alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES, Appellant v JOSEPH W. O’NEAL, Specialist Four, U. S. Army, Appellee

12 USCMA 63, 30 CMR 63

No. 14,437

Decided December 9, 1960

*Lieutenant Colonel James G. MeConaughy*and *Captain William Á. Zeigler*were on the brief for Appellant, United States.

*Colonel Harley A. Lanning, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Herrod,*and *First Lieutenant Jerome D. Meeker*were on the brief for Appellee, Accused.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

In this case, The Judge Advocate General of the Army has certified to this Court the question whether the board of review was correct in concluding that the law officer erred in refusing to permit a sentence worksheet furnished the court members to be revised to indicate that permissible penalties included an undesirable or general discharge.

*64The certified question is answered in the negative. United States v Phipps, 12 USCMA 14, 30 CMR 14; United States v Plummer, 12 USCMA 18, 30 CMR 18, decided November 18, 1960; United States v Goodman, 12 USCMA 25, 30 CMR 25, decided November 18, 1960.

As in the *Goodman*case, however, the board found that the error was not prejudicial, and affirmed a sentence which included a bad-conduct discharge. While we again note our belief that harm going solely to the question of accused's punitive separation from the service may not be so purged, the fact that we find the law officer’s action proper permits us to affirm the board’s ultimate decision. United States v Goodman, supra.

The decision of the board of review is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Pagan, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 404]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Grajales, J.), rendered May 5, 1994, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant has not preserved for appellate review his contention that the hearing court erred by denying suppression of the drugs and the gun that Were recovered from his automobile at the time of his arrest on the ground that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him *(see, People v Manuli,*156 AD2d 388; *People v Claudio,*64 NY2d 858). In any event, we find no error in the hearing court’s conclusion that the arresting police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and search his vehicle *(see, People v Galak,*81 NY2d 463; *People v Rosario,*78 NY2d 583; *People v Blasich,*73 NY2d 673; *573
      *People v Belton,*55 NY2d 49; *People v Bonilla,*199 AD2d 519; *People v Fulton,*189 AD2d 778).

In addition, the defendant has failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it is legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Tomlinson,*199 AD2d 352; *People v Jones,*186 AD2d 681; *People v Ramos,*181 AD2d 837; *People v Vickers,*177 AD2d 608). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The sentence that was imposed is not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Balletta, J. P., Ritter, Copertino and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Kevin O’Connor et al., Petitioners, v Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown et al., Respondents.

[633 NYS2d 552]

—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown, dated June 1, 1993, which, after a hearing, terminated the employment of the petitioner Kevin O’Connor pursuant to Public Officers Law § 30 upon a finding that he ceased to be an inhabitant within the geographical restrictions established pursuant to that statute.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the record amply supports the determination of the Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown that the petitioner Kevin O’Connor ceased to be an inhabitant of the geographical area required for members of the Town of Clarkstown Police Department when he moved to Warren County *(see,*Public Officers Law § 30). Hence, that determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The fact that O’Connor may have occasionally stayed at the apartment of his in-laws within that geographical area does not support a different outcome *(see, Matter of Nigro v Board of Trustees,*57 AD2d 695). The fact that O’Connor was disabled and entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law § 207-c (1) does not render Public Officers Law § 30 inapplicable *(see,*1990 Opns St Comp No. 90-62, at 142).

We have considered the petitioners’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit *(see,*1989 Opns Atty Gen 8; *Matter of Sharkey v Police Dept.,*179 AD2d 655; *Matter of Plummer v Klepak,*48 NY2d 486, *cert denied*445 US 952). Sullivan, J. P., Thompson, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
IN THE 

s.kniiitd

ANTHONY BIRBILIS,

Petitioner,

v.

T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

OP 20-0428

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

THE HONORABLE JESSICA T. FEHR,

DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondent.

FILED

SEP 1 5 2029

Bowen Greenwood

Cferk of Supreme Court

'Stafc4 nf Kfic,nta

ORDER

Petitioner Anthony Birbilis seeks a writ of supervisory control directing the

Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, to reverse its Order denying

Birbilis's motion to dismiss in its Cause No. DV 15-0391. In that Order, among other

rulings in the matter, the District Court rejected Birbilis's arguments that the counts against

him in the underlying litigation should be dismissed under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or

12(b)(6).

Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes justified when

urgency or emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate, when

the case involves purely legal questions, and when the other court is proceeding under a

mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice, constitutional issues of state-wide

importance are involved, or, in a criminal case, the other court has granted or denied a

motion to substitute a judge. M. R. App. P. 14(3). Whether supervisory control is

appropriate is a case-by-case decision. Stokes v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court,

2011 MT 182, ¶ 5, 361 Mont. 279, 259 P.3d 754 (citations omitted). Consistent with Rule

14(3), it is the Court's practice to refrain from exercising supervisory control when the

petitioner has an adequate remedy of appeal. E.g., Buckles v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court,

No. OP 16-0517, 386 Mont. 393, 386 P.3d 545 (table) (Oct. 18, 2016); Lichte v.

09/15/2020

Case Number: OP 20-0428
Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 16-0482, 385 Mont. 540. 382 P.3d 868

(table) (Aug. 24, 2016).

Here, Birbilis asserts that the District Court is operating under an error of law and

that the issue is purely one of law is causing a gross injustice. Birbilis further alleges that

the matter presents a constitutional issue because the court's ruling affects his due process

rights, and he asserts, without further explanation, that the matter is one of state-wide

importance. However, as set forth above, a party must also demonstrate that the normal

appeal process is inadequate for this Court to grant a writ. Although Birbilis recites Rule

14(3), he offers no argument as to why the normal appeal process would be inadequate in

this case. He has therefore not met the criteria for this Court to assume supervisory control.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of supervisory control is DENIED and

DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to provide immediate notice of this Order to counsel for

Petitioner, all counsel of record in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone

County, Cause No. DV 15-0391, and the Honorable Jessica T. Fehr, presiding Judge.

DATED this Alay of September, 2020.

Chief Justice

Justices
#### In the Matter of Burnell Hendricks, Appellant, v E. S. LeFevre, as Superintendent of Franklin Correctional Facility, Respondent.

[634 NYS2d 11]

—Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ryan, Jr., J.), entered March 8,1995 in Franklin County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner, a prison inmate, was charged with violating certain prison disciplinary rules. After a hearing, he was found guilty of only one of the charges, namely, creating a disturbance. In support of his claim that the administrative determination should be annulled, defendant asserts that the Hearing Officer was biased and improperly failed to ascertain the reason a certain witness refused to testify. Upon review of the record, we reject petitioner’s contentions. The Hearing Officer conducted the hearing in a fair and impartial manner. Moreover, inasmuch as the refusing witness’s testimony related to a charge of which petitioner was found not guilty, the Hearing Officer’s handling of this matter did not affect the administrative determination at issue. Lastly, the misbehavior report together with the testimony of the officer and the inmate witness provides substantial evidence in support of the determination. Accordingly, we find that Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition.

Mikoll, J. P., White, Casey, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
#### William H. Stiles, *Appellant, v.*Samuel Reichart et *al., Respondents.*

Judgment affirmed, with costs.. Opinion by Dykman, J.
Exhibit 10.2


 


MEMBERSHIP INTEREST PURCHASE AGREEMENT


 


This Agreement dated October 9, 2013 by and between FAL
Minerals, LLC, an Alabama limited liability company (the “Company”), and David Lubin & Associates, PLLC (the
“Purchaser’’); and


 


WHEREAS, FAL Minerals, LLC. owes David Lubin & Associates, PLLC
legal fees for services performed in the amount of $10,000.00; and


 


WHEREAS, David Lubin & Associates, PLLC has agreed to accept
a membership interest in lieu of the past legal fees;


 


NOW THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows:


 


The terms of this Agreement shall only apply to legal services provided
prior to the execution of this Agreement.


 


The Members agree to issue a TWO (2%) interest in FAL Minerals,
LLC. to David Lubin & Associates, PLLC, and each member shall contribute a portion of their interest in proportion to their
ownership.


 


The new Membership Interests shall be as follows:


 


	David Lubin & Associates, PLLC	 	 	2	%
	Eric Weisblum	 	 	58.8	%
	Brazil Gold Corp	 	 	19.6	%
	FAL Exploration Corp	 	 	19.6	%
	 	 	 	 	 
	Total	 	 	100.00	%



 


Each Member shall signify their agreement by signing below.


 


		 
	David Lubin & Associates, LLC	 
	 	 
		 
	Eric Weisblum	 
	 	 
		 
	Brazil Gold Corp	 
	 	 
		 
	FAL Exploration Corp.
EXHIBIT 13.1

ALESTRA, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER

I, Rolando Zubirán Shetler, the Chief Executive Officer of Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V. (the Company), hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that, to the best of my knowledge:

1. the Companys annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2011, to which this statement is filed as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: April 20, 2012





Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V.By:

/s/ Rolando Zubirán ShetlerRolando Zubirán ShetlerChief Executive Officer


This certification accompanies the report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall
not, except as to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification will not be deemed to be incorporated
by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporated it by reference.
Exhibit 31.1**CERTIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Blair J. Merriam, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Annual Reporton Form 10-KSB of Platina Energy Group, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: 7/14/2007            /s/ Blair J. Merriam         Blair J. Merriam    Chief Executive Officer, President						and Chief Financial Officer
No. 44062.

#### Protest 25190-K of N. Y. Mdse. Co. (New York).

*271Opinion by

Dallinger, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of Abstract 38680 the curling irons in question were held dutiable-as household utensils at 40 percent under paragraph 339 as claimed.
June 16, 1959

No. 63190.

#### F. W. Myers & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 321582-K.

Plaintiff’s application for rehearing granted.
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Annual Report of McCarthy Grenache, Inc. on Form
10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on the  date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I,  Haggai  Ravid,
Principal  Executive  Officer of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1)      the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial  condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.


/s/    Haggai Ravid
Haggai Ravid
President and Director
(Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer)


March 26, 2004


A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
1 Judge Thornberry concurred in the above opinion before his

death on December 11, 1995.

2 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no pre cedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-30319 Summary Calendar

CHARLES C. WHITE, SR., Individually,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

EXXON CORPORATION, doing business as Exxon Co. USA Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(93-CV-1745)

December 13, 1995

Before THORNBERRY 1 , JOLLY and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 22

Charles C. White, Sr., filed suit against Exxon under the

O uter Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, to

recover damages for injuries he sustaine d while working on an

offshore platform owned and operated by Exxon. Exxon moved for

summary judgm ent, alleging that because White was a borrowed

employee, Exxon was entitled to tort immunity under the Longshore

and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). The

district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of

Exxon.

I n granting summary judgment, the district court determine d

White was a borrowed employee in light of R uiz v. Shell Oil

, 413

F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1993). The court reviewed the summary judgment

evidence in light of the nine Ruiz factors, I d

. at 312-14, and

determined there was no genuine issue as to any material fact

regarding White's status as a borrowed employee.

After conducting a de novo review of the record, and viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to White, we conclude that

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in

f avor of Exxon. S ee Billizon v. Conoco, Inc.

, 993 F.2d 104 (5th

Cir. 1993); Melancon v. Amoco Production Co.

, 834 F.2d 1238 (5th

Cir. 1993). The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-12-0000826

07-FEB-2014

08:38 AM
Jfourtlj Court of

£>ti\\ Antonio,

December 30, 2013

No. 04-12-00735-CR and 04-12-00736-CR

Albert NICHOLAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. B93-6 and B93-7

Honorable Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding

I)

The Appellanl's motion for extension of time to file the motion for rehearing is

GRANTED. Time is extended to January 27, 2014.

Sandce Bryan Marion, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 30th day of December, 2013.

Keitn E. Mottle

Clerk of Court
Before the First Division,

May 15, 1958

No. 61930.

#### Camera Specialty Co., Inc., and Rohner Gehrig & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 300153-K (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with oral stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of parts of cameras, not specially provided for, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. BERNARD WEISSMAN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

See same case below: 73 *N. J. Super.*274.

*Mr. William A. Ancier*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Brendan T. Byrne*and *Mr. Peter Murray*for the respondent.

June 11, 1962.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-18-00534-CV

In the Interest of S. F. H.

FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY 

NO. D-1-AG-18-000834, HONORABLE MARY ANN MORTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

The clerk’s record in this appeal was due for filing in this Court on September 10, 

2018. On September 11, 2018, we notified appellant that no clerk’s record had been filed due to 

his failure to pay or make arrangements to pay the trial clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s 

record. The notice requested that appellant make arrangements for the clerk’s record and submit 

a status report regarding this appeal by September 21, 2018. Further, the notice advised 

appellant that his failure to comply with this request could result in the dismissal of the appeal 

for want of prosecution. To date, appellant has not filed a status report or otherwise responded to 

this Court’s notice, and the clerk’s record has not been filed.

If a trial-court clerk fails to file the clerk’s record due to an appellant’s failure to 

pay or make arrangements to pay for the clerk’s fee for preparing the record, the appellate court 

may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless the appellant was entitled to proceed 

without payment of costs. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). In this case, appellant has not established 

that he is entitled to proceed without payment of costs. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145. Because 
2

appellant has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s 

record, this appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution.

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: February 13, 2019
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly report of GEOPHARMA, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the annual period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Carol Dore-Falcone, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ Carol Dore-FalconeCarol Dore-FalconeVice President and Chief Financial OfficerJuly 2, 2004