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UNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS IN FIRST CONTRACT 

NEGOTIATIONS: POSTDOCTORAL SCHOLAR 

BARGAINING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND LABOR 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN BERKELEY, CA, APRIL 30, 2010 

Serial No. 111–59 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice Chairman 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, Virginia 

Lynn C. Woolsey, California 

Rube

 ́

n Hinojosa, Texas 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Rau

 ́

l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Timothy H. Bishop, New York 

Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania 

David Loebsack, Iowa 

Mazie Hirono, Hawaii 

Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania 

Phil Hare, Illinois 

Yvette D. Clarke, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio 

Jared Polis, Colorado 

Paul Tonko, New York 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, 

Northern Mariana Islands 

Dina Titus, Nevada 

Judy Chu, California 

John Kline, Minnesota, 

Senior Republican Member 

Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California 

Peter Hoekstra, Michigan 

Michael N. Castle, Delaware 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan 

Judy Biggert, Illinois 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Brett Guthrie, Kentucky 

Bill Cassidy, Louisiana 

Tom McClintock, California 

Duncan Hunter, California 

David P. Roe, Tennessee 

Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania 

Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director 

Barrett Karr, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 30, 2010 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Members: 

Lee, Hon. Barbara, a Representative in Congress from the State of California .............................................................................................................. 5 

Miller, Hon. George, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor ......... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3 

Questions submitted for the record ......................................................... 78 

Woolsey, Hon. Lynn C., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 5 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Burton, Hon. John L. (ret.), former Representative in Congress from 

the State of California .................................................................................. 43 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 44 

Duckett, Dwaine, vice president of human resources, University of California .............................................................................................................. 37 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 39 

Responses to questions submitted for the record ................................... 80 

Ferguson, John-Paul, assistant professor, Stanford University Graduate 

School of Business ......................................................................................... 51 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 53 

Additional submission—‘‘The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential 

Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999–2004,’’ Industrial and 

Labor Relations Review, Oct. 2008 ...................................................... 86 

Kampas, Bradley W., Jackson Lewis, LLP ..................................................... 45 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 47 

Miller, Michael, International Representative International Union, UAW . 11 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 12 

Tyler, Ludmila, Ph.D., postdoctoral researcher, University of California, 

Berkeley ......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9 

(1) 

UNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS IN FIRST 

CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS: POSTDOCTORAL 

SCHOLAR BARGAINING AT THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 

Friday, April 30, 2010 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in the auditorium at Berkeley City College, 2050 Center Street, Berkeley, California, Hon. George Miller [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller and Woolsey. 

Also Present: Representative Lee. 

Staff Present: Jody Calemine, General Counsel; Gordon Lafer, 

Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Alexandria Ruiz, Administrative Assistant to Director of Education Policy; and Jim Paretti, Minority 

Workforce Policy Counsel. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. A quorum being present, the 

Committee on Education and Labor will come to order for the purposes of conducting a hearing to examine the challenges posed by 

the first contract negotiations at the University of California, an 

issue of long concern to this Committee in many other settings. 

The Chair will recognize himself for the purpose of making an 

opening statement and then I will recognize Congresswoman Woolsey and then Congresswoman Lee. 

Today we will explore the issue and using a particular case 

study, the first contract bargaining of Postdoctoral Scholars at the 

University of California. Over the last several years my Committee 

has been collecting testimony and information about the erosion of 

American workers’ fundamental rights to organize and bargain for 

a better life. We have learned that workers face immense obstacles 

when they try to form and join a union. And we have learned that 

even when they succeed in getting representation there is an entire 

new gauntlet to run when they try to reach the first contract with 

their employer. While parties in a labor negotiation are obliged to 

bargain in good faith, the applicable law often provides no effective 

enforcement of that duty. Federal labor laws give wide way to 

someone to stall and frustrate the bargaining. In fact, a recent 

study found that 34 percent of the union election victories have not 

resulted in a first contract after two or even three years of bargaining. This is unacceptable to those workers. 
2 

As the Committee has learned, some employers have used delay 

as a tactic because after a year of bargaining without a contract to 

show for it, a newly recognized union can be decertified. Both federal and California law gives the parties 12 months to reach the 

first contract before decertification of the union may occur. 

Originally, it was thought that a year was more than enough 

time for an employer and a union acting in good faith to settle a 

contract. However, we’re seeing an increasing number of cases 

where the negotiations last well beyond a year. This is one reason 

why a majority of the Congress agrees that the federal law needs 

to be reformed in order to encourage all parties to come to an 

agreement in a reasonable amount of time. The Employee Free 

Choice Act would do just that. If after 90 days a first contract has 

not been finalized, either party can request mediation assistance. 

If mediation does not help bring the parties together in 30 days, 

then the mediation can be referred to binding arbitration. That bill, 

however, amends Federal labor law. It applies to the private sector 

only, not the public sector bargaining like the case before us today. 

Public sector organizing and bargaining can present its own challenges, but many of the basic rights, obligations and issues remain 

the same. 

We seek today to learn more about the first contract negotiations 

in a particular case, why they have gone on so long without reaching an agreement and to see what lessons can be drawn from this 

case. In 2008, after three years of organizing, postdoctoral scholars 

at the University of California won certification for their union, the 

UAW, the United Auto Workers before the State Public Employees 

Relations Board. Although negotiations began November 2008, the 

University of California system and the postdoctoral scholars have 

been unable to reach agreement on a first contract. But for more 

than a year, the postdoctoral scholars have bargained and been unable to get a first contract. 

What is discouraging is that there is nothing novel about collective bargaining on university campuses. There have been graduate 

student unions for 40 years, and faculty unions for nearly a century. In fact, the University of California system recognizes and 

successfully bargained with the University researchers and graduate student unions. These scholars work hard. Their contribution 

to the University and to the nation is, indeed, invaluable. 

After 18 months of talk these scholars deserve a contract. After 

18 months of talk these scholars deserve a say over the terms and 

conditions under which they work day in and day out. 

Today we will hear from witnesses involved in the current negotiations, from witnesses experienced in past negotiation and from 

experts on the broader policy issues of first contract negotiations. 

And while this hearing comes in the context of an ongoing dispute, 

I want to emphasize that we are here today to learn and understand the issues, not to mediate them. 

I would like to thank Congresswoman Barbara Lee for hosting 

this hearing on this important topic in her District. And I am glad 

that you and Congresswoman Woolsey, the Subcommittee Chair on 

our Committee on Education and Labor, have joined me today. 

And personally, I want to thank all of the witnesses for taking 

time out of their schedule and lending to us their expertise, and 
3 

their knowledge and their experience in these issues. And I look 

forward to all of your testimony. And with that, I would like to recognize Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey, the Subcommittee Chair of Worker Safety Committee. [The statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor 

The Committee on Education and Labor meets this morning in Berkeley to exam- ine the challenges posed by first contract negotiations, an issue of long concern to 

the committee. 

Today we will explore this issue using a particular case study—the first-contract bargaining for post-doctoral scholars at the University of California. Over the last several years, my Committee has collected testimony and informa- tion about the erosion of American workers’ fundamental right to organize and bargain for a better life. We have learned that workers face tremendous obstacles when they try to form 

or join a union. And we have learned that, even when they succeed in gaining representation, there is an entire new gauntlet to run when they try to reach a first contract with 

their employer. While the parties in a labor negotiation are obligated to bargain in good faith, the applicable law often provides no effective enforcement of that duty. Federal and many state labor laws give wide leeway for someone to stall and frus- trate bargaining. In fact, a recent study found that 34 percent of union election victories had not resulted in a first contract after two or even three years of bargaining. This is unacceptable. 

As the Committee has learned, some employers have used delay as a tactic be- cause, after a year of bargaining without a contract to show for it, a newly recognized union can be decertified. 

Both federal and California law gives the parties 12 months to reach a first contract before decertification of the union may occur. 

Originally, it was thought that a year was more than enough time for an employer and a union acting in good faith to settle a contract. 

However, we are seeing an increasing number of cases where negotiations last 

well beyond a year. 

This is one reason why a majority of Congress agrees that the federal law needs 

to be reformed in order to encourage all parties to come to an agreement in a reasonable amount of time. 

The Employee Free Choice Act would do just that. If after 90 days, a first contract 

has not been finalized, either party can request mediation assistance. If mediation 

does not help bring the parties together in 30 days, then the mediation can be referred to binding arbitration. 

That bill, however, amends federal labor law. It applies to the private sector only, 

not to public sector bargaining—like the case before us today. 

Public sector organizing and bargaining can present its own challenges. But many 

of the basic rights, obligations, and issues remain the same. 

We seek today to learn more about why first contract negotiations in a particular 

case have gone on so long without reaching an agreement, and to see what lessons 

can be drawn this case. 

In 2008, after three years of organizing, post-doctoral scholars at the University 

of California won certification for their union, the UAW, before the state Public Employment Relations Board. 

Although negotiations began in November 2008, the University of California system and the post-doctoral scholars have been unable to reach agreement on a first 

contract. 

But, for more than a year, post-doctoral scholars have bargained and been unable 

to get a first contract. 

What is discouraging is that there is nothing novel about collective bargaining on 

university campuses. There have been graduate student unions for forty years, and 

faculty unions for nearly a century. 

In fact, the University of California system recognizes and has successfully bargained with university researchers and graduate student unions. 

These scholars work hard. Their contributions to the University, to the nation, 

and, indeed, to the world can be invaluable. 
4 

After 18 months of talks, these scholars deserve a contract. 

After 18 months of talks, these scholars deserve a say over the terms and conditions under which they work, day in and day out. Today, we will hear from witnesses involved in the current negotiations, from witnesses with experience in past 

negotiations, and from experts on the broader policy issues of first-contract negotiations. 

And, while this hearing comes in the context of an ongoing dispute, I want to emphasize that we are here today to learn and understand the issues, not to mediate 

them. I would like to thank Congresswoman Barbara Lee for requesting this hearing on an important topic in her district. I am glad that you and Congresswoman 

Woolsey have joined me today. 

Finally, I thank the witnesses for taking time out of their schedule to be here. 

I look forward to everyone’s testimony. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this hearing on this very difficult problem 

that has been posed by the first contract negotiations under current law. We have a lot to learn about the situation in general, but 

also using what is going on right here in our own region as a good 

test case. 

This issue is important to the entire Bay Area; there is no question about it. In fact, we have together and individually met with 

and contacted those involved in the first contract negotiations here 

in our area. I mean, we are not taking this lightly. We know it is 

important. 

It has been 18 months since negotiations began for our first contract between the University of California and the postdoctoral fellows, which are represented by UAW. 

The California Delegation has been urging Mark Yudof, the 

President of the University of California, to reach a first contract 

since May of 2009. When President Yudof and I spoke last summer, 

I urged him to negotiate a contract as soon as possible. I told him 

I had confidence that he would do that because the entire situation 

is just causing disruption instead of going ahead with the important work of the University and our postdocs. 

So, 10 months later it certainly appears that this is not happening. And I would worry that the University is dragging its feet. 

About 10 percent of all postdoctoral scholars in the United States 

work at the University of California; 10 percent. And the research 

work they do has helped this University become a world renown research institution. These 6,000 scholars have helped bring millions 

and millions of dollars in Federal grants and contracts to the University of California from such agencies as the National Institute 

of Health, the National Science Foundation and the Department of 

Energy, among others. And even though the postdocs pay for themselves through these grants, they are underpaid by universities. 

That is why they have banded together in the first place. 

We certainly appreciate the budget constraints the University is 

under. But I do not think it can blamed on the state cutbacks since 

it is a separate situation. In the 18 months it has been negotiating 

the first contract it has not made a convincing case that University 

funds are even impacted by the wages and benefits of postdocs. 

Mr. Duckett is here on behalf of the University. And I am going 

to be very, very interested in what you have to say, Mr. Duckett, 

about the relationship between the University’s budget and re-
5 

search funds. I think we need to know where one starts and the 

other ends. 

I am looking forward to hearing all of you witnesses. You have a lot for us to talk about, and we will learn a lot from you. And 

we have to get involved; we are. We need to evolve this first contract negotiation situation so it actually it becomes meaningful instead of meaningless. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Ms. Woolsey follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Lynn C. Woolsey, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of California 

Thank you Chairman Miller for holding this hearing on the difficulties posed by 

first contract negotiations under current law. 

It has been eighteen (18) months since negotiations began for a first contract between the University of California and the postdoctoral fellows, represented by the 

United Auto Workers (UAW). 

The California delegation has been urging Mark Yudof, president of the University of California, to reach a first contract since May of 2009. 

When President Yudof and I spoke last summer, I urged him to negotiate a contract as soon as possible. 

Some ten months later, it certainly appears that the university is dragging its 

feet. 

About ten percent of all postdoctoral scholars in the United States work at the 

University of California, and the research work they do has helped the university 

become a world-renowned research institution. 

These 6,000 scholars have helped bring millions and millions of dollars in Federal 

grants and contracts to the University of California from such agencies as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department 

of Energy. 

And even though these post-docs pay for themselves through these grants, they 

are underpaid by the university—which is why they banded together in the first 

place. 

We all appreciate the budget constraints the university is under due to state cutbacks, but in the eighteen months it has been negotiating this first contract, it has 

not made a convincing case that university funds are even impacted by the wages 

and benefits of the post-docs. 

Dwaine Duckett is here on behalf of the university, and I will be very interested 

in hearing what he has to say about the relationship between the university’s budget and research funds. 

I am looking forward to hearing the testimony of our other witnesses as well: it 

is time to shine a light on the problems that have evolved with regard to first contract negotiations. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

As I noted earlier, we are holding this hearing on Congresswoman Barbara Lee’s District. And I want to thank her for joining 

us. Her participation, it is not just this hearing but she has been 

involved in this issue for a considerable period of time. And I would 

like now without objection to recognize Congresswoman Lee for 

opening remarks. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. Thank all of you for being here. 

And thank you first, Chairman Miller, for your continued support 

for not only workers, but for students and families that has provided really for the real health care reform, for our student loan 

overhauls, and also for equal pay for equal work. So I appreciate 

your hosting this hearing here. And thank you for your leadership 

on these issues, and so many issues. 

Also let me thank my good friend and colleague, Congresswoman 

Lynn Woolsey who Chairs the Subcommittee on Workforce Protec-
6 

tions. And thank you for being here and for your hard work and 

your leadership each and every day. 

As you know, Congresswoman Woolsey continues to inspire us all 

with her unwavering support for economic justice, security, global 

peace and worker rights and uses her role as Chair of this Subcommittee for these issues. 

I want to thank all of you, all of our witnesses, for being here 

today. 

And I want to thank, again, all of you for coming and not only 

today, but for your diligent work and vision, and commitment to 

workers rights and to equal pay each and every day. 

This is one of the most ethnic, diverse and most progressive Districts in the country. And I am proud to have you here, Chairman 

Miller and Chairwoman Woolsey, to see the richness of the 9th 

Congressional District. 

I am privileged to serve on the Appropriations Committee. I am 

on the Labor Health and Human Services and Education Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 

On this Subcommittee, I have been able to push for what I see 

as equal rights under the law and worker protection, and fair 

wages and equal pay. And so as institutions bring their budget requests to this Subcommittee, that is how I view these requests. 

This is one of the prisms upon which I look at these budget requests. 

So the ability for workers to have a voice in their wages, benefits 

and engagement with management as well as employers to be able 

to maintain fair labor practices without being pushed out of business, this is extremely important as a member of the Appropriations Committee. It is this fine balance that I believe makes the 

collective bargaining process work so well. 

Now given our current financial climate, I believe that we must 

be even more steadfast is pushing for a living wage for all Americans. I just believe that. I have worked to address issues such as 

higher wages and benefits, modern whistleblower protections and 

to push for the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act, thanks 

to Chairman Miller and Chairwoman Woolsey. And I tell you, I 

have to say that I am disappointed to learn that these negotiations 

continue to drag out for such a long period of time. 

Over the years we have fought to protect the rights of employees 

to organize, bargain collectively and to engage in other legally protected activity, and the right to organize a union. 

The right to organize is not limited to Federal workers or the 

automobile industry. It is supposed to be open and available to 

those who fall under the protection of the Public Employment Relations Board as well. And so these scholars, they played by the 

rules. They receive, if you ask me, very low wages for the important work that they do. And they should be treated fairly. 

I am a proud alumnus of the University of California. And for 

the life of me, I really do not understand why my alma mater is 

dragging its feet. And so I look forward to the hearing today. 

Thank you very much for being here. And I look forward to the 

witnesses presenting their testimony. 

Thank you again. 
7 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you very 

much, Barbara. 

I am going to introduce the witnesses in a moment. But first, I 

just want to say that this is an official hearing of the Education 

and Labor Committee, and we are going to conduct it in the manner in which we ordinarily conduct Committees. That is, you may 

hear things that you agree or disagree with, and that is fine. But 

we ask that the hearings not be disrupted. 

I also want to encourage people who are here, many of you are 

involved in this issue, many of you have experienced it from both 

sides. And there will be facts stated and positions stated; if you 

have some expertise, you want to make that available to the Education and Labor Committee, the record will be held open for 

emails, or for letters, or however you want to send it, in what form 

you want to send it to the Education and Labor Committee. And 

we will go about that after the hearing. 

So, thank you again for your attendance and your participation, 

and your interest. 

Our witnesses this morning, we will begin with Dr. Ludmila 

Tyler, who is employed as a postdoctorate researcher at University 

of California at Berkeley since the fall of 2006. Dr. Tyler earned 

her PhD in biology from Duke University. 

Mr. Mike Miller is the international representative of the United 

Auto Workers and is responsible for working with local unions 

throughout Region V of the United Auto Workers. Mr. Miller currently serves as the Chief Union Negotiator for the Postdoctoral 

Scholar Bargaining Unit at the University of California at Berkeley. 

Mr. Dwaine Duckett is the Vice President for Human Resources 

at the University of California at Berkeley. Prior to his tenure at 

UC Berkeley, Mr. Duckett was Vice President for Human Resources Heinz North America and at AT&T Cingular Wireless. 

The Honorable John Burton today is before us as one of California’s most experienced legislative leaders. Congressman Burton 

served as a State Assembly member, member of the U.S. Congress 

and President Pro Tempore of the California State Senate and currently Chairs the California Democratic Party, which makes it difficult for us on this side of the agenda to know whether we call him 

Senator, Assemblyman, Congressman or Chairman. But anyway, 

thank you for your service to the State. 

Mr. Bradley W. Kampas is a partner of the San Francisco office 

of Jackson Lewis. Mr. Kampas practices labor and employment law 

representing and advising employers on labor relations. 

And Dr. John-Paul Ferguson is Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior at Stanford University Graduate School of Business. He is an economic sociologist and has written extensively 

about labor law and trade union formation. 

Dr. Ferguson, welcome to this side of the Bay. 

So welcome, and again thank you for your time and your expertise. 

We have a lighting system in this Committee on those little 

boxes before you on the table. When you begin your testimony, a 

green light will go on. You will have five minutes for your testimony. After four minutes, one minute, an amber light will go on 
8 

and we suggest that you consider wrapping up your testimony. We 

do, however, want you to finish in a manner that you deem coherent and making your final points as you do wrap up. Then there 

will be a red light and we will ask that you stop your testimony 

so we can make sure that we have time, not only to hear from all 

the witnesses but for the questions from the members of the panel. 

Dr. Tyler, we will begin with you. Welcome, and thank you so 

much for being here. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LUDMILA TYLER, POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCHER, PLANT AND MICROBIAL BIOLOGY DEPARTMENT, 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY 

Ms. TYLER. So, good morning, Chairman Miller—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I think we are going to ask 

you to pull that microphone a little closer to you, if you can. 

Ms. TYLER. Certainly. If you cannot hear me at any point, just 

say so. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Ms. TYLER. So, Chairman Miller, Congresswoman Woolsey, Congresswoman Lee, thank you very much for holding this hearing and 

inviting me to testify. 

My name is Ludmila Tyler. I am a postdoctoral researcher in 

Plant and Microbial Biology at UC Berkeley. My research focuses 

on improving plants used to make biofuels. And I am really excited 

about my work and the chance it gives me to contribute to the development of green energy. 

I have been a postdoc at UC Berkeley since the fall of 2006. My 

colleagues and I are dedicated to our work and we are committed 

to being part of the University community. 

We found it necessary to unionize in order to improve our professional lives so that we can better support ourselves and our families. Specifically, we hope to achieve significant, regular and transparent salary increases, longer and more stable appointments, improved health benefits and more family-friendly policies. 

I will try to explain with a few personal examples why these 

changes are so critically important. 

I have two bachelor’s degrees, a Duke University PhD, and threeand-a-half years of experience beyond the PhD. My current salary 

is $37,400 a year. That is the minimum of the UC postdoc pay 

scale in spite of my years of experience. 

Those of you who live in the Bay Area will appreciate it is really 

hard to cover your basic expenses with $37,000 a year. That challenge grows when you have a child. I have an 18 month old son, 

and I do not want my scientific career to be a disadvantage for 

him. 

As a postdoc, I have had appointments of nine months, 11 

months, two months, another nine months and now finally 12 

months. The short duration of these appointments creates tremendous insecurity in my life. I can never predict whether I am going 

to have a job in a few month’s time. 

In fact, after less than two years at Berkeley, I unexpectedly lost 

my job. That was a shock because about a year after I started 

working at UC, my supervisor approved a pay increase for me. A 

pay raise in my department after one year is usually awarded for 
9 

outstanding job performance. Several months later my supervisor 

stated very clearly that there was at least 18 more months of funding for my position. And so we discussed long term project plans. I was hesitant to tell my employer that I was pregnant, but given the positive evaluation and the assurance about funding, I made 

the announcement. Shortly afterwards, my supervisor told me that 

there had been a change. There was no longer funding for my position. She assured me that it had nothing to do with my performance, there was simply no longer funding for me. So, I immediately tried to find out what my options were. What was going to happen to my health insurance, things like that. And 

when I explained the situation to a Berkeley administrator, his response was ‘‘oh, Lord.’’ And then he said ‘‘You should focus on finding another job. Don’t cause trouble.’’ Fortunately, I did find another job. Another lab hired me as a postdoc at UC, but my time off disappeared. And the week I got 

home from the hospital after having my son, it was an emergency 

delivery, the University sent me an email and said ‘‘Your sick leave 

is drastically reduced. Please plan accordingly.’’ I was able to fight that and get my sick leave back. The time off just disappeared. And so did a significant portion of my pay. It is important to note that this statement is not about my pre- vious supervisor, or my department, or even about me. These 

issues of low pay, job insecurity, poor benefits and a lack of familyfriendly policies affect all UC postdocs and they are forcing us to 

ask: Can I afford to continue along this career path? Will I be able 

to support myself and my family? So a first contract will not be a magic fix, I think we all appre- ciate that. But it will be a concrete step in the right direction. So, with that I will say thank you for holding this hearing. Thank you for your interest in UC postdocs. And I would love to 

see the University of California, which has had a first class reputation, live up to that reputation. 

[The statement of Dr. Tyler follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Ludmila Tyler, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Researcher, University of California, Berkeley 

Good morning Chairman Miller, Congresswoman Lee and Congresswoman Wool- sey. Thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting me to testify. My name is 

Ludmila Tyler. I am a postdoctoral researcher in the Plant and Microbial Biology 

Department at UC Berkeley. My research focuses on a grass species, with the goal 

of improving plants used to make biofuels. I am excited about my work and the opportunity to contribute to the development of green energy. I have been a postdoctoral researcher at UC Berkeley since the fall of 2006. My colleagues and I are dedicated to our work and committed to being part of the University community. We have found it necessary to unionize in order to improve our 

working conditions and to create more stability in our postdoctoral appointments. 

Specifically, we hope to achieve significant, regular, and transparent salary increases, so that we can support ourselves and our families; longer and more stable 

appointments, to ensure job security for more than a few months at a time; improved health benefits for ourselves and our families; and more family-friendly policies such as better child-bearing, parental and family leaves. I will try to explain, 

with examples from my own experience, why these changes are critically important 

to postdocs. 

I have two Bachelor’s degrees, a Duke University Ph.D., and three-and-a-half 

years of experience beyond the Ph.D. My current salary is $37,400 per year. Although I have been a postdoc at UC Berkeley for three-and-a-half years, my salary 

only meets the minimum of the UC postdoctoral pay scale. Especially in places like 

the Bay area, where the cost of living is high, it is challenging to cover basic ex-
10 

penses with $37,400 a year. The challenge grows when one is providing for a child. 

I have an 18-month-old son, and I do not want my pursuit of a career in science 

to be a disadvantage for him. 

As a postdoc, I have had appointments of nine months, eleven months, two 

months, another nine months, and now—finally—twelve months. The short-term nature of these appointments creates tremendous insecurity in my life, because I can 

never predict with confidence whether I will have a job in a few months’ time. 

In fact, after less than two years at Berkeley, I unexpectedly lost my job. Approximately a year after I started my first postdoctoral position, my supervisor approved 

a pay increase for me; in my department, a pay raise of this type, i.e. after one year 

instead of two, is generally reserved for outstanding job performance. Several 

months later, my supervisor stated that my position would be funded for at least 

another 18 months, and we discussed correspondingly long-term project plans. I was 

hesitant to tell my employer that I was pregnant, but given her positive evaluation 

of my work and her assurance concerning funding, I made the announcement. 

Shortly thereafter, my supervisor told me that there had been a change: there was 

no longer funding for my position; it would end on the last day of the month (June 

30, 2008). When pressed, my supervisor assured me that the decision had nothing 

to do with my performance, which she maintained was excellent. She said that there 

was simply no longer funding for me. 

I immediately attempted to find out what my options were—for example, what 

would happen to my health insurance. When I explained my situation to an administrator at Berkeley, his response was first ‘‘Oh, lord’’ and then ‘‘You should focus 

on finding another job. Don’t cause trouble. The scientific community is very small, 

and you’re likely to regret it if you burn your bridges.’’ 

Fortunately, the head of another lab hired me as a postdoc, but my accumulated 

time off disappeared and my sick days were drastically reduced. The university informed me of the reduction in sick days the week I came home from the hospital 

and instructed me to ‘‘please plan accordingly.’’ I was able to fight to have the sick 

days reinstated but lost several weeks of time off. Because I could not use the time 

off I had previously saved to cover part of my maternity leave, I lost a significant 

portion of my pay. Changing postdoctoral positions also disrupted my health insurance coverage, causing additional stress. 

When I returned to work after maternity leave, I wanted to continue feeding my 

infant son but, to do so, needed access to a private room. I was given a dusty, vacant 

office with a defective door lock and a glass wall opening into the main administrative office. I had to clean the unused space myself, arrange to have the lock fixed, 

and buy a curtain to cover the glass. 

It is important to note that this statement is not about any one individual. It is 

not about my previous supervisor (to whom I wish only the best) or about a particular administrator or department. It is not even about me. I am here today because the issues of low pay, job insecurity, poor benefits, and a lack of family-friendly policies affect all UC postdocs. The hardships created by these conditions force 

far too many of us to ask: ‘‘Can I afford to continue on this career path? Will I be 

able to support myself? Will I be able to support my family?’’ Each month that UC 

does not agree to a fair contract with the union, these questions persist. 

Postdocs are some of the nation’s best-educated workers. Yet, one of the biggest 

leaks in the scientific pipeline is at the postdoctoral level, particularly for women. 

At a time when the US is trying to improve its global competitiveness, can we really 

afford to have that leak? 

Settling a first union contract will not solve all the problems experienced by 

postdocs. It is not a magic fix. I am, however, hopeful that a union-negotiated contract will prevent many of the regrettable circumstances which currently confront 

UC postdocs and will also provide a mechanism for addressing problems when they 

do occur. A fair contract will be a significant, concrete step in the right direction. 

Thank you very much for taking an interest in University of California postdocs 

and our efforts to improve our professional lives by negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Miller. 
11 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MILLER, INTERNATIONAL 

REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Congresswoman Lee and Congressman Woolsey. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. Thank you for supporting 

scientific research, the University of California and postdoctoral 

scholars. 

My name is Mike Miller. I have been an international representative with the UAW for ten years. I am currently Chief Union Negotiator and bargaining a first contract covering 6,000 postdoctoral 

scholars throughout the UC system. 

I am also a proud alum of UCLA, where I earned a master’s degree in political science, worked as a teaching assistant and helped 

organize the union for 12,000 teaching assistants, readers and tutors at UC statewide. 

The Postdoctoral Scholar bargaining unit was certified in November of 2008. Since then, bargaining has dragged on 56 days without 

settling a contract that as we have heard in Ludmila’s previous testimony, would greatly improve the work lives of such critical and 

deserving employees. 

Based on my experience negotiating contracts with UC, University of Washington, and the California State University, 56 days 

over 18 months greatly exceeds the amount of time needed to settle 

a first contract if the parties want to do so. The evidence here, 

however, suggests that UC does not want to settle the postdoc contract. 

UC’s chief negotiator, Gayle Saxton, and several administrators 

in the UC Office of the President, have repeatedly maintained that 

the California budget crisis prevents UC from agreeing to reasonable salary increases and health benefit improvements for 

postdoctoral scholars. At least three sets of facts, however, undermine UC’s position: 

First, over 90 percent of postdoctoral scholars are compensated 

from research contracts and grants that come from federal sources 

allocated by Congress, not state general funds. UC’s revenue from 

research contracts and grants is growing significantly, increasing 

113 percent since 1997, including a 4.3 percent jump at the height 

of the state budget crises. These funds, moreover, may not legally 

be used to cover losses in state funding and show signs of growing 

even more in the future. 

Second, in February of this year UC agreed to a contract with 

another union representing 10,000 researchers and technicians who 

work side-by-side with and are funded by the very same contracts 

and grants as postdoctoral scholars. This contract includes significant compensation increases in each of the next three years. 

Third, in addition to using the California budget crisis as pretext 

for not settling the postdoc contract, Ms. Saxton also contends that 

the University is philosophically opposed to providing experiencebased pay increases to postdoctoral scholars because they are academic employees who, according to UC, should only be eligible for 

merit not experience-based raises. Yet UC provides experiencebased salary increases to thousands of resident physician whom it 

also classifies as academic employees. 
12 

Moreover, because of the high rate of turnover among 

postdoctoral scholars, who cannot work in this job more than five 

years, establishing a system of experience-based step increases 

would represent a one time, relatively low cost to UC. As UC’s own 

records indicate, 72 percent of postdoctoral scholars already receive 

a salary or stipend which based on their years of experience is at 

or above the rates we are proposing. 

While the union and UC settled nearly 30 issues in the first nine 

months of bargaining, we have not resolved a single issue since October 2009. This hold up is attributable to UC’s delays in responding to the off the record proposals we made in October and what 

UC admitted have been the unreasonable nature of their responses. 

UC has repeatedly delayed providing information we have requested, and then used its own failure to do so as an excuse to 

delay bargaining. 

The claim that one of the most sophisticated research universities in the world lacks the information technology to track its employees is as revealing of UC’s motivation not to reach a contract, 

as it is ridiculous. Such a claim is even more revealing, however, 

when viewed in the context of UC’s efforts to encourage decertification of the UAW. On at least three campuses the UC administration has disseminated a website promoting decertification of the 

UAW and encouraged postdoctoral scholars to review it. 

Moreover, in December of 2009 Ms. Saxton provided a list of 

postdoctoral scholars to an individual seeking to decertify the 

union. While UC is more interested in decertification than 

postdoctoral scholars are, these actions further demonstrate UC’s 

desire to delay or even avoid reaching an agreement on a contract. 

In conclusion, I would like to point out that while the first UAW 

contract for teaching assistants at UC only settled after unfair 

labor practice charges by the union, strikes, intervention by the 

Governor and legislative leaders, and the personal involvement of 

the UC President, the UAW and UC did establish a cooperative 

and productive bargaining relationship for a number of years after 

that. Rather than building on that relationship and bargaining constructively toward an agreement for postdoctoral scholars, however, 

UC appears intent on delaying and derailing bargaining to reach 

this historic first contract. 

UC will hopefully change course, avoid such unnecessary and unproductive acrimony and settle this contract swiftly and equitably. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

[The statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Michael Miller, International Representative 

International Union, UAW 

Good morning Chairman Miller, Congresswoman Lee and Congresswoman Woolsey. Thank you for holding this hearing. Thank you for supporting scientific research, the University of California and Postdoctoral Scholars.1 My name is Mike 

Miller. I have been an International Representative with the UAW for ten years. 

I am currently chief union negotiator in bargaining a first contract covering 6,000 

Postdoctoral Scholars throughout the UC system. I am also a proud alumnus of 

UCLA where I earned a Masters degree in Political Science, worked as a Teaching 

Assistant and helped organize the union for 12,000 Teaching Assistants, Readers 

and Tutors at UC statewide. 

The Postdoctoral Scholar bargaining unit was certified in November 2008. Since 

then, bargaining has dragged on 56 days without settling a contract that, as we 
13 

have heard in previous testimony, would greatly improve the work lives of such critical and deserving employees. 

Several bargaining issues are still pending. Please see Exhibit D. Unfortunately, 

no issues have been resolved since October 2009. 

Based on my experience negotiating contracts with UC, University of Washington, 

and the California State University System, 56 days over 18 months greatly exceeds 

the amount of time needed to settle a first contract if the parties want to do so. 

Negotiations for a first contract for Teaching Assistants at UC took only nine 

months in 1999-2000 during which the Union filed dozens of unfair labor practice 

charges and struck and the Governor as well as Legislative leaders intervened in 

bargaining leading to the direct involvement of the UC President in settlement; the 

first contract for Teaching Assistants at the CSU system took 6 months during 

2004-2005; and the first contract for Teaching and Research Assistants at the University of Washington took only seven weeks in 2004. 

The evidence in the case of Postdoctoral Scholars’ bargaining, however, suggests 

that UC does not want to settle the contract. This is particularly unsettling since, 

after a great deal of struggle and rancor to negotiate the first Teaching Assistant 

contract ten years ago, we established a cooperative and productive bargaining relationship with UC for a number of years. Rather than building on that relationship 

and bargaining constructively toward an agreement for Postdoctoral Scholars, UC 

appears to be trying to delay and derail bargaining. 

UC Using State Budget Crisis as Pretext to Deny Increases 

UC’s chief negotiator, Gayle Saxton, and several administrators in the UC Office 

of the President, have repeatedly maintained that the California state budget crisis 

prevents UC from agreeing to increased salaries or improved health benefits for 

Postdoctoral Scholars. At least three sets of facts undermine UC’s position. 

Postdoctoral Scholars are Paid from Expanding Research Revenue, not Shrinking 

State General Funds 

Over 90 percent of Postdoctoral Scholars are compensated from research contracts 

and grants that come from federal sources allocated by Congress, not state general 

funds.2 Moreover, according to UC’s budget office: ‘‘UC cannot legally transfer funds 

from restricted sources, such as state and federal research grants, and use the 

money to make up for cuts in state funding.’’ 3

These grant and contract revenues that fund Postdoctoral Scholar salaries and 

benefits have also been expanding dramatically in recent years. According to UC’s 

audited financial statements, the University’s overall research contract and grant 

revenue—including federal, state, local and private sources—has more than doubled 

in recent years, growing from $2.2 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $4.7 billion in 2009.4

Even in the midst of California’s current budget crisis, UC’s overall research contract and grant revenue increased 4.3 percent from 2008 to 2009—including a 3.4 

percent expansion of state research funds.5 (See Chart 1) 

Moreover, this increase in research contract and grant revenue only shows signs 

of accelerating in the future. Much of this increase will come from federal sources, 

especially given the recent re-prioritization of science under the Obama administration. The federal government (through agencies such as NIH, NSF, DOE, DOD, and 

NASA) provides by far the largest single portion of UC’s research funding, contributing roughly two-thirds of the University’s overall annual research contract and 

grant dollars, and is especially important to Postdoctoral Scholar positions. (See 

Chart 2) While federal sources are the largest source of UC’s contract and grant revenues, the fact remains that all categories of research contract and grant revenues 

at UC—including from the state of California—have grown significantly in recent 

years and show no sign of waning. 
14 

In fact, a number of the UC campuses have been touting their unprecedented recent growth in contract and grant revenue. UC Davis recently announced, for example, its expectation that it would set a record this year for research revenues and 

underscored the significance of that fact in the context of the current state budget 

crisis. ‘‘Despite the difficult budget situation, UC Davis is on a steep upward 

curve—doubling our research income in less than a decade,’’ says UC Davis Chancellor Linda Katehi. Similarly, UCLA recently announced that its research operations were bringing in a record-setting $4 million per day so far in fiscal year 

2010.6

This growth in contract and grant revenue at UC should only make easier UC’s 

existing capacity to provide economic improvements for Postdoctoral Scholars. ‘‘The 

University has the capacity within its research budgets to agree to fair salary increases,’’ notes Norman Ellstrand, Professor of Genetics at the University of California, Riverside and recent recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship. ‘‘Funding agen-
15 

cies, as well as the University administrators who oversee grant proposals, expect 

that grant budgets include salary increases each year and budget accordingly. Given 

these facts, and the tremendous value Postdoctoral Scholars bring to the institution, 

the University’s bargaining team should be able to reach an agreement with fair 

wage increases and benefits quickly.’’ 7

UC Has Agreed to Substantial Compensation Increases with Similar Employees 

Second, in February of this year, UC agreed to a contract with another union representing nearly 10,000 Researchers and Technicians on a contract that includes 

significant compensation increases in each of the next three years.8

In the agreement with UPTE-CWA, UC will provide Staff Research Associates 

and Technicians a $1,000 lump sum for the 2009-10 year, and combined general and 

step increases of 4.5 percent, 5 percent, and 5 percent in fiscal years 2010-11, 2011- 

12, and 2012-13, respectively, a 15.2 percent compound increase.9 Not only do these 

researchers and technicians work side-by-side with Postdoctoral Scholars, but they 

are also funded by the same contracts and grants. 

UC has also agreed to provide substantial increases to Resident Physicians over 

the next few years. Resident Physicians will receive combined general and step increases of 6.0 percent to 7.9 percent in each fiscal year, 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011- 

12.10

UC ‘‘Philosophically Opposed’’ to Experience-Based Pay Increases for Postdoctoral 

Scholars 

In addition to using the California budget crisis as pretext for not settling the 

Postdoctoral Scholar contract, Ms. Saxton contends that the University is ‘‘philosophically opposed’’ to providing experience-based pay increases to Postdoctoral 

Scholars because they are ‘‘academic’’ employees who, according to UC, should only 

be eligible for merit-based raises. Yet, UC pays thousands of Resident Physicians, 

whom it also classifies as academic employees and who have similar levels of education and training, experience-based salary increases every year. 

Additionally, the NIH, the agency providing the single largest source of federal 

funding for research grants to UC sees fit to reward its own NIH Postdoctoral Fellows with experience-based step increases. The NIH Kirchstein program, one of the 

most academically prestigious in the world, ensures that Postdoctoral Scholars on 

this fellowship receive annual experience-based step increases to recognize and reward their experience level. Pursuant to NIH regulations, UC already applies these 

increases to the 400-500 Kirchstein Postdoctoral Fellows who are part of the UAW 

bargaining unit.11 A number of departments and labs at UC also follow this standard already for non-NIH Kirchstein Postdoctoral Scholars to track the national 

standard.12

Moreover, because of the high rate of turnover among Postdoctoral Scholars (who 

cannot work in this job more than five years), establishing a system of experiencebased step increases would represent a one-time, relatively-low cost to UC. As UC’s 

own records indicate, 72 percent of Postdoctoral Scholars already receive a salary 

or stipend at or above the rate we are proposing, based on years of experience.13

Delaying Bargaining by Hiding Behind UC’s Own Alleged Inability to Provide Information 

UC has repeatedly delayed providing information we have requested and then 

used its own failure to provide the information as an excuse to delay bargaining. 

Relevant to the outstanding bargaining topics, we have requested information regarding historical salary/stipend rates, source of stipend, salary/stipend increases 

and the reasons for those increases, years worked as a Postdoctoral Scholar, the 

number of Postdoctoral Scholars laid off in recent years, examples of and information regarding grants and contracts, health insurance premium information for Fellows and Paid Directs. As of yet, we have only received a tiny fraction of the information requested.14

The claim that one of the most sophisticated research universities in the world 

lacks the information technology to track its employees is as revealing of UC’s motivation not to reach agreement as it is ridiculous. 

As an example, on April 15, 2010, UC for the first time asserted that there were 

alleged restrictions from funding sources of a small fraction of Postdoctoral Scholars—those in the Postdoctoral Scholars—Fellow and Postdoctoral Scholars—Paid Direct titles—that prevent UC from agreeing to salary increases and health benefit 

improvements in 2010 as well as any salary increases and health benefit improvements in any subsequent year of a contract. 

When pressed for the number of Postdoctoral Scholars whose funding source may 

pose such a problem or the cost of the alleged liability for UC, Ms. Saxton stated 

that she does not and cannot know because UC does not keep track of this informa-
16 

tion in any centralized way. Ms. Saxton also has not produced a single agreement 

with a funding agency that contains the restrictions she alleges prevent increases 

in salary and benefits. But, most ridiculous of all and clearly reflecting their strategy of delay, when UC proposed the next day that we postpone bargaining salaries 

and benefits for future years to October 2010, they also proposed a one-time acrossthe-board 1.5 percent increase for all Postdoctoral Scholars in July 2010—completely 

contrary to Ms. Saxton’s claim about restrictions on salary increases. This contradictory position suggests very strongly that UC’s alleged inability to provide information is simply pretext for not reaching agreement for as long as possible. 

UC Wasting Valuable Public Resources Avoiding a Contract 

The use of University resources—whether from the $825 million UC received last 

year in Facilities and Administration costs from grants and contracts, general funds, 

or tuition revenues—to engage in these delays has not gone unnoticed. ‘‘We have 

been watching these negotiations for roughly 15 months now and are disappointed 

to see UC once again continuing its pattern of dragging out negotiations for as long 

as possible,’’ says Victor Sanchez, President of the University of California Student 

Association, representing over 200,000 students across the UC system, ‘‘especially 

since some part of our rapidly increasing tuition and fees goes to pay the administrators in charge of these negotiations.’’ 15

Rather than settle a multi-year contract with reasonable salary increases and 

benefits each year, UC is proposing to bargain over salary and benefits in October 

2010 and each subsequent October if no multi-year agreement can be reached. Unnecessarily prolonged bargaining wastes resources. 

Attempting to Support Decertification Effort 

On at least three campuses, the UC administration has disseminated a website 

promoting decertification of the UAW and encouraged Postdoctoral Scholars to review it. Moreover, in December 2009, Ms. Saxton provided a list of Postdoctoral 

Scholars to an individual seeking to decertify the Union. 

On December 10, 2009, in a UC San Francisco Academic Senate Graduate Council 

meeting at which Postdoctoral Scholars were present, a University administrator 

discussed positively as an ‘‘item of interest’’ and provided the address for the 

website advocating decertification of the UAW while giving a report on the ongoing 

negotiations. A University bargaining team representative was in attendance and 

made no efforts to stop the administrator from providing this report and the 

website. 

While UC is clearly more interested in decertification than are Postdoctoral Scholars, these actions further demonstrate UC’s desire to delay reaching agreement on 

a contract. 

Conclusion 

From the evidence presented emerges a pattern of delay and obstruction by UC 

with the apparent goal of stalling and/or avoiding all together a collective bargaining agreement that would significantly improve the lives of the 6,000 

Postdoctoral Scholars who make UC such a great research University. The first 

Teaching Assistant contract and the most recent Researcher and Technician contract only settled after unfair labor practices and strikes and we’d like to avoid that. 

UC will hopefully change this pattern, avoid such unnecessary and unproductive 

acrimony and settle this contract swiftly and equitably. 

EXHIBIT A: TESTIMONY OF NORMAN ELLSTRAND

I am Norman Ellstrand, Professor of Genetics at the University of California, Riverside, and recent recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship. I have been a UC faculty 

member for three decades and have employed a several Postdoctorals over those 

years, in addition to other researchers and graduate students. 

Postdocs have been critical to my research projects. The Postdoctoral scientists 

that I have hired have conducted research that has lead to many of the key publications of my career. And many of those scientists have gone on to become research 

leaders elsewhere. For example, my first three postdocs are now faculty at University of New Mexico, University of Pittsburgh, and University of Washington at Seattle. 

Thus, I am well-aware that postdocs play a crucial role both in maintaining UC’s 

reputation as a world leader in innovative research and in generating the science 

that propels UC’s continually expanding research budget. Postdocs not only perform 

the research for existing grant projects, but they also do much of the work in developing new projects and grant proposals. 
17 

The University has the capacity within its research budgets to agree to fair salary 

increases. Funding agencies, as well as the University administrators who oversee 

grant proposals, expect that grant budgets include salary increases each year and 

budget accordingly. Given these facts, and the tremendous value Postdoctoral Scholars bring to the institution, the University’s bargaining team should be able to reach 

an agreement with fair wage increases and benefits quickly. 

EXHIBIT B: TESTIMONY OF ROBERT DUDLEY

My name is Robert Dudley. I am a Professor of Integrative Biology at the University of California, Berkeley. I have been at UC Berkeley since 2003. My research 

focuses on the mechanics and evolution of animal flight, particularly in insects and 

hummingbirds. 

The Berkeley campus and UC generally are the envy of the world when it comes 

to higher education and scientific research. Postdocs are a critical component of our 

world-renowned research programs. 

As faculty, it is in our own best interests to advocate on behalf of Postdocs. Improving working conditions for Postdocs enhances our overall research capacity and 

helps us to attract and retain the scientific prowess necessary to maintain our academic reputation. 

What is also at stake is the preeminent position of the United States in scientific 

progress and technological innovation. Post-WWII US economic and scientific 

progress has derived substantially from our ability to attract the best workers and 

researchers from around the nation and the globe. To this end, improved 

postdoctoral support must be an integral component of ongoing efforts to maintain 

the nation’s scientific and engineering infrastructure. 

EXHIBIT C: TESTIMONY OF VICTOR SANCHEZ

My name is Victor Sanchez. I am the President of the University of California 

Student Association, representing over 200,000 students across the UC system. We 

have been watching these negotiations for roughly 15 months now and are disappointed to see UC once again continuing its pattern of dragging out negotiations 

for as long as possible, especially since some part of our rapidly increasing tuition 

and fees goes to pay the administrators in charge of these negotiations. Postdocs do 

much of the work that makes UC such a premiere research institution and, as such, 

they deserve a fair contract. The thousands of undergraduates who work in the labs 

on campus benefit tremendously from the supervision and mentoring of Postdocs. 

These undergraduates are the potential Postdocs of tomorrow, but watching how UC 

is approaching these negotiations will make many of them question whether or not 

to go into science as a career after graduating. 

EXHIBIT D: OUTSTANDING BARGAINING TOPICS 

UAW PROPOSALS UC PROPOSALS 

HEALTH INSURANCE 

Lower costs and improved coverage for healthcare No Improvements to health insurance 

• Maintain percent of premiums paid by Postdocs (like UC 

is doing for other staff plans at UC) and ensure paid coverage for all Postdocs; improve preventive coverage (which 

may well reduce UC’s long term costs) and reduce annual 

out-of-pocket costs 

• Maintain benefits and premium structure for 2010 

(meaning Fellows and Paid Directs have no guarantee of 

paid health insurance) 

• Wait until October 2010 to negotiate health insurance 

benefits for future years 

SALARIES 

Salary increases consistent with funding agency standards Meaningful increases postponed 

• $1,000 lump sum for 2009 

• General Range adjustment of 4 percent upon ratification 

and each October1 after 2010 

• Experience-based increases based on NIH Kirchstein program 

• One-time 1.5 percent across-the-board increase in 2010 

• No experience-based increases 

• Wait until October 2010 to negotiate any future increases 

APPOINTMENT LENGTH/SECURITY 

• Postdocs shall have 5-year appointments 

• UC pays health insurance for six months before COBRA 

begins 

• Postdoc appointments will normally be one year 

• COBRA begins at layoff 

NO STRIKES 

Postdocs have same rights as Teaching Assistants Postdocs have fewer rights than Teaching Assistants 
18 

EXHIBIT D: OUTSTANDING BARGAINING TOPICS—Continued 

UAW PROPOSALS UC PROPOSALS 

• Protect right of individual Postdocs to exercise their conscience in support of other employees’ strikes • Deny the right of individual Postdocs to exercise their 

conscience in support of other employees’ strikes 

EXHIBIT E
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 

EXHIBIT F: TESTIMONY OF STANTON GLANTZ

My name is Stanton Glantz. I am a Professor of Medicine and American Legacy 

Foundation Distinguished Professor in Tobacco Control at UC San Francisco, since 

I joined the faculty in 1977 following a postdoctoral fellowship here from 1975-7. I 

am also a member of the UCSF Cardiovascular Research Institute, Institute for 

Health Policy Studies and co-director of the UCSF Comprehensive Cancer Center 

Tobacco Program. I have enjoyed strong research support from both the National 

Institutes of Health as well as state agencies and foundations. I am also a past chair 

of the University of California Systemwide Committee on Planning and Budget and 

am familiar with a broad range of financial issues facing the University of California and higher education in general. 

During my time at UCSF, I have also supervised dozens of researchers, including 

Postdoctoral Scholars, working on numerous projects in my areas of specialty, cardiovascular research and tobacco control. I am the program director for a 

postdoctoral training program in tobacco control currently funded by the National 

Cancer Institute. 
36 

UC San Francisco is a world-class research university. In fiscal year 2009, for ex- ample, UCSF won more National Institutes of Health research grant money than 

any other public institution in the nation. As a whole, the University of California 

system has been a world leader in research and scientific innovation for decades. Postdoctoral Scholars play a central role in making UC such a top-notch research institution, working on topics ranging from heart and cancer research to public policy issues surrounding health care reform to climate change. They do much of the 

day-to-day work on our cutting-edge research projects happening and are the source 

of some of our best and most innovative ideas. Postdoctoral scholars also help train 

graduate and undergraduate student researchers, and contribute to writing the 

grant proposals that continue to generate UC’s robust research revenues. Without 

Postdoctoral Scholars, UC would not be the world-class research university it is. 

A world-class research university such as UC needs to pay stipends and salaries 

to the researchers that match the quality of the pivotal work they do. UC’s salaries 

tend to be low, so I am confident that funding agencies (who pay the great majority 

of stipends and salaries for Postdoctoral Scholars) would approve research grant 

budgets that include fair increases in salaries and benefits to these front-line researchers as long as they are approved by the University. The granting agencies expect these costs; indeed, the University will not permit faculty to submit grants unless the budgets allow for anticipated increases in salaries and benefits. 

Not only does UC have the capacity to agree to fair increases for Postdoctoral 

Scholars, but it is also critical to establish and maintain competitive salaries and 

benefits that will attract the best and brightest researchers to UC and help us continue to be a world leader in the realm of science. 

ENDNOTES

1 UC received $2.98 billion in grants and contracts from federal sources in fiscal year 2009. 

See UC Consolidated Audited Annual Financial Reports, available at http:// 

www.universityofcalifornia.edu/reportingtransparency/. Also see Chart 1. 2While UC receives research funding from a variety of sources, and although UC says exact 

numbers are unavailable, UAW and UC have discussed in bargaining that federal grants and 

contracts fund roughly 90 percent of UC’s Postdoctoral Scholar appointments (See Chart 2). 3See ‘‘How the Budget Works,’’ on the University of California Budget News webpage, which 

can be viewed at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/budget/?page—id=1120) 4See UC Consolidated Audited Annual Financial Reports, available at, http:// 

www.universityofcalifornia.edu/reportingtransparency/. 5 Ibid. 

6For UC Davis, see ‘‘Research funds hit new high, top half-billion dollars,’’ at http:// 

www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/22536. For UCLA, see ‘‘UCLA researchers bring in 

$4M a day in research contracts, grants,’’ at http://www.today.ucla.edu/portal/ut/researchersbring-in-4m-a-day-111993.aspx. 7See Exhibit A, Statement from Professor Norman Ellstrand. 

8See http://www.upte.org/rx-tx/ulp/index.html for UPTE-CWA’s description of charges filed 

prior to their one-day ULP strike on September 24, 2009. For a description of the labor board’s 

response to the charges, see UPT-CWA’s January 2010 newsletter at http://www.upte.org/rxtx/01-10CAW.pdf. For examples of UPTE-CWA’s public relations campaign against UC, see 

http://www.upte.org/rx-tx/execpay.pdf or http://www.peopleorprofit.org/. 9See http://www.upte.org/publication-ebulletin/2010-02-19.html for a summary; and see the contract at http://www.ucop.edu/atyourservice/employees/policies—employee—labor—relations/collective—bargaining—units/technical—tx/contract—articles/tx—contract— 

0410draft.pdf. 10The Resident Physician contract can be viewed at http://www.ucop.edu/atyourservice/employees/policies—employee—labor—relations/local—agreements/ucsd/SDHSA—MOU-Final-09- 

12.pdf. See http://meded.ucsd.edu/assets/6/File/housestaff/Salary percent20Scale percent2009- 

10 percent20& percent2010-11.pdf for their salary scales that will take effect July 1, 2010. Salary scale changes that took effect on July 1, 2009, can be viewed at http://www.ucop.edu/ 

acadadv/acadpers/0910/table22.pdf. 11While UC has not provided specific information on stipend source for Postdoctoral Scholars, 

they have communicated in bargaining that roughly 400-500 NIH Kirchstein Fellows are currently working at UC. 12See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-10-047.html for the NIH 

Kirchstein stipend scale based on years of experience as a Postdoctoral Scholar. 13 According to a costing document from April 2009 payroll records that UC provided to the 

Union, 4,029 of the 5,578 individuals were paid at least the equivalent of what they would make 

on an NIH fellowship 14The Union requested these items starting on December 19, 2008, and continuing on February 6, 2009, March 10, 2009, April 17, 2009, July 17, 2009, August 26, 2009, March 17, 2010, 

and April 20, 2010. More specifically, starting on December 19, 2008, and numerous times since 

then, the UAW has requested source of stipend for each Postdoctoral Scholar, which UC has 

yet to provide. The Postdoctoral Scholars Saxton now says may pose a problem are all in the 

Fellow or Paid Direct titles, which receive a fellowship stipend rather than a salary. As of July 

17, 2009, we also requested a number of pieces of information regarding Fellows and Paid Directs, including, but not limited to: any agreements between funding agencies and the Univer-
37 

sity regarding Fellows or Paid Directs (including those referenced in the University’s September 

5, 2008, letter to PERB (See Exhibit E) as the basis for arguing to include Paid Directs in the 

bargaining unit), description of how the University determines the overall stipend/salary rate 

for Fellows and Paid Directs, and a description of the process for setting up the appointment 

at the University. 15While the claim that UC lacks the information technology to track its employees seems implausible, credulity is strained even further by the fact that last year alone UC received $825 

million in Facilities & Administration (F & A) costs from grants and contracts. F & A costs are 

recovered by UC as a percentage of every dollar awarded by a granting agency for the direct 

costs—salaries, benefits, etc.—of performing the research project. For federal grants and contracts at UC, for example, UC receives roughly 53 percent, or an additional 53 cents spent on 

every dollar of research. One of the main purposes of this money is, according to the NIH, to 

pay for ‘‘indirect costs associated with the overall management of an organization, e.g., President’s Office, Human Resources Office, Accounting Office, office supplies, etc.’’ See http:// 

oamp.od.nih.gov/dfas/faqIndirectCosts.asp#difference. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller, if you would pass the microphone over to Mr. 

Duckett. 

Mr. Duckett. 

STATEMENT OF DWAINE DUCKETT, VICE PRESIDENT OF 

HUMAN RESOURCES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE 

OF THE PRESENT 

Mr. DUCKETT. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, members of Congress and the Committee. I’m 

Dwaine Duckett, Vice President of Human Resources for the University of California. 

Thank you for this opportunity to talk on this topic, and your interest. 

We are pleased to be here today to talk about the collective bargaining process between the University and the UAW postdoctorate 

scholars. 

I want to point out that the University has a solid track record 

that might get alluded to a little bit earlier, of concluding first 

party contracts. An unbroken line of successful negotiations over a 

quarter of a century. There is no reason to believe that the postdoc 

negotiations with the UAW will be any different this time. 

In the public employment context that we have if the parties 

don’t reach an agreement, the state law here directs a mediation 

and an impasse process that both sides have sought to avoid thus 

far. This negotiation is a proceeding in accordance with prior university first party negotiations and, we have reached agreement on 

29 of 35 articles during the period of time that negotiations have 

gone on. 

We are currently bargaining a handful of issues that remain. 

They are difficult issues that remain, but none are outside of the 

normal bargaining process. 

Rest assured that we have an interest in making sure that this 

contract gets settled also. A settlement provided the University 

with certainty, stability, predictability and labor peace due to the 

enactment of grievance and arbitration processes to resolve issues. 

And the state law backstops this process where bargaining reaches 

impasse, as I mentioned before. 

On terms of talking about state funds, they do not in and of 

themselves basically influence the negotiations. The primary issues 

that make this process long and difficult have to do with the na-
38 

ture of this particular bargaining unit and what is at stake for both 

sides if we do not get this right. 

Let me talk a little bit about the complexity of negotiations. I 

know that the first negotiation is the hardest. And this is a diverse 

group with a variety of unique job descriptions ranging from some 

of the items that Dr. Tyler works on to things like examining 

manuscripts, working on nuclear energy, et cetera. So none of these 

jobs are the same in and of themselves. This creates a complexity 

in the bargaining that does not exist with other units in private industry and even at UC. 

These postdoctoral scholars, as another complication, come from 

all over the world to complete their training and research. They 

usually stay for a short period of time. And for example, they work 

on a staggering array of projects like I talked about earlier. 

Funding comes from a variety of different sources, including federal contracts, grants and grants from state and foreign governments as well as private sources. These are all regulated differently. 

It is difficult to implement a across the board wage increases, 

which is one of our biggest remaining bargain articles that the 

UAW has asked for. Fund resources restrict how these funds are 

spent. 

For example, this means that a faculty advisor with fellows 

working in her lab but not directly on the research for her work, 

cannot use particular grant money to pay an increase for a 

postdoctoral scholar. What’s at stake here is that if we miscalculate 

or fail to account for each funding scenario that exists for each 

postdoc, there is no direct funding source for compensation increases except through the core University budget, which has been 

severely impacted by the loss of millions of dollars in state funding. 

As you can see, the unique characteristics of this group also 

means that we cannot just import language from other contracts to 

expedite the process. But despite these complexities and challenges, we have made great progress. 

There are existing complexities when you talk about the difference between national labor law and HEERA, which governs 

these particular proceedings. Bargaining at the University is different than it is in the private sector because we are subject to 

these state laws and not the National Labor Relations Act. 

There is an incentive for both sides to settle. And fair mediator 

opinions usually have provisions within all of them that both sides 

could find particularly unattractive. Thus far, both sides have 

sought to avoid getting into a situation where we are at impasse. 

If the mediator cannot settle a contract, the neutral fact finders 

assigned conducts the investigator and renders a recommendation 

about consensual settlement. 

As mentioned, we’ve come to agreement on 29 of 35 issues to 

date, and hopeful that we can reach agreement without needing to 

consider HEERA’s impasse procedures. We are confident that in 

the spirit of negotiation that we showed in the past, and continuing 

to bargain in good faith, that we will do so. 

We have a history of collective bargaining success, and we have 

consistently been able to do this. Our optimism arises out of existing long-standing relationship s with the UAW, of which Mike al-
39 

1 California Government Code sec. 3560-3599 

luded to a little bit earlier, in that they have represented our graduate students for over ten years. We have negotiated a first contract with them successfully in multiple successor agreements. We have also had a track record that makes it very clear that we have bargained in good faith and that these successor agreements have been executed, for the most part, without any major 

hiccups. 

Adding to our complexity, we have 13 system-wide and 12 local unions. They represent over 78,000 of our employees and we reach 

successful agreements with each of those when we are called upon 

to do so. 

Although this has been slow going for both sides, in every case we have completed negotiations and reached fair first contracts. We look at the glass being 80 percent full in this case. We want to push to close the remaining issues. UC will do everything it responsibly can to reach an agreement with the UAW that meets the 

needs of both the University and the postdoctoral scholars. In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here to share the University’s perspective on the complex nature 

of these proceedings and these groundbreaking deliberations. We 

hope this gives you and the Committee insight to help you guide 

policy decisions that you alluded to earlier, and again, we thank 

you for the opportunity to be here. [The statement of Mr. Duckett follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Dwaine Duckett, Vice President of 

Human Resources, University of California, Office of the President 

Mr. Chairman, and members of Congress, I am Dwaine Duckett, Vice President of Human Resources at the University of California. I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss the collective bargaining process to date between the University and the 

United Auto Workers union, which represents Postdoctoral Scholars at the University. With me today is Gayle Saxton, Director of Labor Relations, who is responsible 

for executing the collective bargaining negotiations at the University. She is also the 

University’s chief negotiator in the negotiations with the UAW for the Postdoctoral 

Scholars unit. 

The University and the UAW have made great progress in these negotiations. At this point, we have resolved 29 articles, ranging from union security to professional 

development and time off work. There are six articles outstanding including appointments, benefits, compensation, duration of agreement, layoff, and strikes. 

These are key issues to be resolved, but we feel confident in each side’s commitment 

to good faith bargaining and desire to reach agreement. We will continue to work 

hard to reach an agreement that meets the needs of both the University and the 

Postdoctoral Scholars. 

Before discussing the details of these negotiations, I would like to provide some background information about the University and its collective bargaining history. 

I believe this information provides important context for understanding the negotiations between the University and the UAW. 

The University of California consists of ten campuses and five medical centers, 

and is involved in the management of three national laboratories on behalf of the 

federal government. The UC system includes more than 220,000 students and employs more than 135,000 faculty and staff. In fact, the University is one of the State 

of California’s largest employers. 

The National Labor Relations Act of 1934 regulates private sector employer-employee relations and exempts government employers. Like many states, California 

has adopted its own labor laws for public sector employers. The University of California, as a higher education employer, is governed by California’s Higher Education 

Employment Relations Act, or HEERA.1 HEERA guarantees employee rights related 

to joining and participating in employee organizations, and requires employers and 

employee organizations to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and other terms 
40 

2 California Government Code sec. 3565, 3567 

3 California Government Code sec. 3563-3563.3 

4 California Government Code sec. 3590-3594 

and conditions of employment.2 California’s Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) enforces and administers HEERA.3

Although many similarities exist between the National Labor Relations Act and HEERA, there are some significant differences as well, particularly in the area of 

resolving bargaining impasses. Under HEERA, once the parties reach an impasse 

in bargaining, PERB appoints a mediator. If mediation does not result in a settlement, then the impasse may be referred to a fact-finding panel that may conduct 

hearings and investigations, make findings of fact, and issue advisory recommendations regarding potential settlement terms.4 Impasse resolution procedures are not 

complete until the parties have considered the fact-finding report in good faith. Impasse under HEERA is a continuation of dispute resolution efforts. Under the statutory timeframes built into HEERA, the impasse procedures usually take a minimum 

of two months’ time to complete, and occur only after the parties have engaged in 

a robust bargaining process and concluded that further meetings would be futile. 

We have not reached impasse in the negotiations involving the Postdoctoral Scholars, and we hope to avoid impasse and work toward our goal of a settled contract. In the 30 years since HEERA’s passage, the University of California has recog- nized a number of different unions as the exclusive representative of thousands of 

University employees. Currently, the University has 13 system-wide bargaining 

units covering 78,000 employees as well as a number of local bargaining units at 

each location covering, for example, employees in the skilled crafts. The University 

entered into its first collective bargaining agreement in 1984, and has successfully 

negotiated many agreements with its unions since that time. In every case involving 

first contracts, the University has a track record of completing negotiations and 

reaching agreement with the union. We are optimistic about our ability and committed to reaching agreement in these initial negotiations with the UAW for the 

Postdoctoral Scholar unit. 

The University and the UAW already have a long-standing and positive relation- ship as a result of the UAW’s representation of many of the University’s graduate 

students. The UAW became the exclusive representative for the graduate student 

bargaining unit in 1999. The University and the UAW completed their negotiations 

for an initial contract in 2000 after more than a year of bargaining, and have bargained two successor agreements since that time. The UAW initially sought to represent the Postdoctoral Scholars in 2006, but withdrew its petition for recognition. It filed another petition with PERB in 2008. 

Following the submission of valid authorization cards, PERB certified the UAW as 

the exclusive representative on October 30, 2008. Formal negotiations began in February 2009. The University of California is one of the world’s preeminent public research uni- versity systems, and Postdoctoral Scholars are important contributors to the research enterprise. Postdoctoral Scholars hold temporary appointments, usually lasting one to three years, which are designed to give them opportunities to conduct 

research under the guidance of faculty mentors. The University limits the time in 

the Postdoctoral Scholar title to five years, which follows the nationwide standard. 

The time spent as a Postdoctoral Scholar is in preparation for career progression 

in academe, industry, government, or the nonprofit sector. For many, especially 

those in the physical and life sciences, Postdoctoral Scholar work is a critical step 

in securing future employment. All Postdoctoral Scholars must have a doctoral-level 

degree. The University has approximately 6,500 Postdoctoral Scholars in three different titles, each of which is exclusively represented by the UAW. The difference in titles 

arises primarily from their source of funding. • The first category is an Employee Postdoctoral Scholar, which is a person who receives funding from a University source that provides discretionary funds in support of the training of Postdoctoral Scholars, or from an agency that requires or permits the person to be a University employee. The majority of Employee Postdoctoral 

Scholars are funded through federal contracts and grants such as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy. 

Other sources include the State of California, private grants and private foundations. The Employee Postdoctoral Scholar is paid through the University payroll system. About 77% of the bargaining unit are in the Employee title. 

• The second type of Postdoctoral Scholar is a Fellow. Fellows have been awarded 

funding by an extramural agency and the funding, which flows thorough the University, is paid as a stipend rather than as pay. Many of these awards carry restric-
41 

5Some of the representative agencies currently supporting Paid Direct Postdoctoral Scholars 

at the University include the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the Hewitt Foundation, the 

Japan Society for Promotion of Science, European Molecular Biology Organization, Wellcome 

Trust, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council for Canada, and the China Scholarship Council. 6The University has lost millions of dollars of funding from the State of California, which loss 

has required measures such as furloughs and salary reductions for large segments of its workforce. These furloughs and salary reductions did not apply to the Postdoctoral Scholars. 

tions about the Fellow holding appointments supported from other fund sources. 

The majority of Fellows in the life sciences are supported by NIH funds, although 

other sources of support for non-life science Fellows include private grants or other 

private sources. 

• The third type of Postdoctoral Scholar is known as a Paid Direct. Paid Directs 

receive funding from an extramural agency or country, which pays the funding directly to the scholar rather than through the University.5 The funding/payment does 

not flow through the UC system and cannot be tracked by the University. 

Postdoctoral Scholars must publish and participate in the research enterprise of 

the University. Postdoctoral Scholars come from all over the world to engage in research under the direction of faculty advisors. The faculty advisor is the Principal 

Investigator (PI) on the grant, runs the laboratory or research project where the 

Postdoctoral Scholar pursues his or her research, and assumes responsibility for the 

conduct of the approved funded research. In some cases, the University selects the 

Postdoctoral Scholar to support the research conducted by the faculty advisor because the person’s skills and areas of expertise benefit the University’s research. In 

some cases, Fellows and Paid Directs seek out positions at the University to work 

with particular faculty advisors. These Fellows and Paid Directs are often funded 

from sources different than those administered by their PI, and may or may not 

work directly on the research funded by the PI’s grant. 

Ongoing across-the-board approaches for Postdoctoral Scholar salary increases are 

difficult, in part because many Postdoctoral Scholars have different sources of funding throughout their term at the University. For example, a Postdoctoral Scholar 

may be appointed as an Employee Postdoctoral Scholar one quarter, and a Fellow 

the next. In some cases, a person may have a dual appointment as a Paid Direct 

and an Employee Postdoctoral Scholar. Salaries for Fellows and Paid Directs are set 

by the funding agency. Fund sources often place restrictions on how funds are spent. 

• For example, grants awarded by the federal government will only allow that 

grant’s funding to be spent on research directly related to the grant. Because grant 

funding cannot be moved between research projects, federal funds cannot be pooled 

to provide across-the-board salary increases in a case where a particular grant may 

not have sufficient funds available for that purpose. 

• Most of the training grants that fund research through the PIs (generally funding Postdoctoral Scholars in the ‘‘Employee’’ title, or research to which no 

Postdoctoral Scholar is assigned) require that the grant funds be spent only on research and materials directly associated with the research funded by that grant. 

Thus, a PI who has two Fellows working in her or his laboratory but not directly 

on the research for which the grant was issued cannot use her/his grant money to 

fund a wage increase for the Fellows. 

• Some fellowships disallow the use of use of federal funds to supplement the fellowship. As such, other fund sources, such as University or State of California 

funds, must be found for such supplementation. As we know, both the University 

of California and the State have a significant budgetary shortfall, and such funds 

are not available.6

Proposals on wages also pose a significant risk to the University if a type of increase is disallowed under a certain type of grant/funding arrangement. Any shortfalls would be covered by state funds that are scarce and shrinking. 

The different categories of Postdoctoral Scholars, the incredible diversity of discipline-specific research projects, the wide variety of funding sources, the external 

restrictions on many of the fund sources, and the fact that almost all Postdoctoral 

Scholars have a different faculty advisor, create a level of complexity in the negotiations between the UAW and the University that is unique to this bargaining unit. 

This complexity has required a commitment by both sides to learn about and understand the Postdoctoral Scholar relationship with the University, the limitations 

placed upon the advisor/Principal Investigator, the differences within the 

Postdoctoral Scholar unit, and the differences between Postdoctoral Scholars and 

graduate students who are already represented by the UAW. Both bargaining teams 

rose to this challenge admirably, engaging in detailed discussions, analysis and 

evaluation of the issues presented. 
42 

In spite of the enormous learning curve we all confronted, the negotiations pro- ceeded at a brisk and productive pace. The University and the UAW met often, typically for two to three days at a time, and at regular intervals of approximately twice 

a month or more. From the early stages of negotiations, we engaged in open and 

often lengthy discussion of the reasons behind the proposals being made by both 

parties, and demonstrated flexibility in addressing each others’ concerns. The University and the UAW have successfully negotiated all but six of what will be 35 separate articles. The remaining articles are Wages, Benefits, Appointments, Layoff, No 

Strikes, and Duration. 

Some of the issues required solutions unique in the bargaining environment. One example pertains to the issue of ‘‘time worked and time off.’’ In most labor agreements, these provisions are fairly standard. However, Postdoctoral Scholars are not 

only professionals exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act overtime requirements, 

but they are also individuals who come to this University (and any other University) 

with the objective of obtaining as much knowledge and completing complicated research as soon as possible in order to move on to other—permanent—employment. 

As a result, the parties had to move away from ‘‘normal’’ hours of work rules. We 

worked collaboratively to incorporate language that acknowledges the over-40 hours 

per week research standard and also protects the Postdoctoral Scholar against 

abuse. 

In these negotiations, each party also had issues of critical importance that re- quired flexibility and a willingness to compromise. • One critical issue for the UAW was the matter of union security. Under HEERA, represented employees who are not active union members must pay a fair 

share fee to the union, and the University must deduct that fee from the employee’s 

paycheck. However, two categories of Postdoctoral Scholars do not receive a paycheck from the University: the Fellows and the Paid Directs. This presented significant challenges in finding a workable solution that would address the UAW’s interest in receiving membership dues or fair share fees from those Postdoctoral Scholars 

in the bargaining unit. The NIH does not consider Fellows (who are paid a stipend) 

to be ‘‘employees’’ and has regulations concerning the application of ‘‘employee’’ rules 

to Fellows. The automatic deduction of fees from a Postdoctoral Scholar’s stipend 

would not be permissible under the NIH rules. To address the UAW’s interest, the 

University consulted with the NIH and developed a process by which the UAW dues 

or fair share fee deductions could be made for the Fellows as a mandatory service 

to them by the University. The University also agreed to allow the UAW on-thejob access to the Paid Directs to collect contributions. • A critical issue for the University, on the other hand, has been the preservation of ‘‘academic judgment’’ as applied to research and mentoring because it could affect 

the faculty’s ability to set academic goals and performance. Academic judgment pertains to the various decisions made by faculty in their oversight and supervision of 

research and scholarly activities. The UAW expressed its concern that Postdoctoral 

Scholars should have some protections built into the contract to ensure the fair exercise of academic judgment. After many lengthy discussions on this topic, the parties agreed to establish the processes that faculty should follow in the exercise of 

their academic judgment, while agreeing that the judgment itself would remain exclusive to the faculty. 

This commitment by the University and the UAW to the bargaining process and 

to sharing information and interests resulted in a large number of tentative agreements over the course of eight months of regular bargaining even though the parties 

could not simply import language from other contracts and apply it to this group. 

Every article of the contract required extensive consideration and evaluation to ensure that the language crafted would accurately reflect the realities of how 

Postdoctoral Scholars perform their work. Every article also required extensive consultation with the faculty to ensure that any contract language being considered did 

not unduly interfere with the research enterprise. 

Despite these complexities and challenges, we have made great progress in these 

negotiations. After many months of regular meetings, in October 2009, we mutually 

agreed to a hiatus in bargaining over the holiday period, with a commitment to return to the table in January 2010. UC contacted the UAW and proposed to meet 

in January, but the UAW was not available. In February, the parties changed a bargaining session to an informal session, in an effort to explore settlement opportunities. Formal bargaining meetings recently occurred on April 15, 16 and 23 and the 

negotiations are now focused on the six remaining issues. The University will continue with the same strong commitment to good faith bargaining and resolution of 

these matters as we work through these final articles. 

Again, while there are key issues to be resolved, the University remains confident 

in each side’s commitment to good faith bargaining and desire to reach agreement. 
43 

We will continue to work hard to reach a mutually acceptable agreement for both 

the University and the Postdoctoral Scholars. 

Thank you to the Committee for the opportunity to join you here today and discuss first contract negotiations with the UAW for the Postdoctoral Scholar bargaining unit. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Congressman Burton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. BURTON, (RET.), A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My experience is a little bit different than what I heard from the 

representative of the University. And I was very instrumental in 

getting recognition for the teaching assistants. I took President 

Dick Atkinson to have several meetings in my office, too. 

I let Dick, who is a very fair man, know how serious I was and 

how serious the legislature was going to look at this. But every 

time President Atkinson agreed to something, and I am sorry that 

I do not remember the name, but the woman who was the Human 

Resource person, every time Dick left the room and I thought we 

had a deal, they moved two steps backwards. And it happened 

after every meeting that we had with President Atkinson and with 

the HR person present in the room. And finally I had to call Dick 

and ask whether she worked for him or he worked for her. And he 

said ‘‘What do you mean.’’ And I told him. And I said I need you 

to show up one more time with a Human Resources person there 

and tell her this is what you agree to, this is what is going to be 

implemented and do not go backwards. And that is how it happened. So it was not an easy go. 

The UAW was organized as an industrial union, which mean 

janitors in the plant, the skilled workers. So you had many crafts, 

many pay levels, many identifiable things as to who got what. And 

I do not see that much difference in the University. 

And in the time that they have been working on this, they ought 

to be able to say these are the categories. This is a manuscript 

reader, this is a person who discovered this medicine, or discovered 

the precursor to something that provided great monies to both the 

grant maker and to the University. 

The money does not come from the state general fund. The 

money comes from outside things. And it would be a very easy 

thing to figure it out and say this is the proposal. If you are making so much money and it is an across the board percentage increase; the low paid workers are getting only five percent of what 

they get and the higher paid should get five percent of that. So, you 

know, if they’re asking for a flat fee, then maybe the lower people 

get more and the upper people get less. 

But I also mediated at the suggestion of Regent Blum and 

AFSCME, with the University when they were dealing with the 

problem with one of the AFSCME locals, and I had to shuttle back 

and forth. And I will have to say this: I told AFSCME that their 

first demands were somewhat sweet. But I went back to the University and they came up, their negotiator came up with such—it 

was insulting, and I said I will not bring this back to AFSCME. 
44 

And when I walked in, they said ‘‘What did they say?’’ And I said 

I will not tell you. And they said ‘‘What did they say?’’ I said I will 

not tell you. And one of them said ‘‘You have to tell us.’’ So I made 

them all stand up, cross their heart, swear to God that they would 

not throw a fit when I told them. I told them about what I considered to be an insult. And one of them started to raise up and the 

other said ‘‘No, we promised we would not do this.’’ 

So I point that out for so much bargaining in good faith. 

Now, we have had this problem over the years with farm workers 

and we were able to pass a bill for farm workers when after a certain amount of negotiation it went to kind of an oxymoron, but it 

was binding mediation. And that has worked. I do not know if that 

is possible with the University or not. But I think as Congresswoman Lee said ‘‘When they come looking for money before the Appropriations Committee, they probably should have one hand out 

for the money and the other hand out for possibly a proposed contract.’’ Because you are not going to get the University and not so 

much demand the bureaucracy to do something. As I said time and 

time again, President Atkinson said that is fine, the person who 

was HR started over like we never had the meeting. And I think 

that that is what happens. And I think that it would be important 

that the policymaker and the ultimate person, and I have not met 

the new President, would give direction that they ought to do something about this. If you dealt with 29 out of 35, you got six to go, 

ought to be a piece of cake. 

But again, UAW has been an industrial union. They had everything from the crafts to the janitors, skilled, unskilled and they did 

not all get the same money, they did not all get the same hourly 

wage, but they did get the same job protection. And I do not think 

anybody in the UAW plant today could get fired because they are 

going to have a kid. So, I mean, that is kind of my point. But my 

experience is they were dragged in the teaching assistants. It was 

not, ‘‘boy, we are happy to do this’’ and if it was not for President 

Atkinson’s leadership, we would still be talking about that instead 

of this. 

[The statement of Congressman Burton follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. John L. Burton, (Ret.), Former 

Representative in Congress From the State of California 

I am honored that the U.S. House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee has asked me to testify in a hearing to understand better the issues surrounding post-doctoral scholar bargaining at the University of California (UC). I 

want to thank the Committee for coming out to California to hold the hearing. 

I have some experience with these issues that may shed further light on this particular case study of first contract negotiations. In 1999-2000, while serving as 

President Pro Tempore of the California State Senate, I was drawn into oversight 

responsibilities and mediation efforts with respect to an earlier first contract being 

negotiated between the UC and its graduate student employees. 

Such negotiations were difficult for various reasons. For example: 

1. It was difficult to coordinate within the different offices of the UC during the 

contract negotiation. For instance, the Office of the UC President and the UC Labor 

Relations staff members were not in agreement over negotiation stance. 

2. The contract that was negotiated between 1999-2000 was the first for graduate 

students in the entire UC system. There were concerns over the contract’s implication for graduate education, such as union work rules overruling academic judgment. Such concerns were shown not to be valid on hindsight. 

I am happy to answer any questions that the Committee may have. Thank you. 
45 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Mr. Kampas. 

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY W. KAMPAS, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP 

Mr. KAMPAS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. My name is 

Brad Kampas. I have been actively involved in collective bargaining on behalf of employers for over 25 years, including many 

first contract settings. 

My testimony today will concern the process of collective bargaining and why first contract negotiations are often times consuming. 

First contracts are of great importance. They are of great importance to employees who have never been represented before. They 

are of great importance to the union which has adopted the responsibility to negotiate on behalf of these employees. And they are of 

great importance to the employers, shareholders, customers, students, taxpayers and other stakeholders who are impacted by that 

contract. 

I would like to put the length of bargaining in context with our 

federal and state labor laws. 

Under federal law, in 1935 Congress passed the National Labor 

Relations Act, the first federal law regulating collective bargaining 

on a broad basis. It obligated the parties to bargain in good faith 

demanding that the parties approach the negotiations with a sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement. The law recognized its 

role as to facilitate private agreement, not dictate results. Notably, 

the law does not require the parties to actually reach agreement, 

or does it impose specific terms of employment. 

The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged in its seminal case ruling on the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act that the free opportunity for negotiation is likely to promote industrial peace over other methods. 

So why do contracts take so long in the first setting? They are 

often difficult and time consuming. 

They seek multi-year contracts. The average contract is three 

years. The employer that adopts a collective bargaining agreement 

is bound by the cost structure while sacrificing flexibility. It commits to future expenses when there’s no guarantee regarding revenue, funding or competitiveness in the marketplace. 

For example, the University is being sought to commit to wage 

increases that are not yet funded by federal grants. And long-term 

care wide do a lot of collective bargaining, the parties relied on the 

state statutory system to negotiate significant wage increases for 

nursing home employees, only to find the State of California this 

year imposed a freeze on Medi-Cal rate increases that were going 

to pay for those, as well as federal cuts in Medicare. 

The solution. Have the Federal Government give everyone more 

money. Certainly the State of California is not in a position to do 

so. 

The process is, of necessity, prolonged. Bargaining starts with information requests by unions. They have a right to information re-
46 

garding those who they seek to represent. They impose significant 

information requests that can take weeks to comply with. 

Sometimes employers also make information requests. Unions 

seek to have employees inserted in multi-employer pension plans. 

Many of these are grossly under funded. A 2009 report by an independent California actuary, the Seigel Company, found that 39 percent of multi-employer plans are not even funded to the 80 percent 

level. Congress was forced to intervene with the Pension Protection 

Act of 2006. This law imposed additional employer contributions 

that were never even contemplated in the bargaining process. 

Health insurance is another complex area. Some unions bargain 

every single time of the health insurance plan and their contracts 

may span dozens of pages on health insurance alone. The parties 

are required to negotiate over future increases in health insurance 

which no one realistically knows what percentage increases they 

will be. 

The first contract also is a very significant contract. It will be in 

place for decades as part of the relationship. As any experienced 

labor practitioner knows, it is very difficult to modify even simple 

language in subsequent contract negotiations as parties become 

fixed. 

The Labor Board has recognized that collective bargaining requires a great investment of time. It uses the concept of impasse, 

the point at which the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement would be fruitless. There are remedies under 

the law should the employer not bargain in good faith. 

Some of the unions and labor supporters have suggested binding 

interest arbitration if the parties cannot agree. Chairman Miller referred to the Employee Free Choice Act which is currently being 

debated in Congress, which would impose mandatory interest arbitration within 20 days after negotiations. That would fundamentally alter our American system. 

Arbitrators are frequently unprepared to deal with different environments where they have a hearing over a couple of days where 

the parties have spent weeks and weeks discussing the issues that 

are involved. Opponents of compulsory arbitration are concerned 

about the arbitrator’s ability to evaluate and determine appropriate 

wage and benefit increases. If the arbitrator guesses it wrong, the 

employee suffers as many of them are laid off. 

Arbitrators are required to deal with minutia. Unions frequently 

bargain every single work rule. Some defer to management under 

management rights. There are issues of constitutionality in a government imposed contracts through interest arbitration. 

The parties need to bargain in good faith and compromise. Very 

frequently, unions fail to compromise because they have over estimated their bargaining power. Interest arbitration is viewed as a 

way to get that which they could not otherwise get at the bargaining table. Other times, unions have problems with telling employees no after they’ve made promise to them in bargaining in the 

election process. 

I conclude my remarks. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Kampas follows:] 
47 

Prepared Statement of Bradley W. Kampas, 

Jackson Lewis, LLP 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Committee on Education and Labor, thank 

you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My name is Bradley W. Kampas. I 

have actively participated in collective bargaining and labor contract administration 

for over 25 years. My experience includes negotiations on behalf of educational institutions, and I have negotiated in many first contract settings. While I am partner 

in the San Francisco office of Jackson Lewis LLP, my appearance and testimony 

today is on my own behalf and represent my own views, not those of the partnership. 

I understand the sub-committee is reviewing the negotiations of the first collective 

bargaining agreement for post-doctoral staff at the University of California. My testimony today will concern the process of collective bargaining, especially as it relates 

to negotiations for a first contract. 

A ‘‘first contract’’ is of great importance. It is vitally important to the employees 

who have never been represented before. It has great significance to the union 

which has adopted the responsibility to negotiate for those employees. Of course, it 

is also crucial to the employer. There are other interested parties in this process 

as well: shareholders, customers, students, taxpayers and more, depending on 

whether the employer is in the public or private sector. 

Collective bargaining is both a practical and a legal process. It is a method of attempting to reach agreement between competing interests. My goal in the next few 

minutes is to explain the genius of our system of collective bargaining, and to discuss why first contract negotiations are often time-consuming. 

In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (‘‘NLRA’’) (a.k.a. the 

Wagner Act) and created the National Labor Relations Board (‘‘NLRB’’) to enforce 

the NLRA. Where a union was recognized as the bargaining representative of employees, the Wagner Act obliged the parties to engage in good-faith bargaining, demanding that the parties approach negotiations with ‘‘a sincere purpose to find the 

basis of agreement.’’ The purpose of the law was to provide a mechanism for labor 

and management to reach agreement. From the beginning, the law recognized that 

its role was to facilitate private agreement but not to dictate results. 

Notably, the law did not require the parties to actually reach agreement. Nor did 

it impose terms of employment. The Supreme Court, in finding the NLRA constitutional in its seminal NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937), 

decision acknowledged this when it reasoned ‘‘that free opportunity for negotiation 

* * * is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustment and 

agreements which the [NLRA] itself does not attempt to compel.’’ 

In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA with its passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 

The amended version included Section 8(d) which further defined the nature and 

extent of the parties’ obligation to bargain. The Congressional record on the passage 

of Taft-Hartley, which the Supreme Court later cited in NLRB v. American National 

Insurance, 343 U.S. 395, 403 (1952), indicated that Section 8(d) was included out 

of Congress’ concern that the NLRB was overreaching its purpose ‘‘in the guise of 

determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself 

up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals 

and counterproposals that he may or may not make. * * *’’ Later Supreme Court 

holdings have echoed that ‘‘while the Board does have power under the National 

Labor Relations Act to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without 

power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective-bargaining agreement.’’ H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 101 

(1970). 

Section 8(d) provides that when a union is certified as the exclusive bargaining 

representative for a unit of employees, it is the ‘‘mutual obligation of the employer 

and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in 

good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.’’ The NLRA does not set a time limit for reaching an agreement. It does not 

even provide that the two parties must reach an agreement at all because the ‘‘obligation [to bargain] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 

the making of a concession.’’ In interpreting the obligation to bargain in good faith, 

the Supreme Court has concluded that the NLRA ‘‘does not compel any agreement 

whatsoever between employees and employers.’’ Further, the Court stated that ‘‘the 

Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in 

judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.’’ 

The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the NLRB’s role is limited 

to determining whether the parties are bargaining in good faith and does not extend 
48 

to evaluating the merits of each party’s substantive proposals. The Court’s decision 

in H.K. Porter v. NLRB, supra, at 108, is instructive: 

Allowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based—private 

bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract. 

The NLRB continues to follow this approach. As it stated in Oklahoma Fixtures, 331 NLRB 1116, 1117 (2000), the NLRB examines proposals ‘‘only for the purpose 

of evaluating whether they were clearly designed to frustrate agreement.’’ Where 

the parties are unable to reach an agreement through good-faith bargaining, ‘‘it was 

never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become a party 

to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement.’’ In short, 

the object of this Act is not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees could 

work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. See H.K. Porter at 103. Negotiation of the first collective bargaining agreement is often difficult and time- consuming. There are unavoidable reasons why these first sets of negotiations are 

lengthy. A collective bargaining agreement is a multi-year contract binding both the 

employer and its employees. A labor contract typically includes a wide array of provisions covering every aspect of working conditions. When an employer adopts a collective bargaining agreement, it is bound to a cost structure while sacrificing flexibility. It commits to future expenses, but it receives 

no guarantees regarding the competitive market or its ability to remain profitable. 

The collective bargaining agreement is a document which will likely have profound 

implications for the future of the company. It is not an agreement that any prudent 

employer would entertain lightly. The process is, of necessity, prolonged. It typically begins with extensive requests for information by both parties, in particular by the union, to inform their strategy 

for the negotiations. Unions are entitled to certain information about the employees 

whom they represent, namely any information about their wages, hours, and other 

terms and conditions of employment. Simply put, in order to bargain effectively regarding terms and conditions of employment, the union must know what these 

terms and conditions are. Unions can and do request payroll lists for prior years, 

scheduling information, staffing plans, health and retirement benefits information, 

and so forth. 

The employer often makes similar requests from the unions regarding their fi- nances. These requests continue throughout the bargaining process. The union may 

propose moving employees into their pension plan. In order to evaluate the union’s 

proposal, the employer will request a copy of that plan to review its requirements 

and solvency. This is particularly important given the status of many multi-employer pension plans which are underfunded and, as such, have massive withdrawal 

liability when and if an employer seeks to withdraw from the plan. The company 

may propose a no-fault attendance policy. The union will request and review the attendance records of employees over the past three years to attempt to evaluate the 

effect such a policy will have on its membership. 

Once parties have the necessary information and have gotten to know each other, 

they must turn to the task of negotiating every word of the contract. This is where 

the real investment of time comes in. There are a myriad of issues which must be 

decided even before the parties ever discuss wages. Health and retirement benefits 

alone can consume months of bargaining. 

Congress is well aware of the crisis in our nation’s pension and retirement plans. 

An increasing number of multi-employer pension plans are underfunded. A 2009 report by independent California actuarial and consulting firm, The Segal Co., Ltd., 

found that only 39 percent of its 400 multi-employer plan clients were even funded 

at 80 percent or higher. The Pension Protection Act was Congress’ effort to address 

the growing problem of these underfunded plans. To a large degree, our pension 

problem was caused by unions and employers adopting retirement arrangements 

without adequate foresight. Today, employers are acutely aware of the risks to the 

company and to employees. This has caused negotiations to become increasingly detailed. Unions are continuing to propose that employers agree to enter their employees in these plans because they desperately need funding. While entry into them 

may have short-term financial benefits, employers must carefully consider the longterm impact of this decision. This certainly causes significant delay and study. 

Health insurance is another area in which employers—and union-administered 

funds—must be increasingly careful in considering their liabilities. It is not yet at 

all clear how recent legislation will impact this area. With exploding health insurance premiums, employers and unions must carefully consider how best control 

costs or expenses two or three years down the road. 
49 

Apart from the complexity of the issues to be negotiated, there are other factors that explain the length of time necessary to reach a contract. In the weeks leading 

into a representation election, unions frequently make promises to employees about 

what they will get should the union win the election. They may point to contracts 

that they have negotiated at other companies (perhaps not indicating those companies have deeper pockets or a better market share). Even without direct comparisons, the union offers hope to many employees who feel that they are not being 

treated fairly by their employer. After the election is over and the employees have 

selected the union as their collective bargaining representative, the employees, like 

any other group of voters, expect their elected representative to deliver. If an employer is already paying its employees a competitive market wage, it may be difficult—if not financially impossible—to increase wages or offer benefits at a less expensive level. Further, an employer may be committed to a particular work rule or 

structure which employees are seeking to change. Or the employer may be committed to changing an existing practice which employees want to keep. Good faith bargaining does not require either party to accept any specific proposal offered by the other. To require otherwise would encourage unrealistic proposals and 

lack of movement to the point of insisting that proposals are accepted. Unions often 

try to bargain the same or very similar contracts with different employers. When 

employers do not consent to terms in these pattern contracts, it is not necessarily 

a delaying tactic. Why should one employer simply agree to the terms and conditions of employment set by another employer? Similarly, if employers pointed to 

terms in employer-friendly contracts, it would not be ‘‘hard bargaining’’ if the union 

did not assent to all those terms. 

First contracts form the framework for decades of future contracts. This adds considerable importance to the apparent minutia involved in drafting each article of a 

contract. Any experienced labor practitioner can attest to the difficulty in modifying 

existing language in second, third, or fourth contracts. In subsequent negotiations, 

parties focus on specific clauses which they would like modified or economic issues. 

They do not rewrite the entire contract. Entire articles from first contract will remain unchanged forever. Therefore, the parties must exercise great care in drafting 

language that will be acceptable not only for the term of the first contract, but for 

the length of the collective bargaining relationship. This, of course, adds considerable time to the process, but parties should not agree to terms in first contracts 

lightly—they must and do consider the lasting impact of the initial terms and conditions of employment created by the collectively bargained contract. The National Labor Relations Board acknowledges that good faith bargaining re- quires a great investment of time. Under Board law, the parties are expected to negotiate until they reach agreement or reach impasse. ‘‘Impasse’’ is a term of art in 

labor law. The Supreme Court and the NLRB have defined impasse as ‘‘that point 

at which the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement and 

further discussion would be fruitless.’’ Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539, 543 (1988); Badlands Golf Course, 350 

NLRB 264, 273 (2007). There is no bright-line rule to determine whether bargaining 

impasse exists, but impasse is not reached easily. As an example, in Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 300 NLRB 324 (1990), the parties did not reach impasse 

until they had held forty-seven negotiation sessions for their initial contract. At that 

point, they still disagreed on fifty different issues. The NLRB will consider the bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the lengths of negotiations, the importance of the issues still to be determined, and the contemporaneous 

understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations (i.e., do both parties believe that an impasse exists). 

The number of bargaining sessions and the amount of time that the parties have 

engaged in bargaining is an important factor, but there is not dispositive amount 

of time after which an impasse is declared. However, the Board recognizes that it 

should be even more difficult and a longer process to reach impasse during bargaining for an initial contract than successor contracts. For instance, in MGM 

Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 NLRB 464, 466 (1999), the Board stated ‘‘where the parties 

are negotiating an initial contract, the Board recognizes the attendant problems of 

establishing initial procedures, rights, wage scales, and benefits in determining 

whether a reasonable time has elapsed.’’ 

Frustrated by their inability to reach first contract settlements quickly (or at all), 

many unions and labor supporters have suggested binding interest arbitration if the 

two parties cannot reach agreement within a certain time line. For instance, the 

proposed Employee Free Choice would require the parties to enter binding interest 

arbitration 120 days after negotiations began if settlement had not been reached. 

While the card-check provision of EFCA received most of the attention from the 

media and the public, compulsory interest arbitration would have an even greater 
50 

impact on the business community, employees, and labor relations in general than 

the practical end of the secret ballot election. Notwithstanding the unrealistic time pressures (and, in most circumstances, prac- tical impossibility) of negotiating a first contract in four months, compulsory arbitration would completely alter the fundamental concepts of American labor law. It was 

never the intent of the drafters of the NLRA that the government (or government 

appointed arbitrators) would play any role in the delicate collective bargaining process. It was never the intent of the drafters that an arbitrator would set terms of 

conditions of employment to affect the workplace for years. Supporters of compulsory arbitration point to its place in public sector collective bargaining. In the public sector, particularly in occupations relating to public safety, 

e.g., police, fire, etc., compulsory interest arbitration is frequently used because 

unions do not typically have the right to strike. For obvious reasons, it would be 

unwise to give a police or fire union the full range of economic weapons—namely 

the right to strike—during contract negotiations. Fear of a third party imposing 

terms and conditions of employment on an employer was believed to compensate for 

the inability to strike. In addition to this practical reason, there are two important reasons why interest arbitration in these industries is, at least, understandable. First, a municipal fire 

department is a monopoly. It would not be competitively disadvantaged (the town 

may be disadvantaged, but not the actual business) if an arbitrator imposed increases to wage and benefits that would make it difficult to compete with other fire 

departments. Second, if an arbitrator imposed increases, the employer has full-proof 

method of increasing revenue; it can raise taxes to pay for the increased labor costs 

borne by its citizens. This is not to say that interest arbitration for these jobs is always effective. As most of us are aware, the city of Vallejo became insolvent in 2008. Skyrocketing 

wages and benefits of its municipal workers were, in part, to blame. Salaries and 

benefits for public safety workers accounted for 75 percent of the general fund budget. In addition, current and future pension outlays were literally bankrupting the 

city. The City Council sought concessions for the union, which they did not receive. 

Ultimately, the City filed for bankruptcy in 2009 and unions fought the modification 

of its collective bargaining agreements. Many opponents of compulsory arbitration raise concerns about the arbitrator’s ability (or inability) to set wages and benefits. Obviously, if an arbitrator does not 

understand a company’s needs or the competitive environment in which it operates, 

he could increase wages and benefits to the point where the company is placed at 

a competitive disadvantage. Ultimately, this is bad for employees who may find 

themselves unemployed if the arbitrator fails to assess the impact of his award. Interest arbitrators tend to opt for ‘‘standard’’ wages and benefits levels. Such compensation standards may be highly problematic for some employers, especially given 

the state of the economy. 

While an arbitrator creating wage and benefit scales that are detrimental to a 

company’s success is the most dangerous outcome of interest arbitration, there are 

other major issues. For instance, work rules are a crucial feature of any collective 

bargaining agreement. An arbitrator would have to decide how overtime will be assigned: by seniority, by some kind of rotation, by a combination of the two. An arbitrator would have to decide if scheduling would be a management right to be 

changed at an employer’s sole discretion, or will it be something that is negotiated 

every time an employer wants to make a significant change. Can schedule changes 

be permanent? An arbitrator would have to decide if promotions would go to the 

most qualified candidate or to the most senior employee or to the most senior employee who meets certain qualifications. After deciding the promotion criteria, the 

arbitrator would have to decide if promotion decisions would be subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions under the contract. 

These examples are all major parts of the collective bargaining process. Some contracts permit sole management discretion in some areas, but not others. There is 

gave and take from both sides on these issues. It is extremely problematic that an 

arbitrator, with little knowledge about an employer’s operations, will make decisions 

that will affect the day-to-day operations of a company. There are thousands of different industries. An arbitrator cannot possibly understand in a couple of days the 

needs of an industry. The problem will be then that the contracts imposed by even 

the best arbitrators may bare little resemblance to that which is necessary for a 

company to operate and for employees to work in a comfortable atmosphere. 

Bargaining for first contracts is always a different and arduous process. For years, 

unions have expressed frustration with employer’s ‘‘tactics’’ in this process. In my 

experience, most unions fail to conclude first contracts with employers because they 

do not properly assess their bargaining power. Employers must bargain and good 
51 

faith and compromise with unions. Likewise, unions must know when to compromise and say yes. Unions that fail to reach first contracts tend to value their 

own national or regional interests as opposed to those of the members for whom 

they are negotiating. They fail to compromise because they have overestimated their 

bargaining power. Thus, unions want interest arbitration because they feel an arbitrator will give them that which they were unable to win at the bargaining table. 

This concludes my remarks, and I request that my full remarks be submitted into 

the record. Thank you and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Dr. Ferguson. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN–PAUL FERGUSON, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, STANFORD UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF 

BUSINESS 

Mr. FERGUSON. Chairman Miller, members of the Committee, 

thank you for inviting me across the Bay this morning to give testimony on first contract negotiations. 

My name is John-Paul Ferguson. I hold a PhD from the MIT 

Sloan School of Management where my research focused on the dynamics of trade union organizing. I am currently an Assistant Professor at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business. 

Others in today’s lineup have more experience with the specific 

case at hand. I will limit my remarks to a general point about first 

contract negotiations. 

I became aware of the current bargaining impasse between the 

University of California and its postdoctoral union when I was informed that someone affiliated with the University administration 

had quoted my research which showed that extended delays in contract bargaining were widespread in this country, as evidence that 

nothing unusual was going on in this case. The research in question is an article entitled ‘‘The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential 

Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1990-2004’’ that appeared in 

the Industrial and Labor Relations Review in 2008. I’ve entered a 

copy as evidence. 

In that study, I tracked more than 22,000 organizing drives 

through as many stages of the process for which we have data, 

from filing an election petition with the NLRB to holding, and perhaps winning that election, to negotiating a first contract with the 

employer. I found that in the cases where the union won the representation election, only 38 percent received a contract with the 

employer within the one year contract bar. 

So, point of fact, long delays in reaching contracts and high rates 

of not reaching contracts are, indeed, not unusual. Nowhere in that 

study do I suggest that because these delays are common, there is 

nothing wrong with this state of affairs. Quite the contrary. The 

figures in my study should be cause for alarm, not for complacency. 

The point of my study is that you can model contemporary union 

organizing like a screening process where only those who made it 

through an earlier screen have a chance to clear the present 

screen. 

There are four main screens in an organizing drive: 

Getting enough signatures during the card drive to file an election petition with the NRLB; 

Actually holding that election; 
52 

Winning the election, and; 

Negotiating a first contract. 

To quote from the study’s conclusion. ‘‘While the NLRB election 

procedure can be modeled as a screening process, it was not designed to function this way. As designed, there were two screens: 

The signature requirement and the election. All of the cases observed here by definition met the signature requirement. The period before the election was not to supposed to last for months or 

years, nor were one of every three organizing drives to be abandoned before an election was held.’’ And directly pursuant to this 

case, ‘‘There were certainly not supposed to be attrition rates surpassing 40 percent in the interval between recognition and contract 

agreement.’’ 

Hopefully this is enough to make clear my own opinion: Such 

delays are not unusual and that this is a bad thing. 

I should say why I think that the low rate of speedy first contract 

agreement is evidence of a problem. I stress that all I, or anyone 

can give you is evidence. The simple fact is that our national data 

on such negotiations are not very good. I have argued elsewhere 

that anyone who is seriously interested in this issue should support 

mandating the relevant agencies to collect better data and giving 

them the resources to do so. That so many people use the absence 

of labor market data to imply the absence of a labor market problem, however, shows how serious their interest really is. 

There are two common arguments why negotiating delays might 

not be a problem. The first is that the issues over which the parties 

are bargaining are simply more complicated these days. 

The second is that increased turnover of negotiators, particularly 

on the management side, combined with lower rates of unionization 

means that parties are often well intentioned but less experienced 

at bargaining. 

There are inherent problems with both of these arguments which 

I would be happy to address during questioning. For now, I will 

just refer back to my own research which has shown that longer 

bargaining delays and lower agreement rates have happened in 

concurrence with more petition withdrawals, more unfair labor 

practice charges against employers and increased use of professional union avoidance consultants by employers. 

If bargaining delays were increasing in isolation, it would be 

easier to credit well meaning but unexperienced negotiators who 

are dealing with hard problems. Given these other trends in the 

data, though, I think that the burden of proof ought to lie on the 

employer to demonstrate that good faith bargain is taking place. 

Thus, when I see negotiations dragging on, as they have here, I 

tend to think that the most plausible explanation is that delay is 

part of a broader effort by the employer to depress, demoralize or 

decertify its newly organized employees, an effort in effect to nullify the employees’ stated preference and to get rid of the union 

through bad faith bargaining. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. Ferguson follows:] 
53 

Prepared Statement of John-Paul Ferguson, Assistant Professor, Stanford University Graduate School of Business 

Chairman Miller, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to give testimony on first-contract negotiations. My name is John-Paul Ferguson. I hold a 

PhD from MIT’s Sloan School of Management, where my research focused on the 

dynamics of trade-union organizing. I am currently an Assistant Professor at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business. Others in today’s lineup have more experience with the specific case at hand. I will limit my remarks to a general point about first-contract negotiations. I became aware of the current bargaining impasse between the University of Cali- fornia and its post-doctoral union when I was informed that someone affiliated with 

the University administration had quoted my research, which showed that extended 

delays in contract bargaining were widespread in this country, as evidence that 

‘‘nothing unusual’’ was going on in this case. 

The research in question is an article titled ‘‘The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999—2004,’’ that appeared in the Industrial 

and Labor Relations Review in 2008. I have entered a copy as evidence. In that 

study, I tracked more than 22,000 organizing drives through as many stages of the 

process for which we have data: from filing an election petition with the NLRB, to 

holding and perhaps winning that election, to negotiating a first contract with the 

employer. I found that, in the cases where the union won the representation election, only38percent reached a contract with the employer within the one-year contract bar. So—point of fact—long delays in reaching contracts, and high rates of not 

reaching contracts, are indeed not unusual. 

Nowhere in that study do I suggest that, because these delays are common, there 

is nothing wrong with this state of affairs. Quite the contrary: the figures in my 

study should be cause for alarm, not for complacency. 

The point of my study is that you can model contemporary union organizing like 

a screening process, where only those who made it through an earlier screen have 

a chance to clear the present screen. There are four main screens in an organizing 

drive: getting enough signatures during the card drive to file an election petition 

with the NLRB; actually holding that election; winning the election; and negotiating 

a first contract. To quote from the study’s conclusion: 

While the NLRB election procedure can be modeled as a screening process, it was 

not designed to function this way. As designed, there were two screens: the signature requirement and the election. All of the cases observed here by definition met 

the signature requirement. The period before the election was not supposed to last 

for months or years. Nor were one of every three organizing drives expected to be 

abandoned before an election was held. * * * There certainly were not supposed to 

be attrition rates surpassing 40% in the interval between recognition and contract 

agreement (p. 16, emphasis added). 

Hopefully this is enough to make clear my own opinion: such delays are not unusual and that this is a bad thing. 

I should say why I think that the low rate of speedy first-contract agreement is 

evidence of a problem. I stress that all that I or anyone can give you is evidence. 

The simple fact is that our national data on such negotiations are not very good. 

I have argued elsewhere that anyone who is seriously interested in this issue should 

support mandating the relevant agencies to collect better data and giving them the 

resources to do so. That so many people use the absence of labor-market data to 

imply the absence of a labor-market problem however shows how serious their interest really is. 

There are two common arguments why negotiating delays might not be a problem. 

The first is that the issues over which the parties are bargaining are simply more 

complicated these days. The second is that increased turnover of negotiators, particularly on the management side, combined with lower rates of unionization means 

that the parties are well intentioned but less experienced at bargaining. There are 

inherent problems with both of these arguments, which I would be happy to address 

during questioning. For now I will just refer back to my own research, which has 

shown that longer bargaining delays and lower agreement rates have happened in 

concurrence with more petition withdrawals, more unfair labor practice charges 

against employers and increased use of professional union-avoidance consultants by 

employers. If bargaining delays were increasing in isolation, it would be easier to 

credit well-meaning but inexperienced negotiatiors who are dealing with hard problems. Given these other trends within the data, though, I think that the burden of 

proof ought to lie on the employer to demonstrate that good-faith bargaining is taking place. Thus when I see negotiations dragging on as they have here, I tend to 

think that the most plausible explanation is that delay is part of a broader effort 
54 

by the employer to depress, demoralize or decertify its newly organized employees— 

an effort in effect to nullify the employees’ stated preference and to get rid of the 

union through bad-faith bargaining. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Well that’s a lot to think 

about. Usually you call a time out and go to the bench and figure 

out what to do. 

We are going to start questioning now from members of Congress. And, John, I know you have some time constraints. So I just 

would say to my colleagues if you want to ask a question of Congressman Burton, I would have you do it. Why do not just do that? 

And I guess I would ask a little bit in conjuncture with Mr. Miller, and that is in first contracts it seems to me that one of the inherent problems you have is that in most instances it would appear 

that the information is with one party. Because those who are 

seeking the union do not necessarily have access to all the information because there may not have been a reason, or they simply 

couldn’t get access because they had no standing to get that information. And then the question is of whether or not that information is being used in good faith to reach an agreement or not. And 

I don’t know if you want to comment and Congressman Burton 

from his experience in this situation. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Well, there is certainly a lot of information 

we have requested from the University starting in December of 

2008 that we have yet to receive. 

The most troubling component of that, though, is that in the middle of April 2010 the University used their failure to provide that 

information, especially about two job titles, as a reason that they 

could not provide us with a reasonable proposal or any proposal on 

salary increases in a second or third year of the contract. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. John? 

Mr. BURTON. I mean, the information is really important. And I 

think going back to Marvin Miller who was the research guy for 

the steel workers and then hired by the baseball players, and when 

he started doing research and he got a lot of money to be doing this 

with, you know salaries went from $30,000 minimum up to God 

knows what because he had the numbers and the information 

which they showed. 

But one of the things that I want to get to, not to answer this, 

Mr. Chairman, but the fact that management is trying to decertify 

the union, if that is in fact the case, is proof to me that they are 

not bargaining in good faith. I mean, why would you want the 

other; if you really want a contract, you do not try to decertify unless you want to decertify before somebody enters into a contract. 

As I say, not that it is stated, but I will pass that. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Dr. Ferguson, both you and 

Mr. Miller referred to that in your testimony that there may be an 

active effort to decertify or a guerrilla effort to decertify within the 

University administration. What do we know about that? 

Mr. FERGUSON. I will defer to Mr. Miller on the specifics of this 

particular case as far as what’s going on with the University. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Miller? 

Mr. MILLER. We know that, as I mentioned in my testimony, on 

at least three University campuses, San Francisco, Davis and at 
55 

Riverside, University administrators have forwarded a website advocating decertification of the UAW to postdocs, and encouraged 

them to look at it. 

We also know that the University’s chief negotiator provided a 

list of all the postdocs to an individual who requested the list so 

that he could try to decertify the union. 

We know those things. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you. 

John? 

Mr. BURTON. Yes? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I was going to call you the honorable, I was trying 

to come up with the title. 

Mr. BURTON. 225-5161. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. That is our number. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Nevermind. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I see his seat in the Congress, and I do know that. 

In listening to—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. The phone number goes with 

the office, not with the member. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Oh God. 

In listening to Mr. Kampas, I started thinking, you know it 

sounds like from where he was coming that writing a first contract 

is like giving birth. But, you know, each birth although it is unique 

has a whole bunch of similarities. I mean, so it’s not look oh gee, 

we are going to have a first contract. We have to go back and start 

all over. 

So, why and where do you think there is enough overlap? I 

mean, why are we not using the experience of the TAs and the 

grad students? I mean, there has to be enough overlap of successes 

and in common and it works because they have the same broad— 

go ahead. 

Mr. BURTON. I mean, I would think so. But again, just sitting 

here and only because of my past experience, I mean I have a theory about the HR people at University. But there could be some validity that it is a little bit different, but also it could be an excuse. 

And if you take the totality of what has been going on, it seems 

like a stall. And I do not know what the six issues are, that it was 

like if the 29 are like Washington’s birthday off and the six issues 

are bread and butter. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Kampas, could you move 

the microphone over to Mr. Burton? 

Mr. BURTON. I am sorry. If the six issues are bread and butter 

issues, are the main issues and we could throw out the other 29, 

then it is a problem. But I mean I could see there is a point because it is different. But the University in my mind would have to 

know how many people read manuscripts, how many do research 

on this drug or that drug, how many people are doing this and 

that. And that is a category just like with AFSCME they said that 

they know how many are janitors, how many are clerical, how 

many are doing this. I mean, you know the information has got to 

be there. It may be a little bit more difficult than the other, but 
56 

they sure as hell have to know who is who and what is what because they are sending them paychecks. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Ms. Lee, you want to ask Mr. 

Burton a question? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. I would like to ask John this question. Certainly 

you have much institutional memory. I actually served with John 

in the early ’90s on the Public Safety Committee in the Assembly 

when he was Chair and then moved on into the State Senate where 

he became President Pro Tem. And even before the early ’90s when 

I was on his Committee in the Assembly, he came to that position 

with a lot of memory about a lot of stuff. 

And so you’ve seen a lot, John. And I just want to ask this question, big picture. If in fact we see a decertification process moving 

forward, and I know for a fact that many efforts to contract out 

services and I think members of the Committee know that, this 

panel knows that, contract out services at the University; what 

does this mean in terms of the historical memory that you have 

and where the University could be going in the future? 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I do not want to be bad for morale at the University because these people chose to do something. And if you are 

stalling to make everybody unhappy what do you need this meeting 

for. But I can go back, and the Chairman’s father was chairing the 

Committee in the Senate when somebody had for the first time a 

bill to organize people in the University and have the dues checkoff. And I remember the lobbyist for the University system at that 

time, the great Jay Michael, stood up and it was right after the 

free speech movement, and said these funds will go to pay for the 

anarchy that’s going on at the Berkeley campus now, which some 

people on the Committee bought, some did not. And I never talked 

to Jay Michael after that because, I mean, it was just so bogus. But 

I do not know if it was a mind-set of the University then, although 

I think it was still Clark Kerr who, despite all, was a fairly decent 

guy. But it was the lobbyist. 

But the University now finally, I mean they understand the fact. 

They know they have to negotiate with various unions with the 

professors, with the academic senate, with everybody. But it just 

seems to me when they are looking at teaching assistants, which 

are like you know, who are they? Well, the ones that teach the 

course while the professors are doing something else. And now the 

postdocs, it seems as if they do not want to do it. I mean, it may 

be difficult. And I do not know this, and do not say after I go. But 

here is the problem we have: How do we figure out the manuscript 

readers and the ones that are researchers, how to do that? I think 

it is doable. But the other thing is I would hope one of the 29 

things agreed to was that if somebody is pregnant and has a child, 

you know it is not what the Speaker called a prior existing situation where she had to fight to get her time back, she had to fight 

to take advantage I guess of the state law on maternity leave. But, 

I mean, those are again basic things but it shows a mind-set either 

in that department or the University bureaucracy that these people 

do not merit common decency. 

I mean, and I am just sitting here, I have no idea. But again, 

I think that some of these questions are great questions to ask 

when they are coming up to Congress and saying we need another 
57 

$130 million to research this. Well, who is going to research it? 

How many postdocs and who is getting the benefit of this? 

Just a personal thing. I know a doctor who researched a drug 

that is the precursor of more TV ads than you ever want to see 

without naming the drug. And I told him, I said ‘‘Man, you must 

be rich.’’ And he said ‘‘No, I ain’t rich. The University got the 

money.’’ Somebody got rich because, I mean you cannot watch your 

football game or see Mike Ditka and Bob Dole, or anybody else on 

the thing. 

So anyway, I mean that is my comment. Thank you for the time 

of letting me come, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. And Barbara and—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate you being here. 

Ms. LEE [continuing]. Juneteenth. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. For sure. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Dr. Tyler, the funding for your 

various postdocs was from what sources? Can you tell us that or 

do you want to submit it for the Committee? 

Ms. TYLER. Yes. My positions have been funded, as most postdoc 

positions are, through federal grants. 

For example, National Science Foundation and Department of 

Energy. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is the source for you 

mentioned a number of different positions you held, it was from either of those two? 

Ms. TYLER. Yes, I believe so. But these are grants to the lab. And 

a particular lab will have usually multiple grants from different 

agencies. National Institutes of Health is another one. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Your work is, in theory, restricted to that grant that is funding your principal investigator? 

Ms. TYLER. Yes. Yes, that’s correct. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And this is your research and 

you are working on that particular research, is that correct? 

Ms. TYLER. Yes. We discuss the project plans and say, okay, 

these are the goals for the grant proposal. This is what we need 

to get done for the taxpayer’s money. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Mr. Duckett, in your testimony you say that the difference in titles of the various postdocs, of some 6,500 postdocs, I am on page 

3 of your testimony, that the differences in titles arise primarily 

from their funding. And you have the first category of the employee 

postdoc. Can you walk through for me for the types you are referring to here? 

As I see it, you have fellows, you have the employee postdoc 

scholar and then you have something called paid direct? 

Mr. DUCKETT. That is correct. 

Just so in terms of walking through those, I will take an excerpt 

from the written testimony. 

The first category being the postdoctoral scholar. It is a person 

who receives funding from a university source that provides discretionary funds in support of training of postdoctoral scholars or from 

an agency that requires or permit the person to be a university employee. 
58 

The majority of postdoctoral scholars are funded through federal 

contracts and grants, like the National Institutes of Health. The 

National Science Foundation and Department of Energy are also 

others. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. And then the second 

type is what? 

Mr. DUCKETT. The second type is a postdoctoral scholar fellow. 

The fellows have been awarded funding by what we call an extramural agency outside of the university. And a lot of this money 

flows through the university is paid as a stipend rather than pay. 

And these awards carry a lot of restrictions about the fellow holding certain appointments at certain times and working on other 

funds. 

The majority of fellows in the life science are supported, again, 

by NIH funds. And although other sources are used in terms of the 

non-life sciences those sources. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And the third type? 

Mr. DUCKETT. The third type being a paid direct. paid directs basically bring their own money with them to conduct research. They 

can be from an extramural agency, it could be a private source, it 

could be a foreign country. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So they come self-contained? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, they do. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Does the university contribute 

anything to them ever? 

Mr. DUCKETT. No. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So if their wages are not sufficient for the cost of the program, what happens? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well if their wages aren’t sufficient in terms of the 

cost of the program, then any gap in terms of what they are supposed to be paid, the work that they are doing, et cetera, will need 

to be made up from state funds if those grants do not cover everything that they are supposed to do in terms of research. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. 

Mr. DUCKETT. That is about ten percent of the population or so, 

as I understand it. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And if I am correct, the suggestion in your paper is these various classifications make this a 

very complex negotiations between you and UAW? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Absolutely. Each one of these types of individuals 

is working on a particular grant or fund source which is usually 

contained in a very thick paper file. All of the provisions of that 

particular grant have to be accounted for to make sure that the research is being done properly and the person is going to be paid 

appropriately out of the designated fund source. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And that is all done today and 

was done last year, and the year before, and the year before that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So where are we in the costing exercise to assess the economic impacts of the UAW proposal? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, there have been several requests for information, which we have noted the difficulty in pulling together. We 

are still working hard to pull together that information, although 
59 

as I mentioned before, it resides in ten campuses across the entire 

State of California and is mostly in paper files. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Duckett, that request was 

made in May of last year. President Yudof sent me a letter and 

said that was one of the reasons why he thought in his report on 

the status of negotiations, why he told me that these negotiations 

were going forward and that he would keep me informed of that. 

It has now been almost a year, I guess it is a year tomorrow, so 

where are we on the costing exercise? Do we know what the problems are with paid directs? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We have identified some of the problems with paid 

directs. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. You identified those when you 

took your first paid direct five years ago, three years ago, or whenever, right? Did they come with a series of conditions? 

Mr. DUCKETT. They come with a series of conditions that are tied 

to their grants. But again, there are thousands of them and they 

are all individual grants. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Have you worked out your 

problems with the NIH or the postdocs, first category? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We have a clearer path with regard to some of 

those categories, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Can you make that information available by clear path to the Committee? In correspondence 

to us a year ago? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, in terms of making it available in this setting, that would be difficult to do to walk through and explain it. 

But we would be happy to—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. No, no. I am not talking about 

you walking through it now. I want to know if the information has 

been developed. I want to know if we have been misled that these 

exercises are, in fact, going on on an ongoing basis. These are the 

reasons why apparently people have not been ready to meet in 

these organizations and you have the information, and we are 

awaiting it. 

Mr. DUCKETT. We would be happy to provide what we have so 

far. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. With the paid directs, where 

are we with the paid direct, I mean with the fellows? 

Mr. DUCKETT. At a lesser stage of completion, but further along 

than we would be—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Why is that? What stage did 

you say you are at? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Incomplete. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Why is that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. It is very difficult to gather this information across 

the thousands of grants and postdocs on campuses. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. But do you not in fact have 

to agree to the terms and conditions of those grants when you accept those individuals in each and every one of these categories? 

Mr. DUCKETT. In each individual case, the principal investigator 

and the research department at that particular university and 

within that particular department does have to agree to those 

terms. 
60 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And one of the terms of, I believe, the postdocs is that they have cost of living increase adjustments in those contracts, is that correct? 

Mr. DUCKETT. In some instances, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. In how many are there not? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Again, we do not have a complete accounting of 

that information. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. We are just asking now who 

does and who does not. 

Mr. DUCKETT. We do not know. We do not know overall—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Because this is a major problem to the settlement and reaching agreements, but you do not 

know? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Absolutely. But we continue to research it and 

continue to try to find the answer. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. How many paid directs have 

you contributed state money to? 

Mr. DUCKETT. That we know of at this point, none. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. None? 

Mr. DUCKETT. That we know of. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So what happens when that 

grant is insufficient to cover its cost? You have not had any of 

those? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I would imagine we have had some—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And what happened in those 

instances? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I do not know on each individual case. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is suggested again as a 

major problem of the complexity of these negotiations, but you do 

not know? 

Mr. DUCKETT. This is true. We do not have a complete picture, 

but we continue to research it. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Do you really expect me to believe this? 

Mr. DUCKETT. It is the truth. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Well then there is something 

very wrong here in the representations to those of us, I think almost the entire delegation has written to President Yudof, about 

his representation about how these negotiations are going, your 

representations of how these negotiations are going. And if this is 

the basic informational base that is lending to the complexity that 

in more than a year’s time and having many of these same issues 

raised with the graduate students that this University cannot develop this information; it really raises a question of whether or not 

this University knows what, in fact, they are doing with these 

grants. 

Mr. DUCKETT. In each individual grant I can assure you that people know exactly what it is that they are doing—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Then why can you not answer 

these questions? You mean, there is nobody in the University administration that can compile this information in a year’s time? Nobody? No team of people with all of the computer—nobody can develop a spreadsheet? Nobody can develop a spreadsheet? 
61 

Well, I would ask the audience to restrain because this is a very 

serious problem. In theory you are in compliance with every one of 

these grants because all of them bring special conditions. And you 

know what they are. You know what they are to recite them as a 

problem, but you do not know what they are to provide them as 

a solution. 

That information has now been requested by the UAW, it has 

been requested by the Congress of the United States and we have 

not seen it in a year. That raises some very serious credibility problems about these negotiations. 

I am going to turn to my colleagues, but I just want to ask you 

one question. In that context, because again it is raised, you talk 

about complexity and then on page 4 you say ‘‘proposals on wages 

also pose a significant risk to the University.’’ How do you know 

that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. They pose a risk because we do not know the impact of these increases across all these grants and fund sources. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. It is a conclusion? It is a conclusion that these proposals pose a significant risk? You do not 

know? They might possibly pose some risk to the University, but 

you do not know that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We know if we fail to account for all of the money, 

that there is nowhere else to go outside of those grants. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is why you would start 

to pull these grants apart in response to the need for information 

from the bargaining unit, from the people who won the contract. 

And somehow this University cannot develop that information. You 

can work on new green sources of energy, you know look it, we are 

talking about one of the smartest universities in the country, smart 

personnel. I do not know, maybe the administration is lacking. But 

this is a real serious credibility problem, especially when we see 

the discussions and the presentation materials about decertification. You know, somebody is going into a stall here so the calendar, 

because it is now a year, and that presents problems. 

Congresswoman Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Now there is an act to follow, okay. 

Mr. Duckett, I have 20 years of experience as a Human Resources Director in private industry in high tech where we grew a 

company from 13 people to over 800 in a ten year period. And I 

would relate what I called my engineers with your postdocs because, you know, each one was unique, each one had what they 

were responsible for. So because of this, my experience, I cannot restrain myself from getting in the weeds here. So I am coming down 

to ask some questions that are probably in the weeds, not out there 

rhetorical at all. 

So because of the complexity, because of the uniqueness of each 

postdoc personnel in the system, and because it does not sound like 

you really know what the raises could be, should be, what the 

funding is, how much is set aside for that activity, I am concerned 

how do the principal investigators know what they are doing? Are 

they trained and are they skilled? And do they know how to evaluate their employees one at a time? Do they want to do that, or 

would they rather be doing the work of the program? 
62 

You know, a lot of engineers I found out at my company was that 

they are really good engineers, but they really were not administrators. They had no desire to be an administrator. 

So, and are these principal investigators, are they evaluated on 

how well they take care of their workers, of the people they hire 

to be part of their program? 

I mean, how do you ensure if you will not have an across the 

board step raise program, how do you ensure that these individual 

postdoc employees get any attention? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, each principal investigator is accountable to 

their department in the research organization that they are working within. So in terms of them not performing critical aspects of 

their job, they would be accountable for not doing that well. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, I would suggest we are looking at those that 

do well and how are they rewarded for it? Because it does not 

sound like from the interaction I have had with the postdocs that 

they think they are being taken care of at all. So now where does 

the responsibility fall? On the principal investigator, the person 

that wrote the contract who is probably a really good scientist, he 

or she on their own? I mean, how do you know as an institution 

that they know how to do this? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well the principal investigator is responsible for 

administering all aspects of that research. And I would assume 

that if the University or that principal investigator did a poor job 

at it, they would not get additional grants. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. No. I do not think that is the end result. I mean, 

you have got these amazing smart, talented postdocs that are doing 

their job for very little wages, I believe, and then they can get fired 

if they get pregnant, which is ridiculous. So you can finish a contract because, as a matter of fact, there are a lot of postdocs in 

fewer and fewer jobs from what I have read in all the testimony. 

They would not want to organize if they thought they were being 

taken care of by their employer, the University. So that is what I 

am—and I do not think you know if their bosses, their managers, 

their administrators—and I am not mad at PIs. They probably are 

just great, great people. But that does not mean they know how to 

do what you want them to do for individual reviews. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well quite honestly, that is another benefit that 

the University sees in terms of getting a settlement with regard to 

these negotiations and getting a contract. And I do want to point 

out that it has come up several times, and prominently, time off 

is one of the articles that we do have resolved and ready to go in 

the event of a settlement. But quite honestly, one of the benefits 

of getting this contract resolved is that we would have more structure around the exact types of issues that you have outlined. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So then that makes it even more important that 

that contract go forward, right? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We absolutely we want to get done as fast as we 

can. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Responsibly. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Congresswoman Lee? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. 
63 

Let me first ask Dr. Tyler a couple of questions. 

You know, I asked a staff to write down, I just wanted to know 

what $37,400 a year was based on an hourly wage. The information 

on the numbers that we have, and I want to thank you very much 

for this. Okay. If you work 40 hours a week it is $18 per hour. 

Sixty hours a week is about $12 per hour. And, of course, many 

postdocs work much longer hours. 

This is not even a living wage in the Bay Area, first of all. And 

I know that postdoc positions and postdoc scholars are not doing 

this for the money. But I also know that, and you shared your 

story, that you have to be able to live a decent life and take care 

of your families. And I am sure the University gets that and understands that. 

And so what concerns me now especially is what kind of competitive destination is the University of California for postdocs? Do you 

know? Are you aware of any movement of postdocs or recent PhDs 

to want to avoid UC Berkeley now based on this type of treatment? 

Ms. TYLER. Well, Congresswoman Lee, you have brought up some 

very good points. I have done those calculations, and I instantly try 

to forget how much I might potentially make per hour. It is incredibly depressing. 

It is a high cost of living area in the Bay Area. And because you 

are asking about comparisons, I will make a few. 

Mr. Duckett has brought up the NIH, and my apologies but since 

he brought it up, I would mention that NIH fellowships place restrictions on postdocs. I have to point out that the NIH guidelines 

for a person with my experience and my qualifications would give 

me about $5,000 more per year then I currently make. Okay. 

NIH is taken as a national standard for postdoc pay. That means 

that nationally UC does not look so good. 

Let me give you another example locally. My husband is also a 

postdoc. We graduated with PhDs, both of us from the same department at Duke University on the same day. We are in the same 

field. We do the same job. It is slightly different, it is a different 

aspect of plant science, but he works at Stanford. This year he is 

going to make $10,000 more per year than I will. 

So in terms of reputation, let me ask this. If you could do the 

same job with the same qualifications, live in the same geographic 

area and make $10,000 more by going to Stanford than UC Berkeley, where would you go? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Yes. So let me ask Mr. Duckett. Thank you very 

much, Dr. Tyler. 

Mr. Duckett, okay. Now you heard that. It is my understanding, 

and I wanted to ask you first of all if NIH knows what is going 

on, first of all. Because, you know, we do have a new Administration. And this Administration is very clear on the right to organize 

and union contracts, and fair wages. 

UC gets an overhead rate of 53 percent on federal contracts, 

which means that for every $1 million in federal funding for a specific professor’s lab research, we provide an additional $530,000 

that goes into the University’s unrestricted operating budget. In 

other words, 53 cents for every dollar is added to the University’s 

grant for postdoc scholars. 
64 

Since they do most of the research on these federal grants, I believe it is 90 percent of UC postdocs are paid by federal grants, 

their work is not only paying for themselves, but is bringing in substantial income, mind you substantial income to the University’s 

operating expenses. So how is it that you’ve taken this revenue 

generating function, how do you take this into account in terms of 

the dollars and cents when you bargain with the union? What is 

the deal? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, in terms of those numbers that you stated, 

not all of the overhead is accounted for for each individual. Those 

amounts vary by grant. They also can change going forward. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So give me what is the estimate then? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I could not—— 

Ms. WOOLSEY. A median? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I could not estimate across the board. There is—— 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Ten percent, 15, 20? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I really could not responsibly estimate. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. Well, we would like to get some information 

on it. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I do not understand the answer. She asked about the difference in the grants you said not all 

of the grants account for all the cost or all the overhead. I do not 

understand. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Not all the grants account for all the costs dollarfor-dollar, or all the overhead dollar-for-dollar and can change in 

subsequent years. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So the conclusion is what? 

Mr. DUCKETT. The conclusion is there is a significant amount of 

unpredictability in terms of what those dollars are and if they are 

going to continue to come into the University? 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Do you have a reserve fund 

among the $800 million? Do you have a reserve fund for contingencies in the overhead fund? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We do not have a reserve fund in terms of contingencies like that, no. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So this is a problem, but we 

do not set aside any money? 

Mr. DUCKETT. We would always get exactly what we have asked 

for and/or agreed to via the grant. These numbers change. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So Congresswoman Lee’s 53 

percent is an average or that is of every grant, or some grants? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. Where does it come from? 

Mr. DUCKETT. In terms of the number that Congresswoman Lee 

is referencing, if I could get on the same page as you. If this is 

something that we provided, I would like to see the source. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, it is based on information that we have, 

okay? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Okay. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. And I want you to tell me what you have, this 53 

percent. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Okay. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. This is what the University 

staff gave to the Committee staff. 
65 

Ms. WOOLSEY. And that is the information that we have. And so 

if it is not 53 percent, what is it? 

Mr. DUCKETT. The number varies, as I have said. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. From what to what? I mean, if you give us 53 percent, that is what we are operating under. I am sure that is what 

everyone is assuming. But if that is not accurate, then can you give 

us closer to what the percentage would be? 

Mr. DUCKETT. As I mentioned, the numbers do change depending 

on whether the grant is renewed at the same level year-to-year. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, would NIH have that information? 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I do not know what the arrangement is, how they figure out the overhead. We get a better 

deal from Blackwater than we get from here. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. Okay. Well, I would like to get a formal response to the panel in terms of what the overhead rate is. 

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will you yield to me for a minute for a 

question? 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. 

Ms. LEE. Well, Mr. Duckett, don’t you negotiate each of your contracts individually on the overhead? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes. Right now in terms of the questions around 

how grants are funded and what level at which overhead is accounted for across the system, and whether we actually get all the 

money that we ask for in each individual grant, that is really out 

of my realm of expertise. That would be more suitable to the research apparatus of the organization—— 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well it is either individual or there is an across 

board, like the NIH and University of California is 53 percent. I 

mean, I have heard that some of the Ivy League schools their overhead is 70 some percent. And you cannot tell us that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. The research organization would be better suited 

to answer that question. 

Ms. LEE. Well, they do not have any answers. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well then, Mr. Chairman, I am going to assume 

it is 53 percent. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is the information that 

was given to the Committee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Duckett, going back a little bit to why this is so complicated. The question of the paid directs, we have what? 6,500, is that Mr. Miller, roughly about 6,500 

people? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And my understanding is that 

the paid directs are about 300? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And then the fellows are 

about 600? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, 600 or 700, about that, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So while this is complex, it is 

not complex for the bulk of the people being employed like Ms. 

Tyler? 

Mr. MILLER. That is correct, yes. 
66 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. There is a fairly standard contract, is it not, from NIH or DOE? I mean, we have been doing this 

a long time. We have, obviously, stepped up the pace with the Recovery Act. But we have been doing this a long time. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And those contracts, if I understand them correctly, contain a cost of living, I assume for the 

contract not just for wages, but the contract to get it through if it 

is a three year—I do not know how long these contracts run? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. It is typically called an escalator. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. An escalator for the overall 

contract? 

Mr. MILLER. I—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Or just for wages and benefits? 

Mr. MILLER. It is broken out for different things. Wages and benefits, but also for other factors, equipment and things like that. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So if they put in an escalator 

for Dr. Tyler’s wages in the gross amount, the University would 

take 53 percent of that money out of that contract? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. Well, they do not take out of the contract. It 

is in addition to the contract. So in addition to, let us say that the 

contract was for $1 million, in Congresswoman’s Lee’s example the 

University would get that $1 million to fund what they call direct 

costs, salaries, equipment, et cetera, benefits. And then they would 

get an additional $530,000 in indirect costs or overhead, or facilities and administration costs. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So is that contract for a million and half, or is that a net million? 

Mr. MILLER. A million and a half. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. A million and a half? So when 

we had a conference at Princeton with the research university and 

they talked about setting up a million dollar lab, that was the cost 

of that lab. But we could expect that there would be another half 

a million dollars attached to that to administer that lab? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, I believe so. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So now we know that that 

money is taken off and used for general purposes in the university? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Is that right, Mr. Duckett? 

There is no restrictions on that money? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I am trying to think through so I can give you—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Well, let me ask it another 

way. That money is not exclusively used for the administration of 

that particular lab? 

Mr. DUCKETT. That money is not used for the particular—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. If it is given for overhead and 

administration? It is costing the taxpayer 53 percent to loan a million dollars for a lab, we were told that sort of the average of these 

would be about a million dollars to set them up in the context of 

the Recovery Act. And that is why we went forward. And nobody 

mentioned at that conference of the research universities that there 

was an add-on if what you are saying is correct, that that is on top 

of. And I just want to know then is that money used for the admin-
67 

istration of Dr. Tyler’s lab? Does that half million dollars go to administer that lab that her principal investigator is running with 

the other personnel that are part of that? 

Mr. DUCKETT. If the question is, is the overhead tied to that particular grant, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, is it used for that purpose? I know it is tied to that. 

Mr. DUCKETT. To my knowledge, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I think the information given 

to the Committee staff is that it is for the general purpose uses of 

the University. 

Mr. DUCKETT. For people working on those grants. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I do not think so. We will 

check it again. But I do not think that is the case at all. These 

would be really rich labs at that point. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. And they should get—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Again, on the complexity 

issue, my understanding is that when the University went before 

the Public Employees Relations Board, is it that they insisted that 

the paid directs be included in this unit. And that they said that 

none of these relationships, referring to the paid directs relationships with their employers, impair the ability of the union to bargain with the University about terms and conditions of employment 

in control of the University. 

So, you did not see that as a complex problem when you insisted 

they be part of this bargaining unit, but now they are complex 

problem, again for the solution and reaching an agreement. 

Mr. DUCKETT. As we have gone through the process we have 

learned more about this particular group. And learned that the 

complexity—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. You have been working with 

these people for years. The paid directs apparently are not a mystery. In many instances, are they not foreign governments? They 

send people here because they would like to have them come attend 

the University of California and participate and get into the community of their area of research or expertise. So, I mean, it’s a 

good—we get their brains, and they get the exposure that they are 

seeking. So this has been going on a long time. But now all of a 

sudden they become a problem and now when we look at their individual contracts. But that goes on all the time. I mean, they are 

intermingled in these other labs, but their sources of funding are 

restricted and who can contribute to those sources, I understand 

are restricted. But that is a known entity. That is the way these 

programs have been set up. And there is only 300 of them. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Our numbers are a little different. We estimate it 

is more like nine percent. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, this is your number in 

filing before the Public Employees Board. It is not my number. 

This is on the University of California letterhead, signed by whoever made the petition. 

Mr. DUCKETT. We estimate our current numbers to be about nine 

percent. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So we are doing better than 

we thought? Okay. In attracting these people? 
68 

Excuse me one minute here. 

So again, just quickly, on the paid directs as far as you know no 

state monies have been used to augment those contracts if they are 

found lacking? I do not think they have access to the federal 

money. I think that is prohibited by the terms of their contract or 

the use of the federal money. I think that is correct, is that right? 

Excuse me. 

Mr. Miller, you are shaking your head. 

Mr. MILLER. I do not think that that is correct, no. I think there 

is a number of paid directs, you know often times you will have a 

partial appointment as a paid direct and then you will have an appointment as a postdoctoral scholar employee, the first category in 

Mr. Duckett’s testimony of postdocs. And those folks are typically 

when you are drawing a salary as a postdoctoral scholar employee, 

you draw a salary as a direct cost off the contractor or grant. The 

overwhelming majority of funding that goes to pay for postdocs 

comes from federal contracts and grants. 

And it is extremely unlikely that the pay would ever come from 

State of California general funds. It may come from a State of California research contractor grant. But most likely, it is going to 

come from a federal contractor grant. And we have not seen a case 

yet, although we have asked for it a number times, of a 

postdoctoral scholar paid direct being funded with State of California general fund money. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. You have not see that? 

Mr. MILLER. No, we have not. 

Mr. DUCKETT. If I may ask? 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. 

Mr. DUCKETT. The prospect of across the board increases for all 

postdocs being done at a certain level, as a more or less one size 

fits all approach, does raise a risk of that happening and us having 

a situation where we have funds that are scheduled by the contract 

to be paid out to paid directs that are not accounted for in paid directs’ contracts that would have to be made up by some other 

source. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate you saying that, 

but you present the one size fit all, but you can continue to present 

the one size fits all on the basis that no information has yet been 

delivered, so that then the negotiators could make a determination 

of whether or not this has to be a different kind or perhaps unique 

contract taking into consideration federal restrictions, foreign funding restrictions, state restrictions. However, but we do not get to 

know that at this point. So you can keep throwing that up, but you 

are the one that holds the information. And withholding the information and then continuing to say this is just about one size fits 

all really does disservice to the idea of good faith bargaining. You 

just can’t continue to hold it out. 

You know, it seems to me that the information again that we are 

looking at is what are the restrictions and sources of funding for 

these postdocs. How the raises might affect those categories? What 

is allowed, what is not allowed? And what is the impact supposedly 

because there is some threat to the University finances, although 

you got $800 million in overhead, how does that affect the University’s finances? 
69 

Apparently there is insufficient evidence on the table so people 

can have a discussion about those facts. We have to have this discussion in the absence of those facts. 

A year ago the President of the University tells me that that is 

all coming along fine; the costing exercises I think is the term. 

Congresswoman Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I am ready. Thank you. You can catch your 

breath. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. No, I just—— 

Ms. WOOLSEY. It is depressing. 

Dr. Tyler, my questions are mostly for you, but I am sure Mr. 

Duckett, you will be part of this. 

I am the author of legislation in the Congress called Go Girl. Because I want to get more women into science, math, technology and 

engineering. I cannot imagine why Go Girl is not really to get more 

women into gardening. I mean, they make a lot more money than 

what you are telling us. So, I mean, I am really finding this frustrating. It is like, what am I doing to these young women. 

So the world is changing slightly. For heaven sakes, in health 

care being a woman is no longer a preexisting condition, and our 

Speaker made that happen. So we are glad of that. 

Now we want being a woman not being a negative condition in 

employment as well. I mean, we are in the 21st century. Why are 

we even talking like this, this is what I cannot believe. 

Your husband’s $10,000 more salary, equivalent everything between the two of you except for two different institutions and you 

are a female and he is a male. Is his higher salary, does it have 

anything to do with his being a male? Are your male colleagues at 

UC paid what you are paid? 

Ms. TYLER. Yes. And that is part of the point that it is not just 

me, and it is not just women, although my husband certainly did 

not have to take a leave and a huge pay cut because he had to give 

birth to a child and recover from that. but it is an issue for everybody. 

My male counterparts in similar positions are paid the same. 

And so what if you have two parents who are UC Berkeley 

postdocs? That is really hard. 

And the thing is that I have colleagues, male and female, who 

say maybe I should just quit science and go work at Home Depot. 

Because I have heard they are a pretty good employer. And the sad 

thing is, they are only half joking. 

And so I really appreciate all of the initiatives and the programs 

and encouragement that young women in science get these days. 

Unfortunately, we cannot promise them very much. Do we really 

tell them you get to slog through graduate school for five, six, seven 

years, who knows how long, and then you get to be a postdoc. And 

you get to pray that you get a job, a decent job in your field. 

So these policies do not take that into account. They do not take 

into account who postdocs are. They are people with PhDs, and 

that means for those of us who have decided to have children, we 

have usually waited until we finish graduate school. If we wait 

much longer, biologically speaking, it can be too late. 

From another perspective, I am in my mid-30s. I do not earn Social Security credits. I am not eligible for my employer’s retirement 
70 

plan. We do have a defined contribution plan, but that is entirely 

different. If I lose my job, I am not eligible for unemployment benefits. My salary is so low that I cannot afford to save for those 

things on my own. 

So what are we telling the young men and women who are thinking about science as a career? We are saying to them get a PhD 

and in terms of financial independence and security, you will be 

about a decade behind your peers who started working right out of 

college. That is not very attractive. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I will end. I cannot have anything 

to ask beyond that. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Congresswoman Lee? 

Ms. LEE. You know, this is pretty demoralizing, to say the least. 

Because, you know over the years I have been involved in a lot of 

labor negotiations in many industries. And I have found that when 

negotiations are just about money, it is usually possible to reach 

a compromise. But where negotiations do bog down, it is not mostly 

about money, but about power, about ideology, maybe ego. And so 

I am wondering about UC in terms of some idealogy maybe behind 

all of this. And is it really not about just the money? And are there 

some areas where you just will not compromise on, or is it really 

about affordability? 

Now, we talked about, and you mentioned 29 of the 35 areas 

have been resolved. But you know what? Let me just read the remaining issues that are outstanding, though. 

I wish John were here to hear this. 

Wages is one of those that is outstanding. 

Health benefits. 

Appointment rights. 

Job security, that is an outstanding issue. 

And the right to respect other union’s picket lines. 

Now if these are the outstanding issues then I cannot figure out 

what the other 29 were. 

And so can you kind of walk us through very quickly the University’s perspective on these specific negotiations, and then I guess 

in general? Because we have seen again, as I mentioned earlier, 

contracting out, decertification processes possibly taking place. 

What is going on at my alma mater? 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, let me just comment. And again, I will point 

out that one of the articles that is settled that we have talked 

about a lot related to the birth of a child is time off from work, 

which is very important. I think we all acknowledge that. 

We have resolved things like union security, making sure that 

the union is acknowledged and can collect dues. 

We have done professional development in making sure that people have the ability to move through the organization to a higher 

level. 

We have resolved discipline; the reasons why you can sort of be 

disciplined or ultimately keep your job or be dismissed from your 

job, which is very important also. 

And we have also resolved the essential piece of most contracts, 

which is the grievance and arbitration procedure. 

So those are just examples. 
71 

So the articles that we have resolved are not small. And acknowledging that we do have a way to go, and some of the ones that you 

have mentioned are very important to people; wages or money and 

benefits being another form of currency or money is important also. 

Layoffs, again, money and/or strike provisions, which is another 

item. 

In terms of asking about the University of California’s position 

with regard to collective bargaining and unions, employees have 

the right to choose a third party representative. This particular 

group of employee has chosen the UAW to represent them. And 

that question as it relates to actions by the University, whether or 

not the University is trying to decertify a union. 

And by the way, the University cannot decertify a union and cannot decertify the UAW in the postdocs. That is a employee choice 

and it is driven by employees. We are neutral, absolutely neutral 

on terms of the right for people to be represented by a union and 

make that choice, and to make the choice not to be represented. 

Ms. LEE. Excuse me, Mr. Duckett. I think I have seen a pattern 

of practice here in the past. Continue. 

Mr. DUCKETT. Well, I will point to our pattern of having resolved 

contracts and closed contracts with most of our unions. And with 

regard to the UAW having negotiated a successful first contract for 

the graduate students and successor agreements after that. So 

there is no fundamental ideological or philosophical opposition to 

unionization within the University of California. We continue to 

bargain in good faith. We are continuing in good faith with regard 

to this process. And we will continue in good faith with regard to 

this particular negotiation going forward. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, 

Mr. Miller, was there some dissemination of the list of the bargaining unit around this issue of decertification? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. What happened? 

Mr. MILLER. In early December 2009 an individual contacted 

Gayle Saxton, the University’s chief negotiator, and according to 

Gayle talking to me, to inform her that he intended to try to decertify the UAW as the union for postdocs. And she gave him the list. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. This was a member of the bargaining unit? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Is that normal? I do not know 

how it plays out ordinarily. 

Mr. MILLER. That is the first time I have experienced that. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I mean, is that a normal and 

neutral position? Mr. Duckett, just referred—— 

Mr. MILLER. No, I do not think it is a neutral. I certainly would 

not give—if I were bargaining with the union, putting myself in 

their position, I would not just hand over the list to someone who 

wanted to decertify the union. If I wanted to engage in cooperative 

productive collective bargaining with them, no, I would not do that. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. How does that person go 

about getting a list? If a member of the unit decides they want to 

decertify the union, how would they ordinarily do that? 
72 

Mr. MILLER. Well, they could get the information themselves. 

Part of what the University communicated to this individual is that 

they could find—they said here’s the list of postdocs, and you can 

find their email in most University directories. So you could go and 

find the people in the University directory. 

You could also file an information request with the University’s 

Public Information Office under the California Public Records Act. 

And that is a process that typically takes, you know weeks if not 

months, and you have to fill out the right forms and dot your I’s 

and cross your T’s to get information under that statute. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Ferguson, I know you do 

not have all of the facts here in this group. But it would seem to 

me that any discussion of participation in decertification by one 

side to the negotiations, I mean the purpose of decertification is 

sort of the elimination of the other side and then you go on about 

your business. I mean, when an employer decides that they have 

had enough, they try to get rid of that unit and then somebody else 

will have to try to get a first contract or get the rights to seek that. 

But what is typical here? 

Mr. FERGUSON. This is rare. It is not common for an employer 

that is committed to neutral bargaining. So consider the case, for 

example, of the University of California where there is a process 

for requesting public information, like a list of postdocs. You know, 

it makes sense that an employer that was insistent on having a 

neutral position in such bargaining would refer someone to that 

public process to get the information on the list of postdoctoral candidates. In that case, the University is complying with its procedures, but it is not taking any exceptional steps to help that person 

with their request to decertify the union. 

Seeing the University go above and beyond that, I will stress 

that I am not a lawyer, but that is at least unusual in the context 

of a bargaining situation where you are trying to maintain your 

own neutrality. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Barbara, do you have any further questions you want to ask? 

Ms. LEE. Well, one question. Let me just ask Mr. Duckett again, 

the contract with your 12,000 graduate student employees granted 

graduate students the right to respect a union’s picket lines. And 

so I am trying to understand why this same issue is still one of the 

outstanding issues and a stumbling block? 

Mr. DUCKETT. I do not know if I would characterize it as a stumbling block in and of itself. It is just another issue that we have 

to go through and negotiate on. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. That cannot be taken off the table then? Okay. I 

got it. I understand. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller, let me ask you a question. Have you been told by the 

University that the data that in fact relates to these costing exercises and these various different research funding sources, that 

that data is simply not available? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. Well, that it is not collected and tracked in any 

sort of central—— 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. They do not know how to retrieve it? 
73 

Mr. MILLER. Right. Correct. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So because of their inability to 

retrieve this information, where do we go from here? Why did they 

not say this a year ago? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Duckett? 

Mr. DUCKETT. First off, I do not think we have said that it is impossible to get. What I have tried to emphasize is that we continue 

to work to get it, and will continue to work to get it. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. But we are looking for 

cold fusion too. 

Mr. Miller, what is the conversation you have had? 

Mr. MILLER. Well, when this was raised to us on the session that 

we had on April 15th and April 16th, I said it was unbelievable 

that this would come up this late in the process, that this issue 

would come up this late in the process. So I raised the fact that 

the University insisted that the paid directs be put in the unit back 

in 2008. And that given that insistence, we had assumed that they 

had started tracking this information at that point in time. 

The University negotiator, Ms. Saxton, said well we did not and 

it is incredibly complicated to do that, and it costs a lot of money 

and you know what a difficult time the University has been having 

financially over this period of time. We just do not have the resources to put together the system to track that information. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. What about the overhead in 

administration of the grants, would this be a proper line item for 

that $800 million? 

Mr. MILLER. In my opinion, yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. My understanding is sitting in 

Washington, and we hear it all the time, that this is a big deal to 

secure these grants. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And so that $800 million is a 

major source of revenue for some purposes, we have a little dispute 

here, but our understanding is it can be used for any general purpose of the University. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. If I may, Mr. Chairman, the whole thing feels 

to me a lot like an excuse. It just does not seem that difficult to 

get this information and to get it quickly. 

You know, there is a person, as Mr. Duckett pointed out, in every 

department or research organization on campus that keeps track of 

this. For example, they have to when a postdoctoral paid direct 

comes into the University, someone has to make the determination, 

even according to the University’s current policy, is the amount of 

money you are getting from your extramural funding agency sufficient, does it meet our minimum salary threshold? If the answer 

is yes, then the University does not have to contribute what they 

call a supplement to bring that individual up to that standard. 

If what they are getting from their extramural agency is below 

the minimum threshold established by UC policy, the University 

then has to go into the payroll system and give the person a supplement in a different title to bring them up to that level. 

So somewhere, somebody is making that determination in every 

department and research organization on every campus. 
74 

Mr. Duckett is a powerful man. Mr. Duckett, if he wanted to, 

could direct all those people on all those campuses through the HR 

office on each campus, which are coordinated by his office at the 

Office of the President, to collect that information. And they do not 

need to build a sophisticated fancy payroll system to do it or information system to do it, they could put it on a spreadsheet. They 

could put it on a Goggle doc on the internet. And each person in 

each department could just go on that spreadsheet, put in the person’s name, their employee ID number, whatever other identifying 

information they need, and put their salary and whatever other relevant information is deemed necessary. That could be done in a 

week’s time. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I always worry when a lot of 

euphemisms enter a system. And politics is a great one for this. 

But this idea that there is somehow 53 percent of the overhead for 

the administration and expenses of these grants and after decades 

of being engaged with these grants, we cannot get basic information on what the status is of these individuals, and that is now 

used to suggest that we cannot go forward in the bargaining. 

I appreciate you never admit you cannot go forward. But if you 

cannot provide the information in the complex—and you used ‘‘complexity’’ in your testimony, how complex this is and that it is a 

threat to the University system; if you do not have the information, 

how do you go forward if that is the threat to the University that 

we cannot do this because this is such a terrible threat. And I 

think from the Washington side I want to know if we are awarding 

grants to people who cannot tell us anything about the grants, the 

administration of the grants, what the hell are they doing with the 

53 percent overhead? I mean, I think it is fundamental. 

You know the Speaker tasked me almost four years ago with an 

innovation agenda. And we met with major universities all over 

country, and we have gathered people all over. And we have prepared ourselves for the Recovery Act. And we made the largest increase in research and development for labs like Dr. Tyler’s in the 

history of this country. But little did we, I guess, recognize, and 

maybe I am not on the committee of jurisdiction, but I did not 

know that Ms. Tyler was not going to get Social Security credits. 

I thought these were things that we sort of settled decades ago. 

But we will have to go back and look at it from the Washington 

side. Because something is very, very wrong here. 

Congresswoman Lee raised this issue at the beginning of this 

hearing, and I just have to concur in that. 

Let me just ask, because again this goes to President Yudof’s representation to our delegation, to the California Delegation. Mr. Miller, when the UAW asked the UC system to provide samples of 

funding agreement and language contained in this because of this 

so called problem, have you received any of those to date? 

Mr. MILLER. No, I do not think so. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. When the UAW asked for 

data quantifying the number of postdocs affected by this problem 

and the dollar amounts involved, they told you there is no way to 

make that calculation now? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, that is true. 
75 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is the conversation you 

are referring to earlier? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. When you first requested the 

information in December 2008 regarding the postdoc salary and stipend rates broken down by source, and funding language, and outside funding agreements, history of salary agreements, and various 

categories of the funders or more, that request has been repeated 

numerous times by you, I believe it was also repeated by our delegation, that has not been forthcoming? 

Mr. MILLER. We have gotten a very small fraction of that information on a few campuses but nothing comprehensive for the entire unit, no. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. It is not sufficient to go forward in the negotiations, or it is, or can you—— 

Mr. MILLER. We think that it is sufficient to go forward. We do 

not, you know think it is such a big deal to settle the contract. I 

mean, the University just settled a huge contract with another 

union, the CWA, who represents the researchers and the techs who 

work side-by-side with the postdocs and get funded off the same 

grants as the postdocs. And they were able to, you know with all 

the complexity of all the different labs and all the different projects 

that those people work on right along with the postdocs, they were 

able to settle that with significant guaranteed salary increases 

across the board and steps in each of the next three years. So if 

it is easy enough to figure out in that context, it is easy enough 

to figure out in this context. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. In his response to us, President Yudof says that ‘‘the union’s proposals carry substantial financial implications for the University at this time. We are already severely strained, underfunded like many public agencies across California.’’ The suggestion is that somehow this has impacts related 

to the state funding and puts that at jeopardy because of the cost 

of this, again even though most of these grants carry escalators 

with them. And in fact, it is insisted by the University that they 

be written with an escalator in them and it is insisted by them 

coming the other way, that they have an escalator. So this money 

theoretically is in these grants if you can deal with it under the 

constraints of how the grants are used and how people are funded, 

is that correct? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. So I just want you to know 

you are not alone, because the Committee, the staff has been asking for direct information from the University, from the President’s 

office, from the rest of the University administration exactly how 

the issues under negotiation would impact state general funds. 

Just so you know you’re not alone, we have not received an answer 

in two months. And yet this is constantly thrown out in the press 

that this is somehow a grave risk to the University. And I say that 

recognizing two different stories here. One where the University is 

taking these grants and taking that overhead and using it to subsidize the rest of the operation because of the state funding problems, or as Mr. Duckett points out, it cannot be used. And I do not 
76 

know what in the hell they are doing with it, in a trust account 

or something. i do not know. 

But the fact of the matter is apparently wherever you come to 

get information, you cannot get it. And I do not know, maybe we 

have to go to the subpoena operation. Because I think this raises 

serious questions of integrity by these grants and the administration of these grants. And I am deeply concerned about this, because 

I am in such strong favor of funding people like Dr. Tyler. And so 

many people who have such talent. And the excitement in the research universities when we made this, when the Administration 

and the Congress made this proposal and it became law about 

what this would mean to our economic future, to our scientific discovery, to innovation and to economic growth, that that is where 

it all comes from. It comes from the discovery and the innovation 

and resulting growth. And now to see that this is how this is being 

administered, I think it would be a grave disappointment to people. 

And I am just so disappointed because it is my alma mater too, 

that this University is riding the point on this kind of issue, of this 

issue of public trust. It is just beyond the pale, as far as I am concerned. 

And to continue to use the complexity and the lack of information, and then to find out a year later not only we cannot get the 

information, you cannot get the information, they cannot get the information. They just waited a year to tell you. And then we see 

perhaps subtle efforts at decertification. 

This is really disingenuous. It is really an outrage for the taxpayers. It is an outrage for policy makers. And certainly for people 

at the University, the postdocs who are working at this. 

Congresswoman Lee? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Chairman, I know we are bringing this to a close. 

I think that it is very clear. We are on to what is going on, and 

it has to change. Because, you see, there are a lot of universities 

that want grants from the Federal Government. And we want 

those grants to go to the programs that are going to take care of 

their employees. 

So, make it happen. You can. I know you can. 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, let me just first in closing my remarks, thank you very much for this hearing and for giving us the 

opportunity to dig deeper. And I hope that we have learned from 

today as a part now of the public record, will really provide the impetus for you getting this resolved. Otherwise, there are a variety 

of efforts that we need to discuss as we leave this hearing. 

It is so disappointing for many of us for many reasons. Of course, 

first, just in terms of fairness and justice. That is not being served. 

$18 an hour for a postdoc scholar is just outrageous. And I agree, 

Congresswoman Woolsey, your Go Girl legislation, we got to go 

back to the drawing board unless we can get this resolved as quickly as possible. 

Finally, let me just say, some of us do not even go to our own 

alma mater. We will not go on campus. I have not been on campus 

in several years. And really it pains me not to be able to go on my 

own campus because of not only this issue, but many issues that 

have not been resolved yet. And so I hope we can take this one off 

the table soon and just work down through the list so that we can 
77 

return to our great university. Because until then, we just will not 

go, unfortunately. 

I just want to take a moment to thank my colleagues. 

And also, let me just thank the Berkeley City College. This is a 

beautiful green facility. Dr. Betty Inclan is the President. 

And all of you for being here today. Because this is an example 

of what we have to do, as not only legislators in Washington, D.C., 

but really as members of Congress who love their constituents 

deeply, who love their universities and who want to see these universities continue to be the most outstanding in the world. And 

issues like this really can tarnish that reputation. 

So thank you again, Chairman Miller. 

Chairman MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

I want to join you in thanking Berkeley City College and certain 

all the staff of the Committee on both sides of the aisle for their 

participation, for the witnesses and for many in the audience who 

sat through this. 

When we started this case study, as you heard in our initial 

statements, it was a study about first contracts and it continues to 

remain so. But clearly today raises many policy considerations beyond the question of the first contract. And I find them deeply disturbing. 

As Chairman of the Education Committee and the Chair of the 

Democratic Policy Committee I meet all of the time with leaders 

from the research university community, from the overall higher 

education community, with business leaders from all different sectors of the economy, with economists and all of them tell us that 

the key to America going forward is we have to increase the numbers, the skills and the talent of people going into science and engineering and mathematics. And that is a goal of this Administration. It is a goal of the Congress with the COMPETES Act. We took 

the wonderful work done by Mr. Augustine and ‘‘Rising Above the 

Storm’’ and really placed a bet here. And I am deeply concerned 

that this is playing out almost in a labor market where while they 

tell us we have to dramatically increase the numbers of people in 

this country that graduate and go on to advanced degrees, that it 

appears almost that there is an excess when it comes to the idea 

of what you are going to pay these individuals to go through a very 

important portal in terms of their career opportunities later on. 

This is a big deal to have a postdoc. But then to suggest that somehow when we keep saying how are we going to encourage people 

to go in to the STEM field, how are we going to recruit them, how 

are we going to retrain them, how are we going to have them go 

forward? Well certainly if more of them knew Ms. Tyler’s case and 

other postdoc’s case, it would be much more difficult. And it is almost as if we are toying with some of the brightest, most talented, 

skilled people in our society because they are in a position where 

there is a bit of a surplus for those particular positions. Not overall 

in the economy, and not everybody is going to get to be a postdoc. 

That is not the issue here. 

But I really worry that the University’s participating in that 

kind of treatment. And it is not just this University. And I say this 

very guardedly. I was in the Congress when this became an issue 

once before, and it was not pretty. But this raises serious questions 
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about the underlying policy with respect to the issues that I have 

raised, that my colleagues have raised about health care, about Social Security, about pensions, about liveable wages. And if the suggestion is we are going to subsidize the acceleration of America’s 

excellence and talents on the backs of these very talented individuals, something is very upside down in the university community. 

Very upside down. 

And we plan to continue to pursue this on both fronts, both from 

the case study of the difficulty of first contracts. It is not unique 

to the university setting. It is in the private sector. It is in other 

public settings. And that is part of the jurisdiction of this Committee. 

The policy questions around the use and abuse of these grants 

I think is a larger issue for the Congress beyond just this Committee of the Congress. 

Finally, housekeeping. If anybody lost their keys in the bathrooms, in one of the bathrooms, check your pockets. Last chance. 

They’re up here on the table. 

Thank you very much for your contributions. 

Without objection, the witnesses will have 14 days to submit additional materials for questions of the hearing from members of 

Congress. 

And again, I also said that people who are hearing this or are 

here in the audience, we would certainly welcome your submissions 

of information and fact that might be helpful to the Committee. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, my colleagues. 

[Questions submitted for the record and their responses follow:] 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, May 7, 2010. 

Mr. DWAINE B. DUCKETT, Vice President of Human Resources, 

University of California, Oakland, CA 94607 

DEAR MR. DUCKETT: Thank you for testifying at the Friday, April 30, 2010, Committee on Education and Labor field hearing on ‘‘Understanding Problems in First 

Contract Negotiations: Post-Doctoral Scholar Bargaining at the University of California’’ in Berkeley, California. 

I have additional questions for which I would like written responses from you for 

the hearing record: 

1. On September 5, 2008, UC submitted to the PERB a 13-page brief discussing 

the intricacies of Paid-Directs’ funding and compensation, and insisting that they 

were so similar to other postdocs that they must be included in the bargaining unit, 

despite UAW objections to the contrary. The UC’s memo goes through every major 

issue of compensation—including salary and stipend; sick leave; time off; childbearing, parental and family medical leave; retirement; terms of service; and appointment percentage—and, one by one and in detail, explained why there is no significant difference between Paid Directs and other postdocs in terms of these issues. 

UC’s General Counsel emphasized that ‘‘[University] policy acknowledges that 

there are three different types of Postdoctoral Scholars and the difference is their 

source of funding. However, other than the source of funding and in some instances 

eligibility for certain benefits, all of their terms and conditions of employment are 

the same.’’ UC obviously conducted an intensive examination of Paid Directs’ funding sources and the agreements governing their compensation—exactly the type of 

information the University now claims to lack—in preparing its September 2008 

PERB brief. UC identifies by name sixteen representative sources of Paid Direct 

funding and quotes repeatedly from the documents governing postdoc payments by 

these sponsoring agencies. UC concludes this detailed analysis by proclaiming that 

‘‘none of these relationships impair the ability of the Union to bargain with the University about the terms and conditions of employment within the control of the university.’’ (emphasis added) 
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When asked at the field hearing about the apparent change in UC’s position from 

its PERB filing about the differences between paid directs and other postdoc scholars, you stated that, as UC has gone through the bargaining process, UC learned 

more about this group of postdocs. 

Please explain what specific pieces of information the University has acquired 

since September 2008, not known at the time of UC’s submission to the PERB, that 

make it unable to stand by its brief. 

2. In its September 2008 brief to the PERB, UC stated that there are a total of 

5,500 Postdoctoral Scholars, including approximately 300 Paid Directs. 

At the field hearing, you stated that UC estimates that Paid Directs constitute 

9 percent of the total postdoc workforce. 

(a) What is the total number of Paid Directs currently employed at UC? 

(b) Of that number, what is the number for which UC has collected information 

needed for bargaining purposes to date? 

3. In its September 2008 brief to the PERB, UC explained that ‘‘some of the Paid 

Directs have a dual appointment and hold an Employee Postdoctoral Scholar title 

as well. These employees are in both titles because it is the University’s policy to 

ensure that all Postdoctoral Scholars receive the same pay. Thus, if a Paid Direct’s 

stipend is not sufficient to meet the University’s salary scale, the Paid Direct will 

receive the difference and be appointed to the Employee title at an appointment rate 

based on the salary differential.’’ Since no witnesses were aware of any state general 

funds ever being used to raise Paid Direct’s compensation to the University’s salary 

scale, we understand that such individuals receive their salary augmentations 

through other funding. 

(a) Please confirm whether state general funds have ever been used in the last 

ten years to provide the differential for any Paid Direct’s compensation. 

(b) What number of Paid Directs currently hold dual appointments as Employee 

Postdoctoral Scholars? 

4. On May 19, 2009, UC President Yudof wrote to me that UC’s bargaining ‘‘team 

continues to make every effort to address the issues raised by the UAW.’’ He also 

said, ‘‘This set of negotiations for an initial contract requires careful review * * *’’ 

and that UC looked forward to reaching an agreement ‘‘in a cooperative and timely 

manner.’’ On July 2, 2009, UC Vice President for Federal Governmental Relations 

Gary Falle wrote to me with an update on the negotiations. There, he said, ‘‘In late 

May, the UAW presented the University with detailed wage and benefits proposals. 

The University is in the process of conducting a preliminary review and costing exercises to assess the economic impact of these proposals.’’ In a June 2009 update 

on bargaining, UC told the public that it was ‘‘costing the Union’s demands and will 

have responses to the Union’s proposals after the costing is done.’’ As of the field 

hearing, nearly a year after these statements, it appears that these cost exercises 

remain unavailable. 

(a) Have these costing exercises actually begun? 

(b) When did these costing exercises actually begin? 

(c) Were these costing exercises underway as of June 2009 or July 2, 2009? 

(d) If so, how were they underway? 

(e) Were these costing exercises abandoned at any point? 

i. And if so, when was the decision made to abandon such exercises? 

ii. And why was no announcement of that decision made to the union, the community or the Congress? 

(f) If such costing exercises were or are underway, please explain who requested 

the costing exercises and which offices and individuals were directly responsible for 

carrying them out. 

i. Please explain what information has been compiled and what calculations made 

as part of those exercises. 

ii. Please explain how often, between June 2009 and today, the party responsible 

for carrying out the exercises has issued reports on those exercises. 

5. With respect to grants under which postdocs work, what oversight does the 

University conduct, specifically what data is regularly collected and what reports 

are regularly compiled, and by which offices within the University, to (1) account 

for all grants received, (2) account for the terms and conditions imposed upon use 

of grant money by each grant, and (3) account for how the money is spent on each 

grant? 

Please send your written response to Gordon Lafer of the Committee on Education 

and Labor staff at gordon.lafer@mail.house.gov by COB on Friday, May 14, 2010— 

the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please 
80 

contact Mr. Lafer at 202-225-3725. Once again, we greatly appreciate your testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 
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[Additional submission of Mr. Ferguson follows:] 
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[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.] 

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