial weapons to attack spac

objects or space weapons to attack terrestrial or space assets. As of today

all space systems are passive. Thus far, humanity has been successful i

353
curtailing the deployment and employment of space weapons through ad

herence to such treaties as the Treaty on the Principles of the Activity o

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon an

Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).

63. Red mercury, also known as “cherry red” because of its color, is 

semiliquid compound of pure mercury and mercury antimony oxide. I

could be used to make a baseball-sized neutron bomb capable of killin

everyone within 600 meters (approximately 0.37 mile) of the explosio

Experts believe this mercury-based explosive was developed in the forme

Soviet Union. “Bomb-Making ‘Red Mercury’ May Exist After All,” Militar

Newswire, 28 April 1995. See also Britain’s New Scientist, April 1995.

64. The “system of systems” can be divided into three general categorie

of reconnaissance assets: space-based strategic intelligence assets includ

ing DSP and the various types of reconnaissance satellites; strategic air 

borne reconnaissance assets including RC-135 Rivet Joint and U-2/TR-1

and tactical airborne reconnaissance assets including RF-4Cs and un

manned aerial vehicles. Despite the wishes of every warrior, space recon 

naissance continues to be limited by weather conditions and orbital me

chanics. It is thus unable to provide the continuous imagery coverag

required for theater warfare. For the dynamic conditions of theater warfar

strategic intelligence assets will only augment the airborne strategic an

tactical reconnaissance platforms that will continue to be the primar

providers of timely imagery intelligence.

65. As many as 30 countries are currently producing unmanned aeri

vehicles.

66. The SPOT system’s technical details are discussed shortly.

67. Covault, 63.

68. Wilson, 393.

69 . Ibid.

70. Renee Saunders, “War in Iraq Enhances Value of Commercial Re 

mote Sensing,” Space News, 21 January-3 February 1991, 16.

71. Lyn Dutton et al., Military Space (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’

1990), 99.

72. Ibid., 98.

73 . Ibid , 98–99.

74. Assessments on the number of entities who will possess military o

commercial imagery satellites vary. Some naval personnel estimate that 1

nations could belong to this group by 2000. In their count the Navy list

Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Spain

and Taiwan as those expected to have imagery satellites. After the yea

2000, Argentina and Brazil may join the group. Offering a significantl

larger estimate, an Air Force Space Command planning directorate repor

estimates that 30 countries will have reconnaissance capabilities by 2000

See Vincent Kiernan, “War Boosts Anti-Satellite Weapons Proponents

Space News, 6–12 May 1991, 7; and Neff Hudson, “Air Force Researchin

Ground-Based Lasers,” Air Force Times, 3 May 1993, 3.

354
75. Cohen, chap. 7, 21.

76. Dutton, de Garis, Winterton, and Harding, 98.

77. Patricia A. Gilmartin, “France’s SPOT Satellite Images Helped US Ai

Force Rehearse Gulf War Missions,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 

July 1991, 22.

78. William Matthews, “The Digital Warrior,” Air Force Times, 6 Januar

1995, 36.

79. Ibid. The process starts with a computer that downloads intelligenc

data from a satellite. The data, which is processed intelligence, include

information ranging from target area weather reports and terrain features t

the latest information on enemy force locations, enemy radars, antiaircraf

missiles, and other threats. Taking this information, the computer produce

maps of the intended targets and threats that troops are likely to encounte

en route to them. Currently, Digital Warrior works through Windows soft 

ware running on a 486 system. Ultimately, Digital Warrior is intended t

provide pilots with computerized maps that will show aircrews where the

are, where the target is, and where the threats are as the mission pro

gresses.

80. Covault, 61, 63. The Navy increased its use of SPOT imagery durin

and after the Gulf War. Aircraft carriers are now equipped with a SPO

database.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 64; and Jay Lowndes, “War’s Aftermath Tracked,” Space New

22–28 April 1991, 8. This is not to imply that the use of one type of imager

data precludes use of another. Each clearly has a unique contribution i

warfare. For example, in the aftermath of Hussein’s scorched earth policy i

Kuwait, LANDSAT’s broad views guided cleanup crews to oil that remaine

in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the high-resolution imagery helpe

estimate the volume of oil in different locations so that necessary equipmen

could be on hand.

83. James M. Gifford and Vincent Kiernan, “Military Calls Space Supe 

riority Essential,” Space News, 6–12 May 1991, 6. In retrospect, some claim

that as much as 70 percent of space’s assets have tactical value.

84. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United State

Air Force, March 1992, 10.

85. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14

Space Operations, 15 April 1992, GL-7.

86. For the text of the Outer Space Treaty, see United States Arm

Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agree 

ments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984). See als

Sylvia Maureen Williams, “International Law and the Military Uses of Oute

Space,” International Relations, May 1989, 413.

87. “Sharp Imagery Spurs Call for ASAT,” Space News, 6–12 Marc

1995, 17. As recently as March 1995, a senior policy advisor to a Senat

Armed Services Committee member said that ASAT capability will be abso

lutely necessary to protect US troops from being spotted by commerci

355
satellites. This advisor sees the proliferation of commercial imagery satellite

as an indication that ASATs are essential and their employment inevitable.

88. Shutter control refers to the government’s ability to block sales o

imagery from United States commercial satellites. To implement shutte

control, current policy requires a cabinet-level decision during a time o

national crisis. Some congressmen believe this policy is too restrictive an

are heading a move to empower officials at lower levels to exercise shutte

control. Warren Ferster, “Prospect of Policy Review Rattles Imagery Execu 

tives,” Space News, 6-12 March 1995, 9.

89. This lesson is frequently offered to orbital analysts. Several suc

offerings include the F-15-launched ASAT test, satellite breakups, an

space shuttle support operations. The United States’ single employment te

of its F-15-launched ASAT corroborated the scope of this problem. Orbit

analysts assigned to the Space Surveillance Center within a few years o

that test are fully aware of the protracted challenge of identifying an

tracking those hundreds of pieces of debris. Every time an on orbit satellit

breaks up, the challenge begins anew. For orbital analysts charged with th

responsibility of space shuttle safety, what was once an infrequent notifica

tion requirement has nearly become a full-time job. As the set of orbit

objects grows, so does the threat to spacecraft. The scope of this problem

significantly increases when considering the limitations of the Unite

States’s space surveillance network. The majority of the space surveillanc

sensors are only capable of tracking objects that have a radar cross sectio

of 10 centimeters or larger. The network daily tracks approximately seve

thousand such objects; however, the complete set of orbital objects is muc

larger than this. Using data derived from some of the network’s more sens

tive sensors, analysts estimate that there are between 60,000 and on

million pieces of orbital debris ranging in size from one to 10 centimeter

Debris objects smaller than one centimeter are estimated to number aroun

the billion mark. The combined efforts of spacecraft shielding and collisio

avoidance notifications provide some protection for the space shuttle. How 

ever, as the 20,000 craters discovered on the Long Duration Exposur

Facility after 69 months in orbit indicate, space is a hostile environmen

Knowingly taking actions that exacerbate the debris problem places bot

adversarial and friendly spacecraft at higher risk.

90. One could argue that destruction of a launch facility is necessar

when the adversary is preparing to launch an ASAT attack. This uniqu

circumstance would, of course, modify the assumption that one is dealin

with an in orbit system and subsequently modify the conclusions. Th

author, in offering the analysis is not attempting to include all possibl

scenarios or variables, but rather to disclose a reasoned approach to spac

control decision making.

91. Wilson, 431. There are currently only 20 spaceports: five in th

United States, three in the former Soviet Union, three in China, two i

Japan, and one each in France, Italy, Australia, French Guiana, Indi

Israel, and Brazil.

356
92. These statements should not be construed as a rationale for th

creation of a joint forces space component commander (JFSCC), but rathe

as an argument that the US’s space systems have evolved to the point a

which only space systems personnel should be granted authority and re 

sponsibility for leadership of space forces. The move to create the position o

a JFSCC transfers from Desert Storm the image of the joint forces ai

component commander who was responsible for coordinating all air opera

tions. The contemporary JFSCC concept is titillating to those who see

position and power, but there is no need for it. The global nature of spac

systems allows for their centralized command and control from within th

United States borders at the hands of USCINCSPACE. The majority o

military space assets continue to provide the data they were designed fo

namely, strategic intelligence and warning. The space systems that provid

tactical data within a theater of operations can be commanded by a fiel

grade officer reporting operationally to the theater CINC and administra

tively to the respective space command. If the United States’s military force

were to reorganize themselves in a manner similar to that chosen by CIS

that is, a military that includes space force and reconnaissance-strike or 

ganizational concepts, plus deployment of space weapons, perhaps it woul

be time to create such a position. Until the United States’s space force

have evolved to the point where they play an active role in force applicatio

a JFSCC is unnecessary.

Regarding the leadership responsibilities for space forces, only a perso

with space systems experience is fully qualified to lead space forces. Thi

follows the same reasoning that has been used since the inception of th

United States’s independent Air Force to justify that its leadership be re 

stricted to its small set of rated personnel. Air and space are uniquel

different media, just as are land, sea, and air. The contributions spac

systems give to warfare are similarly unique just as a much shorter perio

of time was sufficient to provide justification for the argument that onl

airmen lead air forces. Forty years of evolutionary history is sufficient t

justify that only space systems personnel lead space forces.

The United States’s four decades of military space exploitation has cre 

ated a large pool of space experts from which to groom and summon th

future’s space leaders for the future. Many of them possess the cognitiv

faculties as well as other critical leadership traits; what they may lack i

training in the art of warfare. This is a systemic problem that can b

overcome.

Injecting rated personnel into space leadership positions only serves t

offer auxiliary leadership opportunities to potential air leaders. Concur

rently, this hinders the development of future space strategists and leader

who do not gain the experience offered through those leadership position

This can also impact their selection for subsequent advanced education

and leadership opportunities. Due to their lack of experience with spac

systems, the rated personnel are placed in the unenviable situation of bein

responsible for decisions about an unfamiliar medium. In most cases, the

357
do not understand the nature of the US military

s role in space, the militar

space community or its unique subcommunities, or the educational an

technical requirements of its people. The level at which this problem exist

is obviated by Space Command’s 400 percent over manning level for rate

officers and its continued ability to hire rated personnel with no spac

experience to take critical leadership positions. The difficult situation tha

the Air Force’s leadership faces is that it needs the warrior mentality it ha

given to its top-rated officers yet needs those warriors to have space sys 

tems expertise. The solution to this dilemma is a concerted effort on th

part of Air Force leaders to, (1) immediately and significantly reduce th

number of rated officers in its space commands, (2) open more space sys 

tems positions at its warrior training schools, and (3) reserve its spac

leadership positions for those with space systems expertise. Failing this wi

perpetuate many of the problems that have stymied the maturation o

military space doctrine, policy, and strategy during the United States’s fir

40 years of military space activity.

Space achievements of the Soviet Union include the majority of first

they were the first to place a satellite in orbit; place men and women i

orbit; leave orbiting crafts to walk in space; send human artifacts to anothe

planet (Venus); flyby, impact, circle, and orbit a craft around the moon

conduct welding and smelting experiments in space; place an automate

lunar rover on the moon; place a space station in orbit; and land spacecraf

on Mars. Soviets hold the human endurance records and have the mo

expertise in scientific investigation. Currently the CIS maintain the onl

space station. In addition to these firsts, one of their most recent achieve 

ments was the formation of an independent space force. The United State

also has a few space firsts including the first test of an ASAT weapo

(1959), the first and only men to explore the Moon, and the first spacecraf

to land like a plane. The United States may not be as ready as the CIS t

form an independent space force, but there may come a day when it is th

correct decision. In preparation for that day, the Air Force should begin no

to wean itself from its reliance upon rated personnel for space leadership

Deferring this decision helps neither the military space mission nor it

potential space forces leaders. It will serve the United States well to groom

its space experts for space leadership rather than allowing those withou

space experience to lead US forces into the next century.

To learn more about CIS concepts, see Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Sovie

Image of Future War: Through the Prism of the Gulf War,” Hudson Institut

HI-4145, May 1991; Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Military and the New

‘Technological Operation’ in the Gulf,” Naval War College Review, Autum

1991, 16–43; Mary C. FitzGerald, “Russian Views on Electronic Signals an

Information Warfare,” American Intelligence Journal, Spring-Summer 1994

81–87; FitzGerald, “The Russian Military’s Strategy for ‘Sixth Generatio

Warfare,” Orbis, Summer 1994, 457–76; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Deser

Storm and Its Meaning: The View From Moscow,” RAND R-4164-AF (Sant

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992). To learn more about the United States’s fir

358
ASAT weapon, the Bold Orion, see Wilson, 163; and Paul B. Stares, 

Dej

vu: The ASAT Debate in Historical Context,” Arms Control Today, Decembe

1983, 2–3.

93. The primary sources for the SPOT technical data are Green, 46–49

and Wilson, 392–94. Even during the cold war, SPOT Image Corporatio

advertised its intelligence-gathering capabilities and military usefulnes

through its advertisement entitled “SPOT: The New Way to Win!” advertise

ment. See Defense Electronics, November 1988, 68.

94. This distance is approximately five hundred miles.

95. SPOT’s high resolution visible sensors use the push broom scannin

technique that utilizes a linear CCD as the active sensor. The camera optic

focus the full width of the ground swath onto the CCD array as the space 

craft travels along its orbital path. The CCD is sampled at a specific fre 

quency to provide sequential lines of image data. Beam splitters transfe

image data to the spectral CCD detectors to acquire multispectral imagery.

96. The twin imagers can operate independently of each other, in pan

chromatic or multispectral modes, and at near vertical or variable angle

Each imager can be steered to any of 91 orientations 0.6 degree apart. Thi

results in a capability for a plus or minus 27 degree off nadir view and th

ability to view a single area on seven successive passes. SPOT is thu

capable of stereo imaging and reattempts when observations are hampere

by cloud cover. The oblique viewing capability decreases the actual revis

time from 28 days to 3.7 or 2.4 days depending on where the targete

imaging area is located on the Earth. The ground swath width is 60 kilome

ters for the panchromatic imagery and 117 kilometers for the multispectr

imagery. A SPOT scene will range from a 60-kilometer square for a vertic

view angle to a 60-kilometer-by-80-kilometer maximum at a 27-degree view 

ing angle (the maximum viewing angle).

97. Decommutation is conversion of unidirectional current.

98. Wilson, 393. Level 1 is basic radiometric and geometric correction

Level 1A is essentially raw data and is useful for stereo plotting and basi

radiometric studies. Level 1B is full radiometric and limited geometric correc

tions and is the basic preprocessing level for photo interpretation and themati

analysis. Stereoscopic pairs data are also available at this level. Level 2 pro

vides rectifications according to a given cartographic projection. Level 2A corre

sponds to level 2 precision processing but can be implemented without use o

map ground control points. Level S scene verification is based on groun

control points, ensuring registration with another scene used as a reference t

within 0.5 pixels. Level IAP was introduced in 1990 and is optimized fo

photogrammetric applications using analytical stereo plotters.

99. Ibid. The proposed SDRS at Fucino, Italy, is still under negotiation.

100. de Selding and Lawler, 3.

359
Bibliography

Burrows, William. “Give Space Reconnaissance Systems 

B+.” Space News, 5–18 August 1991.

Cohen, Eliot. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary. Maxwel

AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 18 Marc

1993.

Collins, Capt Brian. “Soviet View of Storm.” Air Forc

Magazine, July 1992.

Covault, Craig. “USAF Urges Greater Use of SPOT Based on

Gulf War Experience.” Aviation Week & Space Technology

13 July 1992.

de Selding, Peter B. “Gulf War Spurs Call for European Sp

Satellites.” Space News, 11–17 March 1991.

de Selding, Peter B. and Andrew Lawler. “SPOT Halts Sales o

Gulf Area Imagery.” Space News, 13–19 August 1990.

Deudney, Daniel. “Unlocking Space.” Foreign Policy, Winte

1983–84.

Dougherty, Vice Adm William A. “Storm From Space.

Proceedings, August 1992.

Durham, Guy. “Satellites’ Keen Eyes Help Allies See Victory

Air Force Times, 3 June 1991.

Dutton, Lyn, et al. Military Space. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s

1990.

Ferster, Warren. “Prospect of Policy Review Rattles Imager

Executives.” Space News, 6–12 March 1995, 9.

FitzGerald, Mary C. “The Soviet Image of Future War

‘Through the Prism of the Gulf War.”’ Hudson Institut

HI-4145, May 1991.

———. “The Soviet Military and the New ‘Technological Opera

tion’ in the Gulf.” Naval War College Review, Autumn 1991

16–43.

———. “Russian Views on Electronic Signals and Information

Warfare.” American Intelligence Journal, Spring-Summe

1994, 81–87.

———. “The Russian Military’s Strategy for ‘Sixth Generation

Warfare.” Orbis, Summer 1994, 457–76.

Gifford, James M., and Vincent Kiernan. “Military Calls Spac

Superiority Essential.” Space News, 6–12 May 1991.

360
Gilmartin, Patricia A. 

Frances SPOT Satellite Images helped

US Air Force Rehearse Gulf War Missions.” Aviation Wee

& Space Technology, 1 July 1991.

Green, William B. Digital Image Processing: A Systems Approach

2d ed. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1989.

Hough, Harold. “Eyes in the Sky: Satellite Surveillance for th

Masses.” Soldier of Fortune, May 1991.

Hudson, Neff. “Air Force Researching Ground-Based Laser

Air Force Times, 3 May 1993.

Kiernan, Vincent. “War Boosts Anti-Satellite Weapons Pro

ponents.” Space News, 6–12 May 1991.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. “Desert Storm and Its Meaning: Th

View From Moscow.” RAND R-4164-AF. Santa Monica

Calif.: RAND, 1992.

Lowndes, Jay. “War’s Aftermath Tracked.” Space News, 22–2

April 1991.

Matthews, William. “The Digital Warrior.” Air Force Times, 

January 1995.

Military Newswire, 28 April 1995.

O’Sullivan, Kate. The L-Bomb. London: 1995.

Pelton, Joseph N. Future View: Communications Technolog

and Society in the 21st Century. Boulder, Colo: 1992.

Powell, Gen Colin L. Report on the Roles, Missions, an

Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States

Washington, D.C.: CJCS, February 1993.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. America’s Secret Eyes in Space. New

York: Harper & Row, 1990.

———. “Implications for Nations Without Space-Based Intelli

gence Collection Capabilities.” In Commercial Observation

Satellites and International Security. Edited by Michae

Krepon, et al. New York: 1990.

Saunders, Renee. “War in Iraq Enhances Value of Commercia

Remote Sensing.” Space News, 21 January–3 Februar

1991.

SPOT Image Corporation. The Catalogue of SPOT Products an

Services. 1989.

———. “SPOT: The New Way to Win!” Advertisement. Defens

Electronics, November 1988, 68.

361
Stares, Paul B. 

Deja vu: The ASAT Debate in Historica

Context.” Arms Control Today, December 1983, 2–3.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Survival at th

Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown

1993.

United States Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospac

Doctrine of the United States Air Force. March 1992.

———. The Space Tactics Bulletin. Falcon AFB, Colo.: Spac

Warfare Center.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arm

Control and Disarmament Agreements. Washington, D.C

Government Printing Office, 1984.

United States Space Command. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Tech

niques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14, Space Operations, 1

April 1992.

Wickham, Gen John A., Jr., USA, Retired. “The Intelligenc

Role in Desert Storm.” Signal, April 1991.

Williams, Sylvia Maureen. “International Law and the Militar

Uses of Outer Space.” International Relations, May 1989.

Wilson, Andrew. Jane’s Space Directory 1994–1995. Alexandria

Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1994.

Wolf, Capt James R. “Implications of Space-Based Observation

Military Review, April 1994.

362
PART IV

High-Ground Perspectives
Chapter 7

National Security Implications of

Inexpensive Space Access

William W. Bruner III

 The nation which controls space can control the Earth.

—John F. Kennedy

24 October 1960

There has been a great deal of discussion in the spac

policy community about the technical challenges of gainin

economical and routine access to space. Despite this, ther

has been little written about the opportunities which exist fo

the development of new missions for US military space forces

Neither has there been much discussion of the security chal

lenges that any proliferation of access to space may present t

the United States and to the established international order

Even the most forward-looking space advocates in the Depart

ment of Defense (DOD) assume that access to space will con 

tinue to be prohibitively expensive and difficult for the foresee

able future, that a US decision not to take advantage of th

military potential of space is deterministic for the rest of th

world, and that “navigation, communications, and surveil

lance activities will likely remain the limits of space-based

capabilities” for all countries. 1

Part of this failure to consider the possibilities of a worl

radically changed by inexpensive access to space is a reaction t

the “expectations gap” set up by the gulf between mankind’

collective dreams about its future in space and the realities of it

achievements so far. The collective public and political mind ha

been shaped by powerful and convincing fictional images o

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, PhD

Reader: Dr Karl Mueller, PhD

365
space activities that we are not likely to see for a hundred

years. Real world, but slow moving and silent, pictures o

earth from space taken from small spacecraft with cramped

cabins and short mission duration suffer greatly in compari

son to images of robust and operable spacecraft spanning th

galaxy at faster than light speeds. A century after the Russia

Konstantin Tsiolkovsky conceptually solved most of the prob

lems involved in human space flight, over a third of a centur

since the Soviet sputnik ushered in the space age, and over 

quarter century since the United States left humanity’s firs

footsteps on another celestial body, many thoughtful an

technically literate people are conditioned by historical experi

ence to think of access to space as an expensive enterpris

that is technically difficult, dangerous, and the exclusive prov

ince of huge government and corporate bureaucracies.2

This stands in stark contrast with the almost giddy opti

mism that characterized thinking about humanity’s future in

space at the beginning of the so-called space age. In a 195

issue of Air University Quarterly Review , for example, a servin

Air Force officer submitted an article from Command and Staf

College that proposed using lunar craters as ballistic missil

silos. 3 Even without the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, it is hard

to imagine anyone in today’s US Air Force making a simila

proposal. 4 This change in outlook, conditioned in part by th

“expectations gap” and by changes in the fiscal and politica

landscape, has shaped thinking on this subject over the pas

35 years.

As a result of these diminished expectations, as well a

competition with other pressing political and economic issue

whose solutions don’t seem related to space, the America

body politic has concluded that routine civil, commercial, an

military access to space is not a national priority; not becaus

it is not technically possible, rather, because the experience o

the past 38 years argues against it. This is true even at th

end of a century of unprecedented technological change. Thi

lack of practical application for access to space and the rela 

tively small size of today’s commercial space industry combin

to create uncertainty about where the United States should b

headed in space, and because of the bureaucratic and techni

366
cal complexity of traditional space operations, makes it diffi 

cult to set a single long-range direction for the nation’s effort

in space. In fact, the uncertainty with which the United State

views the new medium is reflected in the fact that there was 

national commission chartered to determine what should b

done in space every year between the Challenger accident in

1986 and 1993. (This streak is still unbroken, the Nationa

Aeronautics and Space Administration’s [NASA] Access t

Space Study was again released in 1994 and 1995.)5

Political, economic, and technological forces may be con 

verging at this point in history, however, to provide the United

States with a way to realistically pursue its national purpose

in space. With respect to political forces, there seems to be 

growing awareness in the US government that something ha

to be done to lower the cost of space access. Most of th

national reports on space over the past decade either sa

something like “a coherent national effort to improve launc

capabilities is desperately needed,” or, “above all, it is impera 

tive that the United States maintain a continuous capability t

put both humans and cargo in orbit.”6

Part of the reason for this new awareness is the high operat

ing costs of the current space launch fleet. As overall spac

budgets fall, operating costs for old-technology space launch 

ers grow as a percentage of total costs. In fact, space shuttl

operations presently consume about one-third of the tota

NASA budget.7 This is one of the economic forces that is pro 

viding incentives to lower the barriers to space access. Th

other is the growing commercial space business ($5 billion in

1992 sales and growing at a double digit annual rate) and th

possibility that new technology will make space access fo

profit-making enterprises economical for the first time. 8

Underpinning these new political and fiscal realities is th

maturation of technologies that, together, can solve some o

the engineering problems that have traditionally forced space

faring nations to throw away the largest part of their spac

vehicles. These new technologies: Lightweight materials from

the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) and National Launc

System (NLS) programs, advanced propulsion from the shuttl

program and from Russia (in fact, the NASA Access to Spac

367
Study bases the propulsion system for its reference reusabl

launch vehicle on the Russian tripropellant RD-704 engine) a

well as new computing techniques from the commercial secto

have combined to offer the potential for an order of magnitud

reduction in the cost of getting into orbit. 9

If indeed this important part of President John F. Kennedy’s

New Frontier becomes more accessible, however, there will no

only be new opportunities for the United States; there will als

be new challenges and obligations that have not bee

thoughtfully considered. These issues are considered in th

pages that follow.

Forces Reducing the Cost of Space Access

An examination of recent technical literature on spac

launch, foreign and domestic writings on space policy, and th

recent activities of the US government seem to indicate that 

confluence of bureaucratic, political, and technological force

may be about to lower the barriers to space access; not jus

for the United States, but for other nations as well. This ex 

panded space access could have implications for US militar

doctrine, and more importantly, for US national security.

Since the beginning of the space age with the launch o

sputnik in 1957, people who have written and thought abou

using space for national security purposes have proposed

crewed space vessels which did not cost significant fraction

of the gross national product (GNP), nor did they require a

advanced education in computing and astrophysics to oper 

ate. Significantly, official Air Force publications of the lat

1950s are full of speculation about the implications of suc

ideas. They proposed using such manned space vehicles fo

bombing terrestrial targets (a proposal from a general office

on the Air Staff) or for establishing intercontinental ballisti

missile (ICBM) bases on the moon. 1 0 Even Gen Henry “Hap

Arnold, in his prespace age “Report to the Secretary of War” a

the end of World War II predicts manned “space ships” as th

weapons with which war would be waged “within the foresee

able future.”1 1 There is not a lot of this sort of thinking abou

space in today’s military writing. In fact, there is no mention

368
of manned military space flight in joint space doctrine, an

the astronaut who returns to Space Command to write doc 

trine informed by experience in the medium is the exception

rather than the rule.1 2

Because of gradually declining faith in the United States’s

ability to repeatedly and affordably gain access to space, cur

rent thinking has become limited to automated systems wit

throwaway ballistic-missile-derived launch vehicles that do lit 

tle more than support traditional terrestrial operations. 1 3 Thi

declining faith in the potential of space power in warfare i

partially traceable to perceived treaty and national policy lim

tations and partially to the expectations gap described earlier

but it is more fundamentally related to the immaturity o

existing technology. 1 4 It simply has not been physically possi

ble to conduct affordable routine operations in the Mach 1

(suborbital) to Mach 25 (orbital) regime with existing propu

sion, materials, or flight control technologies. In addition, th

early promise of the space shuttle (dashed with high spac

shuttle maintenance and launch costs and the loss of Cha

lenger), the realization that air-breathing space planes (suc

as the late NASP program) are not affordable or technicall

unachievable in the near term, and large expendable launc

costs that stretch far into the future, have combined to mak

the institutions charged with the responsibility of maintainin

US access to space averse to changing the status quo an

resistant to proposals that change this calculus because ear 

lier proposals for change have come to naught.1 5 Doubtin

that change is possible, they are loathe to accept new ideas o

solutions, even if the technologies required to create Genera

Arnold’s ideal “space ship” were to become available. In fac

strong institutional forces have grown up around the estab

lished methods of doing business, even if they are demonstra 

bly more expensive in the long run and less operable in th

short run. Despite this institutional inertia, however, a con 

junction of political, economic, and technological forces in th

last few years of the twentieth century may finally bring dow

the cost and technical sophistication required to get int

space, turning this period into General Arnold’s “foreseeabl

future.”

369
Confluence of Political Forces

Now, a quarter century after the first human beings set foo

on the moon, there is an understanding at the highest level

of the US government that without repeatable and affordabl

access to space, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to accom 

plish national purposes in and from space. This under 

standing is driven by the poor cost performance of curren

space access methods (this includes low launch rates, high

costs, and lack of reliability) and by the resulting lack o

hands-on experience with space which, along with the expec

tations gap discussed earlier, cripples thinking about wha

can be done in space.

There are as many proposed solutions to the space acces

problem as there are players in the space policy debate. Nin

national-level studies on the issue in eight years, plus innu

merable internal studies in agencies across the governmen

each with its own solution, are indicative of the lack of 

coherent vision for what is possible or desirable to do in space

This incoherence is due in part to the immaturity of spac

technology, and due in part to the fact that few “experts” hav

actually been in space (because access is still restricted to th

select few by the expense of getting there). It has been due in

largest part, however, to the struggle for organizational sur

vival in a world of limited resources.

In the past two years, Congress has attempted to brea

through the roadblock of diminished expectations and lack o

policy direction. There now seems to be congressional under 

standing that lack of assured access to space prevents th

United States from pursuing its national purposes there, bu

at the same time, Congress has shown itself to be dissatisfied

with the solutions proposed by the various agencies of th

Executive Branch. 1 6 Congressional dissatisfaction with Execu 

tive Branch space policies has traditionally caused it to do tw

things: first, to cancel every new expendable launch vehicl

(ELV) proposed by NASA and the DOD in recent years (th

Advanced Launch System [ALS], NLS, and Spacelifter), an

second, to direct a series of studies to address the problem.1 

Immediately after the cancellation of Spacelifter and the effec

tive cancellation of NASP, Congress directed NASA and th

370
DOD to study space access in the FY93 NASA Appropriation

Act and in the FY94 Defense Authorization Act.1 8 These stud

ies, released within three months of each other in early 1994

used the same technology base and, in some cases, the sam

study participants; but came up with diametrically opposed

conclusions about the best way to solve the nation’s spac

access problem (perhaps for some of the bureaucratic an

organizational reasons outlined above).

The Case for and against Standing Down. With large an

continuing requirements for access to space, both the DOD

and NASA have little choice but to continue their costly pre

sent launch operations as they try to solve this problem. Th

US government mission model for the next 15 years average

about 30 launches per year, while industry will account fo

roughly 15 more. 1 9 These continuing requirements include ob

ligations to our International Space Station (ISS) partners fo

space station assembly missions, DOD launches of nationa

security payloads, and the replacement of aging communica 

tion and sensor satellites to address shortfalls highlighted in

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although th

DOD could use foreign launch services to get its “must carry

payloads into orbit, former US representative Dave McCurd

and his coauthors call such a possibility “truly disturbing” in

an article for Strategic Review in 1994. Dependence on foreign

launch vehicles in time of war or crisis could turn out to b

even more costly than the status quo. The private sector, on

the other hand, does not mind going offshore for launch serv

ices, but with an already negative balance of payments, thi

poses questions of US economic competitiveness that are als

ultimately questions of national security. As recently as 1979

the United States launched 100 percent of worldwide nongov

ernment satellites. Today, that figure is closer to 40 percent.2 

This situation has deteriorated to the point that Charles Bigo

the chairman of the European launch consortium Ari

anespace, no longer considers the United States to be a majo

competitor in the $1 billion commercial launch business be

cause “to develop a really new transportation system you need

probably between six and ten years [and] I don’t believe tha

America will do it.”2 1

371
With foreign officials dismissing the United States as unabl

to compete, with a fiscal vise closing on both NASA’s an

DOD’s launch budgets, and with a continuing national need

for sovereign space access, there seems to be a consensu

growing in Washington and elsewhere that something has t

be done about fixing space launch.2 2 The space policy commu

nity also recognizes that the United States must simultane

ously fly the missions that are necessary to the fulfillment o

national policy goals. This is the context within which th

following discussion takes place.

The Case for and against the Status Quo. There is alway

the option of doing nothing to build on the technology devel

oped for the programs that have already been canceled. I

would save on the cost of a new space launch vehicle in a tim

of declining budgets and would decrease the technical risk o

developing new spacelift technology when the time finall

comes to field a new launch vehicle. However, there are thre

arguments against this approach.

The first is that the US’s foreign competitors are takin

more and more of the launch market away. As the Vice Presi

dent’s Space Advisory Board on the Future of the US Spac

Launch Capability Task Group (the “Aldridge Commission”

report put it,

A decision by the Administration or the Congress not to fund a new,

reliable, low-cost operational space launch capability is a de facto

policy decision to forgo US competition in the international space

launch marketplace, a mandate that the US government will continue

to pay higher prices than necessary to meet future government launch

requirements, and acceptance of less reliability, less safety, and higher

risks for space flight than our technology is capable of providing.2 3

The second argument against the status-quo approach i

that the United States has essentially pursued this policy b

default after the series of program cancellations discussed

earlier. This policy has gotten the nation no closer to solvin

the problem, but has cost several billion dollars ($2.4 billion

for NASP and $600 million for advanced logistics system [ALS

and NLS).2 4 If the nation does nothing with the technolog

from these programs, then this money will have been spent fo

naught. The third reason, as outlined above, is that the cost o

space launch is a large part of both NASA’s and DOD’s con 

372
tinuing costs. Although the shuttle program is under continu

ing pressure to cut operating costs, its share of the NAS

budget increases as the overall NASA budget decreases. Th

same can be said for the DOD space budget. As overall budg

ets decline and launch costs do not, there are not enough

resources left over for either organization to carry out its othe

tasks. This is where much of the political incentive to “d

something about space launch” comes from. Both the DOD

Space Lift Modernization Plan (SLMP) and the NASA Access t

Space Study considered the option of remaining with th

status quo. Both concluded that the continuing high cost o

their present space launch operations were not supportable

In addition, both concluded that waiting would not, in th

end, save money. As the NASA Access to Space Study states

“delaying the decision of which space architecture to select b

four or five years but not funding a focused technology phas

will achieve nothing, since the lack of a focused technolog

program during that period will not reduce the risks of devel

oping an advanced technology vehicle. Therefore, the choice

available in four to five years would be exactly the same a

those we face today.”25 NASA and the DOD both seem to agre

that there is nothing to be gained by waiting.

The DOD Space Lift Modernization Plan: the Case fo

and against Expendables. The DOD study, the SLMP, con 

cluded that pursuing new reusable launch vehicle technolog

was “controversial” due in part to the risk.2 6 DOD recom 

mended, therefore, that it remain committed to the evolution 

ary development of its present stable of aged Atlas, Delta, an

Titan launchers, while investing in incremental technology im 

provements. The SLMP itself admits that this would delive

little or no per launch or per pound to orbit cost savings.2 7

Despite the DOD’s enthusiasm for this new evolved expend

able launch vehicle (EELV), however, there is no new money in

the president’s budget for either new or evolved expendables

Congress has appropriated $40 million in the FY95 Defens

Appropriations Bill for an evolved expendable, but that is fa

from the $2 billion estimated total program cost, so the Ai

Force plans to take $400 million out of its own budget ove

the FYDP to fund it. 2 8 As in the cases of ALS, NLS, an

373
Spacelifter before it, EELV is a conservative approach based

on what is essentially 1950s ballistic missile technology, deliv 

ering small savings in per launch costs. It is, in fact, intended

to be even more technologically conservative than earlier ex 

pendable programs to cap the development cost at $2 billion.2 

Even with such a cap, however, these development costs ar

still of the same order of magnitude as those for a majo

weapon system. With this multibillion dollar developmen

cost, the EELV will narrow , not reduce, the range of medium

lift costs from $35–$90 million to a projected $50–$80 mil

lion.3 0 Although standardization of the launch fleet to a singl

vehicle/contractor combination from the separate and costl

Atlas, Delta, and Titan programs will bring some savings, it i

impossible to get away from the fact that “staged expendable

means, in effect, building two vehicles every time you fly

mating them meticulously, and sinking both craft in the ocea

when the mission is complete. As W. Paul Blase says in th

March 1993 edition of Spaceflight magazine,

All current rocket launchers are derived from 1960s era ICBM designs,

and man-rating procedures are merely ways of producing man-rated

ammunition. Rocket designers are conservative by their nature and

the high cost of both the vehicles and their payloads causes them to

refine the same basic concepts continuously to finer and finer degrees,

taking few risks with radically new ways of doing things. This has

resulted in a situation very much like trying to pull a semi-trailer with

a racecar. Like a racecar, ICBM-based rockets are designed to get

maximum performance from minimum equipment. Technology is

pushed to the very brink to wring out that last ounce of thrust.

However, it is an engineering truism that when one gets near the

theoretical limits of a system, every additional 10 percent increase in

performance doubles the systems cost and halves its reliability. 31

The NASA Access to Space Study—the Case for and agains 

Reus ables. The civilians at NASA, using essentially the sam

data, came to a different conclusion. They believe that neithe

ELVs nor the shuttle are suitable launch vehicles for th

twenty-first century. They believe that the time has come fo

the nation to move to the next technological level. Accordingly

NASA’s Access to Space Study recommended that the United

States “adopt the development of an advanced technology

fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit rocket vehicle as an Agenc

goal.”3 2 In addition, NASA concluded, “leapfrogging” the Unite

374
States into a next-generation launch capability would plac

the nation in an extremely advantageous position with respec

to international competition. 3 3

As a result of the separate positions taken by the agencie

primarily responsible for the nation’s access to space, the Ex 

ecutive Branch has decided not to focus on a single strateg

for space access in the twenty-first century. Instead, the new

national space policy accepts the NASA position on sprintin

ahead to reusable launch vehicle technology while also main 

taining a core expendable capability in the interim (managed

by the more risk-averse DOD). 3 4 The language of the new

NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Transporta 

tion Policy makes this clear. Administration policy, NASA says

“calls for a balanced two-track effort; first, to ensure contin 

ued access to space by supporting and improving our existin

space launch capabilities, consisting of the Space Shuttle an

current ELVs; second, to pursue the goal of reliable and af

fordable access to space through focused investments in, an

orderly decisions on, technology development and demonstra 

tion for next-generation reusable transportation systems.”3 5

This two-track approach, while it satisfies the competin

bureaucracies of NASA and the DOD, and appears to manag

risk prudently, does not seem to be fiscally or politically realis 

tic. As outlined above, every expendable launch vehicle tha

DOD and NASA have proposed in recent years has been term

nated by Congress. 3 6 These cancellations had less to do wit

the merits of the respective programs than with the limited

launch savings over existing launch vehicles and high pro 

gram costs (relative to those same limited savings) that ar

characteristic of expendables.3 7 With this in mind, a spac

policy that calls for two new program starts, one of which i

an expendable much like those canceled in the recent pas

has little likelihood of continued funding from Congress. I

seems more prudent, and politically realistic, for the Executiv

Branch to decide early which track it wishes to pursue, an

then to focus its efforts there.

What explains the significant difference between the tw

recommendations? It is important to answer this question be

cause the political viability of the president’s two-track ap

375
proach depends on the ability of NASA and DOD to convinc

Congress of the soundness of the reasons underlying thei

respective recommendations over the lifetimes of the two pro 

grams. In an era of limited resources, the recommendation

that fails to stand up to the scrutiny of lawmakers will no

survive, no matter how strongly its bureaucratic constituenc

believes in its merits. The rest of this section will attempt t

determine the reasoning underlying the two recommenda 

tions, and to assess their respective political viability in th

Washington of the late 1990s.

The Political Viability of the RLV and ELF . The firs

question in determining the viability of the respective ap

proaches is whether technology advanced so far between th

two reports that reusable launch vehicle development sud

denly became more possible and less “controversial.” This i

not likely. In fact, the NASA report was released first and DOD

used the NASA study for purposes of comparison. 3 8 The NASA

report’s assessment of the technology’s potential to solve th

nation’s launch problem seems, therefore, to have been drive

by some other factor. If the level of technology is acknow 

ledged by both reports as being within striking distance of a

operational reusable vehicle, then, to observers in Congress

NASA’s choice would appear bold and the DOD’s choice su

fers by comparison. It would be difficult for DOD to make th

“immature and risky” technology argument and maintain th

funding level for the old technology EELV when NASA’s flyin

advanced technology demonstrators are competing for th

same dollars. (This calculus would change, of course, if eithe

program ran into major technical trouble.)

The second question is whether the two conclusions wer

driven by differences in the risk tolerances of the two institu 

tions. Perhaps so. The DOD argues, correctly, that the stake

are higher in the national security arena, and that the nation

can ill afford another launch hiatus caused by exclusive reli

ance on high-risk technology (as it suffered after the Cha

lenger explosion). NASA argues, also correctly, that risk ha

been reduced by recent advances in lightweight materials

thermal protection, high speed computing, the attendant fligh

control and systems integration software, and other technolo 

376
gies. Even though these advances do not reduce the risk of th

reusable launch vehicle to zero, NASA, it seems, is willing t

take some programmatic risk to protect US competitiveness in

the international launch vehicle technology race. Congress i

likely to be more sensitive to this concern than to DOD’s

national security concerns in the wake of the cold war.

Along the same lines, risk tolerance is one thing, but did th

two institutions have differing perceptions of the same techn

cal and fiscal risks? On the subject of the same prospectiv

(RLV) technology that NASA considered, the DOD study says

“A fully reusable, single stage to orbit space plane is an excit 

ing concept to all the space sectors and industry alike. I

offers benefits of responsiveness, reliability, operability, an

very low cost per flight which are universally agreed to b

desirable. However, the practicality of achieving those benefit

is controversial.”3 9 NASA, on the other hand, concluded tha

“single-stage-to-orbit vehicles appear to be feasible because o

reduced sensitivity to engine performance and weight growt

resulting from use of near-term advanced technologies (e.g

tripropellant main propulsion, Al-Li [Aluminum-Lithium] an

graphite-composite cryogenic tanks, graphite-composite pri

mary structure, etc.). An incremental approach has been laid

out to reduce both technical and programmatic risk.”40 Again

with the same information, NASA reaches the more forward

looking conclusion.

NASA may be looking further forward, but did this cause i

to manipulate the numbers so that the bold RLV solution wa

made to look unrealistically inexpensive? The similarity wit

the DOD figures makes this doubtful. DOD estimated the cos

for a reusable launch vehicle program (technology and engi

neering development) at between $6.6 and $20.9 billion, whil

NASA estimated the same costs at $17.6 billion.4 1 Though th

upper end of the DOD range is higher, there does not seem t

be a significant enough difference in the estimates alone t

cause the wide discrepancy between the two recommenda 

tions. If DOD was concerned that it did not have enough

money to go it alone (which, given the office of Secretary o

Defense (OSD) Bottom-up Review funding levels that were th

SLMP’s starting point, seems a reasonable assumption), i

377
could have proposed a joint national launch strategy wit

NASA (as with Spacelifter and NASP), unless of course ther

were unstated reasons for not doing so.4 2 These unstated rea 

sons might include the perception that because cooperation

with NASA on ALS, NLS, Spacelifter, and NASP was difficul

and each program ended badly, a DOD-only program migh

have a better chance of success (although the DOD has man

aged to get quite a few programs canceled on its own). Unfor

tunately for the DOD, Congress has a long record of preferrin

cooperative programs with joint program offices over compet

ing and redundant programs.4 3 Unpleasant experiences wit

previously canceled programs are not a politically palatabl

justification for the DOD going it alone.

Was there a stronger bureaucratic constituency for expend

ables than for reusables in the DOD? The answer to this ques 

tion may lie in the strong institutional tie between the expend

able ballistic missile acquisition community at the Air Force’

Space and Missile Center in Los Angeles and the Air Force Spac

Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Space and Missil

Center (formerly the Ballistic Missile Office) managed all Ai

Force ballistic missile acquisition during the cold war. It als

managed NLS and is the home of the program office for EELV

Space Command, which was recently assigned responsibility fo

the peacetime organization, training, and equipage of the ICBM

force, has launched the majority of the payloads it now control

on expendables (and the rest on the partially expendable spac

shuttle), and now is staffed with officers who spent years prepar

ing to carry out the strategic missile mission with expendabl

rockets. If there is an institutional tie between flying officers an

the program offices at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB

where airplanes are acquired, then there may be a similar ti

between the missile officers at Space Command and the Spac

and Missile Center at Los Angeles, California.

There was a small constituency for RLVs inside DOD wh

helped in the preparation of the SLMP, but it was confined t

the narrow group within Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza 

tion (SDIO) who had developed the DC-X subscale RLV dem

onstrators.4 4 If there were a single difference between the tw

studies, this may be the most significant. In contrast with th

378
situation within DOD, there was a strong constituency fo

RLVs within NASA. In fact, a group of engineers at NAS

around 1991 began publishing a number of papers on th

feasibility of rocket-powered-single-stage-to-orbit vehicles. 4 5

This project is not intended as a study in bureaucratic deci

sion making, it is simply intended to serve as a tool for under 

standing how bureaucratic forces inside NASA and DOD drov

the president to a “two-track” policy, when there were stron

political trends favoring one “track” over the other. In fact, 

senior administration official has noted strong congressiona

interest in the RLV. 4 6 Congress was also willing to back thi

preference up by voting more money for the RLV subscal

demonstrator in the FY95 Defense Appropriations Bill than fo

initial work on the EELV. 4 7 The EELV’s chances for surviva

given the unfortunate precedent of ALS, NLS, and Spacelifte

would not be very good in the best of circumstances, but give

the real or perceived competition between an old-technolog

ELV and a flying RLV advanced technology demonstrator fou

years hence, Congress is even more likely to cancel the EELV

NASA has scheduled the advanced technology demonstrato

RLV to fly no later than July 1999 (the 30th anniversary of th

first moon landing, a coincidence to be sure). 4 8 DOD’s EELV

on the other hand, is projected to fly for the first time in

2000. 4 9 In today’s resource-constrained environment, an ex 

pendable launch system on the drawing board will find it ver

difficult to compete for dollars with a flying prototype RLV. Th

EELV’s first flight may very well be a year late and a couple o

billion dollars short. As Luis Zea says in the December 199

issue of Final Frontier, “Recycling ideas like the Nationa

Launch System and the more recently proposed Spacelifte

family of expendable boosters appears to be politically dead.”5 

EELV program managers are working hard to prove him

wrong, but the weight of history is against them.

Convergence of Economic Forces

Even if RLVs, arguably the precursors of Hap Arnold’s spac

ships, are more politically viable and fiscally realistic tha

EELVs, they still may not be affordable enough to avoid can

cellation themselves. If Congress won’t vote $2 billion for a

379
EELV, why should it vote $20.6 billion, $17.6 billion, $6.

billion, or even the $5.5 to $6.5 billion figure quoted by forme

astronaut Pete Conrad for a reusable launch vehicle? 5 1 Per 

haps it would be cheaper to stay with current ELVs or th

shuttle. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, the cost of operat

ing today’s launch fleet will not permit that. The DOD’s cur

rent expendable fleet costs $2.5 billion a year (about 20 per 

cent of the DOD space budget), while NASA launches abou

eight shuttles a year for $4.3 billion (approximately 31 percen

of NASA’s budget). This is the source of urgency behind new

launch vehicle development. While EELV makes a margina

improvement in per mission and operations and suppor

costs, the RLV promises to bring launch costs down by 

factor of five to 50 (to between $1 and $10 million per flight). 5 

The cost savings over the life cycle of the single stage to orbi

(SSTO) reusable “space ship” would be significant. The DOD

estimates the annual operational cost of a fleet of four suc

vehicles at $0.5 to $1.5 billion (as opposed to the $6 billion

plus for today’s expendables and the shuttle). 5 3 In othe

words, even if the DOD is right about the high up-front invest

ment required, the nation would save at least $4.5 billion pe

year. NASA conservatively estimates that payback on the in 

itial investment will occur approximately nine years from RLV

initial operating capability. 5 4 If this is accurate, it become

difficult to make an economic case for remaining with th

status quo. The rest of this section tries to determine whethe

there is a positive economic case for reducing the cost o

access to space (in addition to the weaker negative motivation

of dissatisfaction with the status quo). The analysis will als

attempt to deal with some of the fiscal issues raised by RLV

opponents.

The Economic Case for and against RLV. Even peopl

who are skeptical about rocket-powered SSTO understan

that the only reason to make the large up-front investment in

RLVs is the savings in life-cycle costs. Some opponents of th

technology believe that the projected savings in life-cycle cost

are too good to be true. There have to be, they believe, som

“hidden costs” to SSTO such as; upper stages required t

reach geostationary orbit, the inability to carry heavy payload

380
that will force the DOD to retain the heavy Titan IV expend

able for national security payloads, or the expense of buildin

a huge liquid hydrogen storage infrastructure. 5 5 These criti

cisms, however, back a conception of new ways of doing busi

ness in a world where spacecraft have some of the operabilit

of aircraft. (As will be discussed shortly, this conceptual lim

tation is even more dangerous in the national security area.)

Analysis of these three charges based on an understandin

of how air transport works may be useful in determinin

whether there are legitimate economic reasons not to proceed

with SSTO.5 6 The parallel between air transport and reusabl

space transport operations may not be complete, but it i

probably closer than the ballistic missile model in use today.

Charge I. Opponents claim that SSTO RLVs could not carr

the significant number of DOD, NASA, and commercial pay

loads bound for geostationary orbit (22,300 miles equatoria

orbit) since the NASA SSTO reference configuration is de

signed to carry a 25,000 pound payload to the planned inter 

national space station orbit at just 220 nautical miles altitude

The critics claim that the SSTO would have to carry an ex 

pendable upper stage (adding $16 million to its per launc

costs for a total around $26 million, wiping out enough o

SSTO’s per launch cost advantage, making it uneconomical)

or that the government would have to fund a multibillion

dollar reusable upper stage to get the per launch costs dow

to $14–$16 million (with Congress in no mood to fund addi

tional program starts.)5 7 Further analysis, however, reveals a

answer that is entirely different for three reasons not consid 

ered by the critics.

1. On-Orbit Refueling. During the Persian Gulf War, whe

planners chose targets in Baghdad for aircraft stationed in

southern Arabia, a refueling tanker rendezvous was scheduled

as a matter of routine. This is what reusable launch vehicle

will enable the United States to do in space. Work has alread

been done on cryogenic fuel transfer in a microgravity vacuum

environment, and even the US Air Force has considered in 

creasing the operational availability of space assets by refuel

ing them with ELVs. 5 8 (Although these ideas never flew be

cause the high cost and long delays of ELV launches mad

381
such operations impractical, RLVs could bring them back t

life because of their lower cost and greater responsiveness.)

Developing and using these techniques for on-orbit refuel

ing, reusable launch vehicles can themselves become “reus

able upper stages” at far less cost than a new program star

The cost for the “tanker” would not be analogous to that o

specialized air-breathing tankers for aircraft refueling in th

illustration above, and would not require the development of 

new vehicle. Instead, it would mean changing out a standard

RLV payload for fuel and refueling connections. Developin

these new techniques will be difficult, similar to the work

involved in making aerial refueling a routine and safe opera 

tion. Although ground-based experiments using possibl

methods of refueling in a microgravity vacuum environmen

have been conducted, no such experiments have been con 

ducted in space. There are the obvious problems of gaseou

venting in vacuum, frozen connections, and unknown propel

lant flow characteristics in microgravity. Mission needs wil

drive the development of this capability, not engineering curi

osity. If the RLV is as operable as NASA believes it will b

(seven-day turnaround with a 0.95 probability of on-tim

launches), then there will be a strong incentive for civil, com 

mercial, and military operators to exploit the potential offered

by that operability. 5 9 Refueling in space is one way to do this

allowing operators to accomplish missions that are not other 

wise possible without developing entirely new vehicles.

Space ship operators would, however, have to ask themselve

several essential questions before they proceeded with any refu 

eling modification. Can we do without the ability to get heav

payloads to geostationary orbit (GEO)? Probably not, since th

majority of the $5 billion space industry is presently in medium

weight geostationary communications satellites.6 0 Can we affor

to operate ELVs or partial reusables far into the future? Both th

NASA and DOD space access studies say no. Can we afford th

billions of dollars that it will take to develop a new orbital trans

fer vehicle? 61 Probably not, and especially if operators have jus

spent billions of dollars to buy an RLV. Is there a possibility o

extending the range of the RLV to capture medium-weight geo

synchronous satellites without the expense of a new program

382
start? There may be, given the encouraging preliminary result

of the refueling studies cited above. If so, then a relatively smal

investment in designing a new payload for an existing RLV

seems eminently more sensible than developing an entirely new

vehicle for a single purpose. Given these answers, it seems likel

that the refueling option will be attractive to RLV operators afte

their ability to get to low Earth orbit (LEO) routinely has been

proven. Again, this modification is not trivial, but engineerin

studies suggest that it is well within the realm of possibility.

2. Lower Insurance Costs. The ELV is a lot like an artiller

shell. Once launched it cannot be recalled. That is why, a

every US ELV launch, there is an official at a console monitor

ing the status of the mission and the ascent trajectory. If th

mission deviates a given amount from predetermined parame

ters, the range safety officer detonates the vehicle’s destruc

package (if the vehicle hasn’t already destroyed itself). RLV

on the other hand, are intended to land safely after ever

mission and have built-in mission abort capabilities. The fac

that there is no destruct package on the first flying subscal

RLV model is a matter of some importance to its program

managers.6 2 If an engine fails after takeoff, the vehicle exe 

cutes an emergency landing as the subscale RLV did after a

explosion during a test flight in June 1994.6 3

Beyond the obvious material savings, this has enormou

insurance implications. At present, payload insurance rate

for expendable rockets are a significant part of launch cost

for commercial concerns. With insurance rates around 18 per 

cent of the total of satellite cost plus launch cost, any reduc

tion in risk could make for significant savings. 6 4 Assuming 

still relatively new reusable launch vehicle that has demon 

strated its intact abort capability at least once, we migh

guess that satellite insurance companies would give commer 

cial space ship operators an insurance discount, perhap

charging 10 percent of launch value rather than 18 percent.6 

For a $75 million medium-weight geostationary communica 

tions satellite on a $60 million expendable mission with th

same payload capacity as an RLV to LEO, it turns out to b

over $66 million in savings for a single mission which mor

than covers the cost of up to five RLV “tanker” missions in 

383
sured for their launch costs at a 10 percent rate. 6 6 In fact, 

$60 million expendable mission launching a $75 million com 

mercial communications satellite to geostationary orbit wit

$25 million in insurance will cost more than six $10 million

reusable missions with one payload carrier and five refuelin

missions. There would be a total of $13.5 million in insuranc

costs at 10 percent of satellite plus launch cost for the RLV

($148.5 million total launch, payload, and insurance costs). O

course, to make money, the launch operator would fly as few

tanker missions as possible. The amount of fuel brought u

by an RLV designed to meet NASA’s X-33 requirements on fiv

missions would be far in excess of what was needed to get t

GEO. In fact, it would be enough to get to the moon.

In addition, the refueled RLV would be able to take th

entire 20,000 pounds to GEO, while the ELV would have t

use up some if its payload weight to LEO to get the satellit

into a geosynchronous transfer orbit. The numbers outlined

above suggest strongly that the enterprises with RLVs would

enjoy a significant competitive advantage over those still flyin

ELVs simply due to insurance savings. This would not directl

affect DOD launch costs, but if a significant number of com 

mercial payloads migrate to RLVs, then ELV production rate

will slow down and prices will go up. A similar slowdown in

Titan IV production has been the principal cause of a 6

percent increase in launch costs.6 7

3. Follow-On Missions. This brings us to the third reason

that the “additional cost for upper stages” argument is falla 

cious. If each of the five-tanker missions in the exaggerated

example above brings up 25,000 pounds of fuel, the RLV car

rying the payload would not only have enough fuel to deplo

the communications satellite, it would also have enough fue

to perform a follow-on mission such as retrieval of the olde

satellite it is replacing (or even to go to the moon with on

more tanker mission). 6 8

Using a derivation of the rocket equation, Δv=g Isp 1

(M0 / ME), a gross lift-off weight of 1,000,000 pounds; a PMF o

0.90; a resulting vehicle empty weight of 100,000 pounds

space shuttle main engine vacuum Isp of 453 seconds, and a

approximate Δv of 12,000 fps required for translunar injection

384
from earth orbit; an RLV could take on six 25,000 pound-fue

loads and reach the moon for a lunar survey mission simila

to the Ballistic Missile Defense Office’s recent Clementine mis 

sion.6 9 Getting 18,000 more fps (two times lunar escape veloc 

ity) for an orbit circularization burn, landing, and takeof

would require 21 more missions (which is less than NASA’s

projected space station construction mission model using 

far less operable spacecraft). 7 0 This mission also requires 

vertical takeoff, vertical landing (VTVL) RLV.

This may seem a massive undertaking for a mission tha

does not seem to have much national priority, but the oper 

ability of the RLV may make such a trip useful for economi

reasons to be discussed shortly. That said, when the nation i

ready to return to the moon, a $28- to $280-million mission

(28 RLV missions at $1 to $10 million each) modifying a vehi

cle whose cost is recouped in earth-to-LEO operations would

be far more cost-effective than paying the development cost fo

purpose built orbital transfer vehicles, lunar landers, or othe

specialized vehicles. It is cost competitive with a single Tita

IV launch and less expensive than a space shuttle mission

There is no cost comparison with expendables for the retrieva

or lunar missions, because no matter how much money i

spent on a single ELV mission with present or evolved vehi

cles, these multiple missions are not possible without develop

ing other specialized expendable vehicles.

This extreme example makes the point: thinking about re

usable launch vehicles in the same way as expendables ca

prevent the analyst from seeing opportunities that will be ap

parent soon after RLVs become available. As this example als

illustrates, it is likely that many more opportunities will aris

once the space operability revolution takes place, but thes

opportunities are so difficult to foresee that they cannot rea 

sonably be used as justification, economic or otherwise, fo

RLV development. There are, on the other hand, enough pos 

sibilities that earthbound analysts at NASA and elsewhere ar

able to justify the economics of proceeding along this develop

ment path if only to reduce today’s high operating costs.

Charge II. Opponents also charge that first-generatio

RLVs will be unable to loft heavy payloads. Where the firs

385
charge was that the RLV compared unfavorably with medium

lift ELVs, the second charge is that the RLV cannot compete a

all with heavy lifters. On the face of it, this claim is accurat

as long as the launch operator limits the mission to a singl

launch. Today’s space community has been conditioned t

think of getting satellites into orbit as unitary events, wit

each launcher custom-tailored to each payload. If a payloa

weighs 40,000 pounds and its mission is in geostationar

orbit, conventional wisdom suggests the need for a heavy-lif

vehicle plus a transfer stage to take the whole package ther

at the same time. Again, this sort of thinking will be inade

quate for the age of the reusable launch vehicle. In the RLV

world, as in the rest of the transportation world, if the cargo i

too heavy to take in one trip, the solution is to put it in tw

boxes and make two trips. As David C. Webb, president of th

International Hypersonic Research Institute and former mem 

ber of President Ronald S. Reagan’s National Commission on

Space, suggests in his Aerospace Industries Association o

America (AIAA) paper, “Spaceflight in the Aero-Space Plan

Era,”

Potentially, the way around this problem is to break th

platform up into smaller chunks and launch them on smalle

launchers. It would be even less expensive to do this wit

aero-space planes. [Something he defines as: “aero” becaus

such vehicles utilize the atmosphere, “space” because they g

into space, and “plane” because they are operated like air 

planes. The SSTO vehicle, therefore, is considered an aero

space plane even though it may not look like an airplane.] I

might seem that the large military reconnaissance satellite

could not be launched on aero-space planes. However, on

possibility could involve splitting the satellite into two module

that are launched separately and assembled in orbit.7 1

If a Titan IV launch costs from $250 to $320 million pe

launch, then one could theoretically take the payload up a

separate components, launching it in 25 to 32 missions a

$10 million per trip and still break even. In fact, work-on-lin

replaceable units for satellites (similar to those in the aircraf

world) is presently under way at the US Air Force’s Phillip

Laboratory. Even though the laboratory is working on modula

386
satellite construction for standardization and cost-saving

purposes, some of this work could be directly transferable t

the on-orbit assembly idea. Again, the extreme example make

the point. It is poor analysis to make the blanket assumption

that a medium-lift RLV will be unable to carry heavy payloads

The operability revolution inherent in RLV technology will en 

able new solutions to old problems, and create economic an

military advantages for the United States in space that ar

difficult to foresee. This will be addressed in further detail in

the discussion of the national security implications of th

RLV.

Charge III. Finally, opponents charge that because SSTO

requires high Isp fuels, which today means cryogens such a

liquid hydrogen, the high cost of the terrestrial hydrogen in 

frastructure necessary to support robust operations will b

prohibitive. This is more an argument against launch sites a

every airport than it is against the cost effectiveness of RLV

in replacing the current fleet of expendables and semi-expend

ables. Many of today’s launch vehicles use cryogens, the spac

shuttle among them. In fact, the shuttle uses the same cryo 

gens that NASA plans to use for its planned RLV demonstra 

tor, the X-33. There will not be large fuel infrastructure cost

associated with the transition from the shuttle to RLVs. In

fact, as part of the X-33 Cooperative Agreement Notice (CAN)

NASA sets out as a program goal that,

the flight vehicle shall be capable of unplanned landing a

alternate landing sites with minimal support equipment

facilities, e.g.,

– No existing cryogenic facilities, launch stands/equipmen

etc.

– Self-ferry of flight vehicle between landing and launc

sites. . . . Equipment required to repair, process, an

return vehicle to launch site shall be transportable. 7 2

If indeed the infrastructure requirements for ferry mission

are minimal and NASA finds it useful to launch some mission

from White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, for extra energ

(because of its elevation), some missions from Florida for east

ward equatorial orbits, some missions from Vandenberg AFB

387
California, for polar orbits, and some from higher latitudes fo

higher inclination orbits, then the government is likely to buil

the skeleton of an infrastructure that private interests can us

to begin commercializing the vehicles. Among past examples o

infrastructure investment for national purposes that turned ou

to have enormous commercial implications was the worldwid

network of coaling stations for steamships in the late nineteenth

century. This network, built by the industry and governments o

the great naval powers, became an essential element of nationa

security and a significant factor in the worldwide trade that buil

the United States’s national wealth.

Another example was the infrastructure required to suppor

the automobile. In the early twentieth century, when Henry For

decided to mass produce the automobile, the infrastructure ar

gument would have gone something like this, “Henry, how d

you expect to make any money? There are no roads to run thos

things on and everyone lives right next door to the store wher

they work. Even your factory workers are within streetcar dis 

tance of your plant. No one will spend the millions and million

of dollars to build the roads or the petroleum-based fuel distri

bution infrastructure for these things to run on.” The criti

would have been absolutely right, if Model Ts provided the sam

amount of productivity per mile as horse carriages.

Similarly, the infrastructure cost critiques would be right i

RLVs are only as productive and operable as ELVs. However, i

there is money to be made or saved by operating RLVs, the

the cost of infrastructure will be amortized through saving

and profit, and as the DOD estimate of annual cost saving

over expendables shows, those savings are in the billions o

dollars per year. If one adds the profit taken from foreign

expendable launch operators, one could buy a lot of liquid

hydrogen and the infrastructure required to handle it. 7 3

The principal economic force acting to drive interest in an

funding for the RLV is the desire to reap the benefits of th

cost savings inherent in its operability. Launch costs are de

vouring the NASA and DOD budgets, and both institution

know they have to do something to cut costs in the face o

continuing budgetary pressures. So far, this is the principa

388
economic force acting as a stimulus to RLV development, bu

there are indications that it may not be the only one.

Private Sector Argument for RLVs. Private sector interes

in a reusable space launch vehicle and in a possible reusabl

hypersonic point-to-point (as opposed to earth-to-orbit) carg

carrier is another economic trend working to stimulate RLV

development. The US government has attempted to take ad

vantage of this interest by pursuing a unique acquisition ap

proach in the development of the RLV, offering “Cooperativ

Agreement Notices” rather than traditional requirement

statements to begin the acquisition process. NASA, to maxi

mize the private sector’s intellectual, entrepreneurial, and fi 

nancial contribution to the RLV program, has issued a CAN

for an experimental flying vehicle, the “X-33,” that allows th

private sector, for the first time, to propose and include inde

pendent research and development as part of their corporat

contribution.7 4 This new approach is designed to keep NAS

engineers from driving RLV design toward a predetermined

solution that meets only NASA’s needs, and not industry’s. In

fact, some NASA centers have had difficulty adjusting to th

new reality, publishing reports that seemed to favor one RLV

solution over another, and earning a written reprimand from

NASA headquarters for their trouble.7 5 The objective of th

CAN, NASA says, is to

stimulate the joint industry/Government funded concept definition/

design of a technology demonstrator vehicle, X-33, followed by the

design/demonstration of competitively selected concept(s). The X-33

must adequately demonstrate the key design and operational aspects

of a reusable space launch system. As a minimum, the scaleability

and traceability of the X-33 airframe, cryogenic tanks, and thermal

protection system (TPS) to the corresponding proposed SSTO rocket

must be identified. 7 6

As of this writing, three prime contractors, Lockheed Mar

tin, Rockwell International, and McDonnell Douglas have en 

tered competitive SSTO concepts. One of their designs i

scheduled to be selected by July 1996 for construction an

flight as early as possible but not later than July 1999. NAS

will make every effort to accelerate this schedule and wil

assist the selected contractor(s) in any feasible manner to fl

the advanced technology demonstrator before July 1999. 7 7 A

389
least one other private company sees the economic potential o

reduced cost access to space and is pursuing RLV technolog

outside of the CAN process. Kistler Aerospace is using th

profit its founders made from their Spacelab venture (a pri

vate/NASA cooperative project that has flown on the shuttle

to finance their own reusable launch vehicle. They plan t

raise $400 million from private investors and to put up $10

million of their own money to fund the estimated half-billion

dollar program cost. Though industry and government official

give Kistler little chance of success, given estimates of RLV

development costs in the billions, the fact that investors ar

willing to risk $100 million of their own money to pursue th

possibility of reusable space ships is another strong indicato

that economic forces are in place that are providing a push t

the technology. 7 8

There are other potential commercial uses for an RLV tha

have spurred some interest from the private sector. Scienc

and science fiction writers have described intercontinenta

ballistic passenger and cargo spaceships for years. In Philip

Bono and Kenneth Gatland’s seminal 1969 book, Frontiers o

Space, the authors propose a 200-foot-tall intercontinenta

passenger/cargo carrier for suborbital missions which could

haul 1,200 passengers 7,500 miles in slightly over one-hal

hour. A second idea, Hyperion, was a conical VTVL SSTO

(much like McDonnell-Douglas’s current ideas) that could

carry 8,100 pounds to orbit.7 9 In the December 1993 issue o

Analog magazine, science writer G. Harry Stine calls suborbi

tal hops the “hidden market” for SSTO services. As Stin

points out, “any SSTO spaceship that can take a payload t

orbit can also deliver passengers and cargo to any place in th

world in less than an hour.”8 0

This could all be dismissed as idle speculation but for th

fact that Federal Express (FedEx), one of the leading on-tim

freight express companies in the world, is giving its support t

the design review processes of all three teams competing t

develop the X-33. 8 1 The FedEx interest on its own will no

build the space ship, but it does seem to indicate that ther

are uses beyond access to orbit for reusable hypersonic tech 

nology. This could provide an even stronger economic stimu

390
lus for the near-term development of single-stage rocket tech 

nology in light of the fact that the $200 billion size of th

commercial air transport market dwarfs the total worldwid

space-market figure of $5 billion.

There are also other missions for RLVs outside of conventiona

earth-to-orbit NASA/DOD mission models that could drive th

market for them. Orbit-to-earth return missions may also turn

out to be nearly as lucrative (e.g., space debris cleanup, on-orbi

satellite repair and salvage, and what might be called single

stage-to-earth [SSTE] operations). The economics of these mis 

sions, however, are difficult to foresee and were already pro

posed as missions for the space shuttle in the early 1980s (an

then turned out poorly). It may, in fact, be so difficult to forese

the cost implications of SSTE missions that they are not usefu

as economic justification for SSTO. The ability to routinely ren 

dezvous with and retrieve material from space may, however, b

an interesting capability that space ships give their operator

which has enormous national security implications.

Other possible missions are even more speculative (such a

space tourism, deep space exploration, military presence mis 

sions); using them as economic justification for RLV developmen

quickly degenerates into an argument over causality. In addition

these missions are not relevant to the debate in the near term

RLV space ships are justifiable on the economic grounds of cos

savings to be gained by eliminating ELV and shuttle operatin

costs, by reducing the need for orbital transfer vehicles and Uppe

Stage Development programs, and (if FedEx’s interest in X-33 i

an indication) on the grounds that there are air transport mis 

sions they can perform at hypersonic speeds.

Technological Forces

Finally, recent technical advances provide the underpinnin

for some of the economic and political trends discussed above

Although space ships have been foreseen at least since the ad

vent of the German A-4 rocket (known to the Allies as the V-2) a

Peenemünde on the Baltic coast during the Second World War

they have not been technically possible because the weight o

the materials and the specific impulse of the rocket engine

available did not permit single-stage vehicles to achieve orbit.

391
As early as 1946, US rocket designers believed that it wa

possible to build SSTO vehicles with lightweight materials (usu 

ally allowing pressurized propellant tanks to double as vehicl

structure to save weight as the early Atlas ICBM did) and high

specific impulse oxygen/hydrogen engines. 82 Unfortunately, nei

ther lightweight materials nor LOX/LH 2 engines were availabl

in the late 1940s. A LOX/LH 2 engine had to wait until Centau

in the 1960s and the shuttle became the first vehicle to use LH 

at liftoff in 1981.8 3 Early drawings of these prospective singl

stage vehicles bore an uncanny resemblance to the V-2. Al 

though some successor to the V-2 was arguably what Hap Ar 

nold had in mind when he wrote about “space ships,” the V-2, in

fact, turned out to be the technological predecessor of the costl

expendable rocket approach. The same German rocket engi

neers who designed the V-2 also developed the Redstone missil

for the United States. Alan B. Shepard rode this missile on 

15-minute suborbital hop in 1961 to become both the firs

American in space and the first American to ride a suborbita

hypersonic transport.

The German engineers from Peenemünde then went on t

form the nucleus of the design teams that built the Jupite

missile, which led to the Saturn I and, in turn, the Saturn 

moon rocket. Offshoots of the Huntsville team include th

Titan ICBM, which has become the Titan IV, today’s larges

and most expensive US ELV. 8 4 As Stine says in Confrontatio

in Space, “nearly all of the USA space launch vehicle stabl

stands on the foundation of Peenemünde.”8 5

Interestingly, the design heritage of the modern RLV goe

back, not to Peenemünde, but to work done by Douglas Aircraf

for a nuclear-powered bomber for the US Air Force in the earl

1950s. In the late 1950s, a young Douglas engineer name

Maxwell Hunter took the engine design for the canceled Ai

Force nuclear airplane and began to investigate a single-stage

to-orbit nuclear rocket called the Reusable Interplanetary Trans

port Approach (RITA). After the RITA program ran its course

aerospace engineer Bono came to work for Max Hunter a

Douglas and began his long work on the series of VTVL SSTO

concepts which he describes in Frontiers of Space. Through

the 1960s and 1970s, SSTO ideas languished because of ma

392
terials and propulsion limitations. Serendipitously, US govern 

ment intervention in the form of the lightweight materials tha

came out of the NASP and NLS programs revived these discus

sions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

At this point, political forces converged with SSTO technology

At the beginning of the President George S. Bush administra 

tion, a group of conservative space advocates including Ma

Hunter and retired Army Maj Gen Daniel Graham, met with th

vice president and the National Space Council to advocate 

reusable VTVL SSTO rocket vehicle. Given the administration’

commitment to former President Ronald Reagan’s scramjet-pow 

ered SSTO, the National Aerospace Plane, however, it woul

have been politically difficult to start another NASA/Air Forc

Joint Program Office to investigate rocket SSTO, so the admin

stration decided that the well-funded SDIO should foot the in 

itial bill. Significantly, General Graham’s High Frontier Founda 

tion had been part of the initial impetus for SDI and h

remained one of its staunchest supporters. It is not surprising

therefore, that SDIO obligingly funded four aerospace industr

study teams to research and design SSTOs capable of launchin

10,000 pounds to polar low earth orbit. In 1991, however, Am 

bassador Henry Cooper, director of SDIO, under funding pres 

sure from Congress and interagency pressure growing out of th

perception that SSTO had become a very popular rival to othe

launch system improvement programs, elected not to assum

management of the program beyond suborbital testing of a one

third scale model, the DC-X. The program title was changed t

Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT), with any additiona

SDIO funding beyond DC-X contingent upon a derivative of DC

X meeting SDIO’s suborbital launch requirements. As a resul

and with the 1993 dismemberment of SDIO, SSRT became a

institutional orphan.

Not content with cutting Air Force follow-on funding for th

technology, agencies with competing agendas actively worked

to dismiss the possibility of rocket SSTO. In 1991, Martin

Marietta (makers of the Titan IV ELV) cast doubt on the eco 

nomics of rocket-powered SSTO and the Air Force space ac

quisition community dismissed the technology in a 1992 NLS

decision brief to the secretary of the Air Force.8 6 A primar

393
back-up chart from the briefing reflects this position in 

quote from the Aldridge Report, “NASP, SSRT, and High Speed

Civil Transport (HSCT) are not in competition with or a substi

tute for NLS since these technologies are not sufficiently ma

ture to risk ‘leap-frog’ development.”87

Despite this Air Force and contractor nay-saying Da

Goldin, the NASA administrator, became interested in the ide

of a reusable single stage-to-orbit launch vehicle after seein

the DC-X fly. 8 8 He saw the possibility of an advanced technol

ogy program building on the knowledge gained from DC-X

that would restore US leadership in space and perhaps solv

the nation’s access to space problem. This was the genesis o

NASA’s sponsorship of the subscale advanced technolog

demonstrators that are now flying, and arguably, the begin 

ning of NASA’s interest in the X-33 idea. 8 9

This idea did not spring up overnight. It has a long techno

logical and engineering history and significant backing insid

and outside of the space technology community (there ar

even three Internet home pages dedicated to RLVs and t

political activism on the technology’s behalf). 9 0 With privat

sector interest inside and outside of the NASA CAN process

with public advocacy groups developing briefings for member

of the public to show to their members of Congress, and wit

a real national need to solve the access to space problem

there now seems to be a significant impetus for the RLV t

change how the United States operates in space.

This moment in history is unique in American developmen

of the space frontier. The combination of the political, fisca

and technological forces that are driving the RLV idea seem t

add up to the possibility, and perhaps even the probability, o

significant near-term change in our ability to access space

What will that mean for US national security? That is th

topic of discussion in the remainder of this work.

Military Implications of

Inexpensive Space Access

As already outlined, the lack of routine civil and commercia

access to space militates against the development of robus

394
methods for using the medium for commercial purposes. Fo

similar reasons, it may also work against the development o

robust methods for using the medium for national securit

purposes. In fact, the current difficulty in accessing space is 

fundamental reason for the limited perceptions of what it i

possible to do there.

The state of present joint US military space doctrine as th

United States lowers the barriers to space access is a case in

point. Joint doctrine assumes that one of the “operationa

characteristics” of space cited in “Joint Doctrine, Tactics

Techniques, and Procedures” (JDTTP) 3-14, Space Operations

is “difficult access.”9 1 Any doctrine that assumes that access t

the medium it addresses is going to be difficult and infrequen

is also likely to assume that operations which require robus

and continuous access (such as protracted combat or logisti

resupply) will not take place there. If the conditions underly

ing the doctrinal assumptions change, however, then the doc 

trine derived from those assumptions is not likely to be pre

pared for the changed conditions. This happened on th

Western Front when Great Power assumptions about the den 

sity of fire on the World War I battlefield proved incorrect, i

happened to the French during the Battle of France in 194

when assumptions about the speed of armored maneuver co 

ordinated with airpower changed, and it happened to th

Iraqis during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when assumption

about the effectiveness of airpower changed. This sectio

attempts to determine whether this sort of doctrinal disconti

nuity is likely in the next few years if the RLV programs called

for by the president’s new National Space Transportation Pol

icy are developed and access to space is made much les

“difficult.”

Despite the limiting assumption of “difficult access,” ther

are nevertheless ideas in present joint space doctrine an

objectives in the president’s National Security Strategy (NSS

that will be useful in the RLV era. The 1994 NSS, for example

says that two of the United States’s main policy objectives in

space are, “continued freedom of access to and use of space

and “maintaining the US position as the major economic, po

litical, military and technological power in space.”9 2 The draf

395
joint armed forces space doctrine, although written two year

earlier in support of Bush-era space policy, supports the ob

jectives of the 1994 NSS in this regard with the recognition

that there are certain strategic locales in space that have to b

controlled in order to maintain access, what Joint Pub 3-1

calls “decisive orbits.”9 3 It also posits that space forces should

consider capabilities to “control” these orbits by force, bu

then, in a “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures” manual, i

provides no tactics, techniques or procedures for doing so. 9 4

To be fair, access to space has heretofore been difficult and, in

part because of that difficulty, few people on the Joint Staff hav

had to think about how realistically to control “decisive orbits

Nevertheless, as General Arnold said of Air Forces in 1945

“National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whos

doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment an

processes of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in

progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrine

ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, ca

only delude the nation into a false sense of security. 9 5

The same might be said today for “any space force” or fo

any service that claims as its mission the defense of th

United States through the control and exploitation of thei

respective realms. If, in fact, access to space is about to be

come much less difficult, then it behooves military thinker

and doctrine writers to determine what the deficiencies in

their doctrines are before the fundamental assumptions un

derpinning them are invalidated (or at least to think fa

enough ahead not to be blindsided when it does happen).

That said, the next section builds on the technological pos 

sibilities previously discussed to determine what doctrinal de

ficiencies a possible “space operability revolution” will revea

in US joint space doctrine, and what new doctrines might b

required in a proliferated space access world. Before proceed

ing, however, it is necessary to challenge some shibboleth

about the military uses of space.

Political Sensitivity of the “Militarization” of Space

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits several specifi

activities in space. It prevents signatories from stationin

396
weapons of mass destruction anywhere in space and forbid

the construction of military bases on the moon. Article II say

that “Outer space is not subject to national appropriation b

claim of sovereignty” and Article V says that the Moon an

other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peacefu

purposes. There are no prohibitions, however, against recon 

naissance, surveillance, military communication, navigation

or other uses that support terrestrial military operations

These uses, whose value to the United States and its Coalition

partners was demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War, creat

tension between the “no national appropriation” rule and real

ity. The war demonstrated that there are orbits and forc

structure in space that the United States must be able t

control and protect in time of war to fight successfully. This i

the origin of the “decisive orbits” idea in the 1992 draft join

space doctrine as well as the statement that force may have t

be used in order to secure them. On the face of it, this state 

ment is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the Oute

Space Treaty, but the president’s National Security Strateg

echoes this sentiment when it speaks of “freedom of access

(similar language with respect to freedom of the sea has bee

the basis for a good part of the development of the US Navy).

The very existence of the “space control” mission, in joint a

well as Air Force doctrine, is an acknowledgment that th

United States has equities in space that it cannot afford t

lose in time of conflict, the Outer Space Treaty notwithstand

ing. As a result of the new higher stakes in space, it has bee

suggested that military space operations could see the sam

progression from observation and signaling to pursuit an

bombardment that aviation made during the course of World

War I.9 6 Since early airplanes were relatively inexpensive, th

armed forces could afford to experiment with various type

and to determine their capabilities under combat conditions. 

few aircraft losses while trying to work out the details did no

threaten the air program as the loss of Challenger threatened

the space program. Another analogy may also be useful, tha

of the development of submarine warfare before World War II

Submarine warfare, after the political and moral opprobrium

aimed at the Germans for sinking troop ships and merchan

397
men in World War I, could not be politically justified based on

the Corbettian idea of the commerce raider. 9 7 Nevertheless, th

Navy was able to buy submarines and field them in a world

where new technology and doctrine had to be developed in 

hostile political climate to set the stage for American succes

in World War II. In fact, the submarine’s threat to the battle 

ship Navy led to its misapplication in war games and to th

promotion of conservative skippers who had to be replaced b

a more aggressive breed in 1941. One submarine captain pu

it this way, “The minds of the men in control were not attuned

to the changes being wrought by advancing technology. Ma 

han ’s nearly mystical pronouncements had taken the place o

reality for men who truly did not understand but were com 

fortable in not understanding.”9 8

This example shows that it is possible for the US armed

forces to field new technologies that give them the edge in

future wars without clear positive national policy goals (an

even in the face of some political and senior military resis 

tance). As we have seen, the NSS already reflects America

national interests more than it does the spirit of the Oute

Space Treaty. If and when RLVs begin to fly, policy maker

can reasonably be expected to use them to further the na

tional interests of the United States, as they did with th

submarine in the 1940s, and as any nation will if and when i

builds its own space ships.

Traditional Military Missions in Space

Some of the possibilities for reaping the economic reward

of increased operability in space have already been discussed

Using some of these economically useful capabilities, this sec

tion will explore some possibilities that space operability offer

for national security.

Current joint and air doctrine divides military operations i

space along the same lines as current US armed forces doc 

trine. These four broad functions are force enhancement, forc

application, space control, and space support. 9 9 Today’s doc 

trine lists activities such as communications, navigation, in 

telligence and surveillance, environmental monitoring, map

ping, charting, and warning processing and dissemination a

398
part of force enhancement. Within force application are ballis 

tic missile defense, aerospace defense, and power projection

In space control, protection, negation, and surveillance o

space are listed. Space support consists of launch, satellit

control, and logistics.

As with much of terrestrial US armed forces doctrine, thi

speaks very much to the nuts and bolts of how military power i

used in warfare, but does not say a great deal about what it i

used for. It also is deficient in describing uses for military powe

outside of the context of a shooting war. There is usually 

diagram at the beginning of US doctrine manuals that outline

the tie between the National Security Strategy of the Unite

States, the national military strategy (NMS), and the doctrine in

question, but the logic flow between the boxes or circles in th

diagram is not clearly spelled out.100 For example, when th

same four pillars of the National Military Strategy of the Unite

States (deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and recon 

stitution) can support both former President George Bush’s NS

and President William “Bill” Clinton’s new National Securit

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement without significan

change, it is reasonable to suspect that there is little real deter 

ministic relationship between the NMS and the grand strategy i

is supposed to support. The military has simply divided warfar

into four parts and tied it to the NSS at only the most superficia

level. What is the logical tie, for example, between Presiden

Clinton’s new national objective of “promoting democracy” an

the combat-oriented strategy of “deterrence, forward presence

crisis response, and reconstitution?”101 As a result, when th

president wants to use military forces to achieve precise politica

effects that don’t involve combat, the armed forces are often

reluctant, pressing instead for either overwhelming force or non 

involvement. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense

achieving precise political effects (not involving combat) is wha

the armed forces are called upon to do much of the time. In th

first 45 years of the US Air Force’s existence, for example, it wa

called upon for “air movements of national influence” hundred

of times, as opposed to only a few combat operations.102 Ameri

can military forces are often used in situations where “force” an

“control” (as in force enhancement, force application, and spac

399
control) are not acceptable. Humanitarian operations and op

erations other than war are good examples of this language’s

failure to describe the full range of possible military operation

in support of national policy objectives.

Joint doctrine’s inadequate treatment of these subtleties in

terrestrial operations is a handicap, but not a fatal one, be

cause policy makers can conceive of and implement uses o

the terrestrial military for noncombat policy purposes withou

the help of military doctrine. The blockade of Cuba during th

1962 missile crisis is a good example. Even though traditiona

US Navy blockade procedures were not followed (sometime

over the vociferous objections of flag officers), the blockad

was conducted as the president wanted it, not in accordanc

with traditional naval practice. Similarly, in 1993, Presiden

Clinton directed a reluctant US Air Force to begin night food

pallet drops to Bosnian civilians to directly achieve specifi

national policy objectives. If this sort of operation, which ofte

characterizes the exercise of US power in both the cold wa

and post-cold-war periods, continues to be prevalent, the

space doctrine as well as terrestrial doctrine should reflec

this reality.

However, doctrine’s inadequate treatment of this type of op

eration in space may be a more serious handicap in the com 

ing RLV era. This is because decision makers will find it muc

more difficult to conceive of the possibilities for using newl

operable space power to implement their policies. Mission

such as enforcement of today’s ongoing terrestrial sanction

regimes or air exclusion zones, blockade of other groups’ ac

cess to space, repositioning space forces over a target state o

group’s territory as a demonstration or to provide presenc

over a given region or in a specific “decisive orbit,” or providin

rapid humanitarian relief using the suborbital lift techniqu

discussed previously could be extraordinarily useful politi

cally, but they are likely to be outside of the cognitive schem

of most military leaders, let alone civilian policy makers. 103

New Space Missions in the RLV Era

The RLV space ship’s characteristics would make it not onl

possible, but affordable and politically feasible to use militar

400
space forces to 

move national influence in the same way tha

air and sea power do today. In other words, operable spac

forces could participate in military missions that directly sup

port the achievement of national policy goals not necessaril

in direct support of a combatant commander on earth in way

that today’s few and fragile space forces cannot.104 Some of th

contributions of the space operability revolution that would

enable such participation would be timely logistic resupply

rapid maneuverability, and on-scene human judgment. Al

three are to be discussed here, with no particular significanc

to the order in which they are presented. Relationships be

tween the three will become evident in the discussion. As eac

is discussed, trade-offs with current terrestrial methods, som

possible strategic circumstances under which these capabili

ties might be useful, and some tactics, techniques, and proce

dures for using them are also addressed.

Logistics. There have been a number of US Air Force an

NASA studies of refueling and refurbishment of on-orbit forc

structure .

105 Many of these studies were predicated, however

on expensive and unresponsive expendable launch vehicles t

bring refueling and servicing payloads up to target satellite

from earth. As a result, these studies never progressed pas

the paper stage. With reusable space ships, however, the cal

culus changes. As previously discussed, RLVs make it eco 

nomical to replace and retrieve the current generation of satel

lites. It also becomes possible to refurbish satellites that ar

designed for on-orbit servicing, thus avoiding the cost of new

satellite design and construction. Reconnaissance and warn 

ing satellites could have their sensor packages upgraded wit

the latest technology using line replaceable units (like thos

the Air Force’s Phillips Laboratory is developing today), rathe

than becoming obsolete. In today’s context, with RLVs an

modular satellite design, the debate over the Defense Suppor

Program (DSP) follow-on would have a simpler answer. Rathe

than asking Congress for a new program start (such as th

canceled Follow-on Early Warning Satellite or the controver 

sial DSP II proposal), the United States could replenish sta 

tion-keeping fuel, replace sensors, and upgrade the communi

cations and data-processing equipment aboard existin

401
spacecraft. 106 No longer, for instance, would this nation

s re

connaissance and surveillance architecture require tens of bil

lions of dollars invested in lump sums to wholly replace on-or

bit capability. Rather, individual spacecraft could be updated

or replaced without entire constellation replacement. Th

mean mission duration (lifetime) of these national asset

would be significantly extended at a great savings.

Such logistic resupply (especially of oxidizers for propel

lant) could actually be easiest using a base on the moon

The 9,000 feet per second (fps) change in velocity (_v ) re

quired to escape the moon’s gravity is a lot cheaper than th

31,000 fps required to get to LEO from earth, even assumin

a 12,000 fps _v to get back to the moon. For GEO and high

earth orbit (HEO), the advantages are even greater. In fac

the energy required to bring materials from the moon t

HEO is less than a twentieth of that needed to lift an equa

mass from earth to such an orbit. 107 Since oxygen is abou

40 percent by weight in lunar soil, it would be fairly simpl

to extract. In fact, some have called the moon a “tank farm

in space. 108 Although hydrogen is in low concentration at th

Apollo landing sites, its relatively higher concentration in

fine-grained lunar soils may allow for its extraction a

well. 109 Just as building RLVs would save billions of dollar

every year in continuing launch costs, building an auto

mated lunar extraction facility and geostationary satellit

resupply base would save a significant amount in propellan

costs over time. Since it takes 1/20th as much fuel to get t

HEO from the moon than it does to get to HEO from earth

we would burn 6,429 pounds of hydrogen and 38,57

pounds of oxygen ($18,000 in fuel at current prices o

$0.05/pound for oxygen and $2.50/pound for hydrogen) t

get to HEO from the moon (with the notional 100,000

pound dry weight, 0.90 PMF vehicle). 110 This saves 122,14

pounds of hydrogen and 732,858 pounds of oxygen com 

pared to launch from earth (with 900,000 pounds of fuel a

a 6:1 oxygen/hydrogen ratio, which would cost $360,000)

That is a total fuel cost savings of $342,000 per missio

(which becomes significant if per mission cost is as low a

$1 million), with the added benefit that such a logistic bas

402
would be even more useful to the numerous commercial an

civil satellite operators than to the military. 111 The downsid

is, of course, the infrastructure investment in building such 

facility. In addition, there is the cost of semipermanent sta 

tioning of RLVs on the moon that would not be available fo

earth-to-orbit launch services. The savings and profits from

such an enterprise would have to be tremendous to justif

such an investment.

If, however, there are hundreds of US flights per year leav

ing earth to refuel and refurbish high-altitude satellites, the

the United States, as the only space power capable of such 

project in the near term, could improve its balance of pay

ments by selling propellant resupply and on- orbit repair serv

ices to the rest of the world at premium prices. The continuin

high cost of lifting fuel out of earth’s deep gravity field (some

times described as a “gravity well”) could convince RLV opera 

tors to make the investment in a lunar base to lower thei

operating costs, just as NASA is investing in the RLV itself t

lower large and continuing operating costs. Such a base, es

sentially civilian in nature, would also provide enormou

treaty-compliant strategic advantages. 112

Rapid Maneuverability . Although spacecraft governed b

the laws of orbital mechanics move at five miles per secon

with respect to the surface of the earth, they are not ver

maneuverable from orbit to orbit. ELV-era space operabilit

does not allow the United States to position its space force

where it wants them when it wants them there. At presen

with a limited and unreplenishable amount of maneuverin

fuel in orbiting satellites, it is not a trivial matter to reposition

them to influence or even monitor events on earth. Although

the details of defense satellite fuel-states are not releasable

the laws of physics suggest that the unexpected movement o

today’s unrefuelable DSP missile warning satellites to cove

the Arabian Gulf during the 1991 war undoubtedly reduced

their on-orbit lifetime and reduced the US’s flexibility in re

sponding to future emergencies. If RLVs gave us the ability t

refuel sensors such as DSP and other satellites (as discussed

in the preceding section), they could be repositioned to cove

any area of interest without posing the danger of future sta 

403
tion keeping fuel shortfalls. Later, smaller, less capable, bu

less expensive and more numerous sensors could be deployed

in orbit in response to a crisis. With the RLV and a supply o

such sensors ready to be launched on short notice, this could

be done in a matter of hours rather than the months that ar

currently required for a launch campaign.

Today’s maneuverability shortfall also limits thinking abou

nondestructive inspection of unknown satellites. Instead, w

inspect satellites that we want to know more about by takin

pictures of them from the ground, which is hundreds of kilo 

meters away and blanketed by the distorting interference o

the earth’s atmosphere. After the space operability revolution

reusable space ships or satellites resupplied by them could

close the minimum distance permitted by international treat

in peacetime and inspect unidentified satellites and their pay

loads (by optical, radar, and other means) up close withou

the distortion of the atmosphere. In a period of escalation

short of a shooting war, RLV space ships would intercep

unidentified traffic and inspect it for hostile capabilities o

intent. If no such capabilities are found, the satellite could b

released to go on its way. If hostility is suspected or con 

firmed, or in accordance with policy-driven rules of engage 

ment, the RLV would have a wide range of options. It could

capture the offending satellite, jam it, or disable it (preferabl

using nondestructive means that would enable the use of th

disabled satellite for leverage in negotiations, which would

have the added advantage of not worsening the space debri

problem). Contrast this with today’s space doctrine. The neu 

tralization of hostile space forces by nonlethal technical meth 

ods is currently the only method of space control short o

destruction. The United States is limited to these technique

(such as eclipsing adversary solar panels or jamming uplinks)

however, because rendezvous with, and capture of, hostil

satellites is considered a rare, expensive, and risky operation

This will not be the case after the operability revolution, whe

rendezvous and capture are practiced on a routine basis in

the course of repairing and retrieving friendly satellites. Ther

are also fewer simple countermeasures to physical capture

Jamming originating from the earth can be overridden an

404
satellites can maneuver on battery power to escape an artifi 

cial “eclipse.” It will, on the other hand, be much more difficul

for an adversary to avoid capture by a grappling arm guided

by human intelligence in real time. In addition, a captured

asset can be used to coerce or deter some space-faring adver 

sary from a hostile course of action. Leaving the satellite on

orbit, as done with today’s disabling schemes, however, give

the adversary time to devise a technical countermeasure t

the disabling technique. Capture puts an end to such hopes.

The maneuverability of RLV space ships would also mak

them useful for missions that are more accurately described

as denial than destruction. They could mine decisive orbits (a

could ELVs), but they could also conduct mine-clearing opera 

tions, soft landing the cleared mines for storage back on earth

something an ELV could not. These mine fields could be laid

in a crisis and cleared afterward, giving new flexibility to na

tional policy makers. RLVs would also be able to respond t

crisis situations with all of these capabilities more quickl

than the ELV due to launch preparation times that are fore

cast to be months shorter. 113

The increased mobility provided by the RLV would enable th

United States to move its forces to decisive orbits in space o

over any trouble spot on earth more quickly (typically 31,00

feet per second with reference to the earth’s surface) than an

form of terrestrial military power.114 Threatened uses of force o

nonlethal inspection of enemy forces (space or terrestrial) coul

work to achieve policy objectives without firing a shot.

As the president’s National Security Strategy of Engagemen

and Enlargement puts it, “all nations are immediately accessi

ble from space.”115 It follows that when space itself become

immediately accessible to the United States, then the United

States will have immediate access to all other nations. Thi

access can mean the ability to observe, or it can mean th

ability to influence. The movement of space forces to threate

on-orbit force structure have been discussed, but RLV spac

ships would also allow the United States to deliver destructiv

or nonlethal power to any point on earth less than an hou

after launch.

405
Although many of the missions made possible by the RLV

s

maneuverability discussed to this point are not captured in

present space doctrine, the idea of force application from

space is. Although the perception exists that force application

from space is prevented by international treaty or US policy, i

is not. Joint Pub 3-14 puts it this way, “international law . . 

allows the development, testing, and deployment of force ap

plication capabilities that involve nonnuclear, nonantiballisti

(ABM) weapon systems (i.e., space-to-ground kinetic energ

weapons).”116 Because it has been difficult to access space

however, it has been difficult to develop any such concep

beyond the idea stage. Concepts such as Sandia Nationa

Laboratory’s Winged Reentry Vehicle Experiment, a ballisti

cally delivered, nonnuclear, long range, precision-guided ki

netic energy penetrator flew three times on the front end o

ICBMs before it ran out of funds.117 Many other studies neve

got past the paper stage. Studies with acronyms such as dat

analysis control (DAC), program management plan (PMP), in 

dependent cost estimate (ICE), BRIM, and GPRC spent hun

dreds of thousands of dollars and produced stacks of report

without really demonstrating any technology. 118 With reusabl

space ships and routine access to space, however, researc

payloads can be flown on operational missions without wait 

ing for rare ICBM test launch opportunities. Separation test

would be scheduled similar to current scheduling for US Ai

Force Seek Eagle weapons carriage and separation tests for ai

breathers.

The RLV could also deliver nonlethal payloads such a

ground-based sensors, radio and television transmissions, an

humanitarian relief supplies (via suborbital lift into secure area

or via shielded reentry containers in denied areas) to places tha

may not be accessible even to airpower (due to threat, distance

or overflight restrictions). If fuel costs for an orbital mission ar

$360,000 and overall launch costs can fall to $1 million, then

suborbital missions requiring less _v and therefore less fue

should cost even less. These missions could be cost competitiv

with military aircraft. A 1991 Air Force regulation says that in

FY92, the DOD would have had to charge NASA $403,132 for 

28-hour, 450-knot average speed, 12,500 nautical miles, non 

406
stop C-5 mission. 119 In the RLV era, if NASA has priority carg

to transport to its few remaining overseas tracking stations, i

might be smarter to pay the same or similar costs and cut th

trip time by 27 1/2 hours.

Such a capability would allow the United States to protec

its interests, on earth or in orbit, at times and places of it

choosing, without having to consider the risk of loss to enem

action. States or other groups with nascent ballistic missile o

space programs will soon have primitive ASAT capability in

the form of sounding rockets carrying kinetic energy submuni

tions (as simple as sixpenny iron nails) launched in the pat

of an oncoming satellite in a predictable orbit. 120 These ASAT

a threat to any satellite in a predictable LEO, are of limited

utility against an RLV space ship launched on a suborbital o

fractional orbital trajectory. There is very little possibility tha

nonspace-faring nations or groups could detect launches from

US sovereign territory. At present, only the United States ha

a publicly disclosed missile warning satellite, although th

Russians have reconnaissance satellites and are likely to hav

missile warning satellites left over from the cold war as well. I

these nations detect launchers, they do not have the data

processing infrastructure to predict and disseminate suborbi

tal trajectories and impact points to space weapon defens

forces. While making a case for an independent Europea

satellite reconnaissance capability in the wake of the Gul

War, former French foreign minister Pierre Joxe acknowledged

the “supremacy of the US space surveillance machine with it

range of missile early warning, ocean surveillance, photo 

graphic and radar reconnaissance, electronics eavesdroppin

and weather satellites . . . with its massive supporting proc 

essing and communications chain.”121 France’s and Britain’s

$1 billion investment in military spacecraft could not matc

the $200 billion US military space machine during the war

and it is not likely that many other nations on earth could d

so in the foreseeable future. 122

That said, it does not take a lot of money to buy sixpenn

nails. Low technology ASATs would, however, be difficult t

use against an RLV changing its orbit from revolution to revo 

lution. Even the United States would have a great deal o

407
difficulty engaging hypersonic maneuvering reentry vehicle

(which would be very similar to the strategic defense problem)

On-Scene Human Judgment. The “difficult access” para 

digm has also worked to keep space doctrine notably free from

references to the idea of military personnel in space. Eve

White House policy makers recognize the Department of De

fense’s aversion to the idea of manned space flight. Richard

Dalbello, assistant for aeronautics and space in Presiden

Clinton’s Office of Science and Technology Policy says, “polic

recognizes that DOD has little current interest in huma

spaceflight.”123 This could be related to the fact that there is 

“manned military space expectations gap” that goes along wit

the overall launch expectations gap. This part of the expecta 

tions gap is also a result of dashed hopes and unsatisfactor

reality. The dashed hopes can be traced to events such a

President Richard Nixon’s cancellation of the Air Forc

Manned Orbiting Laboratory, the shutdown of the Air Force’s

space shuttle launch facility at Vandenberg AFB, in 1986 afte

the Challenger accident, and, in both cases, the subsequen

disbanding of military astronaut groups who had been

screened and selected through an arduous board process.12

The disillusionment (or, at least, the skepticism) concernin

the role of military man in space is evident from the deafenin

silence on the subject in Air Force doctrine, in joint doctrine

and in even the most forward-leaning research papers an

projects such as the US Air Force’s recently completed Space 

cast 2020 study. This has led to an almost universal assump

tion in the US space community that most DOD space mis 

sions can be performed by robots; some contend that an

requirement for human judgment in space can be fulfilled

today by unmanned systems and tomorrow by telepresence o

virtual reality.

There may nevertheless be a case for military personnel in

space. The experience of land, sea, and air warfare seems t

indicate that the judgment and initiative of the human bein

on the scene is critical to success in battle against a reactin

enemy. It is not obvious that this pattern will be repeated in

the new space medium, but history suggests that the presenc

of military personnel could help with the continuous tactica

408
improvement and adaptation that has traditionally made fo

victory in war. As John Collins of the Congressional Researc

Service says in Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years, “sizabl

manned contingents probably should deploy in space, becaus

commanders and staff far removed from crises seldom can as

sess the situation and take appropriate actions as well as on

the-spot counterparts.”125 Commanders and staff on the groun

may also have their links with RLV ships disrupted or jammed

while it is much more costly for the enemy to break the man

machine link in a piloted vehicle. There are also complexities in

military operations that may not lend themselves well to remot

control. As with the submarine, a complex vehicle with multipl

missions in a challenging and dynamic physical environmen

with a reacting enemy, it is very difficult to imagine a remot

crew of operators coordinating rendezvous, grappling, defensiv

countermeasures, damage reporting and control, and all of th

subtasks implicit in those operations simultaneously, whethe

under the sea or in space.

To adapt to such rapidly changing situations, military ma

on earth has had to have repeatable and regular familiarit

with the medium in which combat operations take place. Thi

repeatable and regular familiarity with the medium is wha

the RLV operability revolution will provide that is now missin

from current space doctrine. Without personal experience wit

the medium, it is arguable whether sound doctrine can b

devised for operating there. It is difficult to imagine that th

Navy could have gained enough experience in subsurface war

fare before World War II to enable it to sink over five million

tons of enemy shipping in the Pacific if all subsurface opera 

tions before the war had been conducted by remotely control

led undersea robots.126

It can be argued that the same results would have bee

obtained with submarines controlled from shore via twenty

first century telepresence or virtual reality. The complexity o

submarine combat suggests otherwise. Damage control an

loading torpedoes in combat situations would have to be don

by onboard robots. Torpedo misfires would also have to b

cleared by such robots. Software would have to be written t

fuse sonar inputs and onboard ambient noise so that th

409
teleoperator could monitor both for damage cues and situation

awareness. It seems that the added level of complexity re

quired for a teleoperated combat submarine would be signifi 

cant and might outweigh the advantages of removing ma

from the scene. In any case, the pre-World War II US Nav

overcame the inherent hostility of the undersea environmen

and a clear lack of political enthusiasm for undersea warfar

and put men to sea on submarines. 127 A similar case may b

made for the manned combat RLV in space.

Policy makers, too, may also be reluctant to trust un

manned or teleoperated warships even though the teleoper 

ated RLV would be like any weapon on earth, a machin

executing a decision made by man just as a firearm doe

when a soldier pulls the trigger. There should, therefore, b

the same amount of trust in the teleoperated RLV as in th

soldier’s rifle. The difference is, however, that when the sol

dier’s rifle misfires, he is on the scene to unjam it or fix th

bayonet. In the event of onboard failure, link jamming, o

battle damage, the unmanned or teleoperated RLV would hav

no trained soldier on the scene to make sure that high-stake

political missions are carried out successfully.

In addition to the arguments outlined above, there is also 

simple physical argument against remote or virtual realit

(VR) piloting of space vehicles in wartime or crisis situations

the speed-of-light delay inherent in the long slant ranges tha

would be involved. It would take an earth-based operator at 

console or in a VR environment, 0.25 seconds to send a com 

mand to a refueled RLV intercepting a maneuvering adversar

satellite in geostationary orbit and perceive that the vehicl

was responding (22,300-mile orbit, 186,000 miles-per-secon

speed of signal, two-way trip). This assumes that the vehicle i

directly overhead the operator. If the space ship is inspectin

a satellite in geostationary orbit on the other side of th

planet, the signal is likely to be relayed via two or more geo 

stationary satellites. The round trip in this case is over 1.0

light seconds and begins to be problematic even for coopera 

tive targets. Speed-of-light delay is acceptable when sendin

instructions to unmanned deep-space probes, but, just as in

air-to-air refueling at 0.70 Mach, rendezvous would be muc

410
more difficult and dangerous with a one-second flight contro

delay as would maneuvers in close proximity to anothe

spacecraft at Mach 25. This would be especially true if th

target spacecraft were itself maneuvering.

Automation, VR, and telepresence would reduce vehicle cos

and complexity since there would be no need for life suppor

and a reduced need for vehicle reliability. There would, there

fore, be military missions that machines or telepresence ca

perform perfectly well (e.g., routine reconnaissance, space sta 

tion resupply, satellite deployment). The Russians have bee

resupplying their manned and politically valuable Mir spac

station for years via automated docking with the unmanned

Progress resupply rocket.128 But in general, high-stakes mis 

sions in which failure would be politically disastrous, espe

cially in an international crisis, argue for man’s presence

even if this increases the risk to RLV crews.

Although the weight and complexity of the generic RLV

might be reduced through teleoperation, the necessity fo

combat vehicles to operate in degraded modes, the onboard

maintenance often required in dynamic situations, and th

coordination required for multiple missions would seem t

argue for the restriction of teleoperation and automation t

relatively benign environments. Man should not be excluded

from space simply because he requires added vehicle complex 

ity in the form of life support. What he brings to the game in

terms of degraded operations, jam resistance, and damag

control may be worth the extra weight. This, however, is no

the approach of today’s US space policy and doctrine. Peopl

sitting at consoles on earth sending inputs to robots in spac

are the US armed forces’ space officers, who are the expert

qualified to write space doctrine. It may be useful to remembe

how unsophisticated early air doctrine, created by peopl

without much flying experience, seems today. 129 Space doc 

trine developed in institutions that assume away routin

manned operations in space may not stand the test of tim

much better.

The preceding discussion of potential missions and argu 

ments for and against manned RLVs highlights interestin

parallels with undersea warfare. Given long duration inspec

411
tion and/or presence missions in an extremely hostile envi 

ronment, multiperson crews performing specialized tasks, an

the ability to maneuver in three dimensions, the best mode

for the fighting RLV may be the submarine. Missions requirin

presence over adversary territory or near adversary space fa 

cilities through the course of a terrestrial political crisis, lon

inspection patrols to survey other nations’ satellites, confine

ment in small pressurized spaces for long periods, and spe

cialized crew functions appear to fit the submarine paradigm

more than any other. 130 This is not to say that there are no

significant analogies to air operations as well, but there ar

many things about military operations in space, especiall

those that have to do with control of the medium, that seem t

be closely analogous to submarine operations.

It is when space power acts to affect political outcomes on

earth that the tie to airpower roles and functions is stronges

If airlift (as suggested by the “suborbital hop” idea), strategi

attack, interdiction, and perhaps even close air support ar

possible from space, then these missions, more than spac

control or presence, are where military power from spac

might have real leverage on political outcomes on earth.13

That said, space operations will require an infusion of naval a

well as air “culture” and doctrine. This will be discussed fur

ther in the next few sections.

Building on the Joint Doctrine of “Decisive Orbits”

After the discussion of what the RLV revolution will allow

the United States to do in space, it may be useful to explor

the physical nature of the earth-moon system and why certain

places in it have military advantages over others. The doctrin

of decisive orbits touches on this point, but the RLV spac

ship could make control of these orbits even more decisive

especially if it makes them more usable.

Physical Characteristics of Decisive Orbits. Before pro 

ceeding with how decisive orbits in space should be used

however, it is necessary to define their physical charac

teristics. It is also necessary to understand how the physica

characteristics of space fit into air, land, and sea doctrine.132

412
Some space doctrine writers focus on the physical differ 

ences between operating in space and operating in the atmos 

phere to emphasize the point that air and space are distinc

military media.133 The organization and doctrine of forces de

signed for operating in one medium are not appropriate, thes

writers believe, for the organization and doctrine of forces in th

other. These writers focus on the physical differences of astrody

namics versus aerodynamics rather than on whether the effec

of an action in or from space is the same as actions taken in o

from the air. This could be called doctrine with a focus on

engineering, rather than doctrine focused on what one is tryin

to do to the enemy. Air and space vehicles do require differen

sorts of engineering, but the effect of a destructive strategi

attack from space (given good intelligence and similar accuracy

is likely to be the same as a destructive strategic attack from th

air (allowing for the greater energy inherent in orbital energ

states). The reason for the similarity of effect is the similar na 

ture of the advantages that air and space power hold over terres 

trial forces and political entities. US Air Force doctrine says tha

speed, range, and flexibility are among the characteristics o

airpower. It seems that a case can be made for these as charac

teristics of space power as well.

Both air and space power have the advantage of elevation

(with its corollaries, superior viewing, and energy advantage

over terrestrial forces. This difference between air and spac

forces on the one hand and terrestrial forces on the othe

unites air and space power in a very fundamental way. I

means that no matter what its physics, flight is still flight, an

that the “control and exploitation of air and space” should b

performed for very similar political purposes. If the advantage

and uses of the two media are the same or similar, it does no

seem to make a lot of doctrinal sense to try to separate them.

That said, there are physical characteristics of operations in

the space medium that make the methods for gaining contro

of the medium very different from the “air superiority” mis 

sion. First, there are certain energy-states in earth orbit tha

are of particular utility in conducting space operations. Thes

energy-states are associated with certain orbits that have bee

proven to be militarily useful. Among these, and cited by Col

413
lins of the Congressional Research Service as 

key terrain in

Military Space Forces: the Next 50 Years, are geostationary an

other equatorial earth orbits.134 Second, these orbits can b

controlled by occupation or other forms of denial in ways tha

have no analogues in air operations. It is necessary to send u

several multiship formations of air superiority fighters in mor

than one combat air patrol (CAP) “orbit” to prevent enem

aircraft from entering friendly airspace. It is only necessary t

occupy an equatorial geostationary orbit with a single long

duration “fighting RLV” at a given longitude to prevent anyon

else from putting a spacecraft there (just as with terrestria

power, blocking avenues of approach by occupying key terrain

is possible in space where it is not possible in the air). Cir 

cumstances are somewhat different for orbits that are no

fixed with respect to the earth’s surface, which describes vir 

tually all other Earth orbits. For these orbits, multiple space

craft are necessary to provide global coverage. Third, and re

lated to the previous point, the laws of orbital mechanics allow

spacecraft to persist in these decisive orbits with very littl

expenditure of energy. As a result, spacecraft on blockade o

blocking missions could stay on station without refueling sig

nificantly longer than the two to three hours characteristic o

fighter CAPs because one can maintain an orbit above th

drag of the atmosphere with the expenditure of little or n

energy. In simple terms, the air-to-air fighter’s engine is run

ning the whole time it is on patrol, the RLV’s is not.

Geostationary orbits are obviously critical to terrestria

forces because they provide stationary “relay towers” in th

sky for communication and other purposes, and may therefor

qualify as “decisive.” There are other militarily useful orbit

that may also qualify for this distinction. Among these are th

polar orbits flown by many reconnaissance satellites. As Col

lins notes, “reconnaissance and surveillance missions inclined

90 degrees sooner or later loop directly over every place on

Earth.”135 That is why he counts these orbits as “key terrain

as well, which leads one to believe that they may also b

“decisive” even though it would take many more spacecraft t

occupy them.

414
The RLV will play in this military geography of earth orbita

space in four ways. First and foremost, it gives the United

States routine access to these orbits for peaceful purposes, fo

political signaling and other nonlethal propaganda purposes

as well as for military purposes. One of these purposes will b

to take unimpeded advantage of one of the corollaries of spac

power’s elevation, superior view. A space-faring power’

awareness of what is going on on earth is far superior to tha

of nonspace-faring nations. A nation with routine access t

space will multiply that advantage with the ability to acces

any orbit at will. Second, as noted above, the RLV will be abl

to occupy these orbits to prevent others from using them

Third, it will allow the United States to engage adversar

space forces at times and places of its choosing from a posi

tion of energy advantage. Fourth, it will allow the United

States to engage adversary ground, air, and sea forces an

political entities at times and places of its choosing from 

position of energy advantage. As mentioned above, one of th

corollaries to the elevation of air and space power is the en 

ergy advantage of superior altitude (what fighter pilots cal

“God’s G”). This discussion naturally leads to a concept whic

may be most useful in understanding the importance of thi

energy advantage to space doctrine in the RLV era.

The “Gravity Well.” The earth, with its relatively stron

gravitational field, “bends” space in its vicinity to create a

attraction to nearby objects. That attraction decreases as th

inverse square of the distance from the earth. What thi

means is that objects farther away from earth (“higher up” in

the gravity well) have more gravitational potential energy tha

those below. This has obvious military implications. Collin

points this out when he says,

Military forces at the bottom of Earth’s so-called gravity well are poorly

positioned to accomplish offensive/defensive/deterrent missions,

because great energy is needed to overcome gravity during launch.

Forces at the top, on a space counterpart of the “high ground,” could

initiate action and detect, identify, track, intercept, or otherwise

respond more rapidly to attacks. Put simply, it takes less energy to

drop objects down a well than to cast them out. Forces at the top also

enjoy more maneuvering room and greater reaction time. Gravitational

pull helps, rather than hinders, space-to-Earth flights. 136

415
The military implications of the physical facts have long been

recognized, but again, the high cost of doing anything abou

them has made force application from space problematic. A

mentioned earlier, this is less a problem of policy than a lack o

a realistic and affordable way to take advantage of the leverag

that space provides. Space-to-earth kinetic energy weapons tha

would achieve the same effects as air-delivered weapons do no

merit multibillion dollar investments (current Air Force concept

of permanently orbiting space strike weapons are unmanne

and can be launched on expendables). 137 Space strike weapon

developed incidentally to highly profitable RLV operations (tha

will go on with or without those weapons) may, on the othe

hand, merit the relatively small investment required. An

example is Gen William “Billy” Mitchell’s development o

antiship bombing techniques in the early days of aviation. Th

US Army did not set out to take advantage of the energ

advantage of the airplane over the surface ship when it bough

its first airplane for the Signal Corps. Despite this, once aircrew

gained practical experience with the “reusable air vehicle

experimenting with it and finding out what it could do becam

part of the airman’s culture. A similar course for th

development of the RLV is logical and desirable.

Nature of Space Doctrine in the RLV Era. This discussion

leads to at least three possible conclusions about what th

RLV will mean to the broad outlines of space doctrine. First, i

may mean that space doctrine should become more naval

with emphasis on the protection of US economic interests in

space and protection of free access to space lines of communi

cation. This would tend to emphasize the control of the me

dium. Second, it may mean that space doctrine should be

come more aerial, focusing on the earth as the seat of politica

purpose and space as a place from which to affect those pur

poses. In the language of the US Air Force, that would b

“exploitation” of the medium. The third possibility is that ther

is some intermediate position between the first and secon

ideas, some merging of air and naval culture and doctrine tha

would be most useful for space. A comparison of the relativ

merits of all three options may shed some light on how doc 

trine writers should approach space doctrine in the RLV era.

416
1. Space Doctrine More Naval. As outlined earlier, ther

are strong arguments to support this position. The physica

characteristics of orbital space, the nature of possible opera 

tions there (blockade, mining), the ability to conduct long du 

ration patrols, and the enormous national and commercia

investment on station in orbit all lend themselves to nava

thinking. Satellites on orbit are much like commercially valu 

able islands or oil platforms in strategic locations at sea. In

addition, once in space, the RLV is far closer to a ship than t

an airplane in terms of the amount of effort required to sta

“afloat.” Aircraft must be continually “flown,” ships float mor

or less of their own accord. Even at five miles per second, th

similar characteristics of the space ship will give the crew tim

to devote its attention to other things, including interaction

with other vessels. The RLV, unlike the airplane, can rendez

vous with other spacecraft and exchange crew members o

cargo other than fuel, and doesn’t have to destroy or eve

disable adversary spacecraft to control the medium. Control o

the sea or of space does not necessarily mean using letha

firepower to destroy an adversary (as it usually does for th

airman). It can also mean interposing oneself between adver 

sary forces and the objective, occupying the objective, or non 

destructive inspection backed up with the threat of force (as in

the Gulf War maritime intercept operation). Mastering suc

operations would take a tremendous amount of time, doctrin

development, and training. If they were the priority mission

of a “space force” as a result of maritime tradition or servic

culture, there might not be much time left over for othe

important tasks that may also be done from space.

2. Space Doctrine More Aerial. Although counterintuitive

it seems fair to say that space forces become more aerial a

they look toward the earth. The fundamental elevation advan

tage of both air and space forces over terrestrial forces is th

underpinning of this assertion. Because most policy objective

for the foreseeable future will be aimed at adversary terrestria

decision makers, strategic operations (nonlethal and lethal

from space aimed at the center of the enemy’s decision-mak

ing apparatus (food drops and propaganda broadcasts to tar 

get national populations, high probability of strikes agains

417
leadership and national-level command and control as well a

other targets) are most like air operations. At the operationa

level, space power will be able to conduct air interdiction an

counterair missions, and with enough affordable force struc

ture in space (provided by the advent of the RLV), terrestria

forces should be able to call in all of the close support the

need to accomplish tactical objectives.

This leads us to the important advantage of space power ove

other forms of military power. This advantage is the previousl

cited corollary of air and space power’s elevation : higher energ

states. The energy states inherent in orbital and suborbita

spacecraft can provide an enormous amount of firepower for 

relatively small investment in the size of a given vehicle o

weapon. As Collins notes, “Offensive kinetic energy weapon

(KEW) plummeting from space to Earth at Mach 12 or more with

terrific penetration power have a marked advantage over defen 

sive Earth-to-space counterparts that accelerate slowly whil

they fight to overcome gravity.”138 Space forces will look ver

much like air forces to those who are at the receiving end o

their effects on earth. They will also look very much like ai

forces at their terrestrial bases. They must, after all, traverse th

atmosphere in order to get into space. In this respect, they ar

much like air forces, vulnerable and useless while on th

ground. The compensating factor is their range. American mili

tary RLV bases are likely to be far from the US coastline an

secured against terrorist attack. This is beyond the strategi

reach of most nations on earth. They will, however, (within th

limits of RLV response time and dispersability) be vulnerable t

intercontinental, submarine-launched, or space-launched hy

personic strikes. If such an attack were launched, though, with

or without nuclear weapons, the United States would hav

larger concerns than RLV survivability.

The demonstrated ability to strike any target on earth wit

precision and discrimination could, in fact, be a potent deter 

rent to or factor in conflict. This deterrent, unlike nuclea

weapons, could be used against nonnuclear powers withou

the collateral damage and the negative moral and politica

fallout of nuclear weapons use.

418
A notional case may be useful in developing this argumen

Assuming RLVs in orbit that are able to employ 30-poun

kinetic energy weapons using the same techniques as ICBM

bus separation, precision guidance of the type employed on

the DOD’s information network system (INS)/global position 

ing system (GPS) guided joint direct attack munition (JDAM)

and a global communications system (i.e., the proposed Irid 

ium or Teledesic cellular systems), a US ambassador any

where in the world would have a “flying gunship” that could

support him or her with precise and discriminate force whe

necessary. 139 Unmanned space-to-earth strike platforms sim

lar to ICBM reentry vehicle buses could be employed quickl

in times of crisis, as in the mine example discussed earlier

and cleared when not needed. Putting these platforms in orbi

should be no more difficult than the civil satellite deploymen

for which the RLV is being designed. This would also allow th

United States to upgrade the platforms on the ground in th

periods between crises, and would reduce their vulnerabilit

to ASATs, unlike permanent stations in orbit.

With such a capability before the Gulf War, the America

ambassador’s meeting with Saddam Hussein might have gon

a little differently. With platforms launched in the precedin

weeks passing overhead every few minutes (assuming little o

no cross-range for their weapons, 32 space ships in 90-minut

orbits would be in employment range every 45 minutes), th

ambassador could have made a case for Iraqi vulnerability t

US power by looking at her watch, making a phone call, an

asking Hussein to step to the window to watch a demonstra 

tion. (Admittedly, this example may not ring true because o

the low probability of State Department use of strategic strike

on foreign territory.) Perhaps an example of sea control from

space may seem more politically plausible. Again, assumin

little or no cross-range for the orbit-to-earth weapon, it would

take 128 orbital weapons employed by RLVs in a crisis t

revisit a maritime exclusion zone every 11 minutes. United

States or allied naval vessels enforcing international sanction

could order threatening or suspicious vessels to heave-to wit

the knowledge that they were supported with precise firepowe

from space. Hypersonic projectiles could create impressiv

419
warning shots across the bows of recalcitrant ships. If such 

situation escalates, sinking the ship from space is not onl

physically possible, but could also be much more politicall

palatable than the first scenario. 140

3. Space Doctrine as a Combination of Naval and Ai

Doctrine. The preceding discussion seems to show that opera 

tions for control of the space medium are more nautical, whil

the leverage it provides in accomplishing the most importan

national policy objectives is more like airpower.

Between the two emphases, it seems clear that in high stake

conflict, US objectives will likely be tied to some outcome o

earth rather than in space. That said, the strategic view of th

airman, whose culture and doctrine is more consonant with

such ideas, seems to be best suited to carry them forward int

space. If, on the other hand, humanity’s political centers o

gravity move outward into space, then control of the medium

and the lines of communication between these new politica

entities will become most crucial. For the foreseeable future

however, the United States is most concerned with what hap

pens in the international system here on earth. This seems t

argue fairly strongly for airmen to lead the US armed forces int

space. These airmen must, however, adapt to the naval natur

of the new medium. This may mean discarding many of th

things that make airmen unique. The destructive offensive coun

terair model as the best way to gain control of the medium ma

have to be deemphasized, as may the role of the solitary pilot. I

launch and landing are automated (which is the NASA CAN

requirement) and orbital mechanics allow the vehicle to keep on

station without much intervention, there is little need for a pilo

who is continuously at the controls. 141 Again, the terrestrial ana 

logue is the ship captain who is rarely in direct physical contro

of the helm. He or she has more important things to do. Th

ability to command a crew rather than hand-eye coordination

may become the yardstick by which space combat officers ar

measured. These new ship captains must, however, remembe

that their mission is to directly affect adversary decision makin

on earth in accordance with national political objectives, no

simply to fly around in orbit. In this, they will be more akin t

airmen than to sailors.

420
This section has attempted to show the changes in U

space doctrine that will be the outgrowth of reduced barrier

to space access. It has outlined the assumptions in curren

doctrine that will be shaken and drawn parallels betwee

what the RLV will mean for civil operators and what it wil

mean for military operators. It has also tried to use the physi

cal characteristics of space and the capabilities of the RLV t

outline a rudimentary space doctrine. The reasoning here i

handicapped, however, by the same problem besetting th

overwhelming majority of all space doctrine. It is written b

someone who has not left Earth. Nevertheless, this outline

based on the assumption that space access will soon be rou 

tine and inexpensive, may more closely reflect the realities o

the RLV era than doctrines which do not.

Summary and Conclusions

After determining that the United States is making stead

political, economic, and technical progress toward fielding a

affordable reusable launch vehicle, this study has attempted

to induce the economic and military implications of such 

development. From this, a few key themes and conclusion

can be drawn.

1. The United States is developing an RLV that will lowe

the cost of access to space early in the twenty-first century.

2. RLV operations will have significant economic impact on

the cost of today’s commercial space activities and foster th

development of new ones.

3. The RLV will have a significant impact on joint US mili

tary space doctrine.

4. The RLV will make space operations much more analo 

gous to present-day naval and air operations.

5. Of the two analogues, the similarity to air operations wil

have the greatest impact on terrestrial political structures in

the immediate future.

A short discussion of each conclusion may help to provid

direction for thinking about these issues as the United State

and the world enter the RLV era.

421
The RLV is Coming

The first conclusion that this study suggests is that the RLV

is coming soon. The president’s new Space Transportation

Policy indicates that the US government is serious abou

building a fully reusable launch vehicle that will reduce th

cost of access to space.

The idea has growing support in Congress and in the spac

policy community, if not in DOD. There is a confluence of politi

cal, economic, and technological factors creating an environ 

ment conducive to the development of a reusable rocket ship.

Economic Impact of the RLV

The first order economic consequence of the advent of th

RLV will be reduced cost access to space and reduced deman

for expendable launch vehicles. The ultimate result of reduced

ELV production would be increased prices for ELV launches

reducing demand and production even further. Eventually

prices would rise to an uneconomic level. This could presag

the end of the throwaway rocket industry, both in the United

States and abroad.

There would be at least two other economic consequences o

low-cost access to space. The first would be improvements in

the US’s economic competitiveness and balance of payments

The second would be an even further reduction in the cost o

access to space after the amortization of the cost of the RLV

In such a case, DOD would find resisting RLV technolog

more difficult, especially with the concomitant reduction on

operating costs. This would allow the US armed forces t

achieve the US’s national objectives of assured access to spac

and maintenance of its military advantage there using tech 

nologies whose cost was recouped in the private sector.

Military Impact of the RLV

The high “sortie rate” of the RLV will rapidly fill orbita

space with billions of dollars worth of politically and econom

cally important manned platforms, civil and commercial re

mote sensors, cellular communications satellites, and othe

objects. Conflicts over orbital position (which have alread

422
arisen over the desire of poor equatorial nations to 

own th

geostationary orbits over their territory) will become more fre

quent as the number of satellites increases.

Space-faring nations flying RLVs will have the ability t

monitor, threaten, sabotage, disable, or destroy the space in 

vestments of other states using techniques very similar t

those used in commercial operations. If the United States see

the possibility of such operations, then other powers may a

well. If so, the assumptions underlying US space doctrin

(difficult access to space, no role for man in space) would

become dangerously out of date.

Military Space Operations More Aerial than Naval

Space operations even in the near-term RLV era will hav

many characteristics of naval operations. Most of these char

acteristics will have to do with control of the space medium

Where military space operations intersect with terrestria

forces and political structures, space power will have more o

the characteristics of airpower. These operations, especially a

the strategic level, will be more decisive than the mission

with naval analogues.

Conclusions

The energy advantage of RLV-equipped space-forces will b

their most significant military characteristic in the context o

the present international system. As orbital energy-states be

come more accessible to larger numbers of people and group

for commercial reasons, they will also become more accessibl

for military reasons. That said, a world in which any state o

political group can buy an RLV whose cost has been amortized

by years of routine operations may be a world where there ar

new and larger threats to US security than terrestrial dictator

and intercontinental missiles.

Notes

1. Michael R. Mantz, The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power

Air University Research Report AU-ARI-94-6 (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB

423
Ala.: Air University Press, May 1995), 11; and Richard Szafranski, 

Whe

Waves Collide: Future Conflict,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1995, 80.

2. Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), 110-11.

3. S. E. Singer, “The Military Potential of the Moon,” Air University Qua

terly Review, Summer 1959, 35.

4. This treaty prohibits stationing weapons of mass destruction in spac

or any military base on the moon.

5. Dana J. Johnson, Issues in United States Space Policy, RAND PM-14

AF/A/OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1993), 3-4.

6. Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, A Post Cold War Assess

ment of US Space Policy: A Task Group Report (Washington, D.C.: Govern

ment Printing Office [GPO], 1992), 26. National Commission on Spac

Pioneering the Space Frontier (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 109.

7. Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, 7.

8. Ibid., 29.

9. NASA Access to Space Study, Summary Report (Washington, D.C

Office of Space Systems Development NASA Headquarters, January 1994)

48.

10. Homer A. Boushey, “Blueprints for Space,” Air University Quarterl

Review, Spring 1959, 18; Singer, 35.

11. Henry H. Arnold, The War Reports of General of the Army George C

Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commandin

General, Army Air Forces, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (New York: J. B

Lipincott Co., 1947), 463.

12. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14

Space Operations, final draft, 15 April 1992.

13. Szafranski, 80.

14. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of mass destruction i

space and military bases on the moon, but does not prohibit the use o

space for military purposes. This perception exists even though there are n

US policy limitations on force application from orbit. In fact, pages 11–21 o

DOD Joint Pub 3-14 says, international law “allows the development, tes

ing, and deployment of force application capabilities that involve non-nu 

clear, non-ABM weapons systems (i.e., space-to-ground kinetic energ

weapons)."

15. Report of the Task Force on the National Aero-Space Plane (WASP

Program (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, November 1992), 23.

16. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” draf

April 1994, iv.

17. Ibid.

18. NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 1; “DOD Spac

Launch Modernization Plan,” 1.

19. DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan, 30.

20. Ibid., 20.

21. “Ariane Chief Says Eastern Nations, Not US, Will Be Future Compe 

tition,” Aerospace Daily, 4 October 1993.

424
22. 

DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan, 10-11.

23. “Air Force Position on the Future of Space Lift: An Approval Brie

ing,” 2.

24. Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defens

(Patty Howe) Reference the Clinton Transition Team Tasking of 17 Decem 

ber 1992, Attached NASP Paper (Unclassified); and “Air Force Position o

the Future of Space Lift: An Approval Briefing,” 14.

25. NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 72.

26. “Air Force Position on the Future of Space Lift: An Approval Brie

ing,” 29.

27. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan,” 13, 18.

28. “DOD Appropriators Boost NASA Reusable Rocket Effort,” Spac

Business News, 11 October 1994, 3; “Air Force Wants Less Oversight an

More Insight for EELV Program,” Space Business News, 2 March 1995, 4

and Lieutenant Colonel Smith, EELV Program Manager, telephone interview

with author, May 1995.

29. Smith interview.

30. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan,” 13, 18.

31. “The First Reusable SSTO Spacecraft,” Spaceflight, March 1993, 91.

32. NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 72.

33. Ibid., 70.

34. NSTC-4.

35. “Revised NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Trans

portation Policy,” November 1994, 3.

36. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” 1994

iv.

37. Marcia S. Smith, Military Space Programs in a Changing Environ 

ment: Issues for the 103d Congress, CRS Issue Brief 92879 (Washington

D.C.: GPO, 1992), 5.

38. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” 10.

39. Ibid., 29.

40. NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 57.

41. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” 19

NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 62.

42. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” 11.

43. Marcia S. Smith, 4–5.

44. This is evident from the list of participants cited on the last page o

the SLMP. Only two, Maj Jess Sponable and Colonel Worden, had worked i

offices where there was RLV work in progress.

45. Alan W. Wilhite, Advanced Technologies for Rocket Single-Stage-to-O

bit Vehicles , Aerospace Industries Association of America (AIAA) Paper 9

0540 (New York: AIAA, January 1991).

46. “Conversations,” Aerospace America, May 1995, 12.

47. “DOD Appropriators Boost NASA Reusable Rocket Effort,” Spac

Business News, 11 October 1994, 3.

425
48. 

Revised NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Trans

portation Policy,” 7.

49. “Air Force Wants Less Oversight and More Insight for EELV Pro

gram,” Space Business News, 2 March 1995, 5.

50. “Sailing Space on the Clipper Ship,” Final Frontier, December 1993

52.

51. Charles “Pete” Conrad, Beyond the NASA Shuttle, remarks to th

Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy, George C. Marsha

Institute, Washington, D.C., 8 November 1994, 8.

52. William A. Gaubatz, “Designing for Routine Space Access,” McDon 

nell Douglas Corp., briefing, 10.

53. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan Executive Summary,” 19.

54. NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 57.

55. Martin Marietta Corp., “Propulsion and Cost Considerations for 

Single Stage to Orbit Launch System,” proprietary briefing, 6 Decembe

1993, 5; and NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 60.

56. There are other charges against SSTO technology, but these ar

representative of the thinking of the opponents.

57. Briefing, Martin Marietta Corp.

58. David I. Chato and William J. Taylor, Small Experiments for th

Maturation of Orbital Cryogenic Transfer Technologies, NASA-TM-10584

E-7295, NAS 1.15:105849, September 1992; William J. Bailey and Dougla

H. Beekman, Ullage Exchange—An Attractive Option for On-Orbit Cryoge

Resupply, AIAA Paper 90-0511 (New York: AIAA, January 1990); and Ai

Force Human Resources Laboratory, On-Orbit Refueling (Wright-Patterso

AFB, Ohio: Air Force Human Resource Laboratory, February 1993).

59. “Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advanced Technology Demonstrato

X-33"; ”NASA Cooperative Agreement Notice," 12 January 1995, A-5.

60. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan,” 4.

61. Briefing, Martin Marietta Corp.

62. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, “Single Stage Rocket Tech

nology, Program Status and Future Systems Feasibility Assessment,” brie

ing, August 1992, 15.

63. “Rocket on a Round-Trip,” Discover, May 1995, 54.

64. Russell Hannigan and David Webb, Spaceflight in the Aero-Spac

Plane Era, AIAA Paper 91-5089 (New York: AIAA, December 1991), 6.

65. Ibid.

66. For the ELV, 18 percent of $135 million is $24.3 million for a tot

cost of $159.3 million. For the RLV, 10 percent of a total launch co

including payload of $85 million is $8.5 million. This gives a total cost o

$93 million—$66.3 million less than the ELV mission. Part of the payload t

LEO for the ELV is the upper stage required to get the satellite to GEO. Fo

a 20,000-pound-class payload in LEO, about 8,000 pounds gets to GEO.

67. “DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan,” 1994, 5.

68. Dietrich E. Koelle and Michael Obersteiner, Orbital Transfer System

for Lunar Missions, IAF Paper 91-181, October 1991.

426
69. Where g is the acceleration due to earth

s gravity, Isp is rocket engin

vacuum specific impulse in seconds, M0 is starting mass, ME is endin

mass, and PMF is propellant mass fraction or the fraction of the gros

vehicle weight that is fuel as opposed to structure—the critical number fo

SSTO and why breakthroughs in lightweight materials have been necessar

to make it a possibility; Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, briefing

28; Robert M. Zubrin and Mitchell B. Clapp, An Examination of the Feasibi

ity of Winged SSTO Vehicles Utilizing Aerial Propellant Transfer, AIAA Pape

94-2923 (New York: AIAA, June 1994), 1.

70. Elske A. P. Smith and Kenneth C. Jacobs, Introductory Astronom

and Astrophysics (Philadelphia, Pa.: W. B. Saunders Co., 1973), 529; an

Hannigan and Webb, 3.

71. Hannigan and Webb, 5–6.

72. “Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advanced Technology Demonstrato

X-33"; “NASA Cooperative Agreement Notice,” A–5.

73. NASA’s Access to Space Study suggests that RLVs “would lowe

launch costs so dramatically that US industry could underprice all compet

tors,” NASA Access to Space Study Summary Report, 68.

74. “Revised NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Trans

portation Policy,” 13.

75. “Marshall Engineers Barred From X-33 Effort,” Space News, 8–1

May 1995, 1.

76. “Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advanced Technology Demonstrato

X-33"; ”NASA Cooperative Agreement Notice," iii.

77. “Revised NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Trans

portation Policy,” 7.

78. “Can a Reusable Launch Vehicle Be Developed without NASA’

Money?” Space Business News, 30 March 1995, 2.

79. Philip Bono and Kenneth Gatland, Frontiers of Space (New Yor

Macmillan, 1976), 182–83.

80. “Single Stage Technology, Space Policy for Opening Up the Spac

Frontier; Single-Stage Rocket VTOL,” Spaceflight, July 1994, 219.

81. “Federal Express Offers Consulting Services to RLV Teams,” Spac

Business News, 13 April 1995, 6.

82. Andrew Wilson, The Eagle Has Wings: The Story of American Spac

Exploration, 1945–1975 (London: British Interplanetary Society, 1982), 8.

83. Ibid.

84. G. Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren

tice-Hall, 1981), 29.

85. Ibid.

86 . Martin Marietta Corp.

87. “Air Force Position on the Future of Space Lift: An Approval Brie

ing,” 3 December 1992, primary backup chart 1.

88. “Rocket on a Round Trip,” Discover, May 1995, 56.

89. “Revised NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Trans

portation Policy,” 11.

427
90. The X-33 Home Page for Space Activists, http://www.contrib.an

drew.cmu.edu/usr/fj04/x33.html; The NASA/Marshall Space Flight Cente

RLV Home Page, http://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/rlv_htmls/rlvl.html; and Delt

Clipper/SSRT Program, http://gargravarr.cc.utexas.edu/delta-clipper/t

tle.html.

91. Joint Pub 3-14, 11–8.

92. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Wash

ington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 10.

93. Joint Pub 3-14, I-7, II-11.

94. Ibid.

95. Arnold, 455.

96. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in th

United States Air Force, vol. 2, 1961–1984 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Universi

Press, 1989), 691; John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Year

(New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 53.

97. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of America Se

Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), 273–75.

98. Quoted in Kenneth Hagan, 275.

99. Joint Pub 3-14, III-1.

100. Ibid., III-4.

101. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 18.

102. Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, “45 Years of Global Reac

and Power: 1947–1992" (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992).

103. See Tom Blow, Defending Against a Space Blockade, CADRE Repo

AU-ARI-CP-89-3 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: n.p., December 1989).

104. Unclassified on-orbit satellite force structure numbers, limited b

high launch and payload costs, range from two for DMSP weather satellite

to five for fleet composite communications system (USN) (FLTSATCOM) na

val communications satellites. National asset program numbers would b

limited by the same factors. These forces are not very maneuverable and ar

vulnerable to primitive ASATs as will be described later, ergo, “few an

fragile.”

105. Scott Smith, Preliminary Analysis of the Benefits Derived to US A

Force Spacecraft from On-Orbit Refueling, Air Force Logistics Comman

Study, February 1993; William I. Shanney, On-Orbit Servicing for US A

Force Space Missions-A Phased Development Approach, proceedings of th

International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, Robots and Automatio

in Space, Kobe, Japan, November 1990.

106. House, Strategic Satellite Systems in a Post-Cold War Environmen

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of th

Committee on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1994, 48–49.

107. The National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontie

(New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 7.

108. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years (Washington

D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 43.

109. Pioneering the Space Frontier, 85.

428
110. Telecon with Maj Jess Sponable, DC-X Program Manager, 14 De 

cember 1992.

111. This assumes final cost of extracted lunar oxygen and hydrogen i

similar to present cost (infrastructure excluded).

112. This complies with Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which the Unite

States has signed, and does not comply with the Moon Treaty of 1979

which the United States has not signed. This is not to say there are n

political issues to be considered. If the president’s policy is to remain th

major economic power in space, this is one way to do so.

113. “RLV Advanced Technology Demonstrator X-33"; ”NASA Coopera

tive Agreement Notice," A-5.

114. Zubrin and Clapp, 1.

115. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 10.

116. Joint Pub 3-14, II-21.

117. Air Force Space Command briefing.

118. Ibid.

119. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 173-13, Attachment A15-1, “Aircraf

Reimbursement Rates Per Flying Hour, US Government (Excluding DOD)

30 November 1991.

120. Stine, 82.

121. Michael J. Muolo, AU-18, Space Handbook. A Warfighter’s Guide t

Space (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), Vol. 1, 85; Sir Pete

Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War,” in The First Informa 

tion War, Alan D. Campen, ed. (Fairfax, Va.: Air Forces Communication

and Electronics Association [AFCEA] International Press, 1992), 128, 130.

122. Anson and Cummings, 121 .

123. “Conversations,” Aerospace America, May 1995, 12.

124. Air Force Space Command briefing, 5.

125. Collins, 123.

126. R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945 (Chelsea, Mich.: Scarboroug

House, 1991), 96.

127. This was partly because of its association with the politically un

pleasant memory of World War I’s “unrestricted submarine warfare.”

128. “Beam Me Down, Scotty,” Time Daily News Summary, 3 Februar

1995. Interestingly, the Russians were reluctant to let a possibly defectiv

US space shuttle flown by a human pilot within 30 feet of Mir on the fir

shuttle-Mir rendezvous mission.

129. There is very little mention of weather, for example in Giuli

Douhet’s Command of the Air. Some attribute this to the fact that Douhe

was not himself a flier.

130. The RLV could perform ship-to-satellite reconnaissance, ship-to

earth reconnaissance, orbital intercept and rendezvous, satellite grapplin

and capture, strategic attacks, and a myriad of other tasks that seem t

require some human intervention.

131. As laid out in three “Axioms of Space Combat Power” by Lt Co

Michael R. Mantz in The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Powe

429
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 

Axiom 1. Space strik

systems can be employed decisively by striking earth forces, both inde 

pendently and jointly. . . . Axiom 2. Space-strike systems can be employe

decisively in war when the enemy’s essential means for waging war (indus

try, transportation, and communication) are vulnerable to attack from

space. . . . Axiom 3. Space-strike systems can be employed decisively b

striking at the decision-making structure (leadership and command an

control) of the enemy.” Mantz, 75–76.

132. Clausewitz was more fortunate in von Krieg because most of hi

readers understood how horses and the firearms of the day worked. Th

contrast with modern doctrine is stark. Today, lengthy technical explana

tions are necessary before even getting to subjects as important as th

subject of policy.

133. For example, see Michael Wolfert, “Concept Paper on Space Organ

izational Options” (paper for the DOD Roles and Missions Commission, 1

December 1994), 9.

134. Collins, 23.

135. Ibid., 24.

136. Ibid., 23.

137. Mantz, 20.

138. Collins, 56.

139. Warheads of this size were tested recently in hypersonic weapon

effects tests at Sandia National Labs. Orbital versions of these weapon

would have to weigh more than 30 pounds when launched because eac

would need a small rocket motor to impart about 7,450 fps of _v to deorbit

140. Mantz, 48.

141. “Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advanced Technology Demonstra

tor X-33"; “NASA Cooperative Agreement Notice,” A-5.

430
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435
Chapter 8

Concepts of Operations for a Reusable

Launch Space Vehicle

Michael A. Rampino

The objective of NASA’s technology demonstration effort is

to support government and private sector decisions by the

end of this decade on development of an operational

next-generation reusable launch system.

The objective of DoD’s effort to improve and evolve current

ELVs is to reduce costs while improving reliability,

operability, responsiveness, and safety.

The United States Government is committed to encouraging

a viable commercial U.S. space transportation industry.

US National Space Transportation Policy

5 August 1994

Introduction

On 18 May 1996, the United States took another small step

toward maturity as a space-faring nation. Under the scorchin

sun of the New Mexico desert, an attentive media corps read

ied their cameras. Ground and flight crews monitored con 

soles and waited for the latest global positioning updates to b

received and processed. At 0812:02, a small, pyramid-shaped

rocket, the McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA) DC-XA, ros

from its launch mount on a column of smoke and fire. Unlik

today’s operational spaceships, this one landed on its fee

after a 61-second flight with all its components intact. Thi

ninth flight of the Delta Clipper experimental rocket was n

giant leap for mankind given the limited capabilities of th

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, PhD

Reader: Dr Karl Mueller, PhD

437
vehicle, but it proved once again that reusable rockets are 

reality—today. 1

The US military must be prepared to take advantage o

reusable launch vehicles (RLV) should the National Aeronauti

cal Space Administration (NASA)-industry effort to develop a

RLV technology demonstrator prove successful. 2 The focus o

this study is an explanation of how the US military could us

RLVs, by describing and analyzing two alternative concepts o

operations (CONOPS).

The most recent National Space Transportation Policy as

signed the lead role in evolving today’s expendable launc

vehicles (ELV) to the Department of Defense (DOD). It as

signed NASA the lead role in working with industry on RLVs

The United States Air Force (USAF), as the lead space lif

acquisition agent within the DOD, is an active participant in

RLV development but with limited responsibility and authorit

since it is a NASA-led program.4 USAF leadership has main 

tained interest in the program but has focused on ensurin

continued access to space without incurring the technical ris

of relying on RLV development. The USAF’s initiation of th

evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program reflect

this approach.5

As of this writing, the USAF, on behalf of DOD, is formulat

ing and defining DOD requirements for an RLV in an effort t

plan for a possible transition from ELVs to RLVs. Specifically

the NASA-USAF integrated product team (IPT) for Spac

Launch Activities is currently examining “operational RLV

DOD requirements.”6 In addition, the USAF’s Phillips Labora 

tory started a Military Spaceplane Applications Workin

Group in August 1995 which may indirectly help identif

DOD’s RLV needs.7 This research is intended to contribute t

the ongoing process by describing how the US military should

use RLVs.

To help remedy the lack of specific DOD requirements for a

operational RLV, this study identifies CONOPS for military us

of such a vehicle. Obviously, identifying CONOPS requires ad

dressing other issues along the way. For instance, the attrib 

utes of an operational RLV must first be identified to facilitat

development of the alternative CONOPS. If there are new mis 

438
sions enabled by the vehicle

s reusable nature, mission

which are not feasible using ELVs or the Space Transportation

System (STS) (also known as the shuttle), they must be identi

fied as well. Given the timeline of the RLV program, the yea

2012 is a reasonable estimated date for the fielding of a

operational system. This date will serve as the basis for analy

sis in this study.

Four assumptions are worth mentioning at the outset. Firs

the estimate that RLV technology could become operationall

feasible by 2012 is reasonable. Second, a fiscally constrained

environment will continue. Third, the US government will con 

tinue to support growth and development of the US commer 

cial space lift industry and encourage dual-use, or perhap

triple-use, of related facilities and systems.8 Fourth, the U

government’s national security strategy will continue to em 

phasize international leadership and engagement to furthe

American political, economic, and security objectives.

Given the assumptions of fiscal constraint and a govern 

ment policy of cooperation with and encouragement of the U

commercial space lift industry, any military RLV acquisition

strategy will do well to take maximum advantage of possibl

dual-use or triple-use opportunities and economies of scale

For instance, the US military could pursue development of 

military RLV which would share design similarities (i.e., hard

ware components) with commercial RLVs to the greatest prac

tical extent, minimizing military-unique design requirement

and thereby lowering costs. Such an approach would also tak

advantage of the economies of scale possible if the commercia

space lift industry were to operate an RLV similar to the on

manufactured for the military. Of course, this assumes ther

is a need for a military-unique RLV—not just military use of 

commercially produced and operated RLV.

Military RLV Requirements

One answer to the research question proposed earlier migh

be that the DOD does not need RLVs. There may be no re

quirement for them. One way to confirm or deny this assertion

is to examine the relevant requirements documentation.

439
Space Lift Requirements. An Air Force Space Comman

briefing on mission area plan (MAP) alignments and defini

tions lists four functions for a “reusable spacecraft for militar

ops”: strike, transport, space recovery, and reconnaissance

However, the most recent space lift MAP takes a more conser 

vative approach. Using the strategies-to-tasks methodology

the MAP documents five tasks of space lift derived through th

mission area assessment process: launching spacecraft, em 

ploying the ranges to support these launches, performin

transspace operations, recovering space assets, and plannin

and forecasting government and commercial launches.1 0 Pri

oritized space lift deficiencies are determined through mission

needs analysis. These nine deficiencies are mainly cost-related

concerns but also include two capability related deficiencies

“cannot perform transspace operations,” and “no DoD capabil

ity to perform recovery and return.”1 1 The mission solution

analysis concludes that the EELV is the number one priorit

in the midterm (within 10 years) although RLVs, orbital trans

fer vehicles (OTV), and a space-based range system are desir 

able in the long term (within 25 years). 1 2 The five key space lif

solutions are developing the EELV, completing range up

grades, cooperating with NASA in their RLV program, develop

ing advanced expendable and reusable upper stage systems

and fielding space-based range systems. 1 3 Although potentia

RLV applications in other mission areas such as reconnais 

sance and strike are discussed, these are seen as long-term

(10–25 years) capabilities.

The fact that the USAF’s MAP for space lift (DOD’s by de

fault) does not aggressively pursue the potential of RLVs is no

surprising. Being based on the strategies-to-task framework

the MAP process will not identify a deficiency or state a re

quirement when there is no existing higher-level objective o

task calling for that capability. Further, the National Spac

Transportation Policy clearly identifies NASA as the lea

agency for RLV technology demonstration, not the DOD

(USAF). Finally, the USAF’s low-risk approach is under 

standable given the very real need to ensure continued acces

to space in support of national security requirements. The las

time our country put all of its space lift eggs in one basket, th

440
STS, major disruptions in access to space for national securit

payloads resulted when the basket broke. The 1986 Cha

lenger accident combined with our national policy to empha

size use of the STS over expendable launch vehicles created 

situation USAF space lift leaders never want to see repeated.1 

Given these factors, it is laudable that the space lift MAP

identifies transspace operations and recovery and return a

capability deficiencies and foresees the use of RLVs in recon 

naissance and strike missions. These two deficiencies will no

be satisfied by EELV development, but they could be used t

derive requirements for military use of an RLV.

Commander in Chief, USSPACE Command Desires. It i

interesting to note that a different approach to generatin

requirements, a revolutionary planning approach, has identi

fied RLVs as promising for broader military applications an

sparked the interest of America’s most senior military spac

commander.1 5 In a 1995 message discussing implementation

of the conclusions and recommendations of the Air Force Sci

entific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas study, Gen Josep

W. Ashy, commander in chief of United States Space Com 

mand (CINCSPACE) and commander of Air Force Space Com 

mand, identified reusable launch vehicles as one of the mos

important technologies cited in the findings of this revolution 

ary planning effort.

General Ashy identified the capabilities to “take-off on de

mand, overfly any location in the world in approximately on

hour and return and land within two hours at the take-of

base” as desirable. He further suggested reconnaissance, sur

veillance, and precision employment of weapons as potentia

RLV applications. 1 6

Requirements Identified. For the purpose of explorin

military RLV concept of operations, this study identifies space

craft launch and recovery, transspace operations, strike (in

and from space), and reconnaissance as potential RLV tasks

The first two tasks flow from the space lift MAP.

The second two tasks are not identified as tasks for spac

lift in the MAP, probably because of the inherent near-term

emphasis of the MAP, but may prove feasible with RLVs. Fur

441
ther, as shown above, they have been identified as potentia

RLV applications by the CINCSPACE.

Project Overview

Before developing and analyzing CONOPS for military use o

RLVs, current RLV concepts and attributes are summarized

and hypothetical attributes of a notional RLV for use in mili

tary applications are suggested in the next section. Identifyin

these notional RLV attributes is a necessary step in the proc 

ess of answering the research question; they are not intended

to be the final word on military RLV design.

Following the discussion of RLV concepts and attributes

another section presents two CONOPS. The two operation

concepts are intended roughly to represent military spac

plane advocates’ visions in the first case and to be a logica

extension of the current RLV program’s goals in the secon

case. An analysis of these concepts of operations is provided

The criteria used in the analysis include capability, cost, op

erations efficiency and effectiveness, and politics. The last sec

tion in this chapter summarizes significant conclusions an

recommends a course of action for the US military to pursu

with respect to RLVs.

RLV Concepts and Attributes

To facilitate CONOPS development and analysis, this chap

ter summarizes current RLV concepts and attribute, and sug

gests hypothetical attributes of a notional RLV for use in mili

tary applications. These notional RLV attributes are no

intended to serve as the final word on RLV design, as a

endorsement of any particular company’s concept, or as 

recommendation regarding whether an RLV should take off o

land vertically or horizontally. Describing the attributes of a

RLV is simply required to provide a basis for the subsequen

analysis.

Before stating these attributes, this section first presents a

overview of the three RLV concepts proposed by Lockheed

Advanced Development Company (LADC), MDA, and Rockwel

Space Systems Division (RSSD), as well as the Black Hors

442
transatmospheric vehicle (TAV) concept made popular by Ai

University’s SPACECAST 2020 project. Next, RLV attribute

are discussed in terms of the requirements introduced earlier

Finally, this chapter presents the attributes of a notional RLV

to be used for further analysis.

Representative RLV Concepts

Definitions. The lexicon associated with RLVs can be con 

fusing. Often, the term RLV is used interchangeably wit

terms like SSTO, for single-stage-to-orbit; TAV, for transa

mospheric vehicle ; and MSP, for military spaceplane. Unfortu 

nately, there doesn’t appear to be a consensus that thes

terms are interchangeable. RLV is not interchangeable wit

SSTO. A one-piece expendable rocket might also achieve orbi

with a single stage, and a completely reusable multistage vehi

cle could be constructed. TAV tends to be used in connection

with winged, aircraft-like vehicles that operate substantially in

the atmosphere while maintaining some capability to reac

orbit. MSP appears to be more general, including RLVs an

TAVs used for military applications. For the sake of clarity

RLV is used here to refer to a completely reusable vehicl

which is capable of achieving earth orbit while carrying som

useful payload and then returning.

RLV Concepts. Three companies are currently participatin

in Phase I of the NASA-industry RLV program, the concep

definition and technology development phase. One of thes

three will be selected to continue developing its RLV concep

in Phase II of the program, the demonstration phase. NAS

has scheduled source selection to be complete by July 1996.1 

The winner of this source selection will develop an advanced

technology demonstration vehicle, the X-33, which will b

used to conduct flight tests in 1999. The focus of this secon

phase will be to demonstrate aircraft-like operations and pro 

vide enough evidence to support a decision on whether or no

to proceed with the next phase in the year 2000. Phase III o

the RLV program would include commercial development an

RLV operations. 1 8 The decision to enter Phase III will be 

complex one. It will depend on Phase II results as well a

many other contextual factors bearing on decision makers a

443
the turn of the century. In keeping with the recommendation

of NASA’s Access to Space Study, all phases of the RLV pro 

gram are to be “driven by efficient operations rather tha

attainment of maximum performance levels.”1 9

All the RLV concepts are currently focused on satisfying th

requirement to deliver and retrieve cargo from the Interna

tional Space Station, Alpha (ISSA). This, perhaps artificially

drives a certain payload requirement (table 35). 2 0 All thre

concepts use cryogenic propellants, liquid oxygen and liquid

hydrogen (LOX/LH2 ), to achieve high specific impulse. 21 Othe

common attributes are based on objectives of the RLV pro 

gram, such as the mission life and maintenance require 

ments. 2 2 The required thrust-to-weight ratio (F/W), specifi

impulse (I sp), and mass fraction are based on current esti

mates and analysis. 2 3 Current cost estimates are based on

paper studies. The estimates vary widely and are affected b

the size of the RLV, the number built, whether or not they ar

certified to fly over land, the basing scheme, other aspects o

the concept of operations, and the acquisition strategy, t

name just a few of the factors involved. 2 4 For example, 

smaller, lighter, and less capable (with respect to payload

RLV would presumably prove cheaper to build and face les

technical risk in development.2 5

Where the three RLV concepts diverge is in their propulsion

systems and takeoff and landing concepts. Lockheed Ad 

vanced Development Company’s RLV would be a lifting bod

using linear aerospike rocket engines as opposed to more tra 

ditional rocket engines with bell-shaped nozzles. 2 6 The vehicl

would take off vertically and land horizontally (VTHL). McDon 

nell Douglas Aerospace’s RLV would be a conical reentry bod

using traditional bell-shaped nozzle rocket engines. The vehi

cle would takeoff vertically and land vertically (VTVL). Rock

well Space System Divisions RLV would be a winged bod

using traditional bell-shaped nozzle engines.27 Like the Lock 

heed concept, Rockwell’s is a VTHL vehicle (see fig. 11 for a

artist’s concept of all three vehicles).

Black Horse. The Black Horse TAV concept was identified

by Air University’s SPACECAST 2020 as the most promisin

space lift idea evaluated by the team.28 The Black Horse i

444
included here for comparison because it continues to be o

interest to military spaceplane advocates and provides an in 

teresting contrast to the concepts being explored under th

NASA-led RLV program. However, this is comparing apple

and oranges to a great extent.

The Black Horse does not come close to achieving the RLV

payload capability (see table 35). 2 9 Also, some analysts hav

doubts about its technical feasibility. 3 0 Even if Black Hors

were technically feasible, the market for small payloa

launchers is highly competitive and includes the most opera 

tionally responsive of all expendable vehicles.3 1 This would

likely limit Black Horse’s utility to only military missions, an

perhaps just a subset of those.

Discussion of Requirements

Officially stated requirements for the RLV concepts cur

rently being proposed do not include conducting military op

erations such as reconnaissance and strike (in and from

space). As discussed earlier, there is growing support for de

Figure 11. Current RLV Concepts

445
446
veloping a system that is capable of accomplishing these mis 

sions. It will be a great challenge to identify a system that ca

meet these military requirements, does not require a grea

increase in the military space budget, and also satisfies civi

(non-DOD government) and commercial needs.

Payload. The payload capability required of an RLV is 

very important attribute. Determining the desired payloa

weight and size capability based on anticipated require

ments for delivering and retrieving satellites and other carg

to and from orbit, flying reconnaissance payloads to spac

and back, and delivering weapons on the other side of th

earth is not enough. Determining the desired payload weigh

and size must also be tempered by the technical risks

monetary costs, and operational costs which might be in 

curred as a result of establishing the payload requiremen

The payload requirement drives the vehicle’s physical size

engine performance requirements, development cost, an

other attributes. There is general, although not complete

consensus that a smaller RLV than currently conceived b

NASA may be more feasible. An argument for the smalle

vehicle can be made based on three factors.3 2

First, the National Research Council’s 1995 assessment o

the RLV Technology Development and Test Program indicated

that scaleability of structures from the X-33 test vehicle to 

full-scale RLV is an area of uncertainty. 3 3 The report also con 

cluded that “an increase of 30 percent or more” in curren

rocket engine performance will be required for the full-scal

RLV.3 4 The X-33 engine will not satisfy full-scale RLV perform

ance requirements, so development of a new engine will b

required. The report estimates it will take a decade to de

velop.35 The report does not comment on the feasibility o

developing a full-scale RLV but identifies the necessary engin

development as a “difficult challenge.”3 6 These conclusion

suggest that developing an RLV closer in size to the X-3

would minimize potential scaleability problems and reduce th

requirement for increased engine performance. The resul

would be less technical risk.

Second, incurring less technical risk may also directly con 

tribute to incurring less financial risk. If RLV development ca

447
avoid the need to develop engines with thrust-to-weight ratio

of more than 75, then nonrecurring costs may be reduced

Cost is an important consideration for both government an

commercial funding. Reducing the cost of access to space, no

performance, is the primary driver for the RLV program.

Third, the greatest demand for launch services is not in th

area of delivering 40,000-pound payloads to low earth orbi

(LEO). Recent forecasts show the greatest demand to be in th

medium and small payload class, not more than 20,00

pounds to LEO, and less than 10,000 pounds to geosynchro 

nous transfer orbit (GTO). 37 These forecasts may indicate tha

sizing an RLV to compete in this market is more likely t

result in a successful commercial development. Developing 

less expensive vehicle that can satisfy commercial require

ments as well as the majority of government requirements ha

the greatest potential for economic development. Of course, 

larger RLV could deliver smaller payloads, perhaps more tha

one at a time, but it is not at all clear that using the large

RLV would be more efficient. The Titan IIIC, a large space lifte

originally designed to support launches of the Dyna-Soa

spaceplane, never quite caught on as a commercial vehicle

The Ariane 5 was originally designed to launch the Europeans

Hermes spaceplane which has since been canceled.3 8 It re

mains to be seen if the heavy-lift Ariane 5 can become 

commercial success without government assistance.3 9

An argument against developing a smaller vehicle can b

made based on the fact that it would not satisfy all the govern 

ment’s requirements. For instance, it might not be able to delive

the necessary cargo loads to the space station or launch th

largest national security payloads. Some suggest that even com 

mercial payload size is on the increase.4 0 This deficiency coul

be addressed in several ways. First, a large RLV could be devel

oped after the smaller version, allowing more time for technolog

maturation and the development of an experience base with th

smaller RLVs. In the interim, the large government payload

could be delivered using existing systems or the heavy-lift ver 

sion of DOD’s EELV projected to be available in 2005. 4 1 Second

the large payloads could, in theory, be made smaller, by takin

advantage of miniaturization or by assembling modular compo

448
nents in orbit. Making payloads smaller may not be a pana 

cea, especially for space-station loads, but there is some evi

dence that the DOD is moving in this direction.4 2 Third, 

technique referred to as a pop-up maneuver may be used t

deliver large payloads with a smaller RLV. This would entai

flying the RLV on a suborbital trajectory to deploy larger pay

loads into LEO than it would be possible to deploy if the RLV

itself had to achieve orbit.4 3 The pop-up maneuver requires th

physical dimensions of the payload bay in the smaller RLV t

be sized to accommodate the largest payloads the vehicle i

planned to fly. It also forces the RLV to land downrange an

be flown back to the primary operating base.

Cargo area dimensions for an RLV are under study, an

recommendations vary considerably. NASA’s Access to Spac

Study considered payload bay lengths of 30 and 45 feet—larg

enough for space station cargo but still too small for som

national security needs.4 4 The USAF’s Phillips Lab has pro 

posed a 25-foot-long payload bay to satisfy military require

ments. 4 5 One RLV competitor, Rockwell, believes a 45-foo

payload bay is needed even to accommodate “future genera 

tions of commercial satellites and their upper stages.”4 6

Propulsion and Mass Fraction. Propulsion and mass frac

tion are important attributes of an RLV but are not stated a

desired attributes here. The appropriate figures would resul

from design of an RLV to meet other requirements.

Takeoff and Landing Concept. An RLV’s methods of take

off and landing are significant to the extent that they affect it

operations. Obviously, the need for a runway limits basin

and delivery access options. The VTHL vehicles will also re

quire some means for erection prior to launch. On the othe

hand, even a VTVL vehicle will require some unique basin

support, such as a 150-foot square grate. 4 7 Both approache

require cryogenic fuel facilities which are not typically avail

able at most airfields. Perhaps more important than whethe

an RLV lands vertically or horizontally is the overall ease an

simplicity of operations achieved through its design.

Cross-range Capability. The term cross-range capability , a

used here, refers to the ability of an RLV to maneuver within

the atmosphere upon its return from space. This does no

449
include the ability of an RLV to change its orbital path whil

in space. 4 8 The ability of an RLV to maneuver within the at

mosphere can be a significant advantage during contingencie

requiring an abort while ascending or a change in landin

location while returning from a mission. This capability could

also prove useful in military applications. For ascent contin 

gency purposes, 600 nautical miles (NM) is adequate.4 9 If th

vehicle must land at the same base from which it took off afte

one revolution around the earth, then a cross range on th

order of 1,100–1,200 NM is required. 5 0 The cross-range capa 

bility requirement for certain military missions could poten 

tially be higher.

Turnaround Time. For commercial and civilian applica 

tions, this attribute is primarily an efficiency question. It wil

contribute to determining how many RLVs are needed and th

nature of launch base facilities. For military missions, thi

attribute is not only related to efficiency but effectiveness a

well. Reconnaissance and strike missions in particular could

be facilitated by shorter turnaround times.

Related to turnaround time is the issue of responsiveness

how long it takes to prepare an RLV for launch. Again, mili

tary missions are likely to demand quicker response times.

Mission Life. This attribute is closely related to costs. Give

the current uncertain state of RLV technology, it is hard t

predict what a reasonable mission life would be, so the figur

of one hundred has been established. Some think a five hun

dred-mission life is a reasonable expectation.51 The frequenc

of required depot maintenance is also difficult to anticipate. 5 2

Other Attributes. There are several other attributes not ye

addressed which can significantly affect RLV operations, suc

as the ability to operate in adverse weather conditions an

crew size. Today’s space lift vehicles are severely constrained

by weather, from lightning potential, to winds at altitude, t

winds on the surface. 5 3 Delays due to weather can add to th

cost of operations and dramatically decrease responsiveness

A truly operational RLV, especially one which will conduc

military missions, should be able to operate in all but th

most extreme weather conditions. A truly operational RLV

should also require smaller operations crews than are re

450
quired by current systems. Today, thousands of people ar

employed in STS launch base operations at the Kenned

Space Center. Unmanned, expendable launch vehicle opera 

tions at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station require hundreds o

people to launch a vehicle. These figures should be well unde

one hundred for an operational RLV. 5 4 Finally, all payload

should use standard containers and interfaces to facilitat

operations efficiency and responsiveness. 5 5

Desired Attributes for a Notional RLV

A review of current concepts under study and developmen

in support of the RLV program provides reasonable bounds fo

requirements or desired attributes for a notional RLV whic

could be used to support military missions. At the same time

one of the assumptions underlying this study is continued

fiscal constraint. This assumption is the basis for a desire t

maximize dual or triple use (i.e., military, civil governmenta

and commercial use) of an operational RLV to the greates

extent practical. If more user requirements can be satisfied

especially those of commercial operators, it is more likely tha

funding will be available and that economies of scale can b

achieved. Of course, trying to satisfy too many requirement

with one vehicle could lead to failure. Defense procuremen

history is filled with programs that attempted to satisfy s

many users that they failed to stay within budget, stay on

schedule, or deliver the desired operational capability. Wit

this caution in mind, the attributes of a notional RLV to b

used as the basis for analysis are described below.

The notional RLV should be able to deliver 20,000 pound

to a circular LEO with an altitude of one hundred NM (tabl

36). This payload weight capability should also allow the vehi

cle to deliver commercial communications satellite-sized pay

loads to GTO, carry reconnaissance payloads on orbital o

suborbital missions, and deliver significantly more weapon

payload than today’s F-16 and F-117 fighter aircraft or a

much as an SS-18 heavy intercontinental ballistic missil

(ICBM). 56 Its propulsion system’s attributes are not described

or stated as requirements, but based on current RLV concept

the assumption is that cryogenic rocket engines will be used

451
The method of takeoff or landing is also not specified. T

provide a basis for analysis, it will be assumed that any RLV

operating base will need no longer than a 10,000-foot runway

If a VTVL vehicle is pursued, this requirement might still exis

in practice if it is necessary or desirable to supply an operat

ing base rapidly using large transport aircraft. In any case

this assumption should not constrain choices of operatin

bases too severely. An RLV used for military applications mus

have shorter turnaround and response times than what migh

be necessary or desired for commercial and civil applications

but a nominal one-day turnaround, 12 hours for contingen 

cies, and a six-hour response time do not seem unreasonabl

based on current concepts. Standard payload containers an

interfaces would be used for all missions. Finally, mission lif

and costs are essentially accepted from the current concept

with one exception. Given the choice of an RLV with les

Table 36

Summary of Attributes of a Notional RLV

Attribute Value

Payload Size and Weight 20K lbs. to 100 NM circular orbit (due east)

30-foot-long cargo area

Propulsion As necessary (LOX/LH2 propellant rocket engines

 based on current concepts)

Mode of Takeoff

 and Landing

As necessary (assume 10K foot airfield required

 at any RLV base)

Required Runway Length 10K feet maximum (if necessary at all)

Cross-range Capability 1,100 NM minimum

Turnaround Time 1-day nominal, 12-hour contingency (6-hour response)

Mission Life 100 minimum

Depot maintenance after 20+ missions

Development Cost $4–13B

Cost Per Mission Annual Costs: $0.50B for 4 RLV squadron <$1Klb.

452
payload capability, the cost figures are estimated to be in th

lower end of the range established for a full-scale RLV.

RLV Concepts and Attributes Summary

The concepts being proposed for a full-scale RLV under th

NASA-industry RLV program are driven by requirement

which may not be completely compatible with requirement

for a military RLV. The large, full-scale RLV may not target th

space lift market in the most economically viable way. Give

the potential to reduce technical risk, save money, and mor

effectively target the vast majority of user requirements, thes

attributes for a notional RLV can serve as a basis for CONOP

development and further analysis.

Concepts of Operations

This section presents an outline of two concepts of opera 

tions. The first concept, CONOPS A, is intended to be repre

sentative of military space plane advocates’ visions. It uses th

notional RLV described in table 36. CONOPS A makes th

fullest military use of the roughly one-half scale RLV to ac

complish not only traditional space lift missions but also th

additional missions of returning payloads from orbit

transspace operations, reconnaissance, and strike (in an

from space). The second concept, CONOPS B, is intended t

represent a logical extension of the current RLV programs

goals. It is based on the full-scale vehicle concepts currentl

being proposed under the RLV program (table 35). CONOPS 

also makes expanded use of RLVs. The capabilities of eac

RLV used for analysis are summarized in table 37. 5 7

New systems, weapons, and technologies are usually fielded

without the ultimate utility or best application (CONOPS) hav

ing been elaborated—the RLV may show its greatest applica 

tion to have been unanticipated. An RLV may have to be buil

and operated for some time before its greatest utility is appre

ciated or the best methods of employment are discovered.5 8 I

spite of this reality, describing a CONOPS for RLVs at thi

early stage is vital. Without defining how an RLV force is to b

fielded, organized, and operated, its development is bound t

453
be unguided by practical considerations and its utility is guar

anteed to be limited.

Each concept of operations is intended to conform to th

same fiscal environment since they both have the sam

budget. Due to this constraint, and as a result of cost esti

mates presented earlier, the two concepts of operations hav

different numbers of RLVs available. Since CONOPS A use

the half-scale RLV developed with less technical and financia

risk, six are available for employment. Since CONOPS B use

the larger RLV developed with more technical and financia

risk, four are available for employment. These figures ar

based on the development cost estimates presented earlie

(tables 35 and 36). 5 9

Each concept of operations is described in terms of its mis 

sion, systems, operational environment, command and con 

trol, support, and employment. The missions of space lift (t

and from orbit), transspace operations, reconnaissance, an

strike (in and from orbit) contribute to the broader militar

missions of space superiority, precision employment of weap

ons, global mobility, and achieving information dominance.6 

The systems description includes not only the RLVs but als

their associated ground systems and payloads. The opera 

tional environment addresses threats and survivability issue

while command and control deals with command relation 

Table 37

CONOPS A and B RLV Capabilities

RLV Fleet Size Turnaround

time (hours) Payload Sorties/day 20K lb.

weapons/day

CONOPS A 6

Nominal: 24

Contingency: 12

Response: 6

20K lbs. to

LEO 12 96

CONOPS B 4

Nominal: 48

Contingency: 24

Response: 12

40K lbs. to 

LEO 4 64

454
ships as well as authority and responsibility for the mission

and the people. Support addresses the numerous activitie

required to conduct successful operations. Finally, the em 

ployment discussion illustrates concepts of how the system

may be used throughout the spectrum of conflict, from peac

to war and back to peace.

CONOPS A

Missions. The missions of the RLV force are to conduc

space lift, transspace, reconnaissance, and strike operations

Space lift operations include deployment, sustainment, an

redeployment of on-orbit forces—earth-to-orbit, orbit-to-earth

and intraspace transportation. Transspace operations involv

delivering material through space, from one point on th

earth’s surface to another. Reconnaissance missions are no

limited to the earth’s surface, but include inspection of adver 

sary space systems as well.6 1 Similarly, the strike mission ma

be accomplished against surface, air, or space targets. Strike

within space will likely be accomplished with directed energy

high power radio frequency (HPRF), or information weapon

rather than explosive or kinetic impact weapons to minimiz

the chance of debris causing fratricide.6 2

In peacetime, routine launch and recovery of spacecraft an

reconnaissance will be the primary occupations of RLV forces

Exercises, training missions, and system tests will also b

accomplished. During contingencies, requirements for respon 

sive launch, transspace operations, and more frequent an

responsive reconnaissance are likely. 6 3 Contingencies may als

include the need for heightened readiness to accomplish strik

missions. During wartime, the full range of missions must b

anticipated. Actions to achieve control of the space environ 

ment, such as reconnaissance and strike against adversar

space systems, as well as surge launch and transspace opera 

tions will be conducted.6 4 RLVs may be called upon to accom 

plish prompt strikes against surface targets early in a conflic

in an attempt to disrupt an adversary offensive.6 5 Once hostili

ties have passed the opening stages, RLV operations would

continue, complementing the capabilities of forces from othe

environments. For example, strikes from space may enabl

455
attacks on targets which would otherwise be beyond the reac

of air, land, and sea forces. Strikes from space may also en 

able attacks against targets deemed too heavily defended fo

nonspace forces. Once hostilities have ceased, RLV forces ma

be called upon to conduct reconnaissance missions and pro 

vide a deterrent force so air, land, and sea forces may rede

ploy. RLV strike readiness could be maintained to ensure 

prompt response if an adversary decided to take advantage o

force redeployment and resume hostilities.

Systems. Six RLVs with the attributes described earlier ar

available (tables 36 and 37). Payload capabilities include 

wide range of systems all using a standard container an

interface. 6 6 Spacecraft, reconnaissance payloads, and weapon

dispensers use the same standard container to ensure sim 

plicity and ease of RLV operations. For surface attack, weap

ons options include maneuverable reentry vehicles which ma

contain a variety of munitions and guidance systems depend

ing on the nature of the targets to be struck.6 7 For strike

within space, weapons options include directed energy, HPRF

and information munitions.

In-flight vehicle operations and control may be affected re

motely; however, the vehicle is capable of executing all mission

based on programs loaded prior to takeoff. The ability to operat

autonomously helps minimize the force’s vulnerability to elec 

tronic warfare and enhances in-flight security. Communication

for purposes such as in-flight operations and control and pay

load data transfer is available throughout the mission primaril

through space-based tracking and data relay spacecraft, though

line of sight communication with ground stations is possible.

RLV self-defense capabilities include its ability to use ma

neuver and speed to avoid threats, and onboard electronic an

optical countermeasure systems which can operate autono

mously and through remote control. The vehicle’s thermal pro 

tection system gives it some inherent passive defense agains

lasers. As with vehicle operations and control, in-flight pay

load operations and control may be affected remotely. Th

payload functions can also be executed based on program

loaded prior to takeoff.

456
The two primary operating bases are located in Florida an

California.6 8 Four alternate bases may be used as necessary

Two of the alternate bases are located on the coasts—one each

on the East and West Coasts. The other two alternate bases ar

located in the US interior. The alternate bases may be used in

the event of contingencies such as those related to system ma

function, extremely severe weather, or threats to primary bas

physical security. RLV units and personnel also have the capa 

bility to establish a contingency base at virtually any airfield in

the world with a runway length capable of accommodating larg

jet-powered aircraft. Other space systems necessary for RLV

operations besides the tracking and data relay satellites alread

mentioned include communications satellites, warning satellites

and space surveillance systems.

Operational Environment. The operational environment o

the RLV currently contains few direct threats. However, th

proliferation of technology, particularly rocket, spacecraft, an

directed-energy technology, combined with the increasing im 

portance of space operations to war-fighting success indicate

that more threats are likely to develop. It would be tempting t

follow Giulio Douhet’s example from the 1920s and predic

there will be no way to defend against an RLV attack, but thi

is not likely to be the case. 69 The world’s leading space-farin

nations, the United States and the former Soviet Union, hav

already demonstrated the capability to attack spacecraft usin

ground-based and air-launched kinetic impact weapons a

well as coorbital kinetic impact systems. Lasers and othe

directed energy devices may also present threats in the RLV

operational environment. 7 0

When in flight, the RLV’s onboard defensive systems an

inherent maneuverability and speed make it difficult for ad

versary weapon systems to prevent mission accomplishmen

The fact that an adversary has to detect the RLV’s launch

predict its orbit, pass that information on to its defense force

and then execute an anti-RLV mission would require a high

degree of technological sophistication and operational capabil

ity. Striking an RLV will be more complicated than a typica

antisatellite (ASAT) mission where the spacecraft’s orbit is wel

established, predictable, and less likely to be altered.

457
However, even if an RLV in flight poses a difficult target for a

adversary, its associated command and control centers, commu

nications links, and bases are very vulnerable to enemy attack

This vulnerability drives the need for warning and other intelli

gence support, an autonomous operations capability, active an

passive operating base defenses, and redundant systems. Se 

cure, antijam, low-probability-of-intercept, communications con 

nectivity provides some measure of protection for in-flight veh

cle and payload operations and control when autonomy is no

acceptable. 7 1 Assuming vehicle autonomy and security measure

for necessary communication links are achieved, the system’s

greatest vulnerability will be at the operating base. The existenc

of alternate bases and the capability to establish contingenc

bases mitigates this vulnerability when combined with activ

and passive base defense measures.

Command and Control. RLV forces are divided betwee

military and commercial organizations. During peacetime

four of the six RLVs available are operated by a commercia

organization engaged primarily in providing space lift services

This company also provides commercial remote sensing serv

ices. The remaining RLVs are operated by the US militar

under the combatant command (COCOM) of the commande

in chief, United States Space Command.7 2 The military RLV

conduct very little space lift during peacetime to avoid any rea

or perceived competition with the US commercial space lif

industry. 7 3 They primarily conduct reconnaissance while train 

ing for and exercising their strike and transspace missions.

During times of heightened tension or war, the Nationa

Command Authorities may direct mobilization of some or all o

the commercial RLV fleet based on existing government-indus

try agreements.7 4 These RLVs may then be modified as neces

sary to conduct military missions. This mobilization of com 

mercial RLVs is necessary to avoid requiring commercia

organizations and their employees to accept the increased

risk, hardship, and discipline required of military RLV mis 

sions. In a war, RLVs used in direct military action or in

support of military operations, along with their associated sys 

tems, facilities, and personnel, will likely be targeted by th

enemy. When CINCSPACE is acting as the supporting com 

458
mander in chief (CINC) to a geographic CINC, RLV force

may be put under the tactical control (TACON) of the join

force commander (JFC) to ensure the most effective use o

these systems in direct support of the theater campaig

plan. 7 5 For air and surface strike missions, the joint force ai

component commander will normally direct the use of RLV

forces.76 CINCSPACE directs the use of RLV forces support

ing the campaign for space superiority and conductin

transspace missions. RLV forces may be used to help wage 

campaign for space superiority by conducting strikes an

reconnaissance within space, space lift, and strikes agains

surface-based elements of an adversary’s space force. Th

JFC resolves any disputes over apportionment and alloca 

tion of RLV forces.

Support. Intelligence support for RLV forces covers a broa

range of requirements. Operating base threats must be as

sessed and threat information provided continuously. Such in 

formation will drive defense status and relocation from prime t

alternate bases or deployment to a contingency base. RLV sur

face strike missions will require extensive intelligence suppor

similar to that required to accomplish precision strikes with

today’s air forces or missiles. Strikes in space will require exten 

sive space surveillance support. Some space surveillance infor 

mation may actually be collected by the RLV itself, but it wil

require support from systems or a network with broader an

continuous coverage of the near-earth environment. Mission

planning will require not only the information just described bu

very capable computer hardware and software to process plan 

ning information inputs and to generate mission programs fo

in-flight payload and vehicle operations.

Security of operating bases is paramount. The greates

threats may come from terrorists or an adversary’s specia

forces. In this regard, security requirements will be similar t

today’s requirements to protect high-value assets at DOD

bases in the continental United States except that the threat

will have evolved by the year 2012. Logistics support is simpli

fied to the greatest extent practical. Organizational-level main 

tenance actions at the operating bases are accomplished b

military enlisted maintenance technicians organic to RLV

459
units. The primary RLV base on the East Coast is home t

RLV unit headquarters.7 7

Employment. During contingencies and war, RLV opera 

tions consist of three phases: readiness planning, mission

planning, and execution. Readiness planning requires bein

responsive to world events and direction from higher head

quarters to maintain a specified readiness posture. At th

highest state of readiness, RLVs may be maintained on alert t

respond within six hours for surge space lift, transspace, re

connaissance, or strike missions.

The RLV force’s ability to execute specific missions within

six hours may be constrained by factors beyond the contro

of the RLV force. For instance, orbital dynamics may dictat

an appropriate launch time for a particular spacecraft de

ployment, space strike, or space reconnaissance missio

that falls beyond the six-hour response time—the RLV ma

be avail able, but physics will require waiting longer to exe 

cute the mission. Maintaining alert at the highest state o

readiness impacts RLV availability to conduct routine mis

sions. Mission planning is conducted once a hypothetical o

actual mission tasking is received. Mission planning is con 

ducted by the RLV unit, nominally within one hour for an

mission, taking full advantage of the support outlined above

Mission planning includes payload selection and generatio

of mission programs to be loaded prior to takeoff, assumin

the specified mission has not been previously planned an

stored for later use.

The execution phase of RLV operations includes fina

launch preparations, launch, flight operations, and recovery

Recovery is normally at the base from which the sortie gener 

ated. System malfunctions, extremely severe weather, o

threats to base security may drive recovery at another base

Transspace operations may require establishment of a contin 

gency base and operations from that location. RLV recovery i

followed by immediate preparation for subsequent missions

Deployment to an alternate or contingency base may be di

rected by higher headquarters or the local RLV unit com 

mander.

460
CONOPS B

Missions. The missions of the RLV force are to conduc

space lift, transspace, reconnaissance, and strike operations

The CONOPS B RLV force of four full-scale vehicles is com 

mercially operated. Given the full-scale RLV’s longer turn 

around time relative to the notional CONOPS A RLV, its utilit

for reconnaissance and strike missions during contingencie

and war is diminished but not eliminated. Further, its com 

pletely commercial operation complicates use of the RLV flee

in direct military actions. 7 8 Nevertheless, this CONOPS includ

strike operations for completeness and to provide a basis fo

subsequent analysis.

During peacetime, routine launch and recovery of space

craft and remote sensing will be the primary occupation of th

RLV fleet. During contingencies, requirements for responsiv

space lift, transspace operations, and surface reconnaissanc

are likely. Actions to achieve control of the space environmen

such as reconnaissance and strike against adversary spac

systems, are also likely to be required. During war, surfac

strike missions may be conducted. Once hostilities hav

ceased, RLV forces may be called upon to conduct reconnais 

sance missions and maintain some level of strike readiness.

Systems. Four RLVs with the attributes described earlie

are available (tables 35 and 37). Payload capabilities are sim

lar to those described for the CONOPS A RLV in that they al

use a standard container and interface, but the weight an

size of CONOPS B payloads is larger. In-flight vehicle opera 

tions, communications, self-protection systems, and payloa

operations are the same.

The basing scheme includes the same two primary operat

ing bases. There are no designated alternate bases, but th

operators have the capability to establish a contingency oper 

ating base at virtually any airfield in the world with a runwa

length capable of accommodating large jet-powered aircraft.

Operational Environment. The operational environment o

the RLV is much as described under CONOPS A, except it i

less hostile. The apparently civilian, and thus less threaten 

ing, nature of peacetime RLV operations would minimize th

461
provocation of hostile action against the vehicles by potentia

adversaries.

Refraining from exercising the RLV fleet in strike operation

during peacetime could help to de-emphasize any potentia

military applications. Exercising strike operations would obvi

ously hurt the RLV fleet’s peaceful appearance, although i

would undoubtedly improve the operators’ proficiency to exe 

cute the mission. Unfortunately, regardless of whether or no

the RLV fleet is used for strike missions, threats from ASAT

like systems as described above for CONOPS A are still likel

to exist. Further, as long as the RLV fleet is used in eve

indirect support of military operations (e.g., surge launch o

spacecraft used to support military surface or air operations)

it will be a potential target of enemy action.

Command and Control. The RLV force is owned and oper

ated entirely by a commercial organization.7 9 The compan

provides space lift and remote sensing services for governmen

and commercial customers.

US government agreements with the RLV operator include 

measure of military oversight and involvement to ensure th

RLV force is ready and available to conduct missions in sup

port of national security objectives in peace and in war. Th

systems are never operated by military personnel, but mobili

zation agreements allow for close military direction of activitie

during contingencies and war. The secretary of defense (SEC

DEF) may approve mobilization of the RLV fleet during contin 

gencies and war for the purposes of conducting space lift an

transspace operations in support of national security require

ments. The president must approve any use of the RLV flee

for strike missions. When mobilized, CINCSPACE exercise

COCOM over RLV assets. CINCSPACE also retains operationa

control (OPCON) and TACON of all RLVs given the fleet’s high

value and few numbers.8 0 When strike operations are to b

conducted, military personnel must be present to provide 

measure of positive control.

Support. Intelligence support to RLV forces is much th

same as under CONOPS A. Logistics support requirements ar

less stringent due to decreased readiness required for deploy

ment and mission accomplishment. Maintenance actions ar

462
accomplished entirely by civilian personnel. There is no re

quirement for military personnel to be trained and certified in

maintenance or operations tasks. Military personnel simpl

develop tasks and oversee their execution by the commercia

civilian operators.

The only exception is with respect to strike missions. Mili

tary personnel working with RLV operators must be trained

and proficient in implementing positive control measures fo

RLV strikes. Military personnel are assigned to a detachmen

collocated with the RLV operator’s headquarters.

Employment. During contingencies and war, RLV opera 

tions will be responsive to national security requirements. I

directed by the secretary of defense, the RLV fleet will b

mobilized to conduct surge space lift and transspace opera 

tions at a cost that compensates for lost commercial revenues

These operations would be conducted in the same fashion a

peacetime RLV operations, but with close military coordina

tion. SECDEF mobilization of the RLV fleet will require th

civilian operators to meet contingency turnaround and re

sponse times of 24 and 12 hours, respectively.

CINCSPACE will direct tasks and priorities for the fleet onc

mobilized. CINCSPACE, in conjunction with the supported

CINC if CINCSPACE is playing a supporting role, will deter 

mine whether or not RLV strike operations are warranted an

request presidential approval as appropriate. If use of the RLV

fleet for strike missions is approved, measures will be taken t

ensure military control of these operations.

Summary of CONOPS A and B

This section presents an outline of two concepts of opera 

tions. The first concept, CONOPS A, attempts to make th

fullest military use of the roughly half-scale notional RLV t

accomplish not only traditional space lift missions but als

the additional missions of returning payloads from orbi

transspace operations, reconnaissance, and strike (in an

from space). CONOPS A is intended to represent militar

space plane advocates’ visions.

463
The second concept, CONOPS B, based on the full-scal

vehicles currently being proposed under the RLV program

also attempts to make expanded use of RLVs, but their appli 

cation is inhibited by design attributes and completely com 

mercial operation. CONOPS B is intended to represent a logi

cal extension of the current RLV program’s goals.

Analysis

The criteria used to analyze the concepts of operations de

scribed in this study include capability, cost, operations effi 

ciency, operations effectiveness, and politics. Capability analysi

includes all the required mission areas: space lift, reconnais 

sance, strike, and transspace operations. Cost analysis ad

dresses operating base, ELV augmentation, and transspace op 

erations costs, as well as the potential for technology maturation

to reduce development costs. Operations efficiency and effective 

ness analysis emphasizes the impact of using cryogenic propel

lants, deployment operations, and overall system reliability

Political analysis examines the suitability of each CONOPS in

both the international and domestic environments.

Capability

Each concept of operation was intended to satisfy all RLV

mission requirements: spacecraft launch and recovery, recon 

naissance, transspace operations, and strike (in and from

space). Each CONOPS meets these requirements but, as a resul

of the differences in the attributes of the vehicles used in each

CONOPS and the way in which they are organized, deployed

and employed, their capabilities in each mission area vary t

some degree. This variation in the extent to which each CONOP

satisfies mission requirements is examined below.

Space Lift. Both CONOPS provide dramatically improved

space lift capability from a responsiveness perspective. Th

most responsive of today’s space lifters requires a minimum o

two months from call-up to launch compared with less than 

day for either RLV described here. 81 However, when consider 

ing space lift payload capability the two RLVs are not equa

The half-scale RLV used in CONOPS A (RLV-A from here for

464
ward) may not necessarily meet all users

 needs from a pay

load weight and size perspective. If a smaller RLV is devel

oped, an alternative lift means might be required, such as 

heavy ELV, if a particular payload cannot be downsized.

At 8.5 meters (28 feet) long and 2,724 kilograms (kg) (abou

6,000 pounds) unequipped, the US components of the ISS

would fit within the dimensions of RLV-A. Not to mention tha

they will have already been deployed long before the first opera 

tional flight of an RLV. 82 However, NASA is concerned abou

minimizing the number of visits to the space station to avoi

disrupting microgravity materials processing work. NASA als

has concerns about accommodating the crew module envisione

for transporting US astronauts to and from the station. Thes

concerns appear to be driving a desire for the large payloa

capability of current RLV program concepts. 8 3 Another facto

behind the large payload requirement is the desire to captur

the large national security payloads that currently fly on th

Titan IV expendable rocket in the interest of pursuing furthe

reductions in life-cycle costs.8 4 It is diffi cult to predict whethe

or not these payloads will be lighter and smaller in the future

However, if we plan on building vehicles big enough to carr

the largest payloads, it is easy to predict that payload design 

ers will take advantage of the capability.

If large national security payloads cannot, or will not, b

downsized, they could be lifted on the heavy version of th

DOD’s EELV, predicted to be available in 2005. If large space

station payloads cannot, or will not, be downsized, they could

be lifted on the heavy version of EELV as well. Large Russia

rockets could also be used. 8 5 In fact, launching into the ISSA

orbit from the Baykonour cosmodrome in the former Sovie

republic of Kazakstan instead of Cape Canaveral, the planned

launch base for American ISSA missions, provides more tha

a 35 foot-per-second velocity advantage to the relatively high

inclination orbit, 51.6 degrees. 8 6 This higher-inclination orbi

is the same as that currently used by the Russian spac

station Mir, which was launched and is resupplied out o

Baykonour. Another alternative might be launching larg

space station payloads on the Ariane 5. The Europeans pla

to develop their own manned crew transfer vehicle as part o

465
their participation in ISSA. 8 7 The Ariane 5 will be able to lif

18,000 (about 39,600 pounds) to LEO, which is comparable t

the payload capacity of the Titan IV.

8 8

A final, but not least significant, consideration is the need t

return large payloads from orbit. While the Russians o

French might happily provide return from orbit services usin

their Soyuz capsule or crew transfer vehicle, respectively, wil

they be large enough for the loads coming back from th

station? As stated above, they might if we plan on using thes

vehicles and size the return payloads from ISSA appropriately

but certainly won’t if we plan to use a larger vehicle.

Reconnaissance. Some may question the need to use a

RLV for reconnaissance given the US ability to perform space

based reconnaissance of the earth’s surface using satellites.8 

However, there may be times when the element of surprise i

desired and not likely to be obtained using on-orbit assets. I

is conceivable that a potential adversary might have enough

information about US space-based reconnaissance systems t

effectively implement operations security measures and avoid

detection. 9 0 Another motivation for using an RLV for recon 

naissance might be the need for responsiveness. For a fas

breaking contingency, RLVs may provide a quick response no

attainable with on-orbit spacecraft, manned aircraft, or un

manned aerial vehicles (UAV). For instance, a low-orbiting re

mote sensing spacecraft might not have a given location on

the earth’s surface within its field of view until several orbit

have passed. Manned aircraft and UAVs may not allow over 

flight of a location deep within the target country’s territory.

With respect to reconnaissance within space, one migh

pose a similar question about the utility of RLVs. There ar

undoubtedly other systems which can perform space surveil

lance. Paul B. Stares, in The Militarization of Space , claim

that the USAF attempted to develop a satellite inspection sys 

tem (SAINT) in the earliest days of the space age.9 1 It wa

canceled in 1962, but Stares suggests the US ability to surve

space was not degraded since advances in ground-based sen 

sors made by the mid-1960s facilitated the gathering of 

great deal of data. This may be true, but on-orbit reconnais 

sance may allow for more detailed as well as active inspection

466
of spacecraft in LEO. Reconnaissance of payloads in highe

orbits, such as geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) or Molniy

orbits, may require reducing the reconnaissance payloa

weight or may have to be conducted from a greater distance

This reconnaissance capability might also support strike mis 

sions in space with prestrike target information and poststrik

battle damage assessment inputs.

Strike . Accomplishing strikes using RLVs is technicall

feasible. However, to be militarily useful, the vehicles should

be able to deliver significant weapon payloads. With respect t

surface strike, it appears RLV-A can deliver as much payloa

as a typical modern fighter. RLV-B can deliver as much weap

ons payload as a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. 9 2

Obviously, there are additional considerations besides pay

load weight when analyzing surface strike capability. Re

sponse and turnaround times have a dramatic effect on th

usefulness of RLVs for surface strike missions. Both RLV

could deliver initial strikes earlier than B-2s. Due to RLV-A’

quicker response time and shorter turnaround time, it com 

pares favorably with the strike capability of a cost-equivalen

number of B-2s conducting strikes over a two-day period eve

though RLV-A’s payload capability is roughly half that of th

B-2 (table 38 and fig. 12). 9 3 RLV-B, on the other hand, canno

compare as favorably through this same period despite it

relatively large payload capability. The B-2’s strike capabilit

exceeds that of both RLVs over a three-day period. Strike in

space using RLVs is also technically feasible.

Both concepts include the capability to strike adversar

spacecraft. The means used and type of strike are only limited

by the creative development of strike mission payloads. Fo

instance, RLV space strikes might be accomplished in a man

ner which minimizes debris and affects only a specific subsys 

tem on board the target spacecraft. Information strikes caus

ing disruption of adversary communications and comman

and control, or aimed at deception, might also be conducted

Strikes against spacecraft in high earth orbits, such as GEO

or Molniya orbits, may require reducing the strike payloa

weight or be conducted from a greater distance.

467
Figure 12. Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons

Delivery within Three Days

Table 38

Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery within Three Days

Time

(hours)

RLV-A

(6 RLVs)

RLV-B

(4 RLVs)

B-2 Spirit

(10 B-2s)

 6.75 48 0 0

12.75 48 64 0

20.25 96 64 0

21 96 64 160

33.75 144 64 160

38.25 144 128 160

47.25 192 128 160

60 192 128 320

60.75 240 128 320

63.75 240 192 320

72 240 192 320

468
Transspace Operations. The requirement for this capabilit

is not very well defined. 9 4 One might easily doubt its feasibilit

except that any RLV capable of recovering and returning pay

loads from orbit will have an inherent capability to delive

cargo from one location on the earth to another.

Putting aside cost considerations for the moment, a majo

factor in assessing the feasibility of transspace operations i

the ability to establish an RLV operations base at the picku

and delivery points. Experience with the subscale, suborbita

McDonnell Douglas Aerospace DC-X can only hint at what a

operational RLV operating base might look like. The base es

tablished for DC-X (now called the DC-XA in its modified form

operations at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in 

cludes propellant facilities, electrical power facilities, vehicl

control systems, and connections. The propellant facilities in 

clude liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen, gaseous helium, an

gaseous nitrogen storage tanks, transfer lines and control sys 

tems. The vehicle control systems include ground control sys 

tems and a “real-time data system” to collect, store, and dis 

play vehicle data centrally before, during, and after flight. Th

real-time data system also provides a means for operator in 

tervention, if necessary, and allows for receipt, processing

and loading of autonomous flight operations programs.9 5

While an operational RLV design should include operation

efficiency considerations, any RLV operating base will cer 

tainly require very large propellant facilities and associated

equipment. Given that a full-scale RLV, such as RLV-B, wil

require about 100 times more propellant than the DC-X, th

propellant facilities will not necessarily lend themselves t

quick and easy transport. In this sense, RLV-A may hav

some advantage in that its propellant facilities would b

smaller than RLV-Bs. Obviously, RLV-A also has less payloa

weight capability. Without a clear definition of requirement

for transspace operations, it is difficult to evaluate this trade

off between the two CONOPS.

Cost

Operating Base Costs. CONOPS A is sensitive to operatin

base costs. CONOPS A includes two primary and four alter 

469
nate bases as well the capability to establish a contingenc

base. CONOPS B simply has two primary bases with a capa 

bility to establish contingency bases.

Launch base costs for today’s fleet of expendable rockets ma

not be a good indicator of future RLV launch base costs given

the objectives of the RLV program. This is fortuitous since to

day’s launch bases are expensive to operate. Operating the US’

largest and busiest launch base, Cape Canaveral, and its associ

ated range, costs about $160 million a year. Experience with th

DC-XA is also difficult to use as a basis for estimation since th

vehicle is very much smaller and less capable than an opera 

tional RLV. The DC-XA launch base also uses existing facilitie

and equipment at the White Sands Missile Range. 9 6

Nevertheless, industry sources estimate it will cost roughl

$50 million to setup an RLV operating base, at a minimum

Using this figure, CONOPS A’s operating base costs may b

estimated at $200 million more than CONOPS B’s.

ELV Augmentation. CONOPS A may also require ELV aug

mentation if large space station and national security payload

are not downsized. The Moorman Study reported that simpl

shrinking the size of the RLV payload bay from 45 to 30 feet migh

cost an extra $26.6 billion in ELV costs through the year 2030.

Employing foreign heavy lift vehicles could reduce this cost.

Transspace Operations. It is unclear that transspace opera 

tions will be economical. If one accepts the program goal o

delivering payloads to orbit for $1,000 per pound, then the sam

estimate may be used for the cost per pound of delivering carg

from one point on the earth’s surface to another using an RLV

Costs for sending cargo internationally, say from New York t

Seoul, using an express package delivery service range from

about $50 per pound for a one-pound box to $5.70 per poun

for a 100-pound box. 9 8 Sending loads by military airlift is les

expensive, but takes longer. For example, shipping a 20,000

pound load on military airlift from Dover AFB, Delaware, t

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, will cost $1.079 per pound an

take 3.1 days, if the cargo is given the highest priority. 9 9

Such costs make it unlikely that RLV cargo delivery will b

economically attractive. Whether or not RLV cargo delivery wil

be militarily useful remains to be seen.

470
Technology Maturation. A recurring theme in studies relate

to the RLV program is the idea that program costs can be re

duced through technology maturation.100 A technology develop

ment program targeted against specific high-risk areas execute

before system development and acquisition can mitigate th

technical and financial risks. Advancing the technology readi

ness of a system from “concept design” to “prototype/engineer 

ing model” prior to entering full-scale development can lowe

development costs by more than 40 percent.101 Phase I of th

RLV program is intended to include demonstration of the matur

ity level of candidate technolo gies.102 The X-33 flight demon 

strations at the end of Phase II represent an attempt to dem 

onstrate technological maturity levels.

However, the major recommendations of the National Re

search Council’s recent review of RLV technology indicate 

need for more vigorous development of propulsion technol

ogy. 103 There is a government-industry effort currently unde

way that can help address this issue. The integrated high

payoff rocket propulsion technology (IHPRPT) program ha

goals for booster, orbit transfer, spacecraft, and tactical pro 

pulsion systems. Noteworthy booster cryogenic propulsio

goals include achieving a “mean time between removal” o

“mission life” of 20 for reusable systems by the year 2000, a

improvement of 3 percent in Isp by 2010, and an increase o

100 percent in the thrust-to-weight ratio by the year 2010. 10

Unfortunately, funding levels for this program have not in 

creased in spite of the start of the RLV program and recom 

mendations by high-level studies to increase funding in thi

area. 105 Given the critical nature of propulsion technology de

velopment to the success of the RLV program and US spac

lift competitiveness in general, it is surprising IHPRPT fundin

has not been raised to the recommended levels.106

Operations Efficiency and Effectiveness

Cryogenic Propellants. Cryogenic propellants are not idea

for operations efficiency and effectiveness. A good historica

basis for this assertion is the Atlas missile’s short life as a

ICBM. It was relegated to a space lift only role in 1965 afte

being an operational ICBM for less than six years because i

471
was not well suited to the responsive operations and reliabilit

required of an ICBM. The extreme caution needed in fuelin

the missile immediately before launch kept it from ever meet

ing its required 15-minute reaction time. It also suffered from

a host of reliability problems, many related to its propulsion

system.107 The Atlas was quickly followed by the Titan an

Minuteman. The Titan ICBM, using hypergolic propellants

could stay propellant loaded since hypergolics did not need

constant refrigeration. The Minuteman, using solid propel

lants, provided outstanding responsiveness and reliability. 108

The legacy of the Atlas missile’s operational life as an ICBM

may provide a caution when contemplating the development o

an operational RLV with a goal of high reliability and low opera 

tions costs. It may be even more relevant when considering th

military use of an RLV that drives quicker turnaround and re

sponse times. Today’s Atlas space lift vehicle outfitted with 

cryogenic Centaur upper stage requires cryogenic propellan

loading about two hours prior to launch, well within the re

sponse time specified for either RLV-A or RLV-B. 109 During tes

flights in July 1995, the DC-X required a similar time line fo

propellant loading and was prepared to demonstrate an 11-hou

turnaround time.110 While these time lines seem to bode well fo

an operational RLV, there is no denying the relative complexit

of cryogenic propulsion systems compared with hypergolic o

solid alternatives. This complexity will make achieving RLV op 

erations efficiency and effectiveness goals a challenge.

Deployment . The nature of cryogenic propellants als

drives complexity in the RLV operating base. This complexit

will challenge designers and operators faced with the problem

of how to build, deploy, and operate an RLV contingency base

Ideally, such a base will be deployable by air. This is particu 

larly true in CONOPS A, where dispersion for security an

increased responsiveness for military missions is required

This contingency base capability will also be a key t

transspace operations. Power and propellant systems ar

likely to comprise the majority of the weight and bulk required

to be moved. Lessons may be learned from efforts within th

USAF to develop multifunction support equipment for aircraf

maintenance.111

472
Being able to reduce the number of operating base suppor

equipment pieces, as well as their size, could ease mobilit

requirements. It could also lead to a decrease in the numbe

of personnel required to deploy and reduce the cost of outfit 

ting a contingency RLV operating base. Winston Churchil

once said, “except in the air [the Royal Air Force] is the leas

mobile of all the armed services.”112 If the deployability of th

RLV force is neglected, it might suffer a similar criticism.

Reliability . Air Force Space Command’s Draft Operational Re

quirements Document (ORD) for the EELV, dated 31 March 1995

defines reliability as “the ability of the space lift system to suc

cessfully accomplish its intended mission.”113 The ORD define

the terms reliability of the schedule or dependability separatel

as “the ability of the system to consistently launch . . . when

planned.”114 The Moorman Study identified three factors which

affect space lift system reliability: complexity, flight rate, an

design stability. 115 After considering these factors, one can se

evidence of their impact in today’s space lift systems. The Delt

II, the least complex system, has the highest reliability, 10

percent over the last five years, compared to 84.2 percent an

85.7 percent for the Atlas and Titan, respectively. 116 The Delt

also has the highest flight rate and the most stable design o

today’s expendable systems. The message for RLV developmen

is clear: keep system complexity down, flight rate up, and design

stable. The second item, flight rate, may be achieved by captur

ing the largest share of the launch market practical and/o

capitalizing on military applications. The third item, design sta 

bility, is aided by requiring standard payload containers an

interfaces. Happily, current RLV program competitors alread

include a standard payload container and interfaces as a ke

design element.117

Unhappily, the National Research Council’s warning abou

the need for vigorous propulsion system development may indi

cate danger ahead for RLV reliability. One of the reliability prob 

lems today’s space lifters face is their lack of performance mar

gin.118 A robust design approach in the RLV program could avoi

this pitfall and lead to increased reliability. Rather than focusin

on eliminating variation in performance, a requirement when

operating a system with no performance margin, a robust design

473
approach would minimize the effects of variation in perform 

ance. If the RLV is designed to be a high-performance system

without any performance margin, then the operators will be in

the same position as today’s space lift operators: reliabilit

goals simply will not be achieved. This would seem to indicat

the desirability of building a system with plenty of propulsion

power for its intended operations. As current RLV concept

plan on milking existing engine (SSME or RD-0120) deriva 

tives for their last ounce of capability, this will result in field 

ing a full-scale RLV always operating at its performance lim 

its.119 In this respect, RLV-A may offer some advantage, as th

smaller vehicle is not likely to push propulsion performanc

requirements to the same extent as a full-scale vehicle.

Any potential lack of reliability is also directly related to cos

in that the cost of failure is typically high in the space lif

business. The ability of an RLV to abort and land back at it

base during ascent or descent may minimize the cost of failur

in flight. However, any unreliability can cause delays whic

increase costs, although they do so less dramatically than 

catastrophic in-flight failure. If an in-flight RLV failure doe

occur, its cost will be considerably higher than that of losin

one of today’s expendable space lifters.

Finally, as highlighted by the Atlas missile’s ICBM experi

ence, reliability is a key attribute of military weapon systems

As much as cost, reliability will determine whether or no

RLVs can successfully perform military missions.

Political Considerations

International. No RLV capabilities or operations described in

either CONOPS A or B would violate international treaties. T

some, this may be surprising. Since the dawn of the space age

the popular image of space activities has been that they ar

peaceful and nonmilitary. This image has been reinforced b

governments, including the US government, to help guarante

the use of space for unimpeded reconnaissance. As such, ther

are international laws and treaties such as the Nuclear Test Ba

Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Treaty on

the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Treat

(1972), which restrict military space activities. However, RLV

474
forces can live within these treaties as long as they are no

used to carry weapons of mass destruction, conduct ABM

testing, deployment, or operations, or interfere with “nationa

technical means (space intelligence systems)” which are bein

used to verify treaty provisions during peacetime. 120 This is no

an exhaustive list of prohibitions, but highlights the main area

of caution for RLV military applications.

Treaties and law are not the only international political con 

cerns related to RLVs. Developing such a dramatic new militar

weapon capability could appear threatening to other states. It i

conceivable that other nations would resent the US’s ability t

strike from space or within space with little or no warning. The

might respond to this threat by developing similar capabilities o

by developing ASAT or anti-RLV weapons. If deployment of a

RLV force were perceived as an attempt to extend America

global hegemony, it could encourage other states to form alli

ances against the United States. Political scientist, Stephen M

Walt suggests that this sort of balancing mechanism led to 

favorable balance of power for the United States during the col

war. The Soviets appeared threatening to other states, which

drove them into the US camp.121 Given its completely commer 

cial operations and more inhibited use in strike operations

CONOPS B might prove less threatening and minimize the ap

pearance of US aggressiveness relative to CONOPS A.

On the plus side, RLVs could be used for conventiona

strikes with the range and nearly the promptness of ICBMs

but without the nuclear baggage. Assuming the RLV forc

would never test or employ nuclear weapons, there should b

no international concern about the start of a nuclear conflic

with the launch of an RLV.

Domestic . Domestically, one concern which must be ad

dressed is the potential US political concern associated wit

ASAT deployment.122 While this would certainly not prohibi

RLV development and use in space lift, reconnaissance, an

transspace operations, it might complicate development of 

strike capability. If the prohibition stands, strikes in space wil

not be possible. Surface strikes might be allowed under th

ban, but Congress would have to be convinced that the sys 

tem would not operate in an ASAT role.

475
On the executive side of the government, NASA headquarter

direction that the RLV must replace the space shuttle come

across loud and clear. While this is understandable, viewing a

RLV as a shuttle replacement can be detrimental in three ways

First, it can be detrimental if it limits the designers’ and plan 

ners’ imagination. Second, it could be detrimental if the shuttl

replacement paradigm leads simply to swapping RLVs fo

space shuttle orbiters, but retaining the same dated concep

of operations and support facilities. Third, it could be detri

mental if it forces the RLV to accommodate the same larg

payload sizes and weights as the space shuttle without a

objective evaluation to consider if there are better options. 123

Outside of the government, industry requires profit to sur

vive. NASA leaders have experienced frustration in their at

tempt to get the private sector to fund a significant share o

RLV development costs. NASA administrator Daniel Goldin

recently criticized the X-33 contractors for their “lack of cour

age to step up to the plate and make it happen.”124 The two

stage X-34 demonstration vehicle program has already been 

casualty in the effort to encourage industry to fund reusabl

launch vehicle technology. The contractor team of Orbital Sci

ences and Rockwell International “withdrew from developmen

of the X-34 launch vehicle after determining it would not b

commercially viable.”125 The reality of industry’s motivation fo

profit should not be surprising. It indicates that unless gov

ernment is willing to fund the RLV program completely itself

the design will have to be commercially viable.

It is not likely that the government will completely fund th

RLV program. The current budget environment is severel

constrained and is expected to remain this way for the fore

seeable future. Both the public and the Congress want a fru 

gal government. The NASA budget in particular is on a down 

ward trend. In fiscal year 1995, the programmed NASA budge

for the year 2000 was $14.7 billion. The fiscal year 199

program cut NASA’s year 2000 budget down to $11.6 bil

lion.126 The DOD budget has suffered from the same trend an

the future appears to offer little relief. 127 In short, support i

not likely to be found for an expensive RLV development effor

reminiscent of cold-war-era space and defense programs

476
RLVs will have to be developed with industry contributions

Again, commercial viability will dictate development invest

ment and time lines.

Summary of RLV Concepts Analysis

Using capability, cost, operations efficiency and effectiveness

and politics as a framework for analyzing RLV concepts of opera 

tions yields several insights. First, capability analysis indicate

either RLV can be used as a multirole space superiority weapon

Each CONOPS provides for spacecraft deployment, spacecraf

sustainment, reconnaissance of the space realm, and strik

within space as well as to the surface—key capabilities fo

controlling the space environment. CONOPS A may requir

augmentation with large ELVs given its use of the smalle

RLV-A. CONOPS B may provide less flexibility and strike util

ity given its longer response and turnaround times. CONOP

A may have the advantage in transspace operations given th

potential for RLV-A requiring smaller propellant facilities an

the accompanying relaxation of mobility requirements.

Second, cost analysis indicates advantages and disadvantage

for each CONOPS. CONOPS A will be sensitive to operating bas

costs, and may require the additional expense of maintainin

access to space for heavy payloads using ELVs. It is difficult t

imagine either CONOPS providing economically competitiv

transportation from one point on the earth’s surface to another

but there may be some military utility for such missions in th

distant future. CONOPS B may suffer in development costs be

cause RLV-B is more likely to push the limits of technology, thu

failing to take full advantage of the cost reductions possibl

through technology maturation. Related to this observation i

the final conclusion of cost analysis—funding for propulsion

technology development should be increased.

Third, operations efficiency and effectiveness analysis indi

cates cryogenic propellants will present a challenge to design 

ers and operators. While these propellant systems offer high

specific impulse, they do not lend themselves to simplicity an

ease of operations. Fortuitously, today’s cryogenically pro 

pelled systems meet the required time lines for eithe

CONOPS. Deployability will be a challenge as well. Power an

477
propulsion systems for RLV forces will likely be physicall

large. Efforts to decrease the size and amount of suppor

equipment will ease the deployment burden. Reliability is per 

haps the most important attribute within the operations effi 

ciency and effectiveness category. Conclusions drawn from th

analysis indicate RLV-A may have the advantage of wider per 

formance margins and greater reliability assuming no majo

propulsion technology breakthroughs are made.

Fourth, political analysis indicates a tougher environmen

at home than internationally for RLVs. Neither CONOPS vio 

lates international treaties or laws, although it might be in th

United States’s best interest to soften the RLV’s military ap

pearance, perhaps an advantage for CONOPS B. Domestically

the congressional ASAT ban would prohibit the use of RLV

for strike missions in space and complicate attempts to us

them for strikes to the surface as well. The domestic fisca

environment poses the greatest difficulty for RLV developmen

NASA cannot afford to foot the entire bill for an RLV fleet, an

industry will only fund what market analysis indicates is 

profitable venture. The DOD is also unlikely to fund RLV de

velopment independently.

Conclusions

Our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving

“space superiority.” Several decades from now the

important battles may not be sea battles or air battles, but

space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction

of our national resources to insure that we do not lag in

obtaining space superiority.

—Maj Gen Bernard A. Schriever

The United States and the Western World has an exciting

and vital future in space activities of all kinds, the key to

that future, be it in security activities, in scientific

exploration or in commercial exploitation, the key is

responsive and cost effective space transportation.

—Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson

478
Maj Gen Bernard A. Schriever, commander, Western Develop 

ment Division, a powerful force behind early developments in U

military missile and space capabilities, was premature in pre

dicting the importance of space battles, in a speech at Sa

Diego, California, February 1957, although the future may prov

him correct. Given the increasing importance of space suppor

to recent battles on the land and sea, as well as in the air, hi

emphasis on achieving space superiority may be more appropri

ate today. However, it is ironic to read Lt Gen James A. Abra 

hamson’s words when he was director, Strategic Defense Initia 

tive Organization of almost 30 years later (Congressiona

Testimony, 23 July 1985). These remarks reflect the view of th

top leader in development of the largest and most lethal spac

weapon system ever seriously considered for deployment. Yet h

chose to emphasize the need for responsive and cost-effectiv

space transportation, not weapons, as the key to future spac

activity of any kind. It is also interesting to note that the pro

gram which may be credited with inspiring the current pursui

of reusable rockets, the McDonnell Douglas DC-X, was starte

by General Abrahamson’s organization.

Having derived RLV requirements, described RLVs and thei

attributes, elaborated two concepts of operations, and analyze

those CONOPS, conclusions may now be drawn in attempt t

answer the initial research question. These conclusions are fol

lowed by recommendations and a summary of the research.

RLVs Have Military Potential. It is clear from both th

CONOPS and the subsequent analysis that RLVs have poten 

tially important military applications. In many ways, they ca

provide a multirole tool to help achieve the space superiorit

General Schriever discussed almost 40 years ago. An RLV’s

potential for accomplishing strike missions, especially to th

surface, will be higher if turnaround and response times ar

shorter. Increasing the tempo of operations can make th

force appear larger. Military missions also benefit from RLV

with greater cross-range capability allowing the kind of opera 

tions described by General Ashy. 128

Taking full advantage of RLVs’ space lift capabilities may re

quire a paradigm shift in spacecraft design, deployment, an

sustainment. The launch on demand strategy possible with a

479
RLV is not in fashion today. Successful implementation o

such a strategy will support space superiority but will requir

spacecraft ready to launch on short notice and ready to oper 

ate immediately upon deployment in orbit. These require

ments could motivate development of cheaper, single-mission

satellites since it may not be feasible to build and store billion

dollar multimission satellites, or to expect them to be opera 

tional immediately upon deployment. 129 Capitalizing on th

RLV’s ability to recover and return payloads, or to servic

them on orbit, would similarly require satellite design

changes.130

RLV Design Is a Determinant of CONOPS. The potentia

impacts of RLV sizing have been addressed throughout thi

study. There is no unanimity regarding the proper size for a

operational RLV. Nevertheless, many argue that the curren

size identified for a full-scale RLV as part of the NASA-le

program involves high technical risk which means high finan

cial risk as well.

This study has suggested that derivatives of current propu

sion systems will not deliver the performance levels required, o

if they do deliver, there will be no performance margin an

reliability will suffer. This assessment may be supported o

proven false by further technology development and demonstra 

tions. But due to the limited objectives of the X-33 flight tests

even these demonstrations may fail to give developers and inves 

tors the necessary confidence to go full scale. Perhaps the bes

course of action with respect to this issue is to ensure marketin

analysts, developmental engineers, and operators remain in th

closest contact to ensure the best RLV size is chosen.

The choice of RLV size must also be informed about th

negative consequences and opportunity costs associated wit

each option. This study suggests that choosing smaller

cheaper RLVs can provide savings to apply towards a large

fleet and more bases. With such a force structure we ca

accomplish militarily significant activities to an extent not al

lowed by the choice of a smaller fleet and fewer bases. How 

ever, choosing a more militarily useful RLV design and forc

structure could result in negative consequences for commer 

cial and civil operators. A more militarily useful RLV design

480
might include increased thermal protection system require

ments to facilitate the greater cross-range capability needed t

take off and land at the same base after one orbit. It may als

require the additional weight and cost of onboard self-protec

tion systems. Meeting these requirements will not be cost free

Whether the costs are in dollars, weight, or space, trade-off

will have to be made.

Propulsion Technology Development Is Required. On

way to mitigate some of the challenges faced in developing 

full-scale RLV is to pursue propulsion technology developmen

more vigorously. Regardless of the size chosen for an opera 

tional RLV, advances in thrust-to-weight ratios such as th

100 percent increase sought in the integrated high payof

rocket propulsion technology program can dramatically de

crease technical and financial risk.

Such efforts should be funded at the full level recommende

by the Moorman Study. An investment of $120 million per yea

pales in comparison to the potential cost of developing an RLV

A lack of investment in propulsion technology development u

front is bound to prove penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Top Priority Must Be Cheap and Responsive Space Ac 

cess. While RLVs have tremendous potential to perform mili

tary missions well beyond simply conducting space lift, a

objective evaluation of priorities leads to other conclusions

The US military possesses tremendous strike and reconnais 

sance capabilities through existing and planned land, sea

and air systems.131 Space-based reconnaissance has also bee

conducted since the dawn of the space age. What the U

military, and the entire nation, does not possess is cheap an

responsive space access.

General Abrahamson’s words quoted earlier were prophetic

Less than a year after his address, the United States’s spac

access program literally crashed as a result of poor polic

choices and a string of accidents that left the United State

with a grounded STS fleet and a limited and unreliable ELV

fleet. Talk of achieving space superiority is cheap. We mus

first have access to the space realm before we can begin t

gain superiority.

481
Recommendations

Three recommendations are offered here. First, the US mili

tary, especially the USAF, is already a participant in the RLV

program, but it should become more active in this area. If, a

this study assumes, today’s fiscally constrained environmen

continues, the US military will not have the luxury of develop

ing an RLV fleet independently. Accordingly, the US militar

will have to blend its requirements with those of other users t

pursue militarily significant applications. The current focus o

the RLV program appears to be on NASA and commercia

requirements. There is an implicit assumption that whateve

is developed will spin on some military capability. 132 If the U

military is a passive participant in the RLV program, then th

assumed spin-on capabilities may be limited or nonexisten

Military requirements must be defined and stated if the United

States is to develop a triple-use, rather than merely dual-use

RLV fleet. If the current fiscally constrained environment doe

not continue, then active participation in the current program

is still warranted. An investment in defining military RLV re

quirements now will reap dividends should the time com

when a military-unique RLV force can be developed.

Second, whether or not the United States develops a dual

use or triple-use RLV fleet or two fleets with one being mili

tary-unique, it should not do so before the technology i

ready. If this study’s assumption that RLV technology wil

become operationally feasible by 2012 does not prove valid

then their development should not be pursued until the tech 

nology matures. The current RLV program appears to includ

this tenet, but NASA may be tempted to seek high-risk devel

opment to acquire a shuttle replacement. For that matter

military space plane advocates may desire a similar approac

in pursuit of a seemingly invincible weapon. Both parties un

doubtedly have the US’s best interests at heart, but could lea

us to squander our treasure in pursuit of a dream not ye

ready to be realized. Careful evaluation of progress at eac

step in the program is the prudent course. The earliest oppor 

tunity, confidently to assess the merits of developing an opera 

tional vehicle, will not come until the turn of the millennium.

482
Third, regardless of the embryonic state of reusable rocke

technology, it is not too early for the US military to thin

deeply about the implications of RLV operational use. If op 

erational RLVs become a reality, there will be serious impli

cations for war-fighting strategy, force structure planning

training, and doctrine. Concepts of operations should b

developed in more depth and breadth than this study could

achieve. In this regard, the analytical criteria used in thi

study may prove to be a useful framework for evaluatin

new RLV CONOPS. Another way to support preparation fo

the birth of operational RLVs is to keep military people ac

tive in the flight test programs. Today’s DC-XA flight test

include uniformed personnel from the USAF’s acquisitio

command. 133 It is not too soon to include operators an

maintenance personnel in this activity. One of the ofte

heard objectives of the RLV program is to develop aircraft

like operations. An excellent way to pursue this worthy goa

would be to leverage the experience of seasoned militar

aircraft maintainers. A handful of senior crew chiefs workin

with RLV developers and test teams may provide helpfu

advice on how to establish efficient RLV generation and re

covery systems and procedures. At the same time, thes

crew chiefs would also be developing a knowledge base fo

future military planning and operations.

Final Summary

The US military must be prepared to take advantage o

reusable launch vehicles should the NASA-led effort to de

velop an RLV demonstrator prove successful. The focus o

this study was an explanation of how the US military could

use RLVs by describing and analyzing two concepts of op 

erations. Four assumptions which guided the research ar

worthy of mention. First, the estimate that RLV technolog

will become operationally feasible by 2012 is reasonable

Second, a fiscally constrained environment will continue

Third, the US government will continue to support growt

and development of the US commercial space lift industr

and encourage dual use, or perhaps triple use, of relate

facilities and systems. Fourth, the US government’s nationa

483
security strategy will continue to emphasize internationa

leadership and engagement to further its political, economic

and security objectives.

Before developing and analyzing concepts of operations fo

military use of RLVs, requirements were stated as space lif

reconnaissance, transspace operations, and strike (in an

from space). Then, to provide a basis for CONOPS develop 

ment and analysis, current RLV concepts and attributes wer

summarized, and hypothetical attributes of a notional RLV

for use in military applications were suggested. Followin

discussion of RLV concepts and attributes, two concepts o

operations were presented and subsequently analyzed. Th

criteria used in the analysis included capability, cost, opera 

tions efficiency, operations effectiveness, and political con 

siderations (table 39).

Four major conclusions resulted from the analysis. First

RLVs have military potential. Second, design choices for a

operational RLV will have effects on risk, cost, capability

and operations efficiency and effectiveness, the choice of 

larger vehicle being accompanied by more risk. Third, in 

creased investment in propulsion technology is warranted

Fourth, the top priority for the RLV program, even from th

DOD perspective, should remain cheap and responsive ac

cess to space.

Three recommendations were offered. First, the US mili

tary should become a more active participant in the RLV

program. Second, the United States should not pursue de

velopment of operational RLVs before the technology i

ready. Third, it is not too early for the US military to thin

deeply about the implications of operational RLVs for war

fighting strategy, force structure planning, training, an

doctrine.

The small steps being taken by the DC-X Delta Clippe

experimental in the New Mexico desert today may be recog 

nized in coming years as having warmed and strengthene

our muscles for the giant leap into an “exciting and vita

future in space activities of all kinds.”134 The United State

and its military must be prepared for that future.

484
Notes

1. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations of DC-XA flight te

number nine, White Sands Missile Range, N.Mex., 18 May 1996. The DC-XA

could hardly be called a spaceship given its limited altitude capability—th

ninth flight only went to 800 feet and it never climbed above 10,000 feet. I

Table 39

Summary of Analysis

Analytical Criteria CONOPS A CONOPS B

Capability

 Spacelift

 Reconnaissance

 Strike to Surface

 Strike to Space (LEO)

 Transspace

Responsive, cannot lift all

 payloads

Capable and responsive

Capable and responsive

Capable and responsive

Capable—advantage of

 smaller propellant facilities

Responsive, lifts all payloads

Capable, but less responsive

Capable, but less responsive

Capable, but less responsive

Capable—disadvantage of

 large propellant facilities

Cost

 Operating Base

 (nonrecurring cost)

 ELV Augmentation

 Transspace

 Technology Maturation

At least $350 million

$26.6 billion through year

 2030

Not economically viable

Decreases development

 costs—moderate require-

 ment

At least $150 million

None

Not economically viable

Decreases development

 costs—essential

Operation Efficiency

and Effectiveness

 Cryogenic Propellants

 Deployment

 Reliability

Complicates operations

Challenging—benefits from 

 smaller propellant facilities

Good—lower propulsion

 performance requirement

Complicates operations

Challenging—suffers from 

 large propellant facilities

Poor—lack of performance 

 margin

Politics

 International

 Domestic

Lives within treaties and

 law—potentially threatening

ASAT ban prohibits space

 strike

Fiscal constraints drive triple

 use

Lives within treaties and law—

 less-threatening

 appearance

ASAT ban prohibits space

 strike

Fiscal constraints drive triple

 use

485
also lacks any payload carrying capability. However, it does prove a poin

about the feasibility of performing reusable rocket operations.

2. For an overview of the program, see the following sources. “RLV Pro

gram Overview,” Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., Octobe

1995, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from

http://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_ HTMLs/RLVOverview.html. “A Draft Coop 

erative Agreement Notice, X-33 Phase II: Design and Demonstration,” Ma

shall Space Flight Center, 14 December 1995, on-line, Internet, availabl

from http://procure.msfc. nasa.gov/ pub/solicit/can_8_3/.

3. Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Space Transportatio

Policy Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: White House Press Release, 5 Augu

1994), 3–4.

4. Maj Victor Villhard, staff officer, secretary of the Air Force, Spac

Policy Office, telephone interview with author, 27 November 1995. Accord 

ing to Major Villhard, the USAF and NASA have an ongoing cooperativ

effort with seven IPTs examining areas for improved efficiency in spac

operations. One of these teams, the space lift activities IPT, has a panel fo

the express purpose of interchange and cooperation on the subject of reus

able launch vehicles.

5. Col Eric Anderson, director of space lift acquisition, assistant secre 

tary of the Air Force for acquisition (SAF/AQSL), Pentagon, interviewed b

author during visit to Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., 1

December 1995.

6. Integrated Product Team for Space Launch Activities, “Terms of Refer

ence,” draft, undated. USAF officers on the IPT encouraged this researc

effort to help satisfy the very real need to identify DOD requirements.

7. “Air Force Forms Study Group on SSTO,” Military Space 13, no. 2 (2

January 1996): 4.

8. Michael K. French, “Industry Officials Cautiously Applaud Tax-Brea

Bill,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17 March 1996): 15. The term dual us

refers to the idea of government and commercial entities using the sam

system or facility. The term triple use is of more recent origin and ha

become popular to emphasize that both civil and defense government agen 

cies use a system or facility along with commercial entities. A recent man

festation of this government policy was a proposal to create tax breaks fo

commercial space ventures.

9. Directorate of Plans, Air Force Space Command, “FY96 MAP Align 

ments and Definitions,” briefing, Air Force Space Command Headquarter

Peterson AFB, Colo., 23 January 1996.

10. Directorate of Plans, Air Force Space Command, Space Lift Missio

Area Plan , 1 December 1995, 20–23 and 28. Transspace operations a

described in the MAP “are those that occur in the boundary regions betwee

the atmosphere and space.” These operations involve moving people an

material to and through space. See also Glenn A. Kent, A Framework fo

Defense Planning, R-3721-AF/OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1989), 

Strategies to task is “a force planning process that focuses on the buildin

486
blocks of operational capability . . . clearly linking national security objec 

tives to the timely procurement of hardware.”

11. Space Lift Mission Area Plan, 32. The cost-related deficiencies are th

high recurring operations and maintenance costs of launch vehicle infra

structure and the ranges; the operability concerns stemming from spac

lift’s manpower intensiveness and long launch preparation times; long

range turnaround times; the poor supportability resulting from nonstan

dard ranges; the ranges’ inability to support all users; and the difficult

DOD has in identifying and validating the growing commercial sector re 

quirements.

12. Space Lift Mission Area Plan, 36 and 85. Space-based range system

refers to replacing the ground- and air-based radar, telemetry receiver

tracking, and command systems now used in support of space lift opera

tions with space-based systems. For example, some space lift operation

depend on support from aircraft to collect telemetry when the launch veh

cle is not in view of a ground station. It may be possible to use a satellite t

collect this information. Using a satellite instead of the aircraft may b

cheaper, more reliable, and more flexible.

13. Space Lift Mission Area Plan , iii.

14. This accident is a theme consistently heard by the author durin

discussions with USAF officers involved in space lift policy, operations, an

acquisition business. At least one author has claimed the USAF’s emphasi

on expendable launch vehicles has more to do with its organizational es 

sence and intercontinental ballistic missile heritage. If there is any truth t

this it would certainly be hard to prove. It would be even harder to prove it

relevance given the strong evidence of rational reasons for the USAF t

pursue its current course. See Maj William W. Bruner III, “National Securit

Implications of Inexpensive Space Access” (master’s thesis, School of Ad 

vanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., June 1995).

15. USAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Spac

Power for the 21st Century, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USA

Scientific Advisory Board, 15 December 1995). The USAF Scientific Advisor

Board’s recently published New World Vistas study is one example of revo 

lutionary planning effort. It was specifically designed by the USAF as a

external complement to the USAF modernization planning process due t

the recognized limitations of a strategies-to-tasks approach to acquisition.

16. Message, 221435Z DEC 95, commander, Air Force Space Command

to vice chief of staff, USAF, commander, Air Force Materiel Command, an

commander, Air Combat Command, 22 December 1995.

17. “Latest News, Official Announcements,” Marshall Space Flight Cen

ter, Huntsville, Ala., n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 February 1996, availabl

from ftp://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/ RLVNews.html.

18. “A Draft Cooperative Agreement Notice, X-33 Phase II: Design an

Demonstration,” Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., on-lin

Internet, 14 December 1995, available from

http://procure.msfc.nasa.gov/ pub/ solicit/can_8_3/, A-2–A-3.

487
19. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, Access t

Space Study , January 1994, 61, 69.

20. The data in table 35 came from a number of sources. Data on RLV

payload capability, propulsion, mission life, and costs came from the follow 

ing documents: Report of the Moorman Study, Space Launch Modernizatio

Plan , 5 May 1994; National Research Council, Reusable Launch Vehicl

Technology Development and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: Nation

Academy Press, 1995); “Executive Review, RLV Technology Program,” NAS

Headquarters, 24 May 1995, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from

http://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/LIBGen.html. Competing contrac 

tors’ cost estimates are at the lower end of the spectrum but are not cited a

they are proprietary and may also prove to be optimistic. The cost figure

also ignore what the unit production costs might be after technology deve

opment. Data on RLV takeoff and landing methods, operations base re 

quirements, cross-range capabilities, and turnaround times came from th

following telephone interviews: Mike Pitman, Rockwell RLV/X-33 system

engineer, telephone interviews with author, 21 and 26 February 1996

David Urie, former Lockheed RLV/X-33 program manager, telephone inter 

view with author, 22 February 1996; Paul Klevatt, McDonnell Dougla

RLV/ X-33 program manager, telephone interview with author, 20 Februar

1996. Data on the Black Horse TAV came from Robert M. Zubrin an

Mitchell Burnside Clapp, “Black Horse: Winging It to Orbit,” Ad Astra 7, no

2 (March/April 1995): 40–43; “Space Lift: Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and o

Orbit,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 42–64; and Capt Mitche

B. Clapp, USAF Phillips Laboratory, telephone interview with author, 2

February 1996.

21. George P. Sutton, Rocket Propulsion Elements, An Introduction to th

Engineering of Rockets (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 21–22. Spe 

cific impulse, Is p or Is, is defined as the total impulse per unit weight o

propellant. Total impulse, It , is the thrust force, F (which can vary wit

time), integrated over the burning time t. According to Sutton, Is p has “unit

of newton-second3/kilogram-meter. Since a newton is defined as that forc

which gives a mass of 1 kilogram an acceleration of 1 meter/second2, th

units of Is p can be expressed simply in seconds. However, it is really 

thrust per unit weight flow.”

22. “Executive Review, RLV Technology Program,” n.p.

23. National Research Council, Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology De 

velopment and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Pres

1995), 1–8, 21, and 73. Mass fraction, also known as mass ratio or MR, i

defined to be the final mass of a vehicle (after propellants are consume

divided by the initial mass (before the propellants are consumed); an

Sutton, 23.

24. The potential cost impact of overland flight certification was high 

lighted by Paul Klevatt, McDonnell Douglas’s RLV/X-33 program manage

during a telephone interview with author, 20 February 1996. The impor 

tance of this issue was echoed by Dennis Smith, Marshall Space Fligh

488
Center, RLV program assistant for technology, telephone interview wit

author, 23 February 1996.

25. There is not complete consensus on this issue, and it is addresse

later.

26. Sutton, 63. The linear aerospike engine is a class of plug nozzl

engine. A plug nozzle engine has a center body and an annular chambe

unlike the traditional bell-shaped or contour nozzle common on today’

expendable rockets and STS. An aerospike nozzle is a plug nozzle wher

low-velocity gases (e.g., from a separate gas source) are injected in th

center and replace the center body. This allows a very short nozzle hard 

ware configuration, which is desirable for a compact vehicle design.

27. Rick Bachtel, RLV program manager, Marshall Space Flight Cente

telephone interview with author, 22 March 1996. Both the MDA and th

RSSD concepts will most likely use engines derived from the space shuttl

main engine or the Russian RD-0120.

28. “Space Lift; Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and on Orbit,” 42–64.

29. To be fair to the Black Horse advocates on the SPACECAST 202

team, they did not intend to suggest great payload capability for the Blac

Horse. Their concept included revolutionary reductions in satellite size an

weight and a greater focus on missions other than delivering payload t

orbit.

30. Analysis conducted by the Aerospace Corporation and discussed a

the 15 February 1996 meeting of the USAF’s Military Space Plane Applica

tions Working Group in Colorado Springs, Colo., indicates the Black Hors

as described by the SPACECAST 2020 group is not feasible. With a chang

from aluminum to composite material structure and a significant increas

in size, the vehicle might be able to achieve orbit, but just barely. Phillip

Lab’s Black Horse experts are in the process of rebutting this Aerospac

Corporation analysis.

31. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), Department o

Defense, Industrial Assessment for Space Launch Vehicles, January 1995

ES-4 and ES-12–ES-13.

32. The belief that a smaller vehicle is more feasible was the consensu

of participants at a meeting of the Military Space Plane Applications Work 

ing Group held in Colorado Springs, Colo., on 15 February 1996. Th

participants included NASA personnel, one of whom had worked on th

agency’s Access to Space Study and claimed the analysis behind this stud

supported the conclusion that developing smaller RLVs involves less techn

cal risk. This perspective is also shared by Dr. Len Worlund, director o

technology for the RLV program at Marshall Space Flight Center, althoug

he was also quick to point out that a smaller vehicle will not necessaril

meet the requirements of all the users, such as NASA. David Urie, recentl

retired RLV/X-33 program manager for Lockheed Advanced Developmen

Company, telephone interview with author, 22 February 1996, representin

a contrary view, suggested a smaller vehicle size was actually less feasibl

than the full-scale RLV envisioned by NASA. Like Dr. Worlund, he was als

489
quick to point out that a smaller vehicle would not meet all user require 

ments.

33. National Research Council, 3.

34. Ibid., 8.

35. Ibid., 73.

36. Ibid.

37. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), II–2. Earlie

studies reached a similar conclusion. For example, see National Researc

Council, From Earth to Orbit, An Assessment of Transportation Option

(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992), 4.

38. “French Launcher Design: Evolved Ariane,” Military Space 13, no. 

(4 March 1996): 3–5.

39. The first two scheduled Ariane 5 launches will carry European Spac

Agency, not commercial, payloads. Craig Covault, “Cluster to Inaugurat

Ariane 5 Flights,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 Marc

1996): 48–50; and Craig Covault, “Reentry Flight Test Set for Second Arian

5,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 51–53.

40. “News Briefs, Satellite Launch Review,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–1

March 1996): 17. According to the Arianespace consortium, the averag

weight of a communications satellite will increase from the current 2,400 t

3,200 within the next four years then level off after that. This average doe

not include the satellite constellations for mobile communications. Thes

weigh less than 1,000 each.

41. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), IV–3.

42. Ibid., I–12.

43. Lt Col Jess Sponable, briefing to Military Space Plane Application

Working Group, Colorado Springs, Colo., 15 February 1996. The pop-u

maneuver is essentially a nonoptimum staging maneuver in which the pay

load, with an appropriate upper stage, is deployed only a few thousand fee

short of orbit. This maneuver can significantly increase the payload capabi

ity to orbit (or into an intercontinental ballistic trajectory).

44. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, 56.

45. Lt Col Jess Sponable, briefing to Military Space Plane Application

Working Group, 15 February 1996.

46. Bruce A. Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Compo

nents,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996)

56–57.

47. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations during DC-XA fligh

test number nine, White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex., 18 May 1996. Base

on the 18 May 1996 DC-XA flight test, this requirement may change. Dur

ing this test, McDonnell Douglas used the grate and trench system for th

first time with poor results. Instead of relieving thermal stress on the bas

on the vehicle, it actually focused the DC-XA’s exhaust flame back u

toward the rocket causing a fire.

48. An RLV’s ability maneuver in space is a function of its propulsio

system and available propellant. To some extent, an RLV may be able t

490
trade payload weight carried for fuel increasing its ability to change it

orbital path. However, given the mass fractions required of an RLV, tradin

all the payload capacity may still translate into very little out-of-plane m

neuverability.

49. Dr. Len Worlund, RLV program technology director, telephone inter

view with author, 22 February 1996.

50. Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, eds. Space Mission Analysi

and Design (Torrance, Calif.: Dordrecht, 1992), 135–36 (equation 6-10). Th

greater cross-range requirement necessary to support landing at the base o

origin after one revolution is driven by the fact that the earth will hav

rotated some 22.5 degrees by the time the RLV completes one 90-minut

orbit. After circling the earth once, the RLV will find its orbital path is we

of where it started. P = 4(360o – ΔL), where P is the orbital period, and ΔL 

the change in longitude that the satellite goes through between successiv

ascending nodes in degrees. For this example, 90 = 4(360 o – ΔL), and ΔL 

337.5.

51. David Urie, former Lockheed Advanced Development Compan

RLV/ X-33 program manager, telephone interview with author, 22 Februar

1996.

52. Joseph C. Anselmo, “NASA Confident of Shuttle Backups,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology 144, no. 15 (8 April 1996): 54. Drawing o

analogies with today’s space shuttles would not be helpful. The orbiter wit

the most flights, Discovery , has flown only 21 times. One could also asser

that depot-level maintenance is required after every flight. If this kind o

performance is repeated by RLVs, there is no hope for achieving the neces 

sary efficiencies.

53. For insight into how weather affects current launch operations, se

J. T. Madura, “Weather Impacts on Space Operations,” July 1992 (Ai

University Library number M-U 44059, no. 92-02) and 30th and 45th Spac

Wing, “Space Lift Concept of Employment,” draft, 1 October 1994.

54. Urie. According to Urie, Lockheed plans on an RLV crew size be 

tween 50 and 60 people, with a total launch organization of 150 peopl

including administrative and logistics support personnel. NASA’s Coopera

tive Agreement Notice for the X-33 Phase II requires demonstration of “a

least three X-33 landing-to-reflight turnarounds with a ground crew (touc

labor) of less than or equal to 50 personnel.” “A Draft Cooperative Agree 

ment Notice,” B-11.

55. Smith, 57. Rockwell plans on this type of arrangement for their RLV

concept. There is a reflection of a broader trend in the space industry t

adopt common standards. In the space launch industry, DOD is funding a

effort to develop standards to benefit the defense, civil, and commerci

sectors. See also Jennifer Heronema, “Space Industry Officials Advocat

Adopting Standards,” Space News 7, no. 8 (26 February–3 March 1996): 10

56. Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’

Information Group Limited, 1995), 567–76. A nominal weapons load for a

F-16 consists of six 500-pound or two 2,000-pound bombs in addition t

491
external fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles. The greatest practical bomb loa

for the F-16 consists of 12 500-pound bombs or four 2,000-pound bomb

assuming no external fuel tanks are carried. The F-117 can carry tw

2,000-pound bombs. The former Soviet Union’s SS-18, the ICBM with th

greatest throw weight, could deliver 16,700 pounds. Max Walmer, An Illus

trated Guide to Strategic Weapons (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1988), 1

These figures obviously do not account for enhanced weapons effects due t

the method of delivery.

57. The capabilities described in this table are based on the discussio

of RLV attributes in the previous chapter. CONOPS A capabilities reflect th

desired RLV attributes described in table 36. CONOPS B capabilities reflec

a composite of the attributes currently conceived by the three RLV program

competitors. In the case of turnaround time, this table actually reflects th

shortest time of any of the concepts rather than an average. Table 37 als

assumes all RLVs are completely mission capable—none undergoing main 

tenance, lost in accidents, or lost to enemy activity. Finally, the RLVs wi

require some form of weapons dispenser. Based on examination of th

USAF’s most recently developed bomber, the Northrop-Grumman B-2 Spiri

it is estimated that eight 2,000-pound weapons may be carried on on

rotary launcher assembly (RLA), and that each RLA weighs 4,000 pound

Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’s Informa

tion Group Limited, 1995), 614–17.

58. This sentiment is echoed in the New World Vistas study. “The fir

attempt to apply new concepts is a necessary, but not sufficient step. I

military systems, the second step in the development of a radically new

concept must be determined after operational deployment. The warfighter

will use the system in innovative ways not described in the manuals.” USA

Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for th

21st Century, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advi

sory Board, 15 December 1995), 13.

59. This is a very conservative estimate of the development cost saving

possible with the smaller RLV—it could well be twice as cheap. But thi

conservative estimate adds more balance to the two CONOPS and may hel

highlight tradeoffs. One premise for the lower cost estimate on developmen

of the smaller RLV is that a major new engine development program is likel

to be required to support the full-scale RLV large payload capacity and siz

The National Research Council’s RLV program review supports this premis

National Research Council, Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Develop 

ment and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995).

60. The terms space superiority , precision employment, global mobility 

and information dominance are used to describe four of the five USAF cor

competencies. They are not used to imply the USAF must own or operat

RLVs for military applications, but to illustrate the connections between th

capabilities and a larger mission area or strategy. For example, the ability t

quickly launch national security spacecraft in response to some contin 

gency in addition to the ability to reconnoiter and strike enemy spacecraf

492
as necessary can provide the basis for affecting control of the space environ 

ment for friendly exploitation while denying the environment to an adver 

sary—the essence of space superiority.

61. In the earliest days of the space age, the USAF proposed satellit

interceptor project (SAINT), involved using an orbital vehicle to inspec

potentially hostile spacecraft. The USAF also hoped to develop SAINT int

an ASAT system. The project was canceled on 3 December 1962 for 

number of reasons. It contradicted the US government’s desire to emphasiz

the peaceful nature of its space program, and it experienced technica

conceptual, and financial difficulties. According to historian Paul Stares, b

the mid-1960s ground-based systems were capable of a great deal of infor 

mation gathering without the added expense and potential political prob 

lems of an orbital system. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space (Ithac

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 112–17.

62. The USAF’s Scientific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas study dis 

cussed the utility of these types of weapons for space control. USAF Scien 

tific Advisory Board, 46–47.

63. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militar

and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 88. A contingency is “an emergenc

involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversive

or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation

contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to en 

sure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.”

64. At least one theorist writing about future war predicts space will b

“a strategic center of gravity in any future war. Both sides will want spac

control.” Col Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospac

Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), xxv

This prediction is also made in the New World Vistas study. USAF Scientifi

Advisory Board, 11, 46, and 61.

65. Barnett, xxv. Colonel Barnett predicts that in 2010, if the U

“chooses to oppose an invasion of an ally, it must do so during the initi

stages of the attack. Failure to immediately engage the enemy could prov

disastrous.” While this passage may contain some hyperbole, it seems intu

tively obvious that being able to strike an adversary while his offensive i

unfolding can be advantageous. The ability to do this without having t

deploy large forces to the theater of conflict would be even more advanta

geous.

66. This standard should be the same for EELV.

67. Max Walmer, An Illustrated Guide to Strategic Weapons (New Yor

Prentice Hall Press, 1988), 12. These maneuverable reentry vehicles migh

have a precision strike capability much like the “Precision-Guided Reentr

Vehicle (PGRV).”

68. Rockwell has identified two baseline locations for RLV operation

Cape Canaveral, Fla., and Edwards AFB, Calif. They ruled out Vandenber

AFB, Calif., because of concerns about flying over environmentally sensitiv

areas when launching to the east. While this type of overflight restrictio

493
may be lifted by 2012, its reality today drove the choice of coastal primar

operating bases in this study. If overflight restrictions are relaxed or com 

pletely lifted in the future, then primary operating bases in the interior o

the CONUS may be a better choice to decrease vulnerability. Bruce A

Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Components,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 57. Vandenberg i

included here because of the anticipation that polar orbits may be desirabl

for some military missions.

69. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 18–1

Douhet’s words “there is no practical way to prevent the enemy from attack 

ing us with his air force” are indicative of his belief in the offensive nature o

airpower and the ineffectiveness of ground-based defense against air attack

70. Andrew Wilson, ed., Jane’s Space Directory (London: Jane’s Inform

tion Group Limited, 1995), 162–63 and 172–73.

71. It is conceivable that complete autonomy would not be acceptable fo

strike missions when collateral damage or fratricide concerns are extremel

high.

72. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces , defines COCOM

as “the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions o

command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing com 

mands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and givin

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training

and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the com 

mand.” Quoted in Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Publication 1, Th

Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1993, 2-20–2-21.

73. Lt Col Robert Owen, “The Airlift System,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 

(Fall 1995): 16–29, proposes four tenets of airlift. One of these tenets sug

gests the military component of the US’s airlift system should only do wha

the civilian component can’t or won’t do. This tenet might well apply t

space lift, especially if there is a viable military component as described i

this CONOPS.

74. A similar arrangement already exists today with the civil reserve ai

fleet.

75. Joint Pub 0-2 defines TACON as “the detailed and usually loc

direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplis

mission or assigned tasks.” Quoted in AFSC Pub 1, 2-22.

76. According to Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint A

Operations, 14 November 1994, II-2–II-3, the joint force air component com 

manders (JFACC) responsibilities do not include space forces. However, 

the JFACC role is to function as supported commander for strategic attac

operations, counterair operations, theater airborne reconnaissance and sur

veillance, and the JFC’s overall interdiction effort, as described in Joint Pu

3-56.1, then it may make sense to give the JFACC authority and respons

bility for planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of RLVs used i

494
support of a theater campaign plan and to include RLV strikes on whateve

the air tasking order evolves into by the year 2012.

77. This is obviously not a critical issue for the CONOPS, but the RLV

unit headquarters would be best located where most of the activity is likel

to be. With the fall of the former Soviet Union, Cape Canaveral has becom

the busiest launch base in the world.

78. Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles (Washington, D.C.: Office of Ai

Force History, 1990), 103, 208, 252–53. Interestingly, in 1954 the USA

considered using civilian contractor personnel to operate its first Atla

ICBMs to attain an early “emergency operational capability” by 1958. Thi

option, described as a “PhD-type capability,” was never exercised. Instea

the Atlas achieved operational status in September 1959 only after a Strate 

gic Air Command crew completed a successful training launch.

79. The assumption here is that the commercial organization would b

an American company. If the operator were to be a multinational corpora

tion, tasking for military missions would be more complicated. At the sam

time, operations by a multinational corporation could provide a measure o

deterrence. Any attack on a multinational RLV might invite a response from

other nations as well as the United States.

80. Joint Pub 0-2 defines OPCON as “the authority delegated to a com 

mander to perform those functions of command over subordinate force

involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of task

the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary t

accomplish the mission.” Quoted in AFSC Pub 1, 2-21–2-22.

81. Report of the Moorman Study, “Space Launch Modernization Plan

5 May 1994, 12. The minimum time required from call-up to launch fo

today’s expendable launch vehicles is 2–4 months for Pegasus, 90 days fo

Titan II, 98 days for Delta II, and 180 days for Titan IV. The shuttle require

12–33 months from call-up to launch.

82. Joel W. Powell, “Space Station Hardware,” Spaceflight 38, no. 2 (Feb 

ruary 1996): 54–56.

83. Rick Bachtel, RLV program manager, Marshall Space Flight Cente

telephone interview with author, 22 March 1996. Bachtel estimated th

crew module will weigh approximately 20,000 pounds and carry a crew o

three to four astronauts.

84. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, Access t

Space Study , January 1994, 40 and 64–65.

85. Powell, 54. The current plans for ISSA deployment have the Rus

sians delivering two of the largest components of ISSA, the functional carg

block at 19,340 kg and the service module at 21,020 kg, from Baykonou

cosmodrome using Proton rockets. Former astronaut Buzz Aldrin has sug

gested using the Russians’ largest rocket, the 220,000-pound-to-LEO Ene

gia , to lift ISSA payloads. See Darrin Guilbeau, “International Cooperatio

and Concerns in Space Logistics,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 

(Winter 1995): 25–31. This lift capability is four times that of the Titan I

and could easily handle lifting the largest planned payloads.

495
86. Cape Canaveral is located at 28.5 degrees (28 degrees, 30 minute

north latitude, while Baykonour is located at 45.9 degrees (45 degrees, 5

minutes) north latitude. Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, eds., Spac

Mission Analysis and Design (Torrance, Calif.: Dordrecht, 1992), 680. On

equation used here as the basis for this estimation can be found in Roger R

Bate, Donald D. Mueller, and Jerry E. White, Fundamentals of Astrody 

namics (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), 307 (equation 6.4-1). Vo 

1,524 cos Lo , where Vo is the speed of a launch point on the surface of th

earth, 1,524 ft/sec is the eastward speed of a point on the equator, and L

is the latitude of the launch site. For launch out of Baykonour, Vo = 1,52

cos (45.9) = 1,060.6 ft/sec. For launch out of the Cape, Vo = 1,524 co

(28.5) = 1,339 ft/sec. To determine how much of the eastward velocity of th

launch site actually may be used to help boost a payload, some basi

trigonometry may be used. V1 = Vo cos ∅, where V1 is the velocity advantag

in the direction of the launch azimuth gained from the rotation of the earth

Vo is the speed of a launch point on the surface of the earth, and ∅ is th

angle between the launch azimuth and a line due east of the launch sit

For a launch out of Baykonour into the ISSA orbit (51.6 degree inclination

V1 = 1,060.6 cos (26.8) = 946.7 ft/sec. For a launch out of the Cape into th

ISSA orbit, V1 = 1,339 cos (47.12) = 911.1 ft/sec. Thus, for launches int

the ISSA orbit, Baykonour actually benefits more (946.7 – 911.1 = 35.

ft/sec) from the rotation of the earth. (Launch azimuths to the ISSA orb

from the Cape and Baykonour were provided by the 45th Range Squadron

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla., and Ed Faudree of the ANSE

Corporation, Washington, D.C., respectively.)

87. Craig Covault, “Reentry Flight Test Set for Second Ariane 5,” 51–53.

88. The Titan IV can lift 39,100 pounds to LEO. Ariane 5 data may b

found in “French Launcher Design: Evolved Ariane,” Military Space 13, no

5 (4 March 1996): 4. Titan IV data may be found in Bretton S. Alexander e

al., “1994 Space Launch Activities,” ANSER Aerospace Division Note AD

95–2 (Arlington, Va.: ANSER, 1995).

89. See “National Reconnaissance Office Home Page,” National Recon 

naissance Office, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from

http://www.nro.odci.gov/, for an official introduction to the US govern

ment’s space-based national security reconnaissance capabilities.

90. There are numerous print and electronic media sources which con 

tain information about US government space-based reconnaissance sys 

tems and provide ephemeris data which could be used to predict orbits an

overflight times. This author makes no judgment about the accuracy of thi

publicly available information. However, if there is any truth to it, then eve

an unsophisticated adversary might thwart US attempts to monitor them

using reconnaissance satellites in space.

91. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Un

versity Press, 1985), 112–17.

92. Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’

Information Group Limited, 1995), 617. The B-2 has a maximum weapon

496
load of 40,000 pounds—the same as the payload weight capacity of RLV-B

However, when delivering weapons such as the AGM 169 advanced cruis

missile (ACM), the joint direct attack munition, or the Mk 84 2,000-poun

bomb, only 16 of these weapons can be carried due to the weight of th

rotary launcher assembly required to carry and dispense them. Obviously

an RLV will not drop these same weapons. Weapons designed specificall

for delivery from space will be required.

93. There are many assumptions underlying the numbers in this tabl

With respect to the RLVs, assumptions include a 100 percent mission-capa

ble rate, no other missions, such as space lift, being accomplished, n

losses, RLA carries eight 2,000-pound weapons and weighs 4,000 pound

mission execution time is 90 minutes to go around the earth and return t

launch base while making strike en route (45 minutes into orbit). Wit

respect to the B-2, assumptions include a cost of $2 billion for each aircraf

allowing for a cost-equivalent fleet of 10 aircraft (corresponds to RLV deve

opment budget of $20 billion), one-hour response time, sixteen 2,000

pound weapons delivered by each aircraft, flying out of the continental U

(CONUS) with an 18-hour flight required to reach the target, recovery at th

point of origin in the CONUS (Whiteman AFB, Mont.), and three-hour turn

around time. The $2 billion cost figure for each B-2 is a unit program

cost—the total program cost divided by the number of aircraft acquired (se

Jackson, 615). A lower cost figure for the B-2 could be used if one onl

counted the current unit production costs, not including program develop 

ment costs. But then one could use the same method to arrive at a lowe

cost figure for RLVs as well.

94. At least one writer has suggested using an RLV-like vehicle to delive

US Marines “From Space” in the 2040 time frame. Maj William C. Redmon

“Campaign 2040: Victory From Space” (master’s thesis, US Marine Corp

School of Advanced Warfighting Studies, 1995), 34.

95. Dave Schweikle, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace DC-X/DC-XA pro

gram manager, telephone interview with author, 2 April 1996, and person

observations of the author at White Sands Missile Range, 16–18 May 1996

96. Ibid., 2 April 1996.

97. Report of the Moorman Study, D-14.

98. Telephone inquiry to package delivery service, 3 April 1996.

99. Daniel McDonald, staff member, Aerial Ports Operations Divisio

Air Mobility Command, telephone interview with author, 4 April 199

These cost and time figures averages are based on all shipments given 

“999” priority, the highest possible, shipped from Dover to Ramstein durin

the period of October 1995 through February 1996.

100. For two examples, see Office of Space Systems Development, NAS

headquarters, 70, and Report of the Moorman Study, 27.

101. Report of the Moorman Study, D-10–D-11.

102. National Research Council, Reusable Launch Vehicle Technolog

Development and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Pres

1995), 13.

497
103. Ibid., 9.

104. Briefing, OL-AC PL/RKF (USAF Phillips Lab, Fundamental Tech

nologies Division), subject: Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Tech 

nology program, 12 March 1996.

105. Recommendation number eight of the Moorman Study was to “in 

crease funding for a core space launch technology program as an enable

for future investment” (see Report of the Moorman Study, 26). Funding fo

the IHPRPT program prior to the Moorman Study report was in the $50–6

million range—it has remained at that level since. James Chew, staff mem 

ber, Directorate of Advanced Technology, director of Defense Research an

Engineering, telephone interview with author, 19 March 1996.

106. The Moorman Study recommended “that the space lift core techno

ogy program within DoD be increased from its current level to $120M tot

by FY 96” (see Report of the Moorman Study, C-1–3).

107. Neufeld, 208–19 and 234–35.

108. A cryogenic propellant is a liquefied gas at low temperature. Cryo

genics are very high performance propellants (specific impulses as high a

450 seconds may be achieved) but are complicated to handle. Hypergoli

propellants are liquid propellants which spontaneously ignite as the oxidize

and fuel come in contact with each other. Hypergolics like those used in th

Titan are liquid at ambient temperature that can be stored for long period

in sealed tanks, easing some of the complications encountered with cryo

genics, but only achieve specific impulses of 300–340 seconds. Solid prope

lants are simple, reliable, and relatively low cost, but have more limite

performance (specific impulses of 300 seconds or less). George P. Sutto

Rocket Propulsion Elements, An Introduction to the Engineering of Rocket

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 147, 175, and 292. Larson an

Wertz, 644–45.

109. Third Space Launch Squadron Operations Checklist, AC-74 Launc

Management Countdown Checklist, 12 April 1994.

110. Schweikle.

111. Edward Boyle, Matthew Tracy, and Lt Col Donald Smoot, “Rethink

ing Support Equipment,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 4 (Fall 1995

28–31.

112. Quoted in Boyle, Tracy, and Smoot, 28.

113. Quoted in Capt Sandra M. Gregory, “Improving Space Lift Reliabi

ity through Robust Design,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 1 (Winte

1995): 16–18.

114. Ibid., 16.

115. Report of the Moorman Study, 10.

116. Gregory, 17.

117. Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Components

56–57.

118. Gregory, 17.

119. The McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and Rockwell RLV propulsio

concepts plan on using SSME or RD-0120 derivative engines. The Lockhee

498
RLV concept requires new engine development given its nontraditional lin 

ear aerospike engine design. Bachtel, telephone interview, 22 March 1996.

120. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14

“Space Operations,” final draft, 15 April 1992, II-18–II-22 and A-1–A-17.

121. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Worl

Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–41.

122. Air Force Doctrine Document 4, “Space Doctrine,” draft, 1 Augu

1995, 5.

123. NASA leaders fear losing the shuttle, so they will take the greate

technical risk involved with developing a full-scale rocket instead of initiall

shooting for reusability in a smaller-scale vehicle. This is entirely specula 

tive but may provide interesting insights into organizational behavior re 

lated to the RLV program. It may also suggest why the DOD would take 

more risk-averse approach. The DOD sees development of an RLV as 

potential gain but is confident of its ability to continue using ELVs for spac

access. Thus, DOD is less motivated to take a high risk in the quest for a

operational RLV. DOD pursues the lower-risk approach of incrementall

improving its ELV fleet through the EELV program.

124. Quoted in Joseph C. Anselmo, “NASA Issues Wake-up Call to In 

dustry,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 8 (19 February 1996)

20.

125. Ibid., 20.

126. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Clinton Budget Chops NASA Again,” Aviatio

Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 23–24.

127. Lt Gen Howell Estes, director of operations, Joint Staff, “Operation 

alizing Space,” address to the Second Annual C4I Symposium, USAF Acad

emy, Colo., 28 March 1996. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary for acquis

tion and technology, “Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century,” Defens

Issues 11, no. 6 (17 January 1996): n.p., on-line, Internet, available from

http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/ pubs/di96/di1106.html. Rep. Ronald V

Dellums, “Toward a Post-Transition World: New Strategies for a New Cen 

tury,” SAIS Review 25, no. 10 (Winter–Spring 1995): 93–111. On the plu

side, the DOD’s 1997 budget request for space programs is up 12 percent i

spite of the gloomy fiscal environment. Jennifer Heronema, “US Military Ha

Less, But Allocates More to Space,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17 Marc

1996): 8.

128. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, CINCSPACE, identified the capabilities t

“take-off on demand, overfly any location in the world in approximately on

hour and return and land within two hours at the take-off base” as desir 

able. This was used as one basis for RLV requirements at the outset of thi

study (see chap. 1). Message, 221435Z Dec 95, commander, Air Force Spac

Command, to vice chief of staff, USAF, commander, Air Force Materie

Command, and commander, Air Combat Command, 22 December 1995.

129. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas report de 

scribes a potential future in space where many low-cost single-functio

satellites work in cooperative networks to achieve even greater capabilit

499
than that possible with a few high cost multifunction satellites. USAF Scien 

tific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21

Century, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisor

Board, 15 December 1995).

130. Wally McCoy, “Sustaining Space Systems for Strategic and Theate

Operations,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 32–3

The feasibility of on-orbit support has been studied within the military, a

recently in 1993 by USSPACECOM, and made a reality by NASA throug

use of the space shuttle. The Hubble Space Telescope is one example of 

spacecraft specifically designed for on-orbit servicing.

131. Report of the Moorman Study, “Space Launch Modernization Plan

5 May 1994, C-1-2-3. If the ability to take off, overfly a target half-wa

around the world within an hour, and land back at the base of origin withi

two hours of takeoff is strongly desired by America’s military leaders, the

there may be a better way to obtain that capability. Scramjet technology

such as that developed as part of the National Aerospace Plane Program

(HYFLITE) might be pursued to achieve TAV-like capability. This might als

satisfy the deficiency in transspace operations as defined in the Space lif

MAP.

132. John A. Alic et al., Beyond Spinoff, Military and Commercial Tech 

nologies in a Changing World (Boston: Harvard Business School Pres

1992), 7–8, 73. The term spin on refers to reverse spin-off. With spin o

technologies developed entirely in the commercial sector are used, or ar

adapted for use, by the defense sector.

133. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations at DC-XA flight te

number nine, White Sands Missile Range, N.Mex., 16–18 May 1996.

134. Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson, quoted in House, Assured Access t

Space during the 1990s: Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Spac

Science Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology and th

Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Arme

Services , 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 41.
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Heronema, Jennifer. “Space Industry Officials Advocat

Adopting Standards.” Space News 7, no. 8 (26 February–

March 1996): 10.

———. “US Military Has Less, But Allocates More to Space

Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17 March 1996): 8.

McCoy, Wally. “Sustaining Space Systems for Strategic an

Theater Operations.” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no

1 (Winter 1995): 32–33.

“News Briefs, Satellite Launch Review.” Space News 7, no. 1

(11–17 March 1996): 17.

Owen, Lt Col Robert C. “The Airlift System: A Primer

Airpower Journal 9, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 16–29.

Powell, Joel W. “Space Station Hardware.” Spaceflight 38, no

2 (February 1996): 54–56.

Smith, Bruce A. “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-3

Components.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no

13 (25 March 1996): 56–57.

“Space Lift: Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and on Orbit.” Airpowe

Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 42–64.

504
Walt, Stephen M. 

Alliance Formation and the Balance o

World Power.” International Security 9, no. 4 (Sprin

1985): 3–41.

Zubrin, Robert M., and Capt Mitchell B. Clapp. “Black Horse

Winging It to Orbit.” Ad Astra 7, no. 2 (March/Apri

1995): 40–43.

Briefings and Speeches

Directorate of Plans, Air Force Space Command. “FY96 MA

Alignments and Definitions.” Briefing, Air Force Spac

Command Headquarters, Peterson AFB, Colo., 23 Januar

1996.

Estes, Lt Gen Howell. “Operationalizing Space.” Briefing, Secon

Annual C4I Symposium, USAF Academy, Colo., 28 March

1996.

James, Maj Glenn. “IHPRPT Is.” Briefing, USAF Phillip

Laboratory, Fundamental Technologies Division, Edward

AFB, Calif., 12 March 1996.

Sponable, Lt Col Jess. “Military Spaceplane Technology an

Applications.” Briefing, Military Spaceplane Application

Working Group, Colorado Springs, Colo., 15 Februar

1996.

Internet Sources

“A Draft Cooperative Agreement Notice, X-33 Phase II: Design

and Demonstration.” Marshall Space Flight Center, 1

December 1995. On-line. Internet. Available from

ftp://procure.msfc.nasa.gov/pub/solicit/can_8_3/.

“Executive Review, RLV Technology Program.” NASA Head

quarters, 24 May 1995. On-line. Internet. Available from

http://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/LIBGen.html.

Kaminski, Paul G. “Building a Ready Force for the 21s

Century.” Defense Issues 11, no. 6 (17 January 1996)

On-line. Internet. Available from

http://www.dtic.mil/ defenselink/pubs/di96/di1106.html

“Latest News, Official Announcements.” Marshall Space Fligh

Center, 19 February 1996. On-line. Internet. Available from

http://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/RLVNews. html.

505
National Reconnaissance Office Home Page. National Recon

naissance Office, April 1996. On-line. Internet. Availabl

from http://www.nro.odci.gov/.

“RLV Program Overview.” Marshall Space Flight Center, Octobe

1995. On-line. Internet. Available from

http:// rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/RLVOverview.html.

Author’s Notes

Rampino, Michael A. Discussions at 15 February 1996 Militar

Spaceplane Applications Working Group. Colorado Springs

Colo., 15 February 1996.

———. Personal Observations of DC-XA Flight Test Numbe

Nine. White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 16–18 Ma

1996.

506
Chapter 9

The Inherent Limitations of

Space Power: Fact or Fiction?

Gregory Billman

Control of space means control of the world, far more

certainly, far more totally than any control that has been

achieved by weapons or troops of occupation. Space is the

ultimate position, the position of total control over Earth.

—Lyndon Baines Johnson

Now the competition will be for the possession of the

unhampered right to traverse and control the most vast, the

most important, and the farthest reaching element on the

earth, the air, the atmosphere that surrounds us all, that we

breathe, live by, and which permeates everything. . . . A

new set of rules for the conduct of war will have to be

devised and a whole new set of ideas of strategy learned

by those charged with the conduct of war.

—Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell

Is US space power’s current subordinate position to terres

trial military powers—air, land, and sea—due to inherent lim

tations? Space power today is limited in its ability to accom 

plish many military missions. Whether those limitations ar

predominantly inherent to the space environment or are self

imposed by the current US approach to space is the subject o

this study.

Following a clear definition of space power, three steps ar

taken in the analysis process. First, the evolving relative im 

portance of space power, as it is generally regarded, is dis 

cussed in relation to the other forms of military power. Histori

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require 

ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala

1996.

Advisor: Col Phillip Meilinger, PhD

Reader: Lt Col Robert Owen, PhD

507
cal analogy with the accession of airpower from the earl

twentieth century onward seems particularly appropriate. Ter 

restrial military theory and space theory are subsequently dis 

cussed from a historical context, leading to a discussion o

current space doctrine as it relates to space power’s curren

supporting military role. In the application of theory and doc 

trine, current technologies are considered as they demonstrat

space capabilities beyond those presently fielded. Second, th

physical attributes of space are examined to establish whethe

conduct of operations within the medium has inherent physi

cal limitations. Third, beyond physical limitations, the issue o

inherent limitations due to a lack of military utility is ad

dressed. Military power characteristics are discussed as the

apply to (1) terrestrial power, (2) currently fielded space force

and (3) space forces which are technologically feasible. Th

characteristics include strategic agility, ability to demonstrat

commitment and credibility, and economic, military and politi

cal considerations.

Conclusions and implications are discussed as they apply t

the future potential of US space power. Depending on th

findings, doctrinal implications exist to properly use spac

power—either as an adjunct force with terrestrial power, or a

an independent military force.

No standard definitions seem to exist for air, land, or se

power. However, all seem to have similar characteristics, an

hence space power can be defined in a similar manner. As Lt Co

David E. Lupton writes in his work, On Space Warfare: A Space 

power Doctrine; “Spacepower is the ability of a nation to exploi

the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purpose

and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation.”

The United States depends on space power. It has a spac

infrastructure, both civilian and military, and is presently ex 

ploiting space for many purposes. As naval forces supply th

military component of sea power, and air forces provide th

military component of airpower, space forces supply the mili

tary component of space power. The following is an examina

tion of how space power has developed as compared to othe

military powers, specifically airpower, and how this develop

ment has affected current space power doctrine.

508
Military Power Development and

Space Power’s Relative Importance

The air war of yesterday becomes the space war of

tomorrow.

—1960 Democratic Party Policy Statement

Space power is evolving into a mature military entity—muc

like airpower evolved into a dominating military force. Thi

section reviews space power’s development and its relation 

ship to airpower’s historical development to demonstrate tha

space power, like airpower, owes its potential rapid rise as 

dominating form of warfare to its unique ability to affect ad

versaries in ways previously unimaginable.

Many similarities exist between airpower’s development an

space power; some are cursory, while others are more con 

crete. Cursory similarities include the difficult conceptua

thought required in both cases to develop theories exploitin

the military potential of fundamentally new and environmen 

tally hostile mediums, the requirement for a technologica

knowledge base of current and future developments, and th

need for a doctrinal push by military organizations to claim

the developmental turf of a new medium. More concrete sim

larities include the way in which each power’s resources wer

first employed, the evolution and relationship of each power’s

technologies to new roles, and the organizational developmen

of each power within the military.

Early Employment of Airpower and Space Power

Peter Hays states “the first military use of these two new

mediums was for observation and reconnaissance.”2 In actual

ity, in 1911–12, prior to World War I, the Italians used air 

power in all four present-day mission areas against the Turk

in Libya (force application, force enhancement, control an

support). Lee B. Kennett, in his book The First Air War

1914–18, suggests that it was this experience that caused 

young Italian artillery officer, named Giulio Douhet, to re

mark, “A new weapon has come forth, the sky has become 

509
new battlefield.

 Though Hayss remark is not completely ac

curate, his concept is predominantly regarded as valid. Forc

application did play a considerable, if not a major, role in

World War I airpower. The rudiments of counterair weapon

began development in the early years, but it wasn’t until th

latter part of the war that purpose-built antiaircraft weapon

appeared on the battlefields. Additionally, lighter-than-ai

German dirigibles were used early on in both reconnaissanc

and bombing roles.3 It is generally accepted that the over

whelming bulk of sorties flown by any side in World War 

involved aircraft and airships in tactical observation and re

connaissance roles. Likewise, Operation Desert Storm, fough

77 years later, utilized military space assets in much the sam

way. Desert Storm has been called “The First Space War,

harking to World War I’s appellation, “The First Air War.”4

World War I gave airpower its first large-scale opportunity t

contribute, mostly by observing for artillery placement an

reconnaissance of enemy troop movements and dispositions

In his book The First Air War: 1914–1918, Kennett emphasize

this point. He illustrates airpower’s contributions and techni

cal development from both sides, including German airpower’s

value at the Battle of Tannenberg and Allied airpower’s effort

at the Battle of the Marne. He discusses specifically how air 

power supported earth-bound forces via communications, po

sitioning, and intelligence and surveillance.

In the early stages of World War I, as the Germans moved

swiftly across the European continent, German observation

planes were found most compatible with this rapid movemen

From 15 August until 9 September 1914, the Fliegerabteilun

of the German Third Army Corps changed airfields 18 time

and during that time was grounded by bad weather only tw

days. 5 Aircraft became essential to command and control o

German forces. Commanders now had much better informa

tion to determine where enemy armies were and, conse

quently, were better prepared to move their troops. Kennet

writes, “German observation planes played a significant role in

the east, where their reports, coupled with interceptions o

Russian radio transmissions, set the stage for the victory a

Tannenberg. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg acknowledge

510
his debt to the German Air Service: 

Without the airmen n

Tannenberg.’” 6

Positioning of friendly (for navigation and tactical purposes

and enemy forces (for targeting purposes) became exceedingl

more precise with the advent of the balloon, and then the air 

plane. Not only did aircrews directly report positions of friendl

and enemy troops, but balloons, which were in use for observa 

tion purposes, were used by fixed-wing aviators and groun

troops to determine their position relative to friendly lines.

Though, as previously discussed, airpower played other sig

nificant roles in World War I, intelligence and surveillanc

were generally regarded as its raison d’être. Altitude, and th

capability to travel well behind enemy lines gave airmen th

unique capability to see and determine things never befor

available to opposing forces. Information on force movements

troop dispositions, deployed weaponry, and enemy resuppl

capabilities all became available to the commander who wa

lucky enough to be supported by air machines. In short, th

visibility restricted by the “fog of war” became a bit cleare

with the introduction of airpower.

There are strong analogies to be made between the emer 

gence of airpower in World War I and the emergence of spac

power in Operation Desert Storm . While it is true that spac

power in the Gulf did not contribute to all four mission area

as airpower did in World War I, the Gulf War provided spac

power with its first large-scale opportunity to demonstrate it

capabilities. Similarly, these capabilities were generally limited

to force enhancement, reconnaissance, and other comman

and control-enhancing operations. Space power severely re

duced the “fog and friction of war” for supported commanders

while it increased the opportunity for “fog” to cloud the en 

emy’s decision making and “friction” to increase the enem

commander’s difficulties. As World War I proved the efficacy o

airpower as a valuable tool for future conflict, the Gulf Wa

seems to have proved the efficacy of space power as a viabl

arm of future military operations. Similar to the dominant rol

of airpower in World War I, allied space assets in the Gul

were limited to functions which supported the other militar

511
arms. In today

s terms, space powers main focus in the Gul

was direct support to the war fighter, or force enhancement.

Force enhancement includes space power capabilities tha

“provide effective operational support to military forces.”7 A

airpower multiplied the combat effectiveness of surface-boun

forces in World War I, so too did space power multiply th

combat effectiveness of terrestrial weapon systems in the Gulf

In fact, a comparison of each power’s early functions demon 

strates the similarities. Specifically, in the Gulf, force en 

hancement capabilities included communications, navigation

positioning, intelligence and surveillance (including weather).

Communications in Desert Shield/Desert Storm were ac

complished via the Defense Satellite Communications System

(DSCS) and Fleetsat spacecraft. The system provided a high

data rate, high capacity, worldwide, secure voice communica 

tions system for command and control, crises managemen

and intelligence data transmission between the field units

theater command structure and the National Comman

Authorities (NCA). As well as supplying direct communication

links, DSCS also provided a bridge for terrestrial communica 

tions systems with line-of-sight restrictions across the vas

expanses of desert. DSCS provided real-time communication

between land, air, and sea units, as well as television into an

out of theater. As the military communication systems becam

saturated, a “Civil Reserve Space Fleet” concept (analogous t

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet or CRAP concept) was adopted t

use commercial communications satellites to relay nonsecur

and nonpriority traffic.

Navigation and positioning efforts in the Gulf were carried

out by the navigational strategic, tactical relay (NAVSTAR

Global Positioning System (GPS) fleet of satellites. This system

provided Coalition forces precise three-dimensional location

and time information. The featureless desert terrain posed

significant navigational challenges, thereby increasing th

benefit of GPS. Additionally, many targeting components of U

weapons systems (of all services) interfaced with GPS fo

highly accurate initial, midcourse, and terminal guidance. It

popularity became so widespread that aircrews flying Viet

nam-era systems, which used notoriously untrustworthy analo

512
inertial navigation systems, bought personal, hand-held GP

receivers to augment their onboard systems.8 Parents of som

infantry personnel included GPS receivers in their children’s

“CARE” packages. At the outbreak of Desert Shield, th

NAVSTAR system had not yet reached full operational capabil

ity, but it soon became integral to the Coalition effort. In th

future, planners believe small, lightweight GPS receivers wil

become standard kit for every deployed US soldier.

Surveillance in the Gulf was accomplished by the US fleet o

spy satellites whose name(s), configuration(s), and specifi

characteristic(s) is/are classified. Civil and commercial satel

lites, such as the French Systeme Probatoire pour l’Observa

tion de la Terre (SPOT), used for earth observation, wer

pressed into service to provide additional surveillance for th

Coalition. A widely publicized, key capability of US surveil

lance satellites is multispectral sensing. Satellites over th

Gulf provided US commanders and decision makers with opti

cal, radar, and infrared (IR) high-resolution images. Other ca 

pabilities included electronics intelligence (ELINT) gathering

though this capability was not as valuable once the war bega

since Iraqi command and control capability was rapidly de

graded early in the conflict. High quality and rapid battl

damage assessment (BDA) was another significant advanc

credited to space systems. Unit complaints about untimel

BDA can be attributed to human errors in developing an inef

ficient and ineffective dissemination system vice technical in 

adequacies of space systems, though the overclassification o

information borne of space capability also contributed. Th

highly accurate photo and radar images provided by spac

platforms allowed for intricate interpretation of damag

caused by Coalition “smart bombs.”

Surveillance assets were also used to assist in targeting Iraq

Scud missile launches. The Defense Support Program (DSP) flee

of spacecraft provided this capability. These satellites sat in thei

geostationary orbits, constantly looking for telltale Scud IR

plumes. Once observed, the system relayed the location, tim

and trajectory to the United States Space Comman

(USSPACECOM) operations crews, who then evaluated an

assessed the data before relaying, via the DSCS, to Patrio

513
missile crews in Saudi Arabia, Israel, or Turkey, using newl

established, refined, and exercised warning-alert communica 

tions paths. DSP—a cold war era space resource—saved lives.

Evolution and Relationship of Airpower and

Space Power Technologies to New Roles

Simultaneous with the evolution of airpower’s operationa

role was an evolution of air-related technology. Similarly, th

evolution of space-related technology has accompanied th

evolution of space power’s operational role.

As airpower developed rapidly from a technological stand

point, so too did its military potential. Within the span of just 

few years, the dominant role of airpower evolved from genera

support to directly offensive. Space power is now advancin

technologically in a very rapid manner. There seems no reason

to assume that space power cannot, technologically, mimic air 

power’s offensive evolution. The most powerful early doctrine

developed for both airpower and space power emphasized th

war-winning potential of strategic applications of force from

these new combat mediums.9 As space power doctrine evolves

the strategic usefulness of applying force from this medium

must be acknowledged, but care must be taken not to fall int

early airpower’s doctrinal trap of promising too much, too soon.

As airpower advanced technologically after World War I, it

primary function became strategic bombardment. Giuli

Douhet, impressed by airpower’s capabilities and potentia

that he witnessed in World War I, drafted an offensive air 

power theory in The Command of the Air. Other great airpowe

thinkers followed, Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, Alexander d

Seversky, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Trenchard, and Gen Jame

“Jimmy” Doolittle, to name a few. All focused on the offensiv

capabilities of airpower. The lesson which flowed from thes

air-advocates was clear: an air force’s sole concern should b

to do the enemy the greatest possible amount of surface dam

age in the shortest possible time (in consonance with th

theater campaign plan). 1 0

By the end of World War I, technology allowed airpower t

be used separate from surface forces to bomb well beyond th

battle front in efforts to affect the enemy infrastructure and it

514
ability to wage war. Government centers, industry, and trans

portation links were targetable by air though such target

were not at great risk due to the limits of the technology. Thi

changed over time. An analogy can be drawn with the evolu 

tionary advance of space power today. Technologically, spac

power clearly has access to the battlefield, yet it is limited in

what it can do offensively. This, too, may change over time

And when it does, the political and military advantages o

being able to rapidly and widely affect an enemy with minima

regard to friendly vulnerabilities will be great.

Organizational Development of Airpower

and Space Power within the Military

Part and parcel to the operational and technological devel

opment of airpower was its organizational development. Man

writers advance the idea that it was actually the wish to iden 

tify a need for independent air forces that spawned offensiv

airpower theories. Due to airpower’s evolution during the in 

terwar years, incremental organizational changes took place

In the United States, the changes led from the Air Service t

the Air Corps to the Army Air Forces, and finally to an inde

pendent Air Force. The emergence of Air Force Space Com 

mand (AFSPACECOM) and USSPACECOM may be similar or

ganizational steps towards the eventual creation of a

independent space force. 1 1

Douhet, Mitchell, and other airpower thinkers pushed for es 

tablishment of separate air forces due to their perceptions tha

airpower proved a decisive form of warfare. Strategic bombard 

ment became the backbone of the air mission. This legacy i

apparent in Air Force Manual 1-1 , as it contrasts surface force

with “aerospace power,” which “can be the decisive force in

warfare.”1 2 It seems with all of the attention paid to strategi

attack as the raison d’être of the USAF, the removal of thi

mission might signal a certain lack of legitimacy in the institu 

tion. Without a strategic attack capability, the Air Force would

be nothing more than a support arm for surface forces, pro 

viding air superiority over the battle space, close air suppor

and resupply missions. The debate would hark back to th

515
arguments of the early forties. Why have a separate air force i

airpower is purely a support function for the surface forces?

This hypothetical situation is somewhat analogous to to 

day’s space operations.1 3 As mentioned earlier, space force

exist today to support terrestrial forces. However, the realiza 

tion of space force application and space control (akin to ai

superiority) capabilities, like airpower’s development, would

present space power with its own raison d’être, thereby mak 

ing the establishment of a separate space force a possibility.

Summary of Air and Space Power Development

Space power development seems to be mimicking the devel

opment of airpower. Extrapolating the analogy, the importanc

of space power will rise accordingly. Airpower’s rapid rise t

dominance as a form of warfare was due to the unique advan

tages that vertical positioning, speed, and eventually range

gave to the war fighter. From early military uses as observa 

tion and reconnaissance platforms, both airpower and spac

power continue to evolve. Airpower gained its present statu

as a separate, and some would argue dominant, form of war 

fare by technologically developing its offensive capability

Similarly, space power could one day achieve such status

given technological innovation as well as political will. Th

similarities between airpower and space power development

seem to suggest that space power will evolve into a dominan

military force in the future.

Physical Attributes of Space and a

Comparison to Terrestrial Environments

National security policy makers, planners, programmers,

and operators take geography into constant account,

because it exerts strong influence on strategies, tactics,

logistics, and force postures. Geography, however, excludes

most of the Earth-Moon system, which comprises a vast

environment loosely known as space.

—John M. Collins 

Report to Congress

516
This section attempts to determine if there are systemic env

ronmental deficiencies which limit space power’s potential to rea

ize more independence. It defines space, discusses the physica

characteristics of the medium, and compares these to terrestria

environments. It begins with a discussion of space and such

celestial phenomena as libration points (also known as La 

grangian points) and the gravity well. It concludes by analyzin

differences between the space environment and the terrestria

environments in which other forms of military power operate.

Space Defined

A short discussion on what constitutes “space” provides 

better understanding of this thesis (fig. 13). Many source

describe the medium referred to as “space.” However, Joh

Collins’ work, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years, dis

cusses it in militarily significant terms. “The Earth-Moon Sys 

tem circumscribes four discrete regions: Earth and Atmos 

phere; Circumterrestrial Space; Moon and Environs; an

Outer Envelope. Boundaries are blurred and some attribute

overlap, but each nevertheless is individualistic. . . . Earth’s

atmosphere, gravity, and rotation strongly influence transi

between that infrastructure and space. Most effects are ad

verse, but a few are advantageous.”1 4

In space, there are areas in which objects theoretically wil

require little or no energy to maintain position, and from

which energy can be used advantageously to affect near-eart

space, as well as the earth itself. These are termed the libra 

tion points. Collins writes:

The five so-called libration points are not points at all, but

three-dimensional positions in space. Mathematical models and

computer simulations indicate that free-floating objects within their

respective spheres of influence tend to remain there, because the

gravitational fields of the Earth and moon are in balance. Spacecraft

could theoretically linger for long periods without expending

significant fuel. L1 through L3, on a line with Earth and moon, are

considered unstable. Objects at those locations, perturbed by the sun

and other forces, will wander farther and farther away, if calculations

are correct. L4 and L5, 60 degrees ahead of and behind the moon in

its orbit, assertedly are stable. Objects at those locations probably

resist drift more vigorously and, if it begins, remain in that general

region.1 5

517
As in air-to-air combat, of “God’s G,” or converting from 

position of relative energy advantage due to high-potential-en 

ergy positioning (high to low), is also applicable to space op

erations (fig.14). Military space forces operating from “low

potential energy states in low or near earth orbit, are disad

vantaged from those operating farther away—“at the top of th

‘gravity well.’” They also experience less maneuvering room

Source: John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years (Washington, D.C., Pergamo

Brassey’s 1989), 7.

Figure 13. Space Regions and Environs

518
and reaction time. Whereas gravity hinders earth-to-spac

transit, it helps space-to-earth flight. “Put simply, it takes les

energy to drop objects down a well than to cast them out.”1 6

Although submariners operate in a seemingly unique envi

ronment, they retain standard terrestrial realities as direction

and geo-position. Similarly, air forces operate in their ow

medium, but they too retain many similarities to their siste

terrestrial forces, such as direction, geo-position, and constan

physical effects of operating within the atmosphere. Obvi

ously, space is a unique operating environment for militar

forces.

Medium Differences

A concise discussion of medium differences may be helpful in

grasping the physical uniqueness of space. In his congressiona

study, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years, John M. Col

lins provides a complete accounting of medium differences:

Source: John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years (Washington, D.C., Pergamo

Brassey’s 1989), 24.

Figure 14. Earth and Moon Gravity Wells

519
Air, water, weather, climate and vegetation within the Earth-Moon

System are exclusively indigenous to this planet. So are populations

and industries at present. Land forms and natural resources are

restricted to the Earth, moon and asteroids. Cosmic radiation, solar

winds, micrometeorites and negligible or neutralized gravity are

unique properties of free space. Near vacuum is present everywhere

except Earth and vicinity.

Space and oceans are superficially similar, but differences are more

remarkable. Continents bound all seven seas, which are liquid and

almost opaque. Topographic features conceal ocean bottoms. The

Earth’s curvature limits visibility to line-of-sight; natural light never

illuminates deeply. Water temperature, pressure and salinity

anomalies are common.

Space has no north, east, south or west. Right ascension and

declination, calculated in different terms than latitude and longitude,

designate location and direction. A nonrotating celestial sphere of

infinite radius, with its center at Earth’s core is the reference frame.

Declination, the astronomical analog of latitude, is the angular

distance north or south of the celestial equator. Right ascension is the

astronomical analog of longitude. The constellation Aries, against

which spectators on Earth see the sun when it crosses Earth’s equator

in spring, defines the prime meridian. Angular positions in space are

measured east from that celestial counterpart of Greenwich

Observatory.

Distances are meaningful mainly in terms of time. Merchant ships en

route from our Pacific coast to the Persian Gulf, for example, take a

month to travel 12,000 nautical miles. Apollo 11 made it to the

moon—20 times farther—in slightly more than three days.1 7

In short, though it is relatively unique, space is a place—bu

so is the air, land, and sea. 1 8 Air and space share some simila

advantages, specifically vantage point and speed of access t

the surface. The difference between the two on those ground

is simply a matter of degree. Continual operations in bot

media require countering the force of gravity. In the air, this i

generally done by buoyancy, such as lighter-than-air opera 

tions, or by lift, via lifting bodies and thrust—but not b

speed, because of the frictional drag and heat of the atmos 

phere. Conversely, in space the effects of gravity are countered

by speed and position, the required speed being determined b

altitude above the earth’s surface.

In the air, typically below 20 miles, the vantage point an

speed of access are not as great as they are in space—abov

100 miles. But in both media, the vantage point increases a

520
one gains altitude. There is a large difference in the speed o

access between air and space—for semiglobal distances, th

access time through the air is a fraction of a day, but through

space it can be fractions of an hour. As one goes higher in

space, one trades speed of access for vantage point—until on

reaches the maximum vantage point for specific operations.

The military significance should be obvious: vantage poin

and access allow observation, communication, navigation, an

when developed, force application. The air provides an order

of-magnitude increase in line-of-sight coverage for any plac

on the earth’s surface, while space provides yet another order

of-magnitude increase.

Speed of access is militarily important because it allow

operations inside the response times of adversaries. To de

velop optimal speeds of access, one must operate in space t

avoid air friction. RAND Corporation’s Carl Builder claims, “I

observing, communicating, and navigating [and if possible

applying force] is important to militaries, space is the dom

nant medium.” Builder concludes:

So space is an important military medium for the same reason that air

is an important medium, except multiplied by another

order-of-magnitude. Space provides for unprecedented vantage points

and speeds of access. Those qualities are not essential to all military

activities, and there are significant costs associated with operations in

space, so the air, land and sea will remain important media for many

operations. But wherever vantage point and speed of access are

critical aspects of military operations—space will be the dominant

medium.1 9

Summary of the Physical Attributes of Space

Physical attributes of the space medium exhibit nothing tha

systemically, or inherently, limits it as compared to other war

fighting media. Space is a medium somewhat unique from othe

war-fighting media. Certain aspects of space allow advantages

though other space aspects tend to be detrimental. Libration

points allow for little or no energy expense for station keeping

while operating from atop the “gravity well” allows for high-po

tential-energy positioning. Differences between the media ar

noted, as are similarities.

521
The terrestrial medium most similar to space seems to be th

air. Vantage point and speed of access are shared physical char

acteristics of these media. What, then, makes space special? It i

the order-of-magnitude advantage gained over the air in vantag

and access—when these qualities are militarily required.

Characteristics of Military Power

and Space Forces

We should on all occasions avoid a general Action, or Put

anything to Risque, unless compelled by a necessity, into

which we ought never be drawn.

—George Washington, 1776

The essential ingredients that lead to an expanded role for

space are coming together.

—Gen Thomas Moorman

Previous discussion demonstrated space power’s curren

subordinate position in regard to the other military powers

but it also illustrated space power’s potential, given curren

technologically feasible capabilities. Upon recognizing its sub

ordinate position and superior potential, the next step exam

ined physical differences and similarities between the militar

operating media. From that background, this section com 

bines these concepts by comparing military power charac

teristics of terrestrial and space forces.

The general characteristics include strategic agility, abilit

to demonstrate commitment and credibility, economic consid 

erations, military considerations, and political considerations

To conclude, the relationship between these characteristic

and political flexibility is discussed. Ultimately, this compari

son demonstrates whether space power is limited by any in 

herent, systemic inadequacies.

Military forces are often compared in various ways, but it’s

the comparison of real politik characteristics which generall

carries the day. Unique equipment, operating mediums, an

doctrinal differences are common parameters for comparison

but such analysis is often incomplete, as seams between mili 

522
tary forces are typically unclear. For example, airpower con 

notes abilities of multiple military forces employing variou

types of equipment, for numerous doctrinal reasons. Herein

forces are compared based on perceived political applicability

At the end of the day, it is the political applicability of a force

not operational dissimilarities from another, which is mos

meaningful.

Airpower as Part of Terrestrial Military Power

Airpower’s characteristics are discussed as part and parce

of terrestrial military power characteristics because airpower’s

medium is limited in many of the same ways as ground force

and naval forces. Though airpower has one great liberatin

characteristic from other terrestrial forces—elevation—due t

atmospheric (drag, gravity, etc.) and geopolitical limitation

(overflight restrictions, basing concerns, etc.), it is similarl

limited.

Speed and elevation allow airpower to rapidly mass larg

quantities of power anywhere in the world, treaty limitation

notwithstanding. It can attack strategic targets that surfac

forces cannot. However, it remains terrestrially limited, a

compared to space power, by footprint size, geopolitical con 

cerns, and persistence. Another observer has noted: “In addi

tion, just like surface forces, political restrictions could deter 

mine where aircraft flew, when, and for what purpose.” H

points out that, 75 years later, airpower remains similarl

limited. His paper discusses airpower advocacy pitfalls, as wel

as the evolutionary, or revolutionary, questions senior leader

dealt with in determining the viability of a separate aviation

service. The important conclusion, however, is that separate 

ness does not equal singularity. “Wars are fought in man

ways with many weapons. Seldom is one service used to wag

a campaign or war, although one service may be dominant in

them. The nature of the enemy and the war, the objectives t

be achieved, and the price to be paid by the people will deter 

mine what military instruments will be employed and in wha

proportion.”2 0

523
Characteristics of Military Power

Regardless of the type of military power considered, they al

share common characteristics which represent, in th

author’s view, diverse considerations capturing the essence o

military power. They are diverse yet interrelated, which re

flects the association between military power and political wil

It is this relationship which, in the end, determines the use

fulness of any form of military power in any given situation.

The characteristics of military power include strategic agil

ity, ability to demonstrate commitment and credibility, eco 

nomic considerations, military considerations, and politica

considerations. The application of these general charac

teristics changes as the status of forces changes from bein

home based to deploying, to engaging in combat.* All of thes

characteristics are essential to determine the political flexibil

ity of applying the military element of power. Basic definition

of these characteristics follow.

Strategic Agility. Strategic agility refers to the ability t

respond rapidly, over global distances, with appropriate capa 

bilities to carry out operations in support of US internationa

interests.2 1 This concept takes on even greater import as U

forces are restructured and decreased, while US global inter 

ests, and possible trouble spots, increase. Various “futures

studies have noted the probability of multiple conflicts in vari

ous stages of resolution, occurring in areas around the world

vital to US national interests. Hence, the ability to respon

rapidly anywhere in the world with appropriate force is a basi

requirement for effective military response, and is therefor

within the US national interest.

Commitment and Credibility. The terms commitment an

credibility go hand-in-hand. Commitment refers to the state o

being bound emotionally, or intellectually, to a course of ac

tion or ideal. The dictionary refers to it as a pledge to ac

while credibility takes this concept another step by makin

*Home basing does not imply US basing. Rather, it denotes a force located in i

primary position, with all of its required logistics for permanent operations and su

tainability. A fighter wing is home based if it is at its primary location, e.g., Laken 

heath, United Kingdom, whereas a carrier battle group is home based if it is total

integrated and sustainable—theoretically, this could be “on station.”

524
this commitment, or pledge to act, plausible. For instance, th

perceived capability of US assets makes the actor the United

States wishes to influence believe the United States will act on

a notion of international interest. 2 2

In the past, these terms have been closely identified wit

the concept of deterrence. Thomas Schelling, in his work Arm

and Influence, talks at length about what he terms “The Art o

Commitment.” He frames his argument in terms of the cold

war, and posits that an adversary must be communicated

with effectively if one is to realize one’s strategy. If a countr

has gone to great lengths to influence an adversary, but ha

not communicated its commitment or credibility to act, then i

has failed—the adversary remains uninfluenced. Interestingly

in the cold war paradigm, Schelling suggests that to effectivel

communicate to an adversary its commitment and credibility

the country must physically, or morally, put itself into a situ 

ation from which its only rational response is to act. In hi

words, “Just saying so won’t do it. What we have to do is t

get ourselves into a position where we cannot fail to react a

we said we would—where we just cannot help it—or where w

would be obliged by some overwhelming cost of not reacting in

the manner we had declared. Often we must maneuver into 

position where we no longer have much choice left. Thus i

the old business of burning bridges.”2 3 The paradigm of con 

ventional terrestrial force commitment and credibility has al

ways included the notion of putting forces at risk to make 

point. This approach remains valid today.

However, this thesis suggests not an alternative solution

but a unique application of these concepts as applied to a

adjunct force. Such a force could demonstrate commitmen

and credibility for less Machievellian reasons. If a force wer

“easy” to use—economically, militarily, and politically—i

would be engendered with commitment and credibility. Th

adversary need not consider that US personnel and equipmen

are at risk to prove credibility and commitment; rather, thes

concepts would exist by US capability to apply force with littl

regard to risk of any kind. This virtual lack of risk, then

becomes the mechanism to convince adversarial leadership o

US ability and willingness to act. This “third wave” concept i

525
the antithesis of the industrial warfare paradigm of provin

commitment and credibility through putting one’s forces in

harm’s way. 2 4

Economic Considerations. A discussion of the myriad o

issues involved in the fiscal realities of military forces is be

yond the scope of this thesis. However, a more narrow focu

for this paper is akin to a USAF perspective: the USAF seem

to believe the basic economic consideration for military force

is the ability to efficiently allocate resources required to deplo

and employ capabilities.2 5 Military forces are expensive and

generally, their size and capability demonstrate the vastness

or lack thereof, of a country’s treasure and international stat

ure. One need only refer to present-day media to discern th

immense amount of fiscal resources involved in fielding 

credible and able fighting force. As the United States down 

sizes its military and takes advantage of the “peace dividend

the susceptibility of US forces to physical loss or damage, o

increasing expense involved in deployment and operations

weighs heavily into political decision making. When one i

comparing forms of military power by economic considera 

tions, many variables exist. Susceptibility of forces to loss o

damage, research and development costs, acquisition costs

sunk costs, operational costs, and associated costs (manning

infrastructure, etc.) are all considerations.

However, when considering the economics of military force

one must realize forces are bought and exist for two basi

purposes—as diplomatic tools and to provide national secu 

rity. If national security is at risk, or serious diplomatic en 

deavors are in jeopardy, many of these cost issues may be

come insignificant. For example, if forces were used in th

interest of a close ally, or for operations upon which monu

mental national economic priorities exist, economic argu 

ments against using such force may be mute. This said

though, if the same effects could be rendered by an adjunc

force with fewer risks, regardless of diplomatic or nationa

security priorities, this would seem advantageous.

Military Considerations. The concept of military considera 

tions is closely associated with economic as well as politica

considerations. The susceptibility of a force to degradation o

526
destruction is the measure of its military vulnerability. As th

USAF defines it, survivability is the key, that is, the ability t

limit risks.2 6 For a deployed force, this plays heavily into com 

mand planning functions. 2 7 Other considerations includ

training, replacements, loss rates, family considerations, me

dia relations, unit cohesiveness, and coalition dynamics, t

name a few.

Aside from these “negative” aspects, military forces are buil

and maintained with one mission in mind—war fighting. 2 8 A

discussed previously, this mission relates to two objec 

tives—diplomatic utility and national security. Sufficient num

bers are planned for attrition, and advancing technology i

offered to increase force effectiveness, though fiscal realitie

make such planning increasingly problematic. Quality and ef

fectiveness are hallmarks of US military forces, though certain

contingents cast counter dispersions. Many quarters prior t

the Gulf War were doubting the effectiveness of high-cost U

weapon systems. Such contingents were noticeably quiet afte

the war ended and US technological superiority was widel

recognized. The US military has generally had quality trainin

and equipment to meet most contingencies—but such asset

cannot make up for fallacious policy.

Political Considerations. The effect of the above considera 

tions rests firmly on the political fulcrum. As economic an

military considerations ebb and flow, so too do a nation’s

political considerations. A nation’s political fortunes ar

closely tied to its economic and military robustness. Hence in

the end, the susceptibility of a nation’s economic health an

military power to degradation affect the nation’s political vi

ability. This interrelationship is one of the most critical an

absorbing problems of statesmanship—it involves the securit

of the nation and, in large measure, determines the extent t

which the individual may enjoy life, liberty, prosperity, an

happiness. 2 9 Other valid political considerations include media

relations, public relations, and world geopolitical dynamic

(alliances, coalitions, neutral, gray, third party states, an

enemy states).

Regarding the counter argument, a successful military op

eration generally results in great political benefits, thereb

527
mitigating any negative considerations that may have existed

For example, President George Bush was inundated with cau

tious overtones from many political quarters prior to the be

ginning of hostilities in the Gulf. Many deemed the politica

considerations of such an operation too costly. However, afte

successfully engaging his forces, the same man was regaled

from the same quarters, and more, for his astute statesman

ship and political guts. The president’s polls were the highes

of any president in recent memory—some showing approva

ratings as high as 90 percent. Politicians can ride the wave o

popularity following successful military operations, or can b

swept up in the despair of a nation which uses its forces les

than effectively.

With these basic definitions, this work considers how eac

characteristic applies to forces on a continuum of deploymen

Terrestrial force characteristics are discussed as the forc

moves from home base to deployment and engagement. Th

work then discusses how these same characteristics apply t

two variations of space forces—current fielded forces and cur

rent technologically feasible forces. The first analysis is of 

terrestrial force located at its home base (fig. 15).

Terrestrial Home-Based Forces and Strategic Agility

Generally, a terrestrial force enjoys its maximum responsiv

capability when based at home. Upon receiving mobilization

orders, and generating to deployable status, the force is read

to be deployed anywhere in the world at varying rates. Obvi

ously, ground forces must be either airlifted or sealifted to a

area of concern, and this process takes time—given a rela 

tively large force commitment, this period could be weeks t

months. Wings or squadrons of fighter, attack, bomber, o

reconnaissance aircraft can be in place with large amounts o

firepower within a theater of operations in probably the short

est time for terrestrial forces—within hours to days. Nava

assets, depending where they are located when the decision i

made to deploy them, are available anywhere from within

hours to days to weeks. Generally, to generate a large enough

force to be decisive in any contingency, the deployment tim

will be days to weeks for naval forces.

528
“At home” for a naval carrier task force could in reality b

“deployed” if such a force is integrated and sustainable in it

location. If this force is not located at exactly the proper spo

relocating such force could take days to weeks. Sustained opera 

tions require arrival of more combat and support forces. How

ever, naval forces themselves have theoretically indefinite sus

tainment capability, given effective replenishment.

Terrestrial Home-Based Forces and Commitment/Credi

bility. On the other hand, while terrestrial forces remain a

home, the commitment of the nation to respond to crises an

its credibility with its alliances/coalitions, and its adversary

is at an ebb. The nation’s potential adversary may remain

unimpressed and affected by only whatever diplomatic rheto 

ric is exchanged. Even if the rhetoric includes outright o

veiled threats of military response, the adversary may no

perceive the intention of the communication.

Terrestrial Force Characteristics

Home-Based Forces:

Terrestrial Power Characteristics

È Strategic Agility

Í

Commitment/Credibility

- Economic 

 Considerations

- Military Considerations

- Political 

 Considerations

Home Deployed Engaged

Note: The use of arrows in Figures 15 through 18 are meant to indicate the significance of the issue

associated with them. While È Strategic Agility means increasing strategic agility and È Commitment mean

increasing commitment, È Economic, Military, or Political Considerations means that the consideration

discussed are of heightened importance. The length of the vectors denotes relative magnitude.

Figure 15. Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Home-Based Terrestrial Forces

529
A force still at home may demonstrate an unwillingness t

react militarily. (Nuclear alert forces are the exception, a

though the threat of their use in most regional contingencie

is regarded by adversaries as low.) The reasons for nonreac

tion could be many, most of which could actually be valid

domestic, national, or international concerns. However, th

perception by the concerned parties is the same—a fundamen 

tal lack of commitment and credibility to react with sufficien

force to stem the tide of an international event.

Terrestrial Home-Based Forces and Economic Consid

erations. Economic considerations for home-based force

tend to be neutral. Generally, the cheapest basing mode for 

terrestrial military force is at home. Units at the home bas

subsist on a system that is integrated, streamlined, and rea 

sonably efficient. Units train effectively and efficiently base

on many years of experience. Historically, accidents resultin

in dead and injured personnel, as well as destroyed and dam

aged equipment, are lower while a unit is home based. 3 0

The personnel and equipment are maintained most effi 

ciently in this mode as well. The result is that national treas

ure remains relatively unaffected. The force is maintained

within budgetary constraints mandated by government, an

no “surge” funding is required to meet unanticipated needs

The force is most easily maintained combat-ready at home.

The exceptions to this concept include possible funding o

US operations by another party, though few operations involv 

ing US forces have been sufficiently funded by another part

to negate a loss to US budgets. At times, training experienc

can be better at deployed locations, for example Red Flag

though records indicate loss rates are generally higher. How 

ever, higher loss rates do not necessarily negate the added

value of such training. Another exception is that home-based

forces could be attacked either by another nation’s forces o

by terrorists. If attacks on home-based forces are broad, wel

targeted, and successful, the economic impact on the nation

could be quite immense. However, if such an attack were t

escalate into a war with the nation’s survival at risk, th

impact on the nation’s economy by an attack on its home

based forces would be a relatively minuscule concern.

530
Terrestrial Home-Based Forces

and Military Considerations

Military considerations for home-based forces tend to b

neutral as well. Obviously, the susceptibility of a terrestria

force to damage or defeat is almost nonexistent when it re

mains at home and the country is not at war. On the othe

hand, the force is usually not operationally viable in such 

position. (Exceptions include carrier task forces and certain

airpower capabilities.)

Military assets, both personnel and equipment, are in thei

least susceptible state when based at home. The exception t

this concept would be a nation that experiences attacks on it

military forces within its own borders. In this instance, th

fact that forces remain in an undeployed state actually make

them more liable to degradation from an attack, and th

chance that the force will be degraded or destroyed is highe

than if the forces were deployed. The military impact of suc

an occurrence could have drastic consequences. If the attack

was but a prelude to a full-scale war with the nation’s surviva

at stake, the impact of the susceptibility of the nation’s force

to such an attack would be great indeed.

Terrestrial Home-Based Forces and Political Considera

tions. As economic and military considerations remain neu 

tral for home-based terrestrial forces, so too do the politica

considerations. The susceptibility of the nation’s politica

realm to domestic as well as international outcry and indigna

tion is low—so too is the chance for great political windfal

given a successful military operation. As a result, the politica

leadership of the nation remains relatively flexible in use o

terrestrial armed force. For example, there is often the littl

public outcry as home-based military forces are mobilized t

help with natural and man-made disasters.

Considering the exception, as noted in the above discus

sion, if the home-based force were to suffer degradation o

destruction from an attack, political considerations could sky

rocket. Again, if the nation’s existence were at stake, thi

would be of little regard. However, if the attack was but 

nuisance operation to demonstrate resolve or capability, th

leadership of the nation could experience great disrepute. Th

531
dangerous consequence might be an inappropriate use o

force in reaction to the humiliation, thereby escalating oppor

tunities for drastic occurrences. This paper now turns its at

tention to terrestrial forces in a deployed state (fig. 16).

Terrestrial Deployed Forces and Strategic Agility. As ter

restrial forces leave their home base and are committed to 

theater of operations, their capability of redeploying to ye

another theater decreases. There are many aspects to thi

dilemma. First, if a force is committed to a theater to carry ou

the lavishes of its political leadership, the wish to relocate i

supposes a severe reason to do so. Doing so may result in

unachieved objectives in the original theater. Second, as U

forces are drawn down, the amount of force required to effec

desired outcomes becomes critical. Theoretically, if just th

right amount of force exists in a theater, moving any of it t

another theater could result in either defeat or unwarranted

losses in both theaters. Third, once a force is deployed and in

place, it becomes physically difficult to relocate it to anothe

area by virtue of logistics requirements.

Terrestrial Deployed Forces and Commitment/Credibility

As US forces are deployed into harm’s way, commitment an

credibility of US resolve increases. Friends and enemies alik

realize the significance of US leadership deciding to jeopardiz

personnel, equipment, national treasure, and domestic an

Deployed Forces:

Terrestrial Power Characteristics 

 Í Strategic Agility

 È Commitment/Credibility

 È Economic Considerations

 È Military Considerations

 È Political Considerations

Home Deployed Engaged

Figure 16. Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Deployed Terrestrial Forces

532
international goodwill by sending forces into a theater of op

erations.

The deployment of forces heralds the increased capability o

the United States to react. It is the perception of this in 

creased capability that is the bulwark of demonstrating com 

mitment and credibility. The perception of US resolve, both b

friends and adversaries, is greatly increased by the deploy

ment of forces.

Terrestrial Deployed Forces and Economic Considera

tions. As forces are deployed, economic costs of all kinds tend t

increase. No longer is the force sustained by a system whos

efficiency has been honed through years of use. Field condi

tions demand additional housing, food, water, transportation

medical care, maintenance, and other things as these func

tions must now be afforded apart from an established base

The force cannot necessarily be maintained within its lega

budgetary constraints. The possibility of additional funding t

ensure adequate operations increases dramatically.

Historically, the accident rate for military forces increase

as they deploy into unfamiliar territory. Emotions run high

units tend to train more “realistically,” crews are not operatin

in territory or under conditions they are used to. In such 

state, equipment tends to break down and personnel tend t

be injured or killed more than when forces are home based.

Maintenance of equipment becomes more expensive an

problematic at deployed locations. Major and minor mainte 

nance on equipment becomes more difficult. Depots exist hal

a world away, and industry technical representatives are no

always immediately accessible. Equipment is fixed with wha

was brought with the force. If the proper tool or part is no

available, the entire system remains unusable. Inefficient trans

portation practices are put into use to field important parts an

ensure rapid repairs. Cost increases as the distance from th

home base increases for terrestrial forces. These costs are varie

and span the spectrum of military requirements.

It can be argued that economic considerations would be of n

import if the act of deploying forces deterred war. This would b

true given an electorate fully cognizant of essential facts an

politicians willing to risk such an act. Given a situation wher

533
deployment of forces successfully deterred war, even though

costs were high in lives, equipment, and treasure, it would b

difficult to prove that it was simply the act of deploying such

force which resulted in peace. In fact, such a situation seem

much too simple. Even with deployed force, it remains th

dynamic of diplomacy which results in peace. With US medi

coverage, the loss of treasure, lives, and equipment would b

on the minds of Americans, even though peace may be a

hand. However, if one considers military forces exist to figh

and fighting generally connotes deployment of US forces, an

deployments generally connote economic losses, which ar

therefore accepted, this argument falls apart. In other words

a nation will tolerate the loss of national treasure if forces ar

properly deployed and engaged with successful results.

Terrestrial Deployed Forces and Military Considerations

The susceptibility of US terrestrial forces to attack in creases a

the force deploys to a theater of operations. Forces are outsid

of the protective boundary afforded by US airspace and se

buffers and are nearer the enemy forces’ capability to strike

Terrorist or unconventional warfare forces can also attack

with greater ease once US forces arrive in theater. As wit

economic considerations, as the distance increases away from

the home base, military considerations of US forces increases

Both of these considerations affect US political consideration

as well.

However, this susceptibility may be a must consideration i

one considers that military forces exist to fight, and to figh

US forces are generally deployed, and deployments tend t

risk degradation and destruction. With such a notion, the fac

that military forces may be degraded or destroyed has little o

no significant impact on the decision to use them—for the

exist to be used. The risk of their destruction or degradation i

of little significance, the argument goes, because such prob

lems have been planned for in force structure and effective 

ness decisions. This argument is more convincing on pape

than in reality.

Terrestrial Deployed Forces and Political Considerations

If deployed US forces demonstrate a heightened importance o

economic and military considerations more than when the

534
are at home, then so too do US political leaders

 considera 

tions increase in significance. If US national wealth become

susceptible to increased diminution, and US personnel ar

put at increased physical risk, US political leaders begin t

walk a fine line as they carry out national policy by usin

terrestrial armed forces.

It can be argued that this point is only true if the politica

objectives for deploying forces are not achieved. If they ar

achieved, it is argued, the deployment of forces actually allow

for the potential of enormous political gains. The question tha

must be answered for this point to be valid is, “Are politician

willing to take this risk, based on recent deployment track re

cords?” If US public opinion still had events like Vietnam, Deser

One, Somalia, or Bosnia on its mind, this line of reasonin

seems debatable. Events such as Haiti and Grenada could b

looked at either way, while the initial public reaction to th

result of Desert Storm could support this line of reasoning.

Terrestrial Engaged Forces and Strategic Agility. E n 

gaged force characteristics tend to mimic deployed force char

acteristics, but with greater impact (fig. 17). The concept o

decreased strategic agility that held for deployed terrestria

forces holds true for engaged terrestrial forces as well. How 

ever, the extent to which strategic agility is decreased is muc

larger. It becomes much more difficult to move terrestria

forces to another theater once they are engaged. The problem

of just disengaging the forces are so immense—politically

militarily, and logistically—as to prohibit the thought of rede

ploying them elsewhere.

Terrestrial Engaged Forces and Commitment/Credibility

Commitment and credibility rapidly rise exponentially when

forces are engaged in combat. The adversary and the allianc

partners become strong believers in US resolve. The ultimat

expression of resolve is to put national resources, such as live

and equipment, into direct contact with the enemy.

Terrestrial Engaged Forces and Economic Considerations

Unfortunately, as commitment and credibility rapidly increas

as forces come into contact, so too does the susceptibility t

losing vast amounts of national wealth. Present and futur

weapon systems are exceedingly expensive, and operators o

535
these systems are ever more highly trained. The economi

impact of their losses is great, and the chances that thi

impact will be felt rises rapidly as terrestrial forces meet th

enemy. War is always costly, but it continues to be waged

because costs of not waging it are perceived to be high. Th

other counter arguments remain the same as for deployed

forces. The point is, however, that if these considerations an

costs can be mitigated, they should be.

Terrestrial Engaged Forces and Military Considerations

As with economic considerations, the susceptibility of losin

military forces is exponential once rounds begin to be ex 

changed in the terrestrial battle space. As weapon system

become ever more complex and expensive, their number

dwindle. Therefore, each one becomes more militarily valu able

The loss of each system, and/or the highly trained op erator, i

that much more militarily significant. On the other hand

such systems and soldiers are meant to fight, therefore thei

loss is generally accepted as attrition, and properly planned

for in force structure debates. Hopefully, this is true and th

planning is accurate.

Terrestrial Engaged Forces and Political Considerations

As with the previous discussion, the political vulnerability as

Engaged Forces:

Terrestrial Power Characteristics

 Strategic Agility

 Commitment/Credibility

 Economic Considerations

 Military Considerations

 Political Considerations

Home Deployed Engaged

Figure 17. Continuum of Operations and Characteristics of

Engaged Terrestrial Forces

536
sociated with forces engaged in combat is quite high. Th

moral and economic impact of one’s forces engaged in comba

bring with it a high susceptibility of political leadership t

ridicule and blame. As American mothers’ sons and daughter

are injured and killed, and media coverage of civilian casual

ties—even large amounts of enemy troops—is broadcast int

American homes, domestic moral outrage could be quite high

Even without a protracted conflict to drain US coffers, domes

tic opinion of losing large amounts of high-cost weapon sys 

tems will begin to emerge. The sum of this discontent will fal

squarely on the shoulders of US elected officials—most o

whom are interested in continued employment and prestige.

Obviously, this applies only to perceived losers. Presiden

George Bush’s 90 percent popularity rating in the wake of th

Gulf War is evidence of the enormous political boon “winning

entails. The question remains, however, are most politician

willing to take such a risk? The United States was considered

the out-and-out winner in Kuwait, but what were public per 

ceptions regarding Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Desert One

Panama, Somalia, and Bosnia? It seems that wildly successfu

campaigns are far outnumbered by perceived questionable o

outright poor results.

Comparative Space Power Characteristics

With all of this said about terrestrial force characteristic

across the spectrum of deployment, how are space power’s char

acteristics affected on this same continuum? Where does spac

power fit on this continuum? Certain space forces constantl

exist somewhere between the deployed and engaged states. Thi

assumes the asset is successfully launched and placed int

proper orbit.3 1 In such a location, the asset is deployed. From

such a deployed location, the asset can engage.

A case could be made, however, that space assets are al

ways engaged. This concept stems from the idea that spac

power, due to its position, is constantly present in the mind o

allies and potential adversaries. Force can be immediately, o

relatively rapidly, employed in concert with or against an ac

tor—either virtually or really (much like terrestrial nuclea

alert forces). This concept is termed presence .

537
The question for space power today is: What forces can b

brought to bear? What capabilities are “present” in the min

of the actor? As previously discussed, space power is limited

today in what “force” it can provide. This limitation, howeve

is not due to technological limitations as much as politica

considerations. Regardless, the limits are real. Such limita 

tions, however, do not negate the applicability of this analysis

To the contrary, this analysis may demonstrate the advan

tages of fielding such capabilities. To demonstrate this, mili

tary force characteristics will be discussed as they apply t

space power both in current capabilities and in technologicall

feasible, projected capabilities. The delta between these vari

ations could demonstrate the advisability of pursuing curren

technologically feasible capabilities from economic, military

and political standpoints.

Space Forces and Strategic Agility. Being forward de

ployed, and due to physical capabilities associated with th

medium, space power entails a responsive capability. Satel

lites in geosynchronous orbit can maintain a constant pres

ence over a specified area for years at a time. Even in low

earth orbit, constellations of satellites could work in unison t

effectively influence areas separated by vast overland dis

tances. Satellites can also be moved. Though today this proc 

ess is slow and expensive in fuel requirements, technologica

developments in solar energy collection, conversion, and stor

age offer new possibilities. The size of satellites is also bein

reduced, correspondingly reducing the energy requirements t

make them maneuverable. Additionally, concepts of directed

energy transfer and reusable launch vehicle resupply are on

the drawing board or in development. The vantage of spac

allows a broad footprint that continues to grow and be mor

maneuverable. Even if moved only degrees per day, that foot

print casts a large effective area.

Given today’s standing space force agility capabilities de

scribed above, as well as emerging capabilities, no longe

would the US military and policy makers be restrained from

engaging elsewhere when their forces are deployed or engaged

in one area of the globe. US space forces retain strategic agil

ity to affect virtually any area, any time. This agility is condi

538
tional, however. If the resource is self-reliant, or not support

ing a terrestrial system, it maintains its maximum agility. I

the system supports a terrestrial system, for example cuein

sensors, it then is limited by the terrestrial system’s agility

unless it retains a capability to support multiple, geographi

cally separated terrestrial systems.

Except for current systems already on orbit, much of thi

argument is mute if the United States does not pursue tech 

nologies now in development to ensure rapid, responsive, af

fordable space lift. Without a capability to place forces int

proper position rapidly and affordably, be it orbital or suborbi

tal, space power’s strategic agility is limited to present on-orbi

assets. Shuttle missions to repair satellites or place assets in

orbit are prohibitively expensive and time consuming, thereb

driving up economic, military, and political considerations.

Space Forces and Commitment/Credibility. The para 

digm of putting forces at risk is replaced with the notion tha

exactly because forces are not at risk, the plausibility of use o

such force increases, thereby increasing the notion that U

policy makers will use it—commitment and credibility. On or

bit, space forces can be thought of as always deployed, or in

certain instances, even engaged. Adversaries no longer need

question US commitment. No longer do costly deployments o

personnel and equipment need be carried out in a show o

force. With space power, the force exists on station, all th

time, or at least can get on station very rapidly—depending on

space force basing modes. Given space assets which are tech 

nologically feasible today, the commitment and credibility o

such a force is inherent.

The degree of commitment and credibility, however, is lim 

ited by today’s actual space forces. The lack of an autonomou

force application capability to directly influence an actor miti

gates the forces’ ability to demonstrate commitment and credi

bility. (This capability need not even require kinetic or directed

energy weapons; information warfare systems would be suffi 

cient, perhaps even superior. In this information age, suc

systems could influence technologically advanced adversarie

just as well, if not better, than more conventional weapons.) In

other words, though certain space forces are considered by a

539
actor (reconnaissance platforms, for example), their lack o

ability to influence directly requires the old paradigm of put

ting terrestrial forces into harm’s way to demonstrate US com 

mitment and credibility.

Space Forces and Economic Considerations. Today’s ac

tual space forces, as well as those technologically feasible, d

not require escalating support and operational costs upon de

ployment and engagement (as do terrestrial forces). The ma

jority of space power costs are those incurred as sunk costs

that is, paid at and prior to acquisition. Maintenance cost

and life cycle costs can be drastically reduced with a lift capa 

bility allowing either on-orbit replenishment, or rapid, contin 

gency-oriented delivery capability, such as a transatmospheri

vehicle or a reusable single-stage-to-orbit system.3 2

The cost of attack on home-based space power resource

depends on the systems’ basing modes. Orbital systems, obvi

ously, are least affected by such an attack, unless the system

are singularly tied to, and reliant upon, a ground-based sta 

tion. Reusable systems are most vulnerable to this situation

and efforts are required to minimize this chance. Today’s

fielded technology presently requires widely dispersed groun

stations, some well outside of the protective boundaries of th

United States. This presents a significant security problem fo

today’s US space assets. Considering the presently availabl

technology, such bases could be maintained well inside U

territory, allowing worldwide control via constellation intercon 

nectivity, providing maximum security. 3 3

Problems with space forces include their extremely high in 

itial cost. The loss of one such asset would be felt muc

deeper than the loss of multiple terrestrial force resources

This fact calls for the early establishment of a space contro

capability to ward off such possibilities. As with airpowe

superiority of the medium is crucial to the ability to operat

from the medium. It also calls for rapid realization of cheap

responsive lift.

Space Forces and Military Considerations. Like home

based terrestrial forces, the susceptibility of space power as

sets to damage or defeat is relatively lower than deployed o

engaged terrestrial forces. This implies a US space contro

540
capability to negate any space-borne, or surface-based capa 

bility against US space systems. If the United States would

attempt to influence a space-capable actor, that actor’s pos 

session of an antisatellite weapon could negate the concept o

US space power’s lower susceptibility to degradation and de

struction. Such an antisatellite system is technologically feasi

ble today, though unclassified sources indicate that none hav

been fielded. Additionally, as previously discussed, minimizin

foreign-based ground stations can negate security problems

Technologies presently exist to minimize this risk, allowin

ground stations to be located within the contiguous United

States, relaying data along constellations.

Tied directly to economic considerations, relatively fewe

space assets can be deployed as compared to terrestrial as

sets. This is due to high cost, as well as the multiple-capabil

ity characteristic of space assets. Both of these issues could

cause the loss of just a few space assets to adversely affec

military operations—much more so than the loss of simila

numbers of terrestrial assets. Again, such a fact harkens th

need for early space control capability and rapid, reliable lif

capability.

Space Forces and Political Considerations. Due to th

relatively low economic and military considerations spac

power resources enjoy, as compared to deployed and engaged

terrestrial forces, the political repercussions of utilizing suc

assets is correspondingly lower. Whereas policy makers hav

to contend with possible loss of troops’ lives when considerin

deploying or engaging terrestrial forces, the use of space force

carries no such political liabilities when considering unmanned

assets, and little chance of political liability when considerin

manned assets. As Maj Gen Roger G. DeKok, Air Force Spac

Command’s director of Operations and Plans, remarked, “Sat

ellites have no mothers.”3 4

Given today’s technologically feasible capabilities, as well a

today’s fielded systems, the inherent lack of political problem

with using space power is instrumental in making it an ex

tremely flexible political tool of national power. It can be use

with little regard to political ramifications at home in man

situations previously deemed as too politically sensitive. Na tiona

541
policy decisions no longer need to be restricted by visions o

the media displaying dead Marines being dragged through th

streets of a foreign land. Space power can complement an

support the other elements of power while not increasin

chances of early US withdrawal due to loss of life or equip 

ment. This fact makes it more plausible in the mind of th

enemy that the US will act, and that equates to deterrence.

On the other hand, as with other considerations, due t

economic and military implications of losing just a few spac

assets, political ramifications of such a loss are high, though

remote. Space control remains a high economic, military, an

political priority if deploying a space capability. Today, withou

this space control capability, political, economic, and militar

ramifications of losing space power advantages to a space

capable adversary could be high. Considering the high degre

of space support terrestrial systems have come to rely upon

loss of such capabilities could be disastrous. Additionally, thi

degree of reliance is increasing.

There is a clear difference as the characteristics of spac

power apply to today’s actual space force and to today’s tech 

nologically feasible space force. That difference demonstrate

the need to pursue space control capabilities that are techno

logically feasible. Today’s actual space forces have a balance o

advantages and disadvantages when compared charac

teristically to terrestrial forces. Conversely, the space forc

that is technologically feasible today and in the near futur

seems to demonstrate many characteristic advantages and few

disadvantages when compared to terrestrial forces (fig. 18).

Risk management is the hallmark of military characteristic

as they apply to space power. Space power, due to its inheren

characteristics of nonprovocativeness of position, decreased

economic, military, and political considerations, coupled wit

increased strategic agility and demonstration of commitmen

and credibility, can act to influence entities with decreased

risk as compared to terrestrial forces. To a certain extent thi

is true given today’s fielded space systems, though limitation

previously discussed, such as a lack of force application capa 

bilities, mitigate the realization of some benefits. The benefit

that space power brings to the diplomatic forum seem to b

542
great as compared to terrestrial forces by the characteristics o

strategic agility, ability to demonstrate commitment and credi

bility, and economic, military, and political considerations.

Many of the considerations discussed with regard to terres

trial forces were moderated by views that military forces exis

to deploy and fight. Such views hold that since this is so, th

forces’ economic, military, and political considerations need

not regard their degradation or loss as a primary limitin

factor in their use. While this notion has credence, it remain

true, it seems, that the ability of an adjunct force to affect a

actor in a similar way, but without risking such loss or degra 

dation, has great advantages. Though such a force does no

totally exist today, due to space power’s lack of ability to appl

force, it does not follow that such a capability should not b

Terrestrial Power

Characteristics

È Strategic Agility Í Strategic Agility Strategic Agility

Í Commitment/Credibility È Commitment/Credibility Commitment/Credibility

- Economic Considerations È Economic Considerations Economic Considerations

- Military Considerations È Military Considerations Military Considerations

- Political Considerations È Political Considerations Political Considerations

Figure 18. Continuum of Operations and Characteristics

of Space Power versus Terrestrial Forces

Overall Comparison

Technologically Feasible Spacepower Characteristics

 Strategic Agility

 Commitment/Credibility

 Economic Considerations

 Military Considerations

 Political Considerations

543
sought. In fact, from an analysis of military characteristics a

they apply to terrestrial forces, today’s actual space force, an

to a space force technologically feasible today, it seems such 

force would be beneficial and should be sought.

Summary: Political Flexibility

It is said that the military is the extended arm of diplomacy

Inherent in this concept is political flexibility to use militar

force. If the domestic or international political ramifications o

using military force are too great, the likelihood that govern 

ment will resort to it seems low. This notion is modified, how 

ever, when considering a fight for national survival or in op

erations of similarly great import. In other, more routin

operations, if left without this sometimes last recourse, gov

ernment could be left impotent to influence events, and ma

be forced to stand by and observe events which are counter t

national interests.

This political inflexibility results from many factors. Consid 

ering recent crises the United States has been embroiled in

however, it seems economic, military, and political considera 

tions are paramount. The problems, as well as advantages

inherent with terrestrial forces and these factors have bee

discussed. As the probability of actual military confrontation

increases, so too do the significance of the considerations

Hence, the political flexibility to use the military instrumen

tends to decrease. However, due to some of the advantages o

space power discussed above (tempered by today’s limitations

and bolstered by today’s technological capabilities), these con 

siderations can be drastically reduced across the spectrum o

military action. This decrease allows much more political flexi

bility, thereby allowing the government another realistic diplo 

matic tool with which to ensure US national interests are met

Conclusion and Implications

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt

themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet

544
Now is the time to take longer strides—time for a great new

American enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly

leading role in space achievement, which in many ways

holds the key to our future on Earth.

—John F. Kennedy

The introduction of new military capabilities often involves a

rethinking, a mental jump to entirely new concepts. It is not

a question of doing something better, it is a question of

doing something different. Not everyone can make this

mental jump.

—Gen Merrill McPeak

This thesis demonstrates that space power is not inherently

limited. Space power has the potential to be a fully functiona

arm of national military power. However, to realize such bene

fits, the United States must develop doctrine to realize ad

vancing space technologies, thereby allowing full space acces

and exploitive ability across the mission spectrum. This las

section deals with some implications requiring further though

by US leadership. A basic change of thinking is needed re

garding future US space capabilities, both in how we thin

militarily about space and how we think fiscally about space

US space doctrine, currently reflecting space power’s subordi

nate role, needs to be more forward-reaching. Billy Mitchel

once remarked about short-sighted doctrine: “National safet

would be endangered by an air force whose doctrine and tech 

niques are tied solely to the equipment and processes of th

moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and an

air force which does not keep its doctrine ahead of its equip 

ment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude th

nation into a false sense of security.”3 5

Space Power Is Not Inherently Limited

Space power has been evolving much like airpower. Airpowe

has evolved into a military power capable of the independen

application of influential force, while retaining its advantages a

an integrated part of the overall US force structure. Space powe

is a viable force today as part of this structure, in that it is use

545
to support all of the terrestrial military arms—and this sup

port is increasing. However, it seems presently stymied a

purely a supporting force, with no aggressive trend towar

realizing greater independent military potential. While earl

airpower doctrine generally seemed to consider ever greate

capabilities than were presently available, today’s space powe

doctrine seems to reflect its stymied position. Past and curren

technological projects, however, seemingly demonstrat

greater available space power potential.

Space is a physically unique medium as compared to terres 

trial mediums. Its physical attributes seem to demonstrate it

ability to affect all other war-fighting mediums. Its encompass

ing nature ensures access to all other mediums, while its abilit

to exploit gravity, vice fight it, gives it a natural energy advantag

over other mediums. Its lack of atmosphere—while limited in

certain respects due to heat, radiation, cold, and so forth—re

quires less energy to be spent for maintaining operational posi

tioning. Airpower’s advantages over the other terrestrial medi

ums include vantage and speed of access. Space power realize

these over the other mediums, and over the air as well, b

orders-of-magnitude. Space power’s physical attributes, a

they compare to other war-fighting mediums, belie nothin

that systemically or inherently limits its ability to be a militar

force able to fully function across the mission spectrum.

A comparison of how military characteristics apply to to 

day’s terrestrial forces , today’s fielded space forces, and to 

day’s technologically feasible space forces illustrates a rela 

tively large difference in limitations and advantages realized

by one form of space force as opposed to another. Today’s

fielded space forces demonstrate certain advantages whe

compared to terrestrial forces. On the other hand, a compari

son of terrestrial forces to today’s technologically feasibl

space forces illustrates an even greater number of advantages

The delta between these two comparisons seems to demon 

strate that space power is not inherently limited when com 

pared, by military force characteristics, with terrestrial forces

In fact, it seems space power can actually be more politicall

useful in most situations—though it is acknowledged that cer 

tain missions will always require the application of other mili

546
tary forces. In other words, though space power has the po

tential to be a leading independent, as well as integrated

element of military power, terrestrial forces will continue t

retain their own unique advantages and applications.

Space power’s current, relatively subordinate position as 

military power is not due to inherent limitations. Why has it

potential not been realized? If, in many ways the medium i

physically more capable than terrestrial war-fighting medi

ums, and space power technology exists allowing it to be in

many ways more useful than terrestrial forces, then ther

must be something “artificial”—not systemic or inher 

ent—which is limiting space power development.

Policy may be the limiting factor. Military forces exist at th

direction of policy. Policy is generated within the services, th

Department of Defense (DOD), and on Capitol Hill. The ramifi 

cations of this reasoning go well beyond the pretenses of thi

paper. In fact, such a line of reasoning seems worthy of it

own study. Suffice to say, however, that if space power allow

military and political flexibility as described here, it seem

worthy of a supportive policy which would be to the long-term

advantage of the United States.

Given supportive policy, a force structure should be create

that allows both maximum political flexibility and maximum

military flexibility—a fully mission-capable space force, couple

with an integrated, well-proportioned, terrestrial force. With

such a force, the possibility may exist for long-term fiscal sav

ings through decreased terrestrial force infrastructure, and long

term manpower and equipment sustainment cost savings.

A major policy change such as this seems a long-term solu 

tion, if it is even probable. However, three major things can b

done now to start US space power down this road. The firs

two concepts could turn the tide of thinking about spac

power as a purely supportive force; the latter would allow 

more economical transition to a fully functional space force

The first is a required change of thinking within the militar

about space power: It can be used in its conventional, suppor 

tive sense, as well as in more unconventional, independen

ways. Some information warfare missions seem ripe for suc

applications. Part and parcel to this first idea, space should b

547
considered its own area of responsibility. Unity of command i

essential for the proper planning and conduct of operation

within the medium. The third concept is that fiscal realitie

require a closer military—civilian space industry reliance.

Required Change of Thinking

When research originally began on this thesis, the autho

believed military space personnel were inexorably committed

to pursuing space capabilities, even those far into the future

which were merely supportive in nature. Perception was tha

USSPACECOM, as well as each of the services’ space com 

mands, were vectoring efforts toward space capabilities tha

would only support terrestrial military operations. It seemed

possible that such an approach could result in a loss of futur

military capability, national technical ability and prestige, an

possibly, national security itself.

After conducting research at USSPACECOM, AFSPACECOM

the Space Warfare Center, Sandia National Laboratory, an

Phillips Laboratory, it became evident that developments t

support the type of space infrastructure requisite to realiz

space power’s advantages were possible. In fact, such enablin

technology as a rapid, responsive, economical, and reusabl

space lift capability may not be far off. 3 6 However, throughou

the course of research for this thesis, there were those, som

with vast amounts of military space expertise, who claimed

space power would never attain the requisite capabilities t

fully exploit the medium. Some within service space com 

mands, especially outside of the Air Force, seemed intransigen

on this position. Varied reasons were given for these views

but most included political, as well as technological and fiscal

concerns.

One need only refer to the historical wrangling airpowe

experienced in its relative infancy to discern the same argu 

ments. There were those in World War I who continued t

disregard airpower’s capability as they put gas masks on thei

ever trusty cavalry horses to ride them into battle. In th

thirties, as the strategic ability of airpower became mor

widely accepted, there was much political discourse abou

limiting airpower’s capabilities for its perceived inherent politi

548
cal and military instability. Fortunately, there existed profes

sional military airmen whose vision outreached those of th

naysayers. Though some suffered humiliating career conse

quences, they aptly demonstrated the effective and efficien

ability of airpower to project presence relatively rapidly a

compared to other forces of the day. 3 7

It seems most of the professional military space cadre real

izes the intrinsic value of operating in and from space, just a

Mitchell and his ilk realized similar advantages in their day o

operating from the air. Personnel within the United States an

AFSPACECOM (including the Space Warfare Center), as wel

as the other forces’ space commands, seem to be moving wit

the momentum of forward thinking. However, some barrier

exist based on the old space-as-support-only paradigm

Though we still face political and parochial barriers to realiz

the military and political advantages of fully integrated spac

power, at least we are exploring the science, technology, an

operational concepts necessary to accomplish it. The “progres

sives” in the “system” seem to be overtaking the sedimentation

of the “status quos.”

Due to fiscal realities of today, and tomorrow, it seems th

technological breakthroughs are being, and probably will be

achieved mostly in the private sector. Space is to commercia

enterprise today, and more so tomorrow, what the airlines

both cargo and passenger, were to yesterday and today. How 

ever, space offers so much more in terms of communications

weather, transportation, and other areas that commercial con 

cerns are rapidly outpacing military research in the field.

The United StatesS must realize the advantages militar

space power offers. Hopefully, this thesis at least touche

some salient concepts that demonstrate space power’s advan

tages. With these advantages realized, the United StatesS ca

fully integrate its technological and operational biases wit

space power as a dominant factor. Professional military offi 

cers have a duty to articulate any particular concept tha

displays increased military, and therefore political, advantag

to their civilian superiors. It is then the politicians’ responsi

bility to ensure US forces are structured in an optimum man

549
ner. Such structuring intimates the need for unity of com 

mand regarding space.

Space as an Area of Responsibility

High strategic agility for space forces assumes a high de 

gree of command and control. As air forces are centrally con 

trolled, for matters of understanding unique strategic utilit

and capability, and decentrally executed, for matters of tacti

cal expertise at the unit level, so too should space forces b

controlled. The pervasive capability of limited numbers o

space resources in high demand sets up the same logica

structure for centralized command and control of space. Sub

jugating high-valued, far-reaching, but limited forces to on

commander responsible for a certain theater of operations ha

been tried and proven, in most instances, to be an inefficien

means of command and control.

Based on arguments presented in this thesis, a case can b

made that space is its own area of responsibility. In fact, th

Russian military considers space a distinct teatr voyennyk

deystviy (TVD), or theater of operations.3 8 If this is accepted

unity of command demands the appointment of a single com 

mander to this area. Requirements of such command gener 

ally include expertise, a fully functional and expert staff, an

control of proper equipment and infrastructure. Only one suc

commander fully fits this requirement—commander in chief

United States Space Command.

As with airpower employment, employing space power re

quires special knowledge and conceptual internalization. Th

far-reaching, sometimes global, aspects of airpower employmen

have demonstrated a requirement for leaders, staffs, and op

era tors trained to think in such terms. Similarly, assets with

space power’s worldwide capabilities need to be controlled b

leaders, staffs, and operators trained to think with such vision.

With unity of command regarding all facets of space, coordi

nation of requirements becomes easier. These requirement

span the spectrum from operational to developmental. Devel

opmentally, as well as operationally, as the use of space be

comes more commonplace, commercial enterprise will have t

be coordinated with military requirements.

550
Fiscal Realities and Military-Civilian Space Reliance

The future dictates a close relationship between militar

space requirements and civil space resources , including bot

operational and research and development realities.3 9 Man

military space functions closely parallel civil functions. Wher

these are evident, they should be exploited to save costs t

both sectors. Certain functions will continue to be the sol

purview of military space. Joint military-civilian space func

tions include weather, navigation, communications, earth re

sources, lift, orbit transfer, and tracking and control systems

Integrating many aspects of these systems to serve both mili

tary and civil customers could realize massive savings in fisca

requirements to both sectors. Near-term examples of probabl

and possible joint projects follow.

Space weather capabilities should become more economica

as Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and th

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA

combines. The turnover of DMSP responsibilities to NOAA wil

decrease military investment in weather reconnaissance. Addi

tional savings can be realized by replacing the purchase o

next-generation military weather satellites with purchasin

such data from commercial sources. Commercial market com 

petition could allow purchase of what you need only when yo

need it. Care must be taken to ensure on-demand militar

capability.

Space navigation systems can be streamlined as well. GP

could be assigned to the Department of Commerce or Trans

portation, since demand for such data is well beyond the pur

view of strictly DOD functions. Alternatively, current GPS sys 

tems could be sold to corporations on a cash plus percentag

basis, thereby raising cash for additional space resources o

developments. Military users could purchase required service

as needed. Military priority and accuracy would need to b

protected. Additionally, large constellations such as Intelsa

and Iridium could repeat navigation signals for redundan

world wide coverage.

Space communications systems seem to be proliferatin

rapidly. Microsoft Corporation’s Bill Gates plans to exponen 

tially expand such capability with his 840 Teledesic satellit

551
constellation. Teledesic

s goal is to bring the information su

perhighway in all its glory to even the most remote reaches o

the globe by the end of the century. 4 0 AFSPACECOM source

expect realization of this within a decade. Commercial enter 

prises will offer complete, competitive, fast response globa

coverage, thereby decreasing DOD demands to build and field

such systems. Additionally, research for such capabilities i

being increasingly funded by the commercial sector due t

potential profit.

Lift and orbit transfer may be solved commercially, drive

by commercial needs to access space. If such a robust system

develops, there would be no need to maintain the military’s

satellite-booster-operator system. Such a commercial system

could make launch-on-demand more realistic due to launc

quantity and competitive price forces.

Tracking and control of commercial satellites could be don

commercially, with intercorporation commonality and cos

sharing decreasing commercial risk. DOD and NASA could

follow corporate footsteps for military satellites, wit

USSPACECOM controlling all military assets. Alternatively

both corporate and military satellites could be controlled b

an integrated national tracking and control system, thereb

sharing costs among all users.

The bottom line of this approach to joint military-civil spac

exploitation is that the huge commercial market would likel

dwarf the military needs in space, thereby driving down DOD

space costs. 4 1 However, the military would need to maintain

certain realistic standards across the marketplace to ensur

its ability to use the systems. 4 2

Care must be taken to ensure a capability to closely contro

these functions in the interest of national security. There ar

two aspects of this concern. First, the military must hav

unobstructed and complete access capability in the event of 

national emergency, much like the current Civil Reserve Ai

Fleet concept. For example, contracts with civil communica 

tion satellite companies to enable daily dual use, and emer 

gency complete use, of the companies’ orbiting resource

would be required. Second, the United States can increase it

security by increasing foreign customer dependence on US

552
provided systems. For example, the United States could pro 

vide GPS data on a day-to-day basis at a price that would

monopolize the world wide satellite navigation market, thereb

ensuring control of access to or denial of such data in th

event of a national emergency.

The space functions that will continue to be the sole pur

view of the US military include certain surveillance and recon 

naissance capabilities, missile warning and defense, most se

cure communications capabilities, resource protection

command and control warfare, attack, and space system ne

gation capabilities. Certain near-term requirements for a ro 

bust space force follow.

Regarding surveillance and reconnaissance, ELINT and im 

agery intelligence (IMINT) tactical satellites (TACSATS) fo

earth observation is needed, with improved responsivenes

and previous systems provided by the National Reconnais 

sance Office (NRO). Real-time data fusion of multiple senso

inputs is presently being worked. Accurate geolocation o

threats in time and space is needed for prompt preemptiv

military action.

Space surveillance requirements include providing spac

traffic control to allow knowledge and control of all spac

resources, including civil. Resources can be saved by allowin

commercial, university, and technical center feeds into a mili

tary space traffic control data base to decrease overall collec

tion requirements. Missile warning and defense require sur

veillance, tip-off, and queuing functions to remain within th

military domain for purposes of speed, accuracy, and preemp

tive capabilities.

Regarding most secure communications capabilities, com 

mercial sources will have corporate secure capabilities. Thi

seems acceptable. In fact, more “routine” military secur

transmission requirements could be met more cheaply thi

way. However, the military must retain a most secure capabil

ity for NCA and CINCs’ communications, highest priority na

tional security communications, and data links for lethal na

tional assets.

Resource protection remains a military consideration. Hard

ening of sensors, receivers, and transmitters is required t

553
maintain the information edge on future threats (close hold

data) and to realize the extent of proliferation of high threat

(RF, HPM, lasers).

Another singular military requirement is space maneuverabil

ity for coverage, evasion, mission responsiveness, and flexibility

Such a capability may be on board a satellite, or may use Sit

Transition Team (STT) or transatmospheric vehicles (TAV) tech 

nology. However, it is not currently relevant to commercial us

ers, so they will not fund such research and development.

Attack and space system negation issues include kineti

energy (KE) and directed energy (DE) force application capa 

bilities, as well as advanced weapons for permanent or tempo

rary, lethal or nonlethal effects. In the age of information war

fare, such capability could give the United States a selectiv

attack option on enemy or third-party information suppliers

with such a capability, space power could realize its maximum

political and military flexibility.

Space force application capabilities could include KE as wel

as DE kill or degradation mechanisms. Such projects as th

Tactical Reentry Impacting Munition program, Impact Tech 

nology program, Discriminating Attack Capability programs

Defense Suppression Vehicle, and Global Prompt Respons

Capability programs all have demonstrated, or discussed, KE

kill technologies. The Sandia Winged Energetic Reentry Veh

cle Experimental program and the Hypersonic Glide Vehicl

program, both have illustrated high-explosives kill technolo 

gies. DE kill technologies have been discussed in the Beam

Experiments Aboard Rocket program.

The feasibility of all of these technologies, and more, wa

demonstrated by Phillips Lab’s 1991 Force Applications Study

The study concluded such technologies could be used to sat

isfy USAF operational requirements to

• reach out and touch anybody, anywhere, anytime;

• operate in the fiscal and geostrategic environment of th

1990s and beyond;

• complement traditional airpower by providing a numbe

of very accurate, very long range, and very responsiv

weapons; and

554
• actively support Global Reach-Global Power by lessenin

reliance on forward deployment and foreign basing, as wel

as supporting aerospace power objectives of flexibility

range, responsiveness, and lethality.4 3

Due to the ever-increasing importance of information tech 

nology, other future force application capabilities should in 

clude capabilities to exploit, disrupt, or destroy adversaries

information systems. US systems should be able to contro

adversaries’ knowledge-support computer infrastructures t

effectively circumvent enemy leadership’s decision processes

Such systems should also be able to exploit and affect enem

industry, electricity, transportation, and computer suppor

networks. These types of capabilities would allow the disrup

tion of such systems without the destruction and inheren

risks of strategic air attacks.

Summary

Space is not systemically, or inherently, limited. Its physica

attributes and application to military characteristics belie n

reason for its present relative position vis-à-vis terrestrial forces

In fact, the advantages of space offer great military and politica

flexibility. It presently exists subordinate to terrestrial power

primarily due to purely ‘’artificial’’ reasons. Policy seems to be a

the root of those reasons. Though a full study of this notion i

beyond the scope of this paper, certain things can be done now

to enhance space power’s chances of one day realizing full op 

erational capability across the military mission spectrum.

Space, as a medium to be exploited, is still waiting for 

user to get its act together, to determine how and why it ca

be exploited (a theory), and how to organize, train, and equip

itself to do so (a doctrine). It must improve on what is alread

good in its space capability, and fix what is broken. To do thi

requires a new way of thinking about space and its role in th

present, as well as future, world order. Using a comprehensiv

space-power theory, the United States can organize, train, an

equip itself better to exploit space. “Better” implies more effi 

ciently, faster and cheaper, via streamlined requirements an

555
joint military-civil capabilities. The product of this change wil

be a national ability to defend US worldwide interests rapidly

with decisive force, and at decreased costs in lives, treasure

and natural resources.

Notes

1. Lt Col David Lupton, USAF, Retired, On Space Warfare—A Space 

power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 7. In hi

well-written and informative book, Lupton is more thorough than any othe

author in dealing with the question of space power’s usefulness. He articu 

lates four distinct space doctrines, each one based on clearly defined beli

structures and historical perspectives. Many of his views are shared by thi

author and are included in this thesis.

2. Peter L. Hays, “Struggling Towards Space Doctrine: US Military Spac

Plans, Programs and Perspectives During the Cold War” (PhD diss., Fletche

School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994). Hays compares the development o

airpower to space power in an attempt to determine three critical steps i

airpower’s development that might explain space power’s future develop 

ment.

3. Richard Ernest Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Mil

tary History, 2d rev. ed. (New York: HERO Books Partnership, 1986), 934.

4. Sir Peter Anson and Capt Dennis Cummings, RAF, “The First Spac

War: The Contributions of Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSl Journal 136, no

4 (Winter 1991): 45; and Lee B. Kennett, The First Air War (New York: Fre

Press, 1991), title page.

5. Kennett, 31.

6. Ibid.

7. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14

Space Operations, 15 April 1992, I-15.

8. Author’s personal experience flying F-111Es in Desert Shield an

Desert Storm.

9. Hays, 27.

10. Ibid., 59.

11. Ibid., 27.

12. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United State

Air Force, 1-3.

13. Dana Johnson, “The Evolution of US Military Space Doctrine” (Ph

diss., University of Southern California, 1987). Johnson presents an analy 

sis of space power’s developmental similarities and differences to the USA

and the Navy. She discusses the impact of the varying requirements place

on the space force by all of the services and concludes that space is a trul

joint arena, and should be managed to support all services to ensure min

mum duplication of effort. She points out that space leaders could lear

from a study of airpower and sea power developments.

556
14. John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years (Wash

ington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 6–8.

15. Ibid., 21–22.

16. Ibid., 23.

17. Ibid., 6.

18. Much of this discussion comes from ideas generated by Carl Builde

of the RAND Corporation in notes to Col Richard Szafranski, Air War Co

lege, national security chair.

19. Ibid.

20. Phillip Meilinger, Col, USAF, “Ten Propositions Regarding Airpowe

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, August 1994), 3.

21. Department of the Air Force, Global Presence 1995 (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 13.

22. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (London: Yale Universit

Press, 1966), 36.

23. Ibid., chap. 2.

24. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston: Little, Brow

and Co., 1993) for a thought-provoking treatise on the evolution of warfar

and technology.

25. Global Presence 1995, 11.

26. Ibid.

27. As was the case when Checkmate initially briefed Gen Charles A

Horner on the strategic air campaign against Iraq in early August 1990

When the general determined they had no defensive plan, he reacted wit

dismay.

28. One might argue the strategic difference between war fighting an

peacekeeping, but the infantryman taking fire or the airman reacting t

antiaircraft fires does not recognize this difference.

29. Edward M. Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Freidrich Lis

The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” in Makers of Modern Strateg

(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 217.

30. This is most evident in the famous “Sunday Briefing” given the fir

day of all Red Flag deployments. This is a mandatory pre-exercise fligh

safety briefing and offers statistics showing a relatively higher accident rat

The point of the briefing is not to become a statistic. The USAF Flight Safet

School also teaches that accident rates at deployed locations tend to b

higher, thereby requiring increased command and safety vigilance.

31. See a later section for a discussion of lift developments or refer t

fig. 13 for associated system developments.

32. Proof-of-concept of such systems is occurring now. See Durnheim

“DCX Proving Initial Operating Concepts.”

33. Iridium will have a constellation interconnectivity capability.

34. Maj Gen Roger G. DeKok, interview with the author, Peterson AFB

Colo., 13 March 1995.

35. The War Reports of Marshall, Arnold and King (New York: Lippincot

1947), 455.

557
36. Work on lift and delivery vehicles such as Blackhorse, DCX, an

TAVs is rapidly progressing. Some estimates put such capabilities, deve

oped primarily by private contractors, only a decade or so away. Transa

mospheric vehicles would allow rapid crisis reaction (approximately 30 min 

utes to deliver “influence,” that is, ordnance, surveillance, supplie

communication, etc. anywhere in the world), flexible targeting (via “atmos 

pheric skipping” the vehicle reenters the atmosphere to reorient its vector t

deploy anywhere over the planet), long-duration presence capability (ai

refuelablility is a hallmark of TAVs), resupply, rearm, refuel (TAVs wi

return to earth, or maybe a space station in the distant future, to refresh)

low vulnerability (possibly a zero vulnerability capability given an un

manned vehicle), and relatively high economic value (projected costs fo

pound-into-orbit run in the hundreds of dollars, versus thousands of do

lars realized by today’s inefficient launch means).

37. Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell was court-martialed for his outspo

ken support of a fully integrated airpower architecture. In the foreword o

Mitchell’s book, Winged Defense (New York: Putnam, 1925), the publishe

writes, “In June 1925, Mitchell was returned to his permanent rank o

Colonel and was sent to Texas on account of his outspoken criticism of ou

military policy in general and our aeronautical policy in particular. Mitche

has always been a pioneer, and in aeronautics a good deal of a prophe

Prophets, one recalls, aren’t always highly regarded at home. At all event

Mitchell, for his outspoken criticisms of things as he sees them in the arm

and navy, has been pretty well belabored by his official opponents, of whom

there are many, however widespread the approval given him and his view

by the country at large.”

38. Jacob Kipp et al., Soviet Views on Military Operations in Space (Co

lege Station, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology, 1986), 223–49. Kip

analyzes Soviet military writings to demonstrate they viewed space as a

“independent theater, pursuing independent missions under the direction o

a TVD headquarters, the direct representative of the Stavka, or Suprem

High Command. He suggests that “once an independent space theater be 

comes feasible, space should then become the main TVD.”

39. Much of this discussion is gleaned from a presentation the autho

received from Lt Col Mike Kauthold, SWC/XR, titled, “The Reinvention o

Space.”

40. S. Faber, “Global Ambitions,” Discover, January 1995, 3.

41. For a complete discussion of “dual-use,” “spin-off,” “spin-on,” an

economic technology interface see such works as John A. Alic et al., Beyon

Spin-Off: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World (Boston

Harvard Business School Press, 1992); Anna Slomovic, An Analysis of Mil

tary and Commercial Microelectronics: Has DOD’s R&D Funding Had th

Desired Effect? (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991); and Victor Utgoff, Th

American Military in the Twenty-First Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press

After a study of such works, the author believes that “dual-use” technolo

gies, or those that can be used by both military and commercial sectors, bu

558
funded by DOD, and 

spin-off technologies, or those that are developed b

DOD for DOD use, but which have certain civil application, do not hold a

much fiscal promise, and do not reflect the reality of today’s commerci

technologic revolution, as “spin-on” technologies do. “Spin-on” technologie

refer to those which are generally developed and funded by commerci

concerns, but which can be adapted for military use. Overall, it is the fre

market competition that will generate both quality products and affordabi

ity applicable to both the military and civil sectors. As Slomovic writes, “

the costs of weapon systems are to be contained, the electronics must b

produced by firms which have incentives and opportunities to reduce cost

As this study demonstrates, in the majority of cases the DOD is not gettin

more advanced components for the higher prices it pays.” DOD R&D fund

must be spent on special military requirements, i.e., those which have n

application in the civil market. However, certain criteria such as reliability

temperature tolerance, and radiation tolerance, once thought to be withi

the military’s unique interest, are now being designed into civil component

The military must take advantage of these increasing capabilities by apply 

ing realistic test criteria and requirements.

42. Alic notes that during heyday of the spin-off paradigm, that is, whe

commercial requirements were being met with defense research and deve

opment dollars, “military requirements distorted priorities toward (overly

complex, high-performance objectives with limited commercial applicabi

ity.” As the spin-off paradigm is left for a more realistic, contemporary

market-place driven, commercial-military interface, the problem should b

partially “self-correcting,” that is, defense will decline as a fraction of na

tional technical effort. However, care must be taken by the corporations, s

comfortable with the spin-off paradigm of the past, to not adopt civilianize

versions of “defense technology paradigms.” International competitivenes

as well as national economic and military superiority, would suffer.” Amer

can business, accustomed to letting DOD carry much of the burden, ha

been slow in responding to aggressive technological investments by Japa

nese firms, even as the latter outdistanced them first in process and then i

product engineering. The cost to Americans of carrying around the wron

mental image of how the technological system works will be paid in terms o

lost markets, overpriced weapons, and wasted resources.”

43. “Force Applications Study,” final report briefing, unclassified (Kirt

land AFB, N.Mex.: Phillips Laboratory, 13 June 1991).

559
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University of Southern California, 1987.

Lentini, Joseph. “Will Congress Support a Space Contro

Policy?” Air Command and Staff College paper. Maxwel

AFB, Ala., April 1984.

Lorenzini, Dino. “2001: A U.S. Space Force.” Paper presented

to the Air University Airpower Symposium. Maxwell AFB

Ala., 1981.

Lyall, Francis. “Space Law—What Law or Which Law?” Pape

presented to the Aerospace Industries Association o

America (AIAA) Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space

Dresden, Germany, October 1991.

McFarland, R. S. “The Impact of Space Systems on Futur

Warfare—A Warrior’s Perspective.” A Naval War Colleg

paper. Newport, R.I. 1980.

Meilinger, Col Phillip. “Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower

Paper written in his position as dean, School of Advanced

Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August 1994, 3.

Piotrowski, John, Gen, USAF. “Space Warfare and th

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568
Index

1967 Outer Space Treaty: 197

1972 ABM Treaty: 204, 224

409–40: 306, 308

access to space: 365–66, 369, 422

aerial vehicles: 146

aerospace assets: 28

aerospace business: 34

aerospace industry: 3–5, 7, 10, 13, 34,

37–38, 42

aerospace power: 30, 33

Air Force: 29

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1: 86, 273,

333

Air Force Space Support Teams: 84

Air Research and Development Center:

306

aircraft manufacturing: 34

airpower: 509–11, 514–15, 523, 545

Aldridge Commission: 372

antisatellite (ASAT) weapon: 249, 346

armed conflict: 15

Arnold, Henry “Hap”: 163

Army Operations: 24

ASAT policy: 199

ASAT program: 196–200

ASAT R&D: 203

ASAT system: 196

ASAT weapon: 275, 278

Ashy, Joseph W.: 208

Attack and Launch Early Reporting to

Theater: 82

aviation research: 11

Betts, Richard:16

Black Horse TAV: 444

Bockman, Larry: 23

Bold Orion: 202

Brown, Harold, Dr.: 203

Bruger, Steven J.: 88

Buchsbaum Panel: 199

budget: 127

centralized space assets: 213

China/Brazil Earth Remote Sensing

satellite: 262

civil space resources: 551

civilian imagery systems: 267

civilian space capabilities: 256

civilian space technology: 264

Clausewitz, Carl von: 17

cold war: 192, 250

cold war space policy: 193

Collins, John M.: 519

command orientation: 120

command, control, and surveillance: 21

command-oriented architecture: 116,

131, 143–44, 151–52

command-oriented space architecture:

142

commercial aerospace: 38

commercial industry: 11

commercial satellites: 328, 552

commercial space systems: 74

commercially available imagery: 345

communications: 512

concept of operation: 464

CONOPS: 438

Corona project: 308

counterspace operations: 293

Currie, Malcolm: 199

cryogenic propellants: 471

DARPA: 40

D’Andrea, Laura T.: 10

data reception stations: 340

Davis, Robert V.: 208

Dawes, Robyn: 193

decentralized space operations: 162

decisive orbits: 412

defense budgets: 127, 228

defense policy: 41

Defensive Technologies Study Team: 201

demand-oriented approach: 147

demand-oriented architecture: 105, 118

133, 148–49, 156, 158

demand-oriented satellites: 151

demand-oriented systems: 151

Desert Shield: 63, 511

Desert Storm: 213

deterrence: 249

digital image processing technology: 314

digital imagery: 313

directed energy weapons: 283

disadvantages of space: 152

distributed architecture: 149

doctrine: 85, 88

569
economic considerations: 526, 530, 533,

540

education policy: 39

elevation: 413, 418

ELF: 376

ELV augmentation: 470

energy states: 418

engine designs: 10

environment: 231, 517

evolved expendable launch vehicle: 373

expendable launch vehicle: 375

expendables: 373

fiber-optic technology: 213

film-based recovery system: 309

follow-on mission: 384

force enhancement: 512

foreign investment: 39

forward deployment/presence: 22

Forward Space Support in Theater

(FSST) team: 292

Fourteenth Air Force: 65, 83

Friedman, George: 15

fuels: 387

future warfare: 326

Gabriel, Charles: 250

Gavin, James: 195

Global Hawk: 214

global protection against limited strikes:

204

Global Reach—Global Power: 29

Glonass satellites: 221

Glosson, Buster C.: 19

government aerospace: 10

gravity well: 415

Gray, Colin S.: 87

Gulf War: 64, 80, 83, 316, 419

Gulf War Airpower Survey: 73

Hayes, Brad: 23

Helios reconnaissance satellite: 221

Holley, I. B. Jr.: 80

home-based forces: 530–31

Horner, Charles A.: 70, 77

Huntingdon, Samuel: 16

imagery: 326

Indian Resources Satellite: 263

industrial policy: 41

industrialized warfare: 324

information dominance: 252–54,

280–81, 286, 288

infrastructure cost: 388

intelligence support: 459, 462

international balancing: 226

international community: 227

international competitors: 225

international security: 14

International Space Station: 371

ISR satellites: 210, 218

Japanese Earth Remote Sensing

Satellite: 263

JDTTP 3-14: 333, 395

Jervis, Robert: 227

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 196

Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14, Space

Operations: 87

joint forces space component

commander: 291

Joint Pub 5-02.1: 290

joint space doctrine: 66

JULLS: 77

KE ASAT: 207

Kennedy, John F.: 195

KH-11 satellite: 312

KH-11 system: 314

kinetic energy: 282

kinetic energy weapons: 419

Kissinger, Henry A.: 198

Landsat: 257

launch costs: 386

launch market: 372

launch vehicles: 371

Lebard, Meredith: 15

lessons learned: 81

life-cycle costs: 380

lightsats: 158

logistic resupply: 402

lower insurance costs: 383

Mackubin, Thomas Owens: 78

McNamara, Robert S.: 196

maintenance: 533

maneuverability: 404, 406

Mann, Edward C., III: 88

McPeak, Merrill A.: 30

Meteosat-4 satellite: 219

military aerospace capabilities: 14

military aerospace power: 36

military applications: 479

570
military considerations: 526, 531, 534,

540

military missions: 398

military operations: 398

military power: 524

military space theory and doctrine: 234

miniature homing vehicle: 200

Moorman, Thomas S. Jr.: 89, 209

MSI: 83

multispectral imagery: 317

NARPA: 40

NASA’s Access to Space Study: 374

national aerospace strategy: 41

National Military Intelligence Support

Team: 71

National Reconnaissance Office: 216

national security space architecture:

104, 120

National Security Space Master Plan: 210

National Space Council: 41

National Space Policy: 206, 274

National Space Transportation Policy:

438

national strategy: 185

National Test Facility: 84

Naval Expeditionary Forces: 20

naval forces expeditionary strategy: 22

navigation and positioning: 512

Navy’s Strategy-POM: 23

notional RLV: 451, 453

nuclear warfare: 325

offensive counterspace operations:

284–85, 289

offensive counterspace weapons: 282

on-orbit force structure: 401

on-orbit refueling: 382

operating base costs: 469

operational capability: 21

operational centers of gravity: 281

operational requirements: 122

orbit-to-earth return missions: 391

orbits: 414–15

Outer Space Treaty of 1967: 396

Parrington, Alan J.: 87

payloads: 381, 385, 406, 447

Pied Piper: 307

Piotrowski, John: 250

political considerations: 474, 527, 531,

534, 541

political flexibility: 544

political intercourse: 17

political risk: 13

power projection: 22

primordial warfare: 324, 327

Program 437: 196

Program 505: 196

propulsion technology: 481

rapid maneuverability: 403

real-world determinants: 122

reconnaissance: 466

reconnaissance satellite: 303

research and development: 11, 79

Resurs satellite: 259

reusable launch vehicle: 216, 421, 438,

483

reusable space launch vehicle: 389

reusables: 374

RLV: 376–77, 392, 405–06, 422, 443

RLV acquisition: 439

RLV concepts: 443, 445

RLV concepts and attributes: 442

RLV design: 480

RLV development: 447

RLV force: 455, 461

RLV forces: 458

RLV operations: 463

RLV requirements: 439

RLVs: 380

robustness: 115

RSTA architecture: 140

RSTA information needs: 140

RSTA mission: 139

RSTA shortfalls: 145

Russian ASAT: 219

Samos program: 311

sanctuary: 189, 234

sanctuary argument: 212

sanctuary policy: 202

sanctuary strategy: 223, 230

satellite communication systems: 70

satellite communications: 72, 75, 213

satellite imagery control: 335

satellite imagery intelligence: 327

Schelling, Thomas C.: 227

Schriever, Bernard A.: 195

Slichter Panel: 198

Soviet ASAT: 198

Soviet military theorists: 252

Soviets: 198, 318

Soyuzkarta: 328

space access: 394, 481

571
space architecture: 106, 111, 130

space budget: 367, 380

space communications systems: 551

space control: 333, 338

space control mission: 347, 397

space control policy: 273

space control strategy: 275

space debris: 230

Space Demonstration Program: 71

space doctrine: 87, 89–90, 408, 416–17,

420

space forces: 538–40, 550

space information: 256

space launch: 82

space lift: 158

space lift requirements: 440

space manufacturers: 13

space medium: 521

space missions: 400

space mobilization: 73

space navigation systems: 551

space operation plans: 79

space operations: 423

Space Operations Doctrine 4: 86

space order of battle: 292–93

space policy: 189, 194, 206

space power: 69, 77, 507, 509, 512, 537,

542, 545

space power doctrine: 65, 78

space reconnaissance: 304, 311

space RSTA systems: 144

space sanctuary: 188, 191, 193

space strategists: 343

space support: 83

space systems: 108, 110, 115

space technology: 256

space transportation policy: 422

space warfare: 347

Space Warfare Center: 84, 121

space weapons: 191, 194, 210, 216,

223, 231, 236, 349

space weather capabilities: 551

space-based reconnaissance systems:

305

space-based strategic intelligence: 315

SPACECAST 2020: 109

spatial resolution: 264

spectral resolution: 268

SPOT: 315, 319, 328, 339, 342

SPOT imagery: 317

SSTO: 392

strategic agility: 538, 550

Strategic Defense Initiative: 201

strategic space intelligence: 305

strategic strikes: 419

strategy: 25

strikes: 467

Sullivan, Gordon R.: 24

surveillance: 513

surveillance data: 329

takeoff and landing: 449

Talon Sword: 33

tax structures: 39

Technological Capabilities Panel: 307

technology: 125, 157

teleoperated RLV: 410

TENCAP: 81

terrestrial engaged forces: 535

terrestrial forces: 528–29, 532, 534, 546

terrestrial military power: 523

theater reconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition: 136

theater RSTA: 149

timeliness: 269

transspace operations: 469–70

Unified Command Plan: 290

uninhabited aerial vehicles: 214

US Central Command OPLAN 1002-95:

8 5

US national security strategy: 272

US Space Command: 64

USCENTCOM: 71

USSPACECOM: 68

vehicle cost: 411

war: 19

warfare: 320

wars: 15

world dominance: 348

X-20 Dynasoar: 203

572
Beyond the Paths of Heaven

The Emergence of Space Power Thought

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Emily J. Adams

Copy Editor

Lula M. Barnes

Book Design and Cover Art

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson