This court reviews dismissal for failure to effect timely service 

of process for abuse of discretion. Abreu v. Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 12-313, 

985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999). Under NRCP 4(i), a plaintiff must serve a 

defendant with the summons and a copy of the complaint within 120 days 

of filing a complaint. Service may be effectuated in several ways and NRS 

14.070 permits service of process through the Department of Motor 

Vehicles (DMV) in certain situations when a party cannot otherwise be 

found through due diligence. See NRS 14.070(1), (2); Browning v. Dixon, 

114 Nev. 213, 216, 954 P.2d 741, 742 (1998). 

Petitioner Rachelle Globig argues that the district court 

abused its discretion by allowing service through DMV because Real Party 

in Interest Ramon Gonzalez-Velasco did not exercise due diligence in his 

initial effort to serve her. As support, she cites the fact that the process 

server attempted personal service only once and that there was a 

grammatical error in the process server's affidavit of due diligence. 

There is no formulaic standard for determining whether the 

due diligence requirement is met because due diligence must be tailored to 

fit the circumstances of each case. Abreu v. Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 313, 

985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999). Here the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by deciding there was no reason for the process server to 

attempt personal service more than once because sufficient evidence 

showed that Globig no longer lived at her last known address. 

Accordingly, the process server's decision to check various databases made 

more sense than repeatedly returning to the faulty address that Globig 

provided in an accident report. Moreover, the process server's incorrect 

reference to Globig as "him" does not undermine the integrity of the 

affidavit of due diligence because grammatical errors do not vitiate the 

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effectiveness of an affidavit. 2A C.J.S. Affidavits§ 38 (2003). Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that GonzalezVelasco exercised due diligence. 

Next, Globig argues that service was not effected because 

Gonzalez-Velasco did not complete all four steps required for substituted 

service under NRS 14.070. 

NRS 14.070(2) enumerates four conjunctive steps for 

achieving substitute service on the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). 

First, a plaintiff must leave a copy of the process, along with a fee, with 

the Director of the DMV. Second, a plaintiff must send notice of service 

and a copy of the process to the defendant via certified mail to the address 

the defendant supplies in an accident report. Third, plaintiff must obtain 

a return receipt that proves the defendant received the process, refused to 

accept delivery, or could not be located. Fourth, plaintiff must file an 

affidavit of compliance, along with the return receipt, with the district 

court. 

Here, Gonzalez-Velasco failed to complete the third 

requirement because he did not obtain a return receipt for the certified 

mail that all parties agree he sent. As such, he also did not fully satisfy 

the fourth element because he did not file a return receipt in the district 

court. Nevertheless, the district court's decision that Gonzalez-Velasco 

sufficiently complied with NRS 14.070 by diligently attempting to locate 

Globig and by making a good faith effort to comply with the statutory 

requirements does not warrant writ relief for three reasons. 

First, Gonzalez-Velasco's efforts at service satisfied the 

minimum requirements of due process because there was a reasonable 

probability that Globig would receive notice of the pending action at the 

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J. 

J. 

address she listed on the accident report. Mitchell v. District Court, 82 

Nev. 377, 381-82, 418 P.2d 994, 996-97 (1966) (also explaining that a 

plaintiff does not have to ascertain, at his peril, the defendant's actual 

address). Second, even though Gonzalez-Velasco could not produce a 

return receipt, he did provide the district court with a copy of the 

completed certified mail form and a report from the postal service that the 

certified mail was delivered on March 18, 2011. This evidence served the 

same ends as the return receipt requirement because it showed that 

Gonzalez-Velasco attempted to follow NRS 14.070 and that the document 

was delivered to Globig's last-known address. Third, and most 

importantly, writs are extraordinary remedies. Gonzalez-Velasco 

substantially complied with NRS 14.070(2) and Globig fails to establish a 

clear basis in law for holding Gonzalez-Velasco to a higher strict 

compliance standard as to the return-receipt proof required. Thus, this 

matter does not meet the demanding standards for granting extraordinary 

writ relief with respect to an order denying a motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

-429.-4S 

Hardesty 

J. 

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cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge 

David L. Riddle & Associates 

Maier Gutierrez Ayon, PLLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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