[Cite as Belle Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2012-Ohio-277.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97102

 BELLE TIRE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB & FAMILY 

SERVICES, ET AL. 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Civil Appeal from the 

 Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. CV-750644 

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Jones, J. 

 
2

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 26, 2012 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Michael Dewine 

Ohio Attorney General 

Laurel Blum Mazorow 

Assistant Attorney General 

30 East Broad Street 

State Office Tower, 17th Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

David J. Kovach 

6480 Rockside Woods Blvd., South 

Suite 180 

Independence, OH 44131 

Irvin L. Cook 

45 Brown Cir. 

Laurel, MS 39440 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Appellant, the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 

(“Director”), appeals the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in the R.C. 4141.282 

administrative appeal from the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review 

Commission. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the 

decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission was unlawful, 
3

unreasonable, and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finding merit to this 

appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} Irvin Cook worked for Belle Tire Distributors, Inc., from June 24, 2007 

through December 2, 2009 as a Shop Technician. On October 7, 2009, one of Cook’s 

co-workers painted a Confederate Flag on his locker and also wrote Cook’s name 

alongside the flag with the word “cotton” inserted between his first and last name. In 

his correspondence to the Review Commission, Cook stated that he complained to his 

supervisor about the flag and the inscription on his locker but that nothing was ever done 

to correct the offensive defacing of the property. Cook claimed that, as an 

African-American, he considered the actions of his co-worker to be a form of racism. 

Cook stated that he resigned in protest over the flag and inscription on December 2, 

2009. 

{¶ 3} Cook filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits with 

the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services on January 27, 2010 for the benefit year 

beginning January 24, 2010. On February 23, 2010, the Director issued an initial 

determination allowing unemployment compensation benefits. In particular, the 

appellant determined as follows: 

The claimant quit Belle Tire Distributors Inc., on 01/23/2009. Facts 

establish that the claimant was subjected to unreasonable abuse and/or 
4

hardship by working with his/her fellow employees. The claimant 

informed the employer of his/her concerns, but the employer failed to 

correct the situation. Ohio’s legal standard that determines if a quit is 

with just cause is whether the claimant acted as an ordinary person would 

have under similar circumstances. After a review of the facts, this agency 

finds that the claimant quit with just cause under Section 4141.29(D)(2)(a), 

Ohio Revised Code. 

{¶ 4} Belle Tire filed an appeal to the initial determination. By a 

redetermination issued April 9, 2010, the Director upheld the determination, affirming 

the decision that Cook quit his employment with just cause. 

{¶ 5} Belle Tire filed an appeal of the redetermination on April 30, 2010. The 

appellant transferred jurisdiction to the Review Commission on May 7, 2010. In 

accordance with proper procedure, a hearing officer conducted a telephone hearing on 

September 14, 2010. Both Cook and Belle Tire participated in the hearing. After 

considering all the evidence in the record as well as the credibility of each witness, the 

hearing officer issued a decision on September 15, 2010 reversing the 

Director-appellant’s decision. Specifically, the hearing officer concluded that Cook 

quit his employment without just cause and determined that an overpayment of 

unemployment compensation benefits had been made and repayment must be made 
5

immediately. 

{¶ 6} Cook filed a timely request for review from the hearing officer’s decision 

and submitted a five-page statement along with his request. The Review Commission 

allowed the request for review on November 10, 2010 and provided notice to Belle Tire 

of their right to respond. Belle Tire never filed a response. On December 7, 2010, the 

Review Commission notified the parties that a decision would be issued based solely on 

a review of the record without a further hearing. On February 9, 2011, the Review 

Commission issued its decision, reversing the hearing officer’s decision and finding that 

Cook did quit his employment with just cause. 

{¶ 7} Belle Tire appealed the Review Commission’s decision to the Cuyahoga 

County Common Pleas Court pursuant to R.C. 4141.282. On July 6, 2011, the 

Common Pleas Court reversed the Review Commission’s decision, finding that the 

decision of the Review Commission was unlawful, unreasonable, and against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the trial court determined that because 

the decision of the Review Commission was based solely on the record as developed 

before the hearing officer, the Review Commission must have given the claimant’s 

testimony more weight than the hearing officer. Thus, the trial court concluded, the 

Review Commission substituted its judgment for that of the hearing officer. Based on 

these facts, the court determined that the decision of the Review Commission was 
6

unlawful. 

{¶ 8} The appellant appeals, raising the following assignments of error: 

I. The trial court erred in reversing the decision of Unemployment 

Compensation Review Commission which was not unlawful, unreasonable 

or against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

II. The trial court erred in reversing the decision of the Unemployment 

Compensation Review Commission simply because the Review 

Commission reversed the decision of its own hearing officer. 

{¶ 9} Because the appellant’s two assignments of error involve the same 

standard of review and facts, they shall be addressed contemporaneously. 

{¶ 10} The Unemployment Compensation Review Commission’s determination of 

whether a claimant was discharged with just cause is appealable to the court of common 

pleas. Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Serv., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 

2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031. “If the court finds that the decision of the 

commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission. 

Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.” R.C. 4141.282(H); 

Williams. This limited standard of review applies to all appellate courts. Irvine v. 

Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985). Thus, a 

reviewing court may not make factual findings or determine a witness’s credibility and 

must affirm the commission’s finding if some competent, credible evidence in the record 
7

supports it. Id.; Williams. In other words, a reviewing court may not reverse the 

commission’s decision simply because “reasonable minds might reach different 

conclusions.” Id.; Williams. 

{¶ 11} In the present case, we find the trial court’s basis for reversing the decision 

of the Review Commission to be erroneous. In particular, the court concluded that the 

Review Commission did not consider additional testimony or evidence in reaching its 

decision and that doubt is cast upon the appeal process if the Review Commission can 

simply weigh the evidence on appeal from the hearing officer without offering any 

explanation or reasoning as to why the decision of the hearing officer should be reversed. 

 We find these conclusions problematic. 

{¶ 12} Primarily, in direct contravention to the trial court’s conclusion that the 

Review Commission had based its decision solely on the record before the hearing 

officer, Cook submitted a five page statement to the Review Commission with his 

request for further review. Thus, the trial court was incorrect; the Review Commission 

had additional information that the hearing officer did not. 

{¶ 13} Furthermore, the trial court’s conclusion that doubt is cast upon the appeal 

process when the Review Commission reverses the decision of the hearing officer 

without offering any explanation or reasoning as to the decision is equally wrong. R.C. 

4141.281(C)(3) provides that following a hearing, the hearing officer’s decision is sent 
8

to all interested parties along with notification of the right of an interested party to 

request a further review by the Review Commission. R.C. 4141.281(C)(4) provides 

that at the review level, the Review Commission may affirm, modify, or reverse a 

hearing officer’s decision. Accordingly, contrary to the lower court’s findings, the 

Ohio Revised Code expressly provides for the Review Commission to rewrite a decision 

of a hearing officer. R.C. 4141.281(C)(6) provides as follows: 

If the commission allows a request for review, the commission shall notify 

all interested parties of that fact and provide a reasonable period of time, as 

the commission defines by rule, in which interested parties may file a 

response. After that period of time, the commission, based on the record 

before it, may do one of the following: affirm the decision of the hearing 

officer; provide for the appeal to be heard or reheard at the hearing officer 

or review level; provide for the appeal to be heard at the review level as a 

potential precedential decision; or provide for the decision to be rewritten 

without further hearing at the review level. When a further hearing is 

provided or the decision is rewritten, the commission may affirm, modify, 

or reverse the previous decision. 

{¶ 14} Thus, the Review Commission had additional information that the hearing 

officer did not possess, and it acted within the bounds of the law in modifying the 

decision of the hearing officer. This court concludes that the decision of the Review 

Commission was supported by competent, credible evidence and, as such, the decision of 

the trial court must be reversed. 

{¶ 15} In order to qualify for unemployment benefits, a claimant must satisfy the 

statutory requirements of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides in pertinent part: 
9

(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a 

waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions: 

* * * 

(2) For the duration of the individual’s unemployment if the director 

finds that: 

(a) The individual quit work without just cause or has been 

discharged for just cause in connection with the individual’s work. 

{¶ 16} Ohio courts have defined just cause as “that which, to an ordinary, 

intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.” Irvine. 

 Additionally, Ohio courts have determined that a person who quits because of a 

problem with working conditions must first notify the employer of the problem and 

provide the employer with the opportunity to deal with the problem. DiGiannantoni v. 

Wedgewater Animal Hosp., 109 Ohio App.3d 300, 671 N.E.2d 1378 (10th Dist.1996). 

{¶ 17} In the present case, the Review Commission found that Cook’s co-worker 

painted a replica of a Confederate Flag on his locker and also inserted the word “cotton” 

between his first and last name. Cook’s statement to the Review Commission outlined 

his complaints to his supervisor and his belief that the painting was a racially motivated 

act. Further, the Commission noted that the flag remained on Cook’s locker for a 

month and a half before Cook left his employ. Cook wrote in his request for further 

review that he reminded Joseph Fiedler, facility manager, on a daily basis of the flag. 

Despite Mr. Fiedler’s comments that he would take care of it, no action was taken to 
10

remove the flag. Thus, the Review Commission had competent, credible evidence 

before it that Belle Tire failed to remedy the harassment even though Cook continued to 

report it. Based on these facts, the Review Commission determined that an ordinary, 

intelligent person would have quit under these circumstances and labeled Cook’s actions 

as just. 

{¶ 18} We find that the decision of the Review Commission was supported by 

competent, credible evidence and that its decision should be affirmed. We find the trial 

court erred in concluding otherwise. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error 

are sustained. 

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The decision of the Review 

Commission determining that Cook resigned with just cause is upheld. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

lower court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 
11

JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR