alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WILLIAM REITER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MAX MARX COLOR & CHEMICAL CO., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued May 4, 1964

Decided May 18, 1964.

*353
      *Mr. H. Curtis Meanor*argued the cause for defendant-appellant *(Messrs. Lamb, Blalce, Hutchinson £ Dunne,*attorneys).

*Mr. Francis Sorin*argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered

Pee Cueiam.

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons given by it. 82 *N. J. Super.*334 *(App. Div.*1964). To avoid any further misapprehension, we state, with respect to the issue of invitation, that when an owner of premises engages a contractor to perform certain work or repairs thereon, under the law be impliedly invites the employees of the contractor to use such part or parts of the premises as are reasonably necessary for the doing of the work or the making of the repairs.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Weintkaub, and Justices Jacobs, Eeancis, Peoctoe, Hall, Schettino and HaueMA® — 7.

*For reversal*— None.
No. 47951.

#### Protests 793065-G/10505, etc., of European Agencies Co., Inc. (New Orleans).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

Following *Wilbur-Ellis Co.*v. *United States*(26 C. C. P. A. 403, C. A. D. 47) the claim for free entry was sustained.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30230

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DEANDRE LAMONT ROGERS, also known as Deandre Rogers,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:15-CR-3-1

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Deandre Lamont Rogers pleaded guilty to two violations of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 111 and 1114 based on two separate incidents in which he groped or 

attempted to grope a female U.S. Postal Worker. His Presentence 

Investigation Report calculated a guidelines sentencing range of 18 to 24 

months and noted (1) several prior convictions based on similar incidents in 

which Rogers groped or sexually touched women in public, as well as (2) his

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 1, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-30230 Document: 00513742920 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/01/2016
No. 16-30230

2

history of mental illness and suicide attempts. The district court denied 

Rogers’s motion for a downward variance to time served, granted the 

Government’s motion for an upward variance, and sentenced Rogers to 48 

months of imprisonment based on his history and characteristics, the need for 

deterrence of criminal conduct, and to protect the public. Rogers now 

challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, which we review for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 213 (2015).

The upward variance imposed in this case is “commensurate with the 

individualized, case-specific reasons provided by the district court” and within 

the range of upward variances we have affirmed in the past. See United States 

v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 338, 343-45 (5th Cir. 2011). Although Rogers argues 

that the district court made “a clear error of judgment in balancing the 

sentencing factors” by putting too little weight on his mental illness as a

mitigating factor and too much weight on his purportedly exaggerated criminal 

history, he has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion. 

See McElwee, 646 F.3d at 338; Diehl, 775 F.3d at 724.

Rogers also has not shown an unwarranted sentencing disparity between 

himself and any defendants “with similar records who have been found guilty 

of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The defendants he offers in

comparison are not similarly situated. See United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 

704, 709 (5th Cir. 2006). The nationwide sentencing statistics on which he 

relies do not establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity. See United States 

v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-30230 Document: 00513742920 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/01/2016
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Frontier Fund on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Brent Bales, the Chief Financial Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the managing owner of The Frontier Fund, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of The Frontier Fund.



/s/ Brent BalesBrent BalesChief Financial Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of The Frontier FundNovember 20, 2006


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or any other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to The Frontier Fund and will be retained by The
Frontier Fund and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ANTONIO RIOS AVALOS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 21-1170

Agency No. A206-265-948

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 9, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit 

Judges.

Jose Antonio Rios Avalos, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of 

his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to seek cancellation of removal. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 15 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and reviewing the denial of a motion 

to reopen for abuse of discretion, Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th 

Cir. 2022), we deny Rios’s petition.

The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Rios’s motion. Because 

Rios failed to depart the United States on or before April 9, 2016, in accordance 

with his sixty-day grant of voluntary departure, he became statutorily ineligible for 

cancellation of removal for ten years, or until April 9, 2026. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229c(d)(1) (if a noncitizen “permitted to depart voluntarily . . . fails to depart 

the United States within the time period specified,” they “shall be ineligible, for a 

period of 10 years, to receive” cancellation of removal); Dada v. Mukasey, 554 

U.S. 1, 10 (2008) (“The voluntary departure period in no event may exceed 60 . . . 

days . . . .”); Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“[A]fter the period for voluntary departure ha[s] elapsed[,] . . . the [Board is] not 

simply correct to deny the motion; it [is] compelled to do so by the operation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1) . . . .”).

We need not address Rios’s remaining contentions. Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 

371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule courts . . . are not required to 

make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they 

reach.” (quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam))).

***
3 

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Rios’s motion to supplement the record (Doc. 8) is denied.
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



CERTIFICATIONS



I, Allan Weiss, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Elderwatch, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:





(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;





(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the Issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants fiscal quarter ending June 30, 2005 that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Issuers internal control over financial reporting.



5. The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditor and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

All deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



By/s/ Allan Weiss

Allan Weiss

Principal Accounting Officer



Date:  August15, 2005
No. 56019.

protests 63855-K, etc. (Pembina).

#### Norman G. Jensen *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006, (the
Report) of UTEK Corporation (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Carole R. Wright, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my
knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/    CAROLE R.
WRIGHTName:

Carole R. WrightDate:

March 4, 2008
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, Tammie A. Quinlan, Senior Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer, certifies that (1) this Quarterly Report of CNL Income Properties, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (this Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (2) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition of the Company as of June 30, 2004 and December 31, 2003, and its results of operations for the quarter and six months ended June 30, 2004.



|                     |  |                       |  |                                                  
|-------------------- |  | --------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | /s/ Tammie A. Quinlan
|Date: August 3, 2004 |  | Name:                 |  | Tammie A. Quinlan                                
|                     |  | Title:                |  | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                     |  |                       |  | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Drug Enforcement Administration 

                    By Notice dated November 28, 2006, and published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on December 7, 2006, (71 FR 70987), Organix Inc., 240 Salem Street, Woburn, Massachusetts 01801, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of Cocaine (9041), a basic class of controlled substance listed in schedule II.                 

The company plans to manufacture a chemical that is a derivative of cocaine that will be sold to another company for research purposes. 

                    No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and determined that the registration of                           ( print page 13825)                        Organix Inc to manufacture the listed basic classes of controlled substances is consistent with the public interest at this time. DEA has investigated Organix Inc to ensure that the company's registration is consistent with the public interest. The investigation has included inspection and testing of the company's physical security systems, verification of the company's compliance with state and local laws, and a review of the company's background and history. Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823, and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.33, the above named company is granted registration as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed.                 

Dated: March 19, 2007. 

Joseph T. Rannazzisi, 

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration.

 [FR Doc. E7-5403 Filed 3-22-07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00372-CV

TOM FRANKLIN APPELLANT

V.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION

APPELLEE

------------

FROM THE 236TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

Appellant Tom Franklin attempts a pro se appeal of the trial court’s 

September 20, 2011 order granting appellee U.S. Bank National Association’s 

motion for nonsuit.

On December 28, 2011, we sent appellant a letter informing him of our 

concern that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the trial court’s order 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

granting appellee’s motion for nonsuit did not appear to be an appealable order. 

We stated that unless appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed 

with the court on or before January 9, 2012, a response showing grounds for 

continuing the appeal, we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Appellant has filed a response, but it does not show grounds to continue 

the appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 

43.2(f); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010) (stating 

that a nonsuit renders the merits of the nonsuited case moot); see also City of 

Dallas v. Albert, No. 07-0284, 2011 WL 3796339, at *5 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011) 

(stating that when a claim is nonsuited, the controversy as to that claim is 

extinguished, the merits become moot, and jurisdiction as to the claim is lost).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: January 26, 2012

 

2We need not address the grounds presented in appellee’s December 2, 

2011 motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, rendered moot by our resolution 

here.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v MELVIN F. HARTFIELD, Yeoman Chief, U. S. Navy, Appellant

17 USCMA 269, 38 CMR 67

No. 20,291

November 17, 1967

*Lieutenant Clinton F. Raymond,*USNR, argued the cause for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel C. R. Larouche,*USMC, argued the cause for Ap-pellee, United States. With him on the brief was *Major Ernest B. Wright,*USMC.

Opinion of the Court

Fekguson, Judge:

Tried by general court-martial, the accused, upon his pleas of guilty, was convicted of a number of offenses in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and sentenced to bad-conduct discharge and reduction. Intermediate appellate authorities affirmed, and we granted accused’s petition upon the issue whether it was prejudicial error for the staff legal officer to fail to refer his pretrial request *270for the services of individual counsel to the convening authority for action.

From the record of trial, it appears that the accused requested a particular legal officer, who was a member of the convening authority’s staff, to serve as his defense counsel. It also appears that his request was denied. In the post-trial review, however, the staff legal officer noted “the decision that LCDR Woods was not reasonably available was a routine action of the District Legal Officer *and was not referred to the convening authority for his personal determination.”*[Emphasis supplied.]

The decision whether individual counsel is reasonably available is one for the determination of the convening authority and is not a “routine action” to be handled by a staff legal officer. United States v Cutting, 14 USCMA 347, 34 CMR 127. The board thought the matter waived by the accused’s failure to renew his request at trial, but it appears his inaction there was on the premise that the convening authority had denied his request, when, in fact, such was not the case. United States v Mitchell, 15 USCMA 516, 36 CMR 14. Indeed, it further appears that it was not until the publication of the post-trial review that the true state of affairs was made known. Moreover, as we said in *Cutting,*supra, “Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights and do not presume acquiescence in their denial. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019 (1938); United States v Mulvey, 10 USCMA 242, 27 CMR 316.” And, “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” Glasser v United States, 315 US 60, 76, 86 L ed 680, 62 S Ct 457, 467 (1942). We, therefore, deem the failure to refer accused’s request for counsel to the convening authority for action to have been prej-udicially erroneous.

The findings of guilty and the sentence are set aside. The decision of the board of review is reversed, and the record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. After accused has been afforded the opportunity to have proper action on his request for counsel, a rehearing may be ordered.

Chief Judge Quinn and Judge Kid-day concur.