alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.10

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of
the Frontier Diversified Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned hereby
certifies, to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Frontier Diversified Series.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                                                                                                          
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert J. Enck                                                                                                                                                        
|Robert J. Enck President
and Chief Executive Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of the Frontier Diversified Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|                                                                                                                                                                          
|/s/ Brent Bales                                                                                                                                                           
|Brent Bales Chief Financial
Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of the Frontier Diversified Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund                 

Date: May 12, 2011
No. 47953.

#### Protests 662580-G, etc., of Henry Pollak, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

It was stipulated that certain of the hats in question are similar to those involved in *Caradine*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 69, C. D. 664). In accordance therewith, some of them were held dutiable at 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 1504 (b) (5), and those imported or withdrawn from warehouse subsequent to the Netherlands Trade Agreement (T. D. 48075) were held dutiable at only *12%*percent under paragraph 1504 (b) (5). Protests sustained to that extent.
(Reap. Dec. 8568)

#### Nelson Bead Co., Inc. *v.*United States

Entry Nos. 755783; 755111.

(Decided April 20, 1956)

*Siegel, Mandell & Davidson*for the plaintiff.

*George S. Leonard,*Acting Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

*553Wilson, Judge:

These appeals for reappraisement have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties hereto, subject to the approval of the Court, that the merchandise and the issues in the Appeals to Reappraisement listed above are the same in all material respects as the merchandise and the issues decided in the case of *United States*v. *Nelson Bead Co.,*C. A. D. 590, and that the record in said case be incorporated and made a part of the record herein.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the appraised values of the merchandise covered by the Appeals to Reappraisement listed above, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the Appraiser in similar cases, is equal to the market value or the price at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, and that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar merchandise.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the cases may be submitted on the foregoing stipulation.

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values were the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mario Tilghman, Appellant.

[635 NYS2d 503]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuífner, J.), rendered April 20, 1993, convicting him of attempted robbery in the second degree and resisting arrest, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738) in which he moves to be relieved of the assignment to prosecute this appeal.

Ordered that the motion is granted, Michael D. Marino is relieved as attorney for the defendant, the brief filed by him on behalf of the defendant is stricken, and he is directed to turn over all papers in his possession to new counsel assigned herein; and it is further

Ordered that Susan Marhoffer, Esq. P.O. Box 784 White Plains, N. Y. 10604, is assigned as counsel to perfect the appeal; and it is further

Ordered that the People are directed to furnish a copy of the stenographic minutes to the new assigned counsel; and it is further

Ordered that new counsel shall serve and file a brief on behalf of the defendant within 90 days of the date of this decision and order and the People shall serve and file their brief within 120 days of the date of this decision and order; by prior decision and order of this Court, the defendant was granted leave to prosecute the appeal on the original papers (including the typewritten stenographic minutes) and on the typewritten briefs of the parties, who were directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on one another.

The defendant’s assigned counsel has submitted a brief in which he concludes that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be raised on appeal. The People suggest in their brief that there may be preserved, nonfrivolous issues regarding the court’s charge. Based on this Court’s independent review of the rec*670ord, we cannot conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Under these circumstances, the motion of the defendant’s assigned counsel to be relieved as counsel is granted and new appellate counsel is assigned *(see, People v Davis,*73 NY2d 864; *People v Casiano,*67 NY2d 906; *People v Brown,*199 AD2d 327; *People v*Pritchett, 149 AD2d 741). Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.
#### Sarah *W.*Shaw v. Humphrey Shaw.

A decree granting a divorce from fcbo bonds of matrimony is a final decree, from which an appeal will lie to this Court, although by the same decree a reference is ordered on the question of temporary alimony.

*Heard and Decided April*1*6th.*

Appeal from Macomb Circuit in Chancery.

The bill was for a divorce, from the bonds of matrimony. The decree granted the divorce, and also provided that defendant pay to complainant a certain amount for permanent alimony, and the costs, “and also what sum or sums of money may be just and reasonable in addition to the sum that has been paid for the support of the said complainant during the pendency of this suit, and the necessary expenses over and above the taxable costs in prosecuting the same;” and directed a reference to a Circuit Court Commissioner “to inquire what would be a reasonable sum to be allowed to the said complainant during the pendency. of this suit, and also what would be a reasonable sum to be .allowed to said complainant over and above the taxable costs to enable her to prosecute and defray the necessary costs, and expenses thereof, ” and to report thereon.

(?. *Hubbard,*for appellee,

moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this was not a *final*decree from which an appeal would lie, within the decisions in *Caswell v.*Comstock, 6 *Mich.*291, and cases cited in note.

*II. D.*Terry, contra.

*165The Court

denied the motion; holding that, as the issue raised by the pleadings was finally disposed of by the decree, the right of appeal was not affected by the reference on the collateral question of alimony.
#### BUNCKLEY et al. v. SCOTTISH-AMERICAN MORTGAGE CO., Limited.†

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 14, 1911.)

No. 2,070.

Aliens (§ 12*) — Right to Hold Land — Construction or Statute.

. Under Code Miss. 1906, § 2768, which prohibits nonresident aliens from acquiring or holding land, but provides that they may take a lien on land to secure a debt, and at a sale to enforce payment of the debt may purchase the land and hold it not longer than 20 years, with full power during that time to sell it to a citizen, a nonresident alien so purchasing lands in Mississippi becomes the legal owner, with the right to all the protection and defenses of its title and possession available to other landowners, and subject only to the right of the state to escheat the same after 20 years.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. § 12.*]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the South■ern District of Mississippi.

Suit in equity by A. N. Bunckley and others against the Scottish-American Mortgage Company, Limited. Decree for defendant, and -complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

*784Theo. McKnight, for appellants.

Caruthers Ewing, for appellee.

Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

*

For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

†

 Rehearing denied April 11, 1911,

PER CURIAM.

After full argument, we have carefully examined the record in this case, in the light of the numerous assignments of error and the very exhaustive briefs furnished, and we are satisfied that none of the assignments point out reversible error.

The only debatable proposition is in regard to the appellee’s rights as an alien owner of title to the lands in controversy, as to which we conclude that, under section 2768, Code of Mississippi of 1906, and other sections cognate thereto, the appellee, having acquired the lands by purchase at a sale to enforce the payment of a lien debt legally held by it, is the legal owner and holder, subject only to the right of the state to escheat the same after 20 years’ holding, and that, as such ownér and holder, it is entitled to all the *protectio.n*and defenses available to other legal owners of land, and therefore that, when its title is attacked or questioned, it may benefit by showing adverse possession under title for a period of 10 3>-ears.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs, and the cause is remanded for such other and further proceedings as may be proper and necessary to perfect and complete the partition under the decree appealed from.
No. 53622.

protest 136651-K (Los Angeles).

#### Ernest A. Becker, Jr. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cline, J.

At the trial there was no appearance on the part of the plaintiff and Government counsel submitted the case on the record. The collec*185tor’s report states that if plaintiff had complied with section 10.53, Customs Regulations of 1943, and produced a shipper’s affidavit of antiquity to substantiate his claim, the merchandise would have been entitled to free entry. Since the record failed to show compliance with the regulations, the claim of the plaintiff was overruled. *Brummer Gallery, Inc.*v. *United States*(2 Cust. Ct. 94, C. D. 95) followed.
#### Ecker Petitions.

Argued April 30, 1969.

Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.

*Robert J. Gillespie,*with him *Bruce S. Miller,*for appellant.

*561May 2, 1969:

*Howard A. Berman,*for appellee.

Opinion

Pee Curiam,

Order affirmed.
No. 63171.

#### Geo. Borgfeldt Corp. *v.*United States,

protests 295688-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise consists of miniature metal figures, such as dogs, horses, and other animals, carts, wheelbarrows, and men, women, and boys, shown as handling different tools and objects and engaged in different enterprises, the same in all material respects as the merchandise the subject of *United States*v. *F. W. Woolworth Co.*(28 *412C.C.P.A. 196, C.A.D. 145). On the agreed facts, certain of the articles were held properly classified under the provision in paragraph 397, as modified, for articles, not specially provided for, composed in chief value of lead, not plated with platinum, gold, or silver, or colored with gold lacquer, dutiable as follows: (1) Those entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, 'between January 1, 1948, and June 6, 1951, at 2 cénits per pound, *but not less*than 15 percent nor more than 45 percent ad valorem, under said paragraph, as modified by T.D. 51802; and (2) those entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, subsequent *to*June 6, 1951, at 2 cents per pound, but not less than 15 percent nor more than 30 percent ad valorem, under said paragraph, as modified by the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (T.D. 52739), supplemented by Presidential proclamation (T.D. 52820). The items in chief value of zinc were held classifiable under the provision in said paragraph 397, as modified, for articles, not specially provided for, composed in chief value of zinc, as follows: (1) Those entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption prior to July 1, 1956, at 22% percent, as modified by T.D. 51802; and (2) those entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption subsequent to July 1, 1956, at 21 percent, as modified by the Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (T.D. 5410S).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 20, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-50892

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ-ZAPATA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:04-CR-108-1-AML

--------------------

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Santiago

Rodriguez-Zapata raises arguments that are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998),

which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 24, 2014

h1021 

# Order

Clerk October 24, 2014

149014

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 149014

COA: 312280

Calhoun CC: 2011

- 003419

- FC

MATTHEW ALLEN MILBOURN,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 18, 2014

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Although the

Court of Appeals erred in determining that the law enforcement officer’s testimony

regarding the complainant’s prior consistent statemen t was properly admitted because it

was not hearsay, the erroneous admission of this testimony does not warrant relief in this

case because it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, as required by People v

Carines , 460 Mich 750, 774 (1999).
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

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ATLANTA,_

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A1 5 A1 92 3 . LAMARKUS SNEED v . THE STATE.

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. O n A p ri l 8

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.

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, y ou m ay req u es t th e t ri al co u rt t o gran t an o u t -o f-t i m e

ap p eal

. If t h e t ri al co u rt g ran t s an o u t -o f-t i m e ap p eal

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t o Sn eed ’ s at t o rn ey , wh o is al s o d irect ed t o s en d a co p y t o Sn eed

. July 20, 2015C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

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.

, C l e r k

. 07/20/2015
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, Tammie A. Quinlan, Senior Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer, certifies that (1) this Quarterly Report of CNL Income Properties, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (this Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (2) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition of the Company as of March 31, 2004 and December 31, 2003 for the quarter ended March 31, 2004.



|                   |  |                                                         
|------------------ |  | --------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 27, 2004 |  | /s/ Tammie A. Quinlan                                   
|                   |  | Name: Tammie A. Quinlan                                 
|                   |  | Title: Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                   |  | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### James I. Healey and Jacob F. Healey, *Appellants, v.*Patrick Sheridan, Respondent.

Order of County Court setting aside verdict affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.
1A basic tenet of summary judgment practice is that a party faced with a properly supported

motion for summary judgment must come forward with specific facts that would be admissible in

evidence demonstrating that there are material factual disputes or that the moving party is not

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993);

Wadlington v. Miles, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06.

2Summary judgments should not be used to make credibility determinations. See Byrd v.

Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 216. However, the credibility concerns that warrant denying a motion for

summary judgment must rise to a level greater than the normal credibility questions that arise

whenever a witness testifies. See Hepp v. Joe B’s, Inc., App. No. 01A01-9604-CV-00183, 1997 WL

266839, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 1997) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

FILED

October 29, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

JOHN J. BANDEIAN, JR., M.D., )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Davidson Circuit

) No. 95C-3587

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9703-CV-00140

MARTIN H. WAGNER, M.D., )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur in the results of the court’s opinion for two reasons. First, the

affidavits submitted by Dr. Bandeian in response to Dr. Wagner’s motion for

summary judgment do not contain specific facts that would be admissible in evidence

demonstrating the existence of material factual disputes or that Dr. Wagner is not

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.1 Second, Dr. Bandeian has not

demonstrated the existence of heightened concerns for Dr. Wagner’s credibility.2

_______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE